The Economics of Violent Resistance in Xinjiang, China
Poster Number
2
Format
Poster Presentation
Abstract/Artist Statement
Social and economic development in the western province of Xinjiang is one of the most difficult questions facing China today. Although Xinjiang as a whole has prospered as a result of reform era economic policies, government sponsored colonization and economic directives have largely favored Han Chinese populations, creating a large economic and social disparity between Han and Muslim populations. These disparities in combination with ethno-nationalism and increased international linkages have inspired numerous political resistance groups. These groups have engaged in active opposition to the central government through a variety of methods, including numerous acts of violence, particularly in the 1990s. The following study is dedicated to understanding how incidents of violence in Xinjiang influence Chinese central government spending at the county level, and how those incidents fit into the larger body of work concerning the economic effects of conflict. Empirical analysis of government expenditures at the county level reveals no statistically significant relationship between incidents of violence and government spending, offering a first glimpse into how ideas concerning the economics of conflict play out in the world’s largest country.
Location
Callison Hall
Start Date
6-5-2006 10:00 AM
End Date
6-5-2006 12:00 PM
The Economics of Violent Resistance in Xinjiang, China
Callison Hall
Social and economic development in the western province of Xinjiang is one of the most difficult questions facing China today. Although Xinjiang as a whole has prospered as a result of reform era economic policies, government sponsored colonization and economic directives have largely favored Han Chinese populations, creating a large economic and social disparity between Han and Muslim populations. These disparities in combination with ethno-nationalism and increased international linkages have inspired numerous political resistance groups. These groups have engaged in active opposition to the central government through a variety of methods, including numerous acts of violence, particularly in the 1990s. The following study is dedicated to understanding how incidents of violence in Xinjiang influence Chinese central government spending at the county level, and how those incidents fit into the larger body of work concerning the economic effects of conflict. Empirical analysis of government expenditures at the county level reveals no statistically significant relationship between incidents of violence and government spending, offering a first glimpse into how ideas concerning the economics of conflict play out in the world’s largest country.