The effect of M&A advisors' opinions on acquirer shareholder voting
Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
ISSN
1062-9769
Volume
57
DOI
10.1016/j.qref.2014.11.004
First Page
175
Last Page
190
Publication Date
8-1-2015
Abstract
Recent studies find that merger advisors, in particular those of the acquirer, often face conflicts of interest and present overly optimistic opinions about a deal. It is not clear, however, whether and how these opinions affect shareholders' voting decisions regarding a deal. The main findings indicate that target advisors' opinions but not those of acquirer advisors, significantly influence the acquirer shareholders' approval rate. Acquirer advisors' opinions tend to be more optimistic, especially when the deal announcement intrigues negative market reaction. However, these opinions are negatively related to the post-merger performance. This paper concludes that acquirer shareholders are able to discern the potential conflicts of interest of merger advisors and follow the advice of more conservative target advisors.
Recommended Citation
Ouyang, W.
(2015).
The effect of M&A advisors' opinions on acquirer shareholder voting.
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 57, 175–190.
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2014.11.004
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/esob-facarticles/345
