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A Comparative Study of the Prasada Complex and the Grace of God

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PRASADA COMPLEX
AND THE GRACE OF GOD

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
The American Academy of Asian Studies

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Jay Ray McCullough
June 1954

APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

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For the Graduate School

APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE COUNCIL

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INTRODUCTION

I. THE CONTEXT OF DOCTRINAL TERMINOLOGY

A word or word group lifted from its context incurs the grave danger of a misunderstanding ranging from the greatest excess of analytical dismemberment to an over-generous and all-inclusive synthesis which tends to rob it of any specific identity or meaning. Considered not only from within the body of textual material which may frame a particular word, but from the ground of those physical, mental and cultural needs which give it birth as well as the motivating force or forces which seem to engender it, it may be possible to develop a better understanding of its varying harmonic nuances of meaning and its possible correlation or differences relative to other concepts or expressions.

In addition, this broad "context" has another static-dynamic aspect. Excluding for the present any philosophical or metaphysical implications, it is possible and highly desirable to consider not only original source material pertinent to the nature of a particular investigation but also those vital moulders of a concept or doctrine as it develops through the many commentators, interpreters, translators, and the common usage of the man in the street.

The history of a concept or doctrine may be viewed as

the reflection of a living and dynamic human need inasmuch as it is the necessary expression of a logically formulated inference or a symbol of that which has been experienced or realized directly. In order properly to establish a background for the understanding of such a term as prasāda, its correlative concepts, and some of their more important relationships with the Christian doctrine of grace, it is desirable for the purpose of this paper first of all to inquire as to why concepts of grace and prasāda have been found humanly necessary.¹

¹ Cf. "A study of the origins of a religion can yield nothing but a knowledge of the origins; the religion itself can be known only in its whole history." George Foot Moore, History of Religions (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), I, xi.

Also, "Religion as a human institution is a living organism [which]...requires to be interpreted according to its meaning and not to its lisping expression.... This growing ideal...which is inadequately expressed in any specific stage is the real spirit, the meaning or the idea, which informs the whole historical movement." S. Rādhakrishnan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I (Jan., 1954), 170.

With specific emphasis upon Christianity as an Eastern religion which has undergone modifications inherent in its Western adoption, Rādhakrishnan writes: "For it is a law of life that religions like other things take on the nature of the organisms which assimilate them. The distinction between the pure and simple teaching of Jesus and the developments Christianity assumed in the West is a striking illustration of the difference between the Eastern and the Western attitude to religion." S. Rādhakrishnan, East and West In Religion (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), pp. 46-47.

The question of verbal identity. In any comparative evaluation stemming from such an inquiry, however, there is a constant possibility of speaking or referring to one element or system of thought in terms properly belonging to another. Even in the West terminology has never been interchanged indiscriminately between philosophic and religious systems, for "verbal identity by itself does not warrant the conclusion that there is an identity of philosophical meaning..."²

The problem of identity or difference, while greatly indebted to pure philological research, must depend ultimately upon the ground of those basic assumptions which underlies any outward verbal identity.³ Rudolph Otto points out the importance of this problem with specific reference to the study of the doctrine of grace. He says:

No one interested in Indian Religion can fail to become familiar with the peculiarly profound doctrine of grace which characterizes the religion of bhakti.

At first one is almost confused by the resemblance to Christian ideas....Closer study, however, reveals the fact that this would be to fall into the error of which we are often so guilty when we read texts in a foreign

² F. S. C. Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 367.

³ Ibid., p. 368.

language, and while doing so unconsciously interpret foreign terms in the sense of our own religion. Once aware of this danger we read with greater accuracy and discover how vast the differences between the two religions are after all.⁴

Woodroffe,⁵ in the introduction to Sakti and Sāktā insists further that no worthwhile account of Indian doctrine and works is possible unless made from the point of view of the Indian and within the frame of reference of his traditional society, and that otherwise faultless and painstaking scholarship is worthless when fundamentally compounded with conscious or unconscious prejudice and bias.

Language problems between different orders. Jacques Maritain definitely is aware of the opposition of language between the speculative and "practically practical" orders, as well as the undesirability of an interpretation of the mystical experience in psychological, philosophical, and purely speculative terms. In an examination of the seeming contradiction of St. John of the Cross' description of contemplation as the "absence of activity" with St. Thomas Aquinas' definition of it as the "highest activity" he finds an accord, an identity in contraries beyond the opposition

⁴ Rudolph Otto, "The Indian Doctrine of Grace and the Christian," International Review of Missions, XIX (London, July, 1930), p. 333.

⁵ John Woodroffe, Sakti and Sāktā, (Madras: Ganesh, 1929), p. x.

of terms.⁶ This opposition is seen as arising from different points of view, the ontological standpoint of St. Thomas which can conceive of "no higher activity than a vital adherence to God" as compared with the mystical experience of St. John of the Cross, in which "the suspension of all activity of a human kind must appear to the soul like an absence of all activity... in the psychological and practical sense of the word."

In a further consideration of this same problem of opposed terms Maritain continues:

It is important to notice first of all that those sciences which I have called practically practical make a wholly different use of concept than do the speculative or speculatively practical sciences⁷, not only in regard to their determining ends and their manner of procedure, but in the very manner in which the concepts themselves are elaborated and remodelled, signify the real and take hold of it.... We may say that in the speculative sciences concepts have their bare value of abstraction and intelligibility, occupied in an analysis of the real into its ontological (or empiriological) elements; in the practical sciences, on the contrary, they are incorporated into concrete harmonies, occupied in composing the means, the dynamic moments, by which action should come into existence. From which it follows that concepts which bear the same name in these two orders of science, and of which one is like the projection of the other into another noetic space [*italics not in the original*], will relate to the real in entirely differing fashion. ...Mystical language... is necessarily different from that of philosophy; there hyperbole

⁶ Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 402. Also Cf. Bhagavad Gita 4.16.

⁷ Infra., p. lxxviii

is not an ornament of rhetoric but a means of expression which is rigorously required for exactitude of meaning; for in fact it is an effort to render intelligible experience itself--and what an experience, the most ineffable of all! Philosophical language wishes above all to define reality without feeling it; mystical language to define it, as though by feeling what it cannot see.

In another place he states emphatically:

It is a scandal to the intelligence and a profound offense to the sense of order to see psychologists and sociologists, or even philosophers and metaphysicians, seizing hold of mystical experience in order to judge of its nature by their light, in other words, to systematically misunderstand it.⁹

The difficulty, however, of accepting an exotic point of view strictly on its own merit, in the spirit as well as the letter of its own terms, and within the cultural framework which colors and in turn is colored by the expressions of its spiritual experience, is all too evident even for those who seem to have the greatest desire to do so. In much of the Western literature is found an almost arbitrary and automatic analysis which labels the content of basic Indian thought and experience with the terms and categories of particular Western creeds and theologies, which seeks to

⁸ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 400-401.

⁹ Ibid., p. 354.

Loc. cit., "If it is true that mystical wisdom is the highest point of the life of the soul...it is equally certain that the philosopher and metaphysician will find the greatest advantage, even for their own proper object, in the study of so transcendent an activity. But they can only do so rightfully when they have recourse to the light of theology."

measure it with the rules of Western logic, philosophy and metaphysics,¹⁰ which limits it by definition to a theological natural order, which, also by definition, denies the full authenticity of the Indian spiritual experience itself, and which, while criticising Indian seers for a lack of conceptual technique demands an understanding generosity for its own adherents who, while enclosed within the walls of its particular definition, have transcended technical exactitude.¹¹

In regard to the sacred tradition of India, [Maritain¹² writes,] I would hold that the upanishads depend originally, in the first case, less on a philosophic than on a contemplative source, and on a powerful intuition, which is more mystical than metaphysical, of the transcendence of the Supreme. Neti! Neti! It is not this, it is not that! The tragedy has been that this contemplation has been contemned into a luxiant, hypertrophic rationalistic discussion, one which has never been able to disentangle its proper form according to the laws of philosophy and metaphysics, like any other work of the human reason which in its essence it is. At the same time the waters of the original spring have been joined by less pure currents and tributaries.

.....
If the pantheism of the Vedāntas is more apparent than real, endured rather than desired, and seems to be produced most of all by the lack of conceptual technique, if the immense mystical effort which runs through Hindu

¹⁰ See Alan Watts, The Supreme Identity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950), pp. 141-142.

¹¹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 403. "...St. John of the Cross sufficiently outsoared philosophy, and...he was not excessively troubled by any need for strict technical exactness in these regions."

¹² Ibid., pp. 340-341.

thought brings clearly into play those natural aspirations for perfect contemplation which seem to prefigure it in the natural order,¹³ the natural processes of asceticism and intuition which prepare its resting place, and a metaphysic which looks for and prepares for it--the permanent temptation for those who seek to conquer by their own efforts a supernatural gift, which runs through all this thought, of thinking of a choice of a supreme despair or pure abolition as the absolute good, is an unequivocal sign of the fact that where infused contemplation has not been given by grace it cannot be arrived at by natural means. The inevitable alternative remains: either an authentic and supernatural mystical experience (which may be overlayed by adventitious but accidental elements) or a natural contemplation which does not unite with divine reality: though the two may be variously comingled, no natural experience of the depths of God is found.¹⁴

Maritain¹⁵ sees then in the poetic discussions of the

¹³ The term is used, of course, in the sense of Catholic theology.

¹⁴ In this regard it is interesting to note Hopkin's remarks concerning Neo-Platonic doctrine, the Upanishads, and early Christian concepts, particularly as he has traced a direct connection between certain Pythagorean ideas and Sāṃkhya doctrine. For the Pythagorean data see E. Washburn Hopkins, The Religions of India (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895), pp. 559-561.

"Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists...felt a longing for absolute truth, which they satisfied by mystical exaltation, an immediate beholding or intuition, only to be attained when there is no distinction between the knower and the known...but something higher than reason must be the absolute, which stands above being as well as above reason, and has neither thought nor will, but is unthinkable, undefinable....Except for the series of emanations, this system is at one with that of the earlier Upanishads of India (c. 600 B.C.) before the doctrine of illusion was introduced into it. The teaching, though opposed to Christianity, had a marked effect on it." E. Washburn Hopkins, The History of Religions (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926) pp. 511-512.

¹⁵ Maritain, op. cit., p. 429.

Upanishads and kindred works evidences of the theoretical and speculative rather than expressions of the highest spiritual experience which both sees and feels, but is ineffable. He points out that whenever a questioning of particular problems arises within the mystical order there is an inclination toward the orders of philosophy and theology and a tendency toward "rash" interpretations which may lead "in its forms of aberration to illuminism and to theosophy," which two tendencies, however, are purely Western. There is, nevertheless, the recognition of the poetic value of the Eastern spiritual writings, but such an identification of the aesthetic "order of poetry," as an expression of Eastern spiritual experience with its analogies in the speculative order is not, though, acceptable to all writers upon Eastern metaphysic, but this problem will be considered further from the more particular viewpoint of that metaphysic.

Dwelling primarily upon Eastern contemplative works Maritain states:

But the very degree of the prestige in which contemplation is held by the spiritually-minded in partibus infidelium and the resources which they display in translating and considering what they have obtained, particularly when the faculty for poetic expression exceeds the experience, may deceive us in our estimate of the stage which they have reached. On the other hand, the whole 'physiology' which prepares for and accompanies contemplation (without speaking of the accidental gifts which are frequent suspect), in these cases where the human search is stretched to its uttermost, may stand out in

particular relief.¹⁶

In his comments upon St. John of the Cross there is, indeed, a marked distinction made between the two elements or orders as found in the poems and the commentaries which were written for instructive purposes:

In his poems...he recounts, in so far as human language may express the inexpressible, which is, truth to say, very inadequately, the mystical experience which he has livingly known. There he dreams of nothing but singing. Yet, perhaps, the very fact that he had received the grace and the divine impulsion to sing of his experience already contained in itself the virtual intention (of which he himself was ignorant) of teaching the ways of spirituality.

Lyrical expression, in the very fact of its own being, contains in itself implicitly and undefined, the first instant of expansion towards others.¹⁷

Any impartial investigation unburdened with apriori judgments and the determination to fit all things into a predetermined and particular mould, must make a similar distinction between the poetic (though not always and of necessity limited to the lyrical) expression of immediate and trans-mystical beatific experience asserted in the basic utterances of the rishis, śivārs, and seers of India and the differing though utterly dependent commentaries, views, or darśanas made by theologians, scholars, or spiritual teachers whose interpretations were pointed, in the main,

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 336, note 1.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 390 and note 1.

toward a definite objective without denying in any way the validity or worth of objectives other than their own.¹⁸

Rādhakṛishṇan¹⁹ views doctrines and scriptures from a dual aspect. One pertains to the particular needs of a specific people situated in a given time and place and its expression is through varied and diverse intellectual idioms which colors and adapts the basic truths of the doctrine to fit the needs of particular conditions. The other element consists of that timeless and immutable truth which is universally applicable to the changing problems.

Contradiction in texts. Thus the differing statements and interpretations of the basic texts are held generally

¹⁸ Cf. Bhagavad Gītā 4.11 and:

"Every meditation on Brahman ends in the attainment of Brahman. The nature of what is attained in mukti is determined by the nature of the meditation of the mumukshu." P. N. Sṛinivāśachāri, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Adyar: Adyar Library, 1943), p. 499.

"The way of devotion is the favorite one to the author of the Gītā; but he admits the validity of other ways too, if for personal reasons a man finds them preferable. Still oftener, all these various ways are more or less vaguely blended and felt as in the last analysis essentially one." Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gītā (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944) I, p. 63.

"There are many paths that lead to the summit of one and the same mountain; their differences will be the more apparent the lower down we are, but they vanish at the peak." Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Am I My Brother's Keeper (New York: John Day and Co., 1947), p. 50.

¹⁹ S. Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavad Gītā (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), pp. 5-6.

by Indian writers to be complementary²⁰ and not a mass of "...divergent beliefs...represented in startling and irreconcilable antagonism..."²¹

This view also is applicable to the systems of Indian philosophy which are treated as differing points of view or darśanas which do not contradict but on the contrary are considered as mutually complementary.²² Kapāli Śāstry states that these apparent contradictions and antagonistic elements are acceptable as authentic inasmuch as they are factual statements of spiritual experience which may be realized in divers forms and aspects. Although the īśa Upanishad does display a "reasoned reconciliation of the opposites....The question of attempting a reconciliation yielding a certain amount of intellectual satisfaction did not occupy the attention of the seers and thinkers of the Upanishads, but was left to Bādarāyaṇa..."²³

²⁰ Cf. T. V. Kapāli Śāstry, Lights on the Upanishads (Madras: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1947), p. 158.

²¹ E. Washburn Hopkins, The Great Epic of India (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1902), p. 84.

²² Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 20. He also adds: "A popular verse declares: 'From the viewpoint of the body, I am Thy servant; from the viewpoint of the ego, I am a portion of Thee; from the viewpoint of the self I am Thyself. This is my conviction'. God is experienced as Thou or I according to the plane in which consciousness centers."

²³ Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., p. 159.

One need not limit all levels of understanding of this problem to purely Eastern authority. In a comparison of Western logic and the arrangement of the Gītā, Edgerton says:

...we can usually find in its own text expressions which, in strict logic, contradict its most cardinal doctrines. From the non-logical, mystical viewpoint of the Gītā this is no particular disadvantage. Rationalistic logic simply does not apply to its problems.²⁴

...Logical arrangement is not intended in the book itself...the Gītā makes no attempt to be logical or systematic in its philosophy. It is frankly mystical and emotional. What we may, if we like, call its inconsistencies are not due to slovenliness in reasoning; nor do they express a balanced reserve of judgement...proved in several cases by the fact that the Gītā deliberately brackets two opposing views and asserts the validity of both. It is only in the realm of logic that we must choose between yes and no, or else confess ignorance. The Gītā finds no difficulty in saying both yes and no, at the same time. For its point of view is simply unrelated to logic. Even what it calls knowledge is really intuitional perception, it is not, and is not intended to be, based on rational analysis.²⁵

Ryder concedes that inasmuch as the Bhagavad Gītā draws from such sources as Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga there is, from the viewpoint of rationalistic logic, an impossibility of perfect fusion and that the absence of perfect logical consistency is a charge often leveled at the text. He states further:

²⁴ Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gītā (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), II, p. 7.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 91.

In a sense, the reproach is not unjustified; yet here, too, a foolish consistency would seem the hobgoblin of little minds, if the emotional reconciliation is perfect.²⁶

From the above-mentioned observation and sampling of points of view it is evident that there appear to be two major and opposing ways of viewing reality; one based upon and owing its foundation to the fundamental ground of logic, analysis, and inference while the other, the mode which many writers on Eastern thought call metaphysic, is based upon the supreme, direct, immediate spiritual experience and, according to some authorities, is of an alogical order. In addition each mode seems to exhibit an exclusive "language" or means of communication, with a notable tendency for the logical language to exclude the mode of metaphysic as a peculiar aberration, or to make its admittedly higher order dependent upon or subservient to a rigidly controlled and organized theoretical system.

If we are to complete our preliminary survey of the

²⁶ Arthur W. Ryder, The Bhagavad Gītā (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. xiv.

Edgerton also finds justification for the Gītā's point of view from a practical standpoint: "...speaking pragmatically, the Gītā's position is justified by the fact that many millions of men have found religious comfort in it, and expected salvation through it. Who can say that they were disappointed? and if it should be granted that they were not, would not the Gītā have proved the usefulness of its doctrines, and so their pragmatic truth?"

Edgerton, op. cit., p. 92.

human field which surrounds a particular doctrinal word or phrase, it is necessary, then, to know some of the outstanding and important characteristics of these apparently antagonistic points of view and the traditional backgrounds within which they act and react.

II. SOCIAL UNITY AND THE NATURE OF METAPHYSIC

Traditional culture. Other things being equal, a culture or society may be thought of, on the one hand, as a living symbol which is shaped and fashioned by and in turn reacts upon and modifies its predominant human values or, on the other, as a reflection of that basic ground which is held to be of ultimate and timeless importance. The questioning of the nature of reality carries with it the ultimate quest for that which is important,²⁷ and the "endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values"²⁸ may be directed in its efforts from a consideration of those values either as ends which look toward an outside and superior source for their conservation or as integral manifestations of that supreme reality which not only transcends but includes them. As ends these relatively contingent values may range from the concrete, material, or practical (in the common everyday meaning of the term) to the highest of mental and moral states,²⁹ and may tend to become the basis for a projected agency, a "social bond" in its highest

²⁷ From an unpublished lecture by Alan Watts, San Francisco, April 3, 1951.

²⁸ William Kelley Wright, A Student's Philosophy of Religion (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 41.

²⁹ Loc. cit.

expression, or religious ideal which attempts or endeavors to attain as a "special function such a desired security."³⁰ As nondual manifestations of the supreme reality these values, or points of emergent importance, are known as reflections, traditional analogies which form a society based upon and identified with a background of metaphysic, a society which is "significant" inasmuch as it is, by this significance,

related to universals...joined to an organic whole greater than itself, and greater than the sum of its parts. In the highest sense, that is significant which is related to the universal and eternal, which finds its true end in the fullness of Infinite Being.

From the standpoint of traditional cultures, knowledge of the universal and infinite is man's true end.³¹

The unity of Indian tradition³² basically does not rest upon the stabilizing ideal of traditional religion³³ but embraces an integrated social order which is "purely metaphysical in its essence" and which is "...strictly governed by the analogical correspondence linking together

³⁰ René Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrine (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), pp. 92-93.

³¹ Watts, op. cit., pp. 26, 30.

³² Ibid., pp. 18-44:- A detailed and comparative account of such a society, unified both cosmologically and traditionally is given in this introductory chapter. See also Guénon, op. cit., pp. 79-108.

³³ Guénon, op. cit., p. 84.

cosmic existence and human existence...and the complete subordination of the various particular orders relatively to metaphysic, that is to say relatively to the realm of universal principles."³⁴

Thus, there is no essential gap or separation between man, the social order, and the universal or highest reality. Each unit of society, therefore, exhibits an eternally present rightness in relation to every other unit, a "fitness of vocation," even unto the most profound detail, in the social-cosmological scheme. There is also a hierarchial and balanced relationship between the various orders of society which is harmonious and analogous to the various manifest powers as well as to the transcendent status of the supreme consciousness. Such a balance provides room for the outcast as well as for those who have transcended caste, for each activity of life from the extremes of the differentiated to the most highly integrative.³⁵

Traditional societies of whatever type "...must be effectively attached in their principle to a doctrine that is itself traditional, whether it be metaphysical or religious, or of any other conceivable kind. In

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 90-91. For a further discussion of Guénon's use of the term "universal" in its metaphysical context see Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to Vedanta (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), pp. 32-37, also Watts, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

³⁵ From an unpublished lecture by Alan Watts, San Francisco, April 4, 1951.

other words, those institutions are traditional which find their ultimate justification in their more or less direct, but always intentional and conscious, dependence upon a doctrine which, as regards its fundamental nature, is in every case of an intellectual order; but this intellectuality may be found either in a pure state, in cases where one is dealing with an entirely metaphysical doctrine, or else it may be found mingled with other heterogeneous elements, as in the case of the religions or other special modes which a traditional doctrine is capable of assuming.*³⁶

Modern Western civilization does not exhibit nor does it, for the most part, presume to base itself upon a traditional and unifying principle. This separatist nature of the West, culminating in modern nationalism, technology, and humanism, has been a predominant note

...ever since the severing, at the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation, of the traditional bond derived from Religion which provided the essential principle...and which gave to Western civilization in the Middle Ages its characteristic form of 'Christendom,'³⁷ [a form which] ...taking the special features pertaining to the religious mode into account, is capable of fulfilling the conditions of a real tradition, as the Oriental mind has always conceived it.³⁸

The claims of medieval Christian faith were universal, and held to a doctrine and principle which gave a unified coherence to the Western culture of that time. It was the major and basic font which vivified human life and gave it

³⁶ René Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrine (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), pp. 89-90.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 108.

meaning,

...namely that man's true end is union with God in the contemplation of the Beatific Vision. Of all ideas as to the destiny of man [*italics not in the original*] this alone, quite apart from any question of its truth, gives us a real end, a point beyond which the question of further purpose cannot be asked, because the enjoyment of God is an infinite good.³⁹

We have found, then, that societies unified cosmologically and traditionally may, among other possibilities, be based upon a point of view which may be predominantly religious or metaphysical. The religious order seems in the works cited to be a falling away from that which is pure metaphysic, and also tends to exhibit certain characteristics of unstable dependence upon values which, being of the nature of relationships, are of a contingent order. Metaphysic, on the other hand, seems to enunciate a doctrine of universal and transcendent unity which does not deny relative and contingent values, but includes them in its timeless infinity.⁴⁰ It is necessary, then, to examine, briefly, some of the essential characteristics of metaphysic as distinct from religion.

What is metaphysic? Underlying surface variations and serving as the link of a common background which binds in "inescapable interconnections and identities" the many

³⁹ Watts, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 95.

different expressions which form particular views of reality is that order of knowledge which has been called metaphysic. "It is the unity provided by these essential relations and identities which merges the cultures of the Oriental countries into a traditional culture of the Far East."⁴¹

Information about this metaphysic has been made available to the West largely through the writings of purely philological authorities or leaders within the disciplines of Western religious organizations. Far too often, particularly in the case of the latter writers, value judgments have been made which are based upon superficial justification and the lack of comprehension of the basic content and doctrine of the East, even by men "with the most kindly and tolerant dispositions, men who are the most generously minded in their valuation of cultures other than their own..."⁴² It is to be noted in this connection that Northrop again sounds the all too necessary and oft repeated warning for those in the West who desire a true understanding of the East divorced from purely personal or regional biases, beliefs, and values. He says:⁴³

⁴¹ F.S.C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 313.

⁴² Ibid., p. 320.

⁴³ Loc. cit.

Correctly to know and to understand the East entails not merely the having of immediate experiences of its concrete cultural forms and practices, but also the viewing of these immediately experienced facts from the Oriental rather than from the Western standpoint. For this, experience alone, essential as it is, is not enough. The basic Oriental premises which have made these experiences what they are, and which have defined the standpoint from which the Orient views them must also be grasped. Otherwise the Westerner is merely fitting his factual information concerning the East into Western theories and assumptions and evaluating it from his standpoint rather than its own, in a manner which will never enable him to see its virtues or to appreciate its riches.

The term 'metaphysic' as used by such Western writers as Watts, Guénon, Northrop, and Woodroffe is

...in the singular to differentiate it from the various systems of academic 'metaphysics' [and] ...properly refers to the knowledge of that which is beyond (*meta*) the natural order (*φύσις*) --that is the universal, infinite, and eternal as distinct from and beyond the individual, the finite and the temporal.⁴⁴

In like manner Guénon⁴⁵ says:

...even etymologically, it denotes whatever lies 'beyond physics'; the word 'physics' must here be taken to denote the natural sciences viewed as a whole and considered in quite a general manner...; it must on no account be taken to refer to one of those sciences in particular....It is therefore on the basis of this interpretation that we make use of the term 'metaphysic'...

This in no way implies, however, that the realm of metaphysic is residual in nature and is situated in every sense apart and separate from science and religion even

⁴⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 32

⁴⁵ Guénon, op. cit., p. 109.

though its scope lies outside them. As a limp analogy astronomical space "lies beyond" and utterly transcends the arbitrarily confined and determined space encompassed within the limits of a room yet at the same time does not exclude but includes it. Similarly one's awareness and experience of Self infinitely may transcend the functional contents of the cranial cavity as well as the entire neuro-physical organism enclosed by the bodily skin-sack, yet these aspects are not necessarily excluded as absolutely separate nor do they exist in essentially dual opposition apart from that awareness and experience. They are "'other' without being 'opposed'."⁴⁶ The distinction to be made is essentially that of point of view.

...anything that may be examined from an individual and particular point of view can, by a suitable transposition, equally well be considered from the universal point of view (which is not to be reckoned as a special point of view at all)....In this way, it may be said that the domain of metaphysic embraces all things, which is an indispensable condition of its being truly universal...⁴⁷

Realizing the impossibility of proposing a precise and accurate definition of metaphysic because of the unlimited and basic universality of its character which precludes any hedging about "with a more or less narrow

⁴⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 33.

⁴⁷ Guénon, op. cit., p. 111.

formula," Guénon⁴⁸ continues:

It may now be stated that metaphysic, understood in this way, is essentially the knowledge of the Universal, or if preferred, the knowledge of principles belonging to the universal order, which moreover alone can validly lay claim to the name of principles...

Northrop⁴⁹ points out the distinction which must be made between the Western philosophical concept of the term 'metaphysics' with metaphysic as used to denote the Eastern order of integral knowledge:

The use of the word 'metaphysic' here⁵⁰ must not be allowed to lead anyone astray. In the Western sense of this term these Easterners are not metaphysical at all; instead they are the most extreme positivists, since they insist that no reality exists except that which is immediately apprehended. The inferred postulated type of knowledge of the West designating unobserved electrons, electromagnetic propagations, or the unseen God the Father they tend traditionally to deny. Thus they are metaphysical only in the sense that they claim to have noted an immediately apprehended factor in experience in addition to the data given through the specific senses.

...this indeterminate boundless factor in immediate experience must be taken as an irreducible element in scientific and philosophical knowledge. It cannot be defined in terms of, or deduced from, anything else, whether this something else be its immediately apprehended differentiations given through the senses or the inferred, syntactically designated, indirectly and experimentally verified theoretic component of things.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 110. For a comparison of the universal order with the natural and supernatural orders of religious doctrine see p. xc, infra.

⁴⁹ Northrop, op. cit., p. 366.

⁵⁰ Northrop refers to Woodruffe's use of the term.

III. KNOWLEDGE

Metaphysic and knowledge. It is the major tendency in the West to form concepts from that which is immediately observed or apprehended by the senses; concepts which in turn constitute radical points of departure from the immediately sensed into a private and separate world within which theoretical,⁵¹ unobserved constructs are permitted existence dependent upon a continuous, indirect, logical and experimental verification. This verification, through its constant change and growing demands, reflects in turn upon those constructs which therefore are in continual flux and change.⁵² This other-world, forever separate and distinct from "...the world of existential immediacy"⁵³ can effect humanity only⁵⁴ "...when grasped by bodily men as an idea of the good and used by them to guide their bodily conduct and their social behavior in ways that transform and reorganize the empirically given determinate existential particulars."⁵⁴ Thus that which generally is considered by

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 448.

⁵² Ibid., p. 302.

⁵³ F. S. C. Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy." See Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950) p. 374.

⁵⁴ Cf. Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1936) p. 157. "...Ideas", says Gilson, "are in God as the forms to the likeness of which they were made...The idea is the model of the thing to be made."

Western science and philosophy as the reality transcending sense data is incapable of being experienced directly as the known through identity, it is "...a reality which cannot be shown, which can only be said, [grasped] ...through the formal intellect, not the denotive, purely empirical aesthetic existential immediacy of the Orient."⁵⁵

The indeterminate transcendent is not specifically given through sense data nor is it to be grasped by speculative and logical postulation. But this does not mean that it is but a supra-cosmic vacuum, a dark, limitless world of utter extinction. The determining limitations of name and form (nāmarūpa), while fundamental for theoretical knowledge, are in metaphysic merely differentiations within the undifferentiated supreme identity. The metaphysical transcendent, the undifferentiated, is not to be known as absolutely exclusive of the differentiated. It is not other-worldly but is the timeless, and therefore immediately present "now," "needing merely to be pointed out."⁵⁶ It transcends the determinate play (līlā) of the senses within it for it embraces all yet is "...as positivistically immediate and possessed of all the attendant stark realism which attaches

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 373.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 374.

to the transitory, determinate differentiations which come and go within it."⁵⁷

"The Indian test for everything is actual experience,"⁵⁸ and this is applicable to the integral knowledge of metaphysic as well as to limited sense data. Woodroffe⁵⁹ carefully points out the nature of this experience:

Experience is of two kinds: the whole or full experience, and incomplete experience--that is, of parts, not of, but in, the whole. In the first experience, Conscienceness is said to be 'upward-looking' (Unmukhi)--that is, 'not looking to another'. In the second experience it is 'outward-looking' (Vahirmukhi). The first is not an experience of the whole, but the Experience-whole. The second is an experience not of parts of the whole, for the latter is partless, but of parts in the whole, and issuing from its infinite Power to know itself in and as the finite centers, as the many.

He states⁶⁰ further that the "whole or full experience," the pūrṇa [integral] super-experience of the īśa Upanishad, has been called "the Fact," while the "incomplete experience" has been called "the Fact-section." Payne⁶¹ mentions these two poles of the non-dual experience, encountered in Indian life and in their pure and undisturbed expression, as

⁵⁷ F.S.C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 377.

⁵⁸ Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

⁶¹ Ernest A. Payne, The Śāktas (Calcutta: Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, 1933), p. 4.

dwelling together in mutual tolerance, the limited related to the infinite as a "phase" rather than as altogether separate and different, just as a local viewpoint is related to that which is universal, or as the "magical" may be viewed as a harmonic of the "spiritual."

This knowledge which is metaphysic is an inward realization, an insight (darsana) into the non-dual ground which is reality and which is at once the reality-experience (anubhava) of the total and integral Self.⁶² Its timeless and therefore always present "genesis" is realization, as distinct from theological revelation, and the expression of that realization in language or art, if the two be separable in this case, is just that and no more, for as differentiation included within the all-embracing infinite it cannot be of the nature of definite speculation.⁶³ Inasmuch as the experience and expression of metaphysic transcend the language and naming processes of philosophy, science and religion, these disciplines find it impossible to understand metaphysic and either dismiss it as fantasy and hallucination or, granting the possibility of such identity-knowledge, view

⁶² S. Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 15.

⁶³ Watts, op. cit., p. 53.

it as beyond any attainment.⁶⁴ Western theologians in particular fail to meet this non-dual and integral nature of metaphysic on a basis of understanding for they properly hold fast to religious insistence upon the necessity for maintaining a strict and absolute dichotomy relative to the transcendent and the immanent, a historical compulsion to preserve an antiseptic barrier between and forever dividing the two. Viewing advaitic and neo-platonic principles as tending to nullify both the transcendent aspect and the "feeling" of the divinity as "wide extended" in a universe where "there is nothing rightly profane, but all is sacred..." Maritain⁶⁵ says:

In the one as in the other the personality of the true God is destroyed. It is obvious that the God of immanence...cannot be a personal God, lost as he is either in things or in the thoughts of professors or philosophers. On the other hand, the idea of divine transcendence, when too humanly understood and insufficiently transcendently, seems at first sight equally incompatible with personality: immense, high above all things and all the concepts which we employ to name him, how can he be a person, one who says 'I' as we do? In speaking so we...are still dominated by images, both in representing the divine eminence and in thinking of the concept of a person.

One could say that India has not known how to bear the idea of the divine transcendence, as if an intense sense of the solitude of God had led her to an a-cosmic metaphysic which, in a despairing circle, runs the risk of ruining in its turn this same transcendence.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

⁶⁵ Maritain, op. cit., p. 287.

Otto⁶⁶ on the other hand describes the seer of metaphysic as beholding multiplicity in non-dual unity which, while neither annihilating nor dualistically segregating the multiplicity, extinguishes all concepts of separation. "What the intuitive mind sees as an essential and ontological relationship of the One and the many, the naive mind apprehends and symbolizes as a temporal relationship, as the 'primordial' which was at the beginning of all time." Metaphysic insists, however, that this total and universal knowledge is the actual experience and immediate realization of the Self in supreme identity with That which is not only the ground of all that is but is the "principle and meaning of human life."⁶⁷

The experience of the Self.⁶⁸ The inquiry which leads to metaphysic, the study of "Perfect Experience," must,

⁶⁶ Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 5.

⁶⁷ Watts, op. cit., p. 18.

⁶⁸ The purpose of these introductory pages is to provide merely the proper setting for an understanding of the more thorough discussion of prasāda and grace which follows in the body of the paper. It is but an outline of some of the more important characteristics of that little understood and often maligned field within which the term prasāda has flourished. To know of prasāda one must first of all have some appreciation of the field, just as it is impossible to find meaning in a single note detached from the body of a symphony without at least some over-all acquaintance with the entire score.

if it is to reach its ultimate, find its answer in man's own direct knowing experience (aparoksha jñāna).⁶⁹ The Hermetic maxim⁷⁰ finds its parallel in a statement from the Viśvasāra Tantra: 'What is here is there. What is not here is not there.'⁷¹

"It is in man's self," writes Woodroffe,⁷² "that he touches the foundations of the view that Reality is ultimately Consciousness as Chit which by its own Power makes an object of itself, and elaborates this object into a world of correlated Centers of Matter, Life and Mind; and that in such elaboration Chit does not suffer its essence, that is, Being-Consciousness-Bliss to be either abrogated or changed. That is so in man's own experiences: Chit becoming varied experience and yet remaining pure Chit always.

That experience is the ultimate and unquestioned 'Fact'; everything else has to make good its title by its bearing upon that Fact....."

If knowledge is to be identical with certitude that

⁶⁹ John Woodroffe, Mahāmāyā (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1929), p. 209.

⁷⁰ Cf. Frederic Spiegelberg, Alchemy as a Way of Salvation (Stanford: James Ladd Delkin, 1945), p. 1. "What is Below is like that which is Above. And which is Above is like which is Below." It is important to note that this example of the Hermetic tradition of the West is phrased in the analogical language of religion which, instead of establishing an identity that can be referred to only negatively, speaks of a relative "likeness."

⁷¹ John Woodroffe (Arthur Avalon), The Serpent Power (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1950), p. 50. "Yad ihāsti tad anyatra yan nehāsti na tat kvachit."

⁷² Woodroffe, Mahāmāyā, p. 210. Although this statement pertains in particular to śaktivāda its essence is common to all Indian metaphysic.

Fact-experience must be realized in a manner far removed from the mere discussion of it.⁷³ There must be a direct intercourse through the principle of unity in the Self rather than an indirect relationship by way of dialectic⁷⁴, or the power of reasoning.⁷⁵ The "...germ of metaphysical realization..."⁷⁶ is an integral and universal intuition of this innermost conscious Self which transcends those limitations inherent in all rational, emotional, spatial and temporal qualifications. Untouched by rational analysis the conscious Self may be experienced intuitively as timeless and supremely transcendent to individual limitations, and at once all-present within the play of varied differentiation. In metaphysic the knowledge of Self is totally and completely all embracing,⁷⁷ and even in cultures which are removed from and alien to the metaphysical tradition there remains a given awareness, some small and basic "...intuition of the Self as the simple witness..."⁷⁸.

⁷³ John Woodroffe, The World as Power Reality (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1921), p. 8.

⁷⁴ S. Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 129.

⁷⁵ R. D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926), p. 270.

⁷⁶ Watts, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

⁷⁷ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 61.

⁷⁸ Watts, op. cit., p. 77.

That which is totally and completely alien by that very nature is beyond all possibility of being understood.⁷⁹ Although the realization of that "...undivided unitary life from which intellect and emotion, imagination and interest arise is the essence of the spiritual life,"⁸⁰ it must coincide intimately with a like intuitive identification⁸¹ of the inmost Self as the supreme reality.⁸² In a similar manner Chaudhuri⁸³ states:

A true knowledge of Reality both in its depth and its extent can be attained only through an extension of our self-knowledge which is both essentially and phenomenally knowledge by identity and through the development of superconscient powers which far exceed our reason. This is so because the ultimate Reality or Brahman is, as the Upanishada declare, identical with our inmost Self.

Speaking of "one's own vision" (darsana) Otto⁸⁴ concurs:

It is rather an awareness of identity with Brahman, and that as an 'intuitus,' a dawning of insight, our own clear-sighted⁸⁵ realization...This awareness cannot be

⁷⁹ S. Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1951), p. 208.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 211.

⁸¹ Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 129.

⁸² Surendranath Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge, 1933), p. 55.

⁸³ Haridās Chaudhuri, Sri Aurobindo: The Prophet of Life Divine (Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Pathamandir, 1951), p. 26.

⁸⁴ Otto, op. cit., p. 33.

⁸⁵ See Prasāda as clarity of vision, infra., pp. 20 ff.

'produced,' we cannot reason it out. It is not a 'work.' It comes or does not come independently of our will. It must be seen.

There is, then, a knowledge which is different from the conceptual, not contradicting it but standing above it,⁸⁶ a knowledge wherein things are seen as they are in immediacy,⁸⁷ where the knower, the process of knowing, and the object of knowledge are one in a non-dual, advaitic unity.⁸⁸ Furthermore, it is a subjective and intuitive awareness of the conscious Self through an identity-knowledge which, though "...neither logical nor sensuous, is the presupposition of every other kind of knowledge."⁸⁹ The knower, the conscious Self, as the essence of its Self-knowledge, knows of its supreme identity with the conscious infinite, and this

...from the metaphysical realization that man's consciousness, which is the necessary ground for his experience, is a particular mode of the ultimate reality and is one in essence, identical with the ground of the whole universe. That which lies at the foundation of the universe will be immeasurably more--not less-- than that which underlies human experience.⁹⁰

Religious doctrine also may look to an inward process as a starting point for contact with what is conceived as the

⁸⁶ Guénon, op. cit., p. 116.

⁸⁷ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 138.

⁸⁸ Guénon, loc. cit.

⁸⁹ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 139.

⁹⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 57.

real, but the viewpoint characteristically is different. In the midst of a discussion concerning proofs of the existence of God, which in the realm of metaphysical experience is not at all necessary, Gilson⁹¹ says:

It will always be legitimate to attempt the construction of a metaphysic on the basis of the presence in our minds of the idea of God, provided, however, that we do not attempt a deduction a priori with its starting point in God, but an induction a posteriori with its starting point in the content of our conception of God.

From the religious point of view man's self (that which in metaphysic would be called the jiva or ego, and is not to be confused with the Self or Atman) as a part of nature has an immediate and privileged experience of itself, for in man alone nature attains self consciousness. Therefore he must interpret that which is known "only from without" through the function of his self awareness. Man is specifically distinguished from other animals by rationality, therefore that causality which is specifically human must be rational in nature, reason then being the directive principle of all causal activity.⁹² Within man, the creature gifted with reason, lies, "...by way of representation, the being of possible effects which shall be distinct from himself," for these effects before becoming such had prior existence in

⁹¹ Gilson, op. cit., 62.

⁹² Ibid., p. 88.

man as rational cause and therefore must "...partake of the being of their cause."⁹³

"Christian rationalism" endeavors to exclude all non-rational elements that might intrude between initial rational principles and the rational conclusions deduced from them. It, however, must have as its primary basis that Christian faith which, although considered as intrinsically self sufficient, "aspires to become an understanding of its own content" and therefore engenders rational evidence. The Christian "does not seek to understand in order to believe, but to believe in order to understand."⁹⁴ Faith, though, is not to be considered as a form of cognition superior to that of the rational, but as a prior and necessary basis and a divine aid⁹⁵ which should be succeeded by the rational. The Christian modes of cognition are arranged in hierarchial order as "faith, understanding, and vision of God face to

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 88-89. It is interesting to note here that self-consciousness was touched upon, but only incidentally and as a point of departure for rationality. This is in contrast to the Eastern point of view wherein rational knowledge is seen as but one aspect of that divine consciousness which is the ground of all consciousness. See Sri Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo (Bombay: Sri Aurobindo Circle, 1951), IV, 85.

⁹⁴ Gilson, op. cit., p. 33.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

face⁹⁶ which is, as it were, a reversal in some ways of the immediacy of the metaphysical order. Faith aids the Christian philosopher by providing him with "a norm of judgment, a principle of discernment and selection, allowing him to restore rational truth to itself by purging away the errors that encumber it."⁹⁷ It is of interest here to compare the above-mentioned view of the function of Christian faith with buddhi, "the ground of all intellectual processes in all individual beings," the special functions of which are "ascertainment and decision [by which] distinction and judgments are made."⁹⁸

Christian faith, however, is not to be confused with the immediately intuited integral knowledge which is metaphysic, that "Supreme Identity" of which even the "vision of God face to face" can be but an analogy. Of this Rādhakrishnan⁹⁹ says:

The human mind, being what it is... tries to reconstruct the universe from the intellectual point of view into an organic whole. For the intellect, the unity is only a postulation, an act of faith. For the spirit, the harmony is the experienced reality.

Christian faith, the "truth believed [which endeavors to] ...

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

⁹⁸ S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, op. cit., p. 300.

⁹⁹ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 110.

transform itself to truth known...¹⁰⁰ is

The analogical instrument put in our hands wherewith to attain God [and] ...is not only an uncircumscriptive analogy, it is a revealed analogy, the proxy or substitute of vision [italics not in the original], what we may call a super analogy. The mode of conception or signification is as deficient here as in that of metaphysical analogy; but what is significant-revealed, i.e. stripped of the veils which belong to our natural knowledge, but left or shown under other veils--is this time the Godhead as such, God as he sees himself, and who gives himself to us--in darkness and without our laying hands on Him, for we do not see Him, (indeed the divine essence, which surpasses every concept, could only be intellectually possessed or grasped if it is seen by itself and without concepts).¹⁰¹

Faith, the "truth believed," the "super analogy," may or may not be based upon a type of mystical or spiritual experience, but in either case its analogical nature would be, in the main, unchanged, although quite different otherwise. Of this faith rooted in experience Rādhakrishnan¹⁰² says: "If we take faith in the proper sense of trust or spiritual conviction, religion is faith or intuition." It might be viewed also as analogous to the integral intuition of metaphysic. "Religion as well as Unreligion is not a matter of knowledge, but of faith or belief,"¹⁰³ "...which

¹⁰⁰ Gilson, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁰¹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 298.

¹⁰² Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 16.

¹⁰³ Frederic Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, (Stanford: James Ladd Delkin, 1948), p. 41.

is to say a sympathy for certain ideas."¹⁰⁴ The development of theology in the West, however, has been such as to give the word "faith" the connotation of "a mechanical adherence to authority" which removes it from the realm of experience.¹⁰⁵ It is observed, in addition, that a pure "act of the intellect moved to assent by the will," that is to say a "willed assent to propositions which are known to be unverifiable occurs in religion, and only in religion..."¹⁰⁶ It may be that "the expression 'to believe' should have been preserved only for the super-sureness of immediate insight..."¹⁰⁷ but as a religious analogy several times removed from the insight of supreme identity the term is in no way synonymous with that intuitive experience.

Gilson¹⁰⁸ cites three different meanings of the word "truth" as given by St. Thomas. (1) Truth in its relative sense as the basic condition which makes truth possible. "Truth," says St. Augustine, "is what is," that is to say, being. (2) Truth in its proper and absolute sense "consists formally in an ontological accord between being and intellect..."

¹⁰⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁰⁵ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 234.

¹⁰⁷ Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁰⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 237.

(3) Logical truth, or truth of the judgment of ontological truth already established.

Truth, in the full and proper sense of the term, is found in thought alone; for truth lies in the adequation of thing and intellect.... Truth... is in the intellect affirming that things are or are not, and judging them to be this and not that.¹⁰⁹

Although residing in the intellect of man truth "in a way" is also in things relative to an intellect, primarily as related to the divine intellect. In this sense there is but one Truth for all things inasmuch as the truth residing in the divine intellect is unitary, all other truths being derived from it.¹¹⁰ From the metaphysical view, as expressed by Sri Aurobindo,¹¹¹

Spiritual truth is a truth of the Spirit, not a truth of the intellect... It is a truth of the Infinite, one in an infinite diversity, and it can assume an infinite variety of aspects and formations..., the hard logical and intellectual notion of truth as a single idea which all must accept, one idea or system of ideas defeating all other ideas of systems, or a single limited fact or simple formula of facts which all must recognise, is an illegitimate transference from the limited truth of the physical

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 235. This parallels, in a way, the discriminatory function of buddhi.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 238. This is an interesting theological analogy of the advaitic principle of one in many, of the transcendence which includes but is not modified by the multiplicity. The truth herein described by religion, however, is not to be equated with the non-dual or advaitic realization, for by definition it implies a dual relationship which is never, and never can be resolved,—that is, it stops short before identity consciousness.

¹¹¹ Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine, (New York: The Greystone Press, 1949), pp. 788-789.

field to the much more complex and plastic field of life and mind and spirit.

According to Christian views the "Truth believed" by faith is related intimately to historic revelation. The discriminating function of Christian faith, the separation of false from true, is possible only when there is a "prior knowledge of the truth given by God through revelation and accepted by man through faith."¹¹² The relationship of revelation and reason thus is said to give "meaning" to Christian philosophy,¹¹³ for revelation enables man continually to be aware of the entire rational system, the existence of the final cause of nature which purely scientific reason, unaided by revelation, knows only partially.¹¹⁴ St. Thomas Aquinas, while distinguishing between the functions of reason basically and precisely expressed by Aristotle and those of divine revelation given to the world under the sole curatorship of the Church, tended to define that revelation in Aristotelian terms inasmuch as it "gave the kind of religious knowledge with which Aristotle had identified the divine, merely presenting it more completely and fully than human reason alone could do."¹¹⁵

¹¹² Gilson, op. cit., p. 31.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 34.

¹¹⁴ Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, p. 277.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 261.

The traditions and teachings of the Church are primarily concerned with man as a being existing in time and history, not the timeless Self of metaphysic which must be distinguished from the human ego.¹¹⁶ Temporal and historical man conceives of inspiration as coming from without himself, as "the operation of the Holy Spirit, who inspires (breathes forth) man with his divine revelation."¹¹⁷ The "Supreme Identity" of Self-realization is not spatialized, however, nor does it exist in time; therefore, its inspiration is at one with its integral knowledge, and is not in its pure and unmixed state subject to exterior projection.¹¹⁸

Time and history. Inasmuch as differentiations occurring within the undifferentiated infinite revolve in an orbit of time the "temporal sequence" may be said to be embraced, yet transcended, by the infinite which is timeless and therefore truly eternal. In the West the general meaning of time may be likened to a moving river or projectile, not cyclical in character, but of a unique, fleeting, and "Heracitian" nature.¹¹⁹ The past projects the shadows of a "truly

¹¹⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 52.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 134.

¹¹⁸ Loc. cit.

¹¹⁹ Northrop, op. cit., p. 342.

necessary" debt which tends to cloud forever the future which alone holds the promise of fulfilment, of perfect and perpetual (not timeless) happiness. The ultimate good, then, of necessity must be in time, according to this conception, and therefore any temporal means which will achieve or grasp this good in some measure may be justified.¹²⁰

In Eastern metaphysic "time in the phenomenal sense, has no beginning."¹²¹ It has been experienced factually "as a placid, silent pool within which ripples come and go," the "Great Mother," the timeless power-womb of all non-separate waves of differentiation; that which also and at once is the silent tomb-power which receives the many as they melt back again into the ground of their manifestation, that never-separate ground from which the rippling play again cyclically will emerge.¹²²

From an essentially Eastern, that is to say a metaphysical, view all attempts to seize or grasp the present bring the invariable result of emotional attachment to the past or future, for

no form can ever take possession of the infinitesimal eternal Now, of the ever present moment in which it is manifested. The Now remains; out of it and through it the forms of life flow with unbroken continuity, pausing

¹²⁰ Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹²¹ Sṛṇivāsaśāstri, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹²² Northrop, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

not even for the merest irreducible fraction of a second. Occupying neither space nor time, the eternal Now contains the whole universe, apart from it nothing has reality or life.¹²³

Societies based upon the ground of metaphysic are traditional, not in the sense of a relay of culture from peoples of the past, but as the "handing down of principles from the eternal realm to the temporal." Historical "tradition" is, in relation to the Now, but a temporal analogy of that traditional differentiation arising within universal principles.¹²⁴ Metaphysic, unlike the historical mode, being immutable, is unaffected by duality, "progress," individual influences, and the outward expression of time and space.¹²⁵ Historic judgments, being of the individual order, are not capable of embracing the whole of metaphysical truth,¹²⁶ for "...when the analytical intellect, in the interests of criticism, dissects the living pulsations of intuition it gives us only dead things and discontinuous bits."¹²⁷ This does not serve to deny the great utility of catalogued historical facts, but such materials, directly

¹²³ Watts, op. cit., p. 93.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 29

¹²⁵ Guenon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrine, p. 113.

¹²⁶ Srinivāśachāri, op. cit., p. 11.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. xxxv.

and in themselves', can contribute little to an initial understanding of metaphysic. Maritain,¹²⁸ in criticism of any historical analysis of St. John of the Cross, writes:

Above all, if, however sagaciously analysed and catalogued under the appropriate headings, the intellectual ingredients which enter into the composition of the Saint's thought and its synthesis are merely exhibited in vitro, bottled in a historical retort, these primarily result in waste labour. History can give us precious evidence as to the material conditions in which a man's thought has been developed, it can never operate the synthesis of that thought.

Christian doctrine, however, as distinct from those spiritual experiences of such as St. John of the Cross, "did not grow up in a vacuum, in a straight encounter between God and the soul,"¹²⁹ but was the result of an interweaving of certain elements of Mediterranean mysticism,¹³⁰ Graeco-Roman rationalism, humanism, and political ideals,¹³¹ plus a particular Jewish exclusiveness which found expression in the terms of Greek philosophy and the forms of Roman organization.¹³² The personal God of the Jews did not have the ground of a metaphysical Absolute and was bound to the Jewish faith in historical fulfillment, "a great decisive event

¹²⁸ Maritain, op. cit., p. 383.

¹²⁹ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 343.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 290.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 260.

¹³² Ibid., p. 271.

which will be the definite solution of the historical problem.¹³³

In essence Greek thought was Western and contained within itself the germinal ideas which tended to develop and flower later in the West.¹³⁴ Notwithstanding certain contrary elements in the teachings of Plato, Aristotle, the Orphic Mysteries and Pythagoras, "it is not incorrect to hold that the Greeks attempted to give an explanation of the problem of certainty in terms of logical reason, and failed to justify the logical postulates themselves."¹³⁵

We are told by Gilson¹³⁶ that "the spirit of medieval philosophy is the spirit of Christianity penetrating the Greek tradition, working within it, drawing out of it a certain view of the world...specifically Christian."

It is necessary to view Church doctrine as it lies within the framework of Greek and medieval philosophy and science. Present-day Roman Catholic doctrine for the most part is indebted to St. Thomas Aquinas who "identified the objects and doctrines of Christian belief with certain items and their hierarchic relations in the Aristotelian

¹³³ Ibid., p. 8.

¹³⁴ Guénon, op. cit., p. 35.

¹³⁵ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 130.

¹³⁶ Gilson, op. cit., p. viii.

universe."¹³⁷ The medieval world, wherein was developed the basis of modern Christian theology,

lived on the memory of an historical fact, of an event to which all previous history led up, from which was dated the beginning of a new era; a unique event, which might almost be said to mark a date for God himself, the incarnation of the Word and the birth of Jesus Christ.¹³⁸

"Historical facts" may or may not be subject to historical proof, but in neither case are they considered as intrinsically sacred by metaphysic. Huxley,¹³⁹ quoting Coomaraswamy in illustration of this writes: "The Mahayānist believer is warned--precisely as the worshipper of Krishna is warned in the vaishnavite scriptures that the Krishna-līlā is not a history, but a process for ever unfolding in the heart of man..." Huxley,¹⁴⁰ furthermore, finds religious historical facts significant only as analogically useful means or aids which might serve to transcend the temporal and individual order. To the traditional East such a foundation of belief upon past phenomenon, the "confusion of eternal truth with temporal fact,"¹⁴¹ and "an overvaluation of happenings in time and undervaluation of the everlasting

¹³⁷ Northrop, op. cit., p. 261.

¹³⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 384.

¹³⁹ Huxley, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁴¹ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 59.

timeless fact of eternity"¹⁴² has resulted in religious bloodshed, modern religious indifference, and the substitution found in today's religion of the State.¹⁴³ The analogy tends to be the sole object of worship and that for which it stands is unrealized. "Even the Supreme is identified with an historical individual, the Kingdom of God is identified with a concrete empirical structure with its own specific form and organization."¹⁴⁴

The Church, however, conceives of history as a part of providential design pointing toward the supernatural (not the timeless) end of man. Therefore individual and social history is ordered to this end, which necessitates "a regular unfolding of events in time, and first of all, of course, that there shall be a time."¹⁴⁵ Gilson¹⁴⁶ further notes that Christians considered themselves as the first to conceive and state a "synthesis of the totality of history" by giving it an intelligible explanation accounting for man's origin and assigned end for "they conceived themselves to be well informed about the beginning and end of history." To this the Eastern

¹⁴² Huxley, op. cit., p. 242.

¹⁴³ Loc. cit.

¹⁴⁴ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 176.

¹⁴⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 385.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 390.

tradition might well ask, "What of the eternal present, the Now?"

Gilson,¹⁴⁷ continuing the Christian thought, states that the purpose of the Christian world and its final fulfillment lies, not only in the attainment of ultimate beatitude, but in the gradual erection of "a kingdom...a society of the righteous, united by the bonds of their common beatitude." This entails a sense of duration totally different from the cyclical, one which allows a historical and "linear" unfoldment in "foreseen sequence from stage to stage, until at last death comes and cuts it short." The "intellectual capital" which the individual has achieved however, is transmitted as an increasing heritage to posterity which is progressing towards an end promulgated and directed by God himself, the "perfect age, which shall be that of future glory." Thus, "ordered and penetrated through and through by an internal finality...the succession of generations in time has not only a real unity, but in it acquires an intelligible meaning." Again the Eastern tradition might ask: "What of the eternal present, the Now?"

The neglect of that timeless infinite which is the Now, coupled with the historical emphasis on the past and future, tends to work toward an "identification of the absolute life

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 387-390.

with the course of human history."¹⁴⁸ While this may be accomplished in some degree with the concept of God as "a self determining principle manifested in a temporal development which includes nature and man" it is impossible with the eternal Absolute which is not modified by creation, growth, or change.¹⁴⁹

The theological god, as separate from the world and "prior to it in time"¹⁵⁰ maintains a teleological relationship with the world process while at the same time abiding outside it. Rādhakṛishṇan,¹⁵¹ while dwelling upon modern Christian fundamentals writes:

God stands outside the process and calls men according to His purpose. He creates crises in the lives of men and the affairs of mankind. He breaks into the course of events, as He did decisively at that point of history marked by the coming of Christ.

This historical emphasis and the unique place in time occupied by the Christian incarnation are of a totally different order than that of metaphysic. The Absolute, the Infinite, Eternal and all-embracing cannot be contained within a purely historical framework. Such a containment by religion falls short of any realization of the Absolute and leaves religious doctrine

¹⁴⁸ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 343.

¹⁴⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁵⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 68.

¹⁵¹ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 303.

as an analogy which has been severed from the security of its metaphysical ground.¹⁵²

Instead of a synthesis of becoming manipulated in varying degrees by the providence of a separate Being, metaphysic sees an all-inclusive, or higher "synthesis" within the Now, within consciousness. Of this Watts¹⁵³ says:

The fact that all things are within consciousness implies neither solipsism nor the unreality of objects. So far as the relative reality of individuals and objects is concerned, it matters not whether we call the events within a space-time continuum, or events within a field of consciousness. It is not difficult to conceive consciousness as a field in which there may be an indefinite number of nodes or points of view, each of which corresponds to the vaguely restricted area which every one of us calls 'my' consciousness. Space and time will therefore be functions of the field, and every point of view or node within the field will, like stars in space, be central relative to the others.

The realization of metaphysical knowledge.

Our human knowledge is a candle burnt
On the divine altar to a sun-vast truth;
Man's virtue, a coarse-spun ill-fitting dress,
Apparels wooden images of good.¹⁵⁴

The faculty of reason is of the individual order and therefore, from its specific and particular vantage point, in no wise can touch the universal.¹⁵⁵ Carried to its

¹⁵² See Watts, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁵⁴ This is a quotation from Sāvitṛī by Śrī Aurobindo and cited by A. B. Purāṇī, Śrī Aurobindo's Sāvitṛī, an Approach and a Study (Anand: Śrī Aurobindo Karyalaya, 1952), p. 104.

¹⁵⁵ Watts, op. cit. p. 33.

ultimate it attempts to measure by its own logic and language that which is beyond measure with the result that it can achieve but a partial view,¹⁵⁶ a partial manifestation,¹⁵⁷ and a partial harmonization.¹⁵⁸ The Katha Upanishad,¹⁵⁹ as but one example, tells us that this wisdom is not to be attained by reasoning or by any process of logical thought, nor is the Self to be gained by speculative thinking or much learning. In modern India the same thought is echoed by Sri Aurobindo¹⁶⁰ when he writes:

For not by Heaven was creation made
And not by Reason can the Truth be seen.

The realization of metaphysical knowledge, then, does not rest upon the one-sided and partial character of reason which, if over-valued even in the individual order, deprives man of other important parts of his nature.¹⁶¹ It depends, rather, on that which, although eternally immanent in man, nevertheless belongs to the universal order and not to the

¹⁵⁶ Purāṇi, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁵⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 138.

¹⁵⁸ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁵⁹ Katha Upanishad 2.8;2.23. from Robt. Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principle Upanishads (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 152.

¹⁶⁰ Sri Aurobindo, Sāvitri (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Āśram Press, 1950), 1.234.

¹⁶¹ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 89.

individual and, being integral in character, encompasses and is identical with that which realizes, the realization itself, and the supreme knowledge. From a Vedantic viewpoint it may be said to pertain to that aspect of the buddhi seen as a "ray from the central sun of the Self."¹⁶² By some Western writers it is called the Intellect, at times an unfortunate term because of its "improper" identification "with the logical and speculative faculty of reason."¹⁶³ The realization or knowledge of Self, no matter the terminology or view of its dawning, is possible only within a spirit of integral harmony and balance superior to any partial view or function of human nature¹⁶⁴ and is a lucid awareness of "identity with the Supreme,"¹⁶⁵ "a clear-sighted¹⁶⁶ intuition, a dawning of insight into that which logic infers and scriptures teach."¹⁶⁷

This intuition,¹⁶⁸ however, must not be confused with

¹⁶² Watts, op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁶⁴ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 139.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Ibid., pp. 144-147.

¹⁶⁶ See prasāda as clearness, infra, pp. 20 ff.

¹⁶⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 24.

¹⁶⁸ J. Baly, Eur-Aryan Roots (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1897), p. 463, notes that "Skeat and Vaniček give a root √tu with the meaning to see, observe,

that which Northrop¹⁶⁹ calls the "intellectual intuition of connotative universals," the incomplete "imitations" by certain aspects of the mind of that higher, integral intuition of metaphysic which has a "certitude, an effective force of Truth in it that the mental intuition at its best even has not."¹⁷⁰ It is also to be distinguished from the instinctive responses of "animal primitiveness."¹⁷¹ Spiritual intuition is of the Self "in its entirety which includes both the conscious and the unconscious" of psychology¹⁷² and "emerges from the total nature of man. It is not something

guard, protect, only found in Latin." The word tutor is also derived from this root. In this connection with intuition and the "tutorial" function see guruprasāda, infra, pp. 229-30.

Rādhakrishnan (An Idealist View of Life, p. 200 n.) gives pratibhā as the creative intuition of genius and brahmagyāna for the intuition of seers and sages. [See also Rādhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948) II, 68 n.] Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 143, also calls metaphysical intuition "the only kind of absolute knowledge...the ultimate vision of our profoundest being."

¹⁶⁹ Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy" from Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy, p. 369.

¹⁷⁰ Sri Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II.131.

¹⁷¹ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 206. Also p. 213.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 215. This differs from Jung's concept of intuition [The Integration of the Personality (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939), p. 14.] as "a perception of relations via the unconscious" as identity differs from relativity, and the Self from both the unconscious and conscious of Western psychology.

uncanny, confined to children, neurotics and savages." 173

Certainty is one of its chief characteristics, for it is absolute, 174 self-revealing, and leaves no room for argument 175 or dispute. 176 Measured by logical and dialectical standards it, in its purity, dispenses with signs and symbols, and is inexpressible 177 and, therefore, incommunicable. 178 Is, then, the term knowledge applicable to it? Of this, Rādhakṛishṇan 179 says:

If the term 'knowledge' is restricted to what is communicable, what can be expressed in formulas and propositions, then intuitive insight as ineffable and nonpropositional is not knowledge. But certainty and not communicability

173 Ibid., p. 217.

174 Carl Gustav Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 113.

175 Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 92.

176 Sri Aurobindo, The Yoga and its Object (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1949), p. 33. "There is no profit in dispute about these standpoints. Wait until you see God and know yourself and him and then debate and discussion will be unnecessary.

The goal marked out for us is not to speculate about these things, but to experience them." Cf., also Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, pp. 22-23.

177 Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 100. Also see Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912) p. 9. "Metaphysics, then is the science which claims to dispense with symbols." In the same work (p. 92) Bergson defines metaphysics as "integral experience."

178 Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 144.

179 Ibid., p. 145.

is the true test of knowledge, and intuitive experience has this sense of assurance or certainty, and therefore is a species of knowledge.

In its highest sense, however, it is more than a species; it is the ground of all knowledge which pertains to name and form.

This certainty is said to be given, immediate, and it "wells up in the consciousness as an intuitive flash."¹⁸⁰ It is the realization, discovery, or awakening to that which is already present in its fullness. Watts¹⁸¹ says: "as in scholastic theology, the lumen gloriæ has a given character, which is why it is called a grace, so in metaphysic there is a corresponding 'givenness' in intellectual knowledge." Strict adherence to a prescribed doctrinal and theological system or method is, however, ineffectual for metaphysical realization. Givenness is the "factual content of the spiritual experience. All other proofs are descriptions of God, matters of definition and language."¹⁸² Mental ideas about the nature and action of the Divine are but impediments. It is the Divine alone that truly matters.¹⁸³

Even though theological dogmas and creeds are but

¹⁸⁰ Purāṇi, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁸¹ Watts, op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁸² Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 22.

¹⁸³ Śrī Aurobindo, op. cit., II. 257.

imperfect and symbolic formulations of the infinite,¹⁸⁴ the "reality which is known theoretically...must nonetheless be known with immediacy. For otherwise the knower could not contact it, even in thought. But this immediacy, in the Western sense is the immediacy to the formal intellect, not the denotive, purely empirical, aesthetic existential immediacy¹⁸⁵ of the Orient."¹⁸⁶ Metaphysically, however, the integral immediacy of the Supreme Experience is the only "order" of immediacy worthy the name.¹⁸⁷

Among the differentiations, translations, and necessarily somewhat analogous points of reference manifest within metaphysic the term "God" tends to take on certain characteristics of a theistic view, although at all times founded in varied degrees upon the fundamental metaphysical ground. As a Viśiṣṭādvaitic writer, and thus referred to as theistic,

¹⁸⁴ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 242.

¹⁸⁵ See Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, p. 304.

¹⁸⁶ Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy, p. 373.

¹⁸⁷ "If one knows 'Brahman exists,' that is only mediate knowledge.
If one knows 'I am Brahman,' that is called immediate experience."

asti brahmeti chedveda parokṣa jñānameva tat |
aḥam brahmeti chedveda sākshātkāraḥ sa uchyate ||

Translated from the Varāṇhopaniṣad, T.M.P. Mahādevan, The Upanishads (Madras: G.A. Natesan and Co., 1945), p. 326.

Srīnivāśāchāri,¹⁸⁸ speaking of the immediate spiritual experience, says:

Though the existence of God cannot be proved, He can be experienced by means of direct intuition. Intuition is said to be an immediate experience of God and to transcend the realms of sentient experience and reason... But intuition transcends the level of instinct and intelligence and is a direct insight into God, or ātman, and is ineffable and incommunicable.

The Eastern seer, though, is for the most part meticulously hesitant, outside the clear and understood license of poetry, art, and hyperbole, of any too-positive statement about the nature of the immediate experience. The Buddha, for example, admitted the reality of the supreme experience, but refused

...to interpret it as the revelation of anything beyond itself. For him the view that spiritual experience gives us a direct contact with God is an interpretation and not an immediate datum... He attempted to keep close to the given...¹⁸⁹

It may be the "ultimate authority for one's ideas of God and life"¹⁹⁰ but the given must be the all-embracing principle of the infinite Now, "not the denizen of an alien world like the world of Plato's ideas."¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁸⁹ Rādhakṛishṇan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I.171.

¹⁹⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 22.

¹⁹¹ Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Rādhakṛishṇan Comparative Studies in Philosophy, p. 374.

According to religious doctrine, particularly that of Roman Catholic theology, "an absolutely immediate and therefore perfectly experienced knowledge of God is reserved for the beatific state,"¹⁹² a transfiguration which bursts forth "into full magnificance only on the other side of the grave,"¹⁹³ a deification or "transformation into a radiant likeness of the divinity...by...a participation in the nature of the godhead,"¹⁹⁴ and "shares in the prerogative of changeless repose which is unattainable by the natural creature and is proper to God alone."¹⁹⁵ It is still within the realm of the intellect, in its nonmetaphysical sense, rather than that of identity consciousness. Natural reason, though, cannot grasp it and therefore needs, religiously speaking, "to rise by faith above its native lowliness to lay hold of it,"¹⁹⁶ for through it "the spirit is rendered capable of a knowledge

¹⁹² Maritain, op. cit., p. 654.

¹⁹³ Matthias Joseph Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), p. 654. Cf. Purani, op. cit., p. 36.: "But the [Christian] Beatitude is far in the heaven of the Divine and this earth is condemned to remain a vale of tears,--it is a place where the soul of man is tested in order to prove its worthiness to reach the kingdom of God away from the earth."

¹⁹⁴ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 653.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 664.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 658.

that in itself belongs to God alone; the immediate intuition of the Divine essence...a miracle by which the creature is raised to full participation in the Divine life and to share in the enjoyment of the Divine happiness..."¹⁹⁷ This "immediate intuition of God in His very essence is in itself natural and proper only to the three persons who possess the divine nature,"¹⁹⁸ and only is allowed to the creature through his elevation and the communication of the "divine light, in which alone the divine essence can be rendered visible."¹⁹⁹ Quoting from the Roman Catechism, Scheeben²⁰⁰ says:

Those who possess God in the beatific vision,...although they retain their own proper substance, are clothed with an extraordinary and almost divine form, so that they seem to be gods rather than men.²⁰¹

The immediacy of the beatific vision is still of the analogical intellectual order which literally is infused from afar and never divorced entirely from the "logical and speculative faculty of reason," synonymous with God in its highest reaches, as it were, yet incapable of non-dual or advaitic Self-realization, for it is of an order far different from and analogous to that of infinite consciousness (chit) which eternally is immediate and not needing to be supernaturally

¹⁹⁷ Loc. cit.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 659.

¹⁹⁹ Loc. cit.

²⁰⁰ Loc. cit.

²⁰¹ Cf. Devas, the "shining ones."

activated and raised to a higher conceptual level.²⁰²

Scheeben²⁰³ writes:

That the divine essence may be really comprehended and beheld as it is in itself, it must be so closely joined to the intellect, and must penetrate so deeply into it, as to become present to it not by means of an impressed species, but by itself. It must become no less present than the impressions emanating from a material object, as required for sensory knowledge, are present to the eye of sense....it is these conditions alone that make the possibility of the intuition of God conceivable.

Maritain²⁰⁴ further stresses the role of the intelligible order wherein the vision is always of One eternally separate:

By the beatific vision the soul becomes God 'intentionally' (secundum esse intelligibile), not substantially, but it is united with Him in a real union (unio secundum rem), since it is by the infinite essence of God Himself immediately actuating the intellect in the intelligible order that it holds this union and that it sees. Thus the intelligence supernaturalized by the light of glory is like the hand whereby the blessed lay hold on God.

Within the light of the Eastern tradition, however, this beatific vision of Christian dogmatic theology is always of One constantly and necessarily separated by a more or less attenuated cordon sanitaire, an experience which, by definition, is incapable of identity-knowledge, that

²⁰² Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 79.: "When we go to religion for light on the nature of the conscious Self it is found that Catholic doctrine, for instance, virtually avoids the question."

²⁰³ Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 659-660.

²⁰⁴ Maritain, op. cit., p. 8 n.

Supreme Identity which even in most Indian "theistic" sects is granted as possible. Of this Rādhakṛishṇan²⁰⁵ writes:

...the beatific vision requires a beatified consciousness (lumen gloriæ) which is distinct from ordinary consciousness (lumen naturale) and prophetic consciousness (lumen gratiæ). Even then the divine essence will not be comprehended.

Even in Roman Catholic terminology the "deification" in this life and "transfiguration" in the future state are but relative terms and therefore pertain to the individual order, parallel analogies "in terms of time" to the timeless realization of metaphysic which marks the transition of the individual state, the ego or soul, through a spiritual awakening or "rebirth," as it were, to the infinite Now, to the true Self or Ātman.²⁰⁶ The equality spoken of by religion is necessarily that of participation rather than non-dual identity. Pohle²⁰⁷ states:

There can be no real equality between God and the human soul, but God in His infinite goodness elevates the soul to a higher plane and allowing it to participate in His own nature makes possible an amicitia excellentiæ S. eminentiæ, which is sufficient to constitute a true relation of friendship. Without this elevation of the soul by grace there could be no friendship between God and man.

Given through the supernatural agency of sanctifying grace,

²⁰⁵ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 278.

²⁰⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 34.

²⁰⁷ Joseph Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1917), p. 355.

"it is a real, though of course only an accidental and analogical, participation of the soul in the nature of God,"²⁰⁸ for there always remains the "impossibility of any deification of the creature in the strict sense of the term."²⁰⁹

This is the only proper view if the highest principle in, of, and natural to man is conceived as the soul, jiva or ego²¹⁰ and not the Self or âtman which is identical with the Absolute. The soul or jiva, as individual, cannot "become" the Supreme, although such a blind yearning may be evident, and neither religion nor metaphysic admits of such a "deification in the strict sense of the term." The supreme identity of metaphysic is the timeless "givenness" of the Self, the "âtman which is brahman,"²¹¹ which is "always" present and not something alien and supernormal to be grasped, attained or conferred. It transcends individuality and is not the individual "immortality" of each separate jiva but the realization of an always present identity awaiting only to be known.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 340.

²⁰⁹ Loc. cit.

²¹⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 135: "In religious terminology man is the ego and the ego is as principally other than God as it is other than the Self."

²¹¹ Ibid. p. 82.

Gilson²¹² writes, respecting theological doctrine:

...man's state in this life is also his natural state... his nature is a human nature....The union of soul and body is a natural union, the state that results from the union is a natural state, and knowledge by way of abstraction from sense, which is bound up with this state, is natural too...

Christian philosophy and theology looks upon the ifva or soul, together with the body, as the norm of man, that which properly is man. Its attention is focused upon the man "as a temporal and historical being"²¹³ limited to ego and body, and eternally seals off his highest conceivable principle from any identification with an abnormal higher principle by placing that which is superior or universal in a distinct and separate category which at best is related to the limited only at a distance by analogy or infusion. "What Christianity promises man," says Gilson,²¹⁴ "is his own individual immortality and not the immortality of a separate substance that would not be his at all."²¹⁵

²¹² Gilson, op. cit., p. 251.

²¹³ Watts, op. cit., p. 52.

²¹⁴ Gilson, op. cit., p. 178.

²¹⁵ There is, however, some touch of the experience of supreme identity in the accounts of spiritual experiences of such Christian mystics as St. John of the Cross, St. Theresa, St. Alphonsus Liguori, and others. (See Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 456-457), though even here there appears to be more of a feeling of merger rather than an identity which is timeless, and therefore beginningless. Even this hint of metaphysical knowledge is veiled, however, when attempts are made to literalize, explain, or justify it by theology.

The soul as understood by religion is conceived as "Always finite...in its entitative structure as it will be always,"²¹⁶ although Maritain²¹⁷ further states that this "always finite" soul is capable, mystically speaking and through the "transformation of love" of becoming "evaporated" so that "in a way it is the Whole, it is the infinity of the life of God which explodes within it..."²¹⁸ Even the explosive life of God cannot bestow timeless identity upon the soul or jiva, for as one ego is distinct from another, and one soul is distinct from and is not to be identified with another soul, God, as distinct and separate Being is never conceived as having true identity with the equally distinct and separate ego which had its beginning in a different order. There can only be a "colloidal suspension," as it were, a participation analogous to that emulsion which is called milk, or the mixture of sacramental wine and water.²¹⁹ Metaphysically speaking, the jiva as jiva cannot know the supreme identity, for the individual cannot comprehend the universal. With realization the

²¹⁶ Maritain, op. cit., p. 457.

²¹⁷ Loc. cit.

²¹⁸ This further illustrates the saving and redeeming catastrophic action, occurring in the past on earth and in the future in heaven, which has become so necessary in Christian thought.

²¹⁹ See Pohle, op. cit., p. 341.

jiva is known as a differentiation, but one of numberless possible centers of flux or play (lila) existing as voluntary limitations within the non-dual, universal Self or Atman, that Self which did not develop from the jiva, but was "there all the time, waiting to be discovered." Church doctrine also mirrors this, but instead of the realization of the non-dual Atman as the true Self, it projects a creator-God whose aloof transcendence above the creature can never include the identity of immanence. This is evident in the following remarks by Scheeben:²²⁰

...the perfection and beatitude of the creature, as held out to us by faith, consists not in the development and maturing of a seed contained in the creature's nature, or in the unleashing of an energy buried in the creature's depths, but in the outpouring of the divine nature upon the creature, in the disclosing of the depths of the divinity...an elevation of the creature above its natural sphere, of a transfiguration of the creature by a participation in the divine nature.

Man (soul and body), in Christian theology, "is not a part of what God would be the whole. He is an analogue, a similitude, of his Principle....,"²²¹ constantly subordinate to God inasmuch as he is made to the image of God, and "this divine likeness, stamped by the creative act in man's very nature, rules his being to its most intimate depths."²²²

²²⁰ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 653.

²²¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 302.

²²² Ibid., p. 210.

As an image, however, man is twice removed from God, for "man is not an image of God; there is but one Image of God, namely the Word. But man is an image of this image, and that is why the Bible says that he is made ad imaginem."²²³ Being an image of an image, the soul cannot rest content in an effective resemblance to God but must avail "itself of the factual resemblance in order to attain to God, that is, it ...only becomes fully itself when it explicitly refers itself to its model."²²⁴ "Man is altogether different from God...intermediate between non-intellectual matter...and pure intelligence,"²²⁵ yet bears in that which is the "highest in man, that is to say, either in his intelligence or in his freedom" the divine image of that pure intelligence or God.²²⁶ Man's perfection, then, lies in being "like to God" for in attaining to perfect resemblance the soul attains its own perfection.²²⁷

The Roman Catholic soul is "a form which possesses and confers substantiality."²²⁸ Man, according to Gilson²²⁹ is

²²³ Gilson, op. cit., p. 294.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 213.

²²⁵ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 278. See also Gilson, op. cit., p. 216.

²²⁶ Gilson, op. cit., p. 211.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 301.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 182.

²²⁹ Ibid., pp. 187-188.

dependent upon the soul for his substantiality. Although the soul cannot develop its full actuality without the body, this latter is devoid of all actuality and substance other than that received from its form, the soul. Thus "man" is not a duality composed of two substances, but a "complex substance" dependent upon its highest principle, for his substantiality. He is not to be identified with his body, which can subsist only through the soul, nor is he the soul alone, for the soul "remains destitute without the body; he is the unity of a soul which substantializes his body and of the body in which this Soul subsists."²³⁰

Metaphysical doctrine is not limited to this view. The unconditioned Self or ātman, undifferentiated and beyond mind and speech, when it has limiting adjuncts such as a body and such organs as give imperfect knowledge, is called

²³⁰ According to modern Protestant theory man is an "interacting aggregate" of many substances, his soul as a mental substance added to the numberless material atoms of the body. The form of the body is not conditioned by the soul but is based on the laws of its physical, atomic structure. Awareness of sensory data is the only relation of soul to body. Cf. Northrop, op. cit., p. 276.

The logical formulation of the Roman Catholic ego-body relationship is a reflection of ākarma-saṁsāric experiences of the jīva. The Svetāśvatara Upanishad relates (5.11-12) "According unto his deeds (karman) the embodied one successively assumes forms in various conditions. Coarse and fine, many in number, the embodied one chooses forms according to his own qualities. [Each] subsequent cause of his union with them is seen to be because of the quality of his acts and of himself." Hume, The Thirteen Principle Upanishads, p. 407.

the empirical individual self (jīva or soul).²³¹ It "appears as jīva in the sphere of individual existence, in illusory mode, it is ātman in its supreme reality,"²³² the "vast background of [man's] being in which all individuals lie...the core of all being, the inner thread by being strung on which the world exists."²³³ When the ātman is realized, when integral man awakens to the Fact of the universal and ordines his life from this all-inclusive "center," "he is a complete man."²³⁴

Metaphysic does not quarrel with the use of the "image" as it is related to the jīva or ego, an image which is but an imperfect and "unrecognizable faint imitation...,"²³⁵ for "the ego of the individual is a distorted reflection of the true Self of the individual which is one with the Self in other individuals."²³⁶

Coomaraswamy²³⁷ writes that "the 'soul' is of the dust....," and this view of the limitations and dependence of

²³¹ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 29.

²³² Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 29.

²³³ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 83.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

²³⁵ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 157.

²³⁶ Ibid., p. 193.

²³⁷ Coomaraswamy, op. cit., p. 48.

the ifva is also found in early Christianity. Tatian²³⁸ in the Discourse to the Greeks said:

The soul, O Greeks, is not immortal, but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die. If, indeed it knows not the truth it dies and is dissolved with the body but rises again at last at the end of the world with the body receiving death by punishment in immortality. But again, if it acquires this knowledge of God it does not, although for a time it is dissolved.

