Husserl on Perceptual Constancy

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

European Journal of Philosophy

Department

Philosophy

ISSN

0966-8373

Volume

20

Issue

1

DOI

10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00405.x

First Page

145

Last Page

165

Publication Date

2-27-2012

Abstract

In philosophy, perceptual constancy refers to the puzzling phenomenon of the perception of properties of objects despite our changing experience of those properties. Husserl developed a sophisticated description of perceptual constancy. In this paper I sketch Husserl's approach, which focuses on the suggestion that perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of intention and fulfilment. Unlike many contemporary theories, this framework gives us a way to understand the relationship between different appearances of the same object. I will show how Husserl's work connects with contemporary theories which emphasize perceptual constancy from particular perspectives. These theories include appeals to perspectival properties and Cohen's counterfactual theory. Also, I show how Husserl's account shares important themes with Kelly's recent interpretation of Merleau‐Ponty on perceptual constancy.

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