Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Experimental Economics

Department

Economics

ISSN

15736938

Volume

26

Issue

2

DOI

10.1007/s10683-022-09764-9

First Page

339

Last Page

356

Publication Date

4-1-2023

Abstract

We design an experiment to study how reversible entry decisions are affected by public and private payoff disclosure policies. In our environment, subjects choose between a risky payoff, which evolves according to an autoregressive process, and a constant payoff. The treatments vary the information disclosure rule on the risky payoff, such that in the public information treatment the risky payoff is always observable, while in the private information treatment, the risky payoff is observable only to the participants who enter the market. We find that under private information, market entry is higher, which suggests that subjects engage in exploration and place value on information.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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