Such immortality as was admitted by the early Fathers was not a natural immortality, for "the soul is immortal only because it has received life and in virtue of the divine decree."²³⁹ It is so "because God imparts life to it," a life which belongs only to God. The soul owes its existence to the creative will of God, likewise its destiny is dependent upon that will.²⁴⁰ Concerning immortality, however, it was "chiefly owing to the influence of Platonism that compelling philosophical reasons exist for the immortality of the soul."²⁴¹

The yearning of the ifva for eternal perpetuation extends also to its body. Christianity has existed without the concept of the immortality of the soul, but Christianity

²³⁸ Cited by Gilson, op. cit., p. 462.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 172.

²⁴⁰ Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1938), II.66.

²⁴¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 172.

"without the resurrection of the man...would be absolutely unthinkable" for it is the entire man who must "rejoice in eternal beatitude."²⁴² The Gospel announcement of salvation was given to the man, the substantial composite. The "salvation of the body by the soul"²⁴³ which, through resurrection, enables man to partake eternally of a "life of wisdom consisting in the contemplation of [God's] perfection and the beauty of His works."²⁴⁴

Christian man, further, is individual, as the psa and body are individual. St. Thomas Aquinas, differing somewhat from Duns Scotus²⁴⁵ affirmed that the soul, as such, is

²⁴² Ibid., p. 172.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 175. It is of interest to compare this salvation of the body with the alchemistic redemption of matter, "in which the divine soul is imprisoned in a sleeping and confined condition. Matter, which contains the divine mystery, is everywhere, and also in the human body." (Jung, The Integration of the Personality, p. 237) It is the alchemist's aim "to procure for this mysterious substance an eternal and perfect existence, to create the incombustible or incorruptible," (Ibid., p. 251) "to produce a corpus subtile, the transfigured resurrection body." (Ibid., p. 266) For a correlation of the alchemical doctrine of redemption with Manichaeism, which also influenced Christian thought, see Spiegelberg, Alchemy as a Way of Salvation, pp. 19-20.

The salvation of matter may be considered also as a reflection of Self-realization which brings into integral consciousness that which was inert, the illumination of that which was projected "into the darkness of matter..." (Jung, op. cit., p. 212.)

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 192-193.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 196.

non-individual.²⁴⁶ Of this Gilson²⁴⁷ says:

...it is indeed matter that individualizes the form, but ...once individualized, it is the form which is individual. In short, the soul is an individual form, although not precisely as form, and it is the subsistence of this individual form which, investing matter with its own proper existence, permits the individual to subsist.²⁴⁸

Man, according to Christian philosophy, is more than an individual, he is also a person which is essentially one with freedom, a freedom rooted in that rationality which "lies at the basis of the subsistence of the soul, and...therefore of the man."²⁴⁹ This person, known as "an individual substance of a rational nature"²⁵⁰ is such because it is created to the image of a Person, and participates in His personality. As "an intellect, a principle of free determinism...united to a matter so as to constitute a rational substance" the person, through constant and constructive moral and rational effort based upon a distinction between good and evil, can perfect a personality which "will only attain its full stature in

²⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 199.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 200-201.

²⁴⁸ This might be viewed as an attempt to justify a synthesis of the Universality of Self with the individuality of ifva.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 202.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 201.

the future life.²⁵¹

Watts²⁵² says that this valuation and development of personality is but a relatively recent tendency in Christianity and that the older concept of personality was more in accord with that of metaphysic, a "finding" of personality through denial of the ego, a losing of the soul which coincides with the realization of the Spirit or Self. This is very difficult for Christian understanding because, from a Catholic theological standpoint, spirit

...seems either to have been confused with the soul, or to have been left out of consideration altogether so that man may be defined in terms of every aspect of his nature except the spirit with the implication, perhaps, that spirit is more than man.²⁵³

Popular Christianity tends to confuse soul with spirit, ifva with Atman which would account for the general Western tendency to place the divine "'outside' and 'beyond' lest He likewise be identified with the individual soul," for the West feels the absurdity of identifying the ego with Spirit. Nevertheless Christianity "defines man as soul and body; it does not define him in so far as he is one who knows soul and body,"²⁵⁴ for to do so would be to transcend the religious order.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 203.

²⁵² Watts, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 79.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 82.

Metaphysically, Self-knowledge is the realization of the supreme identity of Atman and Brahman. Is there, then, a type of self-knowledge to be found in religion? Christians, first of all, "must learn to know the nature God gave them, and the place He worked out for them in the order of the universe, so that they in their turn might order themselves toward God."²⁵⁵ This is self-knowledge as it exists for man,²⁵⁶ a hierarchial arrangement of each in his proper place, closely akin to the medieval structure of society and the analogical relationship of vocation. It also may be considered as an analogical corollary with metaphysical realization of the Self which, transcending the ego-sense of a graded arrangement demanded and ordained by a "completely other," knows and integrates the finite as a conscious rather than an unconscious component.²⁵⁷ Watts²⁵⁸ states clearly:

Thus in the unconscious and ego-conscious stages the Self, as one with the infinite, always wills that which it experiences as a finite point of view. In realization this process becomes conscious. It becomes conscious when you, as the Self, find yourself able to will or accept your total experience, your state of mind and being as it is at any moment. This is something wholly different from lying down inertly under the heel of an impersonal Fate. It is the understanding that you, in

²⁵⁵ Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

²⁵⁷ Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178. See also p. 182.

identity with the infinite Self, are just exactly what you will to be and have just those experiences which you will to experience. Because of this Supreme Identity of the Self and the infinite, of the will of the Self and the will of the infinite, you accept and affirm in clear consciousness²⁵⁹ all that you are, all that you do, and all that you know and feel.

The ego, or soul, is said by Gilson²⁶⁰ to have a certain awareness or feeling of its own presence underlying those "sense illusions which cast a veil over its own nature." Gilson²⁶¹ further states that it must free itself from these illusions in order to recognize itself for "neither more nor less than it really is," that is to say, its limited ego-hood stamped to the image of God. This view clearly is an analogy, at all times within the individual order, of the metaphysical non-dual relationship of the Self and the veiling power of māyā. The Thomist concept, wherein "all knowledge presupposes a sense intuition," can permit the soul to know itself only indirectly, and even the Augustinian soul

does not apprehend itself without intermediary for ... this essence is an image of God...which not only has to express other things in order to know them, but also expresses itself to itself when it would know itself.

The resistance of the soul to being known by itself, its inscrutability, is said²⁶² to result from its participation

²⁵⁹ See Prasāda as clearness, infra, pp. 20 ff.

²⁶⁰ Gilson, op. cit., p. 265.

²⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 223-225.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 220.

in the incomprehensibility of God, in the unfathomed image of god "stamped" in the mind (mens).

Can the soul have a knowledge above the ego, that is to say, above itself? Catholic philosophy and theology agree with Eastern metaphysic in denying the ego, as such, a realization or knowledge above itself. Gilson²⁶³ points out the great and overwhelming difficulty inherent in man's knowing his environment, his waking consciousness, and the obscure workings of his "unconscious," but

when from his own being he would obtain light as to what is supra se, then indeed he finds himself face to face with a dark and somewhat terrifying mystery. If in any true sense man is an image of God how should he know himself without knowing God? But if it is really of God that he is an image, how should he know himself?

The ego alone cannot know the Self, and because the West has tended to omit the Self from its religious doctrines and to consider intuition of it by others as "abnormal," any intuitive movement which might be construed as opening onto the infinite is felt as reaching "back" into that which is tabu, back into God. "Full of fear and a kind of sacred horror... at the sight of this divine presence, man stands awestruck at himself, perceiving the mystery that underlies the appearances of his human nature."²⁶⁴ Although the Christian soul is

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 219.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 221.

considered²⁶⁵ capable of attaining to divine knowledge of the intelligible in a state separate from the body, such is not its natural state nor its natural mode of knowing.

True judgment, as conceived by Augustine, could not be dependent upon the sensible order with its mutability.²⁶⁶ To be true it must judge, not by "accepting empirically the thing that is, but by referring it to what it ought to be,"²⁶⁷ which presupposes "a natural illumination of the mind of God [who is] the living seed that enters the womb of thought."²⁶⁸ St. Thomas, on the other hand, conceived of the active intellect analogically participating in the light of divine truth, an intellect endowed as a "participated likeness of the uncreated light in which dwell the ideas."²⁶⁹

Human reason, if it is to be at all capable of true moral judgment, must be

...informed...by the divine law at each of its degrees (i.e. by natural information, by sacred doctrine, or by infusion)...directed by God to the supernatural end ...subject to the prescriptions of revelation or the hidden actions of grace.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 251.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 229.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 136.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 137.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 139-141.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 329.

Nevertheless all knowledge of God, "this side of the beatific vision," although it may possess truth and certainty, "remains irremediably deficient, disproportionate by its very mode of grasping and signifying the object signified and known."²⁷¹ This appreciation, in the analogical terminology of religion, of the insufficiency of human reason "this side" of metaphysical realization, does not lessen, however, the basic religious dependence upon theoretical speculation in its practical aspect as the regulator of human action in the living world, for here the speculative order is prior to and immanent in the practical order.

Maritain²⁷² conceives the mind in its consideration of the world of existence as speculatively moving upward toward a greater "pureness of intelligibility" through stages of natural science, the philosophy of nature, mathematics, and finally the realm of metaphysics (which is not to be confused with metaphysic), each stage being further removed from gross matter. It then begins a return movement to the world of existence, focused now upon human actions in that world, and, "this time in the practical order, applies itself to know, not only in order to know, but in order to act, and to acquire an object which is something practical." Although

²⁷¹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 17.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 384.

proceeding in a practical manner, this knowledge "in regard to the general and fundamental equipment of knowledge" remains in a "speculative and explicative mode..." Thus, for Catholic theology, practical knowledge cannot be divorced from the theoretical and speculative mode which discovers rules of action which the practical adapts for use.²⁷³

Upon this framework of speculative and practical orders, Maritain²⁷⁴ sets forth three forms of wisdom, the metaphysical, theological, and mystical.

In this scheme metaphysics (in its philosophical meaning and as it is known in the West) is placed at the summit of the purely speculative order. Its truth is "in itself accessible by reason alone [and does not demand]... for its understanding a mystical experience,"²⁷⁵ for, strengthened by supernatural light and theology, it is sufficient for "the truths which are demonstrable by reason alone."²⁷⁶ It does, however, incline the soul toward that superior knowledge which is to be found in the mystical experience or contemplation of the saints, a knowledge which does not contradict the truths of the philosophical intellect, but "assists

²⁷³ See Fig. 1., p. lxxx

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 312. See Fig. 2., p. lxxxi.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 344.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 450.




Fig. 1

THE SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL ORDERS²⁷⁷²⁷⁷ From Maritain, op. cit., p. 385.

The Beatific Vision.....seen in His essence




Fig. 2

THE THREE FORMS OF WISDOM²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 312.

and purifies" them.²⁷⁹

Theology²⁸⁰ also embraces the speculative inasmuch as through its cataphatic nature it is considered as necessarily prior to the mystical contemplation toward which it should lead. Its positive and logical description of the divine in concrete terms is, however, conceived as capable of communicating as a "true practical knowledge" all speculatively conceived truth which is necessary "for the immediate regulation of action."²⁸¹ Thus theological knowledge is said to embrace both the speculative and practical orders, but it is "still in a speculative manner, and with pure intellect, that theology considers and regulates human actions. It is, we may say, a speculatively practical science."²⁸²

The metaphysical viewpoint would not quarrel with any contention that theoretical and speculative knowledge or contemplation is a "preliminary means,"²⁸³ "a preparation for

²⁷⁹ Loc. cit. Thus Western metaphysics is conceived only within certain limitations and not sufficiently detached from that which is of the nature of philosophy. It has "remained incomplete, with the result that its universal character, implying as it does the absence of limitation, was never fully grasped." Metaphysic, therefore, has never been fully known in the West. Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 122-123.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 294.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 387.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 386.

²⁸³ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, p. 264.

...integral experience,"²⁸⁴ "a support or point of departure, playing the part of 'aids' only,"²⁸⁵ for the Self does not so exclude them as differentiations. The spiritual intuition of the Self includes them, rather, within an interdependent synthesis.²⁸⁶ Further, the processes of reason aid in logically demonstrating the metaphysical realization.²⁸⁷ It must be understood, however, that as "no amount of sense training can make the senses perceive thought, even so no amount of intellectual skill can lead us to the intuitive experience,"²⁸⁸ for one of the greatest "aids" reason can render toward realization is "a sort of intellectual passivity [wherein] ...the mind is [kept] still in a perfect purity and peace,"²⁸⁹ a ... passivity which is the preparation for the highest knowledge."²⁹⁰

In the purely practical order, as conceived by Maritain,²⁹¹ there is, as an "intermediate zone of knowledge between speculatively-practical knowledge and prudence" that which is called

²⁸⁴ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 147.

²⁸⁵ Guénon, op. cit., p. 172.

²⁸⁶ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 153.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 181.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 211.

²⁸⁹ See prasāda as purity of mind, infra, pp. 20 ff.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 180

²⁹¹ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 387-388.

"practically-practical knowledge," which, reversing the methods of theoretical knowledge, does not attempt to explain or resolve a truth into its reason and principle but to "prepare an action," to synthesize and unite rather than analyze. In its lower reaches it is the practically-practical science of living, of manners and art, and encompasses the crafts, professions, arts, and social sciences.

There is also a higher practically-practical science, that of contemplation which, sharing with theology in

...that action par excellence which is the passion of divine things and the contemplative union with God... the science of the practitioners of soul, of the masters of spirituality, of the artisans of sanctity...

This practically-practical science of contemplation is dependent upon the speculatively-practical knowledge of theology taken as a "virtually revealed science proceeding in the speculative mode" and is considered as an "extension of theology, into which mystical experience and the gifts of the Holy Ghost intervene....a particular development of theological habitude." This mystical contemplation remains at all times controlled by theology and dependent upon the latter's regulation through those "multitudinous notions and conceptual signs by which divine Truth is manifest to our intelligence and without any abandonment of revealed dogmas," for through its surpassing of those notions and signs it but

fulfills them and gives them greater coherence.²⁹² The mystical knowledge and wisdom which enters into this contemplation is through the supernatural and infused gifts of the Holy Ghost which renders the soul sensible to a special inspiration of God.²⁹³ This is, however, not an "absolutely immediate and therefore perfectly experienced knowledge of God, [for that] is reserved for the beatific state."²⁹⁴ It is not beatitude, "the perfect spiritual possession of divine reality," but its beginning.²⁹⁵ The contemplative life, "the highest end of man...is not the intuitive vision of the divine essence," for on earth it is possible only to have "a partial knowledge of God by mental images (phantasmata) ..."²⁹⁶ Even this "approximation to the divine essence as an object of our vision" is man's only so far as it is "ordinated by grace" and given to men, capable because they are reasonable beings with a capacity which "lies in the obediential potency of [their] souls with regard to the First Agent."²⁹⁷

²⁹² Ibid., pp. 390-393. See also p. 15.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 320.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 305.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁹⁶ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 278.

²⁹⁷ Maritain, op. cit., p. 317.

In the contemplation of the saints, as it is in metaphysic, the formulated and conceptual affirmation of what God is has been found to be quite inadequate and futile as a description of that which is experienced. Even though the Christian mystic places almost sole emphasis upon a feeling of things divine, a Christian faith and love which unites him, as it were, with a being of another order,²⁹⁸ he somewhat parallels the Eastern metaphysic by expressing himself in an "apophatic theology which knows God by the mode of negation or ignorance," rather than through the positive cataphatic mode of theoretical speculative knowledge.²⁹⁹ This Christian way of ignorance is conceived as more than the via negationis which, according to Maritain³⁰⁰ marks the highest point of metaphysical or ordinary theoretical understanding and is but an announcement that God is like no created thing. It is, rather, a theologia negativa, an "ignorance which knows," above reason only because of entrance into contemplation, a "theology of another kind [which] is mystical experience or it is nothing." As cataphatic knowledge is a knowledge of truth "from the outside," apophatic theology "experiences mystically in that mode without modes...that reserve of ignorance which is the crown of communicable

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 416.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 291.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 291-292. Apophatic knowledge is called by Maritain (p. 294) the "Wisdom of the Holy Ghost."

knowledge of these things." Mystical or apophatic theology, while higher than the speculative in its manner of attainment,³⁰¹ is in constant need of speculative theology as a foundation which it supplements but can not contradict. It can never act as a substitute for "ordinary" theology, for the highest of supernatural truths available to contemplation are "spoken of by dogmatic formulas infallibly and with a perfect exactitude and absolute truth." Apophatic knowledge, continues Maritain³⁰² from the religious viewpoint, does not lend itself to any identification of contraries through a higher synthesis, for he conceives such an action as the faulty product of an intellectual super-knowledge which produces "at one and the same time a philosophy which to be true must enunciate, and a philosophy which in being true destroys enunciation; the one cancels the other." This criticism, however, can in no wise touch metaphysical realization which is not a philosophy nor a super-knowledge based upon any rationality, although it is the ground of all philosophy and all rationality.

The mystical experience, as described further by Maritain³⁰³ is characterized by a co-naturality whereby [in

³⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 294-295.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 296.

³⁰³ Ibid., pp. 321-323.

a manner which may be invisioned as somewhat analogous to that of an inductive current] a capacity or desire which, rooted and ingrown within man's faculties, enables him to respond by a kind of immediate instinctive inclination to the object, though not with the "absolutely immediate knowledge reserved for the beatific vision." There is no identity with the object (for the soul like the ifva is, metaphysically speaking, the individual ego and therefore is incapable of knowledge by identity), but the "feeling actually experienced of the soul, the actual effects which serve as an actual medium of knowledge under the illumination of the Holy Ghost." God, then, is not seen in His essence but only known by His effects which are experienced, not in themselves as "formal signs...of intellection," but in an order of knowledge by love which, as a means, is "wholly obscure, experimental and apophatic, which unites the soul to a hidden God..."

The Catholic Christian properly maintains his sole privilege, given by the grace of his creator, to that participative union known in the contemplation of the saints and the specifically Christian grace of the beatific vision, for "the Christian man alone knows what it is that raises him above all creatures, for he alone knows of what Creator he is the image; but he knows also by that very fact that the depths of his own being surpass his own powers of vision, that the full grasp of the soul by the soul is an ambition to

be realized in mystical union or in the future life."³⁰⁴
 This mystical union and beatific vision, however, is that which is experienced by the soul or jiva, and not the Self-realization of metaphysic, of which the former is an analogy. In addition the ego, soul, or jiva, by whatever name or faith, is capable of becoming aware of the limits of its own powers of vision and the gap which seems to separate it from infinity.

In the main, Catholic Christians, however, do not touch even the mystical periphery of their doctrine, and Protestantism withdraws from it still more. Modern Protestant fundamentalists, such as Karl Barth, contend³⁰⁵ that "we are in the midst of the subjective in mystical experience and God as the object will always remain on the other side of experience," for mystic states are looked upon as "psychopathic conditions." As far as the great mass of Western Christians are concerned, those of all faiths, the goal is in the future, after death, and the mystical experience, if it is believed in at all, is but a by-product,³⁰⁶ for

in our own ecclesiastical circles those who show any interest in it [the spiritual wisdom of metaphysic] are usually regarded as eccentric and a little mad, and

³⁰⁴ Gilson, op. cit., p. 222.

³⁰⁵ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 297.

³⁰⁶ From an unpublished lecture by Watts, San Francisco, March 27, 1951.

sometimes as dangerous heretics. But when religion ignores this vital center of man's spiritual life and treats it as eccentric, the Church necessarily falls into impotence and disunity.³⁰⁷

Roman Catholic theology emphasizes the dependence of the natural order upon the supernatural. Man, made to the image of God, in every aspect of his physical, intellectual and volitional life^{is} subject to the divine providence and judgment of that God, and the beatitude he seeks is of a Being transcendent to and completely other than himself. In common with the physical world each created being and each of its actions depends "momentarily, for existence and efficacy, on an omnipotent conserving will."³⁰⁸ The Catholic natural order includes certain immaterial substances³⁰⁹ such as the angelic order which is intellectual but not composed of essence and existence, the distinctive characteristics of the supernatural, or God, "the only being in whom essence and existence are identical."³¹⁰ Catholic religious doctrine³¹¹

³⁰⁷ Watts, op. cit., p. 14.

³⁰⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 364.

³⁰⁹ Under the Sāṃkhya system there is a somewhat similar classification where, for example, buddhi or the discriminating intellect, predominately sattvic in nature, arises out of prakṛiti as does the antahkarana or complex composed of the mind (manas), the ego sense (ahaṃkāra), and the buddhi. See Chatterjee and Datta, op. cit., pp. 298-306.

³¹⁰ Gilson, op. cit., p. 432.

³¹¹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 332.

does not conceive the possibility of an authentic mystical experience, bearing upon God himself and carrying with it the "sensibility of the divine reality," as possible in the natural order. Without the supernatural aid and inspiration of grace which makes possible the "experience of the deep things of God" the mind of man cannot be raised to know, "in a super-human mode due to connaturality and charity." The authentic Catholic mystical experience presupposes and can only occur in the supernatural order of "sanctifying grace and by its means." Furthermore³¹² grace is bestowed by the "completely other," by God and there is no partnership between nature and God. "...nature does not begin from below what grace completes from above," for such a sharing would be conceived, from the religious view, as "mechanical addition." Nature can remain only passively docile to an infusion of qualities from outside and above which can raise it to that which in itself it could not grasp. The soul, like the jiva, cannot raise itself to the supreme vision. The difference lies, however, in that the soul depends upon an outside aid to be raised to another state or stage, whereas the jiva depends upon the "unveiled" Self or Atman which will realize the infinity already present here and now. In addition, the tendency of Christian doctrine to monopolize valid mystical experience

³¹² Ibid., p. 317.

through special and supernatural revelation is in itself not unique, for such is the basis of all doctrines incorporated in every religious belief.³¹³

Roman Catholic theology³¹⁴ is based upon a primary dichotomy between nature and God., an eternal separation wherein nature has need of the miraculous appearance of the transcendent and supernatural to effect a transforming change and reorganization which³¹⁵ does not obliterate nature but perfects it. Eastern metaphysic, however, sees the multiform many of nature as based and grounded in the nonseparate transcendent.³¹⁶ It is not a "nature mysticism"³¹⁷ wherein the jiva experiences an "immersion in the oneness of nature," but instead is an experience of the Self which does not exclude either nature or jiva. Religion seeks the touch of the divine miracle "in certain places, here and there"³¹⁸ as a supernatural event in time and history whereas metaphysic realizes "unrestrictedness of the miracle, and therefore an abandoning of all fixations and limiting statements about it.

³¹³ Watts, op. cit., p. 41.

³¹⁴ Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy, p. 374.

³¹⁵ Watts, op. cit., p. 37.

³¹⁶ Northrop, op. cit., p. 374.

³¹⁷ Otto, op. cit., p. 74.

³¹⁸ Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, pp. 40-41.

He who has entered into the super-religious state no longer believes in a system of theological knowledge, and suspects every claim which is made in this direction." Metaphysical realization³¹⁹ is not of "two spheres miraculously intermingling [for] ...the power of the higher insight is not supernatural in the sense of a 'donum superadditum' but it is just the essential of the soul."

Metaphysic realizes the impossibility of separating the finite from the infinite, for "nature" is the manifestation and embodiment of That which is its ground, and therefore leads to the infinite.³²⁰ A consciousness of the multiplicity of nature, alone and in itself, is but a partial experience of the "play or varied self-expression of the One,"³²¹ and is therefore ignorance. The consciousness of the One without the realization of its multiplicity is but a "sterile" knowledge, a limited knowledge. Thus the Upanishad states:³²²

Into blind darkness enter they that worship ignorance;
Into darkness greater than that, as it were, they that
delight in knowledge.

Man's perfection, therefore, lies in the realization

³¹⁹ Otto, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

³²⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 79.

³²¹ Sri Aurobindo, Isā Upanishad (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1945), p. 68.

³²² Isopanishad. 9. ; Hume, op. cit., p. 363.
andhaṁ tamaḥ pravṛṣanti ye 'vidyāmupāśate |
tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyām ratāḥ ||
-see also Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4;4.10.

of the advaitic or non-dual identity of the world and the infinite.³²³ This view is further expressed by Woodroffe³²⁴ in tāntric terminology when he says:

The Natural, which is the manifestation of the Mother or Nature, and the Spiritual or the Mother as She is in and by Herself are one, but the initiate alone truly recognizes this unity. He knows himself in all his natural functions as the one Consciousness whether in enjoyment (bhukti), or liberation (mukti). It is an essential principle of Tāntrik Sādhana that man in general must rise through and by means of Nature, and not by an ascetic rejection of Her.

Christian apologists³²⁵ are aware of that which Northrop³²⁶ calls the "aesthetic" component in metaphysic, but they attempt to restrict it to a philosophically metaphysical order which, "precisely as an artefaction, a work of art" transcends "external nature"; the sensible and the supra-sensible." It cannot, then encompass a "formal participation in deity" for it remains in nature as its summit. As such it is considered as without the special gift of that Christian grace which, it is said, alone can ordinate man to the true mystical vision of the divine essence, and pertains only to the natural intellect, not to "knowledge in grace." It is conceived³²⁷ as "a far-off image

³²³ Sri Aurobindo, op. cit., p. 69.

³²⁴ Woodroffe, Sakti and Śākta, p. 129.

³²⁵ Maritain, op. cit., p. 316.

³²⁶ See Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, pp. 300-306.

³²⁷ Maritain, op. cit., p. 347.

on an inferior plane of mystical contemplation," and as it runs the risk of being mistaken for the Christian mystical experience, is to be regarded as a "dangerous natural symbol." Maritain³²⁸ does, however, recognize that it is possible to find individual examples of authentic mystical experience among exceptional persons who are nominally included within the Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu spheres. Inasmuch, though, as these "mystical schools" have no foundation based upon Christian theological faith any authentic mystical experience found therein must "result from divine grace and infused contemplation," modified, no doubt, and existing without the benefit of sacramental grace and revealed truth which is reserved for the purely Christian experience. "Veracious contemplatives," although they may be non-Christian, are by virtue of the authenticity of their experience to be considered as "belonging invisibly to the Church of Christ, and have sanctifying grace and so theological faith and the infused virtues." Rāmakrishna is cited³²⁹ as an example of this type of "pagan" contemplative who has received a "scattered fragment" of Christian revelation, and who therefore must have adhered at least to the first two articles of

³²⁸ Ibid., pp. 336-337.

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 338.

Roman Catholic faith,³³⁰ namely, a supernatural belief that God exists and will save those who seek him, thus implying belief in the other four articles.

On the whole, however, the Church classifies the non-Christian spiritual experience as of the natural order and "an external resemblance to supernatural contemplation,"³³¹ particularly so with reference to the techniques of yoga, "the 'physics' of the interior life..." which are considered as purely natural. Even the natural or philosophic mode which may be termed as non-Christian is thought of as tending toward an impure state wherever assistance is not forthcoming from actual graces and the discipline of dogmatic theology. From the Roman Catholic point of view, then, such natural and non-Christian contemplation is open, not only to the base and corruptive influences of the body and imagination, but also to the "mental commerce with the angelic nature as such, which is the same in the good and evil angels."³³² Maritain,³³³ further, views non-Christian, and particularly

³³⁰ Pohle, op. cit., p. 183. The six articles of faith are: "a supernatural belief in...the existence of God, retribution in the next world, the blessed Trinity, the incarnation, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace."

³³¹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 339.

³³² Loc. cit. Cf. devas and asuras. See also Watts, op. cit., p. 190 n.

³³³ Maritain, op. cit., p. 340.

Indian, spiritual experiences, in the main, as succumbing to the attractions of sharing in the beatitude of the angelic pure intelligence, imitating "in some fashion, in a suspension of knowledge, in a night, but quite another night than that of infused contemplation..., their manner of self-knowledge and knowledge of the Supreme." He continues,³³⁴ further defining and judging an experience of one order in terms of another:

If it is so, we can more easily understand how a certain kind of intellectual mysticism, which seeks for ecstasy or 'realization' by means of asceticism and an entirely metaphysical dialectic, and of which we can find examples among the Neoplatonists and the Gnostics or in various oriental schools of thought, may achieve that absorption into the unity of which Porphyry speaks apropos of his master, and so reach a form of superhuman state which seems due to the collusion of a higher intellectual world: but it is equally comprehensible how infinitely far such metaphysical ecstasy, where the human mind brushes against an angelic abyss, is from any interpenetration of divine things, and indeed must inevitably find its end in pantheism.

Concerning pantheism Gilson³³⁵ writes:

As soon as we identify God with Being it becomes clear that there is a sense in which God alone is. If we refuse to admit this we shall have to assert that all things are God, and that is precisely what a Christian can never do...if all things are God, then there is no God.

Northrop³³⁶ defines pantheism as "the doctrine that the universe in its totality is God," but asserts that Eastern meta-

³³⁴ Loc. cit.

³³⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 65.

³³⁶ Northrop, op. cit., p. 401.

physic no more identifies the divine with this limited totality than do theists of the West or East. Śrīnivāśachāri³³⁷ concurs in this view and states that no Vedānta school is pantheistic and includes in that statement Viśiṣṭādvaitic theism which "defines Brahman as the Self that is in all beings and beyond them."³³⁸ Immanence of the divine is not to be confused with the limited identity of the universe, as we find it, with God. "Hindu thought takes care to emphasize the transcendent character of the Supreme"³³⁹ which, furthermore, is not in opposition to the finite and individual inasmuch as, being beyond the duality of opposites, it is "absolutely all-inclusive."³⁴⁰ For Maritain³⁴¹ it is conceivable that the presence of a personal and separate God be in all that He has created. He writes: "...St. Theresa received in supernatural prayer the infused knowledge of the presence of God in all things in His creative immensity...". This can be viewed well as a personalized analogy of the transcendent-immanent, the Śiva-Sakti of Eastern experience.

³³⁷ Śrīnivāśachāri, op. cit., p. 77.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 592.

³³⁹ Rādhakṛiṣṇan, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

³⁴⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 32.

³⁴¹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 344.

Religion as analogy. The Western world has no broad basis composed of a living, native metaphysic. Its nearest approach to the Eastern tradition is the "doctrinal and sacramental structure" of "traditional Catholic Christianity"³⁴² which, purposefully or not, contains true religious analogies to the principles of metaphysic³⁴³ or, as it were, interpretations in another order of spiritual wisdom, "as a dancer interprets music."³⁴⁴ "In religion," writes Watts,³⁴⁵ "the formless and imageless ultimate Reality is translated into finite images," "physical" images which conform to those elements of dogma, moral law or value, and cult mentioned by Guénon³⁴⁶ as peculiar and unique to the three Semitic religions. Thus there are the conceptual or rational images, the feeling images or values, and sense images which reflect in the sacraments.³⁴⁷

It is the tendency of religion to overlook the symbolic character and function of its "creed, code, and cult" and to confuse the analogy, the tentative, provisional and

³⁴² Watts, op. cit., p. 142.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 160. See also p. 31.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

³⁴⁶ Guénon, op. cit., p. 103. See also Watts, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

³⁴⁷ Watts, op. cit., p. 50.

constructed theory with the highest spiritual experience itself; to set apart the peculiar and unique characteristics of its own point of view, establish them as the norm and the real and, by definition, consider all other views as non-real or false.³⁴⁸

The crystalization of the analogy and the theoretical complex into articles of faith tends to destroy the utility of that analogical aid or support and make of it an end in itself, a legalistic adherence to the letter at the expense of the spirit. "The greatest idolotry," states Rādhakrishnan,³⁴⁹

³⁴⁸ Such an attitude is not reserved for purely religious writers. From Hopkins, The Religions of India, pp. 570-571: "No sect has ever formulated as an original doctrine Christ's two indissoluble commandments, on which hang all the law and the prophets. ... In her own religions there is no hope for India, and her best minds have renounced them. The body of Hinduism is corrupt, its soul is evil. As for Brāhmanism ... that produced the Upanishads--the spirit is departed, and the form that remains is dead. But a new spirit, the spirit of progress and of education, will prevail at last. When it rules it will undo the bonds of caste and do away with low superstition. Then India also will be free to accept, as the creed of her new religion, Christ's words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God..." But to educate India up to this point will take many centuries, even more, perhaps, than will be needed to educate in the same degree Europe and America." See also Rādhakrishnan, East and West in Religion, p. 50.

³⁴⁹ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 119. In a sense of endeavoring to preserve strictly religious values Maritain (op. cit., p. 348.) notes certain dangers which analogy may incur. He says: "...for divine things are so lofty and transcendent that sometimes it is only in the negative correspondences of sin that they are able to show forth their analogies." He further states that "The danger always exists of taking an analogy between essentially distinct and even infinitely distant terms (as in the case where one analogue is formally divine by participation and the other may be subject to sin) for a natural continuity or tendency..."

"is the worship of the letter."

Analogy and symbol also are to be found within the framework of a traditional society based upon metaphysic. Watts³⁵⁰ notes that, in a metaphysical society, "a certain element of analogy remains as long as there is no immediate realization." Any discussion of that realization of necessity must be either of a negative character or partake of a certain amount of poetic license which is proper as long as it is understood in the nature of play or lila rather than literal truth or infallible theology. If the ground of the metaphysical order is realized constantly and properly, symbolological, analogical, and conceptual expression-aids have their place.³⁵¹ Northrop³⁵² writes,

The Eastern, on the other hand, uses bits of linguistic symbolism, largely denotive, and often purely ideographic in character, to point toward a component in the nature of things which only immediate experience and continued contemplation can convey.

Metaphysic cannot be contained within any religious category, whether it be "speculative," "speculatively-practical," or "practically practical." It is beyond all idea, speculation, or action,³⁵³ for it is superior to, although not exclusive of,

³⁵⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 53.

³⁵¹ Huxley, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁵² Northrop, op. cit., p. 316.

³⁵³ Cf. Bhagavad Gita 8:3., "Brahman (or the Absolute) is the indestructible, the Supreme (higher than all else),

individual contingencies.³⁵⁴

From the basis of all-embracing consciousness Srf Aurobindo³⁵⁵ draws sharp distinctions between the ordinary life, religious life (dharmā jīvan) and spiritual life (adhyātmā jīvan):

The ordinary life is that of the average human consciousness separated from its own true self and from the Divine and led by the common habits of the mind, life and body which are the laws of ignorance. The religious life is a movement of the same ignorant human consciousness, turning or trying to turn away from the earth towards the Divine but as yet without knowledge and led by the dogmatic tenets and rules of some sect or creed which claims to have found the way out of the bonds of the earth-consciousness into some beatific Beyond. The religious life may be the first approach to the spiritual, but very often it is only a turning about in a round of rites, ceremonies and practices or set ideas and forms without any issue. The spiritual life, on the contrary, proceeds directly by a change in consciousness, a change from the ordinary consciousness, ignorant and separated from its true self and from God, to a greater consciousness in which one finds one's true being and comes first into

essential nature is called the Self. Karma is the name given to the creative force that brings beings into existence."
(Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 227.)

akṣharam brahma paramam svabhāvo'dhyātmamuchyate |
bhūtabhāvodbhavaḥ karō viśargah karmasamjñitah ||

Rādhakṛishṇan comments thus: "The Immutable which is above all dualities of subject and object, becomes, from the cosmic end, the eternal subject, adhyātmā, facing the eternal object which is mutable in nature, prakṛitī, the receptacle of all forms, while karma is the creative force, the principle of movement. All these are not independent but are the manifestations of the One Supreme..the expression of Brahman, the Absolute Spirit which is above distinctions of subject and object."

³⁵⁴ Guénon, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

³⁵⁵ Srf Aurobindo, Letters of Srf Aurobindo, I, 90.

direct and living contact and then into union with the Divine. For the spiritual seeker this change of consciousness is the one thing he seeks and nothing else matters.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE GAP

Self and Ego. "Of moksha [liberation] we have no personal need; for the soul is niyamukta [eternally free] and bondage is an illusion. We play at being bound, we are not really bound."³⁵⁶

It definitely ^{to be} is understood that the Self is in no need of realization³⁵⁷ for the Self determines Itself as the unconscious play (lila) of differentiation, the ego-state, as well as the conscious realization of that play.³⁵⁸

From the limited and separate ego (jiva) view there is necessarily a continuity of awareness, in varying degree, of a lack of wholeness, an incompleteness encompassing a field of ceaseless and frustrating activity³⁵⁹ dedicated to an ultimately unattainable and temporally recessive series of limited goals.³⁶⁰ The ego can never be satisfied in its

³⁵⁶ Sri Aurobindo, The Yoga and its Object, p. 1. The word "soul" is here used in the sense of Self or Atman, not the jiva or ego.

³⁵⁷ Watts, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

³⁵⁸ This, translated into analogical religious terms would become the all-pervading will of God, purveyor of grace.

³⁵⁹ Watts, op. cit., p. 145.

³⁶⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 303. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, East and West in Religion, p. 134.

ego-hood; a "divine discontent" tends to permeate in some measure even the lowest harmonics of its activity, a witness to the hard fact of their limitations. "When self-consciousness," says Rādhakṛishṇan,³⁶¹ "knows itself to be finite and limited, it is a greater than self that judges that which is less than itself in its wholeness." William James³⁶² speaks of this "uneasiness" as "something wrong about us as we naturally stand" and states that "the individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness and criticizes it, is to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch with something higher, if anything higher exists." Within the realm of speculation about that "something higher" and its relationship to the uneasy individual arise the varied theological, religious, and philosophical theories which color the expressions given to ego-anguish and determine the hoped-for means of bridging the separative gap. Man's ordinary experiences here, in saṃsāra, exhibit an all too evident state of stress which engenders³⁶³ waste and disease in the order of nature, strife and world chaos in human relationships, and either dark, unknowing fear or the drugged

³⁶¹ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 302.

³⁶² William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random House, Modern Library), pp. 498-500.

³⁶³ Huxley, op. cit., p. 233.

numbness of ignorance concerning the spiritual.³⁶⁴ Herein is constructed a world of duality, of sharp contrast between pleasure-pain, the good-the evil, the "fact" of sorrow eternally separate from that perfect happiness which "should be."³⁶⁵ The ego experiences a relentless flux, bringing with it inevitable suffering, pain, sorrow and ruin, within a world pronounced good by its creator; an action play of frustrating and agonizing opposites which accompany the willed, therefore accepted, manifestation of the power (śakti) of the Absolute.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ "I was not sorrowful, but only tired of everything that ever I desired."

Ernest Dowson, "Spleen," The Poems and Prose of Ernest Dowson (New York: Modern Library), p. 42.

³⁶⁵ Cf. James, op. cit., p. 137. "In short, life and its negation are beaten up inextricably together. But if the life be good, the negation of it must be bad. Yet the two are equally essential facts of existence; and all natural happiness thus seems infected with a contradiction. The breath of the sepulchre surrounds it."

Dowson (Op. cit., p. 41), in his poem "Exile" says to his anima images:

No man knoweth our desolation;
Memory pales of the old delight;
While the sad waters of separation
Bear us on to the ultimate night.

He also (in the poem "Dregs," p. 116.) senses what would be the vanity and bitterness of samsāra:

The fire is out, and spent the warmth thereof
(This is the end of every song man sings)
The golden wine is drunk, the dregs remain,
Bitter as wormwood and as salt as pain;
And health and hope have gone the way of love
Into the drear oblivion of lost things.

³⁶⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 94.

Thus the imperfections known to the ego can be explained as existent only through a quality or state of relationship between the ego and "that which is higher."

From the point of view of the metaphysical absolute, the Self, no relationship can be improper, for all is in accord with the will which manifests the līlā. There can be only a state of ignorance (avidyā) willed as the necessary part of saṃsāric play, a "movement of separation" or frustration which can be but the manifest other part of the "movement of union"³⁶⁷ or satisfaction, "the unity in duality." The world of saṃsāra is a construction, a binding or forgetting, and its appearances are veiled in avidyā or nescience³⁶⁸ wherein separation is carried to the point where the īśva is distinguished by the desire will, the voluntas propria³⁶⁹ which binds the ego in that self satisfying longing (arthārthisaṃbandha) or root desire³⁷⁰ which colors its entire saṃsāric experience. Avidyā is always separative in nature, but different schools of metaphysic have defined it in slightly varied terms. Sāṃkhya³⁷¹ thought emphasized its

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

³⁶⁸ Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 183.

³⁶⁹ Huxley, op. cit., p. 174.

³⁷⁰ Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 183.

³⁷¹ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 171.

aspect as an identity of pure spirit (purusha) with nature (prakriti). Vedānta stated it differently as ignorance of the identity of Self (ātman) and Brahman, while Buddhistic ignorance was that of a wrong view of this ever-changing world of opposites which bears within its desire-clashes the fruits of pain and sorrow. Rādhakṛishṇan³⁷² could have been speaking for Eastern metaphysic as a whole, as well as for the Buddha, when he stated, "He thought of the world as ignorant rather than wicked."

From the ego's exaggerated view there is a separation which should not be, an estrangement between himself and the "wholly other."³⁷³ He feels himself limited, distant and apart from both the Almighty as "other" and the earth, all too near and known in memory and fear as the area of suffering and sorrow.³⁷⁴ Over and above the world of everyday

³⁷² Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 183.

³⁷³ Watts, op. cit., p. 102. Also compare with Sartre's "l'en-soi-pour-soi," Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952), pp. 159-165.

³⁷⁴ Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 232. Speaking of Franz Kafka's "The Trial" he says: "Man appears as a stranger to the world into which he has been 'thrown' and in which he is inescapably involved...Everywhere man finds himself locked out and alone with himself...handed over to uncertainty and insecurity."

Also Cf. lines from "Endless Yearning" by Li Po, [Witter Bynner and Kiang Kang-Hu, The Jade Mountain (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), p. 69]:

Above, I see the blueness and deepness of sky.
Below, I see the greenness and the restlessness of water...
Heaven is high, earth wide; bitter between them flies
my sorrow.

reality lies that which is "entirely different," that which can effect jurisdictional contact with the below only through miracle, cataclysmic act, or the supernatural medium of its agent. Thus the ego constructs a religious duality³⁷⁵ in recognition of the gap separating it from the Other, a temporal and oft-times spatial analogy of the principle of non-duality.

Guilt. Imperfections experienced by the ego, then, are due to an improper relation between it, as the lower, and the supreme authoritative Being as a result of disobedience, of "a debt of guilt contracted with God..., a want of right relationship with God"³⁷⁶ which can make us "objects of divine wrath and abhorrence,"³⁷⁷ of "His hate and anger" until the debt is paid, through his aiding grace, by repentance and "rendering satisfaction."³⁷⁸

Upon the "native goodness"³⁷⁹ which was a primary gift of grace bestowed by the Roman Catholic God, there are "super-induced" the deforming ills of sin, distorting the

³⁷⁵ Cf. Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, p. 14.

³⁷⁶ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 253.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 619.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 253.

³⁷⁹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 295-296.

image to God, thus making it false to its creator and to its own nature, a situation which engenders a "horror of self" which is the inner tragedy of the sinner's life." The Christian horror of the distorted image remains until, "through charity and grace" the image is not only restored but the reflection of God Himself is envisioned. Gilson³⁸⁰ also states in literal and finite religious terminology a perfect analogical example of the lila of atman in samsara, wherein the jiva, ego, or soul is a finite "forgetting," a sleep state which in itself aspires to be infinite; a level of limited animality which needs but "remember" or awaken to know its true nature. He says:

The grandure of man lies in the fact that he is created to the image and likeness of God....He very well knows that it is not to himself that he owes his greatness... If he fails to recognize his dignity he does not know himself; if he insists on it without referring it to a greater than himself, he founders on the rock of vain-glory...forgetting his humble estate he aspires to set himself among the angels, and even to usurp the place of God....Being created in all the glory of divine likeness, man loses this glory as soon as he forgets it. Doubtless the fact of his dignity remains, but in the measure in which he fails to recognize it he lowers himself to the level of the brutes... [Memory itself is said to have a redeeming action, for] by the mere fact that he remembers, man partially redeems the world from the stream of becoming that sweeps it along, and redeems himself along with it.³⁸¹

Man's willed, ego-centric self interest, and not an

³⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 216-217.

³⁸¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 386.

inherent evilness of nature, thus is in direct opposition to his utter dependence upon the religious Creator,³⁸² although Protestant Christianity carries with it a more naturalistic and "melancholy 'conviction of sin'...., of feeling inwardly vile and wrong."³⁸³ Regardless of its origin, however, there is a religious sense of guilt, of an all-too-easy sinfulness that serves to divide the Christian from his God,³⁸⁴ an "infinite gulf between his own injustice and divine justice."³⁸⁵ Metaphysically this sense of guilt arises³⁸⁶ when the jiva or ego, the "true center unconscious of itself," becomes identified with impermanent finite objects and thereby establishes a finite desire center with all of its attendant frustrations, anxieties and dread. This individual center is, therefore, the ego, the jiva,--"a distorted reflection of the true Self...which is one with the Self of other individuals."³⁸⁷ In Religion, then, there is a gap of guilt,³⁸⁸ of sin, unworthiness and unrighteousness³⁸⁹

³⁸² Watts, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

³⁸³ James, op. cit., p. 167.

³⁸⁴ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 283-284.

³⁸⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 340.

³⁸⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 148.

³⁸⁷ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 193-194.

³⁸⁸ Nygren, op. cit., p. 110.

³⁸⁹ Otto, op. cit., p. 191.

separating man from God. The metaphysical gap is one of ignorance with its attendant misery and vexations of samsara³⁹⁰ which separates the jiva from Self-realization.

Dependence of the finite. Both religion and metaphysic agree that the finite creature or manifestation is dependent and not self-sufficient, not only in relation to his higher aspirations, but also his finite existence and desires. In the East the finite is dependent for its manifestation, as well as its inclusion in that always present identity of âtman with Supreme reality, upon the will of the true center or Self. Religion, on the other hand, depends, not upon identity consciousness, but upon help from a totally other, from "outside." Catholic doctrine reflects this dependence of the finite by noting the inability of the creature to realize itself or "even fully to survive as nature" without the constant help of divine intervention or grace.³⁹¹ Contingent created being which cannot be God nor that "nothing" from which it was made and upon whose brink it continually hovers, constantly and dependently receives as an outpouring from God its life, movement, causality (except that of sin), and being.³⁹² St. Augustine,³⁹³ for

³⁹⁰ Loc. cit.

³⁹¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 127.

³⁹² Ibid., pp. 129-132.

³⁹³ Ibid., pp. 133-134.

example, was hesitant in granting to "nature a perfection that might seem to make it self sufficing" and insisted upon "the supernatural dependence of creatures in the order of grace and their natural dependence in the order of existence," although Pohle³⁹⁴ speaks of a "natural grace...not necessarily super-natural" wherein "creation itself, and everything connected therewith, is a gratuitous gift of God...an act of His free-will." "It is because God is beautiful," writes Gilson³⁹⁵ "that things are beautiful; because He is good that they are good; because He IS that they are."

The gap of nothingness. The peculiar Christian heritage of "nothingness" has influenced profoundly the Western sense of a gap or separation between finite and infinite, ego and spirit. Sankara reduced nature to māyā or avidyā and retained only the Supreme Identity.³⁹⁶ Catholic doctrine reduces both nature and soul to mere analogy, knows of no

³⁹⁴ Pohl, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁹⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 133. Cf. Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣhad 2;4.5. "...it is not for the sake of everything that everything is dear, but for the sake of the ātman...for it is only when the ātman is seen and heard and thought about and meditated upon does all this become verily known." Cited in Rāṇade, op. cit., pp. 303-304.

³⁹⁶ Cf. Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 165. "This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existing as mere objects of name and form; but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality."

ātman, and retains only God--who graciously saves the "image of the image" from lapsing back into its immanent nothingness by adopting it.³⁹⁷ The Christian universe, including man, created by "an evocation of something out of nothing by the mere word fiat...",³⁹⁸ "wrested from nothingness and darkness by a divine act,"³⁹⁹ is "in constant peril of lapsing back into nothingness"⁴⁰⁰ from which it was made. It must be "saved at each moment"⁴⁰¹ from collapse into nothingness by the continuous giving of a being which, of itself, it could neither give nor preserve."⁴⁰²

The Christian "gap of nothing which is man without divine grace"⁴⁰³ was intensified further by the Protestant

³⁹⁷ Cf. Maritain, op. cit., p. 343. "...we may also arrive at a certain obscure and experimental perception...of the nothingness immanent in everything which is created."

³⁹⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 438.

³⁹⁹ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 243.

⁴⁰⁰ Gilson, op. cit., p. 114.

⁴⁰¹ The analogy of the metaphysical Now.

⁴⁰² Gilson, op. cit., p. 72. In Indian terminology this would be Brāhma-Vishnu saving the world of samsāra from the dissolving power of Śiva, an absurd and impossible situation, for even the aspect of dissolution is integrative in nature, and the trimūrti but "different forms of the One Supreme..." (Rādhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 480). Metaphysical "nothingness" is no-thingness. "Nothing is the opposite and negation of something; but the infinite No-thing, so far from being the opposite of things, is their essential ground." (Watts, op. cit., p. 64.)

⁴⁰³ Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 168.

view of nature wherein "everything natural, temporal, and human [was] emptied of any eternal and metaphysical meaning."⁴⁰⁴ The modern Western ego has felt itself as experiencing a homelessness,⁴⁰⁵ an estrangement from Being which brooks of no analogical similitude,⁴⁰⁶ wherein "the experience of Nothingness or 'the nought'... [which] forces man into an existential 'crisis' in which the marks of his finiteness or contingency--his 'temporality' and his 'historicity'--are strikingly revealed."⁴⁰⁷ "Being-no-more,"⁴⁰⁸ as death or total annihilation, permeates with dread his total existence⁴⁰⁹ and the entire complex of insecurity forces the ego to explore every way out of this "meaningless absurdity," even unto the "futile passion" of self-divinization⁴¹⁰ until, accepting in some measure the human situation as it exists and calmly meeting its challenge face to face instead of beating futilely against its limitations, the ego comes to some initial terms with its environment and itself wherein

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 118.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 234.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 240.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 160-163.

even nothingness may assume its place as the opposite pole, the veil of Being,⁴¹¹ or metaphysically speaking, "the finite, while becoming indefinite through the extensions of which it is capable...through the development of its own possibilities, always remains nothing in comparison with the Infinite."⁴¹² When, however, a separate Being, a "totally other" God is identified with absolute infinity, with sole reality,⁴¹³ there is a resultant sentimental tendency to feel a "gnostic gap" between the transcendency and the evils of worldly existence, an awareness of exile from "home," a "knowledge" of the ego-self "expelled from the Eden of primitive unselfconsciousness."⁴¹⁴ Popular Christian practice, contrary to ^{the} theological doctrine of man's essential duality, attempts, then, either ego-denial or self-deification as a bridge between the always separate extremes.⁴¹⁵ Nature balances on the brink of nothingness and "spirit is gone up into heaven"⁴¹⁶ with the end result that modern Western man suffers a "terrifying metaphysical dismemberment."⁴¹⁷ The

⁴¹¹ Ibid., p. 154.

⁴¹² Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 163.

⁴¹³ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religious and Western Thought, p. 128.

⁴¹⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 102.

⁴¹⁵ Loc. cit.

⁴¹⁶ Maritain, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴¹⁷ Loc. cit.

tensions of such human existence, the experience of the rending force of relentless pressures as they make themselves felt in the "limit situations"⁴¹⁸ of suffering, guilt, and death as seemingly unbridgeable gaps which man, with reason alone, can never surmount,⁴¹⁹ only can end from the ego view in "ultimate shipwreck."⁴²⁰ This fact may be accepted with some profit, but for the most part dread is focused and projected upon that which is, in the West, the ultimate unknown, the Now, as the "anguish of the tragic instance,"⁴²¹ that instance conceived by Gilson⁴²² as but the center wherein the past and future are constructed, where "thought gathers up the debris saved from the shipwreck of the past from collapse into pure nought,... [and] escapes death only in the instant of the thought that endures, but the instans is something that at once stands in the present and presses on toward the future where likewise it will find no resting place; and at last an abrupt interruption will close a history and fix a destiny forever." To the Christian, then, the instant is the epitome of the flux, of samsāra, while the

⁴¹⁸ Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 194.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 237.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 197.

⁴²¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 386.

⁴²² Loc. cit.

metaphysical Now is the timeless, infinite, and all encompassing release from bondage to the flux.

The "anguish of the human intellect." The Thomistic view⁴²³ of the dependence of the concept upon a prior reception of sense impression imposes a necessary natural relation between the human intellect and the natural order. God, then, inasmuch as He transcends in all ways the knowing human soul and its natural object, cannot "fall within the natural grasp of our intellect."⁴²⁴ "Dionysius," says Gilson,⁴²⁵

had good reason to say that the God whom our reason reaches remains, so to speak, an unknown God...for we know, indeed that He is, and we know what He is not, but what He is remains wholly unknown to us...Certainly the distance between intellect and God is immense in Thomism; if one may say so, a 'distantia maxima'; nevertheless, it is not such that God Himself could not overcome.

Western "metaphysical wisdom,"⁴²⁶ the peak of intellectuality in the natural order, enables man to see God only by analogy and not "by what He is in Himself." This alone is not sufficient for man and leaves him still unsatisfied.

⁴²³ Gilson, op. cit., p. 249.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., pp. 250, 256.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., p. 259. Cf. Kenopanishad 3. (Hume, op. cit. p. 335). "Other is it than the known and moreover above the unknown."

⁴²⁶ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

Says Maritain:⁴²⁷

Knowledge brings to our souls all forms and all good things, but stripped of their proper existence and reduced to the conditions of objects of thought. Present, as though grafted in us, but in a mode of being which is essentially incomplete, they cry out to be completed... to possess them not in idea, but in reality... Our intellectual life is thus fated--unless by some inhuman deviation--to end by avowing its indigence, and one day pour itself out in desire... This then is the misery of metaphysics (and also its greatness). It rouses the desire for the supreme union, spiritual possession consummated in the very order of reality, and not only an idea. And it cannot satisfy it.

The natural intellect,⁴²⁸ torn by the opposition of its desire to assimilate all intelligibility and a "sense of its own impotence [experiences] ...the anguish of the human intellect itself which has in itself the power to become all things, and, grasping the existence of Being from the starting point of sense, would become That, and cannot." Thus does the unrealized jiva, devoid of any tradition of metaphysic, aspire to a separate and divided supreme identity, to divinity.⁴²⁹

As a corollary to the Western over-emphasis upon the theoretical and logical function of the human intellect,

⁴²⁷ Loc. cit.

⁴²⁸ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 259-260.

⁴²⁹ Cf. Sri Aurobindo, Sāvitrī, Book 10, canto 2, p. 250:
 "Immortality thou claimest for thy spirit,
 But immortality for imperfect man,
 A God who hurts himself at every step,
 Would be a cycle of eternal pain."

with its resultant frustration, there is the attendant starvation of the immediately experienced aesthetic and emotional component of human nature.⁴³⁰ The Thomistic and Aristotelian concept of the "divine as [the] purely rationalistic, male, metaphysical principle in the nature of things"⁴³¹ tended to relegate the aesthetic "female" principle either to that which, following Plato, was an ultimate factor of the nature of evil,⁴³² or to the supporting role of sign or servant, suitable only "to convey the theoretical component,"⁴³³ not being a good in itself. The Great Mother of the Oriental tradition, the divine consciousness-power or śakti, thus was glimpsed only as a shadow image; a symbol of the unknown, separate and far removed from the everyday world of analytical reason. Even theoretical knowledge presupposes the immediately given aesthetic⁴³⁴ which, as the "basic insight of the Orient," is the source in its own right of genuine knowledge⁴³⁵ and "as justified a criterion of trustworthy knowledge and of the good and the divine in culture as is the

⁴³⁰ Northrop, op. cit., p. 304.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴³² Ibid., p. 58.

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 305.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 311.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 305.

theoretical component."⁴³⁶

Attempts toward religious restoration. Religious separation has as its counterpart the mode of restoration.⁴³⁷ The man of religion, the ego beginning to be aware of its ego-hood, feels a primary compulsion to escape from his guilt by acknowledging the degradation of his sin and abjectly imploring the Perfect Other⁴³⁸ to pour upon him the healing⁴³⁹ and redeeming light of His grace. This tends to take on an almost legal and contractual arrangement where, as an earnest, "or mark of sincerity, the ego must in thought and deed renounce and denounce itself, and must embrace the discipline of perfection which will subject the nature of the finite and material to the laws of the infinite and spiritual,"⁴⁴⁰ a program which, if too rigorously, ideally and prematurely applied, involves the danger of repeated failure, guilt piled upon guilt, resulting either in that which "breeds contempt" or adds to the frustration. The last and final religious recourse of the ego as sinner⁴⁴¹ is a total

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 311.

⁴³⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 300.

⁴³⁸ Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 102.

⁴³⁹ Cf. Malachi 4.2.: "...the Sun of righteousness...with healing in his wings..." See also "rays of grace," infra pp. 158 ff.

⁴⁴⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 102.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., p. 149.

surrender in theological faith to the mercy, the will and revealed "promises of the external Savior."

The "revelation" of intuitive inspiration is experienced by metaphysic as that which is non-spatial and non-temporal, therefore it is not external to the Self. Rādhakṛishṇan⁴⁴² says: "Inspiration in every one of its forms is a manifestation of the universal spirit in us," that is, of the non-dual, non-separate Self, which is inclusive of the unrealized ego. Otto⁴⁴³ concedes that the advaitic intuition receives from the ego view a symbolic, temporal and literal interpretation. The ego, being unconscious of its Self, the immanent ātman which is Brahman, projects that unconscious content upon the external, the outside,⁴⁴⁴ into the farthest heavenly reaches of the Above,⁴⁴⁵ and also into "myth and image, literature and art."⁴⁴⁶ Thus is a sensed perfection projected into man's space, time and history, and "all earthly qualities and virtues...all goodness and brightness and power"⁴⁴⁷ placed upon the veiled and "moated eminence" of

⁴⁴² Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 206.

⁴⁴³ Otto, op. cit., p. 5.

⁴⁴⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 89.

⁴⁴⁵ Cf. Ibid., pp. 89, 134.

⁴⁴⁶ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 144. See also Watts, op. cit., pp. 132-134.

⁴⁴⁷ Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 57.

the supra-mundane ideal.⁴⁴⁸ The inner light of the spirit or Self, unknown as such by the jiva or ego, outlines a gigantic anthropomorphic shadow cast by man into the equally unknown externality. Although such an "image narrows the thoughts of the divine being [âtman] within human [ego] limits and works against a more spiritual conception of godhead,"⁴⁴⁹ man's theoretical and logical reason can reach and grasp that which is a determinate transcendent for its very being is posited in logical terms. Man as an image to God, and only man, may achieve, therefore, a type of religious meaning in his own right, for the divine being can touch the world only "when grasped by bodily men as an idea of the good and used by them to guide their bodily conduct and social behaviour..."⁴⁵⁰ Thus is the jiva-centered view. Metaphysic, rather, would tend to speak of man and all nature as integral projections

⁴⁴⁸ Cf. Sri Aurobindo, op. cit., Book 10, canto 2, p. 241:

"The ideal never yet was real made.
Imprisoned in form that glory cannot live;
Into a body shut it breathes no more.
Unwillingly it descends to earthly air
To inhabit a white temple in man's heart:
In his heart it shines rejected by his life.
Immutable, bodiless, beautiful, grand and dumb,
Immobile in its shining throne it sits;
Dumb it receives his offering and his prayer,...
Its light stirs man the thinker to create
An earthly semblance of diviner things.
Its hued reflection falls upon man's acts;
His institutions are its cenotaphs,
He signs his dead conventions with its name;..."

⁴⁴⁹ Râdhakrishnan, Eastern Religion & Western Thought, p. 59.

⁴⁵⁰ Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Râdhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy, p. 374.

(lila or play) of the infinite,⁴⁵¹ the transcendent-immanent, wherein man and all of nature are eternally meaningful.

The indwelling, all-inclusive, and all-illuminating Self, when transposed by religious symbolism, becomes the exterior center of God,⁴⁵² which by logical definition excludes the finite. The God of religion, as the external object or projection of the Self "still firmly identified with the ego"⁴⁵³ is conceived as the possessor of all those qualities which the ego lacks.⁴⁵⁴ These either may be enumerated positively in a never ending series or posited negatively by privation. The logical mind of the ego cannot by conceptual knowledge contain the infinite spirit, the

⁴⁵¹ A. C. Bouquet, "The Valuation of the Historical in Eastern and Western Thought," Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy, p. 175n., quoting from Dr. Harī Prasād Sāstrī.

⁴⁵² Cf. Watts, op. cit., pp. 89, 184.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., pp. 173-174. Cf. Sri Aurobindo, op. cit., Book 9, canto 2,:

A fragile miracle of thinking clay
 Armed with illusions walks the child of Time.
 To fill the void around he feels and dreads,
 The void he came from and to which he goes,
 He magnifies his self and names it God.
 He calls the heavens to help his suffering hopes,
 He sees above him with a longing heart
 Bare spaces more unconscious than himself
 That have not even his privilege of mind
 And empty of all but their unreal blue
 And peoples them with bright and merciful powers.

.....
 A magnified image of man's mind for Gods,
 A shadow of thyself thrown upon Space.
 (Book 10, canto 2, p. 250)

⁴⁵⁴ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 107.

supreme reality, and therefore needs must refer to it by representation "in the form of a personal God,"⁴⁵⁵ the highest, "most accurate and adequate" symbol possible for man "provided we recognize that it is only a symbol, and that the Reality exceeds our power of positive conception altogether."⁴⁵⁶ There is, however, an emphasis upon the literal interpretation of the symbol⁴⁵⁷ in the practical application of religious theory, for religion tends to become identified with a symbolical relationship wherein God is the supreme "symbol in which religion cognizes the absolute."⁴⁵⁸ Of this Chaudhuri⁴⁵⁹ says:

Just as the multitudinous deities of polytheism are only symbolic representations of the different attributes and aspects of one and the same Godhead, so also the personal God of monotheism is in ultimate analysis no more than a symbolization of the one ineffable, impersonal Absolute. ...God is only the Absolute conceived from the human end.

⁴⁵⁵ Loc. cit.

⁴⁵⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 133. See also Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 108.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 133. (A substitution of "God Is" for "God is like.")

⁴⁵⁸ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 109.

⁴⁵⁹ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 242-243.

The undoubted comfort and aid received by religious man from a father-relationship with the God-projection is called by Huxley⁴⁶⁰ a "human grace" which "comes to us

either from persons, or from our own wishes, hopes, and imaginings projected outside ourselves and persisting somehow in the psychic medium in a state of what may be called second-hand objectivity...; the grace which we derive from our ideals, whether high or low, whether conceived of in abstract terms or bodied forth in imaginary personifications."

Huxley further identifies this human grace, as contrasted with a truly "spiritual grace," with the religious mode and conceives of it as "coming back to the worshipper from the vortex of psychic power set up by repeated acts (his own and other people's) of faith, yearning, and imagination."

The separate ego, conceiving its Self-projection as the ideal of perfection,⁴⁶¹ can never remain satisfied with the ego state and its myriad attendant evils, and refuses to accept that which it calls evil as a necessary component of a world created by a separate and perfect Being.⁴⁶² This evil must be ascribed to the will of the creature. From this standpoint there are but two ways of eliminating evil, either through the efforts of the ego-will alone or with the gratuitous help or aid of the divine "totally other," or

⁴⁶⁰ Huxley, op. cit., p. 167.

⁴⁶¹ Cf Jung. Op. cit., pp. 230-232. Also Spiegelberg, Alchemy as a Way of Salvation, p. 30.

⁴⁶² Watts, op. cit., p. 108.

religious grace.

Catholic theology posits⁴⁶³ a prior rectitude of human will which was, in itself, a grace of God, a harmonious righteousness lost through human revolt or sin against the fiat [will] of God, of infinite Being, and therefore impossible of recovery by sinful man alone, for the complete dependence of the creature upon the creator of necessity refers all, even initial attempts toward restoration, to supernatural will and the righteousness which can be acquired only by God's grace. As creature, and sinful creature at that, man cannot hope to turn toward the supernatural "other" and eventually attain the vision of divine essence, that vision "altogether proper to God...unless God raises him to it."⁴⁶⁴ Furthermore, the divine essence is seen only by the divine intellect. Man's intellect, not being divine, must be so supernaturally acted upon as to give it the capability of such a vision. The nature of the Thomistic intellect⁴⁶⁵ is that of "a capacity for the apprehension of the intelligible," therefore knowledge of the divine is possible, not to the unaided power of the intellect whose proper object is

⁴⁶³ Gilson, op. cit., p. 340.

⁴⁶⁴ Gilson, op. cit., p. 257.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 262.

the sensible, by being actualized by God. "He can give all there is to give provided only that they [men] are capable of receiving. Since, then, the intellect is capable of total intelligibility, God can bestow it if He wills..." The intellect is said⁴⁶⁶ to apprehend "existence in itself...without any determination whatsoever," an action which in no way involves the identity of Divine Being and created being, or their unity by being as such, but is of the indeterminate intellectual essence itself which can serve by the power of grace as a pointer, as it were, to the Divine Being. Natural reason can recognize the existence of God, Divine Being, who alone can will and bestow the gratuitous gift of the beatific vision of Himself, for the creature is incapable of transcending himself. Although Catholic man cannot attain the beatific vision by his own efforts he has the freedom of choice⁴⁶⁷ between accepting or refusing this gift of grace.

Inasmuch as religious grace proceeded from a source of divine Being completely separate from man's being, it rarely was felt as removed from the projected field of symbolic imagery into intimate contact with man's innermost nature. That is to say, in practice man's religious

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 264-266.

⁴⁶⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 300.

acceptance of the offer of grace, his honest participation in all religious disciplines and sacraments, all too often produced nothing but authoritative and institutional religious assurance of the bestowal of grace without any accompanying realization or feeling of a diminution of that lonely separateness and insecurity which had at first called with such necessity upon grace. Watts⁴⁶⁸ says,

If God is responsible for all the good in me, and I responsible for all the evil; if I by myself can do no good, and yet God's withholding of grace is my fault and not His--then the opposition between myself and God is ultimate. I am a lost soul; I am again the lonely, insecure ego.

Caught in a vicious circle⁴⁶⁹ of prerequisites wherein sinful man at one and the same time must needs be sinless in order to avoid sin, Western man has turned increasingly to himself, still the lone ego, for an escape which religion could not give him. If man cannot possess the highest religious good, if the finite ego cannot be like God, he will try to possess and master in a "god-like" manner the highest natural good. Thus the unrealized religious ideal of God possession has been replaced by the same need in different form, the ideal of utopian possession by way of humanistic technology, the raising of a man-made heaven in a perfect

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 103.

⁴⁶⁹ Loc. cit.

world and society.⁴⁷⁰ Failing to fill the gap of nothingness with God, Western man has attempted to fill it with things ruled and mastered by his ego-self.

For the "over-ruling providence of God" man has substituted the "blind fate of the materialists,"⁴⁷¹ the unswerving force of natural law which the ego, still within nature, aspires to rule. As the lord of matter,⁴⁷² and at the same time removed from a supernatural creator, Western man must look to electro-chemical matter for his source and preservation.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. Watts., op. cit., pp. 100-102.

⁴⁷¹ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 303.

⁴⁷² Matter, "The kink in empty space that provides resistance." Julian S. Huxley, "Matter, Energy, Time and Space," The Captive Shrew (London, Harper and Bros., 1933), p. 64.

⁴⁷³ Julian Huxley, Ibid., "Undevout Astronomers," p. 46.

"For now we're certain, sure enough,
That everything's the self-same stuff--
Just matter--in the heavenly host,
Or in a piece of buttered toast;
Orion's nebula, Halley's comet,
Or sacred wart upon Mahomet;
In Sirius and Betelgeuse,
Or in the dirt upon your shoes;
In mud and sun, dishwater, planet, flame,
Matter, we find, is always just the same."

The chemical determinism of the ego is shown in "Song of the Glands," p. 72-73.

"We'll show you how a Self is made:
We squirt into his blood, and he
Turns into what we make him to be.
.....
Glands, boys, glands,
All join hands,
Squirt your chemical commands
The Self of himself makes a terrible fuss,
But he'd be someone else if it wasn't for us."

Materialism, "common sense in a thinking mood,"⁴⁷⁴ has erected, in the West, a religion of technology, one mode of that "higher idolatry" spoken of by Aldous Huxley⁴⁷⁵ with its own special graces, gratuitous gifts of technological instruments for material comfort and progress,--gifts, as practically conceived, which should enable man to enjoy the benefits of their possession in a life of unfulfilable desire, eternal pleasures to be enjoyed without payment, pain, or suffering. The relative ease of technological mastery has given the West illusions of similar success in the human and social field.⁴⁷⁶ Notwithstanding a noticeable lack of success in this area and a growing and necessary doubt evidenced by a few concerning its eventual possibility there yet remains the equally necessary struggle of the ego to lift itself by itself.

Contemporary Protestantism, relatively limited in symbol and imagery and divided in authority, tends to emphasize that active, self-sufficient humanism⁴⁷⁷ which is one of the predominating factors in Western culture,⁴⁷⁸ an

⁴⁷⁴ Śrīnivāsācārya, op. cit., p. 4. For Indian materialism see Chārvāka philosophy, Chatterjee and Datta, op. cit., pp. 55-72.

⁴⁷⁵ Aldous Huxley, op. cit., p. 251.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 142.

⁴⁷⁷ Nygren, op. cit., I, xi.

⁴⁷⁸ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 75.

earthly heaven made by man rather than received by the grace of God.⁴⁷⁹ The free gift of God's love, or Agape, not being realized, and eros⁴⁸⁰ denied him in the order of religion, Protestant man developed that eros in the social order.⁴⁸¹

The modern secular world of scientific materialism and self-sufficient humanism has a view of reality which is centered upon man, "the sole 'creator' of all truth and all values."⁴⁸² As laudable as such an effort may be in its greatest purity, "to serve humanity as humanity is to serve one's ego expanded to embrace the entire human species."⁴⁸³ Solutions to human problems made by a rarefied or subtly enlarged human ego which has expanded through the stages of family, tribe, nation, and internationalism, can but engender more conflict over a wider area.⁴⁸⁴ Integrality can never

⁴⁷⁹ Nygren, op. cit., I, xi.

⁴⁸⁰ "...man's desire for heavenly things which...seeks God as a means to an end, the satisfaction of itself; in fact, it does not really seek God at all; it seeks its own highest good, which it happens to identify with God." Nygren, op. cit., II.viii.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., I.xi.

⁴⁸² Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 114. Cf. Julian Huxley, op. cit., pp. 63, 50.,

"I handle matter; but to boot
I attain the Absolute---" ("Ego Contra Mundum")

"Only the intellect can make us live,
And mind is all our Immortality." ("The Mind's
Surgery")

⁴⁸³ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 124.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 98-100.

be achieved short of complete realization of the all-inclusive and non-separate Self,⁴⁸⁵ the Self which is not "an enlargement of the ego, or an objective extension of the empirical consciousness,"⁴⁸⁶ for it is the ground of all consciousness, all knowledge, and all harmony inclusive of dissonance. Metaphysic and human well-being are not mutually exclusive, for the Self, far from alienating human values, includes them and gives them their only true meaning,⁴⁸⁷ not as separate and exclusive entities, but, in a deeper humanistic sense,⁴⁸⁸ as analogical modes reflecting the ever present and immediately known ground of spirit.⁴⁸⁹ The modern Western tendency to try to reach the highest good by technological and ethical methods involving a progressively intricate organizational machinery reduces man himself to the status of a mechanized unit⁴⁹⁰ and ignores the needs of his integral nature.⁴⁹¹ Material and social programs aiming

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 124.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁸⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 76, 108.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁸⁹ Watts, op. cit., p. 32.

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 107, 44., also Aldous Huxley, op. cit., p. 171.

⁴⁹¹ Cf. Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 45.

toward "progress" and which are allowed to run rampant devoid of any unifying principle, can be at best but momentary attempts to satisfy multiform ego-desires which have no ultimate meaning and can serve only to isolate man from nature and from his fellows.⁴⁹² Spiritual integration and unity cannot be the result of a mere extension of ethical systems,⁴⁹³ the "worship of redemptive social and economic organizations" or even of "the gods of nationalism and gadgetry."⁴⁹⁴ Modern man, according to Jung,⁴⁹⁵ is unwilling to learn "that technical progress and social improvements do not mean psychological differentiation or a higher level of consciousness." Religious theism, the true and meaningful analogy of metaphysic, becomes by its literal legalism and over-organization "an encumbrance arresting rational thought, degrading life and perpetuating unhappiness."⁴⁹⁶ The improper analogy of "scientific materialism, self-sufficient humanism, and mystical nationalism"⁴⁹⁷ forming a never-ending progression

⁴⁹² Cf. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

⁴⁹³ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 304.

⁴⁹⁴ Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, p. 56.
See also Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, pp. 10-17.

⁴⁹⁵ Jung, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

⁴⁹⁶ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 219.

⁴⁹⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 80.

of "senseless cycles of repetition, cannot give meaning to life."⁴⁹⁸ Rather, it begets an increased sense of frustrated forlornness and individual homelessness, of "existential despair...in the 'objective' and collective modern world"⁴⁹⁹ which in turn is "an encumbrance,...degrading life and perpetuating unhappiness." Rādhakṛishṇan⁵⁰⁰ has remarked, "In order to live we have lost the reason for living." Man is more than his body, and his "mind is only a sundered aspect, a subordinate instrument of the truly self-effectuating power of the Spirit..."⁵⁰¹ Societies and cultures can experience unity and harmony only as expressions of a "spiritual unity... [for there] cannot be order and agreement in the particular spheres of human life unless there is common agreement as to the nature and meaning of life itself."⁵⁰²

The spirit-centered solution. The metaphysical solution to the problem of the gap is spirit-centered rather than egocentric.⁵⁰³ The spiritual is realized as that Self

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 81.

⁴⁹⁹ Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 115. See also pp. 1-9.

⁵⁰⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 257.

⁵⁰¹ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 16.

⁵⁰² Watts, op. cit., p. 19. See also p. 27.

⁵⁰³ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 77.

"which contains the self, thoughts, feelings, etc., as elements only in it, but in itself transcends them all, since by none of them can we get it, but we can get them all in it somehow interfused or welded."⁵⁰⁴ The differentiations within the spirit depend upon That (tat) for their active existence and their meaning, although they are timelessly non-separate within their ground.⁵⁰⁵ James⁵⁰⁶ speaks of a "stage of solution" wherein man "realizes the reality of [his] higher part," identifies himself exclusively with it, and finally identifies it "with all the rest of ideal being." Although this is still speaking from the viewpoint of the ego as the one who realizes it does "involve the change of personal center and the surrender of the lower self..."⁵⁰⁷ together with a reintegration of the God-projection into the consciousness of non-dual Self.⁵⁰⁸ The horror of being divided, the fear of separation, is based upon the assumption of the factual existence of an eternal dichotomy the poles of which are held apart by an uncrossable chasm. "It is not necessary," writes

⁵⁰⁴ Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

⁵⁰⁶ James, op. cit., pp. 498-499.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 499.

⁵⁰⁸ Cf. Watts, op. cit., pp. 173-174.

Rādhakṛishṇan,⁵⁰⁹ "to look upon the divine as totally unlike the human." He then continues, "Time is the moving image of eternity, and experience is the appearance of the Absolute. If we dig a ditch between the two, there can be no passage from one to the other." Of this separation and identity Chaudhuri⁵¹⁰ states:

Since the fundamental evil of life is the separation of the finite from the Infinite, or the burial of the individual in his exclusive particularity or repellent egoism...the sovereign means of escape...is naturally provided by the reunion of the finite and the Infinite, or the realization of their essential identity.

The ego's acceptance of itself as an identity-mode of Self in līlā, the hide and seek play of differentiation, and the realization of the identity of the Self and the Absolute, is an awakening to the Fact that the gap of nothingness, of separation, is timelessly and eternally filled with the clear light of the serene Self which is no-thing yet includes all things.

⁵⁰⁹ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 301.

⁵¹⁰ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 40.

PART I
THE MEANING OF PRASĀDA

CHAPTER I
THE PRASĀDA COMPLEX

The word prasāda has such a variety of meanings, not being restricted to any specific concept, that it may be thought of in a general sense as denoting a conceptual core around which a complex of allied meanings and terms revolve. This complex, growing out of the tradition of metaphysic, contains within it the various positive and conceptual nuances of relationship which might apply to the particular and functional differentiations experienced by the jīva consistent with the infinite metaphysical ground principle which includes them. At the same time it must give expression, still necessarily within the range of admittedly inadequate metaphysical analogy, of the revealing intuition, the realization of the integral and pure consciousness-power (chit-śakti) identical with that ground, the infinite and all-inclusive Self. It thus includes both the ego-self relationship of sādhana stated from the viewpoint of the jīva and the givenness of the experience of supreme realization.

The three modes of grace. Primitive life-forms, including the most primitive human types and their persistent characteristics, exhibit a certain naive and natural harmony

or accord with the totality of nature which tends to produce a state of well-being based upon an undifferentiated uniformity. There is as yet no evidence of the emergence of individuality, for the complete and perfect projection on the biological level unconsciously has identified all subjectivity, both conscious and unconscious, with the object to such an extent that all is the object, all is nature. This unthinking, uncritical and non-discriminating "acceptance" of the world as a meaningless harmony marks the most obscure state in life, that of "maximum identity of the infinite with the finite, of the Self with the objects in its point of view,"¹ for the scene of the cosmic play is laid in the "Eden of primitive unselfconsciousness,"² the realm of that which Lévy-Brühl has called "participation mystique." This is that which Aldous Huxley³ has termed "animal grace," experienced in its completeness "in a blissful sub-rational eternity on the hither side of good and evil" only by those life-forms which as yet have not touched upon ego-conscious, or which temporarily have abandoned it.

While Roman Catholic doctrine in general reserves the

¹ Alan W. Watts, The Supreme Identity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950), p. 146.

² Ibid., p. 102.

³ Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 166.

term grace for the supernatural gifts of God there are occasions in the writings of the early church Fathers as well as in the scriptures where natural favors and gifts are conferred in general upon man, such as creation itself, and good health, talents, etc., which are individual gifts.⁴ Neither St. Augustine nor St. Bernard conceived of the possibility of man subsisting in a state of pure nature without the aid and help of God's grace, for man was created by God in a state of grace and nature is the capacity to receive it.⁵ St. Thomas Aquinas said:⁶ "...faith presupposes a natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection something that can be perfected." Even natural law, says Pohle,⁷ cannot be observed in its entirety and for an extended time by man without the help of grace. These religious views of "animal grace," total projection, or "participation mystique" are of one order judged in terms of another, an explanation of the undifferentiated objective-totality from a particular

⁴ Joseph Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1917), pp. 7-8.

⁵ Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 291-292.

⁶ Pohle, op. cit., p. 52. Pohle, p. 51, as an article of faith quotes the Vatican Council, "If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason through created things, let him be anathema."

⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

and differentiated point of view.

