Perceptual presence without counterfactual richness

Authors

Michael Madary, University of the PacificFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Cognitive Neuroscience

Department

Philosophy

ISSN

1758-8928

Volume

5

Issue

2

DOI

10.1080/17588928.2014.907257

First Page

131

Last Page

133

Publication Date

1-1-2014

Abstract

In this commentary, I suggest that non-visual perceptual modalities provide counterexamples to Seth’s claim that perceptual presence depends on counterfactual richness. Then I suggest a modification to Seth’s view that is not vulnerable to these counterexamples.

Recommended Citation

Madary, M. (2014). Perceptual presence without counterfactual richness. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5(2), 131–133. DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2014.907257
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cop-facarticles/750