This, then, leads to the second mode of grace or the human stage wherein the ego is differentiated and therefore conscious of itself as alone and separate from both the external and the internal, both being considered as objectively foreign to the ego and apart from it as subject. This is the common, everyday, "normal" world of modern man, the world of the "fall," of banishment from Eden. It is a stage absolutely necessary if the unconscious shell of total projection is to be cracked inasmuch as

...metaphysical realization lies only through the stage of ego-consciousness, with all of its conflicts and struggles...For the sense of extreme isolation, of extreme opposition to God on the one hand and his universe on the other, is the one essential preparation for the consciousness of union...⁸

It is a preliminary step and not to be confused with integration, a sādhana "which requires for its consumation some help from outside the range of the personal self,"⁹ usually in the form of aid from a preceptor. In religion there is a tendency to depend upon a formal and intricate organization or code, upon external, usually written, revelation, spiritual intercession or mediation, and the legalistic grace of a projected God, conferred upon man in certain fixed quanta,

⁸ Watts, op. cit., p. 147.

⁹ Kapāli Śāstry, Lights on the Upanishads (Madras: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1947), p. 157.

at a certain level of efficiency, and for certain purposes.

Aldous Huxley¹⁰ terms this stage one of "human grace" characterized by intense human aspirations (or eros), hopes, and desires projected outside man and maintained by him there in a "vortex of psychic power," the effects of which may revert back upon man in the form of a religious grace or of a type of herd or parent comfort which can sustain him in the misery of his separate ego-consciousness. It may point the way toward that which is greater than the ego, but cannot carry him to its realization, for the goal is the ego's projection and the gap persists in time.

The third stage is one of integration wherein all aspects of the total personality properly are realized.¹¹ The primitive state was one of total objectivity, the state of ego-consciousness one of division between object and a limited and partial subject. The state of integration, however, is that of a total or transcendent subjectivity which includes all of nature, all objects. It is beyond all dharmas, sādhanas, or disciplines¹² for it is devoid of tension which is a product of duality, of division. Being integral it does not advocate extremes (which are in themselves

¹⁰ Aldous Huxley, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 253.

¹² Cf. Bhagavadgītā 18.66.

basically dualistic), and although it involves the realization of and identity with the transcendent Self as absolute, that very realization carries with it a conscious participation in the divine lila which is not removed from natural everyday life. Huxley¹³ terms this "spiritual grace" or inspiration (the love of the Self for its differentiation,--agape), the all-inclusive which fills the gap with That (tat). Its realization is dependent, not upon the will of the ego, but upon the sacrifice of ego-will, its total and instantaneous abandonment to the will of the timeless center, the Self. In many respects this is once again the "participation mystique" or "animal grace," for there is no separation and the center is not of the ego. "Spiritual grace" differs from primitive projection, however, in that it is integral, that is, the Spirit or Self (either not known or denied in the first two stages) is the center which includes both nature and the ego in a higher synthesis. It is a conscious rather than an unconscious identity, a harmony perpetually inspired and permeated by the supreme consciousness-force of the Self,--the Atman which is the Brahman. This "grace," distinguished by a clear and tranquil awareness which negates the turbidity arising from the impingement of opposing forces, is proper only to metaphysic, being unknown

¹³ Aldous Huxley, op. cit., pp. 167-169.

to religion as such.

Before realization the jīva necessarily must look upon any possibility of transcendence as potential with reference to manifestation, and moksha, inasmuch as it cannot originate from his ego-state, is to the ego a free gift,¹⁴ the gift of infinite awakening made to the limited and finite.¹⁵ With the first veiled glimmer of understanding or awareness of ātman the jīva tends to think of it as the "other," the one which helps, aids, gives the grace which will eliminate the metaphysical gap of thingness separating him from the Void of fullness. Of this Rādhakṛishṇan¹⁶ states, "The attainment of spiritual states when refracted in the logical universe appears as a revelation of grace."

Metaphysic does not deny the differentiations within it. Consistent with its metaphysical ground the fact, or "fact section," experienced by the jīva, that contact with a force of consciousness-power which, having givenness, does not proceed from the ego's finite will, may be termed, analogically, an "astounding process performed upon him from

¹⁴ René Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), p. 43.

¹⁵ Cf. Watts, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

¹⁶ S. Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 28.

above."¹⁷ If metaphysical realization is to be spoken of at all, particularly if attempts be made to tell of it to those who have not as yet experienced it, there must be utilized some symbolic concept which, while admittedly incapable of an ideal definition, at least can give some expression to the givenness of the fact of experience, the tone of the content of silence. Thus the Self-willed experience of awakening to and of Self "within the finite order"¹⁸ may be expressed as the gift of blissful clarity and tranquility.

The spiritual fact of metaphysical experience, viewed either as the section encountered by the ifva or the integral realization of the Self, at once is impressed by theology into the service of religion. James¹⁹ thus observes:

Theology, combining this fact with the doctrines of election and grace, has concluded that the spirit of God is with us at these dramatic moments in a peculiarly miraculous way, unlike what happens to us at any other juncture of our lives. At that moment, it believes, an absolutely new nature is breathed into us, and we become partakers of the very substance of the Deity.

"Spiritual grace" is thus interpreted and analyzed in terms of "human grace" and its projection factor.

The prasāda complex, then, contains terms related to

¹⁷ William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random House, Modern Library), p. 222.

¹⁸ Watts, op. cit., p. 142.

¹⁹ James, op. cit., p. 222.

the element of givenness within the spiritual experience, terms which express different views of that givenness and which may be classified, for purpose of discussion only, under three major headings. These are 1. Favor, 2. Clearness, and 3. Compassion.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ETYMOLOGICAL SURVEY

Favor. One of the most frequently used terms in the prasāda complex is that of anugraha with the meaning of grace,¹ favor; kindness, and beneficial or gracious aid.² To this also may be added the concepts of furtherance, promotion,³ and "facilitating by spells."⁴ Anugraha is formed from √grah, seize, take, hold, catch; grasp, capture, attach; eclipse, rob; keep; claim, appropriate, receive; assume, adopt; acquire; perceive, understand, infer.⁵ Bhide also adds "win over, induce to one's side; to please, gratify, satisfy, propitiate." To the root is added the prefix anu,

¹ Sivananda, Yoga Vedānta Dictionary (Rishikesh: Yoga Vedānta Forest University, 1950), p. 14. See also C. V. Shankar Rau, A Glossary of Philosophical Terms (Madras: Tirumalai-Tirupati Devasthanams Press, 1941), p. 6.

² Otto Böhtlingk, Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch (St. Petersburg: 1855-1875), I.202.E. Washburn Hopkins, Ethics of India (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1924), p. 92. Arthur A. Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (London: Oxford U. Press, 1924), p. 15. Vidyadhar V. Bhide, A Concise Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Poona City: Chitra Shala Press, 1926), p. 62.

³ Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., I.202.

⁴ Bhide, op. cit., p. 62.

⁵ Macdonell, op. cit., pp. 87-88. Bhide, op. cit., p. 441.

afterwards, then; again;⁶ after; along; next; under; toward.⁷

The predominant etymological motion of the root grah is that of an in-going assimilative movement of encirclement or enclosure combined with a grasping and clutching factor which is characteristic of a separate ego striving to maintain itself.

For grah Holbrooke⁸ gives:

Skt.: -hri, to grasp. ghrā, to pant after. grī, to devour. gras, glas, to grasp, eat, glah, grah, (grahāmi, grihnāmi) to grasp, take, griham, home, wife, gruch, gluch, to steal.

Gk.: -ῥάχουα, to cling to, strive after, desire.

Lat.: -grassar, to assail.

A.S.: -clyster, clenched fist.

Eng.: -to clutch, clinch.

Ir.: -glacaim, to take, receive.

Holbrooke⁹ further develops the theme of encirclement and enclosure which tends to "set apart."

Skt.: -hri, to grasp, embrace. haranam, hand, arm, bringing, taking. harmyam, palace (guarded enclosure). gras, to devour. glah, grah, to grasp. gridh, to desire.

Zd.: -zar, to snatch away. zarazdā, devoted, consecrated (enclosed, set apart). zaranh, devotion.

Gk.: -ΧΕ(ρ, hand. ΧΡΙΜΠΤΩ, to grasp, touch lightly, press, draw near. Χεῖρ, to lay hands upon, be eager,

⁶ Macdonell, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷ Bhide, op. cit., p. 60.

⁸ George O. Holbrooke, Aryan Word-Building (London: Trübner and Co., 1897), pp. 184-186, abridged. William Dwight Whitney, The Roots, Verb-Forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language (New Haven: The American Oriental Society, 1945). Whitney notes (p. 40) that grah, grath, could as well be given as grih, grih.

⁹ Holbrooke, op. cit., pp. 177-178. (abridged)

attack, hand over, deliver, supply, desire, stretch out hand, consult oracle, treat as friend. ΧΛΑΜΥΣ, cloaks (enveloping, embracing).

Lat.: -co-hors, enclosure, farm yard, hortus, garden.

Goth.: -garda, enclosure.

O.N.: -gardhr, court yard.

A.S.: -geard, yard. gildan, to yield, produce, pay, sacrifice.

Ir.: -gil, hand. gell, pledge.

Baly¹⁰ also notes the element of binding and enclosure:

Eur.-Ar.: -Vēher, to seize, grasp, enclose.

Skt.: -har, harāmi, I take hold, seize. haras, grasp. hira, a band, stripe.

Zd.: -zar, zara, band, cord.

Lat.: -hortus, garden (enclosure for plants).

Ital.: -orto; O.F.: ort, garden.

L.Lat.: -cortis, country house, court, royal palace, court of justice held in the king's name.¹¹
cortensis; Ital.: -cortese; O.F. & M.E.: -corteis, courtois, curteis; N.E.: -courteous.

From the same Eur.Ar. root (Vēher) Baly¹² links the pleasure incident to grasping and "taking within" to the Greek Χάρις:

Eur.-Ar.: -Vēher, Vēhre, to be fond of, like desire.

Skt.: -har (haryati), desires, takes pleasure in. haryatas, desired.

Zd.: -zar, zaranh, devotion to, inclination.

Gk.: -χάρ; in χαίρω (for χάρω), to rejoice. χάρᾱ, joy. Χάρις, favor, liking, grace, goodwill.

χάρισμα, a grace, favor. χάρμα, source of joy.

χαρὸς, pleasing. Εὐχαριστία, giving of thanks, the Eucharist. χρῆ, need, necessity. χρεός (subs.), desire, longing, want.

Lat.: -hor; O.L.: -hor-ior (inf. hori), to cheer, urge on. exhortari, to exhort.

¹⁰ J. Baly, Eur-Aryan Roots (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1897), pp. 381, 184. (abridged)

¹¹ Cf. B8htlingk and Roth, op. cit., I.202: "rājanugrahanena, by favor of the king."

¹² Baly, op. cit., pp. 380-381. (abridged)

Teutonic:-O.H.G.:-görn; N.H.G.:-gern; A.S.:-georn,
desirous of, eager for, glad.
O.H.G.:-gēr, giri, desirous. N.H.G.:-zier, desire,
greed. Eierig, greedy.

The word grace, according to Skeat¹³ denotes favor,
mercy, and pardon, and is based upon ghar, to yearn, whence
also Skt.:-hary, to desire. Lat.:-gratus, dear, pleasing.
gratis, favor. O.F.:-grace. M.E. grace. Holbrooke,¹⁴ in
a manner similar to that of Skeat, and to Baly's development
of the Eur-Ar.ghar, traces grace from:

Skt.:-hri (haryāmi), to be eager, enjoy, love. haryatas,
dear, ghrinās, melting pity. ghrinis, ray of light.¹⁵
Gk.:-χαίρω, to be glad. χαρά, χαρμα, joy.
χαρτός, delightful. χάρις, grace, favor;
χάριτες, the graces (beauty, joy, bloom).¹⁶
χαρίεις, charming. χλεύω, mirth. χλιδάινω,
to melt, be warm, affectionate.
Lat.:-gratus, dear. gratis, grace, favor.
O.N.:-goela, to cheer. gala, to sing, enchant. græti,
compassion, sorrow. grídh, peace.
A.S.:-grinan, to smile, grin.
Lith.:-gerētis, to enjoy.
O.R.:-zhelate, to wish. R.:-zhalovat, to be gracious.
zhaleit, to pity. zhelet, to desire.
Ir.:-grád, love. grind, lovely. grinne, nectar. gerat,
gerait (W:-geraint), hero (χαρίεις); a saint, virgin.¹⁶
Breton:-grad, favor, good will. grizein, to be tipsy.¹⁶
gloéh, dew.¹⁶ gloén, sprinkled, scattered.¹⁶
O.Celt.:-gerudatiae, nymphs.¹⁶

¹³ Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Oxford, 1893), p. 241.

¹⁴ Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 178.

¹⁵ See "rays of grace," infra, pp. 158 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. Saktivāda, Part VI.

Baly,¹⁷ as a variant to his analysis based upon Vger,¹⁸ and indicating an approach to the relationship of logos and vāch with the concept of grace or favor, reverts to:

Eur.Ar.: -Vger, Vgel, to make a noise, utter a sound, cry, call, chant, praises, honor.

Skt.: -gri, gir, gil, [to swallow]. gri, to sing. girate, to sing, praise. grinoti, praises, honors. gurti praise. gurdhayati, praises and honors (cf. Celt. gradh, love.

Zd.: -gar, garañh, praise, honor, reverence. gar, dignity.

Gk.: -γῆρ, γῆρ, γῆρ, in γῆρὺς, voice. γῆρῶ, to cry, shout. γῆρας, prize, honor.

Lat.: -gar, ger, gru, gur, gal, gra, in gratus, pleasing, agreeable, grateful (Skt. gurtas, approved, pleasing, welcome. Cf. Oscan: -bratom... = Lat. gratum). gratis (for gratiis), by favor, freely, for nothing. gratia, favor with another, a courtesy, kindness.

Ital.: -grazia. Prov.: -gracia. O.F.: -grasce.

Lith.: -giriū, giriti: -praise, celebrate. girtas, praised.

O.I. and Gael.: -gair, a cry. W.: -gawr, a cry. Bret. and Cornish: -garm, clamor. Bret.: -galu, to call. W.: -gerain, to cry. Gael and Ir.: -gradh, love, affection.

Grace¹⁹ is "a word of many shades of meaning, but always connoting the idea of favor, whether that in which one

¹⁷ Baly, op. cit., pp. 302-304.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 380-381.

¹⁹ For the two hebrew forms, חֶסֶד, favor, goodwill; חֶסֶד, loving kindness, a benefit conferred gratuitously, see: "Grace," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), X, 585; E.R. Mackintosh, "Grace," Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1928), VI, 364.; R. Seeberg, "Grace," The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1909), V, 41. According to Mackintosh חֶסֶד was used, for the most part, to indicate the attitude of the divine toward Israel, the free flow of divine love toward the chosen ones regardless of worth.

stands to others or that which one shows to others."²⁰

Pohle²¹ lists four general meanings of the term:

- a. ...subjectively,...good will or benevolence shown by a superior to an inferior, as when a criminal is pardoned by the king's grace.
- b. Objectively, it designates a favor inspired by good will or benevolence. ...any free and *gratuitas* gift, as when a king bestows graces.
- c. ...personal charm or attractiveness. ...(the three Graces). Charm elicits love and prompts a person to the bestowal of favors.
- d. The recipient of gifts or favors usually feels gratitude towards the giver, which he expresses in the form of thanks. Hence the word gratias...frequently stands for thanksgiving....

From a theological viewpoint Pohle²² defines grace as "a *gratuitas*, supernatural, internal gift, derived from the merits of Jesus Christ, by which man is rendered pleasing in the sight of God." He explains further²³ that it is called a gift because it springs, not from necessity or compulsion, but from a free benevolence not conditioned by the dictates of justice. It is *gratuitous* for its bestowal is not dependent upon nor earned by the creature's merit. The only motive for this *gratuitous* gift is the sheer love of God for the creature. Although all supernatural graces are said to come from God²⁴ the "grace of Christ," or the grace of

²⁰ Encyclopaedia Britannica, X, 585.

²¹ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

²² Ibid., p. 14.

²³ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

Christianity, "flows exclusively from the merits of the atonement." Scheeben²⁵ remarks that "grace is an ennobling and elevating of our nature and its activity by their glorification and transformation."

Aldous Huxley²⁶ speaks of grace in psychological terms as "something other than our self-conscious personal self, by which we are helped." Metaphysically he views it²⁷ as "those influences from the eternal order into the temporal, which are called grace or inspiration," the givenness of which is not realizable until the jīva abandons his separative and temporal ego-will in full immediacy to the eternal will of the ātman.

Other and less frequently encountered terms of the prasāda complex indicating favor or indulgence are ānukūlyam, upakāra, pranaya, and kṣamā. Ānukūlyam is defined by Macdonnell²⁸ as "favor, agreeableness, friendly terms," and by Monier-Williams²⁹ as "favor, kindness, humoring." Upakāra (kṛi + upa, "bring something to someone; do a service, act

²⁵ Matthias Joseph Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), p. 583.

²⁶ Aldous Huxley, op. cit., p. 166.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 252-253.

²⁸ Macdonnell, op. cit., p. 39.

²⁹ Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: 1899), p. 140.

as auxiliary.³⁰) is defined by Macdonnel³¹ and Monier-Williams³² as help, friendly service, benefit, favor, kindness.

Pranaya,³³ according to Macdonnel³⁴ denotes guidance, manifestation; affection, love; fond attachment (of lovers), display of affections, desire; and prapayin has the meaning of favourite, and dear friend. One interesting meaning of the term pranayana is that of bringing, fetching; the means or vessel for fetching,--a vehicular concept found in many of the terms indicating favor or grace.

Kshamā brings with it the tone of earthiness, the eternal forbearance of nature within the samsāric play or game. Macdonnel³⁵ defines it in such terms as patience, forbearance, indulgence, earth, while Monier-Williams defines √ksham : to be patient or composed, to pardon, forgive, suffer or bear patiently. Holbrooke³⁶ adds to this

³⁰ Charles Rockwell Lanman, A Sanskrit Reader (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 142. Also Cf. subvene.

³¹ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 52.

³² Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 195.

³³ Böttlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1097.

³⁴ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 172.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁶ Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 229. (abridged)

the concept "be gracious," and continues by tracing the root as follows:

- Skt.: -ksham, kshamā, kham, gam³⁷ (gen. gamas), the earth.
 Zd.: -zem (nom zēo) the earth.
 Gk.: -χαιμᾶ, epithet of Demeter.
 Lat.: -humus, earth, soil, homo, man, mortal.
 O.H.G.: -gomo, komo, man. Goth.: -guma, man. gaumyan, to care for, watch, observe, provide for.
 O.N.: -gaman, merriment, game, love, sport...gaumer, attention, care.
 O.R.: -zemlya, earth.
 Lith.: -zhemė, earth, ground. zhemyna, earth, goddess. zhmu, man.

The words grace and favor pertain also to personal charm or attraction. Chārutā³⁸ (√chan, be pleased) has the meaning of loveliness, beauty, popularity. Lālityam³⁹ (from lalita), denotes grace, beauty, charm, amorous or languid gestures. Lāvanyam⁴⁰ has the meaning of beauty, loveliness, charm. Prasādhaka⁴¹ (from caus. of √sādh with pra) means, in general, adorning. Saundarya⁴² (from sundara) denotes beauty, loveliness, gracefulness, elegance, noble

³⁷ Cf. Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 82.: (in accusative)- "have sexual intercourse with; perceive, recognize." Cf. also biblical use of word know. Gama (Bhide, op. cit., p. 421), sexual intercourse; a game played with dice and men.

³⁸ Cf. Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 393; Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 93.

³⁹ Cf. Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 898; Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 262.

⁴⁰ Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 900.: Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 262.

⁴¹ Cf. Böttlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1098: mukha prasādhana which pertains to the art of adorning the face.

⁴² Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 1253.; Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 360.

conduct, generosity.

The Graces of ancient Greece had their beginnings⁴³ in a single goddess, Charis, but later developed into the three, Aglaia (Brilliance), Thalia (the Blooming), and Euphrosyne (Mirth). These Graces were not only efficacious for the bestowal of bodily charms but also gave men special talents, particularly in the arts, and influenced or stimulated acts of benevolence and gratitude.⁴⁴ Returning to the goddess Charis it is said⁴⁵ that:

In no Greek legend is the pre-Greek Indo-Germanic character more strongly marked... Charis (Skt. hari, bright), is an old adjective, originally an epithet of the light-illuminated clouds which seem to escort the dawn, often applied in the R.V. to the horses of the dawn or of the sun, and at last growing into a distinct deity who possesses the character of the ancient dawn-goddess... The burning bright vasus (ushas, us, Aurora, with a different suffix Ostara, Easter), -who restores the blessings lost during the night, who lights up what was dark and reveals the hidden wrong, who gives active labor and wealth to men, growth and fertility to plants-- had been from the earliest time the center of a great

⁴³ "The Graces," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, R. S. Peale Co., 1892), XI.26.

⁴⁴ See Holbrooke's analysis of Varhi. Supra, p. 13.

⁴⁵ "The Graces," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1892), XI.26. Cf. John Dowson, A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion, Geography, History and Literature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950), p. 119: "Harits, Haritas. 'Green.' In the Rig-veda the horses, or rather mares, of the sun, seven or ten in number, and typical of his rays. 'The prototype of the Grecian Charities'-- Max Müller." Cf. "Rays of Grace," infra, pp. 158 ff.

worship... Obviously the noun charis and the connected verbs and substantives, which existed alongside of the mythological name, exercised a continually growing influence on it. The Charities became then the impersonations of the bloom of all sensuous appearance, of grace and cheerfulness, both in nature and in moral action.

The term prasāda ($\sqrt{\text{sad}} + \text{pra}$) has two general meanings which seem to express both the infinite and finite views of "those influences from the eternal order into the temporal." Primarily it denotes clarity, brightness, and serene, calm tranquility. It also is used extensively, in a manner similar to anugraha, to express favor, grace and kindness. From this later point of view it is defined as favor, grace, mediation, benevolence, goodwill; pardon, mercy; free gift, gracious gift; propitiousness; help, aid; kindly disposed, graciousness of disposition; well-being, welfare; cheering; pleasing.⁴⁶

As a propitiatory offering or free gift⁴⁷ prasāda may be used to indicate the food offered to an image, a preceptor, or divinity. The term also is applied to such

⁴⁶ See Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1097-1098, and Supplement I-IV.175; Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 183; Monier-Williams, op. cit., pp. 696-697; Bopp, op. cit., p. 231; Lanman, op. cit., pp. 197, 265; Bhide, op. cit., p. 766; Sivananda, op. cit., p. 74. As a mark or sign of favor Monier-Williams (p. 697) cites prasādāntara, also prasādanatta, a turban of honor, a sign of royal favor (also given by Böhtlingk and Roth, IV.1098). Isvaraprasāda is cited by Monier-Williams as divine grace (p. 171). Cf. also Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴⁷ Cf. Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 697. As a gift of food = prasādravya, prasādānna. See also Bhide, op. cit., p. 766.

food which, being dedicated, "made holy," may revert to the devotee or disciple, and may be eaten without scruple as something "holy."⁴⁸

Clearness. It has been mentioned previously that prasāda also pertains to clearness, radiance, calmness, serenity, cheerfulness and tranquility. From the integral view this is a simple experience of fact. From the ego's view that which is calming, soothing, and non-turbid is capable of being conciliated, is gracious, and therefore inclined to grant favors.

Clearness, with the attendant concept of purity, is the primary meaning usually given to the word. With clearness and purity Böhtlingk and Roth⁴⁹ also bracket the concept of cloudlessness, that which is untroubled and undisturbed. In the Supplement⁵⁰ "intelligibility" is linked to clearness and purity. Perspicuity as clearness, lucidity or intelligibility is cited with particular reference to speech or style.⁵¹ This is carried somewhat further by Monier-Williams⁵² when, under prasanna (pp.) he adds "true, right, plain, correct,

⁴⁸ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 183; Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 697; Bhide, op. cit., p. 766; Sivananda, op. cit., p. 74.

⁴⁹ Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1097.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Supplement I-IV.175.

⁵¹ See Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 183; Bhide, op. cit., p. 766; Monier-Williams, op. cit., pp. 696, 699; Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1097.

⁵² Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 696. See also Bhide, op. cit., p. 765.

just.⁵³ In opposition to turbidity Monier-Williams⁵³ gives prasannarasa, clear juiced, and prasannajala, pertaining to clear water. In the same connection ambuprasāda and toya-prasādanam⁵⁴ refer to the kataka or clearing nut tree, the nut of which clears muddy water. The element of serene lucidity which is characteristic of prasāda serves also to distinguish a very high stage of conscious samādhi,⁵⁵ prasādavattisamādhi.⁵⁶

Brightness or radiance is a quality closely akin to transparent clearness which, by removing obstruction, stain, or ignorance, permits the ever-present light or ray of Self consciously to encompass all differentiations within the undifferentiated. This brightness usually is defined⁵⁷ with reference to the radiance of the countenance,⁵⁸ eyes, mind, or of liquids such as water. Calmness, peace and purity of

⁵³ Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 696.

⁵⁴ Cf. Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1097-1098; Bhide, op. cit., pp. 135, 520. Ambu, toya=water.

⁵⁵ Cf. Yogasūtras 1.4.

⁵⁶ See Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1098 and Supplement, I-IV.175; Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 697.

⁵⁷ See Macdonnell, op. cit., p. 183; Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 697; Bhide, op. cit., p. 766.

⁵⁸ Cf. Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1097: mukha-prasāda, clearness of countenance; Monier Williams, op. cit., p. 696.: prasannamukha, placid countenance, looking pleased, smiling.

mind is likened to a limpid pool, or to the sea and sky as they "settle down, grow clear and bright, become placid and tranquil."⁵⁹

Tranquility is a characteristic closely allied with composure, absence of excitement, cheerfulness, and good temper⁶⁰ and therefore approaches the idea of graciousness and the inclination to grant favor. Monier-Williams,⁶¹ for example, gives prasāda as "abiding in serenity, kind, propitious, happy." Bhide⁶² defines chittaprasannatā as joy or pleasure (of the mind, heart), and Böhtlingk and Roth⁶³ cites guruchittaprasāda, gladden the heart [therefore court favor] of the guru. The same authorities give netra-prasādana for the quieting, tranquilizing use of the eye which makes for cheerfulness and favor. Drishti-prasāda may indicate the natural tranquility of the glance or look,⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 696.

⁶⁰ See Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 183; Bhide, op. cit., p. 766; Sivananda, op. cit., p. 74; Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV.1098. Cf. also Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 697, and on p. 696 see prasannagātrātā, "having tranquil limbs (one of the eighty minor marks of a Buddha. Dharmasaṅgraha 84.)."

⁶¹ Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 697.

⁶² Bhide, op. cit., p. 467.

⁶³ Böhtlingk and Roth; op. cit., IV.1098.

⁶⁴ Ibid., IV.1097.

or the "favor of a glance."⁶⁵ Thus the serenity of spirit⁶⁶ which is prasāda is productive, from the finite view, of a soothing satisfaction⁶⁷ which, conceived as an object outside the ego, is conducive to the granting of favor.

Eöhtlingk and Roth⁶⁸ give svachchha and svāsthya as synonyms for prasannatā, meaning clearness, brightness, perspicuity, complaisance, good humor. Svachchha⁶⁹ is defined as "beautifully clear, transparent or bright; clear, distinct (speech); pure (heart, conduct, etc.). Svāsthya (sva-stha)⁷⁰ particularly is illustrative of the integral experience rather than that of division or separation. Derived from sva-stha⁷¹ (the self abiding, one's natural state), svāsthya may be defined as a sound state, integral health, wholeness, ease.

⁶⁵ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 124.

⁶⁶ Cf. Ibid., p. 183; Bopp, op. cit., p. 696. See Eöhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1097, for Prasāda as the son of Dharma and Maitrī, the personification of serenity and kindness, or happiness and favor.

⁶⁷ Rau, op. cit., p. 57.

⁶⁸ Eöhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1097.

⁶⁹ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 370.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 373.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 372.

In his etymological analysis of the prasāda root
Holbrooke gives:⁷²

Skt.: -√chand, to flash out, shine. śat, to sit down.
satt, shoot, be strong, dash out, give, dwell.
sad, to speed, go. sad, to occupy, sit down.
pra-sad, to be desirous, propitious. sādh
(sadh), to attain, accomplish, acquire. sidh,
to attain, succeed, be lucky.
pra-sannas⁷³ (pp. of sad), propitious.⁷⁴
sadā, sanā, always. sanātanas, eternal
(Lat. tenuis)

Lat.: -semper, always.

Skt.: -sad⁷⁵ to sit down, sink down, be exhausted.⁷⁶
pra-sad, to yearn toward, be propitious. (caus.,
to seek favor, pray). sadas, seat. sadman, abode.
sadyam, home.

Gk.: -ἔλomal, ἰλomal, to sit down. ἑδρα, shrine.
ἑδρας, seat.

Zd.: -had, to sit. hadis, dwelling.

Lat.: -sedeo, to sit. sedo, to calm, quiet. sēdes,
sedile, sella, chair. sedulus, diligent (pra-sad).

A.S.: -sadol, saddle.

O.R.: -seisti, to sit. sedlo, saddle. saditi, to plant.

R.: -sazhat, to set, put, plant. sad, garden.

Ir.: -sudim, to sit. sude, seat. sēsta, repose.

W.: -seddu, to sit. hedd, peace. heddu, calm.

Lanman⁷⁷ (re-√sad + pra) gives the opinion that "behind

⁷² Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 245. (abridged)

⁷³ Ibid., p. 250.

⁷⁴ See Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 182. where the meaning is given as clear, bright; pleased, soothed, delighted; com-
plaisant; gracious, propitious, kindly disposed; plain
(meaning); distinct (impression); correct (supposition).

⁷⁵ Holbrooke, op. cit., pp. 250-251. (abridged)

⁷⁶ As when the ego finds that all attempts to rise
above ego-hood are fruitless.

⁷⁷ Lanman, op. cit., p. 265.

the meaning 'be gracious' lies doubtless the physical meaning 'settle forward, incline towards, by a suppliant.'⁷⁸ This, of course, is from the view of the suppliant. The āsana shown in all figures depicting those who have realized the Self, or who have awakened to the supreme which is integral and universal, in no manner can be regarded as an act of supplication or propitiation which is peculiar to the finite and divided state. It indicates, rather, the complete and instantaneous surrender of the ego-will, the clearness of realization, the serenity, tranquility and peace of the timeless, the undifferentiated yet all-inclusive state which is above all movement, both the in-going, grasping current or the out-going flow of supplication asking for a return of favor. It is the abandonment of all the flux of modification, chittavrittinirodha, yet it is the non-separate ground for and of those modifications which constitute its līlā.

The prefix pra, before, forward, onward, on, forth,⁷⁸ is derived⁷⁹ from:

Eur.-Ar.: -pro (Baly), onward.
 Skt.: -prī (Holbrooke), to shoot beyond. pur (Holbrooke),
 to go before. pra, before.
 Zd.: -fra, before.
 Gk.: -πρῶ, before.
 Lat.: -prō, prō, prōd (old abl.), in front of, before,

⁷⁸ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 171.

⁷⁹ Baly, op. cit., p. 640; Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 68. (abridged).

in favor of.⁸⁰

- ⁸⁰ The element of favor provides an interesting variant given by Holbrooke, *op. cit.*, p. 66, where: (abridged)
- Skt.: -prī, to fill, pri, to help to food, be busy. spri, to cheer, be gracious, protect. pri (pārayāmi), to nourish. prī (prīnāmi), I enjoy. privas, delightful, enjoyable, beloved. preman, love.
- Gk.: -(πρίμα), to [love, redeem]. πρεῶν, to sooth, calm, tame.
- Lat.: -privus, the portion of a favored guest (Hor. Ep. 1,1,92). praemium, favor, reward.
- Goth.: -frauya, [portion bestowing] Lord. friwei, freedom.
- O.N.: -fridhr, love, peace, frynn, joyful.
- O.R.: -priyati, to provide, care for.
- R.: - priyotit, to protect. priyazn, affection.
- Ir.: - (p)rath, chieftan's bounty, grace.

From spri (see above) Holbrooke (p. 71) gives the following:

- Skt.: -plu, pru, eddy, go round. pri, to pass round, help to food, to feed, make happy. spri, guard, make happy, protect, encircle. prush, to sprinkle, favor, fill, satisfy, [sparkle], blaze. plush, plus, to distribute food, to burn. bhrās, bhrāg, bhreg, bhlās, to sparkle, flash, shine.

Baly, *op. cit.*, pp. 665-666, (abridged) gives:

- Eur.Ar.: -prī, dear, kind, pleased.
- Skt.: - prī, privas, dear, friendly. prīnāmi, be fond of, make glad. prī-tis, satisfaction, contentment.
- Zd.: - fri, frya, (friendly). fritas, blessing.
- Gk.: - πρᾶ, πρῆ, -πρᾶ-ος, πρᾶος, mild, gentle.
- O. Slav.: -prī-jati, cares for. priatelj, a friend.
- Lith.: - pretel-ins (a friend). pri-yas, dear.
- Dutch.: - vrijen, court, woo.
- Goth.: - frijonds; O.H.G.: -friunt; N.H.G.: - freund; O.N.: - fraendi; A.S.: -freond; M.E.: -frend; N.E.: - friend (originally a pp. = loving).
- Goth.: - freis; O.H.G.: -fri; N.H.G.: -frei; A.S.: -freo, fri; M.E.: -freo, fre; N.E.: -free
- Goth.: - fritha; O.H.G.: -fridu; N.H.G.: -friede; O.N.: - fridh-r; A.S.: -freatho, frithu, = peace.
- Eng. deriv.: friend, free, afraid.

Could it be that that which is not a friend, which is not free or peaceful, that is to say, which separates the

Compassion. The advaitic experience, being integral, is not an aloof withdrawal from the multiferm, from the apparently antagonistic forces of duality. The calm and peace of serene clearness is not a vacuum but a boundless plenum⁸¹ of consciousness power grounded in the unmanifest transcendent which cannot be denied Self-determination, lila, in both formless and formal manifestation.⁸² Thus Brahman, Īśvara, and jīvātman are the three modes of the supreme spirit or Parabrahman.⁸³ Self-realization is inclusive of an all-embracing (therefore not possessive or sentimental) compassion for the emergent manifold, the differentiated; a compassion which so freely and gratuitously gives of itself that it consciously may share in the vicissitudes of the many, the jīva, by a sympathetic plunging into the trembling life-

ego and the "other," is conducive to fear, to being afraid?

The meanings given to the greater part of the above derivatives by Baly and Holbrooke are to be found in the prasāda complex from the viewpoints both of favor and of clearness.

⁸¹ See Haridās Chaudhuri, Sri Aurobindo, the Prophet of Live Divine (Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Pathamandir, 1951), p. 249, also pp. 206-207, 218-221.

⁸² See Guénon, op. cit., p. 63, also Watts, op. cit., p. 96: "If the one in three God can be meaningful, then the one in many (i.e. non-dual) infinite can be meaningful--and just as remote from monism." Cf. also the Christian supernatural order, the realm of pure intelligences, and the state of man.

⁸³ Chaudhuri op. cit., p. 207.

role of the ego. There are, then such terms as anukampā⁸⁴ which may be defined as compassion or sympathy. The root kamp means "tremble" or "shake,"⁸⁵ and the prefix anu is given as "after, along, toward."⁸⁶

The word karuṇā ($\sqrt{\text{kri}}$)⁸⁷ also means pity and compassion,⁸⁸ and kripā ($\sqrt{\text{krip}}$)⁸⁹ is defined as "pity, compassion, tenderness."⁹⁰

Dayā ($\sqrt{\text{day}}$)⁹¹ has the meaning of sympathy, compassion, pity.⁹² Bhide⁹³ gives dayāvīrah as "heroic compassion...or heroism arising out of compassion," probably an analogy of the bodhisattva ideal. Monier-Williams⁹⁴ also gives dayā as

⁸⁴ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 15; Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 31; Bopp, op. cit., p. 10.

⁸⁵ Whitney, op. cit., p. 17; Lanman, op. cit., p. 139.

⁸⁶ Lanman, op. cit., p. 116.

⁸⁷ Whitney, op. cit., p. 21.

⁸⁸ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 63; Bopp, op. cit., p. 67.

⁸⁹ Whitney, op. cit., p. 23. = lament

⁹⁰ Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 73; Bhide, op. cit., p. 383; Lanman, op. cit., p. 144.

⁹¹ Whitney, op. cit., pp. 70, 72. $\sqrt{\text{day}}$, 'share,' a secondary form of $\sqrt{\text{da}}$. 'divide, share.'

⁹² Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 116; Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 469; Lanman, op. cit., p. 168; Bopp, op. cit., p. 164.

⁹³ Bhide, op. cit., p. 532.

⁹⁴ Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 469.

the daughter of daksha [spiritual power]⁹⁵ and the mother of abhaya [security, safety, free from fear].⁹⁶ Holbrooke's analysis extends the meaning toward the guarding, encircling motion as found in anugraha, but here the action is not initiated by the ego or jiva for it is empowered by the compassion of the realized Self. Holbrooke states:

Dental roots seem to center around a form of stha; losing the initials they become dha, da, ḍa, ta, tu, melting constantly into each other.⁹⁷

sthā, stand, be firm; sthai, heap up, round out, bind, encircle; stai, to stretch tight, wrap...; tay, tāy, day, dāy, to pitch camp, encircle, guard, make the rounds, move, ...love, give, [protect] ...⁹⁸

Gk.: -τημελέω to guard, care for...

Lat.: -tueor, watch, guard.⁹⁹

Skt.: -day, to circle, defend, glance, aim, flash out... divine (brightness, sky). dya, dyaus, heaven, god of heaven, ...devas, god.

Skt.: -day...to give, distribute, be generous, merciful. dā, to give. dal, cut up, distribute.

Lat.: -dolo, to hew.

A.S.: -taele, torn...daelan, to tear away, expose, reveal. daelan, to divide, share.

Goth.: -dailyan, to share. ga-daila, sharer, compassion.

⁹⁵ Lanman, op. cit., p. 166.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 119. Also Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 22; Bhide, op. cit., p. 110.

⁹⁷ Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 278.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 279.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 292.

O. Brt.: -dal-itoc, generous
 O. Ir.: -dal-agnos, cheerfully generous. 100
 Skt.: -day, to glance round, observe, aim, reflect...
 dis, to aim...point,...show,...teach,...name...
 dfksh, to sacrifice.
 Zd.: -dahksh, to teach...
 Gk.: -διδάσκω, to teach.
 Lat.: -indico, to point out. indicum, information.
 de-dico, to dedicate. doceo, to teach. disco,
 to learn. discipulus, pupil.
 Goth.: -teihan, to announce. taiknyan, to point out,
 to show. taikns, token, proof.
 A.S.: -taecan, to show, teach.
 O.H.G.: -zeigēn, to point out, to show.
 Ger.: -zeichnen, to make evident... ver-zeihen, to
 [accept atonement], pardon. 101

From the above-listed definitions and etymological notes it is evident that the element of "favor" found within the prasāda complex contains meanings which may fall within all of the four general categories mentioned by Pohl, 102 that is, good will or benevolence; favor inspired by such good will or benevolence, or any free or gratuitous gift; personal charm or attraction; gratitude. Their relations, however, to the particular religious definition of grace given by Pohl 103 are best left to an examination of usage in textual material and in the various Indian systems.

The element of "clearness" or "calmness," while

100 Ibid., p. 294.

101 Ibid., p. 310.

102 Supra, p. 14.

103 Supra, p. 14.

experienced and observed as pertaining to cheerfulness, appears to be related to the four general categories of grace only as they are analogies of the advaitic experience. Even the terms grouped about the concept of clearness may be viewed as metaphysical analogies of a somewhat higher order, just as nirvāṇa, void, silence, are used in the attempt to express in some measure the inexpressible.

Compassion, while capable of being perverted into sentimental channels, in its purity is but the manifestation of conscious love or agape directed toward the finite self, and proceeding, not from a remote and separate "other" or some unique historical figure, but from the Self, the That (tat) which includes yet transcends all This (idam) as well as the ego (aḥam), for within and above these three poises it is the eternal Parabrahman.

Whether the terminology be that of favor, clearness, or compassion, no portion of the prasāda complex, as long as it is based upon a ground of metaphysic which is fundamental to any overlay of religious analogy, ^{can} look to a completely other, set apart by any unbridgeable ontological gap, as the source of a "gratuitous, supernatural" gift, internal or external, nor can it be derived solely from the merits of a unique historical figure.

PART II

TEXTUAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRASADA COMPLEX

CHAPTER I

VEDA SAMHITA

Vedic interpretations. Vedic truth and knowledge is said to be not in itself a logical construct but, rather, it is a gift of immediate and timeless¹ intuitive insight whose authority rests upon the fact that it is the "highest truth revealed to a pure mind."² It arises, fundamentally, from the unclouded, clear "intuitive seeing" by the rishis of a truth which is not of their own making, but instead is of the infinite order "above the narrow plane of the discursive consciousness," and its inception does not imply the workings

¹ Therefore non-historical. See T. V. Kapāli Śāstry, Lights on the Vedas (Madras: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1947), pp. 15-16.

² S. Rādhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948) I, 128. Rādhakrishnan also points out that the word veda is derived from the Aryan vid, cf. vision (a "seeing") from Lat. video, ideas; Gk. eidos, wit. Whitney (Wm. D. Whitney, The Roots, Verb-forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language [New Haven: American Oriental Soc., 1945], p. 159) gives for vid 1. knowledge, 2. find. J. Baly, Eur-Aryan Roots (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1897), p. 107, for the term vision gives:

Eur. Ar.: -vid, vid, to see, perceive, know, find.

Skt.: -vid, ...know; veda; vitti, consciousness; vindati, a present formation of vid with nasal, and a sense of finding, obtaining; p.p. vitta, found, obtained; vedatā, possession, property.

Gk.: -εἶδω to see; εἶδος, look or semblance, in Plato the ideal

of a miracle or the touch of the supernatural of theology.³ Thus the gift of vedic truth, inasmuch as it is an aid from that which is other than the ego-consciousness and is considered as an inspirational "influence from the eternal order into the temporal," may be thought of as a type of that "spiritual grace" mentioned by Aldous Huxley.⁴

Kapāli Sāstry cites certain variations in interpreting the vedic mantras which, according to Yaska and the Rig-bhāshya of Madhvāchārya⁵ is three-fold in nature; that is, an interpretation will tend to stress either the power of spiritual knowledge, knowledge of the gods, or knowledge of sacrifice.⁶ Rādhakṛishṇan⁷ also notes that there are differing views held by undoubted authorities concerning the

form, archetype; ~~is~~ one who knows...

Lat.: -vid- in videre, vidi, visum=vid-tum to see. visio, visus, a seeing, vision.

O.F.: -vis (=Lat. visus) a face, vis a vis, face to face.

Balto-Slav.: -Lith.: -weidz-mi, see, look; valdas, face.

O. Slav.: -videti, to see; vidu, face; vedeti, to know; vedi, knowledge.

Teutonic: -Goth.: -witan; O.H.G.: -wizzan; N.H.G. wissen;

A.S.: -witan; O.N.: -vita, --to see, perceive, know.

³ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., I, 128.

⁴ Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), pp. 166-167, 252-253.

⁵ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., p. 84.

⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., I, 68.

spirit of the hymns. He, however, tends to favor the ritualistic and naturalistic interpretation stressed by Sāyana and the majority of Western trained scholars and rather pointedly discounts the spiritual interpretation given by Sri Aurobindo.⁸ Kapāli Sāstry,⁹ though, defends the spiritual thesis, not to the exclusion of other views but as metaphysically basic to them, and looks beyond those literal and naturalistic interpretations¹⁰ which seem to involve a mythological structure stemming from the rishis as naive "imbeciles agape, wondering all the days of their lives at natural phenomena."¹¹ The figurative language and allegorical legends of the hymns refer, in the spiritual view, to the immediately experienced metaphysical fact, the content of which, being inexpressible, can be related only in anthropomorphic and naturalistic terms involving the sacrifice of the ego-self to the infinite. While this interpretative disagreement as such is a subject for a separate and detailed study, it does involve the determination of that frame of reference which is basic to any understanding of the vedic

⁸ Ibid., I, 69-70.

⁹ See also Sri Aurobindo, Hymns to the Mystic Fire (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Āśram, 1946), introduction.

¹⁰ In a manner similar to Jung's interpretation of alchemical writings.

¹¹ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., p. 89.

usage of terms or experience-content implied in the prasaḍa complex. If the interpretation is grounded solely upon deities and deified natural phenomena which are those irreducible "others," ontologically separate, distant, and eternally set apart from equally irreducible ego, then the elements of deliverance, of favor, compassion, and clear tranquility of mind are to be viewed in a religious light. On the other hand, if the characters and events related in the vedas are dramatic analogies of psychological and spiritual experiences, the entire scheme is capable of metaphysical interpretation. The religious view necessarily excludes the metaphysical, while the latter, being all inclusive, does not deny the analogical status of other interpretations. Again, a strict religious interpretation of the hymns would tend to alienate them not only from the traditional metaphysical doctrine which looks to them as its basic scripture but also that entire body of metaphysic characteristic of the Orient.¹²

Devas. Rādhakṛishṇan¹³ mentions that the word deva is elusive in character because of its varied meanings. Not only does it pertain to that which is bright, and therefore denotes the god, the "shining one," but in addition "deva

¹² This of course is not inclusive of the three religions of the Near East.

¹³ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., I, 72-73.

is one who gives to man." The deity who gives the manifest world is deva, the teacher who gives knowledge is a deva, as also are the sun, moon, sky, parents, and guests, among others.

Petition. It is related of Varuna¹⁴ (\sqrt{vr} 1, cover, encompass, therefore his mythological relationship to the sky) that he is the constant watcher over the world, the one who wills punishment for those who sin¹⁵ and wipes away the sins of those who appeal to him for aid. Hymns addressed to Varuna usually contain petitions for deliverance from sin, for "he is merciful even to him who has committed sin."¹⁶ Varuna and Mitra are, together, keepers of rita¹⁷ and of

¹⁴ Ibid., I, 177.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the vedic idea of "sin" see infra, pp. 351 ff.

¹⁶ R.V. 7.87.7. in Sten Rodhe, Deliver Us From Evil (Lund: 1946), p. 144. In R.V. Varuna is widely associated with ideas of deliverance from sin.

¹⁷ Cf. Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., I, 78-79. Rita as law, justice, literally the "course of things...the order of the world." The undying order which is behind the particular. Cf. Alfred A. Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (London: Oxford U. Press, 1924), p. 57,--established order...divine law; truth, righteousness. See also the later meaning of dharma, p. 130. Cf. Egyptian concept of maat, James Henry Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 142-145.

deliverance from sin, based not upon whim or the turn of chance, but upon a basic and all-inclusive harmony which has a willed purpose.¹⁸

Hopkins¹⁹ speaks of freedom from sin as a "free gift of the gods," and mentions²⁰ that Aditi, the divine mother, is besought to grant sinlessness as also are Varuna and Agni,²¹ the Maruts, Soma, Soma-Rudra, heaven and earth, the pitri and Savitri.²² Rādhakrishnan²³ cites a line from the Yajur Veda indicating the obstructive, cloaking or hiding nature of the separative ego-consciousness; "O god Savitri, the Creator of all, remove the obstructions and grant the blessings."

The readiness of the gods to respond to the devotee's call for aid is noted²⁴ in R.V. 1.155.6 where Vishnu is esteemed for that quality. Agni²⁵ is invoked in the Rig

¹⁸ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., I, 80. Here also see quotation from R.V. 10.133.6: "O Indra, lead us on the path of rita, on the right path over all evils."

¹⁹ E. Washburn Hopkins, Ethics of India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), p. 18.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

²¹ R.V. 1.162.22; 4.23.8; 10.35.2; 4.12.4; 3.54.19.

²² Rodhe, op. cit., p. 145. See R.V. 4.54.3 for petition to Savitri.

²³ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., I, 81.

²⁴ Loc. cit.

²⁵ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., p. 32, speaks of Agni as

Veda²⁶ with the use of prasatta²⁷ which has received a variety of treatment in translation. Griffith²⁸ gives, "I laud with reverence the gracious [prasatta] Agni: here may he sit and part our mead among us." The text in The Sacred Books of the East²⁹ similarly translates, "I implore Agni, the gracious..."; while Wilson³⁰ gives "I adore the protecting Agni with hymns: may he, propitiated on this occasion, approve our acts."

The deliverance spoken of in the Vedas is said by Rodhe³¹ to involve freedom from evils other than that particular bondage to samsāra which is an upanishadic problem. The terms mukti and moksha imply deliverance from samsāric evil and are therefore rarely found in the vedic hymns where

"The seven tongued (saptajihva) power of divine will with wisdom...the immortal guest in our mortal being [whose] ...activity is directed toward mediating between earth and heaven and therefore he ascends."

26 R.V. 5.60.1.--file agniṁ svavasaṁ namobhīriha prasatto vi chayatkrīṣam nah...

27 pp. sad+pra, satisfied, pleased. Macdonnell, op. cit., p. 331.

28 Ralph T. H. Griffith, Hymns of the Rig Veda (Benares: E. V. Lazarus and Co., 1920), I. 530.

29 Max Müller, Editor, Sacred Books of the East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), XIXII, 352.

30 H. H. Wilson, Translator, Rig Veda Saṁhitā (London: Trübner and Co., 1888), III, 342.

31 Rodhe, op. cit., p. 26.

muñchate (much) occurs most frequently in the sense of "loosen, release, deliver." A certain herb, for example, is designated as having the power to remove a disagreeable or evil condition, and in A.V. 10.1.2³² it is stated "...let these plants free (muñchantu) thee from all ill (pāpa) that is designed..."

Sacrifice. According to Rādhakrishnan³³ sacrifice is representative of the second stage of vedic development, the first being that of simple petition. Rodhe³⁴ views the vedic combination of knowledge and works (karma) as pertinent particularly to the social stage of life and delivery from physical and social evils, while the upanishadic stress upon knowledge and meditation emphasizes the later stage of life in the forest and delivery from samsāric experience. Dāsgupta³⁵ relates how sacrificial works utilized the hymns in operations which were designed to obtain special favor (not yet for the purpose of moksha, however) from the gods addressed in the particular hymn. The sacrifices were conceived to be coercive with respect to the gods inasmuch as the

³² Ibid., p. 32.

³³ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., I, 107.

³⁴ Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

³⁵ Surendranath Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 1-2.

deities were powerless to withhold fulfilment if the sacrifice and ritual were performed properly. Thus the method and the sacrifice, according to Dāsgupta,³⁶ because of its unalterable efficacy tended to stress deliverance by knowledge alone rather than deliverance by the special favor of a deity. The same author³⁷ also states that from the belief in the magical and automatic efficacy of sacrificial works capable of producing both good and bad effects there springs the later development of the law of karma as it was applied to the realm of morals. Proceeding from the magic of the ritual act or sacrifice was a transference of its efficacy to tapas, meditation, and yogic practices which again seemed to place a type of technical "knowledge" over and above the grace of favor of gods.³⁸ The deities themselves practiced tapas and the manifestation of the world was preceded by the calm, tranquil, breathless breathing of "that One," the warmth (tapas) of which was a prerequisite to "all this."³⁹

Kapāli Sāstry⁴⁰ looks upon the physical sacrificial process and all of its minute elements as portions of a

³⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

³⁹ Cf. Ibid., pp. vii, 9. See R.V. 10. 129.

⁴⁰ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

symbolic analogy of the true sacrifice of the finite multiform, that inner sacrifice or letting go of the ego-nature and all of its appurtenances, and the acceptance of all that is made holy,--or whole, by the spiritual power or will. He sees a "subtle transaction of give and take"⁴¹ which involves a giving up of the finite and a taking over of integral and harmonious realization.

In this connection a petition is made⁴² to Agni, the god of fire or the power of divine will with wisdom, who is likened to a connecting or mediating thread which can bridge the gap between finite and infinite. The word prasāda is not used, but the element of favor is implied with the use of prasādhana.⁴³

May we obtain (the favor of) him to whom burnt offerings are presented, (Agni), who is the thread, the perfection of sacrifice, drawn out (by the sacrificers) to the gods.

Hopkins,⁴⁴ in speaking of the Hymn of Vāch,⁴⁵ cites

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 49.

⁴² R.V. 10.57.2. See Wilson, op. cit., III, 149.

⁴³ Otto Böhtlingk and Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch (St. Petersburg, 1855-1875) IV, 1098. The meaning is given as "to bring about, to effect, to bring to pass."

⁴⁴ Edward Washburn Hopkins, The Religions of India (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895), pp. 142-143.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 142. "Speech, the word personified, a goddess." See R. V. 10.125. Also Sakti as Vāch. infra, Part VI.

Weber as looking toward this source as the prototype of the logos doctrine. Wilson⁴⁶ states that the "deity may be considered either as Vāch, personified speech,...or as Para-mātmā; Vāch is the rishi..." In this hymn Vāch appears as the omnipresent, "active female divine power showing grace to mortals"⁴⁷ and raising her chosen ones to great heights of wisdom. Hopkins concludes by saying,⁴⁸ "This is almost vedāntic pantheism with the vishnuite doctrine of special grace included," a statement which ignores the metaphysical ground of vedānta and the "vishnuite doctrine."

⁴⁶ Wilson, op. cit., VI, 347.

⁴⁷ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 558.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

CHAPTER II

THE UPANISHADS

The two prasādas. Kāthopanishad 2.20 is of great importance inasmuch as it is regarded by some as "being the first explicit statement of the doctrine of Grace (prasāda)"¹ and in addition it provides an excellent example of the double usage of prasāda. Hume² translates the passage as follows:

More minute than the minute, greater than the great,
Is the Soul (ātman)³ that is set in the heart of a
creature here.

One who is without the active will (a-kratu) beholds
Him, and becomes freed from sorrow--

When through the grace (prasāda) of the Creator (dhātṛi)
he beholds the greatness of the Soul (ātman).

Hopkins⁴ states that the doctrine of a divine and saving grace is to be found only in the later Upanishads, although it is foreshadowed in the hymn of Vāch⁵ and

¹ Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principle Upanishads (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 350n.

² Ibid., pp. 349-350. With slight variations this passage also is found in Svet. 3.20, Taittirīyāranyaka 10.10.1, Mahānārāyanopanishad 10.1 (Ātharv. recension 8.3).

³ As explained in the introduction the word "spirit" or Self tends to give a more adequate and metaphysical interpretation of ātman than does the use of Soul, which tends toward the religious view of self as jīva or ego.

⁴ E. Washburn Hopkins, The Great Epic of India (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1902), p. 188.

⁵ R.V. 10.125.

Mund.3.2.3. This doctrine is an assertion that one sees the Self (ġman) or Lord⁶ through the grace or favor of the creator. Hopkins⁷ contrasts this emphasis upon grace to that "older and severer school--those who attain salvation scientifically, either by knowledge of soul or of god," said by him to be by knowledge alone in the older Upanishads and in the Mahābhārata by jñāna, ascetic practices, yoga, and tapas. Opposed to "salvation by knowledge and science" was "salvation by grace" which developed, according to Hopkins, into the "less troublesome way"⁸ of dependence upon the grace of Krishna, the man-god.⁹ Thus the two seemingly opposed tendencies are described¹⁰ as, (A), the scientific approach of knowledge, wisdom jñāna and vidyā which culminates in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems and, (B), the later development of the "grace of the creator-spirit" which flowered within the

⁶ Svet. 3.20.

⁷ Hopkins, loc. cit.

⁸ Cf. Bhagavadgītā 12.5.

⁹ This interpretation ignores the view of metaphysic in a seemingly gratuitous self-limitation to the two Western views of mechanical causation and religion. The interpretation of the "grace of Krishna" is reminiscent of a religious dependence upon the grace of Christ, the "God-man," and is influenced probably by a too close parallel between Krishna, the avatāra of the non-separate metaphysical ground and the theological Christ as the only begotten son of the eternally separate God.

¹⁰ Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

Krishna cults.

Hume¹¹ states, "As regards speculative knowledge of âtman, its apprehension by means of human knowledge is opposed to the doctrine of prasâda, or 'Grace'..." While it is true that any doctrine of divine grace opposes the sole efficacy of speculative human reason as an agent for salvation or awakening, there seems to be here an unfounded assumption that a knowledge of âtman must be of a human, speculative and theoretical order. In a previous discussion of knowledge Hume¹² has declared that "Knowledge--not 'much learning,' but the understanding of metaphysical truths--was the impelling motive of the thinkers of the Upanishads." Hume illustrates his identification of metaphysical knowledge with Western philosophical standards involving the purely finite power of speculative reason when he immediately continues:

Because of the theoretical importance of knowledge in that period of speculative activity, and also because of the discrediting of the popular polytheistic religion by philosophical reasoning, there took place in India during the time of the Upanishads a movement similar to that which produced the Sophists in Greece, namely, a re-adjustment of the accepted ethics and a substitution of philosophic insight for traditional morality.

¹¹ Hume, op. cit., p. 59.

¹² Ibid., p. 58.

Metaphysical knowledge¹³ is neither speculative nor theoretical but is an immediate subjective experience or realization of that ground and principle of all manifestation, the ultimate reality or Self (âtman) which, being of a higher order, cannot be grasped by the tools of a lower. While Hume¹⁴ sees no common denominator able to bridge the gulf existent between the seemingly opposed forces of "...the grace of the creator" and "the general upanishadic doctrine of salvation through knowledge," he is aware of the other general meaning which the one word prasâda possesses. He cites Sankara's interpretation of Kâthopanishad 2.20 where 'through the tranquility of the senses' is substituted for 'the grace of the creator,' as well as other occasions where this sense of the word unquestionably appears in the Upanishads and the Gîtâ, therefore tacitly admitting the possibility of this sense in Kâthopanishad 2.20.

Böhtlingk and Roth,¹⁵ citing this same verse, give dhâtuprasâda as "without excitement, natural repose or tranquility." This meaning is prefigured in the second line of the translated sloka, "One who is without active will (a-kratu)

¹³ See Section III in Introduction concerning the difference between metaphysical knowledge and inferred, rational knowledge, p. xxv, supra.

¹⁴ Hume, op. cit., p. 350.

¹⁵ Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1097.

beholds Him, and becomes freed from sorrow." Rānāde¹⁶ translates the line containing dhātuprasāda as, "it is only when the whole moral being is purged of evil that one is able to realize the greatness of God." He immediately continues:

We prefer to understand the reading 'dhātuprasāda'¹⁷ instead of 'dhātuḥprasāda' in the above passage, for to our mind the idea of dhātri or creation is absolutely irrelevant into it, the purification of the moral being yielding quite a necessary and legitimate sense.

Kapāli Śāstry¹⁸ states:

Dhātu-prasāda in Kātha. 2.20 is the same as sattva suddhi according to Sankara; he states clearly that dhātu means mind and other instruments...he means anta-hkarana which indeed is generally understood to be the sense of sattva in later writings. But dhātu connotes something connected with the physical organism also. In rendering into English dhātu in dhātu-prasāda in the Kātha. text, Sri Aurobindo has used a word which conveys the sense of all that the Sanskrit word connotes. 'Temperament'---a happy expression which at once refers to the physical and psychological elements.

As for prasāda, it is of course, purification, suddhi, according to Sri Aurobindo as well as to Sankara.

The view of prasāda as that purity, that lack of turbidity which permits or freely gives access to the ever-present light of metaphysical understanding is expressed by

¹⁶ R. D. Rānāde, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926), p. 341.

¹⁷ Cf. Macdonnell, op. cit., p. 132. dhātu, element, component part.

¹⁸ T. V. Kapāli Śāstry, Lights on the Upanishads (Madras: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1947), p. 6n.

Sri Aurobindo¹⁹ as follows:

Sattwa...is by the purity of its quality a cause of light and illumination and by virtue of that purity it produces no disease or morbidity or suffering in the nature. When into all the doors in the body there comes a flooding of light, as if the doors and windows of a closed house were opened to sunshine, a light of understanding, perception and knowledge,--when the intelligence is alert and illumined, the senses quickened, the whole mentality satisfied and full of brightness and the nervous being calmed and filled with an illumined ease and clarity, prasāda, one should understand that there has been a great increase and uprising of the sattwic guna in the nature.

This calmness and purity is not to be construed as that of a vacancy, for when the "substance of the mental being [is] ...so still that nothing disturbs it" it is capable of the reflection of integral consciousness-power. "A mind that has achieved this calmness can begin to act, even intensely and powerfully, but it will keep its fundamental stillness."²⁰ Sri Aurobindo further states,²¹ "When the mind is at peace, when it is silent one can become aware of Purusha, silent also, separate from the actions of the nature." This peace or silence, however, is not necessarily a process which automatically or mechanically brings the

¹⁹ Sri Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā (New York: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1950), p. 383.

²⁰ Sri Aurobindo, Bases of Yoga (Calcutta: Ārya Publishing House, 1949), pp. 3-4.

²¹ Ibid., p. 5.

reward of Self-realization. The Self is not a commodity to be obtained by the coin of tranquility in the machine of the mind, for without the will of the ātman (that which Huxley calls spiritual grace) perfect tranquility, non-turbidity, and Self awakening is impossible.²²

Nikhilānanda²³ translates the dhātuprasāda portion of Kaṭha. 2.20 as, "a man who is free from desires beholds the majesty of the Self through tranquility of the senses and the mind and becomes free from grief" and thus concurs with the view that "purification of the stuff of the instrumental being, sattwa śuddhi, which is the same as dhātuprasāda--crystalline purity of the temperament,"²⁴ permits a "certain settled intuitive grasp of the Truth..."²⁵ In his notes Nikhilānanda²⁶ says that

Commentators who upheld Dualism explain the compound word dhātuprasādat ('tranquility of the sense and the mind') in the text as 'by the grace (prasādat) of the creator (dhātu).'²⁷ It is true that one does not feel the grace of god without desirelessness, inner calmness, and purity.

²² Cf. Ibid., pp. 6, 22. See also Sri Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo (Bombay: Sri Aurobindo Circle, 1951), IV, 205, 609.

²³ Nikhilānanda, The Upanishads (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), I, 141.

²⁴ Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., p. 155.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁶ Nikhilānanda, op. cit., I, 142.

Edgerton²⁷ mentions that most of the Upanishads, particularly the earlier ones, do not personalize sufficiently the ātman or the Brahman so as to permit the play of the grace concept as a element of relationship to a personal god. As the Vāch hymn in the Rigveda illustrates, however, there was a certain early tendency to personalize the consciousness-power and will (śakti) of the absolute as a carrier or embodiment of favor.

Clarity. Further interpretation of prasāda as clarity, peace, and tranquility is found in Mundakopanishad 3.1.8:²⁸

Not by sight is It grasped, not even by speech,
Not by any other sense-organs (deva), austerity, or
work.

By the peace of knowledge (jñāna-prasāda), one's nature
purified--

In that way, however, by meditating, one does behold Him
who is without parts.

Nikhilānanda²⁹ translates jñānaprasāda as "serenity of intellect" with the understanding that here jñāna means buddhi, and quotes from Sankarāchārya's Bhāṣya to the effect that the natural nature of buddhi is pure, clear and capable of Self-realization but, due to the turbidity of

²⁷ Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavadgītā, Translation and Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944) II, 26.

²⁸ Hume, op. cit., p. 375.

²⁹ Nikhilānanda, op. cit. I, 301-302.

avidyā experiences attachment, desire, and separation.

Elimination of this superimposed turbid nature permits the pure intellect or buddhi to function in its proper manner.³⁰

Sivānanda³¹ translates jñānaprasāda as the "serene light of knowledge" and the "pure intellect," and comments that this removal of all impurities is the "grace of wisdom."

Rāṇaḍe³² interprets the lines as follows:

It is only when a perfect katharsis of the whole moral being takes place by the clearness of illumination, that one is able to realize the immaculate God after meditation; for He can be attained neither by sight, nor by word of mouth, nor by any other sense, nor by penance, nor by any action whatsoever.

In Maitryupanishad 6.20 are lines beginning chittasya hi prasādena³³ which Hume³⁴ translates:

For by tranquility (prasāda) of thought
Deeds (karman), good and evil, one destroys!
With soul (ātman) serene [prasanna], stayed on
the Soul (ātman)
Delight eternal one enjoys.

Svetāśvataropaniṣad 2.13³⁵ lists "clearness of

³⁰ Cf. Sveta. 2. 14-15.

³¹ Sivānanda, Principal Upanishads (Rishikesh: The Yoga Vedānta Forest University, 1950), I, 387-388.

³² Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 341.

³³ = Maitri. 6.34; (var.) M.Bh. 3.213.24 (C 13983) & 12.247.10 (C8960).

³⁴ Hume, op. cit., pp. 436, 447.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 398.

countenance" (varna prasāda) as one of the first signs of progress in yoga. This quality is preceded immediately by that of steadiness which Hume notes can be read, alternately, as alolubhatvam, "freedom from desires."

Sānta also is used to express the peaceful tranquility which has been ascribed to prasāda. Mundakopanishad 3.25³⁶ speaks of seers "who are perfected souls (kṛitātman) from passion free (vītarāga), tranquil [praśāntāḥ]..." Chhândogyanishad 3.14.1³⁷ states, "Verily this whole world is Brahman. Tranquil [sānta], let one worship It as that from which he came forth, as that into which he will be dissolved, as that in which he breathes." Kaṭhupanishad 2.24³⁸ stresses peace and tranquility in the lines, "Not he who has not ceased from bad conduct, not he who is not tranquil [nāśāntaḥ], not he who is not composed [nāśamāhitaḥ], not he who is not of peaceful mind [nāśāntamānasaḥ] can obtain Him by intelligence." Svetāśvataropanishad 6.22³⁹ declares that "the supreme mystery in the Veda's end (vedānta),... should not be given to one not tranquil [apraśāntāya]."

³⁶ Ibid., p. 376.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 209.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 350.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 411. See also Maitri. 6.29.

Favor. Svetāśvataropaniṣad 1.6⁴⁰ introduces the word jushtaḥ⁴¹

In this Brahma-wheel the soul (haṁsa) flutters about, Thinking that itself (ātmānam) and the Actuator are different.

When favored [jushtaḥ] by him, it attains immortality.

Hume⁴² says that "It is by means of this grace,...that an individual obtains release from illusion and reaches immortality," a concept which stresses the jīva view, the hunger of the individual ego to "obtain" and "reach" that which is above his ego consciousness. Tyāgīśānanda⁴³ comments as follows:

The blessing of God, according to advaitic interpretation, is the realization of the oneness of jīva and Brahman. The theists construe it as referring to the doctrine of grace.

There is no real conflict between the two views, as the Lord's grace is necessary for the realization of identity. A greater difficulty is as to how to reconcile the doctrine of grace with the doctrine of karma or self effort. Here also the difficulty can be overcome if we understand that the grace of God is bestowed on a person only after he has reached the limits of self-effort.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 395. M.R. Sakhere, History and Philosophy of Liṅgāyata Religion (Belgaum, 1942), p. 167, mentions that in Svet. the doctrine of grace (prasāda) is stressed and that this Upaniṣad "stands at the door of the bhakti school."

⁴¹ For jushtaḥ see Tyāgīśānanda, Svetāśvataropaniṣad (Mylapore: Sṛī Rāmakṛiṣṇa Math, 1943), p. 28, "Favor, blessed"; Vidyadhar V. Bhida, A Concise Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Poona City: Chitra Sala Press, 1926), p. 489, "pleased, gratified;...liked, loved...the remnant of a meal."

⁴² Hume, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴³ Tyāgīśānanda, op. cit., p. 28.

In Svetāśvataropaniṣad 6.21⁴⁴ the use of prasāda as favor is coupled with the concept of tapas, here translated by austerity; "By the efficacy of his austerity [tapas] and by the grace of God (devaprasāda)..."⁴⁵ Prasāda is used in the sense of favor or grace in Varāhupaniṣad 5.70,⁴⁶ "(know that) the mantra [pranava] bestows grace [prasāda], and that the mantra might prove fruitful;" in Yogakundalyu-paṇiṣad 2.23,⁴⁷ "...his tutelary deities bestow this grace (favor)"; and in the Yogasāhkopaniṣad 1.7,⁴⁸ "O Mahādeva, the great Lord (who can do, undo, and otherwise do all things)! pray tell (me) out of thy grace [prasāda]."

Anugrāha as grace is used in Amṛtābindūpaniṣad 22:⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Hume, op. cit., p. 411.

⁴⁵ Cf. Kathāsaritsaṅgāra in Charles R. Lanman, A Sanskrit Reader (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 51, 1.2; prasādah pārameśvarah, "the grace of the supreme Lord." See also C. D. Basu, Editor, The Sacred Books of the Hindus (Allahabad: Bhuvaneśwari Āśrama, 1918), XX, 150, as a form of samarpana, after mantra-japa in a pūjā; ...siddhirbhavatu me deva tvatprasādāt mahēśvara ||, "Oh deva, oh Mahēśvara, by thy grace, may success be mine."

⁴⁶ S. Subrahmanya Śāstri, Editor, The Yoga Upaniṣads (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1938), p. 446; ...mantraṁ prasādam mantrasiddhaye.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 268; ...prasīdanti cha devatāḥ.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 321; tattvātītam mahādeva prasādāt kathaye-śvara.

⁴⁹ Minor Upaniṣads (Almora: Advaita Āśrama, 1938) p. 31; sarvabhūtādhiśaṁ yadbhūteshu cha vasatvapi sarvānugrāhakatvena tadasmyaḥ vāsudevastadasmyaḥ vāsudeva iti.

In whom reside all beings, and who resides in all beings by virtue of His being the giver of grace (anugraha) to all--I am that Soul of the Universe, the Supreme Being. I am that Soul of the Universe, the Supreme Being.

Compassion. In Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad 5.2⁵⁰ each of the three classes of Prajāpati's offspring (gods, men, and asuras) asked him to instruct them whereupon (5.2.1) he replied to the gods by the one syllable 'da' which they understood as meaning 'restrain yourselves' (damyata). To men (5.2.3) he also spoke the syllable 'da,' correctly understood by them as 'give' (datte). The same syllable was spoken to the asuras and they replied with understanding that the meaning was 'be compassionate' (dayadhvam).

The doctrine of election in the Upanishads. A more detailed study of that which has been interpreted as pertaining to the doctrine of election, and its relationship to similar Christian views, must be reserved for the study of Indian theism. It is pertinent, however, to introduce the subject as it appears in the Upanishads. To those who interpret Kātha. 2.20 so that it may conform to the doctrine of grace Kātha. 2.23⁵¹ is "an even more explicate denial of the knowledge-doctrine...where a strict Calvinist doctrine

⁵⁰ Hume, op. cit., p. 150.

⁵¹ = Mund. 3.2.3.

of election is anticipated...⁵² While this seems to be a rather premature and projective assumption that the theological and religious basis fundamental to the thinking of John Calvin is of the same order as the metaphysical ground of the upanishadic experience,⁵³ it does indicate the dependence of finite consciousness upon the infinite which encompasses it, the fact of experience upon which religious analogy may be based. The text in question, as translated by Hume,⁵⁴ says,

⁵² Hume, op. cit., p. 59. See also Hopkins, op. cit., p. 188.

⁵³ Such an assumption does not resolve the fundamentally different East-West views concerning the relationship of soul or ego and spirit or âtman. There also is no common understanding of the nature of the "one" who is "to obtain," and no agreement concerning the nature of the chooser. If either the soul or âtman chooses, what, then, are the functions of the Christian God? If the choice is made by the soul or ego, then the object of choice is the undivided higher Self or âtman. If the choice is made by the âtman it can but be its own Self-realization which remains fully conscious of its undivided play in and as the jîva and nature.

⁵⁴ Hume, op. cit., p. 350; nāyamâtma pravachanena labhyo namevayāna bahunā śrutena | yamevaisha vrinute tena labhyasta-svaisha âtmā vivrinute tanŋ svām || = Mund. 3.2.3. Cf. M. Bh. 12.337.20, Hopkins, op. cit., p. 188; "That man can see Him to whom He gives His grace." yasya prasādaṁ kurute sa vai tam drashtam arhati. Also cf. S. Rādhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā (New York: Harper and Eros., 1948), p. 63 where he cites the first verse of avadhūta gītā: "It is only with the grace of god that in men with knowledge is born the inclination for non-dual experience which protects them from great danger." īśvarānugrahād eva pumsām advaitavāsanaḥ | mahadbhayaaparotrāṇa prāṇam upajīvate ||

This Soul (âtman) is not to be obtained by instruction,
Nor by intellect, nor by much learning.
He is to be obtained only by the one whom He chooses;
To such a one that Soul (âtman) reveals His own person.

Râdhakṛishṇan⁵⁵ ^Wvies this as a support for the later doctrine
of prapatti, and mentions that Sankara⁵⁶ does not grant to
the jîva the power to free itself but makes the ego conscious-
ness dependent upon the Supreme for the wisdom which gives
liberation. Sivânanda⁵⁷ in his commentary explains that the
âtman of him who desires to know âtman reveals its own truth.
He also states that, according to Sankara,

yam means which i.e., which âtman the aspirant seeks.
esha means the aspirant. It is attained by that aspir-
ant alone who seeks the âtman. According to the dvaitins
yam means whom, esha means this (god). It is attained by
him alone whom god chooses i.e., on whom god shows his
grace; with whom he is pleased.⁵⁸

Kapâli Sâstry⁵⁹ repeats the metaphysical truth that awakening
or realization is dependent upon the will of the revealing
âtman⁶⁰ for, he says,

⁵⁵ Râdhakṛishṇan, Bhagavadgîtâ, p. 63.

⁵⁶ Loc. cit., Râdhakṛishṇan here cites Sankara's
commentary on the Brahma Sûtra: tad anugrahaahetukenaiva cha
vijñânena mokshasiddhir bhavitum arhati.

⁵⁷ Sivânanda, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

⁵⁸ Cf. Kapâli Sâstry, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁶⁰ The integral Self, not the eternally separate God
of religion.

Nowhere in the Upanishads where instructions of the Sādhanas are given, do we find that realization is the fruit of the personal effort alone. ...Even when an exclusive choice is made for realizing the Self, it is the Self that reveals its own body to the seeker, tasya esha ātmā vivṛiṇute tanūṁ swām, and not that the seeker storms the gate and discovers the Self by the merit of his own sādhana.⁶¹

Thus from That which transcends the limited and finite boundaries of the ego or self-conscious personal self is experienced the power (śakti) of Self-awakening. The ātman, the true Self, has, according to this upanishadic doctrine,⁶² the power of will, of choice, not only to abandon itself by plunging into unconscious līlā, but to seek and aspire for itself and to awaken integrally to the infinite possibilities of that līlā, as well as realize its supreme identity with the transcend-ency.

Nikhilānanda⁶³ sees no real contradiction between the views of Sankara and those of Indian theists concerning the exposition of grace in Kaṭha. 2.23. He says:

Both self-effort and divine grace are necessary for the realization of ātman. Through self-effort the seeker removes obstacles and prepares the ground; next there is the spontaneous revelation of ātman...In other words,

⁶¹ Cf. Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., p. 13n. Sāstry here cites Sankara's commentary on Īsopaniṣad 16,--'By the grace of Thy Self I see (that most auspicious form.)', tava ātmanah prasādāt paśhyāmi.

⁶² Ibid., p. 158.

⁶³ Nikhilānanda, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

ātman, which is the seeker's own Self, reveals its real nature to him, being pleased with his earnestness and devotion. As long as a man remains egotistic and desires to know ātman through such external means as scriptural knowledge or erudition, he fails in his quest. When all external disciplines are proved inadequate⁶⁴ the earnest seeker then realizes the futility of the ego and develops self-surrender, which makes possible the descent of the divine grace, resulting in his realization of the Truth.⁶⁵

The Upanishad clearly indicates that realization is dependent upon the favor or will of the Self or ātman, for the ego cannot lift or force itself by its own strength to grasp or obtain awakening, just as the character of Hamlet, as Hamlet, has no power to realize himself as the person who is enacting the rôle. The actor, however, can lose himself completely in the rôle, forgetting himself as it were, yet, at will, can realize himself playing this and other rôles, can change rôles or dispense with them altogether.⁶⁶

Samprasāda. The term samprasāda⁶⁷ is used by the Upanishads to indicate that integral state of calm, tranquil

⁶⁴ Cf. Gītā 18.66.

⁶⁵ The final "tone" here is somewhat characteristic of the thought of Śrī Aurobindo. Also cf. A. S. Purāṇi, Śrī Aurobindo's Sāvitrī, an Approach and a Study (Anand: Śrī Aurobindo Karyalaya, 1952) p. 207; "...when he [man] completely surrenders himself to the absolute power..."

'The timeless Ray descends into our hearts,
And we are rapt into eternity.'

⁶⁶ Cf. Kaushītaki 3.9.

⁶⁷ Macdonell, op. cit., p. 339. "mental repose (during deep sleep); grace, favor; soul during deep sleep."

consciousness-power which differs from the state of bodily consciousness and dream consciousness and, in its purity, leads toward complete realization of the true Self, the âtman which is Brahman,⁶⁸ thus serving to bridge the gap between limited states of consciousness and turiya.

Chhândogyaopanishad 8.7-12 gives the famous parable of those instructions concerning the nature of the Self given by Prajâpati to his pupils, the god Indra and the asura Virochana.⁶⁹ Not being satisfied with the first two answers given by Prajâpati which identified the Self with the jâgrat and svapni states respectively, Indra is told⁷⁰ that the true Self is identical with sushupti, the consciousness of deep, dreamless sleep. This in turn does not satisfy Indra, for such a state, while opposite to the extreme material state of jâgrat, is a consciousness which is exclusive of the integral, non-dual experience. Prajâpati then speaks to Indra in the following manner:⁷¹

The wind is bodiless. Clouds, lightning, thunder--these are bodiless. Now as these, when they arise from yonder space and reach the highest light, appear each

⁶⁸ jâgrat--waking state; svapna--dreaming state; sushupta--dreamless state, samprasâda; turiya--the fourth state, supreme identity. Samprasâda lies between the two limited states and the infinite consciousness of turiya.

⁶⁹ Rânade, op. cit., pp. 264-269.

⁷⁰ 8.11.1.

⁷¹ 8.12.2-3. Hume, op. cit., p. 272.

with its own form, even so that serene one (samprasāda), when he rises up from this body (śarīra) and reaches the highest light, appears with its own form. Such a one is the supreme person (uttama puruṣa).

By this the true Self is indicated as self-shining in a state of pure serenity (samprasāda). The Self is not the state of dreamless sleep--but reveals itself, so to speak, as a light that dawns when the peaceful state, the "underlying ground of all knowledge"⁷² succeeds in clearing or cleansing all finite turbidity.⁷³ Speaking of the state of sushupta and the nature of samprasāda Dāsgupta⁷⁴ says:

So long as we are in our ordinary waking state, we are identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that we call 'I' or 'mine,' but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely without any touch of these phenomenal notions, the nature of our true state as pure bliss is partially realized.

In Chhândogyaopaniṣad 8.3.4 it is stated:⁷⁵

⁷² Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 47.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 13, 41. See also Taittirīya 2.1-9 for a similar hierarchial or evolutionary arrangement concerning the five sheaths.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 164. Cf. tranquility and the dream state in Anugītā 36.36, Max Muller, Editor, Sacred Books of the East (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1900) p. 392: "...and when the understanding is clear, he attains tranquility. And the nature of tranquility is as when one sees a dream. (Comment by Nīlakaṇṭha: 'The nature of tranquility is this, that in that state the self abides without attachment to the body, and any external object, but working within itself as in a dream.'

⁷⁵ Hume, op. cit., p. 265. Chhând. 8.3.4 is contained in Maitrī 2.2 as follows: "Now, he who, without stopping the respiration, goes aloft and who, moving about, yet unmoving, dispels darkness--he is the soul (ātman). Thus said the honorable Maitrī. For thus it has been said:...[here Chhând. 8.3.4. is repeated.] ...

Now, that serene one [samprasāda, "the soul in deep sleep"] who, rising up out of this body, reaches the highest light and appears with his own form--he is the soul (ātman), said he (i.e. the teacher). 'That is the immortal, the fearless. That is Brahman.'

Hopkins⁷⁶ refers to M.Bh. 3.213.24-27 which states that "salvation is attained by peace of mind (prasāda) and by perceiving self in self, and that this purified spirit by the aid of the lighted lamp (of knowledge), seeing self as free of self,⁷⁷ becomes released." He then continues:

First, just as the Epic says that one must have peace of mind, prasāda, and be pure, and then becomes nirātman ('free of soul,' i.e. free from the delusion of subjectivity), so (in Maitri 2.2-4) after an allusion to samprasāda, the same peace of mind, says that one becomes pure and nirātma (suddah pūtah sūnyah śānto'brāno nirātmā). The sign of this peace is explained as when one sleeps sweetly (M.Bh. 3. 213.25 = 12.247.11.)

In a note⁷⁸ Hopkins identifies samprasāda with sushupta as unconscious slumber or existence and states that the goal of the soul is "unconscious existence" inasmuch as the conditioned jīva, being a "part of the unconsciousness" enters into it when purified. This is illustrative of the typical and arbitrary Western view which equates the waking state (jāgrat) with the whole of consciousness, a view which, by definition, denies the waking consciousness any peaceful status, for "samprasāda is a spirit at peace..."

⁷⁶ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 41.

⁷⁷ Cf. Gītā 6.5.

⁷⁸ Hopkins, loc. cit.

Hume⁷⁹ views the concept of samprasāda as "an idealistic tendency which rejects the world of the waking consciousness and which adopts the state of dreamless sleep or of ecstatic meditation as grasping the absolute unity and reality."

Concerning the sushupti stage, it is evident that it is beyond, as it were, the limitations of the ego consciousness.⁸⁰ Māndūkyaopaniṣad 5⁸¹ describes the state of deep sleep (sushupti sthāna) as "unified" (ekī bhūta),⁸² a "cognition mass" (prajñāna-ghana),⁸³ "consisting of bliss" (ānanda-maya), "enjoying bliss" (ānanda-bhuj), "whose mouth is thought" (chetas),⁸⁴ and "the cognitioned" (prajña).⁸⁵ The peace of samprasāda is that gulf-destroying aid which leads beyond the realm of duality to the realization of Self where

⁷⁹ Hume, op. cit., p. 45.

⁸⁰ Carl G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1939), p. 15: "It is obvious that the center of a transcendental consciousness cannot be the human ego, since the ego has neither a hand in producing such experiences nor the necessary intelligence to understand them. It can only be their victim--or the receiver of divine grace." See also Bṛih.4.3.21.

⁸¹ Hume, op. cit., p. 392.

⁸² René Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta (London: Luzac & Co., 1945) p. 103n. Quoting from Chuang-tzu 2., "All is one; during sleep the understanding soul is absorbed into this unity."

⁸³ Loc. cit., Chuang-tzu 4.: "To concentrate all one's intellectual energy, as it were, in one mass."

⁸⁴ Loc. cit.: "...whose mouth (the instrument of knowledge) is (exclusively) total consciousness (chit) itself (without intermediary or particularization of any sort)."

⁸⁵ Loc. cit.: "He who knows above and beyond a special condition."

"in that unbounded ocean-like pure unity of the real Self (Brih.4.3.32) the duality and limitations of the subject-object relation are obliterated."⁸⁶ Thus Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣhad states: "But when everything has become just one's own Self, then whereby and whom would one see...smell...speak...hear...think...touch?"⁸⁷ Such a state cannot be described for it is beyond words. Of it there only can be said, "This is it."⁸⁸

The true deep sleep state is a condition wherein there is made possible the revelation or shining forth of that "pure spirit...essentially of the nature of consciousness,"⁸⁹ the ground or basis which is the "supreme light by which we see and hear, think, and meditate."⁹⁰ Such a condition of peace opening upon integrality must be of the nature of the point (bindu), the timeless (therefore memoryless) Now which, "alone and unclouded [prasāda], [is] the eternal mode of knowing proper to the Self"⁹¹ and, seed-like, includes all other states of knowledge "synthetically centralized in [its]

⁸⁶ Hume, op. cit., p. 46.

⁸⁷ Brih.2.4.14. Hume, op. cit., pp. 101-102, also p. 46. Cf. Brih. 4.5.15; 4.4.2; Mānd. 7.

⁸⁸ Hume, op. cit., pp. 46-47. See Maitri 6.7; Tait. 2.4; Katha 5.14.

⁸⁹ S. Rādhakṛiṣṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940) p. 123.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 122. Cf. Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 41 and Chhānd.6.8.1.

⁹¹ Alan Watts, The Supreme Identity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950) p. 91.

essential and fundamental unity."⁹²

Distinctions have been made⁹³ between true samprasāda and that ordinary sleep which is called dreamless wherein the mind merely is stupified and still "immersed in the torpidity of avidyā." Samādhi thus is differentiated from a "dreamless sleep" which is imperfect and not properly united with buddhi, although such incomplete conditions can be productive of a certain indefinite feeling of well-being.⁹⁴

Sushupti or samprasāda is not to be regarded, as Western writers so frequently have done, as unconscious, for in its purity it is the focal point of that integral chit-sakti, the consciousness-power of the Self, wherein knower, known and knowing are one.⁹⁵ In this state of prajñā the "intelligible light" immediately is realized and known "by intellectual intuition [buddhi], and no longer by reflection through the mental faculty (manas) as occurs in the individual states."⁹⁶ To the ego-consciousness this condition which is on the level of "buddhi-mahat," appears as a void, as

⁹² Guénon, op. cit., p. 104.

⁹³ Kṛishṇa Prem, The Yoga of the Bhagavadgītā (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949) pp. 201-202, with quotations from Mānd., Gaudapāda Kārikā 3.34-35, and Sankara.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 202.

⁹⁵ See Guénon, op. cit., p. 106.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 107.

unconscious, for, "when the pluralistic view of the lower self is transcended nothing is left except a dark blank... retaining of the true sushupti nothing except its unity."⁹⁷

The relationship of samprasāda to buddhi also is expressed in the concept of buddhi as a ray emergent from the Supreme and lodged, undivided from that supreme identity, as the "sun" in the heart of man. Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad

4.4.29⁸ tells how, in samprasāda, a person by the light of the "point of his heart...becomes one with intelligence."

Chhândogya 8.6.2-6⁹⁹ speaks of the "channels of the heart":¹⁰⁰

...the rays of the sun...extend from yonder sun, and creep into the channels. They extend from the channels, and creep into yonder sun. Now, when one is thus sound asleep, composed, serene, he knows no dream; then he has crept into the channels; so no evil touches him, for then he has realized the Bright Power (tejas)...But when he thus departs from this body, then he ascends upward with these very rays of the sun. With the thought of Om, verily, he passes up, as quickly as one could direct his mind to it, he comes to the sun. That verily, indeed, is the world-door, an entrance for knowers, a stopping for non-knowers. ...

There are a hundred and one channels of the heart,
One of them passes up to the crown of the head.

⁹⁷ Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 201.

⁹⁸ Hume, op. cit., pp. 139-140. Cf. Kaush. 4.19.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 267. See Rays of Grace, infra, pp. 158 ff.

¹⁰⁰ Western analysis may be prone to interpret this language of metaphysical analogy as literal ideas entertained by the Upanishads concerning anatomy and the cosmos. Cf. alchemical relationship of macrocosm and microcosm.

Going up by it, one goes to immortality,
The others are for departing in various directions.¹⁰¹

It is not possible to draw a line distinctly separating the four states for they are not divided chronologically, and the logical division is for convenience only. Even within our every-day waking consciousness we are many and varied "selves," all intricately interwoven from the same thread.¹⁰² Prājña, the Self associated with deep sleep shares with the turiya state a non-dual character, but the Self, the âtman of turiya¹⁰³ is not associated exclusively with sleep.¹⁰⁴ Mundakopanishad 3.1.7¹⁰⁵ speaks of the âtman as "farther than the far, yet here near at hand, set down in the secret place (of the heart), ever here among those who behold (it)," and in Maitri 7.11¹⁰⁶ it is said that "the nature of the ether within the space of the heart is the same as the supreme bright power...verily, the nature of the ether within the space (of the heart) is the same as the syllable Om."

101 Cf. Kâtha 6.16. Cf. also Īśā 15.

102 Cf. Lucian, "A Descent to the Unknown" from "Menippus: a Necromantic Experiment," The Best of the World's Classics (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1909), I, 237-243.

103 Mând. 7., Hume, op. cit., p. 392.

104 Nikhilânanda, op. cit., I, 94-95. He speaks here of Mând., Gaudapâda Kârikâ 1.12-13.

105 Hume, op. cit., p. 375.

106 Ibid., p. 457.

Māndūkya 9-12¹⁰⁷ looks upon the mantra as composed of the three elements A-U-M and considers A as symbolic of "the jāgrat state, U the swapna and M the sushupta, while the Om taken as a single unity, stands for the 'fourth' "¹⁰⁸ the turiya which encompasses all but is supremely transcendent.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 393.

¹⁰⁸ Krishna Prem, op. cit., p. 202.

CHAPTER III

THE BHAGAVADGITA

Grace or favor, in itself and as it is encountered in the Gītā, is a subject worthy of separate and extensive treatment, a specialized work which cannot be explained fully here. It must suffice merely to point out a sampling of those elements included in the prasāda complex as they occur in the Gītā, and refer their more detailed relationships to those chapters which center about particular schools of thought. As an example Gītā 18.64, 65, 66, particularly the latter śloka, contains in all probability the condensed essence of that for which prasāda stands, but such a consideration will be dealt with in the discussion of Indian theism.

In the Gītā, as well as in the Upanishads and other metaphysical works, Western writers are apt to draw a clear and distinct boundary between what they call the Way of Knowledge and the path of divine love which is theistic grace. Such a view stems from a mistaken attempt to identify metaphysical knowledge which is supreme identity with analytical reason and the mere accumulation of facts,¹ as well as a similar unfortunate identification of sentimental, hungering

¹ Rādhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 61. Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 162.

love (eros) with "that intellectual charity which is of the will rather than emotion."² Edgerton and Hopkins see in the "Way of Knowledge"³ the usual Western concept which envisages ownership of an informational tool⁴ which can pry open, willy-nilly, the treasure-chest of salvation. Metaphysical knowledge is not a tool, it is realization itself, inasmuch as no tool is needed to "attain" or "get" that which is already.

In his treatment of the Gītā, Edgerton equates the word yoga, when used alone, with discipline, "a practical method as distinguished from an intellectual method,"⁵ that is,

² Watts, op. cit., p. 162.

³ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 62, and Hopkins, The Great Epic of India, pp. 189-190. Edgerton cites the methods of attaining this knowledge as meditation, discrimination, karma yoga, and instruction, (Gītā 4.38; 13.24-25); devotion and surrender (18.64-66). Hopkins places against the grace of Krishna the attitude of "sink or swim, let one put his trust in science alone" which he ascribes to yoga. He sees in yoga, however, a god-recognizing bridge between the, to him, irreconcilable differences between the "atheist" of Sāṃkhya and the devotee. He also states that "Krishnavism stands to Sāṃkhya-Yoga chronologically as stands the later grace-of-the-creator theory to the earlier knowledge of the Upanishads. Cf. dhātuprasāda, supra, pp. 45 ff.

⁴ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 42. It is interesting to note Edgerton's definition of "true enlightenment" and how it is utilized to effect a permanent escape from matter; "When one attains true enlightenment, that is, realization of the true nature of the soul and matter and their fundamental independence of each other, then, by virtue of this perfect, mystic knowledge, he obtains release; his soul transcends matter and is freed from the chain of rebirths." (Gītā 13.23)

⁵ Ibid., II, 64. Cf. Gītā 3.3.

the discipline of nishkāmakarma. The inherent "stability of mind," the equanimity which is that yogic "indifference" is to be thought of as tranquility.⁶ This yoga, discipline, or tranquility does, however, have an "intellectual basis,"⁷ inasmuch as tranquility presupposes a knowledge of the result of action, and also because karma-yoga leads to knowledge.⁸

Clarity. Gītā 2.64, as translated by Bhagavān Dās⁹ gives prasāda as peace:

But the disciplined self, moving among sense-objects with senses free from attraction and repulsion, mastered by Self, goeth to Peace [prasādam].

Other translations of the prasāda phrase are: "is satisfied in his mind";¹⁰ "he attains peace";¹¹ "goes unto tranquility";¹²

⁶ Ibid., II, 64, 67. Cf. Gītā 2.48-72.

⁷ Ibid., II, 68-69.

⁸ Ibid., II, 64. Cf. Gītā 5.2; 5.4-5.

⁹ Annie Besant and Bhagavān Dās, The Bhagavadgītā (Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House, 1950), p. 52: rāgadveshaviyuktaistu viśhyānindriyaiścharan | ātmavaśyairvidheyātmā prasādamādhigachchhati ||

¹⁰ Bal G. Tilak, Srī Bhagavadgītā--Rahasya (Poona: Tilak Bros., 1935) II, 903. Comment, p. 904: "The peace of mind which he obtains is not the result of giving up action, but of giving up the desire for fruit of action."

¹¹ A. Mahādeva Sāstrī, translator, Bhagavadgītā with Commentary of Srī Sankarāchārya (Madras: 1947), p. 74. The commentary says, "Such a man attains peace, tranquility, self possession." Krishna Prem, op. cit., p. 17 says, "...the disciple will find a luminous peace and wisdom reflected in his heart,...like the images of the eternal stars reflected in the depths of a lake..."

¹² Edgerton, op. cit., I, 29.

"he wins serenity";¹³ "purity of mind";¹⁴ and "clearness of soul."¹⁵ The comments of Srf Aurobindo are:

Then...the senses will be delivered from the affections of liking and disliking, escape the duality of positive and negative desire, and calm, peace, clearness, happy tranquillity, ātmaprasāda, will settle upon the man. That clear tranquillity is the source of the soul's felicity; all grief begins to lose its power of touching the tranquil soul; the intellect is rapidly established in the peace of the self; suffering is destroyed. It is this calm, desireless, griefless fixity of the buddhi in self-poise and self-knowledge to which the Gītā gives the name of Samādhi.¹⁶

In Gītā 2.65 prasāda occurs twice. Bhagavān Dās¹⁷ translates it:

In that peace [prasāde] extinction of all pains ariseth for him; for of him whose heart is peaceful [prasanna] reason soon attaineth equilibrium.

Other translations also give terms which are applicable for both of the above forms of prasāda: "In peace there is an end

¹³ Arthur W. Ryder, The Bhagavadgītā (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 22.

¹⁴ Tāvaradatta, translator, Rāmānuja's Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā (Biher, 1930), pp. 41-42.; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 126.

¹⁵ Anilbaran Roy, editor, The Message of the Gītā as Interpreted by Srf Aurobindo (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946), p. 43.

¹⁶ Roy, op. cit., p. 43n. This comment is for both 18.63-64.

¹⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 52.
prasāde sarvaduḥkhānām hānirasyopaiśyate |
prasannachetaso hyāśu buddhiḥ parvavatishthate ||

of all his miseries...";¹⁸ "When the mind is satisfied...";¹⁹
 "purity of spirit";²⁰ "...when serenity is won";²¹ "In tranquility."²²

Gītā 17.16 draws a parallel between prasāda and tapas:

Tranquility [prasāda] of mind, gentleness, silence, self-control, purity of thought--this is called austerity of the mind.²³

Similar translations for manah prasāda are: "Serenity of mind";²⁴ "sedateness";²⁵ "a clear, calm gladness of mind."²⁶
 This last interpretation combines the qualities of clearness and cheerfulness, as also found in Tilak's translation, "keeping one's mind pleased";²⁷ and "cheerfulness of mind."²⁸

¹⁸ Sāstrī (Sankara), op. cit., p. 75.

¹⁹ Tilak, op. cit., II, 904.

²⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 127; Īśvaradatta (Rāmānuja), op. cit., p. 42. Comment: "When the purity of mind is achieved (manasaḥ prasāde sati)..."

²¹ Ryder, op. cit., p. 22.

²² Edgerton, op. cit., I, 29.

²³ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 291:
manahprasādaḥ saumyatvaṁ maunamātmavinigrahaḥ |
bhāvasamśuddhirityetattapo mānasamuchyate ||

²⁴ Sāstrī (Sankara), op. cit., p. 434; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 347; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 157; Īśvaradatta (Rāmānuja), op. cit., p. 316; Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 175.

²⁵ Ryder, op. cit., p. 122.

²⁶ Roy, op. cit., p. 237.

²⁷ Tilak, op. cit., ii, 1164.

²⁸ Jayadayal Goyandka, "Commentary on the Gītā," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, 14:144, Aug., 1948. Cf. Rāmāyana 3.55.36, guruchittaprasādaka, to cheer up the heart of the guru (dis-
 pose to be gracious); 2.90.17, aham tu taṁ naravyāghramupa-

An association of buddhi with prasāda is found in

Gītā 18.37:

Which at first is as venom but in the end is as nectar;
that pleasure is said to be pure, born of the blissful
[prasāda] knowledge of Self.²⁹

Variations in the translation of ātmabuddhiprasāda are:

"Born of the purity [prasāda] of one's mind";³⁰ "born of a clear knowledge of the soul";³¹ "which springs from a clear understanding of the self";³² "in intellects serene";³³ "born of the placidity of mind";³⁴ "spring from serenity of soul and of intellect";³⁵ "born of the satisfaction of the higher mind and spirit."³⁶

yatah prasādakah, I verily go unto that most illustrious of men gladdening (cheering, courting favor, propitiating, disposing to be gracious). See Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1098.

²⁹ Besant and Dās, op. cit., pp. 312-313: yattadagre vishabiṣa parināme 'mritopamam | tatsukham sātṭvikam proktam ātmabuddhiprasāda || On p. 313n Dās connects prasāda with placidity and lucidity.

³⁰ Sāstri (Sankara), op. cit., p. 470. Comment: "... born of the purity of one's own buddhi or antahkarana: or born of the perfectly clear knowledge of the Self." Cf. Gītā 7.10 where the Supreme is "...the intelligence (buddhi) of the intelligent (buddhimatām)." See Roy, op. cit., p. 114.

³¹ Iśvaradatta (Rāmānuja), op. cit., p. 341. Rāmānujas comment: "...its clearness consists in it being freed from all other objects." Cf. "suddha darpanatāle," Böhtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1097.

³² Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 363.

³³ Ryder, op. cit., p. 132.

³⁴ Goyandka, op. cit., 189-190.

³⁵ Edgerton, op. cit., I, 171.

³⁶ Roy, op. cit., p. 254. Tilak, op. cit., II, 1191, also gives "satisfaction" as the translation of prasāda.

Gītā 18.54 tells of the supreme serenity and equanimity which is the experience of Self-realization:

Becoming Brahma, serene [prasanna] in Self, he neither grieveth nor desireth; the same to all beings, he obtaineth supreme devotion unto me.³⁷

The general meaning, here, of prasannātmā as "serene in Self" also is shared by the majority of authorities cited.³⁸

Rādhakṛishṇan³⁹ gives "tranquil in spirit," and Goyandka⁴⁰

but it is a satisfaction "of the self-engrossed reason." He attempts to rectify reason by removing it "from the diffusions of prakṛiti" through discipline of the senses. Thus the rarified reason, "introspective and self-engrossed...becomes happy (prasanna)..."

³⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 320: brahmabhūtaḥ prasannātmā na śochati na kāṅkshati / samah sarveshu bhūteshu madbhaktiṁ labhate parām ||

Cf. Anugītā (Max Muller, op. cit., pp. 247-248, 277): "Then freed from all impressions he attains to the eternal Supreme Brahman, tranquil, unmoving, constant, indestructible." "...and tranquility is the eternal Brahman." (4.13; 9.17)

Rāmānuja (īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 350) states that the serene Self is "not tainted by the (fire) kleśas," [torment, pain, suffering, affliction]. Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 114, attributes to Sankara an interpretation of this śloka which stresses grace rather than serenity,—"Whoever comes thus by stages to the Brahman and has attained to the grace of highest ātman is free from care." No authoritative Indian source for such an opinion of Sankara's intention was given.

³⁸ Rāmānuja (īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 350); Sankara (Śāstrī, op. cit., p. 488); Sri Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 268); Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 184; Ryder, op. cit., p. 135; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 175.

³⁹ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 371.

⁴⁰ Goyandka, op. cit., p. 216. Comment:—"Prasannātmā is he whose mind is sinless, free from impurities and unruffled, and ever remains merged in pure delight. The use of this adjective is intended to convey that everything other than Brahma having ceased to exist in the eyes of the man who

translates it as "cheerful in mind."

Favor. Hopkins,⁴¹ in appraising the element of favor which, metaphysically speaking, is that motion of the supreme will of the Self directed into both the Self-forgetful samsāric consciousness and the realization of full awakening, tends to interpret "the one and only transmigrant,"⁴² the ātman which is Brahman, in a literal and purely religious light devoid of that metaphysical ground which gives meaning to religious analogy. The pronounced element of supreme love which is evidenced in the Gītā, that loving abandonment of the infinite Self to and as its finite mode, and that abandonment in love, "purified in the fire of wisdom,"⁴³ which constitutes the sacrifice of the ego,⁴⁴ is noted by Hopkins⁴⁵ as "the doctrine of 'special grace,' originating perhaps still earlier in the Vāch hymn." Metaphysically, the Krishna who speaks to the unrealized soul or ego is not the

has attained oneness with Brahma, his mind is ever calm and never gets excited on any account."

⁴¹ Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 393.

⁴² Ananda K. Coomāraswāmy, "On the One and Only Transmigrant," JOAS Supplement, 1944. Cf. Gītā 4.7-11; 18.66.

⁴³ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 80. Gītā 4.10.

⁴⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 162.

⁴⁵ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 393n.

far-off and separate god, not even the unique and historical God-man of religion whose Christhood is never permitted realization as the basic Self of all jivas. Krishna is the full avatāra of the Supreme, and therefore is the Supreme and the ātman, "the eternal seed of all existence,...the intelligence (buddhi) of the intelligent, the energy of the energetic,"⁴⁶ and is not an inadequate image of the historical, unique and religious Christian Savior.

Gītā 11.44 illustrates the tragic awareness of spiritual poverty and incompetence which encompasses the jīva upon contemplating the multiform infinite, the longed-for, yet ego-terrifying, Supreme:

Therefore I bow before Thee with my body, I worship [prasādaye] as is fitting; bless Thou me, As father with the son, as friend with friend, with the beloved as lover, bear with me.⁴⁷

Other translations involving the middle causative term

prasādaye are: "I seek to propitiate you";⁴⁸ "be appeased";⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Sri Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 114). Gītā 7.10.

⁴⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 216: tasmātoraṇamya prañidhāya kāyaṁ prasādaye tvāmahaṁśamidyam | piteva putrasya sakheva sakhyuh priyaḥ priyāyārhasi deva sodum || Dās also gives propitiate as an alternate meaning.

⁴⁸ Goyandka, op. cit., p. 215. "Arjuna invoked His favor...through the grace of the dust of His feet."

⁴⁹ Tilak, op. cit., II, 1090.

"I implore you";⁵⁰ "I demand grace," "I seek grace," "I beg grace";⁵¹ "humbly pray for mercy."⁵²

Gītā 11.47 indicates that any transcendence of the ego consciousness which permits a seeing of the Self and its infinite possibilities of manifestation arises, not from the will of the ego, but from that of the Self:

The Blessed Lord said: Arjuna! by My favor [prasannena] thou hast seen this loftiest form revealed by My-Self's yoga; radiant, all penetrating, endless, first, that none except thyself hath ever seen.⁵³

Similar translations of prasannena involve the use of the words "pleased";⁵⁴ "gracious";⁵⁵ and "grace."⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Rāmānuja (Iśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 220); Sankara (Sāstri, op. cit., p. 296.).

⁵¹ Sri Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 177); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 285; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 115.

⁵² Ryder, op. cit., p. 216.

⁵³ Besant and Dās, op. cit., pp. 217-218. śrībhagavānuvācha | mayā prasannena tavārjunedaṁ rūpam param darśitamātma-yogāt | tejomayaṁ viśvamanantamādyam yanme tvadanyena na drishtaḥ pūrvam || Dās also gives "(by) pleased" for alternate.

⁵⁴ Tilak, op. cit., II, 1091; Goyandka, op. cit., p. 219.

⁵⁵ Rāmānuja (Iśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 221); Sankara (Sāstri, op. cit., p. 298).

⁵⁶ Ryder, op. cit., p. 91; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 117; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 286-287. He adds that the fleeting vision offered by grace, "divine power," is not the final goal but a first opening toward an integration which must be worked into life. On p. 54 he notes that "Arjuna could not see the truth with his naked eyes and so was granted divine sight,"--the eyes of ego could not see that which transcends ego.

Verses 11.25; 11.31; 11.45 portray the terror and bewilderment felt by the ego when actually confronted with that which transcends its limitations, and infers the favor of the Self which mercifully veils itself from the unripe ego's view. These three verses utilize the form prasīda in the ego's plea for mercy, which is not to be equated fully with the "compassion" of anukampā, but with the ego-view which pleads for appeasement, kindness, at the pleasure of the still strange Self.

11.25. Like Time's destroying flames I see Thy teeth, upstanding, spread within expanded jaws; naught know I anywhere, no shelter find, mercy [prasīda], Oh God! refuge of all the worlds.⁵⁷

11.31. Reveal Thy Self; what awful form art Thou? I worship Thee! Have mercy [prasīda], God supreme! Thine inner being I am fain to know; this Thy forth-streaming Life bewilders me.⁵⁸

11.45. I have seen That which none hath seen before, my heart is glad, yet faileth me for fear; show me, O God! Thine other Form again, mercy [prasīda] O God of Gods! Home of all the worlds!⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., pp. 204-205.: danśtrāka-rālāni cha te mukhāni dṛiṣṭvaiva kālānalasaṁnibhāni | diśo na jāne na labhe cha śarma prasīda deveśa jagannivāsa || Dās also gives "be pleased" as alternate in this and the following two slokas.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 208: ākhyāhi me ko bhavānugrarūpo namo'stu te devavara prasīda | vijñātumichchāmi bhavantamādyam na hi prajānāmi tava pravrittīm ||

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 216-217: adṛiṣṭapūrvam hrishito'smi dṛiṣṭvā bhayena cha pravayathitam mano me | tadeva me darśaya deva rūpam prasīda deveśa jagannivāsa ||

Other writers translate prasāda as it occurs in the above-mentioned verses as: "be merciful," "have mercy";⁶⁰ "be appeased";⁶¹ "turn...to grace";⁶² "be gracious";⁶³ be pleased," "be kind."⁶⁴

Gītā 18.56, as translated by Bhagavān Dās⁶⁵ says:

Though ever performing all actions, taking refuge in Me, by My grace [prasādāt] he obtaineth the eternal indestructible abode.

Other translators of the prasāda term give: "by

⁶⁰ Sankara (Sāstrī, op. cit., pp. 289, 297); Rāmānuja (Iśvaradatta, op. cit., pp. 215, 221); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 279; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 111, 113, 117; Ryder, op. cit., pp. 87, 88, 91. Ryder adds for 11.31, "most mercifully send enlightenment..."

⁶¹ Tilak, op. cit., II, 1085, 1091.

⁶² Srf Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., pp. 170, 171, 177). Srf Aurobindo says, p. 178n, "...the gracious mediating form of Nārāyaṇa, the god who is close to man and in man, the charioteer of the battle and the journey..."

⁶³ Sankara (Sāstrī, op. cit., p. 286); Rāmānuja (Iśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 213); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 286; Goyandka, op. cit., pp. 216-217.

⁶⁴ Goyandka, op. cit., pp. 201, 204.

⁶⁵ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 321: sarvakarmānyapi sadā kurvāno madvyapāsrayah / matorasādādayānnoti śāśvatam padamavyayam || Cf. 7.21.

(through) my grace";⁶⁶ and "favor."⁶⁷

Gītā 18.58 draws a sharp distinction between ego knowledge (avidyā) and infinite knowledge, the limited leading to that separation in time which, if persisted in, is destructive of integral realization. In 18.62 the favor of the the Self aids in the elimination of all turbidity, which results in supreme peace:

18.58 Thinking on Me, thou shalt overcome all obstacles by my grace [mat prasādāt]; but if from egotism thou wilt not listen (to my advice), thou shalt be destroyed utterly.⁶⁸

18.62 Flee unto Him for shelter with all thy being, Oh Bhārata!; by His grace [prasādāt] thou shalt obtain supreme peace, (and) the everlasting dwelling-place.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Sankara (Sāstrī, op. cit., p. 495); Rāmānuja (Īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 351); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 372; Ryder, op. cit., p. 135; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 175; Goyandka, op. cit., pp. 218-219; Śrī Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 270). Here Śrī Aurobindo notes the element of śakti which is inseparable from infinite aid for it pertains to infinite will, "That oneness here brings with it the power to rise there into the immortality beyond time."

⁶⁷ Tilak, op. cit., II, 1200.

⁶⁸ Besant and Dās, op. cit., pp. 321-322: machchittah sarvadurgāṇi matprasādāttarishyasi | atha chettvamahaṁkāraṇna śroshyasi vināśyasi ||

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 323: tameva śaraṇaṁ gachchha sarvabhāvena bhārata | tatprasādātparāṁ śāntiṁ sthānaṁ prāpsyasi śāśvataṁ ||

Prasādat is translated as: "by my (his) grace";⁷⁰
 "favor."⁷¹ Kṛishṇa Prem⁷² also notes the rôle of śakti which
 here is equated with grace: "His [Kṛishṇa's] power [śakti],
 the power which sways the universe, will carry him [Aṛjuna]
 past all the obstacles and dangers that confront him on the
 way."

Gītā 18.73. The ego-will has been sacrificed through
 the infinite will, samsāric delusion or turbidity has been
 replaced by that clarity of vision which permits integral
 and timeless "memory," recognition, or knowledge of the ad-
 vaitic state, of the Self:

Destroyed is my delusion. I have gained knowledge memory
 through Thy grace [prasādat], Oh Immutable One!
 I am firm, my doubts have fled. I will do Thy bidding.⁷³

⁷⁰ Sankara (Sāstri, op. cit., pp. 452, 495); Sṛī
 Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., pp. 275, 276); Rādhakṛishṇan, op.
cit., pp. 372, 375; Ryder, op. cit., pp. 135-136; Edgerton,
op. cit., I, 175. Rāmānuja (Īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 351)
 comments concerning the Self: "For there is nobody except
 myself who knows what all living beings ought to do, what
 they ought not to do or who can teach them this." See also
 Goyandka, op. cit., pp. 220, 224-225.

⁷¹ Tilak, op. cit., II, 1200.

⁷² Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 185.

⁷³ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 328: nashto mohah
 smritirlabdhā tvatprasādānmayāchyuta | sthito'smi gatasaṁdehaḥ
 karishye vachanam tava ||

Similar translations are given by Rāmānuja (Īśvara-
 datta, op. cit., p. 358); Sṛī Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 281);
 Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 191; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 381;
 Goyandka, op. cit., pp. 238-239; Ryder, op. cit., p. 138; Ed-
 gerton, op. cit., I, 175. Tilak, op. cit., II, 1207, gives
 "by your favor."

The use here of smṛiti is consistent with the views

Gītā 18.75 expresses the power of the guru or teacher to enhance the vision or insight,⁷⁴ the dependence of the finite upon the power of the infinite.

By the favor [prasādat] of Vyāsa, I listened to this secret and supreme yoga from the Lord of Yoga, Krishna Himself speaking before mine eyes.⁷⁵

Compassion. In Gītā 1.28⁷⁶ kṛpā is used to indicate

of Kapāli Sāstry (op. cit., pp. 9-11): "By smṛiti is meant an immediate awareness of what one is seeking, an intuitive reference to the constant presence of the subject meditated upon or the object sought after...Śruti and smṛiti are vedic terms, the former denotes the inspirational, spiritual audience, the latter intuitive discovery of what has been heard by the mystical subtle hearing...Smṛiti...is not a mere memory, but an intuition that carries with it a certain dynamism that cuts asunder these knots of ignorance....." [although this intuition is not sufficient to cut the] "radical ego-knot...in the heart, hṛdaya granthi for...the knot in the heart is cut off only by the direct perception of the Supreme..." Purity, prasāda, smṛiti, all these are but the bridge, the introduction to realization which its basis depends upon the supreme will, the willed power of spiritual aid (prasāda). Cf. Guénon, op. cit., pp. 19-20 for a different view of śruti-smṛiti.

⁷⁴ See guruprasāda, infra, pp. 229 ff.

⁷⁵ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 329: vyāsaprasāda-chchhṛutavānetad guhyamaham param | yogam yogeśvarātkrishnā-tsākshātkathayatah svayam ||

Translations such as "By the grace..." are given by Rāmānuja (Īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 360); Sri Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 381); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 382; Ryder, op. cit., p. 138; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 179; Goyandka, op. cit., p. 240. Tilak, op. cit., II, 1208, gives "by the favor..."

⁷⁶ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 13. Cf. Yogaśikhopaniṣad 1.1 (Sāstrī, Yogopaniṣads, p. 326): "Tell (me) my Lord Sankara, in the plenitude of thy grace [kṛpāyā], how salvation is attained by thee." The meaning probably could be strengthened by the use of compassion for kṛpā. The same may be said for Vivekanudāmani 518, where the

pity: "Deeply moved to pity [kṛipayā], thus uttered in sadness...." The same word and meaning is found in 2.1:⁷⁷ "To him thus with pity [kṛipayā] overcome..."

Anukampā is encountered in Gītā 10.11:

Out of pure compassion anukampā for them, dwelling within their Self, I destroy the ignorance-born darkness by the shining lamp of wisdom.⁷⁸

Other writers give "compassion";⁷⁹ "grace" or "mercy";⁸⁰ and "favor."⁸¹

This verse again speaks of the light of buddhi which dispels darkness. Of this Rādhakṛishṇan⁸² says, "Intellectual knowledge is rendered luminous and certain by the direct intuition of buddhi." Sankara⁸³ comments:

translator (Madhavānanda, translator, Vivekachudāmaṇi of Śrī Sankarāchārya, [Almora: Advaita Āśram, 1926], p. 224) gives: "O teacher, thou hast out of sheer grace [kṛipayā]..."

⁷⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 23.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 178.: teshāmevānukampāarthamaharājñānajaṁ tamah | nāśayāmyātmabhāvastho jñānadīpena bhāsvatā ||

⁷⁹ Śrī Aurobindo (Roy, op. cit., p. 153); Sankara (Sāstrī, op. cit., p. 264); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 259; Ryder, op. cit., p. 76; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 99.

⁸⁰ Goyandka, op. cit., p. 149.

⁸¹ Rāmānuja (Iśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 190); Tilak, op. cit., II, 1069.

⁸² Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 259.

⁸³ Sankara (Sāstrī, op. cit., p. 265); Cf. Vivekachudāmaṇi 147 (Sankara [Madhavānanda, op. cit., p. 64]); also Kātha. 2.20 and dhātuprasāda, supra, pp. 45 ff.

Out of mercy, anxious as to how they may attain bliss. I dwell in their antaḥkarana which is engaged in thinking exclusively of the Self and destroying the darkness of ignorance,--that illusory knowledge which is caused by the absence of discrimination,--by the lamp of wisdom, by the lamp of discriminating knowledge, fed by the oil of pure devotion (bhakti-prasāda), fanned by the wind of earnest meditation on Me,...placed in the wind-sheltered enclosure of the mind which is withdrawn from the sense-objects, untainted by attachment and aversion, and shining with the light of right knowledge generated by incessant practice of concentration and meditation.⁸⁴

Kṛishṇa Prem⁸⁵ says that this compassion, far from being a matter of capricious whim which comes and goes at the will of despotic favor, is as constant and steady as the rays of the sun which shine alike on all those who have divested themselves from all that would inhibit the rays of compassion from contacting them, drawing them to the light with a tidal-force "sometimes termed 'grace.'"

Karuna occurs in Gītā 12.13 which Bhagavān Dās⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Cf. Rāmānuja (Iśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 190): "...destroy their darkness which is born of ignorance...by the luminous lamp called my knowledge which (lamp) is homogeneous to myself."

⁸⁵ Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 93.

⁸⁶ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 229: advēṣṭā sarva-bhūtānāṃ maitraḥ karuṇa eva cā nirmamo nirahaṅkāraḥ samaduhkhasukhahkṣamī Dās also notes karuṇa as "merciful."

Karuna is given as "compassionate" by Rāmānuja (Iśvardatta, op. cit., p. 232); Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 296; Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 119; Goyandka, op. cit., p. 242; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 123; Sankara (Sāstrī, op. cit., p. 311). Sankara remarks that such a one "has offered security of life to all beings, he is a samnyāsī..." Cf. Gītā 7.17. Śrī Aurobindo interprets karuṇa as "pity" (Roy, op. cit., p. 186); and Tilak, op. cit., II, 1102, translates it as "kind."

translates:

He who beareth no ill-will to any being, friendly and compassionate [karuna], without attachment and egoism, balanced in pleasure and pain, and forgiving.

In Gītā 16.2 dayā also has the meaning of compassion, here used as "...compassion to living beings" (...dayā bhūteshu...).⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 272.

CHAPTER IV

MANAVADHARMAŚĀSTRA

Traditional social structure is based analogically upon the experience of metaphysical reality, and the norm of the organized collectivity, the attempt to apply harmonically the expression of natural order or universal will to the social sphere on a juridical and hierarchial level impressed with the concept of vocation, may take the form of a code or śāstra for a particular age or condition.¹

The concept of prasāda as it is found in such a level has many implications some of which, such as the meaning and performance of the saṁskāras, rituals, symbols, and signs, properly are introduced in later chapters. It is sufficient here, however, to give as introduction but a few examples of the prasāda complex as it occurs in Manu.

The term suprasāda is found in Manu 3.213:²

They term gods of śrāddhas³ those best of brāhmanas

¹ René Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrine (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), pp. 209-216.

² Arthur Coke Burnell, translator, The Ordinances of Manu (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1891), p. 70. From J. Jolly, editor, Mānava Dharma Śāstra (London: Trübner and Co., 1887), p. 61: akrodhanānsuprasādānvadantye-tānpurātānān | lokasyāpyāyane yuktāñchhrāddhadevāndvijottamān ||

³ See Macdonell, op. cit., p. 320, term applied to pious brāhmanas; deity of the funeral rite, etc.

who are free from wrath, gentle [suprasāda],⁴ primitive, engaged in the satisfaction of the world.

Anukampaka occurs in Manu 6.8:⁵

Let him (the forest hermit) be ever applied to recital (of the Veda), subdued, well-disposed, composed; ever a giver, not a taker; compassionate [anukampaka] to all beings.

A very interesting exposition of the concept of pra-sāda as clarity, and one which removes it from any interpretation of mechanical ritualism or the automatic efficacy of the sign is that found in Manu 6.67:⁶

Though the fruit of the strychnine tree⁷ clears [prasādakam] muddy water, water does not settle

⁴ See Böhrtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1097.

⁵ Burnell, op. cit., p. 135; Jolly, op. cit., p. 116: svādhyāye ninyayuktaḥ syāddānto maitraḥ samāhitah | dātā ninyamanādātā sarvabhūtānukampakah ||

⁶ Burnell, op. cit., p. 143; Jolly, op. cit., p. 122: phalaṁ katakavrikshasya yadyaoyambuprasādakam | na nāmagrahaṇādeva tasya vāri prasīdati ||

⁷ Cf. Böhrtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1098. Fruit of the kataka tree, phalaṁ katakavrikshasya. The tree itself is also called ambuprasādana and toyaprasāda.

⁸ Cf. Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: 1899) p. 697.

down[prasīdati]⁹ by merely mentioning its name.¹⁰

⁹ Cf. Loc. cit.

¹⁰ Cf. Vidhuśekhara Bhāṭṭāchārya, Bhoṭaparakāśah (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1939), pp. 14, 236.

This verse reappears in the Prajñāpāda, a Sanskrit anthology attributed to Nāgārjuna (p. xi) and translated into Tibetan. In the text (p. 14) ambuprasādakam has the Tibetan equivalent chu . rnam.s. (ambu) dañ.bar. byed (prasādakam). Dañ.ba=~~✓~~sudh- to be pure, also as adjective suddha, pavitra --pure, clear (p. 236). The text (p. 14) substitutes vari prasannam for Manu's vari prasīdati. The Tibetan equivalent is chu.rdul.dan.ba. (rdul=dhūli, dust; dañ.ba=suddha, pure; therefore the meaning 'pure from dust,' i.e. 'clear.') (p.236). The term dañ.ba is repeated in the Udānavarga 26c (p. 82) where it occurs as rab.đañ.ba, meaning prasanna, pure.

Other Tibetan terms are: drin (prasāda, favor), occurring in Kavyādarśa 3c (p. 193); bkā'.drin (prasāda, favor), in Nāgānanda 13c (Śrīharsha) (p. 65); bkā'.drin. mdzod (prasīda, do favor) is the same as the preceding example with the addition of mdzod (kuru), the imperative of mdzad which is the honorific of byed.pa (✓kri, to do). It occurs in the Tibetan text of Aśvaghosha's Buddhacharita 41c (p. 100); dad.pa (1. śrad, faith; 2. prasāda, favor) (see p. 375) is found in Nāgānanda 13.7 (p. 66), and rab.tu.dad. byos (prasīda, be gracious, propitious, lit. prasādam kuru) is given in Nāgānanda 5.3 (p. 43).

Examples of other terms of the prasāda complex as used in the Bhoṭaparakāśah are: rjes.su.bzuñ.ba (anugraha, a favor); (rjes.su=anu; bzuñ.ba='holding,' see ✓grah) in Nāgānanda 2.14 (p. 37); rjes.su.gzuñ.bya (for anugrahvyesu, fit to be favored) in Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā 25b (p. 147); sñiñ.rje (sñiñ=the mind, heart, hridaya; rje=lord; together = karuṇā, kind p. 362) in Buddhacharita 41b (p. 100), it also occurs as karuṇā (kindness) in Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā 12a (p. 142); sñiñ.rje.lđan.pa (kārūṇika, compassionate, kind) in Nāgānanda 1c (p. 33); sñiñ.brtse.ba.ñe.bar.bzuñ.ste (sñiñ=heart; brtse;ba=love, affection, kindness; ñe.bar.bzuñ ste=having taken; lit. anukampāmupādāya, having taken compassion. Translated anukampayā, 'with compassion') (see pp. 285, 362), it occurs in Lalitavistara A12 (p. 9); rab.tu zhi.ba (rab.tu=pra; zhi=✓sam; zhi.ba=calmed [also śiva, protecting, auspicious]; together=prasānta, calmed, (tranquilized), in Nāgānanda 10.7 (p. 58).

PART III

THE COMPASSION OF BUDDHISM

The Triratna¹ as an initial point of departure for the Buddhist life may be thought of as enunciated from the viewpoint of the aspiring ego which has divided the all-embracing non-duality into a trinity of transcendent realization, knowledge of the harmony of manifestation, and an understanding of the non-separation of all sentient beings.

These "Three Refuges" seem to imply that which seeks refuge, that from which refuge is sought, and that refuge which is sought. In addition, the "going to" or "seeking for"² a refuge places the seeker, the "I," in a relationship

Buddham sarapam sachchhami
dhammam sarapam sachchhami
samgham sarapam sachchhami

I go to the Buddha as my refuge.

I go to the Light of the Law as my refuge.

I go to the Brotherhood as my refuge.

² gam = go, move, etc. It also is interesting, in this connection with the "Three Refuges", to notice some of its secondary meanings. Alfred A. Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 82, gives, in addition to its primary definition, the meaning "perceive, recognize...attain..." and Vidyadhar V. Bhide, A Concise Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Poona City: Chitra Shala Press, 1926) adds "to go to the state or condition of, become..." In addition there is a subsidiary meaning similar to the biblical use of the word know to denote a sexual union, for both Macdonell and Bhide give such a meaning. From this viewpoint the statement would indicate a knowledge, a re-cognition or re-knowing, a re-union by way of perfect intercourse with That which is the three-fold refuge.

of active cooperation with the protecting, covering, all-embracing power (śakti) of that refuge.³

That which is called the "I" or individual ego, according to Śāntarakṣita is nothing more than a "particular series of cognitive states," momentary appearances which also momentarily dissolve or disappear as soon as they arise. Thus a given number of individuals are but separate and distinct streams of non-stable conscious states, each capable of influencing other streams.⁴ Śāntarakṣita, therefore, could not give expression to a permanent, unchanging ground of pure consciousness for that flux of mental states which is man's experience of himself.⁵

³ Śarana. Cf. W. D. Whitney, The Roots, Verb-forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language (New Haven: American Oriental Soc., 1945), p. 179: The derivatives of √śri are probably best referred to a separate root √śri, √śar, √śal with the general meaning of "cover." Chao. L. Lanman, A Sanskrit Reader (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 256: śarana, protect, refuge; shed; hut. Cognates: Gk.: Kallid, hut; A.S.: heal..., hall; Ger.: Hülle, covering; Eng.: hull, covering of grain; A.S.: helm, protector (used of God and Christ), headprotector, helmet... Cf. Sri Aurobindo, editor, Isā. Upanishad (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1945), p. 1, (Isā. 1.) "All this is for habitation of the Lord..." On p. 22 of the same source Sri Aurobindo says, "...although the Lord inhabits each object as if separate, yet all objects exist in Self and not outside it." Therefore the finite ego is inseparable from its ground through the union or knowledge-experience of That as an all-embracing, "Whole," transcendent "covering" which, not being separate, permeates "all this."

⁴ Surendranath Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: 1933), pp. 133-136.

⁵ Ibid., p. 133.

The samsâric flow or stream of ever-changing "becoming," however, tended in Buddhism toward a ground either within its opposite polarity or in That which eternally transcends yet includes polarity. Whatever the nature of the ground it was not to be thought of as separated and removed from the flux, but inclusive of it.

In Christianity this same flux which constitutes ego-knowledge is experienced, and the historical problem involving change vs. stability has left an unbridgeable gap between pure Being and the constant change of the creatures of that Being. Gilson⁶ says:

...all that we know is subject to becoming, that is, to change; and thus no single one of these things is perfect and immutable as must of necessity be the case with Being Itself. In this sense, then, there is no fact or problem more vital to Christian thought than that of movement, and it is precisely because the philosophy of Aristotle is essentially an analysis of becoming and of its metaphysical conditions, that it has itself become an integral part of Christian metaphysics, and will always remain so.

⁶ Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 65.

CHAPTER I

THE GROUND

Sūnyavāda. Human reason and logic has been long a poor vehicle for expressing any affirmation concerning the ground of metaphysic. Affirmations run into the extreme danger of misinterpretation or idolatry of the symbol. The "Way of Negation," then, became the only recourse for those who dis-trusted affirmation, and in the Sūnyatā doctrine of Nāgārjuna this negative approach reached its culmination. Scorning formal logic and any need for a thesis, Nāgārjuna and his followers concentrated upon breaking down the intricately-woven and positive theses as but interdependent relations of illusory appearances⁷ wherein nothing positive can be stated. The reality is indescribable by any concept, not being composed of phenomenal thingness it has no-thingness and from the logical view of the ego is the Void, the emptiness.⁸

Maritain,⁹ speaking of St. John of the Cross, graphically portrays this Emptiness as it has been experienced in the West:

⁷ Saśi Bhusan Dāsgupta, An Introduction to Tāntric Buddhism (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950), p. 19.

⁸ Cf. Judith Tyberg, Sanskrit Keys to India's Wisdom (San Francisco, 1952) p. B8.

⁹ Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 437-438.

Nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing; this is the path of St. John of the Cross. Knowledge and Repose--not this, not that. Joy and Honor--not this, not that. NOTHING,--and upon the mountain--nothing.

Christian theology, however, cannot be content to rest upon the void-ground, but must conceive of it, quantitatively, as but an abandonment dependent upon and made by the soul, an emptiness which must be filled by supernatural Being conceived as the ever-separate God. Maritain¹⁰ says:

Since all human means, whatsoever they may be, are inadequate to the possession of God in the fulness of His Life, the best thing the creature can do is to abandon itself, exhaust itself, renounce all its rightful operations, to make itself void. This central thesis of St. John of the Cross would be absurd if God was not there, supernaturally present in the soul (and the question is that of a soul already directly called to contemplation), if God was not there on the threshold, desirous of filling the whole soul, to replace all that it has lost with a richer life, the life of God Himself, the torrent of His peace. A mad courage, a heroic confidence which responds, in the order of the spirit itself, to the 'mad' love of the most holy God--such is the basic character of the spirituality of St. John of the Cross.

Even this self-abandonment is begun and continued, theologically, by the grace of God, directing the will of self, otherwise "such conduct would be insane."¹¹ Thus does the ego view its own inability in relation to Sūnyatā.

Tathatāvāda. A too rigorous application of the Sūnyatā

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 406.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 439.

doctrine as the way of absolute negation also was productive of misconception and often falsely labeled as nihilistic. The legitimacy of philosophical inquiry and explanation was recognized by Āśvaghoṣa¹² in his exposition of the metaphysical ground which is non-separate from the void and the phenomenal world of change, the "ultimate and absolute reality which is the uncreate, eternal and immutable conscious principle underlying the diversity of the universe as a whole."¹³ This reality he designates as Tathatā or Thatness¹⁴ which is at once the indescribable void and the...

quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyā veils it or perfumes it the world-appearance springs forth, but as the pure "Thatness" also perfumes avidyā there is a striving for the good as well. As the stage of avidyā is passed this illuminating character shows forth for it is the ultimate truth in which the illusion appears as the many of this world.¹⁵

This ultimate truth, however, is not to be conceived as positive in relation to the negation of illusory appearance, "for it is that in which the positive and negative are one and the same."¹⁶

¹² Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 103.

¹³ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁴ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. xv.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 93. This closely approaches the advaitic Brahman-ātman.

Thus the Tathatā appears to have two aspects each in inseparable non-dual relation to the other. The first "aspect," if it may so be called, is that of "pure thatness" or bhūtatahatā, the all-inclusive, inexplicable, and ineffable in which all phenomenal appearances cyclically merge and from which they are manifest (dharmadhātu).¹⁷ The second aspect is that of the samsāric, "external" world of particulars manifesting in the all-conserving mind (ālayavijñāna) in manner similar to foam-clouded waves emerging from the stillness of ocean, and just as the all-conserving mind "which in its own nature is pure and clear, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidyā), the waves of mentality (vijñāna) make their appearance."¹⁸ The turbidity of samsāric experience is due to ego-memory (vāsanā or smṛiti), the stream of momentary causation which is the karmic history constituting the jīva. This history, or separation, is a deterrent to realization and must be overcome and made to disappear,¹⁹ a view diametrically opposed to the religious, and particularly Christian,

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 80. Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁸ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 24. This is a quotation from Aśvaghosha's "Awakening of Faith." See Robert Ballou, Friedrich Spiegelberg, and Horace Friess, editors, The Bible of the World (New York: The Viking Press, 1939), pp. 339-340. Also cf. prasāda as clearness and ambuprasāda.

¹⁹ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 80. Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 26.

emphasis upon historicity.²⁰

The Tathatā doctrine, therefore, has both positive and negative polarity. Negatively it is Sūnyatā, the complete negation of all attributes, signs of distinction, particularization, condition, existence and non-existence. Because nothing can be said of it, it only can be indicated by the word negation, a negation which is void inasmuch as there is no content or thingness in it, and it also denies any subject which negates or object which is negated.²¹ Positively it is Aśunya-tā, the store-house of infinite merit and the self-existent field of manifestation of the eternal, the immutable, and the pure.²² No affirmation, however, can touch it, for it can be experienced only by metaphysical realization and not by the efforts of the individualized conceptual intellect.²³

The Laṅkāvatārasūtra speaks of a "thatness" and "voidness"²⁴ but also denies a ground-principle behind the illusory world of samsāra, yet at the same time it promulgates the doctrine of the ālayavijñāna upon which, like a sea, arise

²⁰ See Introduction, pp. xlii ff., supra.

²¹ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 25. Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 81.

²² Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 26.

²³ Loc. cit. Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 81.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 93.

ripples of avidyā constituting the phenomenal world and its experience, a contradiction which Surendranath Dāsgupta believes indicative of a parallel and dual philosophical presentation, the higher holding to the "negative philosophy" of Nāgārjuna, "and the lower philosophy of the subjective mind, as creating the whole phenomenal world, subjective and objective, seems to be a concession to weaker intellects."²⁵

Vijñānavāda. Just as Western religious speculation in its dualistic emphasis upon Being has tended to avoid any consideration of consciousness, Eastern metaphysic has the tendency to center about consciousness as the boundless core, the ground of all non-duality.²⁶ The Buddhistic culmination of this tendency as it was promulgated by Maitreya and Asaṅga and developed by Vasubandhu²⁷ was based upon the experience of a pure consciousness "which is also of the nature of pure bliss, eternal, transcendent, unchangeable, and unthinkable in character like the Brahman of the Vedānta."²⁸ This absolute and indeterminable pure consciousness (Vijñāptimātra)

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 96-103.

²⁶ See Alan W. Watts, The Supreme Identity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950), p. 79.

²⁷ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. xv.

²⁸ Ibid., p. xvii.

has no object, and no conceptual statement truly may be made of it, and "even the knowledge that the ultimate reality is this pure consciousness is a false imposition."²⁹ Nevertheless it is admitted that only by entrance into this absolute pure consciousness³⁰ is final emancipation to be realized.³¹

The pure consciousness as that which is devoid of all duality, of all constructs, the Abhūtaparikalpa, "exists in the void (Sūnyā)...and the void exists in it."³² The Sūnyatā exists in the Abhūtaparikalpa as the absence of the knower and the known (grāhya-grāhaka-rahitatā), as the all-inclusive transcendence rather than absolute negation.³³

Within the non-dual Abhūtaparikalpa, which is specifically of the nature of awareness, are the inactive and dormant seeds of subject-object relationship, the mere possibility of such manifestation which in itself is not within the area of dualistic reality.³⁴ Appearances arise as transfor-

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 119-120

³⁰ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 148. The undifferentiated absolute pure consciousness here is called the Dharma-kāya.

³¹ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 123.

³² Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 27, quoting from Madhyantavibhāṣaśikṣā. On p. 31 Abhūtaparikalpa is cited in Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu as pure consciousness.

³³ Ibid., p. 28.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 27-30.

mations of the pure consciousness-power (cf. śaktivāda) and their essential reality resides in the ground of consciousness rather than in its modifications.³⁵ The "home" of the root-drives or "seeds" that may develop into samsāric experience is that subliminal mind-store, the all-conserving mind called the Ālayavijñāna from which the possibilities within the seeds are brought forth by the impingement of opposing forces or actions.³⁶ Ālayavijñāna is

...the ground of all individual centers of experience analogous to the buddhitattva of the Sāṃkhya, containing the resultant tendencies of the whole past. It is one unitary principle from which the individual subjects spring out and in which the past and future experiences are gathered up as root-tendencies, making the further future career of individuals possible.³⁷

Even so the Ālayavijñāna is to be considered as but a hypothetical state necessary for the explanation of the world of duality, a state grounded upon pure consciousness which is the ultimate essence of all appearance, even that of Ālayavijñāna, for all modifications of pure consciousness are as but impositions on the nature of consciousness (Abhūtaparikalpa).³⁸

³⁵ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 109.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. xvi, 116. Śaśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 30.

³⁷ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. xvi.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 116-120. In addition, the reality of the transcendent ground of pure consciousness is experienced during the state of gushupti or samprasāda, when the subjective-objective world is not operative. See Śaśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 34 and samprasāda, supra, pp. 59 ff.

With enlightenment the Ālayavijñāna ceases its activity and work, and becomes as one with the ground of pure consciousness,³⁹ the particular series of modifications becomes still, silent, and tranquil⁴⁰ and, losing all manifest content merges with pure consciousness and bliss "which is thus different from the tathatā of Aśvaghoṣa and very similar to the Brahman of the Upanishads."⁴¹ The waves of mentation, the ordinary mind, having become stilled,⁴² the nature of Abhūta-parikalpa may be intuited by that transcendence which is superior to, and thus, as it were, makes void all duality, vāṣana and saṃskāra, and that karmic bondage which is the "world of dimension."⁴³ The realization of or awakening to this advaitic sūnyatā as the

...nature of things...[which] is synonymous with the thatness (tathatā) of things, the totality of things (bhūtakoti), the uncaused (animitta), the highest truth

³⁹ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. xvi.

⁴⁰ As in the tranquility which is prasāda.

⁴¹ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. x, 120.

⁴² Cf. Chu Ch'an, translator, The Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind (London: The Buddhist Soc., 1947), p. 20: "This Universal Mind is No Mind (in the ordinary sense of the word) and is completely detached from form...If sentient beings can only rid themselves of mentation, they will have accomplished everything."

⁴³ F. Harold Smith, The Buddhist Way of Life (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951), pp. 181-182. Cf. also chittavrittinirodha.

(paramārthatā) and the ultimate element of things
(dharma-dhātu).⁴⁴

Samsāra, dharma, and nirvāṇa. From the viewpoint of Kṣhanikavijñānavāda the jīva, as a "series of momentary mental states appearing as a persistent entity,"⁴⁵ a temporary vortex-mass of body (kāya), mind (manas), and conscious life principle (viñāṇa),⁴⁶ eternally is based and abides in the truth of nirvāṇa. At the touch of avidyā there comes forth that mentation which desires the agreeable and disagreeable, together with the memory of such states which tends to promote a clinging to the agreeable. This leads to the superimposition and attachment of name-labels and definitions together with the interplay of various actions hinging upon the multiform stream, deeds which forge the bonds of that

⁴⁴ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 30-31. See also Soyen Shaku, "Concept of God in Buddhism," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I (Jan., 1934), 178-179.

⁴⁵ P. N. Srinivāsachāri, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943) p. 475. The author continues, "...but a mere mental state cannot seek mukti...", --which emphasizes the metaphysical view that it is the Self or Supreme consciousness which loses, seeks, and realizes.

⁴⁶ Tyberg, op. cit., p. B4. This also may be viewed psychologically as the Five Aggregates (pañcha-skandhā): body (rūpa), feelings (vedanā), perceptions (sañjñā), predispositions from past impressions (saṃskāra), and conscious life principle (viñāṇa).

suffering and misery which are opposed to perfect freedom.⁴⁷

Smith states that both Christianity and Buddhism agree that the grasping character of ego-desire is at the heart of suffering in the human environment. He discerns a point of departure, however, in the attitude toward suffering taken by the two views; "Buddha sets out to end suffering, Christianity to accept it as integral in the divine plan,"⁴⁸ as a medium of healing through loving acceptance of the will of God which, by His grace, redeems. The Buddhist experience of ultimate reality as "a passionless state in which suffering had no more meaning"⁴⁹ is compared by Smith with the Christian concept of "God Himself, as afflicted in the afflictions of His people,"⁵⁰ God in Christ ever crucified afresh through human sin--a unique revelation of the Supreme Being, known through the concrete life of God Incarnate."⁵¹ B. L. Suzuki,

⁴⁷ Surendranath Dāsgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84. Cf. Beatrice Lane Suzuki, *Mahāyāna Buddhism* (London: David Marlowe, 1948), p. 114 where the origin of all evil is based upon a mind which is not composed and tranquil [*āprasāda*], for "when the mind loses its composure it moans like an agile monkey and thus becomes the origin of all evils."

⁴⁸ This, of course, does not apply to the new religion of humanism.

⁴⁹ The Christian concept of heaven also is devoid of suffering.

⁵⁰ This seems to be an analogical statement of *līlā*, the plunge of the Self into *saṃsāra*.

⁵¹ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

however, finds in the Bodhisattva doctrine and its joyful acceptance of any samsâric pain necessary for the giving of aid to sentient beings, a development of a view of suffering which is not only meaningful but the outstanding principle and way of deliverance in Mahâyânic Buddhism.⁵²

Carl Jung finds a given equanimity and tranquility when one consciously realizes oneself as undivided from the full nature of things as it is. He says:

Nobody can know what the ultimate things are. We must, therefore, take them as we experience them, and if such experience helps to make your life healthier, more beautiful, more complete and more satisfying to yourself and to those you love, you may safely say: This was the grace of God.⁵³

Northrop,⁵⁴ speaking of Oriental morality, says that good conduct consists in accepting the nature of things, both in its indeterminate and determinate aspects, for nothing more or nothing less than it is. B. L. Suzuki⁵⁵ equates the nature of dharma with the spontaneous and immediate experience of things in the Now, an experience which must remain unexplained by desire or that speculative intellect which is

⁵² B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵³ Carl Gustav Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 114.

⁵⁴ F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 386.

⁵⁵ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 7, 134.

of the nature of ignorance. She says: "The dharma is grasped when things are taken as they are, yathābhūtam. It is, therefore, Tathatā, Suchness or Thusness." "Nirvāna and the world of saṃsāra are but different aspects of the same thing." According to Vijñānavāda a full and integral knowledge of saṃsāra as sūnyatā or pure consciousness constitutes in itself nirvāna for saṃsāra is but a fleeting, passion-stained condition of mind (chitta) clouded by mentation, whereas nirvāna is that chitta without the stain of fleeting passion or the cloudiness of mental constructs.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the ground inclusively transcends even the conceptual poles of nirvāna and saṃsāra,--for they are "in the last analysis, in the

⁵⁶ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 45, 148. Cf. also The Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind (Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 20): "Though all the realm of phenomenal or sensory experience is looked upon by the Dhyana Sect as having only relative existence it is not regarded as something separate from universal mind. It IS universal mind wrongly apprehended."

From the Anugītā, Max Müller, editor, Sacred Books of the East (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1900) VIII-247-248, 277.: "...abandoning by the understanding all fancies bodily and mental, he gradually obtains tranquility (nirvāna), like fire devoid of fuel." (4.4) "Then, freed from all impressions he attains to the eternal Supreme Brahman, tranquil, unmoving, constant, indestructable." (4.13) "...and tranquility is the eternal Brahman." (9.17)

realm of pure intellect, identical."⁵⁷

Thus is stated in varied language and with equally varied word-pictures the experience of the advaitic "many in one and one in many," the metaphysical ground, the Brahman, Ātman, Nirvāṇa, Sūnyatā, Tathatā, Universal Mind, Dharmakāya;

⁵⁷ Cf. Tejabindūpanishad 10. in Minor Upanishads (Almora: Advaita Āśrama, 1938), p. 38: "Though It is that which is not void, yet thought of as void, (but in reality) It transcends voidness and is firm-fixed. There is neither thinker, nor thought nor the thinkable. Still it is to be meditated upon."

aśūnye sūnyabhāvaṃ cha sūnyāstītama va sthitam |
na dhyānam na cha vā dhyātā na dhyeyo dhyeya eva cha ||

The Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind (Chu Ch'an, op. cit., pp. 16, 18, 28, 45) says: "There are no things differing from each other. Hence (to understand this) is called attaining complete, perfect, enlightenment." (p. 45). "All the Buddhas and all sentient beings are nothing but universal mind, besides which nothing exists....It is the substance that you see before you--begin to reason about it and you at once fall into error. It is like the boundless void which cannot be fathomed or measured. This universal mind alone is the Buddha and there is no distinction between the Buddha and sentient beings, but sentient beings are attached to forms and so seek for Buddhahood outside it....The Buddha is directly before them, for this (universal mind is the Buddha and the Buddha is all living beings. It is not the less for being manifested in ordinary beings, nor is it greater for being manifested in the Buddha." (p. 16.) "There is only this universal mind and not a particle of anything else on which to lay hold..." (p. 18.) "The void and the Dharmakāya do not differ from each other, neither do sentient beings and Buddhas, the phenomenal world and Nirvāṇa or delusion and Bodhi. When all such forms are left behind--that is Buddha. Ordinary people look outwards, while followers of the Way look into their own minds, but the real Dharma is to forget both the external and the internal. The former is easy enough, the latter very difficult."

supremely infinite but Self-manifesting in and as the limited and finite, "individualizing itself in the manifoldness of the phenomenal world [for] it does not stand alone outside particular existences..."⁵⁸

Smith⁵⁹ believes that the fundamental division between Buddhism and Western religious thought is based upon epistemological differences, the intuitive, immediately experienced non-dual realization or awakening which is sambodhi⁶⁰ versus the postulated "idea of God distant from the sensed world, [and the belief that], in some way, the idea (distinct from sensum) interprets a Being (also distinct from the sensed world)." Furthermore, Smith contends that concepts concerning objects and individual persons in time interpret, either directly or by analogy, the Supreme Being for Christianity through the "central act of God in history" (John 3.16). He of course does not extend the concept of analogy to include the entire religious structure of Christianity in a harmonious and meaningful relationship to metaphysic. He draws, instead, a line of battle, a chalk-mark of decision demanding a choice

⁵⁸ Shaku, op. cit., p. 179.

⁵⁹ Smith, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

⁶⁰ Cf. S. Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 21:
 "Perfect insight (sambodhi), is the end and aim of the Buddhist eight-fold path."

of sides, either one or the other.⁶¹

⁶¹ Smith, op. cit., pp. 179-181.

CHAPTER II

KARUNA AND THE BODHISATTVA

The Trikāya. The Buddhistic undifferentiated all-consciousness is the ground, the all-pervasive sea of consciousness within which the turbidity (avidyā) of limited and separate ego-consciousness momentarily manifests. Mahāyānic personification of this absolute of metaphysic is but figurative in nature, not to be confused with the "personal supreme God of the Semitic faiths" but, rather, an analogical representation of that transcendent power which is co-equal with consciousness, emergent "from the Void, the Quality-less, the Unmade, Unformed,"--the power of the Supreme Will which alone permits realization or awakening. In addition it is said that "within it are contained, in indescribable unity, all the Great Ones of all the ages, the Fully Enlightened Ones, the Buddhas, the Saviours of mankind." To it human concepts are not applicable for its only "contact" is by realization.¹

The Theravāda concept of Buddha "as a historical personage in the life and activities of Sākyamuni,"² was developed by Mahāyānist experience toward a transcendency coincident with the ultimate principle of consciousness which

¹ W. Y. Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 38n.

² Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 12.

was viewed from three different but non-separate aspects known as the Trikāya. This development has been called docetic³ as a parallel to the oldest Christian heresy which regarded matter, in a somewhat Manichean manner, as evil in itself and therefore incapable, in its defiling corruption, of housing the separate and totally other divinity which was Christ. This view saw the incarnation as a semblance and its "theory of Christ's humanity is linked with the dualism of popular philosophy," for "he whose mission is to deliver men from the world of matter and sense cannot himself be subject to the infirmities or the defilement of the flesh."⁴

From the "seeming" which is characteristic of saṃsāra and from the transcendental view that the Brahman is eternally⁵ superior⁶ to the limiting conditions of human existence there is a certain surface resemblance to a docetic theory, and, with equal disregard for the metaphysical basis, a seeming terminological framework for the imposition of a type of theological hypostasis. Inasmuch as these aspects also are applicable to all advaitic realization, the

³ Ibid., pp. 12, 37. Also Geo. Foot Moore, History of Religions (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1928) I, 302.

⁴ Moore, op. cit., II, 153, 166.

⁵ That is, in the Now.

⁶ That is, inclusively superior rather than superior in a vertical and separate manner as "the other."

relationship of the many to the one, the ego to the Self, of saṃsāra to nirvāṇa, and the basic Mahāyānic doctrine of same-ness embracing the non-dual Trikāya, the docetic label, as well as that of hypostasis, loses meaning. Metaphysic has no ontological gap, a religious ingredient absolutely necessary for those "bridging" theories such as the docetic and hypostatic. It is possible that the term advaita would be a happier one, particularly as it bears no family likeness to dualistic and religious concepts other than serving as a supra-dimensional field for their function as dependent analogies.

Briefly the Trikāya consists of an inseparable trinity known as the Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya, and Nirmāṇakāya. Dharmakāya employs the use of dharma not only in the sense of law but also as entity, therefore it has an ontological-cosmological significance which encompasses thatness (tathatārūpa), the void, the primordial ground element (dharma-dhātu), and the indeterminate pure consciousness (viññaptimātra). From the view of Buddhology it is the nirvāṇa state of Buddhahood. In a comparison of the varied schools within the metaphysical tradition it may be equated with the Nirguna Brahman of the Upanishads.⁷ In any event it

...cannot be sought through speech, hearing, or the

⁷ Śaśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 12-15, 37.

written word.⁸ There is nothing about it which can be put into speech or made evident. It is the voidness and omnipresence of our own nature⁹ and nothing more.¹⁰

The Sambhogakāya, the Beatific Body, is presented symbolically as streaming forth itself in illuminating rays.¹¹ Ontologically it is the "Dharmakāya evolved as Being, Bliss, Charity, Radiance, or the Intellect, individualized as the Bodhisattva." Buddhalogy places this state as prior to the nirvāṇic awakening, and it is the abode of that compassion which is enjoyed for all sentient beings.¹²

Nirmānakāya is the manifest state experienced by the human Buddhas, the "apparent doings of a phantom of the Buddhakāya,"--but, in no wise is ^{it} equal to any Western docetic doctrine, for even in the state of individualized consciousness the essential oneness of samsāra and nirvāṇa,--of the

⁸ Cf. Katha, 2.23.

⁹ Svabhāvakāya. See also Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 12n.

¹⁰ Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 37.

¹¹ See Rays of Grace, infra, pp. 158ff. This is expressed in the Christian analogy of the beatific vision wherein there is embraced "in a single act of knowledge [metaphysically prajñā] and love [metaphysically the compassion or karuṇā extended by the undifferentiated to the differentiated] of God [analogical inversion] all the stages of development..." Matthias J. Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), p. 664.

¹² Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 12-15.

non-separate Trikāya, is to be remembered.¹³

The Bodhisattva. The early tendency of the Mahāsāṅghika school to see the Buddha nature in its more universal and all-inclusive fullness was developed in Mahāyāna as a nature inseparable from the supreme and non-dual consciousness-power, and at one with the ground of all that is manifest (dharmadhātu). It is also from a Mahāsāṅghika Lokottara document, the Mahāvastu, that one of the earliest presentations of the Bodhisattva doctrine is encountered.¹⁴ The element of compassion is found both in the ideal of the Arahat as well as the Bodhisattva.¹⁵ In the former, however,

¹³ Loc. cit. Cf. Sri Aurobindo's views concerning the three modes or poises of Brahman,--the absolute transcendence which is full and timeless integrality, superior to samsāric forms; the sustaining spirit giving nourishment, meaning, and existence to world-forms; and the presiding principle which is the ground of all individuality. Haridās Chaudhuri, Sri Aurobindo The Prophet of Life Divine (Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Pathamandir, 1951) pp. 16, 209.

Cf. also the enveloping three-fold "das Umgreifende" of Jaspers which encompasses all which we know;--that is, the world, one's own self, and, finally, that Transcendence which also reaches into and touches the world and the self. Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existential Revolt (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952), p. 193.

¹⁴ Smith, op. cit., p. 85.

¹⁵ A pratyeka-Buddha is said, silently and in unseen ways, to project compassion and aiding influences throughout the world, just as the rays of the sun bring vital forces to life forms. See Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 19n. Also see Rays of Grace, infra, pp. 158 ff.

it is viewed predominately as a means to enlightenment while in the latter compassion exists not only as a means but as inherent in the awakening experience and in the evolutionary processes within the Trikāya.¹⁶ The Bodhisattva is not a separate being distinct and apart from saṃsāra but, rather, a personification of the non-sentimental compassion which is inherent in the essential and integral unity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, in the complementary rather than the contradictory nature of the two poles which, "transmuted in the absolute... still find a place in the harmony of contradiction."¹⁷

Realizing the sameness which is the field for both the cycles of rebirth and the extinction of oppositional stresses, the Bodhisattva remains emotionally unattached to either through knowledge of the superior pole and perfect compassion for the inferior, and a realization of their free and eternal compatibility.¹⁸ Of this B. L. Suzuki¹⁹ says:

...a Bodhisattva does not seek to be delivered from things. Sam̐sāra is not hated by him nor Nirvāṇa loved. When perfect enlightenment illumines, it is neither bondage nor deliverance. Beings by nature are Buddha, so Sam̐sāra and Nirvāṇa are like a dream of yesterday. As it is like yesterday's dream there is no birth, no death, no coming, no going.

¹⁶ Smith, op. cit., p. 97.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁸ Watts, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁹ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 118.

The Bodhisattva, though, may be viewed as the personification of the will of the absolute consciousness-power which is active in the supreme awakening from all saṃsāric states and therefore freely enters those states²⁰ as an inherent and given channel of enlightenment.

In the four-fold vow the Bodhisattva is identified with the will to bring about the awakening or realization of all sentient beings, to initiate a cathartic process (cf. dhātuprasāda) which will eliminate or "blow out" all saṃsāric passions, to awaken to realization and guide others in their efforts to experience integrality and, finally, to lead others toward Buddhahood.²¹ This vow implies a willed activity in the saṃsāric state as long as any sentient being has not awakened or been guided across the turbulent waters of ignorance. It implies further the absence of a doctrine of never-ending damnation or reprobation, such as is found in Semitic religions, for not only this world of appearances but also "heaven," with its gods, and "hell" are in the same saṃsāric and karmic category of non-permanence and are subject to dissolution, change and transmutation through knowledge.²²

²⁰ Cf. Smith, op. cit., p. 119.

²¹ Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 19n. B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 52.

²² Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 151n.

Thus the Buddhist personalization of conservation, love, and compassion does not depend upon uniqueness or historicity, nor is it independent in its own right. Buddhahood is non-dual in nature being inclusive of the historic Buddhas yet never separate from the intuitively and spontaneously experienced indeterminate Thatness or all-consciousness-power. It does not deny the ideal of the "beloved person" as a source of inspiration, but that same "person" is the Buddha-nature which is the ground-basis of all beings.²³ The doctrines of karma and rebirth are necessary corollaries to the Bodhisattva ideal if it is to escape the religious fetters of historicity and particular uniqueness, if it is to remain true to its metaphysical ground as the bodhisattva-principle, or spirit (i.e. Christ-spirit) and not become an analogy separate from its ground and focused solely upon a projected distant, historical figure which, being unique, cannot be realized in identity through each individual manifestation. Although gnostic Christians adhered to the tradition of rebirth and an ideal of direct spiritual insight, the enlightenment of Christhood which was used to help all others find that same state, church Christianity has, since the second Council of Constantinople in 553 a. d., abandoned this doctrine and for the Bodhisattva ideal substituted the

²³ Cf. Smith, op. cit., p. 180.

goal of self-salvation "by faith in the infallibility of the Church's decrees and teachings."²⁴ Modern non-traditional Christianity is of such a nature that the term Christian only can mean an indistinct theological norm constituting a conjectured statistical entity. Nevertheless, Smith²⁵ states that "the Christian would maintain that the love which the Buddhist intuitis can be understood only truly in the light of the postulated concept of Person," a statement which emphasizes further the observations made by most Eastern authorities and such Western writers as Northrop, Guénon, Watts, Evans-Wentz, and Woodroffe concerning the inferential nature of Western knowledge as compared with the immediately intuited integral experience of the East.

There are certain approximations to the Bodhisattva doctrine, apart from the mission of the historic Christ, in the lives and experiences of Christian mystics, although their interpretation is colored more or less by the prevailing theological environment of the time. Maritain,²⁶ in speaking of St. John of the Cross states:

...the soul which has been already elevated to the transforming union, and which therefore, on the testimony of

²⁴ Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁵ Smith, op. cit., p. 180.

²⁶ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 408-409.

all the saints, can no more suffer than God Himself, is more than ever, St. John of the Cross tells us, thirsty for suffering. In fact and in truth the grace itself which transforms us is the grace of our crucified Lord, and it is in order that we may share in the work that is His own, that is, to die for the world, that we are transfigured from brightness into brightness.

The Bodhisattva ideal is to do all, to sacrifice all, and to die, not once but countless times, but not to insist upon dying, and the compassion is directed, not toward the Lord Buddha, but to all sentient beings who are unaware, through that ignorance which is unawareness, of their identity with the Supreme.

Compassion and extra-samsâric aid. Seeberg²⁷ has considered love from two interrelated aspects of manifestation. It may be conceived as assuming the form of mercy when it aids and relieves need and misery, and as grace inasmuch as it gives this aid without demanding a corresponding merit from the recipient.

Bodhisattvic mercy and compassion, since it arises in the awakened, undifferentiated consciousness and is directed towards the differentiated current of turbidity or avidyâ within that all-inclusive supreme consciousness, can assume its aiding and relieving function through the will to clarify avidyâ by knowledge. A dualistic or separatist interpretation

²⁷ R. Seeberg, "Grace," New Scharff-Herzog Religious Encyclopedia (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1909), V, 41.

of the Buddha's last recorded words, which after observing that the inherent characteristic of all composite things is dissolution and decay admonished his hearers diligently to work out their own deliverance, would entail an inseparable opposition between imprisonment and deliverance as they effect the equally separate prisoner-entity, which, without any aid superior to the karmic flux-construct composing its ego-self, must break through that self-same karmic flux-construct constituting its prison. The very admonition attributed to the Buddha, however, is an aid, given out of compassion, from the ground of all consciousness to its non-separate manifestation in avidyā, and it is only that which is integrally and eternally awake in the Now which can awaken into identity with its limited harmonic and release it from the bonds of turbidity.²⁸

The flux of avidyā, the particular power-current of manifesting states of mentation which constitutes the ego, may be arrested, made tranquil as it were, in a repolarization of that self-same power through the "extra-samsāric element" termed prajñā (pañña), that all-inclusive wisdom which purifies the temperament in a manner similar to dhātu-prasāda,²⁹ but with a more active connotation. Furthermore,

²⁸ Cf. Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 203.

²⁹ See supra, pp. 43 ff.

this "extra-saṁsāric element" of prajñā is considered to be present in all jīvas for each individual is a potential Bodhisattva and capable of conscious integration into the Buddha-nature.³⁰

The power (śakti) or special extra-saṁsāric strength concomitant with this prajñā or knowledge is called virīya-bala and is superior to ordinary human energy for it derives from the integral consciousness-power which is of the bodhi-sattvic will and therefore can "liberate the will by means of the will," providing the power and "a positive opportunity" to awaken to the full realization of That which is liberation.

The manifestation of this knowledge and of this strength, particularly in modern Western man, can rightfully be called a kind of a 'grace,' in view of its marked discontinuity when compared to all faculties and forms of consciousness.³¹

This virile energy, with prajñā,³² constitutes a strength of the integral will, greater than the strength of the ego, which promotes tenderness toward wholeness or spiritual health and is relied upon as a moving force which will

³⁰ See J. Evola, The Doctrine of Awakening (London: Luzac and Co., 1951), p. 111.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 111-112. Cf. A Christian analogy-parallel, Gilson, op. cit., p. 317, in the Augustinian concept of the helplessness of the will in a state of sin, its lack of freedom which can be healed only by grace. "In possession of grace we have something more than free-will plus the power of grace, it is free-will itself which, by grace, becomes power and achieves its liberation."

³² See śakti as will and wisdom, infra, pp. 499-501, and Part VI.

replace the turbidity due to "delight in craving (kāma sukham) by delight in heroism (vīra sukham).³³

This energy concept is reflected in the Christian analogy of "grace as an inexhaustible source of power for the apprehension of truth and the realization of the good" and expressed in the words of St. Augustine as quoted by Gilson:³⁴

It is one thing to will...to act rightly, quite another thing to have the power to perform the good act..., and who then will make the law of God to reign also over the outward man, save only God Himself by the grace of Jesus Christ.

.....
That Plotinus should advise us to rise above sense, to rule our passions, and to adhere to God, that is all well and good! But will Plotinus give us the strength to follow this excellent advice? and what does it avail to know the good without power to put it into practice?

The natural order as conceived in religious thought depends for its existence and efficacy, during each and every moment³⁵ on the supernatural order,³⁶ "on an omnipotent conserving will."³⁷ From a Christian (Roman Catholic) viewpoint the supernatural order is God Himself as the unique

³³ Evola, op. cit., p. 122.

³⁴ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

³⁵ Cf. the Buddhist concept of jīva as a particular series of momentary cognitive states.

³⁶ See supra, pp. xc ff.

³⁷ Gilson, op. cit., p. 364.

Being-Creator.³⁸ Metaphysically speaking this Being for all time properly is separate and distinct from the creature for both partake of that duality inherent in the "pairs of opposites."³⁹ To carry out any "supernatural movement" within man, the creature being by definition incapable of initiating such a movement, God must induce him to accept it, continue its acceptance, and make it fruitful. This "means" is the "exciting, soliciting influence" of actual grace whose "end and radical principle [is the] informing influence of habitual grace."⁴⁰

Actual grace is defined as:

...an unmerited, supernatural, internal divine help, based on the merits of Jesus Christ, which renders man pleasing in the sight of God, enabling him to perform salutary acts; or, somewhat more succinctly, as a supernatural help bestowed for the performance of salutary acts, in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ.⁴¹

This grace, then, is distinguished from merely "natural graces" and the ordinary providence of God by being a "supernatural transient influence exercised by God on the soul" which springs from the atoning merits of Jesus Christ.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 432.

³⁹ Any religious dichotomy devoid of its metaphysical ground denies the essential oneness of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra by postulating and projecting an ideal saṃsāric heaven for all time separate from a saṃsāric earth and hell.

⁴⁰ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 722.

⁴¹ Joseph Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1917) p. 15.

Its purpose or end is for the performance of an act and not the realization of a state of consciousness, and the act or actions pertinent to its purpose must be "in the order of salvation," hence cannot be performed by mere natural strength.⁴² This aid is given in the moral field where it removes impediments to salvation, inspires a liking for virtue and a hatred for sin, and serves to heal the will which was incapacitated by sin. It also aids man in attaining the physical strength to perform salutary acts by raising the soul's faculties to the supernatural.⁴³

All salutary acts are for the purpose of the reception of habitual or sanctifying grace and are directed towards the supernatural end of man⁴⁴ either as a preparation for that end or for the purpose of "gaining merits for heaven....," and must be distinguished from those acts which "are good only in a natural way."⁴⁵ This, of course, implies that there are acts which are in no way connected with the supernatural end of religion. Bodhisattvic metaphysic, on the other hand, does not exclude the smallest act in samsāra

⁴² Ibid., pp. 15, 85.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

⁴⁴ It is to be observed that the Now of metaphysic is totally absent here. Instead, time and history are emphasized.

⁴⁵ Pohle, op. cit., p. 82.

from the ground of Thatness which is pure consciousness. The metaphysical pure consciousness is not supernatural in the sense of being above "nature" in a lineal and separative measure. It is more than saṃsāra only in an infinitely expansive sense, just as, for example, interstellar space is more than and superior to the space within a soap bubble,-- but doesn't exclude it or stand off from it.

Actual grace is called by varied names applicable to the particular function or purpose to which it is applied. As the power which inspires salutary thoughts it is called the illuminating grace of the intellect (gratia illuminationis s. illustrationis) and may be either mediate, that is, of the nature of ordinary external preparatory suggestions such as sermons, etc., or immediate, which is an elevation of the powers of the soul by the Holy Ghost, powers which have the obediential capacity to perform supernatural acts. Faith, for example, is based on this supernatural enlightenment of the mind of man.⁴⁶

Actual grace known as the Strengthening Grace of the Will (gratia inspirationis) gives the "desire to be able to do that which we know we ought to do," that is, one must have the power of will to do what knowledge prompts. This grace is mediate if it is produced by a preceding intellectual

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

illumination, and is called immediate if produced directly by the Holy Ghost, although, "because of the interaction of intellect and will every grace of the mind, whether mediate or immediate, is...also a mediate grace of the will..."⁴⁷

A third division of actual grace comprises those graces which inspire the will through the channels of the emotions or "spiritual passions." They are eleven in number: love and hatred, joy and sadness, desire and abhorrence, hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger.⁴⁸ All of these, with the exception of despair, may inspire and strengthen the will for the performance of salutary acts and are called, both scripturally and traditionally, graces. Love, not in this case that theological charity which is the "perfect love of God above all things for His own sake," is the basic affection of the will to which all the others may be reduced, therefore the production of acts of love is the fundamental function of grace as it effects the will.⁴⁹

Prevenient grace (gratia operans) is that actual grace which precedes human activity or the free determination of the will. It is grace in relation to time, inclining the

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 23-25.

⁴⁸ The "pairs of opposites" as grace. Cf. Grace of Saṁsāra, pp. 127, 130 f., 198, 207, 217, 225, 283, 324, 334-335, and Part VI, infra.

⁴⁹ Pohle, op. cit., p. 28.

will of man before it turns to God. This relative aspect is further emphasized inasmuch as within a series of supernatural graces each may be regarded from the point of view of either cause or effect, and therefore each may be prevenient or subsequent. St. Augustine said: "The will itself can in no wise be moved, unless it meets with something which delights or attracts the mind; but it is not in the power of man to bring this about." In relation to time grace is also called concomitant when it accompanies human activity, and consequent when it follows human activity so as to keep man in a desirable and linear relation within the prescribed salutary conduct.⁵⁰

Actual grace as prevenient is considered necessary for all stages on the way to salvation. It is needed for the very beginning of faith which stands at the boundary of "the supernatural domain of salutary action...and it is divided off from the natural [action] by a very sharp line." In this realm God must initiate all, and His grace proceeds, that is, it is prevenient.⁵¹

Actual graces, both prevenient and cooperative, are necessary even after the reception of faith for each and every salutary act which is requisite for justification.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 32-37.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 104-105. Quoting Oswald.

Justification itself and the state of sanctifying grace do not remove man from the necessity, moment by moment, to depend upon the aid of actual graces for the performance of salutary acts, although, perhaps, not in "the same measure."⁵²

Cooperating grace (gratia cooperans), in Christianity, is within the mode of activity and is said to occur when it accompanies, coincides, and cooperates with the free determination of the will and implies the consent of the will. Of this St. Gregory said, "The Divine Goodness first effects something in us without our cooperation [prevenient grace], and then, as the will freely consents, cooperates with us in preparing the good which we desire [gratia cooperans]."⁵³

Actual grace viewed as to effectiveness may be thought of as both efficacious and merely sufficient. This is not to be confused with prevenient and cooperating graces, for cooperation, while it may be efficacious, does not necessarily include the infallibility which guarantees the attainment of the goal, for the will of man may intervene. Efficacious grace (gratia efficax) is that which assures God's

⁵² Ibid., pp. 99-110. The religious tendency to approach extra-samsâric aid in a technological manner which attempts to analyse and carefully compute with slide-rule accuracy precise measurements of grace serves to indicate the purely samsâric nature of all such concepts. Mâyâ, or the samsâric determinate principle, is derived from mâ meaning "measure, mete out, ...infer..." (Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 223.)

⁵³ Ibid., p. 32. See also p. 37.

omnipotence and infinite wisdom by retaining unto Him the power to overcome all of the frustrations of man's free will. Therefore efficacious grace is that divine aid which "with infallible certainty includes the free salutary act," a certainty which variously is attributable either to the physical nature of the grace or to God's foreknowledge which, by definition, is infallible.⁵⁴

To all just men God is said to give grace sufficient to keep His commandments [laws]. This sufficient grace is not to be thought of as present at all times, but only apportioned [meted out] to man when he is called upon to obey the divine fiat, and every commandment of God carries with it by special ordinance the grace necessary for its observation. The claim to supernatural beatitude which is conferred by the justified state would not avail unless there were not also conferred a parallel claim to all graces necessary for justification.⁵⁵

Merely sufficient grace (gratia mere sufficiens) is that divine aid "whereby God communicates to the human will full power to perform a salutary act...but not the act itself..." The inefficacy of merely sufficient grace is to be attributed to that resistance which is implied as possible

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 167-174.

in the gift to man of a free will. The power of this grace is considered as always truly sufficient, that is, at all times it has the power to accomplish its aim,--but it may remain ineffective (gratia vere et mere sufficiens) through the frustration of the will--yet that ineffectiveness does not destroy its sufficiency. St. Augustine said, "[Adam] had received the ability...if he would (gratia sufficiens), but he had not the will to exercise that ability (gratia efficax); for if he had possessed the will, he would have perservered."

Merely sufficient grace also may be considered under two subdivisions: (A.) Proximately sufficient grace (gratia operationis) which gives unto the will full power for immediate action. (B.) Remotely sufficient grace (gratia orationis) which bestows only the grace of prayer having, however, the relay-like ability to "bring down full power to perform other salutary acts."⁵⁶

All attempts to bridge a religious gulf between the duality of that unique supernatural Being called God, the totally Other, and His creatures made from nothing seem, necessarily, to involve the creation of an infinite series of measured, carefully apportioned, and intricately, mathematically, and legislatively conceived aids which will give

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 41-47.

the creature some hope for the attainment of an idealized and projected beatitude greater than the limitations of life afford, and at the same time keep the unique Being, for time eternal, separate, inviolate, and uncontaminated by finiteness. Arrangements are further involved by the interpolation of a sole mediating agency or vicarage which, upon the authority of theological faith and the literal written word of unique Being is given power and sanction, both as an unseen spiritual organization and as a physical institution with jurisdiction religious, economic, social, and political, to provide the approved channels for the bestowal of those many graces necessary for that constant, moment to moment divine aid without which man is doomed to eternal damnation.

Metaphysic, as stated in the introductory chapter, having no ontological gap to bridge and no essential separation of the above and the below, cannot present as intricate an outline of extra-samsâric aid, nor is that aid, as an integral and ineffable supreme experience, capable of such a precise, analytical and logical exposition as is found in Western theology. The mere possibility of such an exact and complete exposition immediately would remove the experience from metaphysic proper and place it within the purely analogical sphere of religion, law, or logic. In addition the grace of religion by definition is exclusive and restricted to the formulated and speculative theological concepts of a

supernaturally based dualism, and from its point of view has nothing in common with the extra-samsâric aid in general and Buddhistic compassion in particular. Metaphysically speaking, however, religious grace forms a perfect analogical drama or shadow-play which, with multiform and separate symbols, illustrates that spiritual favor which is compassion in particular, finite imagery.

Buddhistic compassion and its allied terms are expressed by such words as anukampâ, kripâ, dayâ, karunâ,⁵⁷ and are variously translated. Any translation, however, which implies an essential separation between the subject, object, and the act of compassion is not true to the basic metaphysical ground from which the doctrine springs. Guénon,⁵⁸ therefore, does not advocate the sentimental fear-relief context inherent in the term pity and considers "cosmic charity" as a more appropriate comparison to the compassion of the Bodhisattva. One of the major principles of Mahâyânic doctrine is that equal compassion of the Bodhisattva (the awakened and integral consciousness which also, of its own free will, retains the awareness of personalization) for the entire separated aspect of Dharmadhâtu,--for that lack of knowledge or illumination which is termed samsâra. A bodhisattvic invocation,

⁵⁷ See Compassion, supra, pp. 27, 55.

⁵⁸ René Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), p. 198.

"...let not this world be dark" is pregnant with that compassionate "aid to the afflicted" which is the motivating power behind all Mahâyânic activity, literature, and teaching.⁵⁹

The two chief Bodhisattvas are Mañjuśrī, the personification of Wisdom (prajñā) and Avalokiteśvara who is that personified compassion (karuṇā) which as a universal principle is capable of nullifying karma⁶⁰ in non-dual awareness. This is but an analogical manner of stating that, after allowing the moral virtue or pāramitās to manifest into predominance, thus making for that undisturbed tranquility and freedom from turbidity which is a basic preparation for the experience of awakening, there is a primary experience of the "mind of enlightenment" (bodhicitta) which precedes the ten stages of the Bodhisattva. This bodhicitta consists of two non-separate aspects, the first being perfect knowledge or enlightenment (prajñā) concerning the nature of the void (śūnyatā), and the second that universal compassion for all which is karuṇā.⁶¹ One aspect without the other would be incomplete,⁶² just as saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are but the poles

⁵⁹ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

⁶⁰ Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1932), pp. 36, 48.

⁶¹ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶² The frigid intellect vs. adhesive sentimentality. Cf. modern humanism.

of a still transcendent Thatness.

It has been said that the motives for karuṇā are both egoistic and altruistic, and from the jīva view this may have some validity. The Bodhisattva, however, is conscious of the unity of samsāra and nirvāṇa and comprises both the knowledge (prajñā) of the void and that karuṇā which, through perfect equality (parātma-samatā), does not make essential distinction between the manifestation of consciousness and the ground of pure consciousness. From such an advaitic state both egotism and altruism expand through and beyond their distinctive and separate meanings and are synthesized or merged in perfect love or compassion which is said to be naturally innate in all sentient beings.⁶³

The importance of karuṇā in Mahāyāna Buddhism also is evidenced by its use as the basis for a hierarchial classification of Buddhists. This ranges from the Srāvakas (the hearers) who listen and try to understand the teachings but do not as yet evidence mahākaruṇā, through the Pratyeka-Buddhas who have right comprehension and gain merit toward individual salvation by a type of compassion yet do not have mahākaruṇā, to the highest state of Bodhisattva, purified from passions and perfectly illumined by the identity-knowledge of that ground which is the void and that compassion

⁶³ Dayal, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

which is mahākaruṇā.⁶⁴

Saṃsāra itself is not devoid of an immanent compassion which works through it. B. L. Suzuki⁶⁵ says:

...ontologically speaking, this universe, the Buddhists would say, is nothing but a grand display of upāyas [līlā] by the Dharmakāya that desires thereby to lead all sentient beings to the ultimate realization of Buddhahood..

This view of upāya closely is allied to that of Buddha-līlā (līlā) expressed by Coomaraswamy:⁶⁶

....the expression Buddha-līlā occurs in Jātaka, e.g. I.54 where it is said by the gods that 'It will be given to us to behold the Bodhisattva's (Gautama Buddha's) infinite Buddha-līlā and to hear his word.' The rendering of līlā here and in the PTS Dictionary by 'Grace' is far too weak; the grace of the Buddha's virtuosity (kuśalam) is certainly implied, but the direct reference is to his 'wonderful works'; the Buddha's līlā is, like Brahma's līlā, the manifestation of himself in act.

Upāya (skillful device or means) is, according to B. L. Suzuki,⁶⁷ used in contrast, or complement, to prajñā, so that they are often referred to as the father (upāya) and mother (prajñā) of the Bodhisattva. Upāya is of the many, the manifoldness (nānātva) while prajñā pertains to the universal equanimity, the sameness (saṃatva). Karuṇā is said to see

⁶⁴ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 9.

⁶⁵ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 60.

⁶⁶ Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, "Līlā," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXI, 990.

⁶⁷ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

and harmonically to experience (anukampā) misery and suffering incident to avidyā-separation which is not known by prajñā. To clarify and remove this darkness karuṇā makes use of upāya which is synonymous with that karuṇā⁶⁸ because it comes from karuṇā as an extension of compassion.

In the Tibetan Book of the Dead the one experiencing the Bardo-plane is told that the views of lights, events, and deities do not come from somewhere outside, but originate within the heart consciousness (Skt. chitta) and "exist from eternity within the faculties of thine own intellect."⁶⁹ Even the fears and terrifying apparitions are sprung from the same source and must be considered as one's "own tutelary deity, or as the compassionate one" (Chenraze), a further statement of the essential unity in the many whereby karmic trials and tribulations find their proper place in the integral process and are of the nature of that compassion which sees that conflict, whether it be positively or negatively resolved, has a certain teaching value for the unawakened jīva and provides a stage for the genesis of discrimination, for the establishment of the first preliminary

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 59. Here karuṇā is termed love and equated with upāya.

⁶⁹ W. Y. Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 121-122.

to awakening which is the necessary "false-dawn" of ego-consciousness.⁷⁰

Smith⁷¹ attempts to distinguish between karuṇā and agāpe by assigning to karuṇā the rôle of an active grief or pathos of compassion which overflows from a higher world into the realm of transmigration for the purpose of alleviating sorrow but which, nevertheless, is based upon "the mystic and undefined impersonal life of meditation." To agāpe he ascribes a wonder and reverence for the Supreme Object that serves to evoke an attitude of worship which, at the same time, engenders a sense of responsibility and curatorship for human personality which is made to the image of God and "flourishes in the conscious life of moral effort." It is evident that the above mentioned view does not take into consideration the stark realism of metaphysical reality and that essential unity of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra which provides the Bodhisattva with metaphysical meaning. The position taken by Smith portrays the usual exhibition of Western distrust, bordering upon a consuming fear, of all that does not arise from the speculative mind or the emotional insecurity of the ego-personality. Practically, and in final analysis, Smith draws a line between "Eastern meditation" as it is all

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 168.

⁷¹ Smith, op. cit., p. 124.

too often conceived in the West, and the new religion of active, emotional, and institutionalized humanism. Smith does give karunā and agape a common opposition to eros, the desire-love of the ego for heavenly things, and a meeting place in the "divine humility of the historical Christ."⁷²

A closer view of agape, however, shows that, relieved from its particular application to the personnel of the Christian drama it may be seen as compatible with karunā in many respects. Nygren⁷³ considers agape as a technical religious term applicable only to Christianity which has sole ownership rights to it. He also lists certain characteristics of agape⁷⁴ from a religious point of view, which define it as...

a self-giving...[which] comes down from above [as] God's way to man...a free gift...which is the work of Divine Love [which]...lives by God's grace, and therefore dares to 'lose it'...agape freely gives and spends for it rests on God's own richness and fullness. [It] is precisely God's own love, for love is agape...When it appears in man [it] is a love that takes its form from God's own love... It is spontaneous, 'uncaused,' and bestows itself on those who are not worthy of it. Agape loves, and creates value in its object.⁷⁵

⁷² Ibid., p. 124. The concept of eros may, with great reservation, be applied to the ideal of the pratyeka-buddha as well as to the arhat. There is, however, the difference that the final goal would be an extinction of that ego-desire which is the basis of eros. Eros would then be aspiring to do away with itself,--and that is not the heaven-fulfilling aspiration characteristic of its nature.

⁷³ Anders Nygren, Eros and Agape (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1938), I, 32, 83.

⁷⁴ Ibid., I, 165.

⁷⁵ Ibid., I, 54:--That is, man in himself has no value other than the fact that God loves him.

If there is a constant remembrance of the Bodhisattvic consciousness of the essential unity of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra (the "above" and the "below") in a higher synthesis of consciousness-Thatness, together with the equally essential lack of gap between Bodhisattva and man, each of the above statements may be transposed to metaphysical understanding and specifically applied to karuṇā, for they are the projection of metaphysical compassion and love on an analogical and religious level. If in the following statements about agape a substitution of Dharmakāya or Bodhisattva is made for that of the religious God, and due allowance is made for an advaitic instead of a dualistic-religious basis, the evident correlation between certain aspects of agape and karuṇā needs no further emphasis. Nygren⁷⁶ says of agape:

In His greatness and wonderful glory God is inaccessible to us men; but in His Love He has revealed Himself to us and Himself came down to us...Man cannot see God by his own powers...God cannot be known without God...We cannot ascend to Him in His sublimity, but He in His love has descended to us. What was impossible for men, God Himself has made possible by the miracle of the incarnation...In the incarnation God's agape manifests itself.

Smith⁷⁷ also points out that karuṇā is wider in scope than agape inasmuch as it "embraces all sentient life [while] agape focuses upon human life." Eastern metaphysic is not separate in nature and includes every degree of finite

⁷⁶ Nygren, op. cit., pp. 185-186.

⁷⁷ Smith, op. cit., p. 124.

variability within that transcendent Supreme which is the ground of all variability. In Christianity the religious lines which separate God, man, and nature for all time are rigorously respected and enforced. The Christian view, as expressed by Gilson,⁷⁸ is that sub-human life forms, being devoid of human knowledge, cannot meaningfully be related with ideas of happiness or unhappiness and remain at all times indifferent to their transient state which inevitably leads to corruption. This same indifference toward a fated end also applies to the entire sub-human universe inasmuch as the economy of things does not lose but is enriched and made beautiful by the harmony of that evolutionary struggle of bestial life-forms within which individual extinction is only a contributing factor. Man,⁷⁹ however, is made to the image of God, the creator who owns his creation with a specific right to govern as He pleases. In his image-relationship man acts as God's vicar and is given a share in the government of creation, representing God "as a Lieutenant represents his Sovereign"⁸⁰ in a type of quasi-divine sovereignty. Man has this importance because he alone of all creatures is free with

⁷⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 116.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 211.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 211.

a freedom rooted in his intellect and therefore is unique in being a possible subject of supernatural graces and virtues. As a "reasonable being endowed with will"⁸¹ man is not to be considered as an instrument of God but rather a "collaborator" with God. The rest of creation,⁸² however, is as an instrument in God's hands--and also in the hands of His collaborator. "The whole physical world is there only to serve as the habitation of spirits created by God in order to participate in His own divine life, and enter into a real society with Him."⁸³ Gilson,⁸⁴ a Christian writer, thus sums up the Christian man-nature relationship:

Things...are ordered to man as their end, not man to things, and that amounts to saying that the rest of the universe is directed towards its end by man and through man. Reasonable beings are there, in a sense, for their own sake, the rest are there for the sake of reasonable beings... the end of the union is beatitude, and since all reasonable beings can enjoy it, the rest are called to participate in it for their sake.

.....
The world is full of various beings, but among them man alone is immortal....in all species other than the human the individuals that represent it are destined to perish. They are born, live and die once and for all. We may say that Providence does not will these individuals for themselves, but for the species they perpetuate. It is altogether otherwise in the case of man. Here the very

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 382.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 164, 382.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 121.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 164-165.

individuals are immortal and indestructible, and so they do not exist simply for the sake of the species, but also for themselves, and God therefore wills and governs each of them for himself.⁸⁵

Merit. Buddhism, in common with all Eastern metaphysic, does not depend upon the power of an "outside" savior, for its adherents are admonished to be lamps unto themselves while diligently working out deliverance through their own efforts. Some writers have ascribed this view to "original Buddhism" and have interpreted the extra-samsāric aid and compassion of the Bodhisattva as a later modification, an "infiltration of the idea of a power from on high busying itself with mankind..."⁸⁶ and a "direct appeal...made by the devotee to the Dhyāni Buddhas and tutelary deities very

⁸⁵ In this instance the Buddhist readily would agree that agape and karuṇā are very far apart. The Christian, particularly the Roman Catholic, soul or ego is set off from all the rest of creation and oriented toward God by the faculty of intelligence, which is in practice confused with speculation and analytical reason. In its yearnings toward heavenly perfection this soul can have no feeling of sameness or brotherhood with nature. In its failure to gain its ultimate desire for perfection it can feel some assuagement of thwarted desire, however, by asserting a quasi-godlike lonely power over all sub-human creatures. This, in a manner, refutes charges that Western man is materialistic, for Christendom as such has never exhibited any love, compassion, or karuṇā for nature, as the pillage of nature's resources bears witness. The broader metaphysical basis of non-dual pure consciousness does not exclude the animal, vegetable, or even the mineral realms,--for they exist, as it were, not only in themselves, but within the total content of consciousness, and as undivided segments of the many in the one.

⁸⁶ Evola, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

much as to Jesus and saints and angels by Christians.*⁸⁷

If the doctrine of self-dependence is limited solely to that of moral merit or causation as upheld by Theravāda the above-mentioned views well may have some discussion-merit. Mayāyānic buddhism, however, saw that within the momentary flux of karmic avidyā constituting the ego as such there was a lack of power to generate that which would transcend its limitations. Instead of moral causality alone the Mahāyānic view embraces the integral ground of all flux including all "moral" action, the "transcendental power of Buddha [which works] freely over the ignorance of all beings.*⁸⁸ To Buddhists the idea of a "permanent, unchanging, eternal personal self, or ego, is erroneous. Reality implies supra-mundane consciousness undifferentiated...⁸⁹ For the changing, finite ego to make itself into the unchanging and infinite, in this view, is bordering upon absurdity. For a separate and higher power, deity, or Buddha to "busy itself with mankind" or serve as a separate object for intercessionary prayer or devotion apart from man and comparable to "Jesus and saints and angels" is also an exotic interpretation of Buddhistic

⁸⁷ Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 235.

⁸⁸ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., xxxvii (Introduction by D. T. Suzuki.)

⁸⁹ Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa, p. 38n.

and metaphysical principles.

In the text of the Tibetan Book of the Dead⁹⁰ the highest buddha-consciousness-reality, the Dharmakāya, is equated with the inner consciousness and untarnished intellect (comparable to the higher buddhi) of that which was known as man:

Now thou art experiencing the Radiance of the Clear Light of Pure Reality. Recognize it. O nobly-born, thy present intellect, in real nature void, not formed into anything as regards characteristics or colour, naturally void, as the very Reality, the All-Good.

Thine own intellect, which is now voidness, yet not to be regarded as of the voidness of nothingness, but as being the intellect itself, unobstructed, shining, thrilling, and blissful, is the very consciousness, the All-good Buddha.

Thine own consciousness, not formed into anything, in reality void, and the intellect, shining and blissful,--these two,--are inseparable. The union of them is the Dharmakāya, state of Perfect Enlightenment.

Thine own consciousness, shining, void, and inseparable from the Great Body of Radiance, hath no birth, nor death, and is the Immutable Light--Buddha Amitābha.

Knowing this is sufficient. Recognizing the voidness of thine own intellect to be Buddhahood, and looking upon it as being thine own consciousness, is to keep thyself in the state of the divine mind of the Buddha.

Furthermore the text⁹¹ states that the radiant light of the "Pure Truth...is the radiance of thine own true nature," that the "natural sound of Reality...is the natural sound of

⁹⁰ Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, pp. 95-96.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 104. Cf. Anugītā 27.54 (Müller, SBE, VIII, 342): "When one with a tranquil self perceives all entities in one's own heart, thus being self-illuminated, one attains to that which is subtler than (the most) subtle (thing), and than which there is nothing higher."

thine own real self," and that the projection of thought forms into the Bardo-state gives a semblance of color, shape, and other sensory interpretation to the transcendent plenum-void which is at once immanent. The "forty-two perfectly endowed deities"⁹² are also but personified projections of the Buddha-love which is inherent in the non-dual micro-macrocosm, and issues from yet abides in the heart (karuṇā) and intellect (prajñā). Thus the aiding effort of extra-saṁsāric powers, Buddhas, deities, or Bodhisattvas is not separate from one's own diligent effort, or the power of that ground of clear intellect which is inseparable from the pure consciousness (viññaptimātratā), the undifferentiated absolute (Dharmakāya), the basic Tathatā, or the void (Śūnyatā) which is beyond the determinism of categorical description.⁹³

The doctrine of 'transfer of merit' (pariṇāmana)⁹⁴ may be interpreted literally or spiritually. Literally it involves the relation of a superior being with a lesser. This, however, may be but a personification-drama of spiritual illumination given by That which is integrally awakened

⁹² Ibid., pp. 121-122. Metaphysic, contrary to religion, consciously recognizes its projections.

⁹³ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 146-148.

⁹⁴ "Transformation into, as a process of natural development," fr. nam + pari = "change, ... ripen ..., attain its full significance." Macdonnel, op. cit., pp. 136, 155. Rhide, op. cit., pp. 588, 662.

to its acknowledged, non-separate, and differentiated modes.

Smith⁹⁵ states that every act of the Bodhisattva produces merit,⁹⁶ a power [sakti] which can be transferred or radiated to others as rays of vivifying compassion for their benefit or welfare.⁹⁷ Hopkins⁹⁸ considers the doctrine of transfer of merit as at first heterodox in character, later assuming a place in the general belief which made it a precursor for the idea of release through Bodhisattvic mercy. This he views as destructive of the ethical character inherent in the method of salvation by one's own effort. Chu Ch'an, in his commentary in The Huang Po Doctrine of the Universal Mind⁹⁹ takes a somewhat literal and quantitative viewpoint of this doctrine as the handing on to others of a portion or the entire amount of merit accumulated by a Bodhisattva during past lives, a doctrine not emphasized in the Dhyāna or Zen sect because of its concomitant attachment to phenomena rather than acceptance of enlightenment. Huxley¹⁰⁰ sees no

⁹⁵ Smith, op. cit., p. 125.

⁹⁶ punya, merit, also purification. Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 164.

⁹⁷ See Rays of Grace, infra, pp. 158 ff.

⁹⁸ E. Washburn Hopkins, Ethics of India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), p. 144.

⁹⁹ Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰⁰ Huxley, op. cit., p. 232.

opposition between transfer of merit and the advaitic metaphysic. His interpretation is both literal and spiritual,--literal in terms of the "selfless and God-filled person... [acting as] a channel through which grace is able to pass into the unfortunate being who has made himself impervious to the divine," and spiritual in the sense that it is not the merit of the saintly individual but the spiritual power (śakti) which flows through a temperament and consciousness which is purified and cleansed.

A snowbound and freezing traveler at first may warm himself by sitting close to a fire until the circulation of his inner warmth approaches its normal functioning,--but the heat-power from the fire and the heat-power from within the traveler both arise from the same solar source. The Bodhi-sattva is, however, nearer to the ego than such an illustration,--for the lesser is but a mode of the all-inclusive. Evans-Wentz¹⁰¹ denies any Buddhistic doctrine of vicarious atonement similar to that of Christian Theology, but this does not prohibit a personalization of the illumination of the saṃsāric consciousness through the rays of compassion and love shed upon it by the integral pure consciousness. Milarepa in his songs has stated that it is impossible truly to serve others until all differentiation between subject

¹⁰¹ Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi, Milarepa, p. 11.

and object is lost, for the compassionate one, the Buddha, and the saṅgha are indistinguishable one from the other.¹⁰² It is the ground compassion-consciousness which operates within and as the many, as Milarepa also has sung, "May every sentient creature e'er encounter reciprocal goodwill and the nobleness of the Bodhisattvic mind."¹⁰³

In Christian theology there is a sharp distinction between merit (meritum, that which is earned,--therefore a reward) and the necessary gratuity of divine grace. Merit is based upon a concept of justice, and justice cannot be demanded of God, although He can make a gratuitous promise to reward certain meritorious actions or works. The free gift of Christian grace is a necessary condition to good works (super-natural or salutary) and must precede them as that in which they are rooted and from which they receive their efficacy. It therefore follows that initial grace is unmerited and consequently all subsequent graces are not merited by mere nature. This, then, does not permit unaided nature to perform any naturally good work as a claim for a supernatural grace. Natural, i.e. human, prayer is a natural work and in itself does not merit supernatural grace for prayer is not efficacious unless inspired by the Holy Ghost

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 273.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 267.

through prevenient grace. This is not to be conceived as a limitation of God but only testifies to the limitation of natural man who cannot, without grace, know of the supernatural order or of beatitude. Similarly, man cannot by any positive preparation or disposition move God to grant a supernatural grace although he can prepare himself in a negative manner, gain a negative capacity or disposition, for its reception by removing all obstacles to it.¹⁰⁴ This negative preparation in many respects is similar to the concept of prasāda as clarity and tranquility, and the metaphysical view of evil as a turbidity which makes for inefficiency and interferes with that "skill in action" which is yoga¹⁰⁵ or chittavrittinirodha. This latter end, being integral with the metaphysical ground of all action, is different from those more particular and differentiated moral actions which make man "pleasant in the sight of God." In addition a negative capacity as such has some affinity with the doctrine of prapatti or complete sacrifice and surrender. From the Church's point of view the Christian must not consider this passivity as a license to abandon the desire (cf. eros) for God or the effort to seek and serve Him, for these are said to indicate his love for God. For this love or worthiness

¹⁰⁴ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 131-147, 400.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.50; 12.16.

he must not claim any merit or reward from God,¹⁰⁶ for all is gratuitously bestowed by God.

Merit, however, may be involved in an increase of habitual or sanctifying grace (gratia secunda). The first grace of justification, though, can never be the result of merit. Heavenly glory or eternal life is said to be both a grace and a reward, and the increase of heavenly glory is to be considered as a meritorious reward.¹⁰⁷

Clarity. It has been observed previously that one of the meanings of prasāda was that of clarity fused with terms such as brightness, purity, tranquility, serenity, and calmness. Watts states¹⁰⁸ that terms for the infinite occurring within the different aspects of metaphysical tradition often refer to pure consciousness as well as that Void (śūnyatā) "which in Mahāyāna Buddhism denotes not so much mere emptiness as an absolute clarity and transparency" revealing an indescribable plenum within and as the Void.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Nygren, op. cit., I, lx. Also cf. the Gītā doctrine of nishkāmakarma.

¹⁰⁷ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 423-429.

¹⁰⁸ Watts, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁰⁹ Frederic Spiegelberg, Spiritual Practices of India (San Francisco: The Greenwood Press, 1951), p. xii, from introduction by Alan Watts.

Jennings¹¹⁰ quotes an example of the Pāli equivalent of prasāda as clarity, "...a bhikkhu by the subsidence of reasoning and investigation attains and dwells in the second contemplation (jhāna), an internal clarity (sampasādanam)..." Turbidity, the opposite of clarity, thus is brought about by inferential, speculative mentation which is in no way an equivalent to that spiritual wisdom which is certainty.¹¹¹ Jennings,¹¹² further, shows a connection between the Pāli pasāda, clearness, and that certainty which is "clear and serene faith" in the lines: "This...is not either for the edification (pasādaya) of the unedified or for the increase of the edified (pasannānam)," translated in SBE as "...for converting the unconvertible and for augmenting the number of the converted." Other Pāli quotations illustrative of the same usage are:

...and to the alienation of some believers (pasannānam).¹¹³
Then the Blessed One...spoke in praise...of the...contentment of the...believing (pāsādikassa)...¹¹⁴ ...the true

¹¹⁰ J. G. Jennings, editor, The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 622. Sutta Pitaka, Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta 26.174.

¹¹¹ See Evans-Wentz, Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 135n. Cf. Katha, 2.23.

¹¹² Jennings, op. cit., p. 606. Vinaya-Pitaka, Mahāvagga 1.xlix (6).

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 317. Vinaya-Pitaka, Culla-Vagga, Khandhaka 1. xxv (1).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 110-111. Vinaya-Pitaka, Mahāvagga 1.xxv (6).

disciple is thoroughly in possession of clear faith (pasādena) in the Buddha...¹¹⁵ For the present, good sir, put off this bathing of the outside...this bathing of the inner self, that is faith (pasādo) in the Blessed One, will be sufficient.¹¹⁶ They acquired an affection for, and faith (pasādam) in, the wandering philosophers ...¹¹⁷ Having perfect faith (avecca-ppasannānam)...¹¹⁸

St. Paul is said to have laid the foundation of the Christian doctrine of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ crucified, and the redemption of sinners by Christ's grace. This also was fundamental to the "new wisdom," for "to have faith in Jesus Christ is a fortiori to achieve wisdom."¹¹⁹

Theological faith, the root and prerequisite of all justification, is defined according to the Vatican Council as

a supernatural virtue whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which He has revealed are true, not because of the intrinsic truth of the thing, viewed by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself, who reveals them, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive...

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 599. Sutta pitaka, Saṃyutta Nikāya, Mahāvagga, Sotāpatti-saṃyutta (Saṃ iv), Sutta 1 (Rāji (5)), Pāli Text Soc. V, p. 343.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 203. Sutta-pitaka, saṃyutta-nikāya, Mahāvagga, Sotapatti-saṃyutta (Saṃ 55) Sutta 30 (6) (Licchavi). Pāli Text Soc., V, p. 389.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 89. Vineya-pitaka, Mahāvagga, Khandhaka II.i.(1).

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 164. Sutta-pitaka, Anguttara-Nikāya, Eka-nipāta, Vagga xiv (6).

¹¹⁹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 20-23.

Of the six articles of Roman Catholic faith the first two must be believed by all men (i.e. inclusive of the "heathen") in order that they be justified and saved. These are: (A) a supernatural belief in the existence of God and, (B) eternal retribution in the next world.¹²⁰ These very conditions taken literally and as they are understood in the West destroy any attempt to find anything in common between Roman Catholic faith and the experience of metaphysical faith or assurance. One metaphysically awakened could state, as it were, that through the clear light of spiritual wisdom the experience of realization brings an assurance of That which is the timeless, non-dual, supreme absolute. He also could affirm an experience of saṁsāric separation and karmic retribution which will continue "unto the end of time,"-- views hardly satisfactory to that theology which deals only in an analogy kept separate from its ground.

Protestant reformers did not agree that faith was "an intellectual assent to revealed truth" and therefore transferred the basis of justifying faith "from the intellect to the will" as a confidence and trust in the gracious mercy of God.¹²¹ As Luther said, "Faith and works are inseparably connected, but faith alone without works appropriates

¹²⁰ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 179, 183, 381.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 273-275.

atonement and therefore justifies, and yet faith does not remain alone."¹²² Good works, then, are concomitant with faith but are not necessary in themselves for justification, thus contradicting Catholic doctrine.¹²³

The early Protestant view of man as a "log, stick, or stone"¹²⁴ is reflected in such modern fundamentalists as Karl Barth whose concept of faith is that of a pure gratuitous grace of God which calls man to salvation and gives him the power to answer that call, a divine miracle which needs no rational justification whatsoever.¹²⁵ This position, as summed up by Rādhakṛishṇan, is that

revelation is the intrusion of divine power into the stream of history. The gulf between God and nature is wide. There are no pathways to God from the side of human nature. Man can only wait for the hour when God in His infinite mercy will claim him as His own. Man is completely alienated from divinity and cannot therefore take even the first steps toward a spiritual life.¹²⁶

Purity and brightness also are contained within the meaning of prasāda. They are by Jennings illustrated as such, and in addition are stressed as they become expressive

¹²² E. Washburn Hopkins, The History of Religions (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 587.

¹²³ Pohle, op. cit., p. 285.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 291.

¹²⁵ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 284, 303.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 285.

of gratefulness and favor. In a list of the names of the foremost disciples of Buddha who became bhikkhus, the twenty-sixth was called "All-pure (samanta-pāsādikānam)--Dobba malla-putta (brother of Sāriputta)."¹²⁷ A passage showing the reaction of an egocentric and selfish bhikkhu says, "...may rejoice and rejoicing may they act gratefully (pasannā; literally brightly) to me."¹²⁸ In the sense of favor there is the passage: "favoring the clan (of the founder) (kula-ppasādakānam)."¹²⁹

The calm serenity which is prasāda also is encountered in the Pāli texts. In a consideration of the seven parts of wisdom (here sam-bojjhanga) there is the following account: "...here a bhikkhu understands...the part of wisdom [called] serenity (passaddhi)..."¹³⁰; "...shall exercise calm (passaddhi), a part of wisdom..."¹³¹ This calmness also is illustrated as "rest in body and soul": "...he is tranquilized,"--"the tranquility is stated to be that reached in the

¹²⁷ Jennings, op. cit., p. 160. Sutta-piṭaka, Anguttara-nikāya, Eka-nipāta, Vagga xiv, (3).

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 113. Sutta-piṭaka, Saṃyutta-nikāya, Nidāna-vagga, Saṃyutta 5 (Kassapa-saṃyutta), Sutta 3.13. Pāli Text Soc., 11, p. 197.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 161. Sutta-piṭaka, Anguttara-nikāya, Eka-nipāta, Vagga xiv (4).

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 134. Sutta-piṭaka, Dīgha-nikāya, Sutta 22.16. From "Great Discourse on Fixing the Attention."

¹³¹ Ibid., pp. 389-390. Sutta-piṭaka, Dīgha-nikāya, Sutta 16.9 (5). "The Narrative of the Great Decease."

fourth jhāna (trance), serenity."¹³² "When the mind has come to rest (prasannam), then, and only then, does a man discover the path to immortality through yoga (dhyāna)."¹³³

This serenity of mind is said to be prerequisite to the experience of the Dharmakāya and its manifold activity, and meditation (dhyāna) is the preparatory means for the receipt of this tranquil state of mind¹³⁴ which is synonymous with the 'cheerfulness of disposition' and 'purification of the heart' that leads to the awakening of prajñā.¹³⁵ Prajñā, however, is not the same as the speculative intellect which is particularized, having measurable attributes, qualities, and limits. Prajñā is identity-knowledge or integral wisdom experienced at first hand.¹³⁶

The perfectly calm and tranquil universal mind is the attributeless, undifferentiated ground from which momentary modes or modifications arise, and which constitutes the multiplicity of things. Thus the all-pervasive mind is expressive of the two principles of enlightenment and non-enlighten-

¹³² Ibid., p. 326 & n.1. Anguttara-nikāya, Dasakaniyata, Sutta 20.3.vii. Pali Text Soc., V, p. 29.

¹³³ Maitreya, The Buddha Mīmāṃsā (London, Thacker and Co., 1925), p. 97., from Buddhacharita of Aśvaghosha 12.102.

¹³⁴ Soyen Shaku, op. cit., pp. 180-182.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 182.

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 180-181.

ment, the latter constituting saṃsāra and the former the purity and perfection of the all-pervading mind free from modifications or mentation which hides its inherent clarity for "when ignorance is annihilated the awakened mentality is tranquilized, but the essence of wisdom remains unmolested." Both enlightenment and non-enlightenment are terms which are relative to each other, but the relationship is resolvable in the supreme non-dual experience.¹³⁷ Mentation or inferential, speculative intellection, and sense perception, as modifications of the mind, are but transient, particular modes which only can becloud or hide the universal mind, the source of all. These modifications not only must be made "unmodified," that is, made tranquil, but the construct-mind, the false mental entity or ego which seemingly holds them together in duality must be abandoned or annihilated.¹³⁸ The universal mind is not and cannot be annihilated or "blown out," and nirvāṇa is but the "annihilation of the modifications of the mind and not the mind itself." This mind is the great nirvāṇic nature comprising the dharma, the Buddha-nature, Bodhisattvas, and "all wriggling things that have

¹³⁷ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 81-86.

¹³⁸ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 22, 26. Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 23.

life."¹³⁹ "A single thought and you separate yourself from reality,"¹⁴⁰ for this mind-reality transcends relationship of time and space and is from the finite view a void, somewhat fearful in aspect to the many who seek the goal through meditation.¹⁴¹ This view is well expressed by the Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind:¹⁴²

If students of the Way desire to become Buddhas, they need not study anything of the Dharma whatsoever. They should only study how to avoid seeking for or clinging to anything. If nothing is sought, the mind will remain in its 'unborn' state and, if nothing is clung to, the mind will not go through the process of destruction. That which is neither born nor destroyed is the Buddha. The eighty-four thousand methods for counteracting the eighty-four thousand forms of delusion are merely figures of speech for attracting people towards conversion. In fact none of them exist. Relinquishment (of everything) is the Dharma and he who understands this is a Buddha, but the renunciation of ALL delusions leaves no Dharma on which to lay hold.

From one point of view, that of the Dhyāna or Zen

¹³⁹ Surendranath Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. xiv. Cf. Saśī Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Also cf. chittavrittinirodha doctrine of yoga.

¹⁴⁰ Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 19, 37. Cf. p. 43: "In these days people only seek to stuff themselves with knowledge and deductions, placing great reliance upon written explanations and calling all this the practice (of the Dharma). They do not know that so much learning and deduction, on the contrary, become obstacles." Further, one is commended to emulate the sages who "abandoning learning, rest in spontaneity."

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 27. Cf. Gītā 18.66; Katha. 2.23; chittavrittinirodha.

sects, Bodhisattvic aid toward realization is resolved into the essential unity and sameness which is the ground of all modification. It is said¹⁴³ that the mind of the Bodhisattva, by relinquishing all thingness and duality, is like the void --which is the absolute. This mind is limitless and is the ground of the non-dual universal mind. Therefore, transmission of prajñā is a spiritual transmission from mind to mind--all mind being identical, and is accomplished in the fullness of silence. Inasmuch as nothing definite can be said of this absolute-ground, calling it mind or universal mind is but an inaccurate act of expediency. Therefore, the text follows its positive statements with the negative correction. "In fact, however, mind is not really mind, and the reception of the transmission not really reception," for

The nature of mind when understood
No human words can compass or disclose.
Enlightenment is naught to be obtained
And he that gains it does not say he knows.¹⁴⁴

The internal "transmission," the "immediate springing into being"¹⁴⁵ of the advaitic intuition of all-embracing differentiation which religion has formed into the analogy of theological grace¹⁴⁶ is a satoric experience in and of the

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁴⁵ Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 59.

¹⁴⁶ For the nature of this analogy see Watts, op. cit., pp. 31, 34-35, 59, 107.

eternal, non-dual Now, in "things as they are,"--beyond conceptual terms, but nevertheless not different from the commonplace present moment,¹⁴⁷ the original Buddha-nature "which is before you...in all its entirety and with nothing whatsoever lacking."¹⁴⁸

Rays of grace. It is a commonplace mystical idea, both in the East and West, that the physical sun is but an analogy of the true spiritual sun which not only is the transcendent absolute but the immanent, infinite and undivided microcosmic sun within the heart of man. It is to be expected, then, that "those influences from the eternal order into the temporal, which are called grace or inspiration"¹⁴⁹ may be likened to emergent rays or waves of pulsating energy or power.

In the writings of Tibetan buddhists there are many references to this imagery. The Tibetan Book of the Dead¹⁵⁰ speaks of "gift-waves of the wholly pure Reality" and "gift-waves of the one-pointed devotion of the mystic devotee"

¹⁴⁷ Smith, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

¹⁴⁸ Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 22. Cf. Edmund Husserl's "intuition of essences" (Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 123) in his concept of immediate aesthetic identity-intuition which is rooted in every-day sense perception but transcends it in essence via a purified transcendental consciousness.

¹⁴⁹ Huxley, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

¹⁵⁰ Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 208.

which indicates that reciprocal gift and sacrifice of love manifesting the essential unity between polarities. Sakhare,¹⁵¹ writing from the Līṅgāyata point of view, says:

The spark of divine love pervades all action and reaction and is the essence of all. It is the faint ray of the Supreme mercy of God that runs through all things in the universe...to unite together all things in the universe.

As further examples of Tibetan usage, certain "gift waves of grace" indicative of "good-will" may be directed by the incarnating consciousness-vortex toward the womb chosen for rebirth.¹⁵² In addition, the sincere and faithful devotees, even though inept and uncouth, must be revered for that psychic force or "gift waves of grace" which his sincerity evidences.¹⁵³ These "gift waves" also are indicative of a spiritual influence of love and happiness radiating from the saints and gurus of particular sects, much as the mind-to-mind

¹⁵¹ M. R. Sakhare, History and Philosophy of Līṅgāyata Religion (Belgaum, 1942), p. 638. This reciprocal movement also is illustrated by the gift, in dedication, of food as prasāda to the guru or ishtadevatā and its reciprocal return as prasāda. See supra, pp.19-20. In another mood this prema-līlā or reciprocity within the non-dual unity is touched upon in the charming lines from Naishadhacharita 7.43 (prasāda + kri, to grant, give favor), "If she were pleased to give the moon even a thousandth part of her smile, that deity would make the existence of the lunar rays crowned with success by worshipping it (with them) as with a circular waving of lights."

¹⁵² Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 191.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 134. Cf. Gitā. 9.23.

analogy is used by Zen.¹⁵⁴ Any view of grace-radiation in terms of space and time are highly inaccurate for the texts are never tired of repeating that spiritual, infinite influences are not from outside but originate timelessly within and of one's real nature, that "Truth-Reality" which, as but one example, is experienced as a radiance immediately after death.¹⁵⁵ The acceptance of this integral light is liberation, or as Marpa sang, "Grace enlightening ignorance."¹⁵⁶ Its fearful refusal is continued samsāric enwombing. Further, the total surrender to acceptance of the "Rays, or the inner Light," indicates an integral awakening to the pure consciousness or unnamable ground which, in aspect, is the Trikāya.¹⁵⁷ Saśī Dāsgupta,¹⁵⁸ speaks of the Sambhogakāya, quoting from the Pañchaviṃśatisāhasrikā, describes it as follows:

An exceedingly refulgent body, from every pore of which streamed forth countless brilliant rays of light...When this body stretched out its tongue, innumerable rays of light issued forth from it, and on each ray of light was found a lotus of thousand petals on which was seated a Tathāgata-vigraha...preaching...

Another interesting variant of the analogical "Ray of

¹⁵⁴ Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa, pp. xxvi, 19n, 96, 252.

¹⁵⁵ Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 104.

¹⁵⁶ Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa, p. 151.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 38n.

¹⁵⁸ Saśī Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 13.

Grace" is that of the "hook-rays of the light of grace," or "hook of the grace waves,"--inseparable from one's true nature, and therefore inescapable, which figuratively catches hold of and saves the devotee from falling into the illusion of ignorance or samsāric existence and puts him face to face with the path of liberation.¹⁵⁹

This image of the ray of compassion ending in a hook is similar in many respects to the Egyptian concept of the solar ray.¹⁶⁰ The Pyramid Texts likened these rays to the arms of the sun acting as an agent on earth: "The arm of the sunbeams is lifted with King Unis raising him to the skies."¹⁶¹ These text writers also conceived the rays as a radiant stairway or ladder bridging the gap between the above and the below: "King Unis ascends the ladder which his father Re (the Sun-God) made for him."¹⁶² Later, as a symbol of Aton in the religious revolution of Akhnaton (Amonhotep IV), the one God is depicted as a Golden Disk¹⁶³ from which emerge ray-beams, each terminating in a hand, and radiating

¹⁵⁹ Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa, p. 282. Cf. Tibetan Book of the Dead, pp. 106-107, 109, 110, 113-114, 115, 117, 118. P. 30 gives an alternate term, "Hook of... compassion."

¹⁶⁰ Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 109n.

¹⁶¹ James Henry Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 278.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 78-79.

¹⁶³ Cf. Isopanishad 15.

downward,¹⁶⁴ often shown holding an ankh¹⁶⁵ to the nostrils of the King. Breasted¹⁶⁶ says of this symbol: "It was a masterly symbol suggesting a power issuing from its celestial source, and putting its hand upon the world and the affairs of men." This light Akhnaton identified with love and beauty,¹⁶⁷ and in his great Hymn to Aton¹⁶⁸ he speaks of Aton's rays:¹⁶⁹

"Thou art in the sky, but thy rays are on earth";
 "Though thou art far away, thy rays are on earth." [This seems to be the view of a separate ego,--but elsewhere, p. 285, the King says, "yet thou art still in my heart."]; "Thy rays are in the midst of the great green sea"; "Thy rays are on thy beloved son"; "He who makes whole the eyes by his rays"; "It is the breath of life in the nostrils to behold thy rays"; "Thy child (the king), who came forth from thy rays"; "Thou didst't fashion him (the king) out of thine own rays"; "Whether he is in the sky or on earth, all eyes behold him without ceasing; he fills (every lane) with his rays, and makes all men to live."

¹⁶⁴ See Breasted, op. cit., Fig. 16, opp. p. 290.

¹⁶⁵ Cruz Ansata, symbolizing Life Eternal. Breasted, op. cit., p. 47.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 293.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 281-289.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 291.

The Aton symbol, which is a variant of the winged solar disk of Ra, whose daughter Maat, the goddess of righteousness, truth, justice,--in fact, dharma, was signified by a wing-feather, is highly reminiscent of the biblical "...sun of righteousness with healing in his wings."¹⁷⁰

The tāntric symbol of the "foot of Śiva" which also is synonymous with the power of wisdom-grace (Arul-Sakti)¹⁷¹ bears an interesting parallel to the Egyptian Hands of Grace or Love. The Sanskrit term kara ($\sqrt{\text{kri}}$) has as one of its meanings that of a "ray or beam... and the rays of the heavenly bodies are conceived as their hands and feet."¹⁷² Sanskrit pāda also indicates the "foot of a heavenly body, i.e. ray, beam..."¹⁷³

In Sanskrit, go is the root for cow, earth, speech; also, in the plural, it indicates "host of heaven, stars, rays."¹⁷⁴ Bhīde¹⁷⁵ in addition gives "Speech, words; the goddess of speech, Sarasvatī; a mother....,"--in all there is the concept of a beam of transfinite power (śakti) which is

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 15, 25, 145.

¹⁷¹ See Arul-Sakti, *infra*, Part VI.

¹⁷² Lanman, *op. cit.*, p. 139 (2 kara)

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 189 (4 pāda)

¹⁷⁴ Macdonnel, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁷⁵ Bhīde, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

related to the maternal or feminine imagery of Sakti.¹⁷⁶ From the point of view of Vedic imagery Srf Aurobindo¹⁷⁷ says:

...the word for cow, go, meant also light or a ray of light; this appears in the names of some of the Rishis, Gotama, most radiant, Gavishtira, steadfast in the light. The cows of the Veda were the Herds of the Sun... the rays of the Sun of Truth and Light and Knowledge...

As a guide for the discovery of these "ray-cows" the Rigveda speaks of Saramā, the bitch of the gods¹⁷⁸ called by Srf

¹⁷⁶ See Evans-Wentz, Tibetan Book of the Dead, pp. 115-116, 116n. Sgrol.ma (Dölma); Skt. Tārā, 'Saviouress,' the divine consort of Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara.

Tārā = star (strewer, radiator), pupil of eye (Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 108). Cf. "Tārāyana, sacred fig tree (tree of deliverance)" (Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 109). Lanman, op. cit., p. 163, considers Tārā as a form of transition to A-declension from tri (stri). stri (p. 278) in plural = "strewers, scattered ones, those spread out"; and in Whitney, op. cit., pp. 193-194, = strew. The same source (pp. 64-65) gives tri, tir, tur, --pass; turv, tūrv, a specialized form of tri, tur which is equally related to the derivatives, --overcome; and trā (p. 67) a secondary root of tri, rescue. This traces the connection between star and deliverance.

Tibetan sgrol.ba (dölba) has the meaning to rescue, deliver, save; to lead, transport, carry, to cross. Sgrol.ma (Dölma) is the goddess of deliverance, Tārā, in Tibet of a dual character (see the Two Mothers, *infra*, Part VI).

¹⁷⁷ Srf Aurobindo, Hymns to the Mystic Fire (Pondicherry: Srf Aurobindo Āsram, 1946), p. xix.

¹⁷⁸ A. B. Purāṇi, Srf Aurobindo's Sāvitrī, an Approach and a Study (Anand. Srf Aurobindo Karyalaya, 1952), p. 21: "When Saramā found the broken place of the hill, she made continuous the great and supreme goal. She, the fair-footed, led him to the front of the imperishable ones." (RV. III. 31.6).

Saramā -- stri, "the runner, messenger. (Lanman, op. cit., p. 268). "...who discovers the hiding place of the herds." (Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 340).

Aurobindo Intuition.¹⁷⁹ Further, in the Gritsamada Hymns¹⁸⁰

there is an account of rays hidden within a dense cavern:

(concerning Varuna)--He who is the supporter of the worlds, who knows the names of the Rays, mysterious, hidden in the cave--he is the seer-poet, he nourishes the poet-wisdoms as Heaven does the manifold forms.

The Sakti or female power-principle is closely connected with the rays, not only as they are hidden, but as they are brought into consciousness as rays of intuition (ketunā).

...it is by the ray of intuition, ketunā, that Saraswatī makes us conscious of the great waters...thus are the intuitions of knowledge as the rays of the Sun of Truth and Light.¹⁸¹

This intuition (ketunā) is not to be confused with the hunch of everyday speech, nor even is it encompassed by the creative intuition of genius (pratibhā). It is, rather, that inward yet unlimited experience (ārshajñāna) which opens to the fullness of the inner light or ray, and may not be distinguished from the ray of enlightenment itself.¹⁸² This ultimate divine power of Truth, or Sakti, can manifest only when all the

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Sri Aurobindo, op. cit., p. xviv: "...Saramā, the Intuition, hound of heaven who descends into the cavern of the subconscious and finds there the concealed illuminations." Cf. also p. 173.

¹⁸⁰ T. V. Kapāli Śāstry, Lights on the Veda (Madras: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1947), p. 69. (VIII.41.5 Yo dhartā bhuvanānām...apichyā veda nāmāni guhyā!)

¹⁸¹ Sri Aurobindo, op. cit., p. cciii. See RV. 6.7.5a (ketunā as light of intuition); 6.7.6a (ketunā as intuition).

¹⁸² Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 91n.

turbidity is cleared, when tranquility is found through the wholeness which is inherent in sacrifice or true surrender.¹⁸³

Chhândogyaopanishad¹⁸⁴ speaks of the interpenetration of the Bright Power or Solar Rays into the innumerably branched channels of the heart or inner center and the inter-relationship existing between the two. In the Hymns of the Vasishthas "the intuitions of the heart or direct perceptions are mentioned as the means by which one walks toward the Secret which spreads in thousand branches."¹⁸⁵

In advaitic terminology, the "gift rays of grace or compassion," "the hook of grace," has been described by Watts¹⁸⁶ as pertaining to the Mahat or Buddhi:

¹⁸³ See Sri Aurobindo, Sāvitrī (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Āśram Press, 1950-1951) I, 251-252 (Book II, Canto XI):

For still the human limits the divine:
Out of our thoughts we must leap up to sight,
Breathe her divine illimitable air,
Her simple vast supremacy confess,
Dare to surrender to her absolute.
Then the Unmanifest reflects his form
In the still mind as in a living glass;
The timeless Ray descends into our hearts
And we are rapt into eternity.
For Truth is wider, greater than her forms.
A thousand icons they have made of her
And find her in the idols they adore;
But she remains herself and infinite.

Cf. Ibid., II, 208 (Book IX, Canto I): "A force descended trailing endless lights, linking time's seconds to Infinity."

¹⁸⁴ Robt. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principle Upanishads (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1949) p. 267. Chhând. 8.6. See Supra, pp. 66 ff.

¹⁸⁵ Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., p. 66. VII.33.9.: ta inninyam hridayasya praketaih sahasravalsamabhisam charanti |

¹⁸⁶ Watts, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

...the field is Brahma, the infinite Reality, and the field in the act of containing nodes, or points of view, is the Self or âtma. Each node, or point of view, taken by the non-dual and undivided Self is the intellect or buddhi. To change our metaphor, the buddhi resembles a ray from the central sun of the Self. Within each ray or point of view, the Self projects the various objects of finite experience, and in doing so, identifies itself with them--or at least with those more proximate objects, the contents of the soul, which constitute the ego or jivâtma.

.....

But insofar as this consciousness [Self] is limited in range, in so far as it is a point of view having a restricted area of experience, it is the buddhi, the ray or viewpoint taken by the Self.

CHAPTER III

JODO

Jodo-shin-shu. The Jodo or Pure Land sects, particularly the Jodo-shin-shu (True Pure Land Sect) exhibit an outward resemblance to certain characteristics of protestant Christianity. Hopkins¹ states that Jodo was a "pietistic reform" founded by Genku (1133-1212 a. d.), with the Jodo-shin-shu emerging by a further extension of the reformation through Shinran (1173-1262). The major canon of Shinran's Shin sect is composed of but three sūtras from the Tripitakas, the Larger Sukhāvatī-vyūha, the Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra, and the Smaller Sukhāvatī-vyūha. These, together with the commentaries and treatises of the Seven Patriarchs (which include Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu) of the sect, and the eleven works of the founder comprise the canonical books of Shin-shu.² The modern sect is divided into ten sub-sects separated by historical rather than major theological reasons.³ It is headed by a "Chief Abbotship (Hosshu)...held by the blood

¹ Hopkins, History of Religions, p. 297.

² Nishu Utsuki, The Shin Sect (Kyoto: Hompa Honganji, 1937), pp. 3-6. Shin-shu assigns 1223 a.d. as the time of its foundation for in that year Shinran completed his major work, The Teaching, Practice, Faith and Attainment outlining the fundamental principles of the sect.

³ Ibid., p. ii.

descendants of the Founder, St. Shinran, and to it infallibility is actually attributed as in the case of the Popes."⁴

Amida-butsu. The essence of Shin-shu is Amida-butsu (Amitābha or Amitāyus Buddha), the Enlightened One of Infinite Light (prajñā) or Infinite Life (karuṇā).⁵ This immanent-transcendent Amida-butsu is not to be regarded as a religious deity inasmuch as he is not an "independent, objectively existent supernatural being [who] creates and rules the universe" nor is he the deification of the historical Buddha.⁶ He is considered as the Dharma or the ground of Sākyamuni's enlightenment.⁷ This Dharma cannot be spoken of for it is not to be contained in categories material or spiritual, being superior to all concepts. This Dharma which is Amida-butsu is, though, immanent throughout the universe of manifest things "even unto the hearts of all sentient beings." "It is for this reason that even plants and trees, lands and soil, without exception, are said to be able to attain Buddhahood."⁸ The non-dual Amida-butsu at base is thus of the metaphysical

⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

⁵ Ibid., p. 7. Smith, op. cit., p. 126. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 296.

⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

⁸ Ibid., p. 8.


rather than the religious order, a "Most Holy Trinosophia," as it were, comprising in general the Triḱāya and more specifically the Sambhogakāya. Shinran wrote:

The Ultimate Law-body [Dharmakāya] is formless, colorless and beyond our words and thoughts. From this Oneness comes the Accomodated Law-body [Sambhogakāya] manifesting itself in the form of Bodhisattva Dharmākara, who became enlightened in compensation of his forty-eight vows. As this Tathāgata appeared as the reward of the vows, he is also called the Rewarded-body (Sambhoga-kāya). This is Amida-butsu.⁹

The inseparable Dharmakāya and Sambhogakāya which is Amida-butsu are the fonts of Wisdom (prajñā) and mercy (karuṇā) respectively and in their perfection are manifest in action in the equally inseparable Nirmanakāya which is "an earthly miniature showing the attributes of invisible Amida-butsu."¹⁰ In Shin-shu, then, Amida-butsu becomes the metaphysical ground which is the Triḱāya, but in view of the predominance and importance here of karuṇā it is Amida-butsu as the Sambhogakāya which is the object of Shin-shu faith.¹¹ Thus the Bodhisattva mode of the Triḱāya in Shin-shu is That which is all-inclusive

⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 8-10. The interrelated unity of the Triḱāya is shown (p. 10) in the following manner:



Cf Maritain's "Three Forms of Wisdom," Figure 2, Introduction, note 279.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 10. See also B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

and which gives meaning to the transcendent and active aspects.

The Buddha-will was "worked out" in the Great Vow taken by Amida-butsu before ultimate enlightenment, as a candidate for Buddhahood, and came about as a result of his supreme compassion for all suffering beings. This major vow, the eighteenth in a series of forty-eight Bodhisattvic vows, reads:

Upon my attainment of Buddhahood, if sentient beings in the ten quarters, who have sincerity of heart, hold Faith, and wish to be born in my land, repeating my Name perhaps up to ten times, would not be born therein, then may I not obtain the Great Enlightenment. Only those are excepted who have committed the five sins, and who have abused the Right Law.¹²

This vow is the central core of Shin-shu teaching and its interpretation is the main work of the sect's theology. The essence of the vow is said to exist in the clause,

'Who have sincerity of heart, hold Faith, and wish to be born in my land' [reduced by Rennyo the eighth Chief Abbot to 'single hearted Faith,'] repeating my name perhaps up to ten times [interpreted by Shinran as expressive of pure thanksgiving with no particular emphasis upon the stated number of times 'namu-Amida-butsu' is repeated].¹³

The compassion of Amida-butsu, then, is that supreme will to bring enlightenment to all which is testified in the vow.¹⁴

¹² Utsuki, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹³ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

Faith and thanksgiving. The relationship of sentient beings to the vow, as mentioned above, is reducible to two elements of "single hearted Faith" and sincere Thanksgiving for the assurance of rebirth in the Pure Land of Amida-butsu. Shin-shu doctrine is posited upon this thankful faith in Amida-butsu alone;¹⁵ an emphasis upon surrender which holds that at the very moment of placing faith in Amida this faith will make samsāric life happy and, after death, insure rebirth in the Pure Land where alone it is possible to receive perfect enlightenment; a pouring out of thanksgiving for the great benefits assured by this faith,--and the power, after attaining Buddhahood, freely to return to this world to work out the supreme compassion-will.¹⁶

Shin-shu faith is not original with the Jodo sects inasmuch as it is a part of older Buddhist teachings incorporated in the three major canonical works. It is not a blind disregard for the samsāric world of suffering and death, for it holds, in common with some modern philosophic trends, that "no problem of life is correctly solved until its relations to death is seen clearly. Especially so when it concerns life as a whole...Life is observed most plainly when

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 7. Amida alone, not the historical or any other Buddha, Bodhisattva, or Principle, for they serve "more or less, in the great network of Amida-butsu."

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 1.

viewed standing on the threshold of death." The faith in Amida-butsu, however, gives meaning to the transitory, ever-changing recurrence of suffering.¹⁷ Faith in Amida-buddha or the Sambhogakāya is considered as the Buddha's Truth pervading the hearts of sentient beings, and it is in itself the Buddhahood, the Dharmakāya,¹⁸ and as such Amida-butsu is immanent as well as transcendent.¹⁹

It is impossible, then, to draw exact parallels between the Christian deity and the immanent, transcendent Amida-butsu, even though Hopkins, while granting the non-personal character of Amida, has stated that for the uninformed worshipper "Amida is practically saviour and God."²⁰

The non-separate nature of Amida-butsu, who is never wrathful, filled with hate for those who turn from him, nor jealous of "other" Bodhisattvas or Buddhas,²¹ is also important inasmuch as it conditions the Shin-shu "sin-concept" which, being of a metaphysical nature, is not comparable to

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 14-15. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 292.

¹⁸ Utsuki, op. cit., pp. 8, 15.

¹⁹ Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 297-298.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 298. This statement attempts to equate the uninformed Amida-concept with a modified, "practically," saviour-God, a quasi-god which, like quasi-Unique Being, can have no logical meaning as divinity. Such a meaning is necessary to the Religious view.

²¹ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 49.

that of the Christian. Buddhist "sin" is, rather, a state of ignorance although at times Shin-shu uses "doubt" as a synonym for ignorance.²²

Corresponding to the different types of karmas Shin-shu has nine general graduated states culminating in the tenth which is Buddhahood. From the lowest state of disintegration and misery through the three dual-worlds of illusion and the world of enlightenment there is "no unsurpassable demarcation between them....," even unto the Buddha-state.

In the present Sect [Shin-shu], where no self-merit is admitted for the attainment of Buddhahood and only the Buddha's Great Compassion that turns merit toward us is believed to be the cause, the nine existences except Buddha are considered to be on the same standing for the Buddhaship.²³

In view, probably, of Shin-shu's faith or surrender emphasis and its attendant assurance of a future state of active consciousness with Amida in the Happy Land, the non-celibacy of the clergy, and the reliance upon the merits of

²² Utsuki, op. cit., p. 18. Shinran says, in one of his hymns, "We go around the worlds, the circle of existences; 'Tis in the main because of bondage of the doubtful mind." Faith, here the absence of doubt, is, then, the present assurance, Now, of eternal vocation. In the case of Shin-shu this assurance is not, nor is it claimed to be, of the nature of complete enlightenment, therefore it still contains much of metaphysical analogy. Such analogy is at all times proper as long as there is recognition of and a "perfuming" by the fundamental, advaitic metaphysical ground. It is only when the analogy tries to stand alone that it takes on a purely religious character.

²³ Ibid., p. 19.

that which he calls "another."²⁴ Hopkins²⁵ ignores the underlying metaphysical ground and bluntly states that "The Shin-shu...is really a Protestant theistic church." He does, however, deny any Christian influence, such as the Nestorians in China (C. 635 a.d.), as "intrinsically improbable" inasmuch as the Shin-shu texts are older than Chinese Buddhism²⁶ Smith²⁷ detects some evidence which inclines him to a belief in a Persian origin imported into India, and traces Avesta authority for the gift of paradise to the faithful (Yasht 22.2) and a Sphere of Endless Light (Yasht. 24.61).

Thanksgiving is coincident with faith, and they both form a type of ego-surrender or prapatti. The formula, Namo Amida-butsu (namo'mitābhayabuddhaya) indicates an obeisance to Amida which implies faith-surrender. Before Shinran other Jodo sects tended to repeat the formula as an act provocative of merit, which was meaningless, according to Shinran, without a fundamental faith which instead of being an expectation of reward is an expression of thanksgiving for an accomplished

²⁴ Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 296-298; Smith, op. cit., p. 174; B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. xxxviii (introduction by D. T. Suzuki); Junjōro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1949), p. 175.

²⁵ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 297.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 298.

²⁷ Smith, op. cit., p. 126.

fact.²⁸ This ideal faith implies that all dharms have been abandoned as unnecessary and sole refuge taken in the indwelling Thatness of effulgent compassion, for within the tranquil, clear peace experienced at the moment of ego-surrender there is the annihilation of grief and evil, an initial opening and reciprocal "thanksgiving" (Cf. lflā-prem) unto the non-dual many in one.²⁹ Shinran defined Namo-Amida-butsu as signifying "Trust in me, Amida-butsu, for I will surely save you."³⁰ A life of experienced thanksgiving,--not in name but in fact, is said to be a dynamic and reciprocal power with its source in the all-pervading Buddha nature and which, radiated by faith into boundless life and wisdom is reflected back as grace.³¹

The ground of metaphysic. There are many who draw a sharp line between a doctrine of emancipation through enlightenment and that of so-called "Salvation by Faith."³² Such a

²⁸ See Watts, op. cit., pp. 52-53. This basic position of faith is encountered in most religious practice. It is important, however, that a distinction be made between blind faith in the unprovable and that faith which is concomitant with metaphysic experience or tradition.

²⁹ Cf. Gītā. 18.66; 9. 28. See also Takakusu, loc. cit.

³⁰ Utsuki, op. cit., p. 13.

³¹ Yoshiko Ohtani, "A Message to Young Buddhists," Mahadharma, no. 2, 6-7. Cf. mantra-śakti. See supra pp. 158-159n.

³² B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 65-66. Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 292-296.

distinction is valid if the two are at base of different orders, the one metaphysical and the other religious. If, though, the fundamental ground of both is metaphysical the distinction can be applicable only to the mode of approach, one through prajñā and the other with an emphasis upon karuṇā. It is to be understood, however, that the more emotional approach carries with it the dangers of sentimental and religious overlay and all too often over-decorates the purity of metaphysic with religious analogy,--but the important thing is that the metaphysical basis is there and recognized as such, conditioning every aspect of the doctrine. Thus it is that the metaphysical "grace" of Amida-butsu differs from religious grace. Its source, Amida-butsu is not a religious God, the "recipient" is not the separate creature, the ego-reality of religion,³³ and the purpose is integral rather than ultra-relational,--for the ultimate purpose and reason for being of the Pure Land is the perfect identity-enlightenment of metaphysic. In Indian "theism" both the "Cat" and "Monkey" doctrines³⁴ of total surrender versus a type of synergism, despite their peripheral and

³³ Cf. Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, p. 96: "Thine own consciousness, shining, void, and inseparable from the Great Body of Radiance, hath no birth, nor death, and is the Immutable Light--Buddha Amitābha."

³⁴ See infra., pp. 298 ff.

conceptual friction, have a similar basis in the non-exclusive metaphysical ground. There can be, then, no fundamental metaphysical difference between the "Self Power" of Jiriki thought and the "Other Power" of the Jodo, Shin-shu, Ji and Yudzunembutsu sects comprising Tariki.³⁵ regardless of variants from, yet still within, the purity of metaphysical doctrine.

Smith, as but one example, views the "saving power" of Amida-butsu from the separatist view of religion, thus creating an everlasting gap between the Buddha and man, nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, and reading into the concept of Transfer of Merit a nature which is religiously vicarious. He says:³⁶

...the supplicant can only receive grace from a Buddha whose asceticism had already gained the requisite merit to secure the salvation of his devotee. But grace is not the power to live a good life; it is the free gift of heaven not as the climax of one's own purity but by virtue of the Buddha's purity.

The Shin-shu doctrine of transfer of merit is but a restatement of the Bodhisattva doctrine amplified and given universal meaning through Amida-butsu. Basically it states that "a man [ego] who has no power to lead himself is given the merit by the compassion of Amida-butsu...if he follows the way

³⁵ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 65-66. No Buddhist sect can claim an exclusive and unique authority which can brand other sects as heretical and non-Buddhist. A high record of tolerance between the sects recognizes the unity of many views within the one Body of Buddhism, although the hierarchical value of such views tends to differ with each sect.

³⁶ Smith, op. cit., p. 175.

indicated by the Buddha.* The ego has no saving merit in its ignorance and only can be realized by Wisdom through the "body of Mercy," which is the ground and source of all, for all of manifestation has immanent Buddhahood.³⁷ In a somewhat similar manner Atman which is Brahman wills its perfection (merit) in an integral realization of the jiva who has surrendered to it (faith and prapatti).

The Shin-shu ideal of rebirth in the Pure Land is distinctive inasmuch as rebirth in Eastern schools of thought is usually viewed as having, at most, only negative value. Rebirth here, however, is not back into this samsāric world but into a special "field for enlightenment," the Pure, or Happy Land (Sukhavatī).³⁸ Enlightenment, according to Shin-shu (and closely approximating certain bhakti sects), is not possible in this world but is realizable only in the field for enlightenment, the Pure Land. This realm is not the ultimate goal, that is, it is not the integral Nirvānic goal of Supreme Buddhahood which is inherent in even the "lowest" of manifest things. The Pure Land is the "Garden of Nirvāṇa" wherein the element of compassion is predominant.³⁹ Such a concept, even when originally based upon a metaphysical ground, carries

³⁷ Utsuki, op. cit., pp. 8, 16-17.

³⁸ B. L. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 51.

³⁹ Utsuki, op. cit., p. 2. Smith, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

within it an emotional content which easily may bring in elements of sentiment capable of congealing into separate religious values. It is only when the Pure Land becomes an end in itself and ruled by an Amida separated by ego-projection from that immanent plenum which is the transcendent void that Shin-shu will have forgotten its basis of traditional Eastern metaphysic.

PART IV

FAVOR AND THEISM

Just as in Buddhism there was a certain resemblance to Christian forms in the Jodo sects, so in Hinduism a parallel similitude is encountered in the so-called "theistic" sects bound by the common approach and attitude which is bhakti. Edwin Bevan, in a book review on "Christianity and the Indian Religion of Grace" by Rudolph Otto,¹ says, "If we are going to establish a difference between Christianity and Indian religion, as such, we must take Indian religion where it is most like Christianity." That area he establishes in the teachings and school (Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda) of Rāmānuja and its apparent resemblances to Christianity through an exclusive devotion to a personal God, a desire for the attainment of a life of loving communion with the Lord made possible, not by the works of man alone, but through the free grace of the Beloved.

Attempts to postulate a Christian origin for the elements of "grace" and bhakti in Indian theism,--particularly from a Nestorian source, is negated by Otto² from the

¹ Edwyn Bevan, "Christianity and the Indian Religion of Grace," Book Review, International Review of Missions, 19:448, July, 1930.

² Rudolph Otto, "The Indian Doctrine of Grace and the Christian," International Review of Missions, 19:333-338, July, 1930.

standpoint both of Nestorian doctrine and its ineffectualness in Southern India, and the fact that the Bhagavadgītā antedates the Christian era. He attributes the similarities, not to borrowing, but to "convergence of form," despite which there remains a distinct difference between the two concepts of grace and devotion. This judgment also is held by Edgerton³ as well as Hopkins,⁴ who adds that "the prasāda doctrine (of special grace) belongs to a much earlier literature [than the Epic]...."

CHAPTER I

METAPHYSIC AND THE SUPREME REALITY OF HINDU THEISM

Is Hindu theism a metaphysic? Guénon,⁵ relative to the relationship between metaphysic and religion, has said that "the division in question does not concern so much things in themselves as the points of view from which they are considered...." Improperly translated into the imagery of reason, feeling or sensation metaphysic assumes the form

³ Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavadgītā, Translation and Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), II, 71n.

⁴ Edward Washburn Hopkins, The Religions of India (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895), p. 429.

⁵ René Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines (London: Luzac & Co., 1945), p. 111.

of pantheism or monism. Religious theism, however, is the proper analogy of metaphysic, an analogy which is all too prone to become hardened and fixed by an attempt to identify the cognitive and emotional functions with the Self or Atman to the exclusion of the latter.⁶

From a Western view⁷ all theistic religions have four points in common: (a) man's complete dependence upon "a power exterior and superior to human nature," (b) this power is recognized as a person, (c) human existence is inseparably connected with a generic notion of grace, and (d) all of man's well being is dependent upon the "beneficent will of a personal and supra-mundane power." Variations within this frame, though, may result from differing points of view concerning the nature of the personal god, of man, and of the relations between these two. Northrop⁸ states that religious theism identifies the divine with an "immaterial, non-transitory factor in the nature of things which is determinate in character," and the nature of the god of theism can be stated positively and determinately in terms of specific attributes. From this standpoint Northrop further

⁶ Alan W. Watts, The Supreme Identity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950), p. 73.

⁷ Philip J. Donnelly, "Grace," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952, X, 585.

⁸ P. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1950), p. 401.

states that no Eastern metaphysic in its purity is theistic, for metaphysically the divine is indeterminate. While the determinate factor which is religious theism tends to exclude the metaphysically indeterminate, the latter as an undifferentiated fact experience does not exclude differentiations, or "fact-sections," within it. Thus it is possible to speak of a religious theism which has separated itself, drawn apart as it were, from the metaphysical ground, and a theism of another kind which still recognizes the Fact of the fundamental undifferentiated metaphysical experience and of its relationship as a differentiated yet undivided section within that Fact. Western theism tends to fall within the first type while Eastern theistic movements tend to establish themselves within the common metaphysical field basic to the Eastern tradition.⁹

Rādhakrishnan¹⁰ speaks of a theistic "current" in Indian thought that looks upon the divine "not only as immanent but as transcendent," wherein both the logically distinguished supra-personal and the personal aspects are

⁹ See John Woodroffe, Sakti and Śākta (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1929), pp. 28-29.

¹⁰ S. Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 291-292.

inseparable in fact. Guénon¹¹ also recognizes that the supreme metaphysical principle may be termed both supra-personal and personal in accordance with the particular point of view. Whether supra-personal in Itself or personal but not anthropomorphic in relation to universal manifestation, there remains the essential and fundamental pure metaphysic which is basic to those transient and multitudinous modifications arising within it. In applying this specifically Guénon¹² says:

...whatever the way each man may choose as being most in conformity with his own nature the final end to which it leads, provided it be strictly orthodox, is always the same: the end in every case is effective realization of a metaphysical order, which shall be more or less direct, and more or less complete, according to the circumstances in which it is undertaken and the extent of the intellectual possibilities of each human being.

Speaking from the point of view of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Śrīnivāsāchāri concurs in holding to the Fact of Eastern metaphysic and rejecting that theism which is synonymous with the Western tendency to separativeness and exclusiveness. He says:¹³

¹¹ Guénon, op. cit., pp. 224-225. Cf. S. Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949) p. 31: "When we emphasize the nature of reality in itself we get the absolute. But when we emphasize its relation to us we get the personal Bhagavān."

¹² Guénon, op. cit., p. 225.

¹³ P. N. Śrīnivāsāchāri, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943), pp. 78-79.

Viśiṣṭādvaita is not strictly theistic, as theism does not favor the idea of apṛithaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa (of the five being an inseparable attribute of God), viśiṣṭai-kyam [unity in the form of an organic whole involving several attributes], and sarīra-sarīrin...

Early evidences of the experience of bhakti¹⁴ are found as expressed in the Rigveda, in the devotional context of the Upanishads, and in the Bhāgavata cult, all tending to culminate in the integral devotion of the Gītā.¹⁵

Love for the devas and their reciprocal fondness for the worshipper is found as early as the time of the Rigveda.¹⁶ This love of the gods for man did not take its origin from a far and separate distance, but was born of an intimate intra-family relationship between the gods and the worshipper.¹⁷ The god is the "comforter"¹⁸ as well as the one who, like

¹⁴ bhaj, to share, serve, therefore service of the Lord, loving devotion to a personal divinity in a relationship of love and trust. See S. Rādhakṛiṣṇan, The Bhagavadgītā (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 58-60.

¹⁵ Loc. cit..

¹⁶ M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1951), p. 13. E. W. Hopkins, Ethics of India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924) pp. 7-8; Hopkins quotes RV. 4.25.1.-"What lover of the god is now enjoying his friendship." He also mentions that the "higher gods extended their wings like birds" to cover the worshipper. Cf. Rays of Grace, supra pp. 158 ff.

¹⁷ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 8. See R.V. 10.64.2 ; 1.84.19 ; 8.66.13; 8.80.1 ; 4.18.13.

the later Buddhist Avalokiteśvara, "looks down with pity"¹⁹ and is not only a friend, but like a father and mother.²⁰ There also are evidences of a devotional development of "bridal mysticism," found both in the East and the West, in Rigveda 10.43.1 where the worshipper's thoughts are said to embrace Indra "as wives embrace a fair young bridegroom."²¹ Rādhakṛishṇan²² finds a Vedic basis for Vaishnavism and the Bhāgavata's bhakti emphasis in the worship of Varuna as a personal deity and in the vedic description of Vishnu as "great in body" or "having the world for his body" (briha-tśarīrah), and "he who comes in response to the invitation of the devotee" (pratyetyāhavam).

Edgerton's analysis²³ posits a popular form of theistic religion leaving no written records and existing side by side with that which he, in true Western fashion, calls the "abstract speculation" recorded in the Śrutis, a cult worshipping

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 11. See R. V. 4.17.17; 10.112.10; 5.3.9. Cf. Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1932), p. 31: "The idea of bhakti arose and flourished among Buddhists."

²⁰ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 11. See R.V. 4.17.17; 7.23.50.

²¹ Ibid., p. 8.

²² S. Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), I, 78, 108, 81.

²³ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 71.

"various local gods and heroes." The critico-historical method, a purely Western technique, has constructed the development of Vishnu into the supreme deity during the Brāhmaṇa period, and later conceived as Vishnu-Nārāyaṇa whose cult blended with that of the non-vedic Bhagavān. Vaishnavism, according to this view, came into being through a brāhmanization of this fusion and the synthesizing efforts of Rāmānuja to identify the Brahman of the Upanishads with the ideas of Vishnu-Nārāyaṇa, Bhagavān, and Krishṇa through a blending of Advaita, Pāñcharātra syncretism, the theism of the Gītā, and the devotional fervor of the Ālvārs.²⁴

The tracing of such contrapuntal forms as they intertwine along a particular historical time-track may be of inestimable value for the purpose of speculative analysis and therefore, in this case, is a particular study in itself. This obsession for nāmarūpa, however necessary for the proper functioning of the fractional-distillation method of critical analysis, is of metaphysical import only as a minor manifestation of differentia occurring among infinite differential possibilities within the undifferentiated absolute. One item

²⁴ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. xxxiv. This view is not held by Srīnivāsāchāri,--it is presented only as an example of the critico-historical method. For Gītā theism and its relation to the cult of Bhāgavata see Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 67; Edgerton, op. cit., II, 71; Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Srī Bhagavadgītā--Rahasya (Poona: Tilak Bros., 1935), II, 733, 766-770, 778-779.

of metaphysical interest, however, is the analogical personification of Nara-Nārāyaṇa projected upon the dynamic figures of Arjuna-Krishṇa as the advaitic identity of jīva-ātman. Just as the basic identity of samsāra-nirvāṇa is fundamental to the bodhisattva doctrine so "Śrī Kṛishṇa is the divine sage Nārāyaṇa Himself and Arjuna has been declared as Nara (the twice-born brother of Nārāyaṇa). Nārāyaṇa and Nara are one life manifested in two forms."²⁵ Further, this Nārāyaṇa as Krishṇa has been identified with "Antaryāmin, the divine Being in whom all embodied souls have their being,"²⁶ the "godhead secret in man" and the "Divine Consciousness always present in the human being."²⁷ It is not the human mind, intellect, or personal will, but the Liberator within,²⁸ the Self which does not exclude but includes the ego as a "Dual Soul,"²⁹ "Vāsudeva who abides in all beings as their Self."³⁰

²⁵ Jayadayal Goyandka, Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, XIV, 229n, Aug., 1948. "Quoting from the Mahābhārata (Udyoga-Parva 49.20) esha nārāyaṇaḥ kṛishṇaḥ phālgunaścha naraḥ smṛitaḥ | nārāyaṇo naraśchaiva sattvamekaṁ dvidhākṛitaṁ ||

²⁶ A. Mahādeva Sāstrī, translator, Bhagavadgītā with Commentary of Śrī Sankarācharya (Madras: V.R. Sāstruhi & Sons, 1947), Translators Introduction (A. Mahādeva Sāstrī), p.1.

²⁷ Anilbaran Roy, editor, The Message of the Gītā as Interpreted by Śrī Aurobindo (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1946), pp. 286-287.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 42n, 66n.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 5n. Kṛishṇa Prem (The Yoga of the Bhagavadgītā (New York: Harper & Bros, 1949), p. xxii.

³⁰ Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 163. In the viewpoint

This Self also is to be thought of as a "gracious mediating form...in man,...a humanized symbol of the God-head,"³¹ an integral "bridge to immortality."³² The essential identity of Nara-Nārāyaṇa, of Kṛishṇa and Arjuna³³ also has been pictured as Indra and Kutsa, as well as the two birds of the Upanishad seated on one tree.³⁴

The relationship of the divine in Indian Theism. The immanent-transcendent fact which is portrayed by Arjuna-Kṛishṇa in the jīva-ātman relationship can find no place in a religion of transcendence which attempts to encompass and dictate to the entire universe through the exclusive authority of its "Isolated supernatural revelation" given by an ultimate divinity "essentially distinct and separate from the world."³⁵

of Nimbārka (pp. 545-546) "Reality is the unity in trinity consisting of the jīva or bhoktā, the subject of experience, the bhogyā or object of experience, and Īśvara, the inner Ruler of both...[The jīva] is different from the Brahman and is also identical with it. Brahman exists in and as the jīva but is not tainted by its imperfections. The absolute exists in and as the particular."

³¹ Roy, op. cit., p. 178n.

³² Mundakopanishad, 2.2.5.

³³ Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. xxi, cites from the Srīmad Bhāgavatā an occasion where Purushottama addresses Arjuna as "a second Kṛishṇa" (ityādishtau bhagavatā tau kṛishṇau parameshthina).

³⁴ Ibid., p. xxii. Roy, op. cit., p. 5n. Mundakopanishad, 3.1.1-3.

³⁵ S. Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951), p. 119.

Inasmuch as the metaphysical undifferentiated may embrace all differentiations within it there is no basis for a fundamental contradiction between these two aspects as applied to the Supreme. A real human need finds its fulfilment in the highest human concept, that of a personal god, and the difference between the Supreme as absolute and all-embracing Spirit "and the Supreme as person is one of standpoint and not of essence." The Supreme Reality cannot be packaged neatly under the label of any philosophic or religious view for it transcends "all conceptions of personality and impersonality."³⁶

The manifestations of the infinite, non-dual Supreme in the emergent lflâ of hiding and finding seemingly are expressed, in the present rules of this particular play, within the finite limitations and the duality of opposites. The entire movement of the lflâ is an expression of love, of the freely-willed "segmentation" of the divine followed by a "drawing close" in the delight of that harmony which is union.³⁷ This lflâ-prem, while manifesting the dynamic dual polarity necessary for the love experience, does not demand the separate

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 107-108.

³⁷ See Watts, op. cit., pp. 114-116. It must be remembered, of course, that all such movement is within the all-embracing field of metaphysics, and is not to be confused with the rigid duality inherent in the monism of religion.

and exclusive personality found even in the religious concept of Christ who, as inseparable with God in the Trinity, must of necessity remain essentially aloof from any semblance of identity with man.³⁸ Eastern theism existing within the metaphysical tradition does exhibit the logical extremes comprising the polarities of the Bhagavān and the devotee, but the actual metaphysical experience serves to reconcile these two seeming extremes in a non-dual, many-in-one metaphysical unity, a "holy trinity" embracing all of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the Supreme Spirit. Thus the reality of finite selves and all of manifestation is dependent upon their non-separateness within that infinite which, while including unlimited possibilities and qualities, is immanent yet beyond all things and is as well the inner guide (antaryāmin), the Self of the devotee.³⁹ To the two puruṣas, the Nara-Nārāyaṇa, the two

³⁸ Rādhakamal Mukerjee, "The Stages of Religious Mysticism," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I, 206, Jan., 1934.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 206-207. See also Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 390; Srinivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 592; John Woodroffe, The World as Power Reality (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1921), p. 44. Mukerjee (p. 207) states that the "school of Nimbārka, while admitting that the soul and matter are distinct from the Adorable, holds that they are nevertheless intimately connected with Him, as its coils are connected with a serpent or as waves are with water." Rādhakrishnan (An Idealist View of Life, pp. 338-339), speaking of Rāmānuja's views, says that "The process of the world is an emergence...under the guidance of God who is immanent in the process, though the goal is transcendent to it. Cf. Gītā 11.13 (Roy, op. cit., p. 168), - "The whole world multitudinously divided and yet unified is visible in the body of the God of Gods."

birds of the Upanishadic story, and the Arjuna-Krishna identity relationship, the Gītā adds the third and crowning purusha, Krishna the Purushottama, the highest (uttama) purusha, the Supreme Principle transcending yet including the destructible and the indestructible.⁴⁰ The Purushottama as

the transcendent, infinite and universal Personality who is at once personal and impersonal, finite and infinite, self limiting and illimitable, one and many, and informs with his being not only the gods above, but man and the worm and the clod below,⁴¹

destroys by His integral fulness any illusion of a gulf existing between an "absolute impersonality and the dynamic possibilities of our nature."⁴²

Here again is illustrated the same non-dual ground-motif of metaphysic, expressed in devotional and personalized

⁴⁰ René Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to The Vedānta (London: Luzac & Co., 1945), pp. 53-55; Edgerton, op. cit., II, 44ff.; Roy, op. cit., pp. 56n, 72n, 82n, 103n, 123n, 128n, 218n, 219n, 220n, 268n; Gītā 15. 16-18.

⁴¹ Aurobindo, The Yoga and It's Object (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1949), p. 5. See also Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā (New York: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1950), pp. 490-491. In Aurobindo, Sāvitṛī (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Āsram Press, 1950), I, 56-57 (Book I, Canto 4):

He is the maker and the world he made,
He is the vision, and he is the seer;
He is himself the actor, and the act.
He is himself the knower and the known.

⁴² Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, pp. 486-491. This view, while denying that the ego is the real person, does insist that man's personality (not his individuality) is not an illusion but is in identity with the Supreme Personality.

terms,--the basic fact-experience of "the one who eternally becomes the Many, the Many who in their apparent division are still eternally one...";⁴³ the conscious identity of spirit with all physical, vital, and mental manifestation and the reciprocal, loving emergence or "out-flowering" of this consciousness-power within the varied forms. Rādhakṛishṇan, in a manner somewhat akin to the thought of Śrī Aurobindo, thus has depicted this unity movement of an all-inclusive love.⁴⁴

Śrīnivāsāchāri,⁴⁵ from the point of view of Viśiṣṭā-dvaita and Rāmānuja, states that the Supreme Person, in his multiform relation to the devotee, has as the sole and innate object of his will and purpose the perfection of the finite self. Thus the general identity-attribute of the divine is Mercy, a willed act of favor by the beloved to his devotees and all finitude. This Mercy (dayā or kṛpā) is therefore synonymous with the Supreme Person and may be viewed variously as the "five forms of Brahman"⁴⁶ known as para [supreme],

⁴³ Ibid., p. 478.

⁴⁴ Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 115, 305.

⁴⁵ Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 163.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 154. The five forms of Brahman are truly the five forms of dayā,-- for Brahman and dayā are identical. Cf. Śrīnevasāchāri (pp. 409-410): " [Vaishṇava's] definition of the absolute, while it includes the Upanishadic idea of Brahman-īśvara and the Pāñcharātra idea of Bhagavān exceeds them by its concept of Dayā nidhi. The Lord is rich in mercy and has not dayā as His differentiation but is dayā itself and

vyūha [form],⁴⁷ antaryāmin [immanent], vibhava [pervasive, omnipresent Great Power], and archā [permanent incarnation, image].⁴⁸ These five forms, continues Srīnivāsāchāri,⁴⁹ "are equally real in the philosophical sense, though from the point of view of religious value each succeeding self-manifestation may be more valuable to the mumukshu."⁴⁹ Therefore, philosophically, Viśiṣṭādvaita claims to reconcile in one concept the Upanishadic Brahman and Ātman, the Vāsudeva of the Pāñcharātra, Bhagavān of the Purāṇas, the avatāras of the Itihāsas, and the archā of the Ālvārs.⁵⁰

(1) Para-Brahman. The first of these five "forms" of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy is that of Para-Brahman, "the self-realized absolute as the Eternal of eternals, which is formless, changeless and transcendental (tripādosya amṛitam divi)..."⁵¹ It is the "given" Fact, ineffable, transcending

is therefore impersonal. Dayā is for dayā's sake, and is not the fruit of righteousness, and is therefore not juristic or moralistic. Dayā is not a process of placating the holy wrath of God, and is not vindictive and retributive. It does not connote forgiveness in installments as it is spontaneous in nature and instantaneous in effect."

⁴⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, I, 491.

⁴⁸ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 162.

⁴⁹ The devotee striving for final beatitude.

⁵⁰ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., 162.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 154.

all human categories,--That which underlies and is the spiritual experience, i. e. "what being known all else becomes known."⁵² Thus, underlying Viśiṣṭādvaita as well as "all other forms of Hinduism and determining the ultimate aim and character [of these forms] is...the primary and irreducible ultimacy of the indeterminate aesthetic component in things ..., "⁵³ That which, being neither the manifest (vyakta) nor the unmanifest (avyakta) is the ground for both.⁵⁴ This "Transcendent Fact in which all other facts are held" remains, for all the forms and viewpoints within metaphysical tradition, beyond conceptual description, not because it is empty,--but because of its integral fulness (pūrṇam).⁵⁵ It is "not imprisoned in its own transcendence,"⁵⁶ for its non-duality permits of immanence in its non-separate emergent manifestation.

⁵² Rādhakṛiṣṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 22; Surendranath Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: 1933), pp. 36ff.

⁵³ Northrop, op. cit., p. 373.

⁵⁴ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 112.

⁵⁵ Rādhakṛiṣṇan, op. cit., pp. 127-128, 366-367; Haridās Chaudhuri, Sri Aurobindo, The Prophet of Life Divine (Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Pathamandir, 1951), p. 26. See Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad 5.1 ; 3.8.8; Kenopaniṣad 1.3.

⁵⁶ Roy, op. cit., p. 103n.

The "theistic" Svetâśvataropaniṣad⁵⁷ speaks of this ground as active within the turning "Brahma-wheel," possessor of qualities (gunin), and yet at once superior to action, devoid of qualities (nirguna), the inner-âtman and inner principle of all things, "the witness, the sole thinker..." The all-comprehensive ultimate spiritual reality, simultaneously transcendent and immanent, personal and suprapersonal, changeless, yet the ground of all mental and material finitude,⁵⁸ from varied viewpoints may be termed the "thing in itself," the unconditioned, the absolute,--but as Purushottama it quickens the identity-harmonic of personality in the "deep caverns of the heart," evoking worship of the Bhagavân⁵⁹ and a relationship dependent upon His grace and mercy.⁶⁰

The bliss or ânanda which arises from this relationship,

⁵⁷ 6. 1-13; Robert E. Hume, The Thirteen Principle Upanishads (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 408-410. See also R. D. Râṇaḍe, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926), pp. 261, 282; Dâsgupta, op. cit., pp. 4-6, S. Râdhakṛishṇan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyâṇa Kalpataru, I:171, Jan., 1934.

⁵⁸ Dâsgupta, op. cit., pp. 34, 43, 59. Râṇaḍe, op. cit., pp. 261-263. Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 224-225. R. V. 10. 90. 1-2. Kathopanishad 5.9-11. Svet. 3.9 ; 3.13-16. Gîtâ 9.3-5, 13.13. Cf. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 23, "Of this Brahman we may say not only that 'It is one without a second', ekamevâdvitīyam, but also that 'all this that we see is surely Brahman,' sarvam khalvidam brahman."

⁵⁹ Cf. Jean Delaire, "The Conception of the Soul in the East and West," Kalyâṇa Kalpataru, I:215, Jan., 1934.

⁶⁰ Râdhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 106.

or which is this relationship, tends to become an end in itself. The līlā-prem, the reciprocal search for self and Self culminating in varied states of ecstatic union, the sweet taste of perfection, impossible and meaningless "if everything is moveless and perfect",--this participation in the alternating currents and pulsations of agape and devotion lying just on the brink of identity consciousness leaves, according to the devotee, more scope for the interplay of dayā and the joy of communion than the opening to complete identity.⁶¹ Thus the "metaphysical absolute becomes Vāsudeva, the perfect, to satisfy the meditational needs of the mumukshu."⁶² As a part of that tradition based upon a fundamental metaphysical ground and unobstructed by impurity or aberration, the love of the divine is denied if "God or the Self is sought as an object apart from the world..." The theistic relationship to the Bhagavān is not one of essential separateness but of conscious and loving interplay between the two polarities of a continuous consciousness wherein the "infinite and finite orders are no longer opposed and mutually exclusive" but are united in the embrace of the infinite "conscious continuum."⁶³

⁶¹ It must be remembered, however, that identity with the Supreme, who is master of the līlā, also is identity with the infinite possibilities within that līlā as "willed" by the Supreme.

⁶² Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 154ff.

⁶³ Watts, op. cit., p. 186.

While the strength of metaphysic lies in its inability to make any definite, conclusive, and authentic statement as to what Brahman is, the widespread appeal of religion in the West lies in its logical, theoretically formulated and meticulously constructed theological apparatus based upon the definition of God as Unique Being. Drawing a sharp line between any tracings of metaphysic and the assertions of religion, organized Christianity has maintained the exclusive and unique position of God devoid of any relationship or degree as against the more homogeneous concepts found in Plato's demiurge and Aristotle's thought-based Unmoved Mover.⁶⁴ "There is but one God and this God is Being, that is the cornerstone of all Christian philosophy, and it was not Plato, it was not even Aristotle, it was Moses who put it in position." Thus the essence and unique prerogative of this One is Being, wherein alone essence and existence are identical,⁶⁵ the pure Act, without limitation or contingency, that "exists by His very essence,"⁶⁶ and around this single "supernatural" principle revolves, for Christians, the entire cosmic system.⁶⁷ Pure Being in its perfection and completion is said

⁶⁴ Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 44-50, 81.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 51, 432.

⁶⁶ Rādhakṛishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 277.

⁶⁷ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 42, 364, 432.

to have as its very essence a positive, dynamic, and expansive infinitude,⁶⁸ a view which, within the limits of the unified Christian concept, is somewhat analogous to the more comprehensive principle of advaita which transcends the unity of Being. The absolute self-sufficiency and complete independence of this pure and unique Being is His perfection which is not dependent upon "anything whatsoever from outside" as well as "everything within Himself,"--thus positing a primal separation of that which is imperfect and outside of this perfection of Being.⁶⁹ This quantitative, analytical, and therefore limiting concept forms another analogy of the advaitic metaphysical ground which has no basic separateness, no ultimate "apartness." The basic Christian duality is that of the God who "alone is," and who is far apart from nature,--from man who does not experience "God himself, immediately, in his own nature."⁷⁰ In metaphysic this experience is possible through the "many in one" identity within the non-dual principle, but to the Christian the only alternative remains an undesirable pantheism.⁷¹

There is, then, the Eastern tradition and experience

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 55-58.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 52-54.

⁷⁰ Northrop, op. cit., p. 278.

⁷¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 65.

based upon the fundamental Fact and ground of that formless yet advaitic and free ultimate reality containing within itself infinite possibility, all form, and all power, the Brahman which is identical with Ātman. Western theistic religion, on the other hand, has postulated, from the human ego-standpoint, a God whose life must be considered in temporal and historical terms projected upon the background of an ever-lasting value-ideal or emotional hope, and "the divine and human soul are identified with certain primary factors in the theoretic component of things."⁷²

Metaphysically all multiplicity is based upon, derived from and "principally contained" within Unity, that is, Being.⁷³ This "oneness" of Being clearly is to be distinguished from the Infinite, the non-dual Supreme Principle, for "Unity is indeed the first of all determinations...and, as such, it cannot be applied properly to the Supreme

⁷² Northrop, op. cit., p. 483; Watts, op. cit., pp. 30, 61. Cf. Edwin Greaves, "The Christian Conception of God," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I:174, Jan., 1934, "For us, what God is is discovered by His activities in the universe in which we live," a conception resembling Pelagianism on a cosmic level.

⁷³ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, pp. 59-60. According To Guénon, Being, as the One, is unity in a sense superior to the quantitative mathematical unity which is its analogy.

Principle.*⁷⁴ Being, although beyond all manifestation subsisting through it, is a primary Self-affirmation or determination, "that from which all others proceed," while the non-duality of the Absolute inclusively is beyond Being inasmuch as it is superior to all determination of Being or that multiplicity which is the extension of Being's possibilities. The similarity of the theological view to metaphysic, though, is limited to Being in itself although approaching that larger experience through the fringe realm of "negative theology."*⁷⁵ The religious idea of God as the One separates Being from the multiform and "keeps Him still within the sphere of dualism. He cannot, therefore, identify Himself with His opposite, the Many."*⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 60, 162-163. Cf. Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 30,—"The pure Godhead stands high above God, and is the ground of the possibility of God, who is absorbed in the Godhead, which is beyond being and goodness."

⁷⁵ Guénon, op. cit., p. 112. See also Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, p. 156, wherein Being, as ontologically determinate and therefore not the whole of metaphysic, is described as "a limitation at which the metaphysical point of view cannot stop short." Furthermore (Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, pp. 162-165), "...Western doctrines...stopping short at Being...remain incomplete and ...exhibit an undesirable tendency to deny that which lies outside their sphere and which, from the viewpoint of pure metaphysic, is precisely the most important part of all."

⁷⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 68. Frederic Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion (Stanford: James Ladd Delkin, 1948), p. 24, states that "We may say that every vital monotheism is in some way a veiled dualism, and we can see this fact very closely in the Jewish and Christian religion. In both systems the pretension of having abolished all demonic

The Supreme Brahman, as īśvara, the particular metaphysical basis for the God of religion, is Universal Being and, as the immediate determining principle of differentiation, implies the distinction (saviśeṣa) of "essence" and "substance" (puruṣa and prakṛiti). Only Brahman-ātman, the More Than Being, is "without a trace of the development of manifestation."⁷⁷ Being and its becoming, then, are but poles of that Supreme which can be spoken of only in terms of pure and absolute consciousness-bliss (chidānandarūpa).⁷⁸

Commenting upon the "Creation" Hymn from the Rigveda⁷⁹ Spiegelberg⁸⁰ states:

The real reason for this evolution [i.e. the "coming into existence" of the world] is seen behind what we call Being or Non-Being. Before this state of Being came into birth, before Heaven and Earth and all the Gods had any being, and even before there could be

opposition is only the expression of a desire, and never, of course, of a real fact.

The idea of a personal God always involves the idea of something opposite, which is not God, and thus gives life to religion."

⁷⁷ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to The Vedānta, pp. 37, 164. Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, I, 103-104.

⁷⁸ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 208-209. See also Guénon, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

⁷⁹ R. V. 5.10.129. Robt. Ballou, Friedrich Spiegelberg, Horace Friess, The Bible of the World (N. Y., The Viking Press, 1939), p. 3.

⁸⁰ Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 35-36.

any Non-Being, there was something which can only be called the 'Tat.' The Gods are later than the Tat. B. Heimann translates the passage 'The Gods are later. They are on this, the empirical side of the world,' and adds: 'Thus India states a problem and answers it in a very strange way, which in the Occident cannot even be raised, since it is against our Western presuppositions about God's uniqueness and supremacy, to search for His origin, for the source of the Supreme Reality itself.'

The Rigveda hymn is thus a song to the unborn and undirected background of all possible Creation...

Hopkins,⁸¹ ignoring the difference between metaphysic and religion, sees on the one hand the possibility of a religion of mysticism based upon a personal relationship between the individual and nature, and on the other a ruler God inseparably connected with the social and political state-ideal. To the former he ascribes the "feeling" and emotional root drive of personal salvation, while to the latter moral conduct apprehendable by the intellect takes the place of any mystical content. He then adds, "So... ethics is an unimportant addition to the mystical Hindu sects and...mysticism is an unnatural addition to the religion of ancient Rome."⁸² In his opinion Christianity brings into a harmonious synthesis these two points of view which otherwise are described as tending to be mutually exclusive.⁸³

⁸¹ E. Washburn Hopkins, The History of Religions (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 594-595.

⁸² Ibid., p. 595.

⁸³ Loc. cit.

While, understandably, there have been those within institutionalized Christianity who have evidenced a mystical experience (which may or may not be equated with metaphysic), such an experience either has been forced into the rationalized analogical-pattern of dogmatic theology or pronounced as unauthentic. "With very rare exceptions," writes Watts,⁸⁴ "that which is truly subjective and interior has thus far remained hidden from Western man. It has been projected wholly upon the objective and external world." For the most part the Western God is still that of the "State-ideal," -- "It is not surprising, then, that the Western world has never really understood the nature of spiritual authority, has almost invariably confused it with the external and compulsive power of a secular monarchy."⁸⁵

(2) Īśvara as Vyūha.⁸⁶ From the viewpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita Brahman as Īśvara is both immanent in and transcendent to the real but dependent world of chit and achit

⁸⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 189.

⁸⁵ Loc. cit.

⁸⁶ Form. Vasudeva as Para, the Supreme, has three forms, Samkarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, each arising from the preceding. Rādhakṛishṇan (Indian Philosophy, I, 490-491) gives for these forms the psychological meaning of "living beings," "mind," and "self-consciousness" respectively, while Sivānanda (Yoga Vedānta Dictionary, p. 109.) describes them as having functions similar to the Trimūrti, that is, dissolution, manifestation, and preservation. Cf. Buddhist Trikāya and the Christian Trinity, Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 21.

which forms his body.⁸⁷ The world of differentiation has īśvara "for its Self," thereby forming the basis for all tranquility and "the attainment of fearlessness,"⁸⁸ and to that World-Self is attributed all the perfection of the highest ideals⁸⁹ as well as that omnipotent will which is Self-determined.⁹⁰ Again, it may be said that within the field of manifestation forming the body of īśvara He is differentiated, yet He is "one without a second" "prior" to manifestation⁹¹ or, with more accuracy, as the unmanifest

⁸⁷ H. N. Rāghavendrāchār, The Dvaita Philosophy and its Place in the Vedānta (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1941), p. 78. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I, 172.

⁸⁸ Rāmānuja, The Vedānta Sūtras with the Sṛī-Bhāṣya of Rāmānujāchārya (Madras: The Brahmanādin Press, 1899), p. 122. See also Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 103.

⁸⁹ Rudolph Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: MacMillan Co., 1932), p. 109. See also Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, p. 225, which states that the qualified attributes of īśvara "are obtained by an analogical transference into the universal of the diverse qualities or properties of the beings of which He is the Principle." Also cf. Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., (Kalyāṇa Kalpataru), I, 172,—"The difference between the Supreme as absolute spirit and the Supreme as personal God is one of standpoint and not of essence." The advaitic Supreme encompasses both views.

⁹⁰ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to The Vedānta, pp. 82-84.

⁹¹ Sṛinivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 80. It must be understood that "prior," here, does not imply a temporal but only a logical succession. See Guénon, op. cit., p. 63, also Bṛih.1.6.1-3; 2.3.1; Chhānd.6.3.2-4; Mund. 1.1.6-8; Kātha. 5.10.

which is common to both formal and formless manifestation.⁹²

Iśvara, with his cosmic will is the source of emergent manifestation, the sustenance of the universe as well as universal pralaya-reabsorption or dissolution,--all as acts of mercy and grace (dayā), even unto the "devouring" function which is also a part of the "healing" process through the "soothing and tranquilizing withdrawal of all instruments of differentiation." Sṛisṭi, or the emission of a new cosmic process following pralaya, also is considered as "redemptive" in the sense of providing opportunities for realization. "The making and the unmaking of the universe thus reveals the redemptive mercy of the Rakshaka,⁹³ and cosmology is to be reinterpreted as a dayāsāstra, or philosophy of redemption."⁹⁴

Iśvara also may be considered, especially from the view of any doctrine of grace, as a connecting link, as it were, of pure Being bridging the ocean-gulf between the world and the Principle that transcends it. Thus to man's īva-consciousness there may be manifest in analogy the integral

⁹² Guénon, op. cit., pp. 33-34, 60-61. See Sṛīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 545-546, where, according to Nimbārka, Reality is "an identity that pervades difference and gives meaning to it."

⁹³ Protective guardian or divinity.

⁹⁴ Sṛīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 155-156, 418. See Gītā 8.18: "From the Unmanifested all the manifested stream forth at coming of day; at coming of night they dissolve, even in That called the Unmanifested."

wholeness of the Divine, nature, and man.

Floating, so to say, in this water, He receives the creative impulse and gives it concrete expression... He is thus Nârāyaṇa or the Great Water Dweller,--also Brahmā or the Amplifier, the first definite embodiment of the Great Soul's...will to be. He has the whole universe with its jīvas and aīvas entirely at His command, because in Him everything lives and moves.⁹⁵

That plenum of consciousness-reality, from whose "self-contained" burning power of ānanda or bliss all being is manifest and into which the multiple is cyclically resolved⁹⁶ also is called, from this viewpoint, īśvara, the Lord of all manifestation (bhātrīprapañcha),⁹⁷ conservation, and dissolution.⁹⁸ This act of manifestation, of movement, cannot find its logical base in a concept of the supremely transcendent absolute.⁹⁹ Brahman, as the absolute, "is perfectly self-sufficient, beyond all distinctions of the world, but the world implies movement in God (īśvara)..."¹⁰⁰ "If any logical description be true at all," says Rādhakṛishṇan,¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ B. Kumar Goswāmi, The Bhakti Cult in Ancient India (Calcutta: B. Bannerjee & Co., 1922), pp. 81-82. Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 127, mentions īśvara and Hiranyagarbha as the mediator between the absolute and the world.

⁹⁶ Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 4-6, 42; Rāṇade, op. cit., pp. 73-74; Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 249-250; Tait.3.1-7.

⁹⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 125-126.

⁹⁸ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 103.

⁹⁹ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁰¹ Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, I. 167n.

"it is Rāmānuja's way of putting it."

Metaphysical manifestation is not "creation" in the religious sense inasmuch as there is no "Creator" external to the "creation," and the emergence of the "implicit" of infinite possibility as the "explicit" in the process of manifestation does not become the origin of the completely new but is "only the articulation of the distinctions already subsisting in Brahman."¹⁰² Metaphysically all world-projection is not an event occurring in time but proceeding out of

eternal spontaneity and this power¹⁰³ of God that reveals itself as eternal self manifestation. Whatever is described as movement (kriyā), energy (vīrya), self completeness (tejas), or strength (bala) of God are but the different aspects of this power.¹⁰⁴

The metaphysical "self-abandonment" of the infinite which engenders the finite, and which at once "implies no essential privation...motion nor necessary causality" is expressed in metaphysical theism as an act of gratuitous giving, of selfless love or agape.¹⁰⁵ The theologically appropriate translation of "universal manifestation" into the concepts of the three major religions in practice becomes

¹⁰² Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 152.; Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 6, 38.

¹⁰³ Sakti.

¹⁰⁴ Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁰⁵ Watts, op. cit., p. 66.

an activity exercised by God upon a "matter" external to Him.¹⁰⁶ In any case the theological analysis is at most only that, and is not to be considered at all equivalent to the integral metaphysical view.¹⁰⁷

The West has demanded that which it calls a "living" and dynamic God but has hitherto limited its concept of the "living" to that small segment of consciousness which deals with the conceptual and theoretical within the waking state, and even the "unconscious" is but a new conception in the West. Spiegelberg¹⁰⁸ writes:

To develop human individuality to the utmost degree and to think about the feeling of Personal Being as the highest possibility of mankind, has certainly been the chief task of Western cultures. This, of course, is the special Western opinion, and seen from the East it means an over-estimation and over-doing of the experiences of our waking state. When today the psychologists speak about the Unconscious and regard dreams and phantasies seriously, this is really an heretic act, for it means the breaking with a tradition which is indeed very old in the West.

¹⁰⁶ This artisan-activity by the "Heavenly Father" in the Christian mythos is reflected in that of the "earthly" father of Jesus, who was a carpenter. It is true, however, that theology endeavors to emphasize God's omnipotence by His creation "from no-thing" whereas man, the creature, can never truly create, for all that man makes is made from something else. See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Soc. For Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1938), II, 62; Gilson, op. cit., p. 91.

¹⁰⁷ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 136-137.

¹⁰⁸ Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

It is "only as the eternal and ceaselessly creating God is He God, for only then is He a 'living' God. This is the Christian God,"¹⁰⁹--and that living creativity must perforce follow the separative, conceptual, and theoretical pattern of waking consciousness. "The theologian," states Watts,¹¹⁰ "separates God from the world (as prior to it in time) and then wonders where the world came from and how."

Christian Catholic theology is based upon an exclusive and unique Being bound up with a creationist "metaphysics"¹¹¹ as an extension of Genesis 1.1. which in itself is but an assertion of God's creative action without metaphysical justification. An immediate dualistic tinge is observable when it is stated that "If God is Being, if He alone is Being, then all that is not God must of necessity hold its existence from God."¹¹² This, then, necessitates a highly technical and advanced degree of dialectical virtuosity in order to construct a symmetrical and structurally stable monistic dogma embracing in harmony both God and "all that is not God," and initiating an involved causal series, the precision of which in time and space is at all times subject to

¹⁰⁹ Otto, op. cit., p. 175.

¹¹⁰ Watts, op. cit., p. 68.

¹¹¹ Metaphysics in the sense of being a special branch of philosophy. This is not the metaphysic of Eastern tradition.

¹¹² Gilson, op. cit., p. 68.

the cataclysmic direction of divine grace. Gilson¹¹³ has thus well summarized the creationist view:

Whatever belongs to a subject per se inheres necessarily in that subject, as rationality in man and upward movement in fire. Now the actual production per se of any effect whatever belongs to the being in act, for every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act. Therefore every being in act can make something actually to exist. But God is being in act as has been shown. Therefore it belongs to Him to produce actual being and to be the cause of its existence.¹¹⁴

Gilson continues,¹¹⁵ in the words of St. Thomas:

God is cause because He is Being, and as He is the Being that presupposes no other Being, He is also a cause that presupposes no other causes: now the first cause produces the first effect, and the first effect, presupposed by all the others, is existence; therefore it belongs to Being to cause existence, i. e., to create. That is why creation is an act proper to God.

The creative act not only gives the sensible world existence but conserves that existence moment by moment throughout duration, thus making all that is created utterly dependent and contingent upon unique Being and the bestowal of divine Grace, for the Christian universe "is suspended... from the freedom of a will that wills it."¹¹⁶ The divine

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 445n.

¹¹⁴ "The pure and simple production of being is the act proper to Being." Gilson, op. cit., p. 71.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 445n-446. Cont. Gent., II, 6.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 71, 253-255. This creation and conservation touches but two of the functions of the metaphysically based Trimurti.

will, understanding, and intellect, however, are God Himself and do not detract from the perfect unity which is unique Being, for within that Being there can be no internal division nor causal opposition.¹¹⁷

From the Christian point of view "to create is to cause being" and God, who is unique Being, is the equally unique Creator.¹¹⁸ All contingent beings derive their contingency from participating in being and are therefore not Being itself or being, but "second causes" and "secondary beings."¹¹⁹ While creation, then, is the sole prerogative of God, being may be a cause "in the exact measure in which it is a being."¹²⁰ St. Augustine postulated certain seeds of all things or "seminal virtues" created by God together with the laws of their development and man, as secondary cause, receives divine moral illumination so that he may "awaken or excite the latent virtualities that God deposited in matter when He created it..."¹²¹ For St. Thomas the efficacy of a secondary cause is increased by virtue of its participation in Divine causality and, as a being in act, "causes

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 92. Cf. Sakti as will and wisdom, Part VI.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

¹¹⁹ Loc cit.

¹²⁰ Loc. cit.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 135, 137.

something of its actuality to pass into the potency of the matter." Beings do not create "but they cause; as substances themselves they generate, not indeed being, but at least substantiality."¹²²

In addition, Catholic theology posits, instead of the Supreme Identity of metaphysic, "the identity of essence and existence in God"¹²³ alone. All else, not being true Being, is but partial being and "hardly deserves the name of being at all."¹²⁴ This total contingency and dependence of beings wherein essence and the act of existence are really distinct and separate, makes it clear that "all that is, save God, might be other than it is... [and] all save God might possibly not exist."¹²⁵ Therefore it may be said that

¹²² Ibid., pp. 138-139. Thus the God of religion, Creative Being as the first cause, is not beyond the realm of causality and its necessary dualism. Gilson says (p. 86) "that we may have causality in the strict sense of the term means that we must have two beings and that something of the being of the cause passes into the being of that which undergoes the effect... Being is the ultimate root of causality... the cause can give only what it has, and establish itself in another only in virtue of what it is." On pp. 446n-447 he states that this does not imply that unique Being is immanent in being for "no effect of God is God, no being is Being ...outside God there is nought but the contingent."

¹²³ Ibid., p. 67.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 64, 277, 435n, 436. See Kurt Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952), p. 229.

¹²⁵ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 67, 436. Cf. p. 431: "...the actual existence of the realized principle belongs to this principle only in virtue of the creative action conferring existence.... The real composition of essence and existence [implies]...that He is able not to create them and could annihilate them."

...all that seems to us most obviously real, the world of extension and change around us, is banished at one stroke into the penumbra of mere appearance, relegated to the inferior status of a quasi-unreality.¹²⁶

There remains, then, the particularly Christian dilemma as stated by Gilson:¹²⁷ "If God is not Being, how is the world to be explained? But if God is Being, how can there be anything other than Himself?" It is only within the framework of that theoretical speculation common to all religions that such a problem could arise, for the gap of exclusive ontological separation does not exist in metaphysic as such.

God, as sole creator, is owner and master of His created universe and the totality of beings with right of authorship and property which carries with it the authority to "dispose of human affairs at His good pleasure." He, anthropomorphically, is a "jealous master," an all-seeing Ruler to be feared if his commands and laws are opposed, even in secret, but who rewards those who acknowledge His power and obey Him and His delegated Authority.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 65. Thus we have a Christian analogy of the metaphysical Supreme Identity together with a sort of māyāvāda. In Indian terminology this, loosely, would resemble the absurd situation of a māyā doctrine united with and based upon an Īśvara arbitrarily cut off from an all-inclusive metaphysic as well as all attributes. Cf. Plato's idealism and the cave analogy.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 85-86.

¹²⁸ See Gilson, op. cit., pp. 150-151, 162.

Christian providence, then, is the government of contingent things by the unique Being who created them, since creation implies government;--"Things would not exist if providence did not exist."¹²⁹ This providence, however, carries to the logical totalitarian extreme the microcosmic monarchical state-ideal from which it seems to have been projected. The purpose or end of all creation and the ordering of that creation by divine knowledge and love is toward God Himself who, as the principle of all beings, is also the end.¹³⁰ Man, as one of these contingent beings and an analogy of God, needs must receive this constant guidance and providence of God toward his proper end, but as a person, in Catholic theology, "each man, instead of simply submitting to the law of the world, collaborates in making that law reign in the world..." and in himself.¹³¹ The doctrine, then, of a Christian providence which reaches unto each individual and singular creature rests upon the divine knowledge or ideas which extend to the limits of God's causality and are as multiple as are creatures. Man as "an individual substance of a rational nature," or person, participates in God's personality¹³² and therefore can share in this providence.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 155.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 162-163.

¹³¹ Ibid., pp. 166-168.

¹³² Ibid., p. 205.

While God's knowledge (or ideas), being in God, is in identity with Him in this sense, the idea as "the model of the thing to be made" is directed toward the creature and the individual as "the forms to the likeness of which they were made."¹³³ This does not imply that multiple and distinct creatures, not even the many separate souls or egos, are in identity with God. God's ideas, creative models, may not be effective toward God,--for "God does not know himself by way of idea."¹³⁴

Metaphysically, īśvara as providence (Vidhātā)¹³⁵ is Antaryāmin, the inner controller, and the third form of Brahman as dayā.

(3) Antaryāmin. From a metaphysical point of view all manifestation has emerged from the very being of īśvara himself, by his power and will, and he also enters into it as its inner controller.¹³⁶ As Antaryāmin he reveals himself as the inner dweller at the very core of all beings, regulating and governing all as the "active principle of the universe,"

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 16, 157-160.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 157.

¹³⁵ Nikhilānanda, The Upanishads (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), I, 62-63. Vidhātā, dhā + vi, disposer, arranger.

¹³⁶ Surendranath Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge: The University Press, 1951), I, 48.

and yet the most passive and unmoved."¹³⁷ Bṛihadāraṇyako-
panishad 3.7 presents the most extensive upanishadic sum-
mary of the doctrine of the Antaryāmin, the Self of the self,
and "constitutes the fundamental position in the philosophy
of Rāmānuja when he calls God the Soul of Nature."¹³⁸ In
this passage the inner controller or Antaryāmin is the undy-
ing ātman or true Self, also immanent in all things which
constitute His body, the

unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker,
the ununderstood understander; other than Him, there is
no seer, ...no hearer, ...no thinker, ...no understander,¹³⁹
[for He is immanent in all, both as] the This and the
That, the Defined and the Undefined, the Supported and
the Supportless, Knowledge and Not-knowledge, Reality
and Unreality--yea He becomes the Reality; it is for
this reason that all this is verily called the Real."¹⁴⁰

Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad 5-6¹⁴¹ speaks of the Antaryāmin, not
as the Turiya but as integral with the sushupta state (i.e.

¹³⁷ Loc. cit., See also Guénon, Man and His Becoming
According to the Vedānta, p. 109. Chhāṇḍ. 3.14.4, 7.25.1:
Mund. 2.2.11. In the interest "of the meditational needs of
the devotee" this concrete and immanent form of Brahman-dayā
is said (Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, p. 156) to manifest as Saṁkarshana
with the two qualities of jñāna and bala (strength), as
Pradyumna with the qualities of aīśvarya (lordship) and
vīrya (heroism), and as Aniruddha with the qualities of
śakti (power) and tejas (energy), all "without any diminution
of Divinity."

¹³⁸ Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 211-212.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 212.; Tait. 2.6.

¹⁴¹ Hume, op. cit., p. 392.

samprasāda),¹⁴² "...the Lord of all (sarveśvara).¹⁴³ This is the all-knowing (sarva-jña). This is the inner controller (antaryāmin). This is the source (yoni) of all, for this is the origin and the end (prabhavāpyayau)¹⁴⁴ of beings."

Iśopanishad 8.¹⁴⁵ tells of "The Seer, the Thinker, the One who becomes everywhere, the Self-existent has ordered objects perfectly according to their nature from years sempiternal."

The more personal aspect characteristic of the Svetāśvatara-
panishad depicts the Antaryāmin as:

the source of all, who develops his own nature,
Who brings to maturity whatever can be ripened,
And who distributes all qualities (guṇa)--
Over this whole world rules the One.¹⁴⁶

The One who, himself without color, by the manifold
application of his power (śakti yoga)
Distributes many colors in his hidden purpose,
And into whom, its end and its beginning, the whole
world dissolves--He is God (deva)!

¹⁴² See Samprasāda, pp. 59 ff., supra.

¹⁴³ Cf. Bṛih. 4.4.22.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Kaṭha 6.11., also the Buddhist doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha (Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 131, 137, 147, 149.) and the union of Garbhadhātu and Vajradhātu in Tāntric Buddhism (Sāsi Dāsgupta, An Introduction to Tāntric Buddhism [Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950], pp. 109, 110n), as well as the symbol of the flame arising from the lotus or crescent, the jar containing the branch, and the yang-yin. See also Hiranyagarbha.

¹⁴⁵ Aurobindo, Iśopanishad, (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1945), p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ Svet. 5.5.; Hume, op. cit., p. 406.

May He endow us with clear intellect!¹⁴⁷

Know Him as in one's own self (âtma-stha), as the
immortal abode of all.¹⁴⁸

Kaushîtakyopanishad (3.9) calls the inner controller "...the
world protector (loka-pâla),...the world-sovereign (lokâdhi-
pata),...the Lord of all. He is my Self (âtman)..." In
Chhândogyopanishad 4.15.2, 4, He is also the "refuge of Love"
(sañyadvâma), for all love goes toward Him, and as the "Lord
of Brightness" He shines in all the worlds.¹⁴⁹

Thus do the texts tell of the inner controller who is
"Providence" and dayâ-mercy, the Eternal Watcher within, yet
encompassing all.

The one God, hidden in all things,
All-pervading, the Inner Soul (âtman) of all things,
The overseer of deeds (karman), in all things abiding,
The witness, the sole thinker, devoid of qualities
(nir-guna).¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Svet. 4.1.; Hume, op. cit., p. 402.

¹⁴⁸ Svet. 6.6.; Hume, op. cit., p. 409.

¹⁴⁹ Nikhilânanda, op. cit., I, 63.

¹⁵⁰ Svet. 6.11; Hume, op. cit., p. 409; Nikhilânanda,
op. cit., p. 63.

(4) Avatāra¹⁵¹ or Vibhava.¹⁵² It may be useful to view the Avatāra as a concentrated and dynamic extension, as it were, of the passive Antaryāmin, his active emergence into the "outer," the "seen." Srīnivāśchāri¹⁵³ describes the Avatāra from the Viśiṣṭādvaitic point of view, and in the terms of Gītā 4.7-11,¹⁵⁴ as a cyclical manifestation or embodiment which is the "redemptive"¹⁵⁵ working of the Rakshaka" (the inner controller personified as Protector, guardian, watchman) operative in the finite. Further, this focal manifestation of the conscious rays of divine love and wisdom may act positively in the finite world in spontaneous accordance

¹⁵¹ (√tri+ava) descent, incarnation, manifestation. (Alfred A. Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary, London: Oxford University Press, 1924, p. 29.). V. V. Bhide, A Concise Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Poona City: Chitra Shala Press, 1926), p. 161, adds advent, coming on; form, and Charles R. Lanman, A Sanskrit Reader (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 121 adds the idea of "appearance" or "showing forth" by including the term epiphany in the definition.

¹⁵² Macdonell, op. cit., p. 286, —might, power, greatness, exalted position, omnipresence. Bhide, op. cit., p. 986, adds final beatitude.

¹⁵³ Srīnivāśchāri, op. cit., p. 156.

¹⁵⁴ Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 393n, cites this passage, together with Upanishadic doctrine and the Vedic Vāch hymn as pertaining to "special grace." He does not mention, however, the differences between Christian and metaphysical views of the "giver of grace" and the "receiver of grace," views which permit only a similarity in name.

¹⁵⁵ In the sense of "freeing."

with the divine will or may serve, passively, as a source of inspiration and guidance for the devotee.¹⁵⁶

It is said¹⁵⁷ that the Avatāra, as the perfect and eternal "Self-experience" or "Self-enjoyment" of Brahman manifests an equally perfect and eternal Self-consciousness, and eternally is coexistent with the absolute spirit, for both are in perfect identity.¹⁵⁸ The Avatāra also is to be thought of as taking part in the reciprocal action of prasāda¹⁵⁹ when the devotees, through surrender and sacrifice of their ego-hood, give of themselves to the divine who, in His love and mercy reveals¹⁶⁰ only as much of His divinity as can

¹⁵⁶ See Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 160.

¹⁵⁷ Sāntinātha, Sādhana, (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1938), pp. 88-89.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. the Christian analogy of the Father-Son relationship of God and Christ.

¹⁵⁹ See supra pp. 20, 159n, 176.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. J. Baly, Eur-Arya Roots (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1897), p. 78, concerning Revelation:
 Eur-Ar. - ves - to clothe, dress
 Skt. - vas (vas-to, -clothe oneself; vasana, -clothing)
 Zend. - vanh (vank-ana, -clothing)
 Latin - ves - vestire, -to dress; velum, veslum, -a covering, a veil; velare, -to veil; develare, -to uncover; revelare, -to draw back the cover; revelatio, - a drawing back of the veil.

This "revelation" may remain more or less "veiled" by the divine māyā and, it is said, even may take the form of special gifts or powers of the human intellect or genius which in time of great crisis may offer the right solution to crucial problems. (Sāntinātha, op. cit., pp. 81, 87-88). Goswāmi, op. cit., pp. 130-131, suggests in an impersonal and somewhat

serve to effect an ultimately beneficial reaction in the finite "for the purpose of awakening the dormant yearning of their inner self for union with Himself,"¹⁶¹ showing the true path for the devotee, setting an example, strengthening all the spiritual forces of the world,¹⁶² and removing or weakening all asuric forces.¹⁶³

Srīnivāśāchāri¹⁶⁴ has stated that "the aim of Vedānta is to reveal the divine that lies concealed in the heart of all jīvas." This view is further expanded by Viśiṣṭādvaita in the imagery of the Bhagavān who, because of his eternal and essential love plunges time after time into the turbid ocean

naturalistic view, that "The intervention of God is nothing but the assertion of the eternal law of harmony in nature. Whenever worldly harmony, in any sphere of worldly activities, is threatened with a break, the force of readjustment automatically comes to work under the supreme law of conservation of life in a form suitable to the particular case." This "automatic" Bhagavān is somewhat foreign to Indian tradition and suggests certain European philosophic influence.

¹⁶¹ See Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 54; "For knowing the truth we require...the development of spiritual vision. Arjuna could not see the truth with his naked eyes, and so was granted the divine sight." Cf. the functions of Christian prevenient grace.

¹⁶² Cf. Huxley, op. cit., p. 51 "...by his being a channel of grace and divine power he actually is the means by which human beings may transcend the limitations of history."

¹⁶³ Śāntinātha, op. cit., pp. 78-79. Cf. with actual graces in Christianity. See also Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 180.

¹⁶⁴ Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 419.

of saṁsāra, giving himself to the world and seeking the heart of the jīva in its depths. It is the experienced fact of the divine, the "Hound of Heaven," seeking the finite, rather than the jīva seeking after "God," and that fact is of supreme value to the devotee.¹⁶⁵ There is, then, a refusal of the divine to allow any prolonged jīva-concept of separation to continue as a bar to the reunion of the Divine Person with the "lost self."¹⁶⁶ This seeking, this abandonment, and this "sacrifice" or making "holy" by the divine is not accomplished as one who is "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," but as trigunātita, one superior to (though not remote nor exclusively separate from) all those qualities which, like a "cord," bind in an exclusive and sightless identification with the finite. This does not make for coldness or aloofness. On the contrary it permits the true freedom of absolute ānanda-bliss to embrace all in an integral and conscious play of love. Rāmānuja has said,¹⁶⁷ in the opening portion of his Srī Bhāṣya:

May my buddhi or iñāna blossom into bhakti or devotion to Brahman or Srīnivāsa whose nature is revealed in the

¹⁶⁵ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 335; Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 154.

¹⁶⁶ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 154, 419. Cf. Christian theology which at all times maintains a proper distance between Being and the creature-analogy.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 360.

Upanishads as the self, that, out of the līlā, or sport of love, creates, sustains, and reabsorbs the whole bhuvana or universe with a view to saving the jīvas that seek His love.¹⁶⁸

Finite diversity, as an expression of Divine Power¹⁶⁸ (śakti), may serve as a veil of the seemingly inconscient, yet that same consciousness-power or śakti is capable of removing all or part of its māyā-veiling through the movements of līlā-prema or cosmic play directed by divine will in integral love and ānanda, a spontaneous play of love proper to the unrestricted Supreme rather than a movement directed by a finite, particular, and determined motive or purpose.¹⁶⁹ This līlā-prema itself, as a gift of love by the infinite to its non-separate finite, involves not only the gift of the Avatāra but of the entire samsāric relationship wherein the complete and total union with the beloved is capable of a realized, total experience. De¹⁷⁰ states:

The cause of divine manifestation is found in the theory of grace or prasāda, which the deity vouchsafes to his faithful devotee as an aspect of his inherent divine śakti... [The] display of...inherent divine energy or śakti [is]...līlā or divine sport of Krishna....His prakāṣa avatāralīlā, that is, his manifest birth in its real and eternal character, is the result of His grace or anugraha to the world...

¹⁶⁸ See Śāntinātha, op. cit., p. 87.

¹⁶⁹ See Sushil Kumār De, Vaishnava Faith and Movement in Bengal (Calcutta: General Printers and Publishers, Ltd., 1942), p. 191.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 189. See also p. 191.

Thus the grace of the Supreme, the extra-samsāric aid given in the form of Avatāra, the extension of which unites all in the union of love and ānanda, is inherent in the play or līlā of that divine "energising productive power," the Great Mother Power, Sakti who is inseparable from the Supreme Reality.¹⁷¹

From the viewpoint of the unrealized ego-consciousness the Avatāra as the external aid, friend and lover remains in the form of an indirect analogy, the projection of an unconscious Self-identity upon a symbol external to the jīva,¹⁷² the image of the indwelling Self as hṛidpuruṣa thrown upon its outflowering in other forms. The jīva, confusing its polarity of ego-hood with ātman, remains, as jīva, unaware that the Avatāra, as it were, is "present in all men alike,"¹⁷³ the Bhagavān within the heart who is the advaitic True Self, the lover of His inseparable jīva. This love of the supremely conscious infinite for its particularized rôle of name and form in the līlā appears to that ego-form as something given,

¹⁷¹ See Hopkins, The History of Religions, p. 217. Herein also note the trinity of powers in Vaiṣṇava thought as it touches Sakti: "...it has a sort of trinity of God-powers, God as all-soul, God as immanent in man..., and God as the energising productive power in the world; with which last [Sir Geo. Grierson] aptly compares the substitution by Syrian Christians of Mary for the third power of the Christian Trinity."

¹⁷² Cf. Watts, op. cit., 148-149.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 136.

as a divine and unmerited grace.¹⁷⁴ Inasmuch as the jiva by his own efforts cannot effect a union with the indwelling and beloved Personality his individuality must be transformed by ânanda through the grace (agape) or play of divine love into a Vrindâvana, the stage wherein every possibility of lîlâ-prema, of every advaitic relationship within the finite-infinite union, may be experienced consciously as the highest bliss.¹⁷⁵

Watts¹⁷⁶ has said that "The Avatâra differs from ordinary men in that he is one in whom realization of the Self is 'born' rather than 'attained'...", and that at the birth of the finite body such a one is eternally free from that amnesia-like forgetting of the Self in the self, that is to say, free from bondage to exclusive individuality. The divine Avatâra consciousness does not lose or extinguish the finite in the infinite but unites with it in love, in a lîlâ which maintains a distinct and unconfused determination¹⁷⁷ yet at once substantially unites the nature of the finite with

¹⁷⁴ See Watts, Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁷⁵ See also Huxley, op. cit., p. 56. Cf. Nygren, op. cit., II, 62, 202; I, 98.

¹⁷⁶ Watts, op. cit., p. 137.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Northrop's concept of the "transitory, determinate differentiations which come and go within... [the] undifferentiated aesthetic continuum." Northrop, op. cit., p. 377.

the infinite advaitic Sachchidānanda. Thus the only "person" or Purusha, as ātman, is in perfect conscious identity with the Supreme Reality and, as the determinate finite which He encompasses, an inferior though perfectly expressed and non-separate pole of That Reality.

The component of Greek philosophy which became embedded in official Christianity demanded a concept such as that of the Christian incarnation to bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite.¹⁷⁸ As a result theological dogma, giving an anthropomorphic, spatial and historical interpretation to a spiritual truth,¹⁷⁹ postulated the Christian incarnation, analogous to the Avatāra doctrine, as a unique, miraculous, and cataclysmic phenomenon with Jesus Christ as the sole incarnation of God. This religious concept presented all of the metaphysical imagery but, as a religion, denied both the cyclical emergence of the Avatāra for other epochs and his central abode in the heart of all as the Self.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ S. Rādhakrishnan, East and West in Religion (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1949) p. 61. In the same place Rādhakrishnan says: "When pagan polytheism and Jewish monotheism became fused together, the Catholic God, a God who is a society, arose."

¹⁷⁹ See Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

¹⁸⁰ For a full discussion of this topic see Watts, op. cit., pp. 135ff., 148-149. Catholic theology [see Joseph Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1917), pp. 111-112.] makes it clear that Christian man, while sacramentally participating in the life of Christ does

Closely allied with the doctrine of Avatāra is that of guru-vāda. Both doctrines, on the surface and as so interpreted by most Western critics, bear a seeming relationship toward an attachment to a saving power external to the devotee, but basically they are founded upon a close and transforming inner experience which, as yet not fully integrated above the horizon separating waking awareness from the totality of consciousness, must be expressed (and not without its own truth) in projective terms and imagery. From earliest times every traditional school of Indian metaphysic has insisted upon the "necessity of the guru-śishya relation and the absolute faith of the śishya in attaining moksha through guruprasāda or the favor of the guru."¹⁸¹ The path toward

not share Christ's "identical habit of grace [which] ... is an accident inhering in the substance of His soul and, as such, cannot pass over to ours." The hypostatic character attributed by the Church to Jesus Christ and the "perfect grace which is Christ's personal possession" makes it evident, in the words of Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 135, "that Jesus was no mere symbol of what every man is essentially..." By limiting the "Supreme Identity" to Jesus the Christ the church portrays in analogy the metaphysical truth which equates Brahman only with ātman. It does not, however, point out that the ātman is the True Self of all finitude, that the soul or jīva is the same ātman veiled or made manifest in the multifarious and by its own divine will, that the "boundless" and the "point" or bindu are infinitely identical. To do so the Church needs must desert religion for metaphysic, and metaphysic is not institutionalized, exclusive, temporal, historical, nor sacramental.

¹⁸¹ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, *op. cit.*, p. 369. See also Rānāde, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-331; Aurobindo, Letters of Śrī Aurobindo (Bombay: Śrī Aurobindo Circle, 1949), II, pp. 265-267. Śrī Aurobindo adds, "if one learns all by oneself, the chances

moksha is said to be as difficult to traverse as "a sharpened edge of a razor" therefore the awakening seeker has need of an experienced guide to give "answers" to all questions.¹⁸²

The true guru is superior inasmuch as he himself has awakened to that realization toward which he guides, or has experienced that subtle truth which he "teaches" and which transcends all logic and argument.¹⁸³ Thus he speaks "as one having authority" and not as a mere pandita and stands as an example of that supreme integrality which is said to be the ultimate experience of all beings.¹⁸⁴ According to his

are that one will learn all wrong." Even those who are said to advocate realization through one's own effort do not dispense with the guru for "even the pure advaita does in fact rely upon the guru, and the chief mantra of Buddhism insists on saranam to Buddha."

¹⁸² See Katha. 3.14; Chhând. 4.9.3. According to the medieval alchemists "a man could receive the secret knowledge only by divine inspiration or out of the mouth of a master, and also...no one could complete the work except with the help of God." Carl Jung, The Integration of the Personality (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1939), p. 250.

¹⁸³ Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., pp. 330-331. Katha. 2.8-9. John Woodruffe (Arthur Avalon), Principles of Tantra, (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1952), p. 801, quoting from the Kulāgama: "A boat can carry a stone across a river, but a stone can never carry another stone across it. One person can never guide another person along a path which he has never trod himself..."

¹⁸⁴ See Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 208-209. In a fashion somewhat akin to that of Sri Aurobindo Rādhakṛishṇan, in speaking of true gurus, calls them the "first fruits of the future man," "...the new emergents, the beginning of a new human species, the 'sports' in the biological expression, in whom a qualitatively new type is awakened."

realization he may be considered as a channel, so to speak, manifesting the conscious divine power or śakti. The attitude of the śishya is considered of most importance, however, for spiritual teachers who are as yet "not freed from the net of illusion can, nevertheless, bestow divine grace and power upon the śishya...who is less advanced upon the Path than themselves."¹⁸⁵

The Roman Catholic concept of Christian Grace posits it as "existing invisibly in the soul either as a transient impulse (actus) or as a permanent state (habitus), tending either to the salvation of the person in whom it inheres or through him to the sanctification of others." In this latter case it is called gratia gratis data and is "intrinsically inferior to the grace of personal salvation and holiness," or gratia gratum faciens and, instead of being intended for all men, is an exclusive gift intended for "only a few chosen persons" such as prophets and priests. It may exist independently of gratia gratum faciens "because personal holiness is not a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of the charismata or the power of forgiving sins..."¹⁸⁶ Like the guru the priest is a channel for divine power,--but a channel far

¹⁸⁵ W. Y. Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 67. Also Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II, 271-274.

¹⁸⁶ Pohle, op. cit., p. 12.

removed from a necessarily direct experience of metaphysical reality, in fact from the necessity for any "personal holiness." Guruvāda, on the other hand, embraces the doctrine of the Supreme Reality as the One Guru manifesting directly as the immanent Self of the preceptor. Rādhakṛishṇan¹⁸⁷ tells of the vedic usage of the word deva to include those preceptors who give spiritual light and knowledge to their fellow man.

The guru-Brahman relationship is, in many respects, the identity relation of microcosm to macrocosm. Woodroffe¹⁸⁸ states:

He who is my Lord is the Lord of the world. He who is my guru is the guru of the world...Just as an image is an instrument (not devatva) in which divinity is seated, so also is the body of the guru. ...although gurus have different bodies, they are all the same in so far as they are embodiments of the One.

Srīnivāsaśāhārī¹⁸⁹ declares that "the world is itself the temple of Hari and the true guru is Brahman or Hari." The Guru Tantra¹⁹⁰ calls him "the Lord, the sustainer and the annihilator. It is he who can give moksha." To him the Upanishad¹⁹¹ recommends "the highest devotion (bhakti)...

¹⁸⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, I, 72-73.

¹⁸⁸ Woodroffe, op. cit., pp. 789-790.

¹⁸⁹ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 561.

¹⁹⁰ Quoted by Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 624.

¹⁹¹ Svet.6.23.; Hume, op. cit., p. 411.

even as for God." This, however, is not the deification of an individual teacher, for all sāstras are very careful to declare the immanence of the One Guru in all samskritic manifestation. "But the human guru," states Woodroffe,¹⁹² "is not the real guru--the real guru is in the thousand petaled lotus"; and from the Yogini Tantra, "The human mantra-giver meditates upon the same guru as Him upon whom the disciple must thus meditate." Inasmuch as the Supreme is said to manifest itself more or less openly in the less turbid being of the guru, "the greatness of the human guru is published in all the sāstras,"¹⁹³ yet the One immanent Guru is in and as all, and is experienced and encountered "in the thousand petaled lotus, sometimes in the heart lotus and sometimes as existing before the eyes, that is, in human form."¹⁹⁴ Sri Aurobindo¹⁹⁵ also declares that the Supreme Himself (as transcendent yet immanent Supreme Personality) is the guru, who as the indwelling witness and guide subtly works in all movements of the divine līlā in accordance with his own will,

¹⁹² Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 624.

¹⁹³ From the Yogini Tantra in Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 625.

¹⁹⁴ From the Yāmala Tantra, loc. cit. From the same Tantra, p. 797: "Siva alone is guru, and I am that Siva."

¹⁹⁵ Aurobindo, The Yoga and Its Objects, p. 28.

that natural process which is divine love and wisdom.¹⁹⁶ At the same time Sri Aurobindo¹⁹⁷ reiterates the general and oft repeated metaphysical warning that, while all true gurus are the same one divine guru, there is also a difference. Each human guru has a different outer personality, mind, background, and a varied set of symbolical and doctrinal tools for use in his teaching. These are necessary for proper contact with the equally varied needs and characteristics of those individuals who are to experience his influence. Therefore the śishya should not take any guru in an indiscriminate manner,--he cannot entrust himself to the authority and "rigid mental logic" of an impersonal and institutionalized confessional "assembly line" and to the more or less anonymous ministrations of one to whom "personal holiness is not a necessary pre-requisite." In addition, some Indian disciplines are of such a complex nature, with a tenuous dividing line between success and failure, that any false interpretation exposes the śishya to the real danger of incurring physical or mental breakdown. The śishya-guru relationship is of all saṁsāric association the most personal and intimate, for it exists as long as there is bondage to saṁsāra.¹⁹⁸ Thus

¹⁹⁶ That is, grace.

¹⁹⁷ Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II, 267-268.

¹⁹⁸ Saśi Dāsgupta, op. cit., pp. 174-175; Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 790.

the necessity for the exercise of great care in the selection of a guru is universally acknowledged in the Eastern tradition.¹⁹⁹

It is said that "Truth, when it descends into a genuinely aspiring soul, not only shines by its own intrinsic light, but also dispells the darkness in other minds, and kindles the torch in other souls."²⁰⁰ It also has been said that that Truth "is here all the while and needs merely to be pointed out."²⁰¹ Regardless of any of the other functions of a guru, this "pointing out" in itself is a gift, the freely given grace or guruprasāda. The true guru is that omnipresent, omnipotent ātman who is Brahman, therefore guruprasāda and Brahman-prasāda are identical, and that which is the will of the guru is the will of Brahman.

The guru, through his influence and consciousness-power, guides throughout the "grinding away" process of sādhana, that usual friction-experience which is the normal and sometimes dangerous process if the jiiva is to be worked

¹⁹⁹ See Woodroffe, op. cit., pp. 805-871.

²⁰⁰ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 231. See also De, op. cit., p. 277: "The first cause of bhakti, no doubt, is the grace of the Lord, but the association with saints and devotees is the most important medium through which this divine grace is communicated."

²⁰¹ F.S.C. Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), p. 374.

into its proper vocational relationship to the advaitic whole.²⁰² The necessary confidence in the preceptor must be that of complete surrender and abandonment of the ego to his charge,--just as the Western analogy in the realm of science admonishes the unwhole, or un-healthy, to obey implicitly the orders of the physician. Srf Aurobindo²⁰³ has called this surrender to the guru complete surrender, "for it is not only to the impersonal but to the personal,--not only to the inner divine, but to the outer," yet it is surrender to the divine in and as the guru and not to the human ego. Still, and this applies to the naïve devotee, East or West, whether drying with their hair the newly-washed feet of the adored guru-deva in Palestine or surrendering with pāda-pūjā

202 See T. V. Kapāli Śāstry, Lights on the Upanishads (Madras: Srf Aurobindo Library, 1947), p. 70. J. M. Nalla-swāmi Pillai, translator, Sivajñāna Siddhiyār [Arulnandi Sivāchārya] (Dharmapuram: Jñānasambandam Press, 1948), p. 282. From Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 791: "Hence śāstra has said:--'obeisance to the guru, by which is shown the Brahman who pervades the entire universe of mobile and immobile things. Obeisance to the guru, by whom the eyes of jīva, blinded by the darkness of ignorance, are opened with the collyrium stick of knowledge.' He by whose grace the Brahman who pervades the universe is revealed and the eye of the soul is opened is not a mere man, in spite of his appearance as such."

Sankara, Vivekachudāmaṇi (Almoraz: Advaita Āśram, 1926), p. 224, śloka 518: "O teacher, thou hast out of sheer grace (kṛipayā) awakened me from sleep and completely saved me who was wandering in an interminable dream, in a forest of birth, decay and death created by illusion, being tormented day after day by countless afflictions, and sorely troubled by the tiger of egoism."

203 Aurobindo, Letters of Srf Aurobindo, IV, 135-136.

to the adored guru-deva in India, it also has been said that "Even the devotees of other Shining Ones who worship full of faith, they also worship Me, O Son of Kuntī, though contrary to the ancient rule."²⁰⁴

From varied and literally countless sources there are to be encountered many expressions of the grace of the guru, or guru-prasāda. Of the devotee, whose true Self is immortal (i. e. timeless and undying), Srīnivāsaśāhārī²⁰⁵ says: "... Though he suffers..., he can attain²⁰⁶ moksha by bhakti and faith in the guru...by repeating Hari-mantra and attaining to guru's grace," for the gift of mukti "is impossible without the grace of the guru and God or guru and īśvara prasāda."²⁰⁷ Varāhōpanishad 5.66²⁰⁸ mentions guru-devaprasāda-tah, or "...the grace of his guru-deva...", and in the writings of Sankara the grace of the guru is mentioned in many passages.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁴ Gītā 9. 23. Annie Besant, Bhagavān Dās, The Bhagavadgītā (Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House, 1950), p. 168.

²⁰⁵ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 561.

²⁰⁶ Before moksha the jīva is apt to think in terms of attainment in time.

²⁰⁷ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 588.

²⁰⁸ S. S. Śāstrī, editor, The Yoga Upanishads (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1938), p. 445.

²⁰⁹ Sankara, Vivekachudāmaṇi, p. 11, śloka 28.-"... this yearning for freedom, through the grace of the guru

It is true that gurvāda, like all personalization, is subject to misinterpretation and all of those aberrations inherent in an overlay of individual religious expression. Just as religious grace is thought of as an exterior force impinging upon the jīva rather than an all-inclusive extra-samsāric power or aid directing the līlā in accordance with the Supreme will, so is there the religious interpretation of the guru as a prophet, receiving an individual "message" from an exterior heaven-source, an often helpful projection of individual human aspiration or eros onto the beloved teacher or Avatāra-hero and its prasāda-like return as the fruit of creative visualization.²¹⁰ Nevertheless, in addition

(prasādena guruḥ), may bear fruit..."; p. 224, śloka 517: "This splendor of the sovereignty of Self-effulgence I have received by virtue of the supreme majesty of thy grace (prasādat)."²¹⁰ Sankara, Ātmabodhaḥ (Madras: Śrī Rāmakṛishṇa Math, 1947), p. 231, "Gurvashṭakam" (Eight Stanzas in Praise of the Guru"), No. 6.: "Even if every nation resound with your beneficence, yet if the mind be not absorbed in the lotus feet of him by grace [prasādat] of whom, alone, everything in this world is won, What will it all avail you? What, indeed, will it all avail?"

To the devotee of Southern India the Saiva Siddhānta [K. Subramania Pillai, editor, Saiva Siddhāntam (Annamalai-nagar: Annamalai University, 1943), p. 210.] SI. 12.6, says: "...but the knowledge of God can only be secured by the grace (arul) of the guru and not by any other means."

In the Tibetan Book of the Dead (W. Y. Evans-Wentz, London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 149, the ones in Bardo are instructed to call "upon the name of their own guru, praying thus: "[alas] wandering am I in the Bardo; rescue me! [o] let not thy grace forsake me."

²¹⁰ See J. Evola, The Doctrine of Awakening (London: Luzac & Co., 1951), p. 25; Huxley, op. cit., p. 167.

to the guru as he appears to the ego there remains the guru as he is. It is only when identity of Self is established between śishya and guru,--the identity of the One Guru that

Bhagavān, Maheśvara Himself, appears before his eyes as guru...Hence it often happens that the guru who has baffled search for even a hundred years, gratifies of his own accord²¹¹ unsought and in one moment, the fortunate disciple without any effort on the latter's part.²¹²

Proper initiation (dīkshā) by a true guru is indispensable according to all Indian spiritual tradition.²¹³ It is said that "...the possessor of knowledge is qualified to communicate it to others...",²¹⁴ and that transmission has been likened to the lighting of one lamp by the flame of another.

Initiation by the guru partakes, in a measure, of an almost vicarious nature inasmuch as the guru must realize

²¹¹ Grace.

²¹² Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 791.

²¹³ Śāstrī, Bhagavadgītā With Commentary of Śrī Sankarāchārya, p., 487. Also see Woodroffe, op. cit., pp. 618-621, 628.

²¹⁴ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 175. Guénon adds: "...or more accurately speaking, to awaken corresponding possibilities within them, since knowledge in itself is strictly personal and incommunicable." The weak and tepid analogy in the more limited field of current secular educational theory is the professional catch-phrase, "provide learning situations or experiences," with "group dynamics" taking the place of the guru-śishya relationship.

See also Evans-Wentz, op. cit., pp. 223-224; Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 790; Sankara, Ātmabodhah, p. 39.

the universality and omnipresence of the divine consciousness-power and, so to speak, "impart," vivify, or "charge" the tranquilized consciousness of the śishya with its potency. This free penetration of the disciple's being incurs the responsibility of a type of union wherein the guru also freely partakes in some degree of the disciple's karma.²¹⁵

The particulars of initiation differ greatly among the various sects, and change with the shifting local, times, and background,--but in general the transmission of spiritual power (śakti) is accomplished when the human guru, through identity consciousness, becomes a clear and tranquil channel for the willed action of the One Guru, and expresses that power, that concentrated yet timelessly expanded point or seed of eternity, as an outer, or inner, mantra-sound which, to the initiated, is pregnant with the infinite plenum and transcendence of the Bindu, the "Now"²¹⁶ Thus the true dīkshā is said to "unlock the door to super-sensual knowledge," "impart divine knowledge," and to provide a direct identity-experience with the divine or some measure of the divine chit-śakti.

The Christian sacrament of ordination or holy orders,

²¹⁵ Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 626. Also cf. agape.

²¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 621-622; Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 223; W. Y. Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 8, 9, 138.

however, like confirmation, baptism, and marriage, is of the nature of a "consecration" rather than of a "healing,"²¹⁷ and stems from magical practices and ideas²¹⁸ dealing with an external force rather than with the act or experience of integral realization.

In Eastern writings pertaining to the guru there are repeated references to the grace and power of the guru's glance or look. Sankara,²¹⁹ after instructing the would-be śishya concerning his conduct toward the guru, tells him to address the preceptor as "ocean of mercy (kāruṇa) [whose eye] sheds nectar-like grace (kāruṇa) supreme." The Varāhopanishad²²⁰ speaks of the glance of the "knower of Brahman" and considers it, not as a giver of mukṭi, but as a cleansing agent which removes the stain of sin or avidyā. The "look of grace" also is termed nayana inasmuch as it is intended to weaken anaya or bad conduct.²²¹ It is to be

217 Matthias J. Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), p. 572.

218 Hopkins, The History of Religions, p. 581.

219 Sankara, Vivekachudāmaṇi Sl. 38-40, p. 14.

220 4. 43-44. Sāstrī, Yogopanishads, p. 432.

221 S. Sivapadasundaram, The Saiva School of Hinduism (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 173. Cf. Otto Böhtlingk and Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch (St. Petersburg: 1855-1875), IV, 1097: "drishti prasādam kuru," "favor me with the grace of thy sight (glance)."; Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 1108 gives "divyadrishṭi" for the divine power of the glance. Also cf. Macdonell, op. cit., p. 120 where divyachakṣus is the "divine eye transcending time and space."

compared to the look of compassion, love, and comfort bestowed by a mother upon her child,--thus the guru is called the spiritual mother.²²² Spiegelberg²²³ speaks of the same power of the eye in the "concentric glance" firmly fixed by the yogi at a point betwixt the eyes of the person he is addressing and which serves as a type of "carrier wave" to convey the force of his will to another. The Sambhavi Tantra²²⁴ gives specific directions for the use of divine sight or "divya-dṛishti, the steady vision acquired by the Hathayoga process known as trātaka." In the Gandharva Tantra the look is described as "angry." The Viśvasāra Tantra characterizes it as a steady gaze "in which there is no twinkling of the eye," and the Meru Tantra says that the

This Look of Grace in many ways approximates the function of the actual (Christian) grace which illumines the intellect, strengthens, inspires, and inclines the will toward the desired moral end. In the guru, however, the peculiar, "supernatural" nature of the Christian Grace is overshadowed by the all-inclusive and immanent divine power (śakti) which is inseparable from the Supreme. In addition, the desired moral actions, if present, are not oriented toward a supernatural end but are acts of expediency, the opposite of that evil which, as a turbidity, destroy the clearness which is prasāda.

²²² Sivapadasundaram, loc. cit.; N. R. Sakhare, History and Philosophy of Liṅgāyata Religion (Belgaum: 1942), p. 515; Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 1132: "...by the merciful glance of the all-good Mother..."

²²³ Frederic Spiegelberg, Spiritual Practices of India (San Francisco: The Greenwood Press, 1951, p. 56.

²²⁴ Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 1108.

glance should be "oblique," that is, out of the corner of the eye.²²⁵

The tendency for the "glance of grace" to gravitate toward magical practices is arrested, at least, in the thought of the Vātūlanātha Sūtras²²⁶ which attempts to describe the immediacy of spiritual inspiration in terms of a "kind glance," thrown by the Seer to the devotee "by chance," i.e. spontaneous. This is called sāhasa inspiration, an unexpected or unpremeditated happening in pure immediacy,--at this moment, Now. It also is called anupāya, or without stratagem, and is related closely to sāmbhavopāya wherein, in eternal immediacy, all objectivity is sprung from Maheśvara, is reflected in Him, and is inseparable from Him.

This "timeless inspiration of the Void" is integral with Khechara, the realized Seer who "eternally" lives and moves "in the ether of consciousness" and that "undominated inspiration quicker than the quick..." The real nature of this Seer is of the highest awareness or awakening, superior to differentiation and in identity "with the state of the great vacuity."²²⁷ The free and instantaneous effulgence

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 1109.

²²⁶ Madhusudan Kaul Sāstri, The Vātūlanātha Sūtras (Bombay: Research Dept. Jammu and Kāśmīra State, 1923), p. 1.

²²⁷ Ibid., pp. 1-4. Gloss to sūtras 1-2.

of consciousness is of the nature of ânanda, completely unfettered,²²⁸ and the great liberation which emerges from this ânanda "is superior to both the bondage and release and is always at hand..."²²⁹

(5) Archâ. The Avatâra is conceived as a cyclical and periodical incarnation of the Supreme, or of Mercy and Love. There is another mode of incarnation which may be thought of as relatively permanent in character, a "concretion of kripâ consecrated by bhakti and mantra."²³⁰ This Vaishnava doctrine of archâ²³¹ sees as a fundamental basis for the honor and worship of the symbol or image that spiritual reservoir which is the "redemptive mercy of Īśvara."²³² The Lord is said to partake of the finite by entering into a "formless form" (aprākṛita śarīra) as a concrete embodiment of the will to free the finite self, a form of Love alone and not one of matter or karma. The divine nature, which is Love and compassion, thereby is enriched and not diminished by embodying infinitely this love in the finite.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 12. Gloss to sūtra 8.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 18. Gloss to sūtra 12.

²³⁰ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 160.

²³¹ arch, rich, - "to shine, to praise." William D. Whitney, The Roots, Verb-Forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1945), p. 4. Archâ - worship, honor, adoration; an image. Archî - ray, flame. (Cf. Rays of grace, pp. 158 ff., supra.)

²³² Srīnivāsāchāri, loc. cit.

The Self-manifestation of the Lord, "as a special providence in order to gratify His devotee...", is not the exclusive stone or wood of the image, but all is the "living and speaking God."²³³ The "stone or wood" is the particularized manifestation of dayā and prema which "render the divine form (śubhāśraya)"²³⁴ perceptually obvious and accessible to all as Archā.²³⁵ As purely material objects these images, in India, are not to be confused with the idol. An idol is a finite thing worshipped as the infinite. Archā is the infinite worshipped as the non-separate finite. The image is a support for meditation upon the divine form and as a finite object cannot be confused with the infinite. They are not the divine, but the divine "is the image and not in the image," for the divine, as supremely transcendent yet all-

²³³ Cf. A. B. Purāṇi, Srī Aurobindo's Sāvitrī, An Approach and a Study (Anand: Srī Aurobindo Karyalaya, 1952), p. 13, quoting from a letter by Srī Aurobindo: "A symbol expresses not a play of abstract things or ideas put into imaged form but a living Truth or universal vision or experience of things, so inward, so subtle, so little belonging to the domain of intellectual abstraction and precision that it cannot be brought out except through symbolic images..."

²³⁴ So called because the divine form purifies and is accessible to the devotee. Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 62.

²³⁵ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 160-162. Also cf. the Egyptian doctrine of the Ka and the preservation of the mummified form as well as the erection of funerary statues or pictures of the deceased and of the gods. See James Henry Breasted, The Dawn of Consciousness (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 56; James Henry Breasted, A History of Egypt (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1912), p. 70.

pervading, is not to be contained in any way.²³⁶ Again, these differing images may be thought of as personal symbols designed to conform to individual tendencies and to provide "an auxiliary means of realization."²³⁷

In some respects, but with the differences of their two contextual fields constantly in mind, the doctrine of Archā may be compared with Jaspers' "cyphers of the transcendent absolute" wherein "the being of transcendence 'becomes audible for the individual in the form of cyphers or symbols,' and human existence can experience transcendence in the reading of these 'cyphers'."²³⁸ The "cyphers" are not to be confused with those signs and symbols apprehensible by philosophical discipline, nor are they the

²³⁶ Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 161. Cf. pratīka (√ añch - bend), "turned or looking toward...outward form, aspect, countenance;...image, symbol." Macdonell, op. cit., p. 176. Pratīka, "counter-measure; likeness, image, figure, picture... symbol." Ibid., p. 174.

Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 160, concerning the critic who sees only the stone and wood and not the divine form, speaks of him as one "who tries to understand the tears of love by the anatomical dissection of the lachrymal glands."

²³⁷ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 226-227. See also pp. 132-133. Hopkins, The History of Religions, pp. 580-581, notes that in "1563 the Church declared that images were only mnemonic, reminders of piety." They also became the instruments for the exercise of practical expediency, for Hopkins also writes that "many old divinities of Greece have become, as images, converted into Christian objects of veneration."

²³⁸ Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 195. Cf., "When the image is authentic it is a symbol, that is to say, it does not merely represent the experience but conveys the experience.." Purāṇi, op. cit., p. 12.

images of theology. They occur in the "limit situation" where "presence and search are one." The observance of rite and cult hinder rather than help, and organized institutionalism opposes the necessary path of the individual in search of the "cypher," the "sign language of the transcendent Reality." All things, movements, relationships, and awareness, in addition to their limited empirical value, can become "cyphers," the symbolic manifestation of transcendence in finite reality. Hitherto "opaque" realities "break open" in becoming "cyphers" and allow a glimpse of the "absolute Being of transcendence" in an "infinite perspective." The great danger here is that of objectification of the "cyphers," of placing "Transcendence in an objective space above and behind the world and thus [trying] to separate that which is inseparable."²³⁹

²³⁹ Reinhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 196. This is all too evident when the spontaneous immediacy of the *Arché* is laid aside and one begins to speak of the image or the sign, to reason about it and analyze it. *Arché* as spontaneous art-experience is one thing,--but in a philosophical or theological discussion all traces of its metaphysical basis becomes changed, finally, through the digestive process of mastication.

Cf. the more analytical approach by Marcel as summarized by Reinhardt, p. 209: "As I am incarnate in my body so the world is incarnate in me, and God is incarnate in the world, manifesting Himself by means of sensible signs, symbols, and vestiges."

Also cf. Howard H. Brinton, *The Mystic Will* (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1930). In his attempts to express an integral metaphysical experience within the limits of a kind of

In a world limited, largely, to those endeavors which tend to enhance, "fortify" and extend the content of waking consciousness only, religious images are useful sources of refuge which may hide the ego from a direct experience of the, to him, fearful void of the "unconscious,"²⁴⁰ the nothingness from which the waking ego-consciousness was made, or, stated more comprehensively, the plenum of integral consciousness-power. The dogmatic sign, separated and divorced from the first hand and original spiritual experience which projected it as a spontaneous power into waking consciousness, tends to become overlayed by an ornate and stereotyped formula, a desiccated sponge-skeleton from which the life-juices have been sucked. It is a peculiar Western tendency to start from the literal image itself without conscious reference to its ground, and upon it build an inferential structure which expels all "unconscious" content "from the psyche into cosmic space."²⁴¹ It is this

theological terminology, Boehme, to whom "Eternal Nature is Divine Incarnation" (p. 158), said: "The whole outward visible world with all its being is a signature or figure of the inward spiritual world; whatever it is internally and however its operation is, so likewise it has its character externally ...the internal holds the external before it as a glass wherein it beholds itself in the property of the generations of all forms; the external is its signature." (Sig.Rer.1.3.) (p. 99) Also see Boehme's "ungrund" as the equivalent to the Upanishadic Brahman. (pp. 180-182).

²⁴⁰ Jung, op. cit., pp. 59, 70. Cf. Aurobindo, Sāvitrī I, 5, Book I, Canto 1: "A message from the unknown immortal Light ablaze upon creations quivering edge..."

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 60. Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of

construct, this series of walls, "erected in primeval times, that later became the foundations of the church. It is also these walls that collapse when the symbols become weak with age,"²⁴² when only the outer form remains. The "image" or sign is then but an "idol," "that is to say, a vain image, and its preservation amounts to mere 'superstition'."²⁴³ Pointing to the purely Western religious image Jung²⁴⁴ has observed that

Dogma advises us not to have an unconscious.²⁴⁵ Therefore the Catholic way of life is completely unaware of psychological problems in this sense. The whole life of the collective unconscious has been absorbed without remainder, so to speak, in the dogmatic archetype, and flows like a well-controlled stream in the symbolism of ritual and of the church calendar.

Western religious thought has persisted in ascribing to the "sensuous, emotional, aesthetic data which every mortal immediately experiences" the exclusive rôle of

...handmaid or sign of the theoretic component of the nature of things beyond, with which the totality of

Life, p. 135 says: "Intellectual symbols are no substitute for perceived realities..." See also p. 97.

²⁴² Jung, op. cit., p. 71.

²⁴³ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 132-133. Jung, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

²⁴⁴ Jung, op. cit., p. 60.

²⁴⁵ Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 52: "The church, its tradition, its teaching, has to do with man as a temporal and historical being; metaphysic has to do with man as an eternal being--not indeed with man the individual, but with... the Self (âtma) as distinct from the individual ego (jîva).

goodness both in morality and religion tend to be identified. Even with Aristotle it was with the universal logical character of the sensible that the Divine was associated.²⁴⁶

This Western overemphasis upon the logical, technical and rational principle has seemed to be the gift of Greek philosophy to Jewish exclusiveness. Aristotle's preoccupation with the purely inductive method, the stress upon observation, description, and classification, and his rejection of Democritian Atomism served to do away with all reason for distinctions "between the sensed world and the more real world of atoms" as well as strictly Plutonic idealism. The Aristotelian real world is the sensed world, and consequently there are...

"no ideas in the intellect which are not first given through the senses. Since pre-Aristotelian Christianity had identified the Divine...with the unsensed and unseen, scientifically and philosophically postulated factor, which could only be known by means of indirectly verified scientific theory and not by direct observation through the senses alone,"²⁴⁷ Aristotle's views were at first a decided shock.

Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, though, saw in the Aristotelian thesis a new and more adequate basis for the traditional doctrine, and therefore guided the church into its acceptance.²⁴⁸ Christian theology, then, tended to

²⁴⁶ Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, pp. 287, 305.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 264.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 261-268.

turn from Platonic idealism and posit its thinking from the starting point of the world of creation, the intelligible sign of "number, weight and measure"²⁴⁹ with which "nature proclaims the wisdom of God."²⁵⁰

The religious relationship of the immediately sensed world to that of the theoretically postulated is based upon a "doctrine of opposites" which declares that "It is the characteristic of any positive form or quality which we immediately sense that it is logically related to its opposite." Thus when a form or quality is "given logically as an opposite of the sensed positive form, it is called by Aristotle 'the form by privation'."²⁵¹ The positive and particular forms or ideas which, through the senses, are grasped or given to human knowledge have also a theoretically postulated and logical character as "forms by privation" which give them "universal, immortal meaning and status."²⁵² Thus, through the "logical character of Aristotelian forms as immortal universals," the soul of man may be equated with "the rational form of the universe." Final form or cause is, then, said to exist and operate from the beginning of a process "as form

²⁴⁹ The Sanskrit māyā comes from mā meaning to measure.

²⁵⁰ Gilson, op. cit., p. 242.

²⁵¹ Northrop, op. cit., p. 269.

²⁵² In itself this may be viewed as a logical and religious inversion, exclusively in space and time, of the metaphysical implications of "neti, neti."

by privation controlling the direction which the development takes [and] ...although it appears last to the senses, is present initially and is first logically."²⁵³ Therefore it may be said that "the nature of any individual thing or substance [is] ...the actualization in matter of the potentially present final cause, existing initially in the status of form by privation..."²⁵⁴

Just as man's ownership of the products of his works is based upon these products or effects being at first but himself as cause, persistently existent in them,²⁵⁵ so does the idea of creation by unique Being imply all that was created as an effect of God as final cause. Man as causal being, however, can be no more than an analogy of unique Being per se, an analogy between "two orders of being not to be added together nor subtracted." This resemblance or analogy, being co-essential rather than additional in quality, is merely the external sign and sensible manifestation of Being.²⁵⁶

By these signs "whose attributes have in the Godhead their sovereign analogy" Christian man may, "as in a mirror," look toward God as the object of his understanding. The process of knowledge begins and ends in the final form

²⁵³ Northrop, op. cit., pp. 270-271.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 273.

²⁵⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 89.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 95-96, 130-131.

which is God, and it is connected inseparably with the power to choose those analogical signs, open to the intellect, of that which is hidden in God,²⁵⁷ for without knowledge of "the effect, the image, and the road...we shall know nothing of the cause, the model, and the goal."²⁵⁸

Every contingent being must have received its existence, "significantly and sacramentally" from Pure Being Itself,²⁵⁹ "like the mark of the workman stamped upon his work."²⁶⁰ The analogy of likeness is one tending toward unity but as no more than an analogy it is separative, being "infinitely different,"²⁶¹ distinct, and discontinuous. There is, then, no identity possible between the image and that Being which can be approached only through the conceptual and postulative process of analogical reasoning.²⁶² In the scientific world this theoretic and postulative process tentatively may be tested, as it were, through "the power of

²⁵⁷ Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 297-298.

²⁵⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 244.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 435.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 226.

²⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 447n-448.

²⁶² Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 277.

prediction."²⁶³ In the religious field, though, this type of confirmation has failed to persuade or command that universal acceptance which has marked the scientific method. The immediate, spontaneous and self-luminous identity-experience, however, as superior to causality and analogy, is based upon the ground of metaphysic which, as all-inclusive, contains within it all of the imagery and rôle-playing which is samsâric lîlâ, the "projections or extraversions of the interior and infinite center."²⁶⁴

Gilson, as an illustration of the Christian concept of "participation and similitude," writes that

...we might say that all Rembrant's pictures are pictures of Rembrant painted by himself,...because he is [their] cause, and because here, as in all other causes of the same kind, it is something of his being which, directly or indirectly, has been communicated to his efforts.²⁶⁵

It is this inferred and logically postulated final form as the real which gives traditional Western art its predominately connotative nature. Apart from this "form by privation," this "speculatively constructed and indirectly verified" theoretical concept, there is the intuitive and directly experienced pure fact as yet unsubjected to reason, dimensional analysis, or name. It is that which is immediately

²⁶³ Râdhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 144.

²⁶⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 51n.

²⁶⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 98.

experienced,--minus even the thought of the experience. As immediate experience it is not shrouded in memory nor anticipated in the future but is,--Now, that timeless point or bindu which alone is eternal. As experienced differentiations it is non-separate from that equal fact-experience of the Now which is undifferentiated, undeterminate and all-embracing. The rich and differentiated symbolism of all traditional oriental art, as concerned primarily with the immediately experienced fact, can refer only to that undifferentiated supreme experience which includes it as an advaitic manifestation or emergence. Traditional Western art, on the other hand, tends to translate that which is directly experienced, manifold yet free from category, into analogous images of rationality, feeling, and sense which are but signs existing only to point to the logical and theoretical "form by privation." The non-dual, undifferentiated Fact-experience, the Supreme Identity encompassing the many and one, is practically unknown in the West.²⁶⁶ More specifically, as stated by Northrop,²⁶⁷ "Roman Catholicism...has used all the arts to direct man's thoughts to and bring his emotional practical life in conformity with the different

²⁶⁶ Northrop, op. cit., pp. 316, 318, 351, 355, 404; Watts, op. cit., p. 30.

²⁶⁷ Northrop, op. cit., pp. 357-358

logically given, doctrinally designated, theoretic component in the nature of things with which it identifies the divine."

Metaphysical art-symbolism ~~may~~, within the variations of its traditional manifestation, ^{may} express certain "determinate constancies" as ~~may~~ be useful, though temporary, aids (upāya) which meet the needs of different states of awareness or of differing personalities. If, on the other hand, the symbol tends to become self-sufficient and its literalness is taken as separate from its metaphysical ground, it becomes but a sign pointing to the external craftsman who made it or to the hidden or occult power which uses it as a magic bridge.²⁶⁸ Symbolism, as an aid for "consciousness-fixation," is present in almost every daily activity, and can become a "fetter" only when it becomes an exclusive end in itself as an object for possession or control.²⁶⁹ Art-experience or Archê, in the metaphysical tradition and in all of its many branches, stands at the horizon uniting the two orders, the finite and the infinite. As such a meeting point or pīṭha, as an expression of the bindu, the Now, it may have a mediative function as opening into liberation,²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 384.

²⁶⁹ Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, p. 73.

²⁷⁰ Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, pp. 68-72.
Pīṭha:- seat, chair, kuśa grass seat of one who meditates, .
 seat of a deity or the pedestal of an image; an intermediary
 between the two sexes; temple erected at a place where the
 limbs of Pārvatī fell to earth. Macdonell, op. cit., p. 163;
 Bhide, op. cit., p. 699; Lanman, op. cit., p. 191.

and the mediative experience or "insight" coexistent with the activity of the artist as well as the devotee embraces that which is so far superior to the conscious analytical mind that it may appear as an experience of grace, a gift of extra-samsāric consciousness or compassion.²⁷¹ Compassion or karuṇā is the realization of community, of wholeness with That which is the other. It is the evidence of true equality or identity. In an aesthetic tradition unseparated from metaphysic it appears through and as art. In religion it is logically and systematically rational, and is encompassed within the theological doctrine of grace.²⁷² The highest art expression, however, has a "givenness," a self-luminous authenticity, for it is a "symbolless symbol," understandable only in the immediacy of integral consciousness within which it is.²⁷³ Archā is this art expressed in degrees of pureness; and one may become conscious of the simple image which is kṛpā in the infinitely rich multiplicity embraced within the infinite bindu of the present.

That spontaneous and intuitive expression of the immediate and integral experience which is art is not limited

271 See Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 186-187, 205.

272 See Rādhakṛishṇan, East and West in Religion, pp. 117-118.

273 Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 194.

to any mode. It may manifest as a flash within the most simple and naive framework, or it may utilize even the highest of disciplined, timeless, techniques in its infinite, manifold play, for it is "skill in action."²⁷⁴ This "skill" is not limited to any expressive medium, formal or informal, for it may be found within the natural and harmoniously directed interplay of those forces which are inseparable from that everyday life which is fully aware of itself.

As a part of the logical and theoretical process art forms lose their immediacy and tend to become crystallized analogy which exists only to point to its theoretical component as the highest good. The sacramental world of Christianity is symbolical in character, and is said to be an analogy wherein the mirrored final form of God may be discovered. The "divine likeness" is born not only in the existence of all creatures, but in their causality as well for, "as a sequel and an analogy of creation, Christian causality, so to speak, prolongs and continues it," not, however, as

²⁷⁴ yogah karmasu kauśalam. Gītā 2.50. See also Gītā 12.16 where such skillfulness is shown to be accompanied by a lack of tension-making desire, an absence of concern or worry, because of the operation of a fluid-like, flawless and pure identity with the Supreme will. The Gītā-term "skill in action" is a drawing near to Zen.

creative causality but as productive of being.²⁷⁵ Gilson²⁷⁶ states that "in the measure in which it is, every being can give of the being it has received, and make it pass, in the character of effect, into another being." There is thus a logical basis established for the channelizing and transmission of certain divine qualities and powers. Given the ultimate permissible measure of being and backed by special divine dispensation and ordination there may be established, then, a logically conceived organism with infallible authority and sole rights to channelize that force to those who may be in agreement with its fiat as mediative agent with full and legal power of attorney to bind and loose on earth and in heaven.²⁷⁷

The Roman Catholic view of the precise nature of sacramental grace is purely speculative and within the church

²⁷⁵ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 96-99; 100-106; 142-143.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 143.

²⁷⁷ The Church, then, presents a logical and inverse analogy to the guru. Whereas gurvāda is based upon identity-consciousness with the One transcendent Guru immanent in all, Church authority stems from an exclusive arrangement of power delegation existing, logically and legally, between God, the logical construct or ultimate "form by privation," and the chosen and sole instrument created by this ever-separate Being. In gurvāda all control is from internal identity with Supreme Will, and with realization the guru-sishya dualistic relation terminates. (See Woodroffe, op. cit., p. 790.) Christianity is governed remotely through an intricate theological bureaucracy, and the dualistic relation is perpetually ordained.

itself there are varying ideas concerning it. There is a lack of scriptural authority other than the bare institution of the sacraments themselves, and even Patristic writings fail to be definitive on the subject. Any explicit doctrine concerning the seven sacraments and sacramental grace, "logically analyzed into genus and species," was not worked out "until five or six centuries after the close of Patristic literature."²⁷⁸ The process of analysis must still be incomplete inasmuch as "There have been absolutely no pronouncements from the Magisterian of the Church through the course of the centuries on the specific question of the nature of sacramental grace."²⁷⁹ There have been two declarations, one of which is termed as infallible, which carry certain implications concerning the nature of sacramental grace. The Council of Florence mentioned the seven sacraments of the New Law which, through the passion of Christ, cause grace. The council of Trent pronounced as an article of faith that "if anyone shall say that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain the grace which they signify...let him be anathema."²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ See Lawrence P. Everett, The Nature of Sacramental Grace (Washington: The Catholic University of American Press, 1948), pp. 6, 10, 54-55.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Hopkins²⁸¹ tells of the Church's extension of the two original sacraments of "baptism and the Last Supper" to seven by the addition of confirmation, penance, extreme unction, ordination, and marriage, and traces the "magical" content and origin of the two original sacraments.²⁸²

In a broad sense Catholic sacramental grace includes all of the graces conferred by the sacraments, that is, the "common habit of sanctifying grace" and in addition those actual graces given as an aid in attaining the "specific effect in the Christian life" peculiar to the institution of the sacraments, "or the right and title to these graces, and any new habit of grace which the sacraments might confer, or modification of the common habit of grace." In its strict sense sacramental grace pertains only to that gratuitous benefit specifically conferred by the divinely instituted sacraments²⁸³ and directed to their special effects "in

²⁸¹ Hopkins, The History of Religions, pp. 581-582.

²⁸² From the point of view of the ifva all integral activity or "skill in action" coincident with immediate metaphysical experience and inexplicable by the current status of the logical mind is magic. As practiced by the ifva, however, it takes on the pattern of appropriating a symbol or art form once apprehended through immediate intuition and by inversion using it as a tool or weapon to compel natural and psychic forces to conform to and obey the ifva's projected desires.

²⁸³ That is, it is "either a new habit of sanctifying grace, an actual grace, a right and title to actual grace, or a modification of the common habit of sanctifying grace." (Everett, op. cit., p. 3.)

addition to the common grace of the virtues and the gifts."²⁸⁴

Actual grace is said to introduce the state of sanctifying grace or to preserve or increase it.²⁸⁵ The object of sanctifying or habitual grace, on the other hand, is to impart, supernaturally, to the soul that degree of intellectuality necessary for the perception of God. While on earth this perception can be but "in the obscurity of faith," in the heavenly world it is unobscured, for it is the beatific vision, the lumen gloriae.²⁸⁶ This sacramental grace is not created directly by God but inheres as an "accidental form of the soul itself" and is, then, drawn from the "obediential potency" of the soul.²⁸⁷ As an accident, that is as a divine quality inherent in the soul, sanctifying grace is not at all a substantial and physical identity. It is, rather, an

²⁸⁴ Everett, op. cit., pp. 2-3. The virtues and gifts, while not of the "essence of grace" occur with it as supernatural privileges. The three divine virtues have for their "immediate formal object" God Himself and are called Faith, Hope, and Charity. The supernatural moral virtues...are the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as "infused habitual dispositions for receiving inspirations from the Holy Ghost....," are wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, godliness, and fear of the Lord. (Pohle, op. cit., pp. 363-370)

²⁸⁵ See supra p.120ff, also Pohle, op. cit., p. 271.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 345.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 332-333. Maritain, op. cit., p. 317.

analogue, an "accidental and moral union" only,²⁸⁸ yet a permanent quality, "an unmerited, supernatural gift, imparted to the soul by the Holy Ghost by which we are made just, a child of God, and heirs of Heaven."²⁸⁹ The Holy Ghost, as "uncreated grace," is not identical with sanctifying grace (which may be increased by good works) and is therefore not "poured forth into the hearts of men." It is the Holy Ghost who is the "efficient cause" of sanctifying grace and, although the Eastern fathers are said to have admitted its "substantial indwelling," the West has denied that the relation of the Holy Ghost to the soul is similar to that of the soul to the body,²⁹⁰ nor is it of a

288 Pohle, op. cit., p. 374. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 314-315, speaks of sanctifying grace as "the vital germ or rich seed [semen Dei],--planted in us here below..., of that full flower which is the beatific vision," and which "leaves us--in our order of being--wholly and infinitely distant from pure act, is in the order of spiritual operation and of relation to the object a formal participation in the divine nature." Cf. Gītā 7.10 where the Lord himself is "the eternal seed (bijam) of all beings."

289 Pohle, op. cit., p. 328. Deharbe Definition.

290 Cf. Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of the jīva as an inseparable attribute of God, as well as the doctrine of śarīra-śarīrin which involves a relation in unity of the jīva as the body of īśvara. This śarīra (√śri, --cover) or physical being is integrally and advaitically inseparable from the "śarīrin or Self which is ultimate Brahman itself."--Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 85, 78-79. Cf. Chhānd. 6.14.3 (Hume, op. cit., p. 249): "That which is the finest essence--this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman. That art thou, Svetaketu."

hypostatic nature.²⁹¹ Furthermore, "God is not a whole of which man is a part, man is not a part of which God is the whole...."²⁹² Man is but an analogy and a similitude of that Principle which is his Creator.²⁹³ The causal implications in this analogy may be expressed, however, by noting that God is the final cause of the universe and all of its parts just as the soul informs its physical body and all of its parts.²⁹⁴ The relation remains, though, one of strict analogy and not of identity or undivided segmentation.

It has been said that the "nature of the church is sacramental."²⁹⁵ From the religious point of view the supernatural life of grace, lost by original sin, is that same abundant life which Christ has brought to man and to which his earthly works were dedicated. In order to enter into this life there must be a participation, a sharing in the benefits of Christ's life and death, and a reception of that grace which directly is ordained as a "remedy of sin," particularly "past sins...or a certain propensity to

²⁹¹ Pohle, op. cit., p. 374.

²⁹² Gilson, op. cit., p. 285.

²⁹³ Ibid., pp. 284-287, 302.

²⁹⁴ Northrop, op. cit., p. 278, from J. C. Osborn.

²⁹⁵ Watts, op. cit., p. 51.

sin." "This is accomplished by the sacraments, the divinely instituted channels of sanctifying grace."²⁹⁶ Thus, from another point of view, the Christian sacraments are practical tools for a dynamic, logical, and samsâric-centered utilization of the theoretically grasped understanding of the transcendent.

The religious "mystery hidden under the visible sign"²⁹⁷ does not look to the "outward sign" for any contribution to the sacramental effect other than as a "hyperphysical" "vehicle of a supernatural power that accompanies it or resides in it."²⁹⁸ As "instruments in the production of grace" these outward signs are the sacraments of the church for as Scheeben remarks, "By the sacraments of the church in the narrow sense we understand those external signs by which the grace of Christ is conferred on us and is signified to us." Man's participation in the divine life and nature is dependent, not "through a simple approval of a man by God," but upon a "supernatural intervention" and work by the Holy Ghost through an extraordinary "hyperphysical power and efficacy... which must in some manner or other be associated with the sacraments themselves, that

²⁹⁶ Everett, op. cit., pp. 5, 130.

²⁹⁷ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 572.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 571.

is, the outward signs."²⁹⁹

Sacramental grace may be viewed as a mode of sanctifying grace, that is, as an added determination which may be thought of as accidental inasmuch as, being the determinate of the accident of sanctifying grace, "it is an accident of an accident..."³⁰⁰ It is positive because it adds perfection to the habit of grace; as being in sanctifying grace and not relative to it it is called intrinsic; and as the positive perfection which it adds is related to the "external sacramental rite which signifies and causes it" it is also connotative. The sacramental rite or sign, then, is an agent necessary for the understanding of the mode of sacramental grace which is conferred by any one sacrament. From Thomistic doctrine on modality that "whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of the receiver," it may be said that "it is from the containing of the grace by the sacrament that it receives its sacramental modality."³⁰¹ Since each sign "contains significatively that which it signifies" it must be true, from this premise, that there are seven different significations corresponding to the seven

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 567-568. Thus within the sacraments there is found the perfect union between Hebraic exclusiveness, the theoretic bias of Greek philosophy, and Roman legalism.

³⁰⁰ Everett, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

³⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 115-116.

sacramental signs, with the manner in which the grace is contained in each sign determined by that sign.³⁰² Thus "the grace conferred by the sacrament is contained significatively in the external sacramental rite since every sign contains significatively that which it signifies."³⁰³

In addition to that universally necessary ordination effected by the grace of the virtues and gifts there is a special ordination which is particularly pertinent to Christianity, the "New Dispensation" or "Life in Christ," and is effected by sacramental grace.³⁰⁴ According to this view the right to the grace of Christ already has been acquired for man conditional upon his entering into possession

³⁰² Ibid., pp. 116-117.

³⁰³ Ibid., pp. 5, 2-3.: This view that each sacrament confers the common habit of sanctifying grace "so qualified or modified as to sanctify the recipient in its own proper manner" is in accordance with the generally accepted doctrine of John of St. Thomas. For Cardinal Cajetan and his followers, however, "each sacrament confers only the common habit of sanctifying grace or its...increase, absolutely identical in every respect for each sacrament. The difference in the sacramental effects comes only in the various activities made possible by the grant of actual graces which one receives in the reception of the sacraments, or, at least, in the right and title to them which is received with the sacrament." Another view, now having only historical value, was that expressed by Peter of Paluda and John Capreolus which stated that each sacrament confers a new habit of grace distinct from the "common habit which is the basis for the virtues and the gifts." Thus the varied schools of thought were concerned with the kind of grace conferred by each sacrament in addition to the common graces.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 101-106.

of it. This can be brought about in accordance with Christ's wishes, so it is said, "by means of external actions performed in His Church and in its name; to these actions He attached the communication of His merits...dependent on the condition that men would become members of His mystical body ["which is likewise a visible body"] by outward acts, or as members of it would enter into a special relationship with Him as their Head." Thus all of these necessary Christian sacraments, "with the exception of baptism which imparts the character requisite to this purpose, can work their efficacy upon us only after we have been taken up into the organism of Christ's body,³⁰⁵ whose arteries are the sacraments."³⁰⁶ It is possible, however, to receive sanctification in certain cases outside of the physical body of the Church when, through a specific act of faith one becomes encompassed by the invisible church. This extra-sacramental sanctification, though, does not permit the perfection of action which is said to come from full participation as a member in the supernatural life of Christ, even though the extra-sacramental grace is received through Christ.³⁰⁷ Extra-sacramental grace, while considered necessary for the salvation of all

³⁰⁵ i. e. the Church.

³⁰⁶ Schaeben, op. cit., pp. 565, 585.

³⁰⁷ Everett, op. cit., p. 112.

men, is added to by the "New Law,"--by those sacraments which alone can enable man to receive "membership in Christ." Thus sacramental grace is not to be superceded, and Church membership is necessary for sacramental grace.

Many Western Orientalists have translated the Sanskrit term saṃskāra³⁰⁸ as sacrament, thus indicating to the average Western reader that there is a parallel meaning between the Sanskrit word and Western sacramental religious implications. The saṃskāric rites, however, have to do with the "dharmas of the castes"³⁰⁹ and not with moksha or a moksha-oriented sādhana. They are listed, usually, as twelve in number.³¹⁰ Manu speaks of vedic ritual to be performed in the conception rite and says that it is "purificative both here and

³⁰⁸ kri - skri, to do or make, + saṃ--preparation; a cleansing purification, working over; a technical proceeding with a thing; a domestic religious rite of purification or consecration. The word sanskrit (saṃskṛita, p.p.) (Cultivated, polished, therefore a polished language) comes from the same root. See Lanman, op. cit., p. 263; Macdonell, op. cit., p. 326; Arthur C. Burnell, translator, The Ordinances of Manu (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1891), pp. 19-21, Manu 2.25-39.

³⁰⁹ Burnell, op. cit., p. 19, Manu 2.25.

³¹⁰ 1. garbhādhāna, conception.
 2. pūṃsavana, male-ceremony
 3. śimantonnayana, hair-parting
 4. jātakarman, birth-ceremony
 5. nāmadheya, name giving
 6. nishkramana, going out
 7. annaprāsana, rice-feeding
 8. chūḍākarman, tonsur of scalp

The samskâras, unlike the Christian sacraments, do not signify nor bestow a "grace" which pertains to any state after death.³¹¹ A should not be given a strictly Christian connotation, for the after-death purification does not denote the realization of moksha nor any timeless "salvation." Until the awakening to moksha and timelessness both the living and after death states are samsâric and are within the cycle or round of existence.³¹² These rites at the most can but mark or indicate the easing of karmic burden.

Again in Manu³¹³ it is said that "By fire offerings during the pregnancy, by the rite of birth, the shaving of the head to form a tuft [and] by binding on the muñja string, the seminal and uterine sins (ena) of the twice born are wiped away (apa mriyate)." Again, there is no reference to any religious supernatural power or to any religious idea of original sin,--a concept unknown in Eastern metaphysics. By this Manu points³¹⁴ to a ritualistic purification indicative of the cleansing or abandonment of any lust or imperfection

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- 9. upanâyana, investiture
 - 10. kesânta, tonsure of beard
 - 11. samâvartana, return from study
 - 12. vivâha, marriage

See Lanman, op. cit., p. 346.

³¹¹ 2.26; Burnell, loc. cit.

³¹² Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 313: "The mind is ever haunted by fear...even in the celestial planes."

³¹³ 2.27. Burnell, op. cit., p. 19.

³¹⁴ From an unpublished class lecture by G. P. Malasekera, San Francisco, March, 1952.

which accompanies conception.

Another purification rite is given in Manu 2.25³¹⁵ and tells how, by vedic study, vows, offerings, and sacrifices, the body is made holy (brāhmf), or fit for union with the "world substance" or "universal physical force."³¹⁶

In addition to the outward resemblance of consecration there is a seeming parallelism in the healing function, although in the case of vedic practice this healing was concerned not with any original sin but with physical illness or disease, a condition which was intimately connected with "sin,"--not as an effect of the latter, but as a practical evil of the same nature as sin. Rodhe³¹⁷ tells how, in Atharvaveda 5.30 the priest is to stand at the side of the one who is ill and by means of chant and mantra remove both disease and sin.³¹⁸

There are also certain Indian customs and rites, with a multitude of variations and local interpretation, which have been interpreted by Western writers such as Hopkins³¹⁹

³¹⁵ Burnell, loc. cit.

³¹⁶ Loc. cit., (note); Lanman, op. cit., p. 347.

³¹⁷ Sten Rodhe, Deliver Us From Evil (Lund: 1946), p. 151.

³¹⁸ Again, the English translation "sin" should not carry with it all the implications of Western theology. The nature of vedic sin will be examined in another chapter.

³¹⁹ See Hopkins, The History of Religions.

from a Western religious view with particular reference to penance and expiation. These include practices such as pilgrimages, bathing rites, gifts, and austerities. While it is true that for certain individuals and classes an overlay of "superstition" and an uncritical tendency toward ego-magic may be found, it is also true that these "superstitious" practices and their supposed effects are entirely within the boundary of samsāric duality and are not meant to lead, in any "sacramental" sense, to any ultimate and supreme moksha or timeless release from the round of existence. There may be evidences that certain rites are indicative of particular emotional responses or that they are symbolic cleansing projections from the unconscious, yet their practical application seems to point toward a lessening of the samsāric burden and the attainment of a more felicitous existence, either physical or psychic, but at all times within the cyclical realm of samsāric opposites. Hopkins³²⁰ speaks of confession as one means of "expiating sin," thus implying the religious idea of morality or the salutary act as a positive agent working toward salvation rather than the metaphysical view which regards it as one expedient means for removing or "tranquilizing" any obstruction

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 373. Hopkins cites here Mahābhārata 3.207. 51-52; 12. 268. 14.

to "skill in action." Rodhe³²¹ gives an account of confession in ancient India wherein a woman who has committed adultery is asked concerning it by the sacrificial priest "lest she should sacrifice with a secret pang in her mind. For, when confessed, the sin (enas) becomes less, since it becomes truth (satya).³²² There is here no elaborate and interlocking system of supernatural graces and penances, nor any power of the priest to forgive or "loosen." It is the simple recognition that truth, a bringing out into the open, helps to mitigate the secret pangs and disintegrative burdens of enas.³²²

Guénon³²³ has stated that in addition to the symbolic character of rites, sacraments, and the mantric "sign" these practices do possess a certain efficacy of their own subordinate to their essential end as supports to a conception or "the 'spiritual influence' which will turn the sacrament into an instrument of immediate or deferred psychical regeneration." Thus we return to the integral function of

³²¹ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 154. From Vâjasaneyi Saṁhitā 3.44-47, and the commentary from Satapatha Brāhmaṇa 2.5.2.20ff.

³²² It is true that there is the possibility that individuals might take advantage of the priestly office and tend to become authoritative "popes" in themselves. Buddhism claims to have acted as a cleansing agent for such a religious condition. Cf. note 314, Part IV, Ch. 1.

³²³ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 131-132.

art or the Archā. Huxley³²⁴ points out that "what the poets and painters see, and try to record for us, is actually there, waiting to be apprehended by anyone who has the right kind of faculties." The divine ground itself,--not merely the exclusive theoretical "form by privation," is thus "wholly present...in the image or the sacramental object. Faith and devotion prepare the worshipper's mind for perceiving the ray of Godhead at its point of intersection³²⁵ with the particular fragment of matter before him."³²⁶

Huxley³²⁷ also mentions that there are those who needs must use the ritual and sacramental tools as effective means to the symbolless end of spirituality and realization. Men differ in their individual "make-up" as characters in the līlā and as such tend to "work out the play" in that character, whether predominantly it be that of reason, feeling, or sense. Thus the outstanding characteristics of finite

³²⁴ Huxley, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

³²⁵ pīṭha

³²⁶ Cf. the medieval alchemist's view of "the particular fragment of matter before him," which is the Philosopher's Stone. Frederic Spiegelberg, Alchemy as a Way of Salvation (Stanford: James Ladd Delkin, 1945), p. 31, commenting upon the alchemical verse which commences with the line "A stone will be found, it is not dear," states that "the alchemist's raw material need by no means be a particularly precious, rare substance, but that any given conditions which we find at hand are sufficient in all circumstances as a point of departure." That which is "at hand" can be but the present, the timeless Now which the builders of speculative theologies have rejected.

³²⁷ Huxley, op. cit., p. 269.

intellectuality, active social morality, and a devotional synthesis tend to be reflected into the dogmatic creed, the moral law or code, and the sacramental cult of religion.³²⁸ Not realizing or experiencing the "inward work" of the Self³²⁹ man as if all too easily makes of the formal idea, the analogy, and the sacrament ends in themselves, and turns toward the sacramental cult for that power which he lacks as an ego, a power which, because of the inversion of emphasis from the spiritual to the cult as intrinsically sacred, is occult rather than spiritual.³³⁰ The "creative visualization" of the worshipper is not in vain, however, for it does produce results. Huxley³³¹ explains:

The longings, emotions and imaginations of those who kneel and, for generations, have knelt before the shrine create, as it were, an enduring vortex in the psychic medium, so that the image lives with a secondary, inferior divine life projected on to it by its worshippers, as well as with the primary divine life which, in common with all other animate and inanimate beings, it possesses in virtue of its relation to the divine ground....The religious experience of sacramentalists and image worshippers may be perfectly genuine and objective;--but it is not always or necessarily an experience of God or the Godhead. It may be and perhaps in most cases it actually is, an experience of the field of force

³²⁸ See Watts, op. cit., p. 50.; Guénon, op. cit., p. 103.

³²⁹ From Eckhart, see Otto, op. cit., p. 128.

³³⁰ Huxley, op. cit., pp. 265, 270-271.

³³¹ Ibid., p. 60. See also pp. 265, 270. Cf. Jung, op. cit., pp. 212-213 for his explanation of projection into the alchemical process.

generated by the minds of the past and present worshippers and projected into the sacramental object where it sticks, so to speak, in a condition of what may be called second-hand objectivity, waiting to be perceived by minds suitably attuned to it.

"Such projections," states Jung,³³² "always repeat themselves when man tries to investigate an empty darkness and then unwittingly fills it with living form." Huxley³³³ points out that this excessive sacramentalism, the persistent inversion of metaphysic, with its exclusive worship of "the projections of human thoughts and feelings about God or even about something less than God," together with rites performed for the reception of "powers and advantages," is "idolatry." Nevertheless this "idolatry" or avidyā has its proper and momentary place in the ever-changing līlā as one of the infinite possibilities willed by the Self, as that limitation or bondage which is derived from the same divine power or śakti that frees.³³⁴

³³² Jung, op. cit., p. 213.

³³³ Huxley, op. cit., pp. 265, 270.

³³⁴ See Woodroffe, op. cit., pp. 421-422: "...just as mental śakti, which is manifested māyā, is called vidyā when it becomes free from the bonds of saṁsāra and rushes toward the Mahāśakti...; so it is called avidyā when it forgets Her and is intoxicated by the things of the world.... That Devī Bhagavatī Mahāmāyā forcibly draws the mental faculties of even the wise and gives them over to delusion...That eternal supreme Vidyā is the cause of liberation. She again is the cause of the jīva's bondage in saṁsāra.

Also cf. Sankara, Vivekachudāmaṇi, p. 44, śl. 108: "Avidyā or māyā...is the power of the Lord (parameśaśakti)."

Whereas the sacraments occupy the apex of the purely religious life metaphysic places no boundary or ceiling upon realization and its tradition provides not only for those who have become less dependent upon outward and visible signs but gives unto him who truly has transcended all "dharmas"³³⁵ not a pronouncement of anathema but a place of preeminence as one who is perfected and fulfilled (siddha).³³⁶

³³⁵ Thus permitting a proper abandonment of them without denying their practical utility within the realm of values. See Gītā, 18.66.

³³⁶ See Northrop, op. cit., p. 370.

CHAPTER II

DIVINE MERCY AND LOVE AS THE EMBODIMENT OF BRAHMAN

The Five Forms of Brahman are not to be thought of as emanated categories but as focal powers or expressions of that infinite Dayā immanent in all of the multiform.¹ Dayā is said to be superior to all other qualities or ideas² for they are within this divine mercy, transformed by the light of the will and love of Brahman. "Brahman transcends the form and matter of prakṛiti, and is niravayava or formless and nirguna and attributeless, but He embodies Himself as Dayā to redeem the jīva" from that ignorance which is essentially separate from divine Love, or Bhagavān.³

¹ Sṛnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 154.

² Ibid., p. 163: Philosophical truth (satyam), knowledge (jñānam), infinity (anantam), ethical purity (amalatva), cosmological omnipotence and omniscience.

³ Loc. cit., This differs from any view which conceives of the jīva as such, the soul or conscious awareness of separation, as in a natural identity with Dayā (as grace) (cf. Pelagian view). This Viśiṣṭādvaitic concept conforms somewhat to Christian theological grace as an accident of the soul which inheres within it and relates it to God in the person of the Holy Ghost as its supernatural end,--but while logically the jīva is different from ātman, metaphysically it is never separate from ātman, for it is the Spirit immersed in its chosen advaitic rôle, the Self covered with the veil of its own self. See Pohle, op. cit., pp. 11-12, 91.

The problem of Justice and Mercy. The transformation of "the nature of Isvara as righteous judge into the deliverer or universal savior"⁴ does, however, pose the problem of a conflict between divine justice and mercy, "the law" and "grace," nomos and agape,--between dharma and daya.

The Western tendency toward a literal and historical interpretation of all components of the mythos resulted in early legalistic arguments concerning the vicarious or real nature of Christ's suffering, and whether Christ's ransom of man's soul was paid to the devil or for the purpose of satisfying God.⁵ The Church view, though, crystallized in the doctrine that "Christ's suffering conjoined with baptism and penance gives remission of sin" and St. Thomas' reasoning that God, being above legal satisfaction, may remit sin if He sees fit, and that "The Christian soul, member of the Church, which is one with Christ, can partly redeem itself (through works of supererogation), as Christ himself not only

⁴ Ibid., p. 165. Nygren, op. cit., II, 34. Pohle, op. cit., pp. 11-12. It must be remembered that this is from the point of view of the jiva, yet a view at all times conditioned by the metaphysical tradition upon which Eastern society is grounded.

⁵ Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 574-575: The legal turn is illustrated in the reasoning of Anselm "on the basis of Roman Law: God has been robbed and must be reimbursed.. Satan's claim is denied. God's justice must be satisfied. It is God's compassion for man that leads to the sacrifice, through which alone justice can be satisfied."

satisfies justice but adds merit to the redeemed.⁶ Gilson⁷ sees the Creator-God as veiling His creative power in and as the Father within whose loving will the human will may find its highest good. Gilson continues:

The iron law of justice, which, in Plato's world, automatically gathers up the good with the good and the wicked with the wicked through the indefinite cycles of their successive existences,⁸ now becomes a paternalistic solicitude producing creatures from nothing in order to manifest the divine glory and associate them with itself.

Another and allied view of the human desire to unite justice and agape, to force back into union that which words have endeavored to divide, is that of Nygren where "The divine agape forces man to a decision which he cannot evade. Just because agape consists in complete recklessness of giving, it demands unconditional self-giving," and the penalty of resistance to "that love which pronounces judgment" is the severity of annihilation.⁹ While metaphysically acceptable as an imperfect analogy illustrating the self-destruction of finitude divorced from Self through the persistence of separation-consciousness, all metaphysical similarity vanishes

⁶ Ibid., p. 575.

⁷ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

⁸ This has some outward semblance to karma and samsāra but differs from them as here expressed inasmuch as it carries the implication of operating from outside the jīva.

⁹ Nygren, op. cit., I, 75.

when it becomes literal dogma. Excessive sacramentalization,¹⁰ which tends to encase the immediate experience felt as divine love and mercy within an intricate and logically encompassed set of insulative rites, and the stern and emotionless justice of Protestantism have tended to leave Western man in an unbalanced state of over-dependence upon speculative logic.¹¹

Western writers trained in the tradition which posits an eternal separation between the natural and the supernatural can discern only an inconsistency between karma and divine love, agape, or grace. While it is possible to go to great lengths in an endeavor to trace probable historical and cultural overlaps which are responsible for the syncretic fusion of otherwise inconsistent elements, the mere fact of that successful fusion does not rule out but, rather, may point to the possibility of a higher metaphysical synthesis unconcerned with inconsistencies.¹² The Christian view wherein "the natural order of this world seems interrupted by the supernatural intervention of God's forgiveness" discerns in karma a tendency "to act as a limitation to God's full

¹⁰ Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 575. Hopkins cites second century Christians who viewed the Eucharist as "the medicine of immortality."

¹¹ Northrop, op. cit., pp. 304-311.

¹² See Arthur Berriedale Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1925), p. 576.

sovereignty and grace."¹³ Its preoccupation with history sees in the metaphysical doctrine of realization transcending karma nothing but an evasion of the problem¹⁴ which demands a supernatural victory over life in time rather than an integral realization of its non-separate nature in the conscious ānanda of the timeless.¹⁵

A superficial view of the seemingly automatic functioning of karma, or action within the realm of the opposites, may lead to the projection of that view into a mechanically austere and "eternal" moral order often labeled with the term "fatalism." Disregard for or ignorance of the timeless and non-dual metaphysical reality within which karma plays may see only an inseparable gulf between the will of the jīva and that of the divine. In addition, by viewing the problem from the side of unique and exclusive Being rather than from "within" the non-dimensional experience of integral consciousness-power (chit-śakti),¹⁶ there is the tendency to pit the projected construct of "blind" justice against its logically opposite construct, the projection of human eros-desire in the form of God's mercy. Both

¹³ Nels F. S. Ferré, "Christianity and Karma," International Review of Missions, 29:190-191, April, 1940.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 194.

¹⁶ While being may be separable from Being, advaitic chit may be thought of as non-dimensional or, as its equivalent, infinitely dimensional.

constructs, being within time, logically may impinge as opposites within an area of complete conflict. The agape of metaphysic, with its advaitic, non-dual, absolute ground transcending time and history, and functioning as an all-encompassing and integral power of the divine will which embraces the totality of the multiform, can in no wise be in absolute opposition to that karmic power which also is inseparable from the divine will and the metaphysical ground.¹⁷ Therefore the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view that Īśvara as Rakshaka or gracious Protector supercedes or, rather, is the reason for the being of Īśvara as Karmaphaladātā, the giver of the fruits of karma.¹⁸ Divine Mercy not only tempers justice but is, here, its consummation, and each impact with both the good and evil found in samsāric action is an act of grace, for "the world of prakṛiti is an ever-changing pariṇāmic transformative process and serves as a common theater for the moulding of muktas."¹⁹ Furthermore, "the grace of the Rakshaka is not a supernatural potency that is infused into the sinner from without. The law of karma finds its fulfilment in the redemptive grace of God

17 See Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 294.

18 See Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 152; also Gītā 9.28; 18.66.

19 Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 179.

[Īśvara]²⁰ and the world, instead of being a mechanism governed by the operation of karmic necessity, is subject to karma as the "living expression of the incarnation of Mercy."²¹

Brahman as Seshī. Although knowing full well the difference existing between jīva and ātman, and yet understanding their fundamental unity within Supreme consciousness, many Indian writers, particularly of the "theistic" sects, take this traditional knowledge for granted and use the word jīva as a generic term to indicate not only the finite self-consciousness as such but the "complex-unit" of rōle and rōle player, the ātman or infinite Self which has assumed this particular poise of finitude. While perhaps not misleading to those whose environment has been that of a metaphysical traditional society, it does pose difficulties for one whose religious thoughts are quantitatively and inferentially limited to Being, to the exclusion of any immediate experience of integral consciousness. This use

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 153-154. Cf. Mahāyāna doctrine of Bodhisattva. Sri Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II, 256, speaks of the three powers of "Cosmic Law," "Divine Compassion" working with and through that law, and "Divine grace" which is superior and transcendent to any rule or dharma, not as an indiscriminate caprice but with a discrimination of its own not subject to the bonds of mental logic.

²¹ Srinivāsachāri, op. cit., p. 176.

of the word jīva arises, perhaps, from the tendency of the-istic sects to emphasize the Saguna rather than the Nirguna aspect of Brahman,²² to dwell upon the differentiation of the Spirit itself "into an infinite plurality of individual soul-forms," to delight in those relationships established in "the play of the One in the Many."²³

Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy, while stressing the distinct being of the self as jīva does not deny that "its ultimate meaning is Brahman, and it is therefore indistinguishable from it." Brahman is not only the ādhāra (sustainer and support) but the "All Self, that pervades all beings as their immanent ground, and imparts its substantiality to them as their inner sustaining life."²⁴ Although finite ego-consciousness has its own distinct expression as "the Lord's self-differentiation,"²⁵ and as such seemingly can be separated for the purpose of philosophical analysis from its divine ground, the "two" cannot be divided "owing to their

²² See Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 214.

²³ Ibid., p. 210. It may be instructive to compare the Christian concept, emphasizing being, which views man as consisting of soul (jīva) and body, with the ego-transcending relationship of ātman-jīva. In Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine the Indwelling Spirit or Rhagavān is to the jīva (soul) as the jīva is to the body.

²⁴ Srīnivāsaśāhāri, op. cit., p. 181.

²⁵ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 213.

aparithaksiddha or inseparable relation."²⁶ Thus, while admitting the plurality of distinct selves, Viśiṣṭādvaita regards these selves as truly "pervaded or interpenetrated by the All-Self as Seshi."²⁷ The microcosmic immanence of the All-Self in man is not considered by Viśiṣṭādvaita as an exclusive "indistinguishability," but Brahman is said, as well, to encompass the macrocosm and is transcendentally superior to both.²⁸ There is at all times a

²⁶ Srīnivāsāchāri, loc. cit.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 185. Seshi is used here in the sense of the Supreme Svāmin (Master, Lord), who utilizes finitude (here the śeṣha or īva) for His purpose. This, then, is but a personalized statement of the relation and dependence of the ego to the supreme but non-separate will.

The dictionary meaning of śeṣha (✓ śeṣh, -leave) is rest, remainder, residue. As such it marks the deepest plunge of divine consciousness into the waters of the finite. Śeṣha is also the name of the thousand-headed serpent,--resting upon the waters as the couch and canopy supporting the sleeping Vishnu. It is the same Śeṣha, this great serpent-power used by the gods and asuras as a rope, held by the great powers at the top and fastened to the dense rock of Mt. Mandara at the bottom, in the churning of the milk-ocean of "unconsciousness." The other name for the serpent Śeṣha (i.e. residue) is Ananta,--the endless, the infinite,--for his thousand-petaled hood is called maṇi-dvīpa, the celestial "island of jewels," the "point" or "bindu" of eternity and of realization. (Cf. sahasrāra padma) See John Dowson, A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion, Geography, History and Literature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950), pp. 291-292.

The term śeṣha (otherwise the īva, the remainder, the finite ego-consciousness) as śeṣham also can indicate the remnants of food or the remains of an offering, and śeṣhā the auspicious flowers left over from an offering,--which is identical with one of the many meanings of prasāda as grace or favor. In addition the word śeṣhas means offspring. Cf. Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 88, "...every īva is, as it were, the son of God..."

²⁸ See Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 185 and Chhānd. 2.14.2-4.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic insistence upon a blissful relationship.-- often expressed in the view that "Brahman, the cosmic ground, is the inner self of the jīva as its śarīrin,"²⁹ that is, the Lord as the Self of the self in a manner similar to the relation of the ego-soul to its body.³⁰ There is this primary difference, though, between Viśiṣṭādvaita and Christianity, for "Brahman as the Seshi is not the personal God of Western theism as that view ignores the truth of Anta-ryāmin or indwelling Self."³¹ The Christian concept which ignores the indwelling Spirit and conceives of man as consisting solely of ego (soul) and body can but consider any doctrine of the Brahman as identical with the inner Self as impossible. The Christian ego can have God only as its supernatural object, for Christian "grace supernaturally confers on us the intrinsic power of laying hold of the Pure Act as our object; a new root of spiritual action which gives us our specific and proper object, the divine essence in itself."³² Srīnivāsaśāhārī,³³ further, equates the Seshi

²⁹ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 595.

³⁰ Cf. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 213.

³¹ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 188.

³² Maritain, op. cit., p. 314.

³³ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, loc. cit.

with Purushottama or an aspect of Purushottama. Inasmuch as Purushottama transcends yet includes both the personal and the impersonal, Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine could not subscribe without reservation to the statement by Otto³⁴ that "Saving grace can only be attributed to Iśvara, to Brahman as personal God."

Iśvara and Srī. The experience of the one in many and the many in one was reflected in the Buddhistic doctrine of Bodhisattva embracing the bi-polar unity of dharma and karuṇā. In still another area of metaphysical tradition insight into the inseparable identity-relation of the Ultimate Unity and the multiform within the advaitic Absolute reached its culminating apex in the tāntric doctrine of Siva-Sakti. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy of "the sat without a second," the Vaiṣṇava "Vāsudeva as the All-Self" also is equated through its identity nature as Dāya with "the dual self of Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa or Srīyaḥ-Pati." The Brahman beyond all the pairs of opposites expresses its reintegrative will "by having a two-fold spiritual form of its own as Lord and Srī that are philosophically inseparable though functionally distinguishable."³⁵ Thus the Supreme

³⁴ Otto, op. cit., p. 114.

³⁵ Srīnivāṣaśchāri, op. cit., pp. 165, 191-192.

"feminine" nature, the image of agape-giving³⁶ rather than that of eros-acquisition, as Īśvarī inseparably^{is} united (as anapāyini) with the Lord "as and in the heart of Īśvara ..., "³⁷ and is intertwined inextricably in identity with dharma as its fruition, a "not-two-ness" wherein it is impossible to consider one without the other.³⁸ Srī may thus be visualized as of a mediative nature,³⁹ for as "Svāminī to the jīva and as puruṣakāra"⁴⁰ she is the "eternal link of love"⁴¹ which gives the devotee the darśana of the Lord

³⁶ See Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, pp. 61-62.

³⁷ Srīnivāsāchāri, pp. 387, 191. Cf. M. J. Scheeben, Mariology (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), II, 8., where the Virgin Mary is likened to the Heart, always dependent upon the Head, which is Christ. Srī, however, is in identity with and inseparable from Īśvara.

³⁸ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 166.

³⁹ Mediative, but always as non-dual, non-historical, and as divine consciousness-power in her own right, thus marking the difference between Srī and the Christian Virgin. See Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 387.

⁴⁰ That is, the force operative toward integral union is not one of fate but is of the power of the Self. See Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 487.

⁴¹ Cf. Aurobindo, Sāvitrī, Book 10, Canto 3, II, 263: "For Love is the brightest link twixt earth and heaven." See also Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 68, "Love must function as the connecting link between soul and God, but also between knowledge and works, or between transcendent peace and indefatigable labour."

as Srīnivāsa, the Abode of Srī, the Supreme Saranya or refuge for the jīva who as śaraṅgata (seeker for refuge) is in complete self-surrender (śaraṅgati or prapatti) to the power of the Lord, knowing Him not only as the means (upāya) but the end (upeya) of integral union.⁴² "Thus," states Srīnivāsaśāhārī,⁴³ "...the metaphysical truth of the absolute as the Supreme Self and as Sarfrin [owner of the body], and the jīva as His aprithaksiddha viśeṣaṇa, inseparable attribute, is restated in terms of the non-dualism of Srīyah-Patī..."⁴⁴

⁴² Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 191. 387.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 191.

⁴⁴ This entire relationship between the many, the love-power, and the One, the integral workings of love, grace, dayā or compassion, neither ontologically nor consciously is separate from the metaphysical non-dual Reality, for there is no gulf between the natural and the "supernatural."

CHAPTER III

THE RELATION OF THE JIVA TO DIVINE MERCY AND LOVE

Surrender. From the point of view of the jiva, the finite, that which is superior to it is the transcendent, the totally "other," the God who in His perfect wholeness evokes in man the need for worship and surrender in the hope of attaining that gift of grace which will bridge the gulf separating the incomplete from the perfect.¹ Christian man also faces the concept that all creation since the fall is engaged in a constant struggle with the forces of evil and, moment by moment, is dependent upon the divinity for grace,² for the very Creator-creature relationship is one of an abject and continuous dependence of the created upon its unique and separate Maker.³ Man, of and by himself, cannot satisfy even his physical aspirations, therefore not only his existence and substantiality but his supernatural future salvation are creative and sustaining gifts of grace bestowed by God upon the impotent,

¹ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 111, 340, 342. Watts, op. cit., p. 160.

² Gilson, op. cit., p. 244.

³ Ibid., pp. 129-130.

insufficient, and contingent creature.⁴

Whenever there is a stressing of the personal element in religion or within a particular segment of metaphysical tradition, and that stress is coupled with an emphasis upon the jiva's dependent insufficiency⁵ rather than the Brahman-ātman identity, there is a tendency to express dynamically that dependence indirectly in the performance of sacramental rites or directly to approach the "other" through devotion (bhakti), trust, and complete surrender.⁶

Srīnivāśāchāri⁷ states that bhakti progresses, develops, and deepens in correspondence to the "awakening of divine grace" (Brahma-prasāda) and sees it as a part of a reciprocal movement of grace⁸ from the divine reflected in "man's will...awakened in gratitude to belong wholly to God."⁹

⁴ Ibid., pp. 129, 133-134. Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 300.

⁵ This is an emphasis which at times seems to verge upon the neurotic.

⁶ See Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 340.

⁷ Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., pp. 381-383.

⁸ Cf. Nygren, op. cit., I, 87n: "...for Paul Love equals grace, the two words are interchangeable."

⁹ Ibid., I, 167. Nygren (p. 93) states that man's love for God should be termed "faith," for "Faith includes in itself the whole self-devotion of love; but it emphasizes the character of this love as a response, as derivative love. Faith is a love to God that is receptive, not spontaneous."

The path of bhakti, as such, is of an arduous nature and encompasses the exacting conditions of yogic practice and discipline marking a gradual progress in conscious awakening.

Over against the relatively indirect practice of bhakti which tends to build up devotion "from below"^{is} the more "direct and independent (advāra) means" of prapatti, "the descent of kripā into the realm of karma"¹⁰ through the act of total self-surrender (śaraṇāpatti) to the power of the Lord's grace (prasāda). The surrender of the ego to the Bhagavān as the way and the goal implies no contractual idea of giving and receiving, neither does it carry with it any logical analysis or judgment concerning merit. It is the fact of an acceptance of the unifying love of the Lord which seeks the prapanna, a voided ego filled by the divine love which carries with it the cancellation of karma, "even prārabdha karma,"¹¹ and is open to all beings, even the sub-human.¹² Rādhakṛishṇan¹³ states that "When we are empty of our self, God takes possession of us,"--a personification of the purely metaphysical view that when the modifications

¹⁰ Śrīnivāsaśāhāri, op. cit., pp. 391, 383.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 383, 386.

¹² Ibid., p. 581.

¹³ Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, pp. 62-63. See also pp. 71-72.

of the mind (the ego or self) are stilled and tranquilized the âtman or true Self is realized as the Brahman. Prapatti, as well as bhakti, tends to be so effected by the impact of this ego-infinite, with the stilling of all of the ego except that which remains to enjoy the relationship, that relatively little practical emphasis is placed upon the âtman as the true Self, the indwelling Spirit whose will awakens to the ego through love and ânanda.¹⁴ In addition to bliss, the "possession" of the chosen beloved by the Bhagavân¹⁵ who dwells within imparts the free gift of that "power of truth," the "light of wisdom," jñâna or smṛiti-santâna which is identical with the Supreme.¹⁶

The simple experience of prapatti has been viewed, philosophically, as taking place in six movements or parts (aṅgas).¹⁷ (1) Ânukûlya Saṁkalpa¹⁸ which is the sâtvic

¹⁴ The choice of emphasis is stated in Sṛnivâsâchâri's comments on a verse by Vedânta Deśika where, as compared with the conscious freedom of the âtman, the "jîva as the śarîra of Paramâtman has its triple function of knowing, willing and feeling fulfilled organically in the life of the Śarîrin."--Sṛnivâsâchâri, op. cit., pp. 393-394.

¹⁵ Kaṭha. 2.23. Gītâ. 11.47; 15.15. See Râdhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

¹⁶ Râdhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 65., also Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 299. Thus even in the lîlâ of divine love, even in Bhakti-prapatti there is the element of jñâna which appears to be found as a necessary element in all Indian "systems."

¹⁷ Sṛnivâsâchâri, op. cit., pp. 390-391.

¹⁸ functionally analogous to the actual graces of

condition wherein the surrendered human will is enriched by the Seshi and is disposed toward the supreme unifying will. (2) Prātikūlya Varjana, that is, avoidance of that which is contrary to the integrating movement of the will. This is but a negative restatement of ānukūlya saṁkalpa. (3) unshakable faith in the all-embracing love of the Bhagavān. (4) Kārpanya, the sense of helplessness, humility, and the inability to unite with the beloved through the sole efforts of the jīva. (5) Goptritvavarana, or the act of seeking the grace of the Lord as the only way to moksha. (6) ātmanikshepa (called "the aṅgin of which the other five are aṅgas or parts), that self-donation to the Seshi which "is itself a gift of the Lord's grace."¹⁹

While the Indian theistic approach to prapatti, at the

Christianity, particularly prevenient grace, gratia inspi-
rationis, and the emotional grace of Love.

¹⁹ A parallel movement of surrender is found in the Suddhādvaita Vedānta of Vallabha (Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 551-552, 556) wherein the more exclusive and arduous way of bhakti may be by-passed for the higher and immediate state of pushti bhakti as a free gift of God (nirhetuka kṛtāksha,--literally a "causeless side-glance" or look of grace). Here the jīva is a spark of the shining Self, and is eternal, self-conscious, and active, but, in the bound state of samsāra has no ānanda or bliss." Therefore the state of pushti bhakti is svarupānanda, that is, it but regains the bliss of the essential nature. Pushti bhakti involves ātma nivedana or the dedication of the Self and all of its manifestations to the Supreme who is the true Master of all and it is this self-gift, presupposing renunciation, rather than formal worship which ranks in importance.

very least, is framed by a tacit or implied understanding of the indwelling Self of the self and of the antaryāmin, the Christian view of surrender is a relation existing between the separate ego as such and the totally other, or God. But the very surrender in itself posits some common ground or meditative process otherwise it would be both meaningless and fruitless. Nature and natural beings, as secondary causes flowing from and dependent upon the creative free will, cannot bind God. Therefore, according to St. Bonaventura, above the special order of nature "there is a general order depending only on the divine intellect and will. What only God can make of nature is impossible from the point of view of nature, but possible, nevertheless, from the point of view of God." There is, then, in nature an "obediential power," an inherent and "purely passive possibility, excluding as by definition all aptitude for self-realization....," of becoming that which God wills to make of nature. From this religious viewpoint human nature, made to the image of God, has an obedient capacity for the beatific vision, and for the influence of divine operative grace, yet,--and here is found that constant religious reminder that the ego or soul is not the veiled divine Spirit or ātman, is not naturally in intimate and indistinguishable union with the "Self of the self" or with the Antaryāmin. Religious doctrine states that in the Christian soul "there

is nothing...at all that already belongs to the supernatural, nothing to attract it, still less anything that demands it; the obediential power, no matter how real it be, remains absolutely passive...open...towards its creator.²⁰ Thus the ambition of the religious ego can be but a movement of desire or eros. The aspiration, however, of the awakening jiva of metaphysical tradition, inasmuch as it is a movement actuated by the indwelling and non-separate "Self of the self," may be a "call of the Spirit to the Spirit, a reflection, as it were, of the divine agape, the will and love of the divine artist speaking through the living body-mask of His rôle.

Works and faith. The personal concept of the divine, as the proper analogy of metaphysical Reality, Always has emphasized a harmonic relation of divine love which can release the ego from its bondage to sin or ignorance and unite it in some measure with the personal deity. It is unfortunate indeed that as soon as the major focus of attention is placed upon this area of relative activity, rather than upon the ground principle of advaitic identity, the nature of the harmonious relation of divine love to man becomes an

²⁰ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 365-381, 299-300. See also Maritain, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

immediate "bone" of inharmonious contention.

Following Rāmānuja the Vaishnava movement split into two opposing factions because of doctrinal differences relating to truth and reality (tattva), the means to the ultimate end of realization (hetu), and the proper purpose of human endeavors (purushārtha).²¹

The relationship between the Supreme and His inseparable grace or mercy (dayā), personified as Īśvara and Srī, was conceived by the Northern, or Vadagalai school of Vedānta Deśika as a non-dual expression of the conjoined (mithuna) identity of dharma and dayā. As inseparable from the Lord Srī is infinite and coeval with justice "and no mathematical explanation is adequate or relevant in dealing with this transcendent unity."²² The Southern School, the Teṅgalai sect of Pillai Lokāchārya, while recognizing the rôle of Srī as mediatrix, stresses the utter dependence of this divinized grace upon the Lord who is also Her Master. The tendency here is toward a strict monism, and Lakshmi (Srī) occupies a rather indistinct place, finite like the īva but also unlike him ever free and unbound.²³ Both schools, however, meet beyond the field of their ontological arguments

²¹ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 534.

²² Ibid., pp. 166-167, 535.

²³ Ibid., pp. 167, 522.

in insisting that the grace or dayā of Srī is essential to mukti. There also is a pragmatic ground for harmony in the mutual assurance that īśvara is by this love and mercy not only the principle of justice but one whose essential nature is "to Brahmanize the jīva."²⁴ In some respects the Southern school's views are similar to the present Roman Catholic doctrine concerning the Virgin Mary as mediatrix and the depository of Christ's merits, the immaculate and sinless (therefore free and unbound) intercessor of merit as yet "obtained from God" and whose participative "fullness of grace[is] to be understood in a sense analogous to that in which fullness of grace is attributed to God," and differs from His "as the light of dawn to the light of day..."²⁵

The relation of divine grace to man, however, provided the greatest scope for argument between the two schools. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine of the Lord, the Sarvaśeṣī, as both the means (upāya) as well as the end (prāpya or upeya) of "vedāntic life" led to a variety of interpretations concerning the scope of the jīva's spiritual efforts as related to the spontaneity of divine grace.²⁶ The Southern, Taṇḍalai

²⁴ Ibid., p. 68.

²⁵ Scheeben, Mariology, II, 7-12; 239-240.

²⁶ Srīnivāsaśāstri, op. cit., p. 398.

school stressed the spontaneous and sole power of the Lord's grace, as both means and end, and prapatti was viewed not as a winning of the grace of the Lord by our self-effort but as a simple and passive response to its "free flow." The analogy of the free secretion of a mother's milk (mulaippāl) is compared with milk sold in the market to illustrate the difference between unconditioned grace (nirhetuka kṛpā) and consequent grace (sahetuka kṛpā) earned by human merit. Surrender is not a yoga, then, but mere faith in this unconditioned grace (nirhetuka) of the divine, for "Dayā comes as the leaves come to a tree."²⁷

Prapatti itself, according to this view, is valueless if looked upon as a means, and both bhakti and prapatti arise from the grace of the "Deliverer" "and are not essential antecedents of such grace," for all the jīva's efforts to attain (svagata svikāra) are but futile gestures²⁸ not to be compared with the seeking of the jīva by and through the Lord's will (paragata svikāra). Even the effort to conform to moralistic dharma breeds the conceit of self-righteousness, for "Godliness alone makes for goodness,...goodness

²⁷ Ibid., p. 400.

²⁸ Cf. Ibid., p. 369: "The real value of the practice of niskāmakarma and ceaseless dhyāna lies in the recognition of the shortcomings of human endeavor and the reliance on divine grace as the only means to mukti."

cannot lead to Godliness."²⁹ Śrīnivāśāchāri³⁰ states:

The grace of God flows where it listeth and the prapanna has only to respond to the free flow of antecedent grace by casting away the burden of responsibility and the conceit of self-righteousness. God seeks the sinner and would cease to be the Savior if moksha is to be won only by merit.

Thus the life of passivity has been likened to the non-interfering dependence and surrender of the kitten as it is being carried by its mother, and therefore is called māriṅ-ranyāya as opposed to the markatanyāya, or way of the monkey which characterizes Vadakalai.³¹ Whereas the cat carries her kittens without any effort on their part, the mother monkey carries her young as it clings to her fur in the unity of cooperation. Man's will, according to Vadagalai, is never to be coerced and his cooperation is a free opening or gift (prasāda) of himself to the divine and is an essential condition for the working of the divine who will not make a forcible entry.³²

Both schools agree that the Lord is at once the "means

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 398-401, 522-523.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 581.

³¹ Ibid., p. 398. A. C. Bouquet, Hinduism (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1948), p. 100, sees in the northern school a "correspondence, in Christian theology, to the doctrine of synergism or cooperation as taught by St. John Cassian," while the Southern sect's stress of the "necessary prevenience of grace [is] after the manner of St. Augustine the Great."

³² See Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 336.

and the end" and fulfills himself as law and love. Vedāgalai, however, insists that a rational and analytical monism cannot explain the relationship between jīva and the Lord, therefore it is immaterial to inquire how much of the divine life comes from God and how much from man for the integral mystical experience itself dissolves all duality of karma and kripā³³ through a love which is truly infinite, and this is not the sole property of a monistic ideal. Using the analogy of the free-flowing maternal breast, Vedānta Deśika declares that this free secretion does exist, but it does not do so effectively unless the child coöperates through the nursing act. The two are not separate but form an organic whole with no causal connotation, and it is impossible to divide them or arbitrarily to ascribe a quantum-factor to each. The truth of Law is in the realm of non-contradiction, or "either-or," while the higher synthesis of Love is expressed by a non-dual "both-and."³⁴ The reciprocal responsiveness of the jīva, whose will is inseparable from that of the Lord, yet dependent upon it, is that of an "effortless effort," a vyāṅja or occasion accompanied by the knowledge of the futility of human or separate effort. This knowledge is itself an occasion, an integrative

³³ Sṛṇivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 401, 582.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 403, 529.

effort, and complete surrender to the divine is made to the non-dual (not monistic) Spirit which does not reject the ijva but includes it.³⁵ The charama śloka of the Gītā which formed a basic argument for the "Cat" school also points out, says the Vaḍagalai, the truth that man must come for that refuge (śaranam vraja), for this causeless grace (nirhetuka kripā), and that action on the part of the ijva forms the occasion or vyāja for the Self-revelation. Vyāja is qualitative and not quantitative and needs be but a gesture, a change of heart, a contrition which bespeaks a ripe responsiveness to dayā.³⁶

Brahman, the Lord, as eternally free and Self-realized, is the means to moksha which is Self-accomplished, or Siddhōpāya. As such He is the transcendental aspect of Dayā "as the free cause which is self-conditioned and spontaneous." Yet there is the other aspect, the Sādhyaopāya, or the means which is to be effected by the aspirant. This phenomenal aspect derives freedom from its noumenal source, for it is rooted in its transcendent ground "and the opposition between the two is apparent and not real." The phenomenal problem of human freedom is the noumenal fact, and the

³⁵ 18.66, Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 325: "Abandoning all duties, come unto Me alone for shelter; sorrow not, I will liberate thee from all sins."

³⁶ Śrīnivāsācāri, op. cit., pp. 394-402, 539-540.

noumenal spontaneity of dayā is known as yoga from the standpoint of the jīva. When the "prapatti-seeker" has realized the integrality of his surrender there is no problem, for it is not solved but dissolved.³⁷

Therefore dayā is not to be conceived as a prize of human effort nor as possibly being injected as a supernatural infusion into the jīva. Both points of view are based upon logic (hetusāstra) and not upon spiritual experience. Similarly divine grace (the "side-glance," kaṭāksha of the Lord) is never conditioned (sahetuka) nor unconditioned (nirhetuka), for it is grounded upon an organic union and not logical causality. This organic union is said to be more, not less, than logic and the dharma of morality, therefore it is alogical and amoral, and "it is illegitimate to apply logical and ethical terms to what is transcendent." Thus the logical categories of cause and effect have no place within the reciprocal and organic flow of dayā to jīva and jīva to dayā.³⁸

In addition the Vaḍgalai points out that the unconditioned dayā of monistic belief, free of the "occasion" of self-opening on the part of the non-separate jīva, would tend

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 402, 540.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 403, 538-540.

to attribute caprice, arbitrariness (vaishamya) and cruelty (nairghrinya) to Iśvara and encourage fatalistic laxity and license. An integral freedom of human will, however, conflicts with any tendency toward election and predestination.³⁹

The difference of viewpoint between the two schools has been compared to that existing between "volitional" and "self-surrender types" of spirituality.⁴⁰ This does not imply, though, any basic and fundamental differentiation, for from the viewpoint of the Vadagalai synthesis, such volition may well correspond to that "subconscious incubation"⁴¹ which precedes, according to James, the "hands off" period necessary for the "opening of a new center of personal energy," a necessary and receptive occasion which does not "transcend the individual's personality."⁴² In addition the problem of karma and kripā has been likened to that of the Christian question of justification by works or by faith,⁴³ and has been compared with Calvinist

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 394, 403, 535, 581.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 538.

⁴¹ Cf. Jung's definition of tapas as "self-incubation." Jung, op. cit., p. 245.

⁴² William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random House, Modern Lib.), p. 207.

⁴³ Srīnivāsaśāhī, op. cit., pp. 538, 582.

controversies.⁴⁴ While the two elements seem to be resolved in the Vadagalai view, the Tenigalai tendency toward monistic absolutism has some outward resemblance, when removed from its metaphysical context, to a strict view of faith as the means for the attainment of spiritual ends. It is true that the "monkey" school centralizes the doctrine of an organic and realizable unity existing between the ifva and the Lord, comparable to the Roman Catholic doctrinal analogy of the "renewal of the inward man through the voluntary reception of the graces and the gifts,"⁴⁵ whereas the "cat" doctrine tends to admit of a condition of "sin" in the "elect," a condition which is "ignored, if not relished,"⁴⁶ and is reminiscent of the protestant "covering of sins" and the lack of "inward sanctification."⁴⁷ Again, the Vadagalai view of "occasion," the infinitesimal and contrite response of the finite component of the ifva-âtman relationship, is the only requisite work,--in its integrality a co-equal harmonic of divine love or agape. As such it is the evidence of that faith which Nygren equates with man's love for God.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Hume, op. cit., p. 59n. Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 500-501.

⁴⁵ Pohle, op. cit., p. 311, quoting the Tridentine Council.

⁴⁶ Srînivâsâchâri, op. cit., p. 523.

⁴⁷ See Pohle, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

⁴⁸ Nygren, op. cit., I, 167, also p. 92.

It is said the Christian, without claiming any merit, actively must seek and serve God in order to show his love for the Divine,--a view which is not "salvation by works"--and one that is not foreign to Vadagalai.⁴⁹ Tengalai also advocates works, but only as the consummation of that spirituality received when the jiva has given up its ahamkāra and the ātman, "incapable of the inert existence of matter"⁵⁰ worships God by work and service to every jiva.⁵¹ Here the intimate relation of jiva and ātman is touched upon, an element lacking in Christianity,--and in addition the humanistic cult of later protestantism is foreshadowed. It has been suggested, however, that a too rigid comparison of Eastern and Western theism on the basis of volition vs. self-surrender or of "justification" by works vs. faith is not indicative of the fundamental and basic points of difference between the two sects, that is, between sahetuka katāksha (grace or mercy arising from a cause) and nirhetuka katāksha (causeless grace or mercy).⁵²

The cat-monkey controversy also has been likened to

⁴⁹ Ibid., I, ix.

⁵⁰ See Luther's comparison of man to a "log, stick, or stone," Pohle, op. cit., p. 291.

⁵¹ Srinivāsachāri, op. cit., p. 401.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 398-399.

that of Pelagius and St. Augustine, and again on the surface this comparison appears quite valid.⁵³ The ancient world which incubated Western civilization held not only Manichaeism, which saw evil as concomitant with nature, but the Stoic belief that "in all men there was a divine pneuma..."⁵⁴ Pelagius, in his reaction against Manichaeism⁵⁵ "became so intoxicated by grace that he absorbs nature almost wholly into grace"⁵⁶ and proclaimed that man was created⁵⁷ good, born without sin, and can achieve salvation by faith, all other gratuitous gifts of God being but aids and not necessities for that salvation.⁵⁸ Nature, then, is conceived as being able to perform salutary and supernatural acts by its own power, that is, "the ego can cure its own selfishness."⁵⁹

⁵³ See Rādhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā, pp. 62-64. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 214.

⁵⁴ A. D. Nock, Conversion (Oxford: 1933), p. 241.

⁵⁵ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

⁵⁶ Gilson, op. cit., p. 378.

⁵⁷ Thus keeping within the Christian limitation of history.

⁵⁸ See Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 73; Hopkins, op. cit., p. 571.

⁵⁹ Watts, op. cit., pp. 105-106; Pohle, op. cit., pp. 50, 84. This view also is reflected somewhat in Schopenhauer's statement that "by virtue of his own inner worth man can raise himself above the nullity and absurdity of existence" if that "inner worth" is limited to that of jīva-consciousness alone. See Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 65.

Pelagius' views are projected upon a religious background which limits the field of relationship to but two "eternally" separated factors, the ego and God. His concept of the created soul (ego) as basically and eternally good does not agree with the doctrine of either the "cat" or "monkey" schools, for they both admit the complete unworthiness and dependence of the jiva as such. Pelagian salvation by faith is a doctrine which reveals the innate goodness of the jiva, and thus differs from the Tengalai faith-union wherein the jiva's unworthiness is "swallowed," as it were, by the reintegrative love of the Lord. The Pelagian idea that "to merit by free-will is to merit by grace"⁶⁰ is harmonically similar to the Vadagalai view that the jiva's self-surrender or self-giving, the infinitesimal "occasion," the act of "nursing" the free flowing "milk" of the mother's grace, is itself a grace. The flow of power, however, in both cases, is of an entirely different nature. Pelagian's free-will of the ego is "able to merit all these graces by its own power,"⁶¹ for all is given apriori as the grace, whereas the all-power of Vadagalai prapatti grace is derived from the spiritual, the Self of the self, not as apriori or

⁶⁰ Gilson, op. cit., p. 378.

⁶¹ Pohle, op. cit., p. 84.

or apostiori, but Now.

Rādhakṛishṇan⁶² has said that "For the Hindu the spiritual is the basic element of human nature." In its metaphysical context the implications of this statement cannot be limited either by syllogistic logic or the identity transpositions of algebraic equations. The eros-like desire to equate human nature with the spiritual, or rather, with the Good, is not the same as basing human nature upon its transcendent ground of immanent and non-separate spirituality. The soul of religion and the jīva of metaphysic may be viewed as alike inasmuch as they are ego, but to equate the jīva with the Christian soul purely on the basis of the religious concept of soul is to pass over the fact that jīva, in a way, is more than soul. The soul is ontologically alone, for in the concept of organized Christianity Spirit or ātman is ignored and the soul attempts, in its separation from the Spirit, to compensate by confusing itself with the divine. Jīva, on the other hand, is not alone for traditionally it is conceived, so to speak, as the "other face" of ātman, the Self-limitation, the multifform manifestation of ātman in the līlā of saṁsāra. In this respect the jīva has less "independence" than the soul, for it is never really separate from its ground. This is

⁶² Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 77.

not to be construed as saying that the jīva is the ātman, for the ego is limited, dependent, and contingent upon the Self. It does say, however, that the ātman is the jīva, yet infinitely more than jīva, and that the Self is inseparable from its beloved rôle, regardless of whether the relation be fully, advaitically integral, purposefully poised within the love-rhythms of union and separation, or submerged within the freely willed divine projection. This spiritual agape or grace does not arise from or as the emergent jīva but eternally is present as the ātman. This "grace" properly is described, although historically and exclusively conceived, in the Christian analogy as the grace of Christ, the sacramental analogy of the ātman.

Renunciation and reintegration. In the Bhagavadgītā the Lord Krishna, the Purushottama (mām), Self of the self, the unborn, beginningless eternal seed of all beings⁶³ gives to Arjuna the essence of prapatti:⁶⁴

Listen thou again to my supreme word, most secret of all;
beloved art thou of Me greatly;⁶⁵ therefore will I speak
for thy benefit. (18.64)

⁶³ See Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 377; Krishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 186; Gītā 7.10.

⁶⁴ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 388.

⁶⁵ Divine love or agape.

Merge thy mind in Me, be My devotee, sacrifice to Me, prostrate thyself before Me, thou shall come even to Me. I pledge thee My troth; thou art dear to Me. (18.65)⁶⁶

Abandoning all duties, come unto Me alone for shelter; Sorrow not, I will liberate thee from all sins. (18.66)⁶⁷

The heart of renunciation is said to be complete surrender, not only of adharma but dharma⁶⁸ as well. In the charama śloka (18.66) the Gītā "opens doors out of the circle of its own system," having first carefully built up that dharma for its proper use.⁶⁹ The way is still left open for those who continue to desire that for which the śruti, sacrifice and "sacraments" were designed, and the assurance of the fulfilment of that desire has been given,⁷⁰ for all dharma or support is but a preparation for this "dharmaless dharma."⁷¹ The Supreme Word, (paramam vachah)

⁶⁶ Cf. Gītā 9.34.

⁶⁷ Besant and Dās, op. cit., pp. 324-325. See also Gītā 2.42-46, 52-53; 4.12; 7.20-23; 9.20-21; 10.2; 11.48, 52-53; 12.6-7; 18.56-57. Anugītā 1.38-39; 32.10-11, in SBE, VIII, 233-234, 370. Also cf. "Barābhayada posture" offering "boon and protection," Maitreya, The Buddha Mīmāṃsā (London: Thacker and Co., 1925), p. 169.

⁶⁸ Hopkins, Ethics of India, p. 70, quoting from Mahābhārata 12.332.44.

⁶⁹ Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, pp. 469-470, also 278-279.

⁷⁰ See Gītā, 7.20-23; 9.20-21. Śrīnivāśachāri, op. cit., p. 391. Edgerton, op. cit., II, 79.

⁷¹ Aurobindo, op. cit., pp. 277n, 494; Krishna Prem, op. cit., p. 188. Cf. "If a Protestant survives the complete loss of his church and still remains a Protestant,

the most secret of all (sarvaguhyatamam),⁷² includes the Trimarga through the enjoinder to be "My-minded" (jñāna), "My lover and adorer" (bhakti), and "a sacrificer to Me" (karma),⁷³ yet transcends all margas and dharmas in an all-embracing abandonment of any attachment to "the forms and laws of the limiting mind" through total surrender to the Lord and His divine will as both the end and means,⁷⁴ as the "highest and sole refuge."⁷⁵ This surrender must be a free, total and absolute abandonment⁷⁶ of the supports, that is, of the egoistic pleasure motive or any pious wish for svarga or moksha (phala samarpana or phalatyāga), of the

that is, a man who is defenseless against God, and is no longer shielded by walls or by communities, he has the unique spiritual chance of immediate religious experience."
--Carl G. Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 62.

⁷² For the Three Secrets of the Gītā see Aurobindo, op. cit., pp. 496-498.

⁷³ Roy, op. cit., pp. 277-279.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 483. Gītā 18.56-57. Īśvaradatta, translator and editor, Rāmānuja's Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā (Bihar: 1930), p. 355. See also Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 119.

⁷⁵ Sāstrī, Bhagavadgītā with Commentary of Śrī Sankarācārya, p. 453.

⁷⁶ Aurobindo, The Mother (Pondicherry: Śrī Aurobindo Āśram Press, 1952), pp. 2 ff.; Aurobindo, Letters of Śrī Aurobindo, IV, 130; Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, pp. 496ff.; Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 105; Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 189.; Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 184; Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 378; Goswāmi, op. cit., p. 248.

sattvic ego-desire to do good, the moralistic motive (bhara-samarpana), and of all egoistic life-clinging (avarāpasamarpana). Thus the "jīva lives but is not jīva as such but the śarīrin or śeṣhi that lives in it."⁷⁷ This total, non-demanding and freely given surrender differs from a dangerously inert, mechanical, and "tamasic passivity calling itself surrender" by maintaining, in the early stages, a continuous and discriminative opening to That which watches from within and sanctions all movements toward realization.⁷⁸ This cooperative surrender-attitude of non-interference is a part of the primary turning toward reintegration and, according to Sṛī Aurobindo, actually is maintained until all of the upward-turning process is carried freely by the Supreme Will. Thus the "State of grace," or acceptance wherein the Divine Will is in total and conscious control, often is prepared in the individual and preceded by a more or less extreme tanasyā ("burning enthusiasm," "self incubation") or clarification (prasāda) of the ego-complex, conducted by the movement of the indwelling, non-separate

⁷⁷ Śrīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. 392. Cf. Aurobindo, Sāvatri, I, 287 (Book 3, Canto 2): "A vast surrender is his only strength."

⁷⁸ See Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 105-109; Aurobindo, The Mother, p. 7; Aurobindo, Letters of SṛīAurobindo, IV, 131.

Divine Will or grace, (prasāda).⁷⁹

If it is possible to speak of the jīva purely as jīva and of his efforts as springing from the finite will alone, it may be said that the jīva as such cannot deliver himself from his misery, cannot "lift himself" by his own sandal latches, for to deny his ego-hood is an impossible annihilation inasmuch as finite consciousness is self-inclosed. Therefore any experience of the Self must appear to the ego as an "outer help," an act of "external grace, which 'comes in' from the 'outside' god."⁸⁰ From the jīva view, again, the first upward-tending movements of love, "discrimination, rejection and alert responsiveness" which occur prior to the integral spiritual experience may be ascribed to a free human choice.⁸¹ Concerning the "occasion," the action of the jīva which serves as an opening toward realization Watts⁸² says:

While it is true, from one point of view, that nothing can be done to produce realization, the fact remains that those in whom there is any immediate capacity for realization are not permitted to sit and wait. For as soon as the Self begins to will the end of the ego-conscious

⁷⁹ See Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, I, 314-316; II, 256, 263; IV, 131.

⁸⁰ Watts op. cit., p. 90; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 378.

⁸¹ See Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

⁸² Watts, op. cit., p. 172.

stage, the ego becomes inflamed with a passion for God, or for metaphysical knowledge, which it imagines to be of its own choosing. Naturally the immediate motive for this desire will be egoistic, but the ultimate motive is the will of the Self. The very fact that a person begins to be interested in the spiritual life, in realization, in union with God, is a certain sign that the process of awakening has begun and that the phase of evolution has been entered.

It is said that renunciation or tyāga ordinarily is of three kinds.⁸³ That which springs from delusion (mohāt) and ignorance, such as Arjuna's "I will not fight" is said to be tyāgaḥ tāmasaḥ.⁸⁴ Rājasam tyāgam is that emotional and passionate renunciation made through fear of suffering,⁸⁵ and tyāgaḥ sāttvika is the prescribed "giving up the fruits" of action and doing that which has to be done.⁸⁶ The highest renunciation, that of the charama śloka, although free of the gunas and ahaṁkāra is likewise dependent on Īśvara (Īśvarādhīna) "and is fulfilled only when it is attuned to the will of the Rakshaḥ,"⁸⁷ for even the will to total surrender and prapatti "can be awakened only through divine grace (prasāda or anugraha)."⁸⁸ This tyāga is reflected in

⁸³ Jayadayal Goyandka, Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, XIV, 160-165; Gītā 18.4.

⁸⁴ Gītā 18.7.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 18.8.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 18.9.

⁸⁷ Srinivāsachāri, op. cit., p. 369.

⁸⁸ De, op. cit., p. 238.

the "doctrine of emptiness,"--the "void" into which the ego must plunge, the "all and nothing" of St. John of the Cross.⁸⁹ It also is echoed dimly in the sincere gropings of a Western philosophy devoid of a traditional metaphysic but face to face with that "sickness unto death," the acme of purely finite endeavor which man can know only when "he 'leaps' into a nothingness in which the abyss of sin becomes the abyss of faith" and thus by this "blind leap into the absurd" gains "authentic existence."⁹⁰ The existential anguish and despair thus appears to contain or lead up to its own cure, an abandonment to the inevitable, the "edge of an abyss wherein either nothingness or God is experienced," a God which to Jaspers is a transcendency beyond theistic transcendence or philosophical immanence,--the plenum which is the void.⁹¹ William James⁹² points out that the ego

⁸⁹ Maritain, op. cit., p. 406.

⁹⁰ Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 57, 31-32. Here Reinhardt is considering the "existential faith" of Kierkegaard. Cf. Aurobindo, Savitri I, 12 (Book 1, Canto 2) where the Dark Night of the Soul is thus movingly described:

An absolute supernatural darkness falls
On man sometimes when he draws near to God:
An hour comes when fail all Nature's means;
Forced out from the protecting Ignorance
And flung back on his naked primal need,
He at length must cast from him his surface soul
And be the ungarbed entity within.

⁹¹ Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 188-191.

⁹² James, op. cit., p. 208.

cannot "create a belief out of whole cloth...and we cannot actively will a pure negation," yet once an overpowering exhaustion with the "struggle" demands that "we drop down, give up, and don't care any longer...when we lapse into a temporary apathy...that this state of temporary exhaustion not infrequently forms part of the conversion crisis." It is only when the turbidity of the egoistic struggle is cleared,--"even for^a moment," that wholeness is realized. This forms, then, a direct correspondence to the calm, tranquil and clear awareness which is prasāda, the serenity which is characteristically present and realized when the center of consciousness is in or of the Now, the bindu, rather than in bondage to temporal turbidity. Within the Now of the infinite, then, all isolation and separation of the Self from the ego is void, and the "stream of experience" finds its pure and integral conscious "vocation" in and as the līlā of the Divine.⁹³ There is, therefore, an advaitic "identity-in-difference," an everchanging and different multiform manifestation which, even in its movement, is serenely non-separate from the Supreme through the essential identity of being.⁹⁴

⁹³ See Watts, op. cit., pp. 177-180.

⁹⁴ See Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

The Gītā⁹⁵ speaks of this immovable tranquility when it tells us that "When thy mind, bewildered by śruti, shall stand immobile, fixed in contemplation, then shalt thou attain unto yoga," the yoga which is union rather than any particular dharma. "For a time comes," says Śrī Aurobindo,⁹⁶ "...when we become aware that all our efforts and actions are only mental and vital reactions to the silent and secret insistence of a greater Prem....," an understanding which will not permit an "unescapable crystallization into this or that inferior formula." This Love, this grace which is of the advaitic will of the Lord, even according to the views of Viśiṣṭādvaitic "theism," "is not a supernatural force or energy, emitted by the Lord and infused into the soul from without."⁹⁷

The Christian view analogically conceives of that "greater Prem," that agape which is of God's gracious will,⁹⁸ as flowing to man "across the abyss between the finite and infinite," a movement possible for God alone inasmuch as

...a being who exists only in virtue of a free decision of God, because it has no necessary relation to God, will

⁹⁵ 2.53. See also Anugītā 32.10-11, SBE p. 370.

⁹⁶ Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, p. 498.

⁹⁷ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 406.

⁹⁸ Nygren, op. cit., I, 168.

know God only in virtue of another divine decision equally free, because there is no natural relation between a contingent intellect and a necessary essence."⁹⁹

St. John of the Cross, although he uses the terminology and characterizations peculiar to the mythos of Christian theism, draws closer to a jiva-Ātman relationship when he says that

The will of the soul is changed into the will of God, it is become entirely the will of God, not that the will or the soul is destroyed, but it has been made the will of God. And so the soul loves God by the will of God, which is also its own will; and it can love as much as it is loved by Him, since it loves by the will of God Himself, in the same love with which He loves, which is the Holy Ghost which is given to the soul, in the words of the Apostle... [Rom. 5.5.] ¹⁰⁰

Love. The "equality of love with God," to love Him "as much as He loves us," is conceived as the supreme religious-mystical goal, the "penultimate end" prior to the Beatific Vision in the next life.¹⁰¹ Imaged as the Spiritual Marriage¹⁰² this consummation in love is regarded as a transforming union bringing perfect peace wherein God and the soul are, in the

⁹⁹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 256. Gilson here is concerned with the views of Duns Scotus. See also Nygren, op. cit., I, 163.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Maritain, op. cit., p. 459.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 396, the "Le amará tanto como es amada" of St. John of the Cross.

¹⁰² Cf. F. Sherwood Taylor, The Alchemists (New York: Henry Schuman, 1949), p. 148, concerning the symbolic "alchemical marriage of medieval alchemists wherein Sol impregnated Luna thus producing the philosopher's stone."

words of St. John of the Cross, "two natures in one spirit and one love."¹⁰³ These accounts of spiritual love from the mystical outposts on the fringe of religion are at one with the highest experiences of love in Eastern metaphysic and are assimilable therein without the necessity for that theological dismemberment and sterilization of their advaitic character which forces the fact of experience to subserve the mere analogy of that experience.¹⁰⁴ Thus do St. Alphonsis Liguori and St. Theresa image the merger,--although not the precise identity, of the soul and God in a transformation or union as of a jug of water thrown into the sea and becoming one with it, or of a raindrop losing its separate identity by falling into the greater waters of the river, which plunges into the inseparable sea.¹⁰⁵ Maritain,¹⁰⁶ in

¹⁰³ Quoted in Maritain, op. cit., p. 447.

¹⁰⁴ See Spiegelberg, Religion of No Religion, p. 47 concerning St. John of the Cross.

¹⁰⁵ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 456-457, 457n. Cf. Sankara's analogy of videha mukti, quoted in Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 169, wherein the âtman "identifies itself with It, in an undivided and conformable manner, just as pure water, mingling itself with the clear lake...conforming itself in every respect therein." Sankara clearly speaks here of the âtman. The Christian mystics, operating within a religious frame of reference which does not acknowledge the âtman, are not quite so definite, for their spiritual experience is not translatable in the terms of their Church. The "merger" of âtman and Brahman is one of identity or, from a Viśiṣṭādvaitic view, of the âtman which could experience identity but which chooses, rather, to maintain a love relationship. The Eastern analogy of the ocean and the waves more closely approximates the metaphysical view which organically unites both in the ever present and eternal Now.

¹⁰⁶ Maritain, op. cit., p. 457.

his analysis of St. John of the Cross, does use the picture of an "explosive" action, "as if the sea should flow into the river, into the amorous river...which may become...one spirit with the sea itself," and illustrates the proper movement of the divine to the finite in a typically Christian "explosive" manner, but still a temporal merger of "two wholes" in history.¹⁰⁷

Theological love, the major theological virtue, is held by most Catholic theologians to be distinct from sanctifying grace although inseparable from it. Sanctifying grace as an "entitative" habit "imparts to the soul a supernatural being, whereas charity, being purely...an operative habit...confers a supernatural power." Theological charity, "the perfect love of God above all things for His own sake" also is made to differ from that fundamental spiritual emotion or affection of the will, love as spiritually inspiring passion.¹⁰⁸ Man, according to Gilson¹⁰⁹ "naturally loves God more than himself," but since the fall has forgotten that love in self-love. It is the task of grace, then, to reeducate, heal and

¹⁰⁷ This is analogous to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine, which goes further by being non-historical and images the Absolute, in this instance, not as the sea, but as the water-cycle with its many attributes of "sea, air, cloud, rain, earth waters, river, sea." See Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, p. 485.

¹⁰⁸ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 358, 28.

¹⁰⁹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 281-282.

perfect his love.

Nygren¹¹⁰ states that the conception of divine love or charity as defined by Christian theology is in general an incompatible mixture of Hellenistic eros and the agape of primitive Christianity. Both the "will to have" which is eros and the concept of agape "which freely pours itself out" and into the soul are inferences from the ego viewpoint. The eros idea of the divinity of the soul (ego) as such does not preclude it from holding God as the object which, when attained, becomes the all-subject without an object. The religious view of soul as creature looks to God as the object, as the free giver of agape to the ego. Both concepts stress being to the practical exclusion of consciousness and tend toward the logical and monistic "extremes of negative religion, excessive asceticism,...and world-flight" or utopia-building.¹¹¹ The relationship of jiva and Atman, though, neither denies the function of the ego nor does it seal off the divine in eternal separation. The ego, and all finitude, is of and in the infinite consciousness as its free manifestation, the projection of its "image," and love is the

¹¹⁰ Nygren, op. cit., II, 20.

¹¹¹ Watts, op. cit., p. 186. See Nygren, op. cit., I, 123, 133-134.

"supreme finite analogy" of the infinite.¹¹² Thus the jīva's love, as "the highest form of meaningful relationship," nevertheless is integrally compulsive for it is beyond the ego's control, yet free because "it is God's own love that moves in [him] even when [he is] unaware that God Himself is its proper object."¹¹³ When the primary religious analogy is transcended, however, both the objective-subjective relationship is maintained in advaitic inseparableness inasmuch as the Lord, the Self of the self, is loved by the jīva "as its subject and the world as its object...For the objective is within the subjective, and in realization the external world is known as within the all-embracing consciousness of Self."¹¹⁴

Līlā-Prema. The Hindu art-analogy of līlā or play is all too often misunderstood or misinterpreted as an unreal and capricious frivolity gauged by purely human standards. It is true that metaphysic does not demand a sanctified lugubriousness as the sign for spirituality for ānanda or absolute

¹¹² Watts, op. cit., p. 113. See Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 440-441.

¹¹³ Watts, op. cit., pp. 98, 96, 113. See also Gilson, op. cit., pp. 279, 282.

¹¹⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 186. This, however, in no way sanctions any premature, forced, and emotional "feeling" of identity wishfully projected from the ego toward the as yet unrealized divine. This finite projection, incapable of rising above its own origin, can revert only to its "creator" as a "psychic experience" which in turn creates a dangerous occult

bliss is the eternal presence of integral spiritual consciousness. The finite is manifest out of the free, joyous and total abandonment of the divine, and the world not only is real but is the "profoundest expression" of that joy or bliss,¹¹⁵ the spontaneous and dynamic movement of the cosmic Artist,¹¹⁶ at once the dancer, the instans of the dance, and That which inclusively transcends both stasis and dynamis.¹¹⁷ This "pure act," this free and effortless abandonment of the

hunger for further "psychic inflations" rather than the true spiritual experience. See also p. 70, and Srinivāsachāri, op. cit., p. 437.

Cf. Brih. 4.5.6. (Hume, op. cit., p. 145): "...Lo, verily, not for love of the gods are the gods dear, but for love of the ātman the gods are dear...not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the ātman is all dear..."

¹¹⁵ See Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 92-93; Watts, op. cit., p. 94; Aurobindo, The Yoga and its Object, p. 31. Cf. Tait. 3.6. (Hume, op. cit., p. 291): "...Brahma is bliss (ānanda). For truly, indeed, beings here are born from bliss, when born they live by bliss, on deceasing they enter into bliss."

¹¹⁶ See Srinivāsachāri, op. cit., p. 203. Also Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 72. Cf. Aurobindo, Sāvitrī, I, 22 (Book 1, Canto 3):

Protagonist of the mysterious play
In which the Unknown pursues himself through all forms
And limits his eternity by the hours
And the blind Void struggles to live and see...

¹¹⁷ Cf. Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 343-344.

Speaking of līlā Śrī Aurobindo has noted that back of the impersonal sad-ātman, the ground of manifestation, "is the silence of asat...the śūnyam, and beyond that silence is the Parātmara Puruṣa... The world is only a play of his being, knowledge and delight, sat, chit, and ānanda...Matter, life, mind and what is beyond mind, it is all Śrī Krishna the anantaguna Brahman playing in the world as the Sachchidānanda." (Aurobindo, The Yoga and its Object, pp. 10-11)

Divine to and as the inseparable finite is under no compulsion or necessity, neither is it limited in a teleological manner. Such an action "has its nearest human equivalent in play," in the divine līlā of Hindu tradition,¹¹⁸ and every movement in this puzzle-play of the Self is in accordance with the divine will and consent.¹¹⁹

"The Vaishnavites," writes Sri Aurobindo,¹²⁰ "accept the world as līlā, but the true līlā is elsewhere in the eternal Brindavan [Vrindāvana]." Brahman,¹²¹ the one Self without a second (ekāke) "sports as two, as the lover and the beloved, without losing his wholeness." Superior to the limits of dialectical logic, the "Brahman in its sportive act of love separates itself from its beloved other, seeking it, and thus becomes one with it" in the irresistible reciprocity of the līlā of love.¹²² This līlā is not "an absorption in the delight of immutable being...but an active participation in the delight of divine dalliance, the joyous

¹¹⁸ See Watts, op. cit., pp. 92, 102, 172.

¹¹⁹ Therefore from within the līlā all movements, whether of involution or evolution, are instruments for the expression of divine grace, and are "freely and voluntarily" willed by the Self. (see Watts, op. cit., pp. 142, 170). Cf. Sankara, Vivekachūḍāmaṇi, p. 2, śl. 3: "There are three things which are rare indeed and are due to the grace of God (devānugraha),--namely, a human birth, the longing for liberation, and the protecting care of a perfected sage."

¹²⁰ Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 13.

¹²¹ According to Śrīnivāsaśāhārī the Brahman of Viśiṣṭādvaita is in identity with Dayā.

¹²² Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 447, 454.

association with the Lord in His cosmic play."¹²³ As each jīva-spark of that uncreated beauty and light which is Krishna circles rhythmically in the Rāsa dance, the Lord who is the center of the circle also intimately is present with each dancer, sweeping away all sense of ego-separateness in that divine love wherein "eternal bliss is experienced in a moment as the eternal present."¹²⁴ This Krishna-līlā, the living, blissful communion with the indwelling Lord of Love is not in absolute dependence upon the catastrophic and explosive interjection of a particular and unique avatāra at a distinct time in history, but is "a process forever unfolded in the heart of man."¹²⁵ The indwelling Lord is that love which is the "enveloping presence," and the Krishna-līlā becomes an experience in which, as Jaspers¹²⁶ has said in his existential philosophy, "the search becomes the finding." God is "already present wherein and wherever I seek Him... Presence and search are one." Christian theology, with its "creation metaphysics" and "form by privation," also conceives of the end of human love as its cause, for without God man could

¹²³ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 68.

¹²⁴ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 456-459.

¹²⁵ Huxley, op. cit., p. 51, quoting from Coomaraswāmy.

¹²⁶ Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 195. See Watts, op. cit., p. 170.

not seek Him, and "none can seek unless he has already found." Thus "our quest of God is God's very love in us, but the love of God in us is our finite participation in the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself...to love God is to possess God."¹²⁷ The Christian concept, though, is not of an integral, compulsive love of the divine will in and as divine līlā, but of love as a movement of the will for the purpose of possessing God. It is bound intrinsically to the limited formal logic of creation, for it appears that in the West God geometrizes, --in the East he plays.

Prema and jñāna. The element of love, while tending to be somewhat exaggerated by Viśiṣṭādvaita and similar theistic sects can not be divided from that spiritual knowledge which illuminates and justifies it and the free flow of spontaneous works coeval with it.¹²⁸

Conceptually, love and knowledge (jñāna) seem to form into a bi-polar arrangement which tends to encourage absolutist views based upon but one of the poles as the ground from which the other must spring, a gratuitous assumption either of causality or dependence.¹²⁹ Christian mysticism in

¹²⁷ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 273-276.

¹²⁸ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

¹²⁹ See Nock, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

particular and popular Christianity in general also stress charity rather than that knowledge or contemplation which exists as a supernatural means for the "union of love with God." Such knowledge itself may be viewed also as a form of love, "a loving attention to God."¹³⁰ Furthermore this supernatural love, as it overwhelms the entire soul and cleans it of all obstacles "to the light of the Holy Ghost"¹³¹ permits God to be known immediately or "by His face,"--but not with that absolute immediacy proper only to the beatific vision. This "infused love and the touches of conaturality," while not in themselves "formal signs," play a part, by the grace of the Holy Ghost, "comparable to that of the formal sign, but in a knowledge which is wholly obscure, experimental and apophatic, which unites the soul to a hidden God."¹³²

Metaphysical realization, however, integrates rather than separates, for "to know the ultimate Reality is to know

¹³⁰ Maritain, op. cit., p. 398; also pp. 11-12, 19.

¹³¹ Cf. dhātu-prasāda as a cleansing of all turbidity, Kaṭha 2.20. From the Viśiṣṭādvaita viewpoint cf.: "Within every jīva is hidden in the Brahmapuri the rich treasure of absolute truth, goodness and beauty. Blinded by karma the finite self is unable to discover it. When the self is morally cleaned [prasāda], it intuitively itself, becomes serene [prasāda] and radiant with bhakti, and reaches the resplendent region of everlasting bliss with the saving grace [prasāda] of the inner light." Srinivāsācāri, op. cit., p. 427.

¹³² Maritain, op. cit., p. 323.

and be one with Caritas itself." Prema, through its nature of self-abandonment, is integral with divine action and divine knowledge.¹³³ Being supra-sensuous and supra-rational it may not, be identified, though, with feeling and sentimental emotion.¹³⁴ Just as the conception of love tends toward the sentimental the more it verges from its polar-component of spiritual knowledge, so does the view of knowledge tend toward the limited, relative, and dependent the more it is removed from intimate contact with the Self-evident Ātman, the Self of the self which is identical with Dayā.¹³⁵ It is within this Self that logic is fulfilled and completed in the "alogical," the moral life fulfilled in the "amoral," and the personal in the "supra-personal."¹³⁶ Analytical classification of the triple qualities can never approach the true unitive spiritual knowledge which is inseparable from, and grows out of, love and devotion to this Īśvara-dayā.¹³⁷

133 Watts, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

134 Sṛnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 437-438.

135 See Rāghavendrachār, op. cit., pp. 81-95; Sṛnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 370.

136 Sṛnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 441.

137 Gītā 14.26 (Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 260): "And he who serveth Me exclusively by the yoga of devotion, he, crossing beyond the qualities, is fit to become (and becomes one with) the Eternal." Cf. also Gītā 7.18: "I hold the wise (jñāni) as verily myself; he, Self-united, is fixed on Me, the highest Path."

See Īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. xxiii.

Both bhakti and jñāna, while philosophically distinguishable, are "fused together in prema," in a spiritual state which is more than thought and feeling."¹³⁸ The total Self-abandonment of the Supreme Consciousness-power is that prema-jñāna, the plenum of power (śakti) which, as Dayā, is immanent in and as finite man who, in the fulness of his bhakti, is cleansed of obstructive impurities and "gifted with Divine eyes, to enable him to have full view of Divine Life."¹³⁹ This gift permits the direct intuition-experience of Brahman, Brahmānubava, that Self-abandonment in the finite which, "on the human side" is a prema-jñāna, "an intellectual love of God known as bhakti-rūpāpanna..."¹⁴⁰ This, according to Srīnivāsāchāri, is not composed of the mere feelings and acts of individuals relative to their concept of the divine

¹³⁸ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 440.

¹³⁹ Goswāmi, op. cit., p. 250. See Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 259; Edgerton, op. cit., II, 72. Cf. Gītā 10.11 (Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 178): "Out of pure compassion [anukampā] for them, dwelling within their Self, I destroy the ignorance-born darkness by the shining lamp of wisdom." Rāmānuja calls this wisdom-lamp "My knowledge which is homogeneous to Myself." (Īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 190). Sankara equates the lamp of wisdom to the buddhi, the light of which is "fed by the oil of pure devotion (bhakti-prasāda)," thereby making prasāda an adjunct of wisdom. (A. M. Sāstrī, op. cit., pp. 264-265.)

Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., p. 93, conceives of anukampā or compassion as "Homeward flowing tides...sometimes termed 'grace'" which can carry man to the light of wisdom but demand that he first expose himself, freely, to their power.

¹⁴⁰ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 440.

but "is the integral experience of the whole ātman and not of its sectional states."¹⁴¹

From the point of view of Christianity, Maritain¹⁴² states that

This supreme wisdom does not depend on the effort of the intellect in quest of the perfection of knowledge, but on the gift of the whole man in quest of a perfect rectitude with regard to his End.... it knows so well that it no longer dreams of knowing. This highest knowledge presupposes the renunciation of knowledge.¹⁴³

Sādhana. Viśiṣṭādvaita looks upon the jīva as chit, the consciousness which is individualized or aware of the ego only, working through achit, or the body. The true Self of the jīva is īśvara, the World-Self, and from the world view, the Ultimate. The jīva, that is, its highest principle, is "naturally of the character of bliss" and it is by nature defectless.¹⁴⁴ Samsāric bondage is due to the ignorance of the individualized ego, its lack of knowledge concerning the ultimate nature of īśvara, yet that bondage is external to its basic nature of perfection and bliss. In order to acquire

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 438.

¹⁴² Maritain, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁴³ Cf. Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 239: "The Thomists postulate a 'gift of higher knowledge' to account for the love which is the most distinctive feature of mystical experience."

¹⁴⁴ The similarity to Pelagius is only superficial, for here perfection is of the non-separate Self of the self, īśvara, and not of the ego or soul as such.

the true knowledge of the Lord as the ultimate and thus consciously receive His prasāda and love the jīva, in bhaktimārga, must undertake a certain discipline or preparation.¹⁴⁵ This discipline or sādhana embraces overt study and moral actions (similar to karmayoga), the attainment of certain convictions having to do with utter dependence upon īśvara in addition to the development of discrimination (the stage of jñānayoga), incessant devotion to the Lord (bhakti-yoga)¹⁴⁶ and that complete self-surrender which is prapatti. The movement of the sādhana is from self-centeredness to the divine, from sensuality to the spiritual love of the divine as the Self of the self.¹⁴⁷

The fifth stage in the Paramapada Sopāna, or the Ladder to Perfection as stated by Vedānta Deśika, is that of prasādana, the grace of the Lord and of the guru, whether it is in conjunction with man's efforts or not.¹⁴⁸ Here it is said that as the bhakti and prapatti develop in intensity, the

¹⁴⁵ Rāghavendrachār, op. cit., pp. 104-109.

¹⁴⁶ Through purification, abandonment of desires, continued practice, dedication of self, truthfulness (including ahimsa), fearlessness, and the absence of sattwic smugness. See Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 580. Cf. with the Christian process of justification (Pohle, op. cit., p. 297) which invariably begins with faith and then ordinarily passes through the stages of fear of divine justice, hope, initial love, contriteness (sorrow for sins), and ends with a "firm purpose of amendment."

¹⁴⁷ Rāghavendrachār, op. cit., pp. 110-111. Also Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 579-580.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. operative and cooperative graces

Divine Himself "becomes the 'Hound of Heaven,' who seeks the self, slays its ahamkāra or egoism, and swallows up its isolated being."¹⁴⁹

While it has been stated that no action on the part of the jīva can in itself bring about metaphysical realization and that the jīva's efforts toward achieving the end of his desire to realize the Supreme are motivated by egoism,¹⁵⁰ it has been found experimentally true that sādhana may have both a negative and a positive effect. Negatively it may serve to show the inadequacy of all ego-effort toward a direct production of realization, and thus through sheer frustration force the ego into the abyss of surrender.¹⁵¹ Positively it may serve as a useful, though not in itself essential, aid, a "brooding-house" wherein the tranquil but sure fires of "burning enthusiasm" or tapas may clear away all that which is extraneous and which may be an obstacle or block in the way of maturation, of integral realization.¹⁵² It is only when these aids are transformed into ends that they

¹⁴⁹ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 460-461.

¹⁵⁰ Watts, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

¹⁵¹ See Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 369.

¹⁵² See Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrine, p. 264; Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 113; Watts, op. cit., pp. 158, 174-175; Northrop, op. cit., pp. 342, 365, 368.

tend to become "harmful" and separative, and that can occur only when they are motivated by the ego-will as separate and distinct from the supreme will which encompasses all movements. In a way, then it may be said that there is a grace which prevents realization at the whim or desire of the ego, the grace of Self-abandonment which, "wherever the Self may be in the cycle of involution and evolution... [it] is always willing the motion of the cycle to its end and fulfillment."¹⁵³ The entire movement, then, of the integral intuition, including the awareness of the religious gap, the divine quest, the first faint and sometimes grotesque stirrings of Self-awakening,--all of these can but point to man as "more than ego," and that "by effort and discipline the ego matures its longing for God under the spur of the waking Self,"¹⁵⁴ which is divine grace or favor. Urquhart,¹⁵⁵ speaking of grace also as man's capacity for seeking God, says:

In quoting the familiar saying: 'I could not seek Thee, unless Thou hadst first found me,' it is not necessary

¹⁵³ Watts, op. cit., pp. 172, 175.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 158, also pp. 173, 183; Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 299.

¹⁵⁵ W. S. Urquhart, "The Christian Approach to Indian Religion," International Review of Missions, 27:254, April, 1938.

to lay all the stress on the latter clause. Is there nothing also God-given in man's capacity for seeking? Must we confine revelation to that which God gives to man after he has begun to search, and ascribe no religious value to the fact that man can search, has begun to search and--in India as well as elsewhere--has reached something divine by means of his searching.

Again, this is expressive of the principle of advaitic identity. "Brahman,"¹⁵⁶ states Rādhakṛishṇan¹⁵⁷ "...is the principle of search as well as the object sought... The striving of the soul for the infinite is said to be Brahman." Therefore, it well may be said that "In reality, the way is the goal....,"¹⁵⁸ and "The exclusive choice of the Self, made by the soul seems the reverse side or the consequence of the free choice of the Self to reveal itself."¹⁵⁹

Theoretical preparation, in addition to its usefulness as a cleansing agent which may clear the ground for a spiritual experience,¹⁶⁰ as Sādhana or effective, sincere aspiration,

¹⁵⁶ See Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, I, 163n: Vbri- to swell or to grow. "Brahman means reality which grows, breathes or swells."

¹⁵⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 22.

¹⁵⁸ From the introduction by Alan Watts, Spiegelberg, Spiritual Practices of India, p. ix. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 22, and the Christian Bible, Phil. 2.12-13.

¹⁵⁹ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., p. 107, also p. 58.

¹⁶⁰ Guénon, op. cit., p. 170; Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 148; Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 121.

can

provide those tools of expression which form the "matrix of rationality"¹⁶¹ so necessary for making the spiritual experience somewhat intelligible to others. These tools also are effective as aids in carrying out the free flow of activity or work, that "skill in action" which can come only after integral realization. The sharpened precision instruments forged by meaningful aspiration, while quite valuable as tools in the realm of multiplicity, are not to be confused with ātmavidyā, the all-inclusive spiritual knowledge itself, for "no amount of intellectual skill can lead us to the intuitive experience."¹⁶² Sincere aspiration is to be distinguished from ego-ambition for it is

symptomatic of the stirring of the divine spark within us... a self-nourishing movement towards Knowledge; it proceeds from an intense apprehension of the Divine, as the essence of all existence. Aspiration is an expression of the self-immanence of the Infinite in the finite....It is a calm and steady flame and must not therefore be confounded with what is usually known as vyākulatā (spiritual impatience)Aspiration has in it the conviction that spiritual progress is not so much a personal affair as a work for the Divine and of the Divine.¹⁶³

Blind yearning for infinite wholeness and security¹⁶⁴ may

¹⁶¹ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 147, 177.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 178, 211, 153.

¹⁶³ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 104. See Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II, 264.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 101.

ripen in accordance with Divine Will into a one-pointed, cleansing tapasyā which not only tends to remove obstacles which work against spiritual interests, but may act in harmonious sympathy with and as the creative will of the Self.¹⁶⁵

Bhaktimārga and Western Mysticism. Chaudhuri¹⁶⁶ has traced, step by step, a likeness between the way of devotion which is Vaishnavism and the stages of Christian mysticism based upon man's love, devotion, and self-subordination to the will of the Divine. While it is true that spirituality is not limited by either geographical or biological distinction and that "Those who have seen the radiant vision of the Divine...speak a language which unites all worshippers as surely as the dogmas of the doctors divide,"¹⁶⁷ there remains in the West a quite extensive vortex of occult feelings and experiences which acts as a nucleus around which circle varied individuals and cults. This occult movement is to metaphysic what eros is to agape, for it receives its desire-impetus from the ego-self reaching upward, instead of manifesting through and as the power of the Self which needs to

¹⁶⁵ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 55; Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 129; Rādhakrishnan, East and West in Religion, p. 76; Aurobindo, op. cit., II, 257.

¹⁶⁶ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

¹⁶⁷ S. Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 35.

reach nowhere. These occult groups, and many "religious mystics", are alike in that their "mystical knowledge...is not always the immediate and universal type of knowledge" which marks integral spiritual insight, and often are marked by an over-accentuation of emotional and sentimental feelings which are but finite and temporal analogies of ananda.¹⁶⁸ Western occultism and certain mystical movements, like the manifestations of eros, tend toward the development of the 'ego blown big,' for they "imply a more or less indefinite extension of purely individual possibilities."¹⁶⁹ This is illustrated in the almost traditional demand of Western "mystics," both ancient and modern, for an individual, specific revelation, a "private intuition" wherein

the visionary illuminist makes his own little rent in the veil which hides the supersensual world from us, and individual apocalypses, oracles and intimations are revealed to him in single flashes of light. He recounts the visions and dreams which he alone has received, and his believers accept them on his authority.¹⁷⁰

Metaphysical realization is timeless and not of a private and individualistic nature. Its universality may be manifest in that which is seen by the poet-sages or rishis,-- but the private and individual seal of the rishi, as a finite

¹⁶⁸ Watts, op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁶⁹ Guénon, ^{Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Sacred Books,} op. cit., p. 124.

¹⁷⁰ Otto, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

being, is not upon it. It is of the eternal Self, and eternally speaks, not through one exclusive channel and at one point in history, but through the ageless community of all those who are integrally aware of supreme non-dual spirituality, and who thereby transcend individuality.¹⁷¹

The dualism inherent in all purely monistic approaches¹⁷² is conducive to a strict cleavage between the evils of nature and the Supreme Good, together with that nature-abandonment so reminiscent of Manichaean influence.¹⁷³ Centered within those Western "mystical" movements which received their impetus from certain Mediterranean sources and traditions were the doctrines of the "double nature of man, of the Divine origin and quality of the soul, its liberation from the fetters of sense, and its ascent to its original divine home ...". Therefore, the body tended to be looked upon, with ascetic disdain, as the prison of the fallen soul, the escape from which, occasioned by occult initiatory ceremonies and practices, was accompanied by the appropriate feeling of ecstasy.¹⁷⁴ This view differs both from that held by the Church

¹⁷¹ See ibid., p. 72; Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 45; Watts, op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁷² See Watts, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁷³ See Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 191; Watts, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁷⁴ Nygren, op. cit., I, 122; Gilson, op. cit., p. 174.

and the experience of Metaphysic. The Church considers that the natural union of soul and body, willed by the Creator and therefore good, is not the result of a fall,¹⁷⁵ and metaphysical doctrine not only says tat tvam asi and aham Brahmasmi, but also sarvam idam Brahma and Brahmaivedam sarvam.¹⁷⁶

The dualistic approach, which makes for the emotion of exclusiveness as well as attachment to the notion of private revelation in time, also tends to place an over-emphasis upon a type of desire-love and that quasi-devotion which enthrones it as the exclusively divine.¹⁷⁷

The dangers of emotionalism are said to arise from a sentimental affection for the projected ego. Of this Huxley¹⁷⁸ says:

A hell-fire faith that uses the theatrical techniques of revivalism in order to stimulate remorse and induce the crisis of sudden conversion;...a saviour cult...stirring up...fleshly love of the avatâr and personal God; a ritualistic mystery-religion that generates high feelings of awe and reverence and aesthetic ecstasy by means of its sacraments and ceremonials, its music and its incense, its numinous darkness and sacred lights--in its own

¹⁷⁵ Gilson, op. cit., p. 174n.

¹⁷⁶ Judith Tyberg, Sanskrit Keys to India's Wisdom (San Francisco, 1952), p. 6.

¹⁷⁷ See Watts, op. cit., p. 41; Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 68; Hopkins, Ethics of India, pp. 204-205.

¹⁷⁸ Huxley, op. cit., p. 257.

special way, each one of these runs the risk of becoming a form of psychological idolatry in which God is identified with the ego's objective attitude towards God and finally the emotion becomes an end in itself, to be eagerly sought after and worshipped, as the addicts of a drug spend life in the pursuit of their artificial paradise.

This criticism also may apply to that type of Western "bridal mysticism"¹⁷⁹ which Otto¹⁸⁰ characterizes as as "...excited emotionalism...an intoxicated eroticism," and which he also equates with some phases of Krishnan eroticism. While the word ecstasy is truly one "which conveys a multitude of things," and may range from the purely physical to the highest sattwic experience,¹⁸¹ it remains, when viewed as an end in itself and as the supremely desirable, but a finite feeling-analogy not to be identified with ānanda. While at times incident to realization, ecstasy is in no way essential to it,--and apart from realization may oftentimes be a perversion in the nature of a psychic orgasm.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ See Maritain, op. cit., p. 447.

¹⁸⁰ Otto, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁸¹ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 77.

¹⁸² See Ibid., pp. 77-79; Watts, op. cit., p. 37.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOAL

Hiriyanna¹ points out that it is impossible to form a concept as to the nature of the goal of early Indian thinking, but suggests that its ends may well have been that "rapturous communion with the Divine" mentioned by Chaudhuri² wherein mukti is inseparable from bhukti or ecstatic enjoyment and participation in the līlā of the beloved. Śrīnivāsāchāri³ also mentions the "identity of abode and co-existence" (sālokyā)⁴ which leads to the proximity of fellowship (sāṃipyā) and similarity of form (sārūpyā). Śrīnivāsāchāri also adds sāyujyā, not precisely within the meaning of that realization of identity with the supreme undifferentiated consciousness as found in jñānayoga, but as a supreme intuitive experience (Brahmānubhava), occurring in the ātmanic consciousness, of a personal union of love with the Divine of infinite attributes. In the highest state of Paramapada there is the experience of an eternal enjoyment of bliss in identity

¹ Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 36.

² Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 60.

³ Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 474.

⁴ See Gītā 12.8; 14.2; Iśopanishad 1.

with that Dāya which is Brahman and the will of Brahman.⁵

There is here much resemblance to the Catholic doctrine of the effects of sanctifying grace such as holiness, supernatural beauty, and the supernatural friendship of God (mystical marriage). There is even more of a parallel in the view of St. John of the Cross that the beatific vision "will itself be the supreme effect of love, the grasp by which love lays hold on its supreme good, and it is from the delights of love that that vision will flower."⁶ But the Christian gulf forever separating the supernatural from the natural stems from the Christian concept of a monistic God, the effects of whose grace, deification and transfiguration remain at all times analogical, a "grafting" or possession and not an integral non-dual union. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic Brahman, The Self of the self, being advaitic, is here viewed as having infinite attributes non-separate from Himself,--and the realization of union therefore is real in the strict sense as realization of integral identity with Saguna Brahman as a non-separate attribute, and is not analogical. This non-dual infinite, as distinct from the

⁵ See Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 409, 460, 489; Rāmānuja, The Vedānta Sūtras with Śrī Bhāṣya, p. 48; Rāghavendrāśhār, op. cit., p. 116.

⁶ Maritain, op. cit., p. 397, also pp. 318, 340-43, 653.

monistic God of religion, "does not exclude the realm of relationship and value."⁷ Viśiṣṭādvaita conceives of attributes as inseparable spiritual values which in themselves are eternal, and Self-realization is, accordingly, "the regaining of Paramapada, which is the realm of eternal values." Here again is a great difference between Viśiṣṭādvaita and Christian doctrine, for the beatific state is not the natural condition of the soul (ego) whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaitic ātman (inseparable from jīva, but superior to it) is by nature free and aware of eternal values.⁸ The Supreme Value in Paramapada is that irresistible ānanda of the Brahmanic experience (Brahmānubhava) which, while permitting a sense of personal relationship, as it were, engulfs this relationship in the perfect enjoyment (bhukti) of bliss.⁹

Mukti. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita mukti is "the integral experience of Brahman that has infinite jñāna and ānanda and other perfections," and this is that same "true nature of the jīva realized by the destruction of avidyā-karma," for "the jīva is a prakāra [mode] or śarīra [body]

⁷ Watts, op. cit., p. 95.

⁸ Srīnivāsaśāstri, op. cit., p. 479.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 490-491, 500.

of Brahman, and its jñāna, which is infinite, has, as its essential nature, the intuitive experience of the bliss of Brahman.¹⁰ Thus the ātman always is free and eternal, "organically" united in inseparability (avibhāga) to and as the Brahman of infinite attributes or modes (viśiṣṭa aīka) rather than in an identity with a featureless Absolute (svarūpa aīkya), and therefore is realized as the inseparable mode or attribute (aprithaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa) "and not as an adjective housed in the Absolute."¹¹ This free self, "confused by avidyā, tempted by kāma and confined by karma, is caught up in the wheel of time."¹² Mukti is a reversal of this process through discipline and loving surrender,¹³ and a spiritual "seeing" of the "highest light" of Brahman and thus is an opening to the ever-present blissful state.¹⁴

Viśiṣṭādvaita conceives of the highest state of bliss as being possible of experience only after earthly death, for "freedom from embodiment connotes the withdrawal of the jīva from the psycho-physical sphere of avidyā-kāma-

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 479. Here jīva stands not for the isolated ego, but for the living complex which includes ātman and jīva. Its jñāna is that which Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 168, calls the "Non-Supreme" knowledge leading to Īśvara. See also Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 78.

¹¹ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 481

¹² Ibid., p. 462.

¹³ Ibid., p. 461.

¹⁴ Cf. Ibid., p. 479; Chhānd. 8.3.4.

karma and the cosmic sphere of space-time."¹⁵ In videha mukti there is a withdrawal from the samsaric state by way of the archirâdi or "path of light"¹⁶ with no "destruction of the psychic make-up," but rather its transfiguration in a lîlâ wherein "Death is the last scene of the Divine comedy."¹⁷ Srînivâsâchâri¹⁸ also adds that inasmuch as the mukta, the freed Self, is beyond space and time he is free to participate in both the "worlds of lîlâ and nitya," that is, may at will "descend" to the finite as an expression of cosmic freedom or "ascend" to the infinite realm, for both "constitute the World of Brahman as a whole and are comprised in the all-inclusive cosmic consciousness."¹⁹ Thus there is to be discerned an element of the Bodhisattva ideal as well as an implication of its concomitant concept of the equality of the above and the below which, combined with the doctrine of videha mukti, provide certain resemblances to Jodo-shin-shu. Still, with the major emphasis upon videha mukti there is a marked tendency toward a religious limitation of the divine

¹⁵ Srînivâsâchâri, op. cit., pp. 462, 465.

¹⁶ A view somewhat reminiscent of Neoplatonic doctrine.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 465, 482. See also Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 167; Rodhe, op. cit., p. 93; Satapatha Brâhmana 10.4.3.

¹⁸ Srînivâsâchâri, op. cit., p. 487.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 487. See also Guénon, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

and a localizing of the highest goal as a future state limited to the cosmic realm of being.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic mukti is possible only in accordance with the nature of the śarīra-śarirīn relationship of jīva and īśvara and through the grace of the indwelling Lord.²⁰ This divine grace is termed mokṣaprasāda or muktiprasāda and is a free gift of the divine, the Dāya of infinite attributes, to each jīva or inseparable attribute.²¹

In Viśiṣṭādvaita realization or divine union, inasmuch as it too is based upon a love relationship with Personality which is all too subject to the dangers of projective idolization, sentimental excess, and dualistic interpretation, exhibits many points of resemblance to Christianity. The beatific vision, which also is possible in its fulness only in a future condition beyond the worldly state, bestows and clothes the souls, "not by the intensification of [their] natural splendor, but by the accession of a splendor from

²⁰ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 72. Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 78.

²¹ Śrīnivāsāchārī, op. cit., pp. 471, 488. This grace is called pusṭi in Vallabha's school. See Dāsgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, IV, 359, 378.

Krishna Prem, op. cit., p. 93n, says: "The term Grace, however, if used at all, is better reserved for a mysterious Power, testified to by mystics of East and West; a power that is wielded alike by Krishna and the human guru, and which is so ultimate that it baffles all attempts at intellectual formulation. All we can say is that it is utterly free and that it is rooted in that aspect of the Supreme and Eternal One that manifests in us as personality."

without,²² and with "an extra-ordinary and almost divine form, so that they seem to be gods rather than men." The Self of Viśiṣṭādvaita, though, is not almost Divine,--for it is at all times an eternal attribute inseparable from the Divine. Here the major point of difference is the nature of the Divine and the self,--the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Divine with attributes as His very nature in opposition to the monistic Creator God whose creature is something other than Himself.²³ The Christian ideal of a "happy posthumous condition of indefinite personal survival"²⁴ wherein the soul's desire to perfect its ego-hood in a projected ideal of "wholeness" or "holiness" demands an equal projection of each soul and the retention of its "own proper substance."²⁵ In Viśiṣṭādvaita the personality also is said to persist in the beatific state of paramapada,--but here there is no clear-cut and eternal separation from the divine as found in Christianity, for this persistence ontologically is within the advaitic īśvara whose nature is that of infinite.

22 Scheeben, op. cit., p. 653.

23 Ibid., pp. 659, 654-655. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 305n, 318, 455. Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 479, 481.

24 Huxley, op. cit., p. 201.

25 Scheeben, op. cit., p. 659. See Otto, op. cit., p. 188; Watts, op. cit., pp. 90.

attributes. There is, here, an identity of a kind differing from absolute identity inasmuch as it is that of a Self-attribute with its inseparable sea of attributes, of a personal Self-expression with the infinite ocean of all personality, united in a timeless and eternal bliss or ānanda which transcends all separation.²⁶ With, perhaps, an undue and onesided emphasis upon attributes, personality, and love, Viśiṣṭādvaita and other similar sects may tend to come dangerously near to an almost religious lack of discrimination between jīva and ātman.²⁷ While frequently spoken of as a single complex, the functions or natures of the two inseparable though unequal components often are pointed out in Viśiṣṭādvaitic writings, but often in a rather indefinite manner as if it were an element of common knowledge or a thing taken for granted.

Guénon²⁸ has stated that the nearest equivalent to the Christian "heaven" in a traditional metaphysical symbolism is that Brahmaloka which may be thought of as the cyclical "assimilation into Hiranya-garbha... (Brahmā

²⁶ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 490, 491, 500. See Watts, op. cit., pp. 51, 90.

²⁷ Although metaphysically they may be said to be inseparable it is at first necessary to discriminate between them in order not to confuse and identify the lesser with its all-inclusive and transcendent Self.

²⁸ Guénon, op. cit., p. 158n.

existing as Hiranya for that cycle only)...²⁹ or Cosmic Being. From this viewpoint, then, Viśiṣṭādvaitic paramapada as advaitically non-separative in nature yet retentive of "a certain connection...with the order of universal manifestation" may be in a higher identity with the Saguna nature of Īśvara or universal Being.²⁹

Deliverance and Samsāric Evil. The pre-Upanishadic conceptual terms for varying kinds of evil and sin tend toward a use which is less specific and concrete than in later periods. In addition there appears to be in vedic times, no precise distinction between sin as a wrong-doing or committed evil, and that evil which comes "from outside."³⁰ Pāpa, the classical word for evil, is infrequently used in vedic texts, and is a term of such general meaning that it fails to specify any particular type of evil. The derivative pāpman,³¹ however, appears with somewhat greater frequency in the texts.³² Pāpman is also a term signifying various

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 158-159. See also Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, p. 127; Huxley, op. cit., pp. 201-204.

³⁰ Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 42, 44-45. Amhas is sometimes used, but, with many exceptions, however, in the general sense of evil from "outside."

³¹ Macdonell, op. cit., p. 160: evil, calamity, suffering, transgression, sin, guilt.

³² Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 30, 41. Rodhe cites pāpa's uncertain etymology as pointing toward Gk. πῆμα calamity; Lat. penuria, want. See also Hopkins, Ethics of India, p. 31, where he believes pāpa to have no ethical content. Rodhe, p. 33, cites AV 6.26.1; RV 10.71.9; 11.8.19 where pāpman is used as a name for the personification of evil.

kinds of evil in general, and its opposite is bhadra or good, a distinction which tends to lose itself in Upanishadic writings.³³ Other vedic terms used for evil and sin include agha,³⁴ āgas,³⁵ anrita,³⁶ enas,³⁷ hedas (wrath or indignation) and hedana (cause of this wrath, therefore offense),³⁸ kilbisha,³⁹ and ripa.⁴⁰

³³ Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 30-34. Rodhe also gives pāpa + karoti with the meaning of wrongdoing. (See Brih. 4.4.5; 4.4.22; 5.14.8. Chhānd. 4.11-14. Tait. 2.9.1. Kaush. 2.7; 3.1) and is contrasted with punya or good works (see Brih. 1.5.20; 3.2.13; 4.3.15; 4.4.5. Mund. 3.1.3. Praśna 3.7. For contrast with sādhu see Brih. 4.4.5. Tait. 2.9.1.

³⁴ Evil in general and not necessarily sin as such. Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 43-44. See Hopkins, op. cit., p. 31 and RV 10.185.2.

³⁵ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 139. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 32. Doubtful connection with Gk. āyēs, guilt. Rodhe gives āgas as a synonym for enas as an act committed against the rishis or gods, an offense.

³⁶ Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 140-142. That which is out of harmony with rita,--usually concerned here with improper speech, transgression against natural, sacrificial and moral law. Cf. adharma.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 137. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 31. Rodhe equates enas with offense, near, but not equal to, the English word "sin."

³⁸ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 136.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 142: "offense." Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 31-32, equates kilbisha with stain and the later Sanskrit usage of kalmasha and kalusha, as well as aparādha, meaning failure.

⁴⁰ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 142. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 32. Debt, offense, injury.

Hopkins⁴¹ mentions a possible tendency to stress the moral over the physical element in evil by the use of compounds with prefixes such as dus, dur, found in dushkrita (evil act), dureva (ill-going, therefore those who commit evil),⁴² abhidroha and drugha (treacherous, malicious).⁴³

Thus there are occasions where sin as an act having moral consequences is mentioned in the Vedas,⁴⁴ but Rodhe⁴⁵ carefully and distinctly points out, on many occasions, that "in the Vedas sin is not regarded as an evil quite different from other kinds of evil," there being "no strict divisions between physical and moral evils." All that interferes with a full and complete life is evil, and not sharply distinguished from sin. Sickness,⁴⁶ bondage to life's ills,⁴⁷

⁴¹ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 31n.

⁴² Cf. Brih. 10.89.9.

⁴³ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 74. Cf. durita as disaster, mischief, and evil in general.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 30-32. Cf. RV 4.5. where dureva ("evil conduct"), pāpa ("full of sin"), anrita ("untrue"), and asatya ("unfaithful") are words used to describe lustful women. Cf. also Brih. 3.61.11.; 10.12; AV 18.1.4.

⁴⁵ Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 32, 44, 146.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 33, 38, 153. Cf. AV 4.31; 18.1.29.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 37-41, 162-163, 168-169. Pāsa (bond, snare, fetter, Yama's fetter) as evil is not distinguished from disease and death itself. Synonyms are dāman (RV 7.86.5.) and padbīśa (RV 10.97.16.). Later Upanishadic usage extended the idea of fetters to those samsāric acts or works which

death,⁴⁸ and trouble in general⁴⁹ are all interrelated evils.

Vedic sin as a transgression against rita has physical and moral overtones but also has a ritualistic nature and is for the most part said to be concerned with Varuna. Rodhe finds no evidence of a guilt feeling or sense of sin, and therefore no need for personal repentance,--for it clearly must be understood that there are no exact distinctions between sin and other evils, and the human will is not connected intimately with these evils.⁵⁰

becloud the mind and bind man in the cycle of existence, especially those desires (esheṇā, kāma) which make work a bondage, (Cf. Bṛih. 3.5.; 4.4.5.; 4.4.22.)

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 81-90, 97-102. Here the death to be feared is for the most part that premature death which ends life before its allotted one hundred year span. There are evidences, according to Rodhe, that death in advanced old age (jarāmṛityu) was not considered as an evil (cf. AV 2.28.4.). This concept of "freedom from death" (amṛityu), however, differs from a more integral view which embraces death as but an incident (RV 9.113.8. ff). Punarṁṛityu or recurring death is also an evil (cf. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 2.3.3.7-8) which can be averted by knowledge and the proper building of the Nāchiketas fire and altar. Rodhe does not agree with Eggeling that this concept of punarṁṛityu is intimately connected with the seemingly later full concept of saṁsāra. Death as an evil is viewed in the Upanishads from a more meditative frame of reference and tends to become identified with saṁsāric life.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 41-42. Similar to the general term pāpa in classical Sanskrit is the Vedic usage of amhas (cf. Lat. angustus; Ger. eng; Eng. anxious, anxiety) with the comprehensive meaning of distress and trouble but it also is used for disease, calumny, and sin.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 135-136, 144, 146-148, 160-162. Cf. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 44, Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, I, 108-109. "...the Upanishads," says Rodhe (p. 170.), "do not speak of deliverance from sin, but of deliverance from 'all opposite pairs,' such as good and evil works, birth and death."

In the Vedas sin, as such, is best characterized as a pollution or stain, an evil encountered in the world, and one which may be wiped off or cleared away.⁵¹ Hopkins⁵² concurs in this view and says that sin is "an encompassing environment like an egg-shell round a bird unhatched. It leads to something being deformed..." It is this cleansing view, this "wiping off" of the stain of turbidity preventing the full realization of spiritual power,⁵³ which forms the basic metaphysical analogy of prasāda as clarity, tranquility, and calm, and which leads to that "clarity of awareness" which constitutes the integral freedom of spiritual experience.⁵⁴

This view of sin as a temporary stain, an obstruction or a hindrance which blocks the normal and clear perfection of awareness, is distorted analogically in the Christian view of sin as "a stain...by which the soul is disfigured and rendered odious in God's sight...a disfigurement and

⁵¹ Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 150, 153, 160. In AV 7.65.2. the evil deed (dushkṛita) is called śamala or stain that can be wiped off. AV 12.2. calls it ripṛa, uncleanness. Cf. AV 6.113 where the verb for wiping off this stain is apamri-jate.

⁵² Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 183.

⁵⁴ See introduction by A. Watts in Spiegelberg, Spiritual Practices of India, p. xii.

degradation of God's image." In the supernatural order this sin-stain "not only covers its [the soul's] countenance with filth, but eats into it like a corroding poison, and thoroughly disfigures and devastates it by altering its state," thus not only beclouding the divine beauty which is the soul's in a state of grace and supernatural justice, but permanently annihilating and completely extinguishing it by an act of "moral suicide."⁵⁵ This permanent defect may be removed only through that opposite power which also is considered as permanent, that is, sanctifying grace and the grace of the Christian sacraments.⁵⁶

In the Upanishadic experience the focus of infection, as it were, for all evil was found in that state of separateness and incompleteness with which the Self is identified in the samsâric "cycle of existence."⁵⁷ More comprehensive than a "mere moral defect," the incompleteness of samsâra may be viewed as a metaphysical limitation and stricture.⁵⁸ This is mirrored analogically in Catholic doctrine which denies

⁵⁵ Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 256-257. Gilson, op. cit., p. 337.

⁵⁶ Everett, op. cit., p. 56. Pohle, op. cit., p. 333.

⁵⁷ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 106. Samsâra (sam+sarati), "to flow together." In Rodhe's opinion the advent of samsâric concepts in the later Upanishads is due to Buddhist influence. See pp. 116, 137.

⁵⁸ See Spiegelberg, Religion of No Religion, p. 6.

and excludes physical evil as a positive quality inherent in nature, and instead gives it but relative and negative status dependent upon the positive good for its meaning.⁵⁹ The Self's jīva-relation with saṃsāra, however, being non-integral from the jīva view, is not, therefore, an acceptance of saṃsāra for what it is, for no more and no less than what it is. There is thus precipitated a state of adharma which is neither of a moral or theological nature, but one of one-sided disequilibrium or inharmony with the integral "norm,"⁶⁰ a condition of incomplete or adumbrated awareness which is far from the Western concept of sin and an "agonizing sense of guilt."⁶¹

⁵⁹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 113-115.

⁶⁰ See Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, p. 212. Northrop, op. cit., p. 387.

⁶¹ See Bevan, op. cit., pp. 449-450. In his review of Otto's book, Christianity and the Indian Religion of Grace, Bevan points out that in England this particular sense of guilt and divine condemnation is peculiar to evangelical Protestantism of past generations and that there is a "shifting of the axis" from the "Lutheran pattern." He asks, "But how far is that kind of experience still found in English Christianity today? How many are troubled now by a sense of guilt or by a fear of Divine judgment? Do not most English Christians now feel sin more as a paralysis than a leprosy, and think of salvation rather as a deliverance from subjection to unworthy impulses than as a 'justification?' How many people are there below fifty to whom 'justification by faith' is a vital concern?" While Bevan's views may be valid as to overt acceptance of certain Christian theological patterns he has not, however, examined the impact of this persistent heritage of mores, of that which tacitly is accepted as "what ought to be," upon modern behavior. Modern

Thus, metaphysically, "sin" is more appropriately termed an aterrational ignorance, a denial of the ground of the infinite Self through persistence in complete identification with the finite and its oppositional pairs rather than a defiance of God or a violation of God's decree.⁶² The Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of avidyā-karma as without beginning (anādi) admits the inadequacy of any logical and causal series, with its infinite regression, to explain the origin and nature of evil. It accepts the ills of saṁsāra, stemming from desire (kāma) and aversion (krodha), as real but insists that their removal is more pertinent than any analysis, for the problem of evil is dissolved in the divine vision (Brahma-dṛiṣṭi).⁶³ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī⁶⁴ declares that in its limited state the jīva,

psychiatry, however, can still find a deep-laid "sense of guilt." Otto, Mysticism East and West, p. 124, points out that for Eckhart sin is primarily the "self-centeredness of the ego" rather than a moral problem involving "libido" and "cupiditas."

Metaphysical tradition does not, like religion, "develop unduly the instinct for being unhappy," nor does it cherish guilt-obsession. (See Rādhakṛiṣṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 43.) Śrī Aurobindo, Bases of Yoga (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1949), p. 56, states that self-depreciation and depression resulting from a sense of sinful guilt forms a great obstacle and hindrance toward liberation. Also see James, op. cit., p. 80.

⁶² Rādhakṛiṣṇan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 73. Huxley, op. cit., pp. 161, 179, 184. Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 305.

⁶³ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 172, 152, 312. Gītā 3.37.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 407.

as the "son of man...bears the cross of his karma," but as the Son of the Divine this abnormality or self-alienation is destroyed by dayâ which replaces the historical sense with consciousness of the eternal.⁶⁵

This karmic "cross" of avidyâ is not to be construed, metaphysically, as mechanistic or as a "constraint from outside,"⁶⁶ for the essence of its operation involves and demands that freedom of choice proper to the jîva and in accordance with the will of the Self.⁶⁷ This freedom is not that of an arbitrary and capricious license, but is characterized in its physical, ethical, and spiritual aspects by that determinism which alone is derived from the Self.⁶⁸ The jîva's "sense" of freedom, often checked and inhibited in practice, can be but a harmonic response to the absolute freedom of the indwelling Self and its identity with infinite will or grace. Thus the actions of the jîva partake of the

⁶⁵ Nârâyana means the "Son of Man" (Maitri 6, 8; 7.7. Hume, op. cit., pp. 429, 454.), not of man as the ego, but of "primal man or Spirit,"--that is, of the ground which is Brahman-âtman. See Lanman, op. cit., p. 180. The "two-fold" view of "living creation" is stated in Chapter 16 of the Gîtâ.

⁶⁶ Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 48.

⁶⁷ See Gîtâ 18.63. Also Kṛishṇa Prem, op. cit., pp. 185-186; Râdhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 75; Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 48-49; Sṛinivâsâchâri, op. cit., pp. 150-151. Cf. Bṛih. 4.4.5.

⁶⁸ Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 46-47. Sṛinivâsâchâri, op. cit., 172-174. Cf. Manu 7.205.

freedom of the Self's freely assumed limitation which includes and gives meaning to all karmic possibilities and responsibilities,⁶⁹--for the ultimate power (śakti) acting as the transcendent-immanent ground for samsāric play and the finite movements of karma is that of the integral and all-embracing will which as "grace fulfils itself" in its finite image "through karma."⁷⁰ The highest sattvic act, however, still is bound within the samsāric "strands," and it is only when there is a clear awareness of being triguṇātita that the full or integral consciousness of freedom is realized.⁷¹

The limitations of samsāra and the sorrows and sufferings experienced by the jīva as a separate desire-individual in time has been conceived by religion as an analogical fall of man which was subsequent to creation.⁷² The peculiar and unique Christian concept of original sin is an historical

⁶⁹ See Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., pp. 58-59; Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, pp. 190-191; Watts, op. cit., pp. 109, 113, 120-121, 124-125, 127.

⁷⁰ Śrīnivāsaśāstri, op. cit., pp. 180, 342. See Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 41, 119; Guénon, op. cit., p. 214; Watts op. cit. p. 94; Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 73; Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 294; Roy, op. cit., p. 68n. Cf. Gītā 7.11-12; 10.4-5, 34, 36, 38; 15.15. Kaush. 3.9.

⁷¹ Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, pp. 197-198.

⁷² See Huxley, op. cit., pp. 182-183, 250; Spiegelberg, The Religion of No Religion, p. 6.

analogy far removed from avidyā, and is entirely foreign to metaphysical principle in general and Viśiṣṭādvaita in particular.⁷³ While Hopkins⁷⁴ recognizes the Brāhmaṇic rule which says that "there is no sin in a new-born babe," a condition which he cites as persisting until the time of initiation, he does dwell upon its apparent contradiction with the vedic idea of "hereditary" sin.⁷⁵ The stain which proceeds from the semen and the womb⁷⁶ is not to be conceived as apart from the general framework of samsāric and karmic obscurations which arise from prārabdha karma, that fruit of the sum total of all past actions (saṁchita) which is responsible for the present bodily incarnation.⁷⁷

The early gnostic view that "man is sinful by nature" reflected the Manichaean doctrine of evil and foreshadowed Luther and Calvin, a concept also held by Cyprian, Ambrose, and Hilary; and Augustine's views of the perverse human will and its utter dependence upon the renovating action of the

⁷³ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 171, 176, 404-405, 538.

⁷⁴ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 110.

⁷⁵ See Ballou, Spiegelberg, Friess, op. cit., pp. 114, 1546: RV 7.86 where Varuna is implored to "free us from sins committed by our fathers." Cf. Christian Bible, Exodus 20.5; Numbers 14.18.

⁷⁶ Cf. Manu 2.27.

⁷⁷ Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 173.

Holy Ghost lead to the doctrine of election and an institutional monopoly over conversion. Justin, Clement, and Origen looked upon original sin more as an "inherited disease which inclines to the wrong" the human being, man, who is sinless at birth, and the Antioch school came close to a karmic doctrine in holding that "none sins through another's sins."⁷⁸

Catholic doctrine differs from the Socratic view that wickedness is ignorance, a "missing of the mark," and, through the construction of a dramatic and analogical mythos, portrays original sin as man's first transgression, arising from an abuse of free will,⁷⁹ a rebellion against God and the order of providential creation,--not in favor of non-existent natural evil, but for the sake of a lesser, creaturely good. Thus freely repudiating his dependence upon God by violating the pristine prohibition which served as a "sensible sign of this radical dependence," man, the created being, renews this violation with every successive sin. Every evil "is either sin or the consequence of sin," shattering the work of creation, the fragments of which, by retaining the good which was pronounced upon them at their

⁷⁸ Hopkins, History of Religions, pp. 572-574.

⁷⁹ Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 126n, sees in this free will a "fatal gift" which, in God's omniscience, foreshadows the horrors of Calvinistic absolute predestination.

creation, may be "resuscitated and restored" by the grace of God alone, for when man sins he "destroys what he cannot create."⁸⁰ The Eastern relation of karma to divine will is further reflected and distorted in the Christian doctrine which, although ascribing man's causality to God and stating that "all that we make, God creates," does not extend that causal act to transgression, that "evil,--which, precisely, is not."⁸¹ The effects of original sin extend to all the ills of the flesh,⁸² to captivity by and slavery to the Devil subject to release by God's special assistance,⁸³ to the total destruction of the gift of original justice which was added to man's nature at creation by God,⁸⁴ to the diminishing (though not extinction) of man's natural (not supernatural inclination to good;⁸⁵--but does not suppress nor

⁸⁰ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 109-111, 118-119, 127, 339-341. See Nygren, op. cit., II, 1.

⁸¹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 129, 132.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 119, 123.

⁸³ Scheeben, op. cit., 307-308. The Gnostic insistence upon the creation of an "evil world" by a Demiurge instead of God is paralleled by Christian utilization of the Devil to account for evil in a world created by God and pronounced good. See Gilson, op. cit., p. 110, Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 68, Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 120.

⁸⁴ Gilson, op. cit., p. 124.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 124, 340. Scheeben, op. cit., p. 306. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 328: "To neglect what reason prescribes is to neglect what God prescribes. ...to violate

diminish the essence of man as a "rational living thing," for if all good were capable of being abolished by sin, being would be non-existent.⁸⁶ The early Protestant views of Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius conceived of man's original good as natural rather than supernaturally added. Through the first sin that nature became totally and irremediably corrupt, leaving man's will incapable of good and his every act as sinful.⁸⁷

There is, then, a dual Christian concept of nature and creation, but with no absolute and clear-cut line of demarcation between Catholic and Protestant. While it is true that the Reformation stressed the world as essentially evil, a vain and empty confusion in antagonistic opposition to God,⁸⁸ and Protestantism has been accused of entertaining a "concept of grace that saves a man without changing him, of a justice that redeems corrupted nature without restoring it, of a Christ who pardons the sinners for self-inflicted wounds but does not heal them,"⁸⁹ the effects of movements such as the

the rule of reason, the proximate rule of human action, is to violate its first and most fundamental rule, the eternal law, which is, in a way, nothing but the reason of God..."

⁸⁶ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 122, 124-125. also p. 112.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 122, 125. Scheeben, op. cit., #244. Cf. nityasaṃsāratva, Śrīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 405.

⁸⁸ Otto, op. cit., p. 91. Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 284.

⁸⁹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 421.

Arminian tended toward certain Pelagian concepts, as opposed to Calvinism, and influenced a large portion of evangelical Protestantism.⁹⁰ The Catholic view, endeavoring to follow a middle course between Mani and Pelagius, looked upon the world as the good creation of God, corrupted when used by the human will in revolt against God.⁹¹ The possibility of defection, however, the constant peril of creation to lapse into the nothingness, forms the root of its mutability, the "deficient cause (causa deficiens)" of that non-being which is sin.⁹² Creation is inseparably contingent and mutable, imperfect inasmuch as its final cause is never actualized completely, and in its heart ^{contains} the necessary possibility of defection and moral evil which, though, could have remained unactualized.⁹³ Christian asceticism and world negation, distinct from those rare occasions of Jewish asceticism utilized by the prophets as a preparation for individual prophetic revelation, is a "contemptus saeculi" which is characterized by its apologists as, not a hatred of being,

⁹⁰ See George F. Moore, History of Religions (New York: Chas. Cribner's Sons, 1928), II, 355, 367.

⁹¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 420. Nygren, op. cit., I, 68.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 72, 114, 438. Scheeben, op. cit., p. 243. Maritain, op. cit., p. 343.

⁹³ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 117, 120-121, 156. Northrop, op. cit., pp. 279-280.

but of the mutability of non-being, of nothingness, of that evil which may be "introduced into creation by man's own voluntary defection."⁹⁴

The importance of moral acts. Generally speaking, ethics as an independent (that is, separate and differentiated) subject for speculation does not occur in the metaphysical tradition. Practical morality, or harmony with the Truth (rita, dharma) which orders the turn of the samsāric wheel, is looked upon as a preliminary, although in itself insufficient, means rather than as an end, and is valued as a cleansing or prophylactic agent incident to and within the integrative process which, in its culmination, dissolves the moral need in a higher synthesis.⁹⁵ Morality, even that which may be considered as of the highest sattvic nature, still is conditioned by samsāric limitation and the functions of finite mental and volitional processes, and as such cannot lead to nor be the basis or ground of that true

⁹⁴ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 108, 126. Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 172.

⁹⁵ See Śrinivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 179-180; Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 103; Rādhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 77; Otto, op. cit., p. 207; Nock, op. cit., p. 15; Hopkins, Ethics of India, p. 183; Rāṇade, op. cit., pp. 288, 315, 329; De, op. cit., pp. 412-414; Huxley, op. cit., p. 251; Śivānanda, All About Hinduism (Rishikesh: The Śivānanda Publication League, 1947), p. 197. Kātha 2.22, 24; Iśa 9; Mund. 1.2.12; 3.1.5; 3.2.4.

spiritual life which transcends it.⁹⁶ Morality is not to be divorced from karma⁹⁷ and as such carries with it its own natural fruits, either as a relatively greater tranquility (prasāda) or an increased turbidity, thus differing from the "intimate connection between goodness and Godness" basic to the Christian concept of sin as a revolt against God, who punishes the wrongdoer, the defiant creature who therefore is odious in His sight.⁹⁸ Viśiṣṭādvaita, as an example of Indian "theism," recognizes no permanence of sin and therefore "no sinner as such," for "sin destroys itself by contacting divine love."⁹⁹

Guénon¹⁰⁰ has said that religion, as distinct from metaphysic, conjoins the three elements of dogma, moral law, and cult,--a triune concept to be found only in Judaism,

⁹⁶ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 81; Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, I, 91; II, 57. See Gītā 12.51-53.

⁹⁷ Cf. Arthur W. Ryder, The Bhagavadgītā (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. x. "Work well done not only does not bring salvation, it has no tendency to bring salvation; yet salvation is impossible without it. Its value is great, but negative. It is a condition necessary, but not sufficient. It is important because it is un-important. What wise man permits the unimportant to block salvation?"

⁹⁸ See Hopkins, Religions of India, pp. 554-555.

⁹⁹ Śrīnivāsaśāhī, op. cit., p. 599.

¹⁰⁰ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 103-105.

Christianity, and Islam. The highly sentimental nature of religion and its over-accentuation of feeling values has tended to displace such values from their proper analogical content and make of them the essence of Reality.¹⁰¹ Thus Western religion, particularly emphasized in modern Protestantism, has tended progressively to develop a type of humanistic morality at the expense of dogma and cult.¹⁰² Even where morality was not conceived as a purely humanistic end it was regarded by Christians as absolute,¹⁰³ for God, as essential Being and righteousness, is the supernatural end of man.¹⁰⁴ The concept of sin as obstructive ignorance, as "missing one's mark" (*ἀμαρτία*), is criticised by Christian apologists as being on the human plane whereas religion demands that it be an offense against God. Unable to look upon morality as a means rather than as an end, Christianity views this "human plane," in contrast to the "supernatural plane" as the end of "pagan morals," unaware that metaphysically the "end" transcends yet includes all conceivable

101 Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

102 Guénon, *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 106; Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

103 Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 554; Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

104 Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 209.

planes.¹⁰⁵ Christianity demands that the supernatural end which qualifies all moral actions be "proposed to the will as a term laid down by the divine law, imposed by a Creator on His Creatures," and the "Christian conscience, as an expression of the Divine legislative reason always prescribes the act to be done as a moral obligation,"¹⁰⁶ thus Christian morality may be characterized as obedient while that of metaphysic is expedient.

Morality and the pairs of opposites. From the time of the Upanishads there is^a quite pronounced tendency to look upon moral good in itself, the persistent sattvic element, as a bond which, like evil, can prevent deliverance. There is thus developed that which Rāṇaḍe calls a "supermoralism" which goes beyond both good and evil as an ethical counterpart to the advaitic absolute realized in Ātmavidyā.¹⁰⁷ Mundakopanishad 3.1.3, for example, states that the wise man "shaking off (vidhuya) good and evil (punyaḥ)" is delivered.¹⁰⁸ Thus, wherever the texts

¹⁰⁵ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 353-357, 475n. Cf. the spirit of Christian exclusiveness as mentioned by Gilson (p. 354): "...since these men knew nothing of the Gospel and therefore nothing of their true end, not a single one of their actions could have been directed naturally to the end that it should have been."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 279, 353.

¹⁰⁷ Rodhe, op. cit., p. 34. Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 306.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Bṛih. 4.4.22-23 and Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 307.

deal with realization, both punya and pāpa are evil (nāpman)¹⁰⁹ from which the wise are delivered. In Chhândogyaopanishad 8.4.1 there is an extensive list of evils composing many pairs of opposites, and both "good" and "evil" are included as the fetter, nāpman.¹¹⁰ The Upanishads also note that the stamp of death is upon all samsâric life forms and activities, and is exemplified in all cyclical natural phenomena,--for life and death are in identity,--are but two aspects of the identical samsâric wheel.¹¹¹ In the Kathopanishad the identity of death and life as samsâra and the necessity for deliverance from both clearly is told. Earthly pleasures as separate and distinct in themselves are but temptations of Death. It is only the âtman which transcends Death and His recurrent cycle of existence which extends even unto svarga-loka or heaven.¹¹² It is through that clarity of consciousness which is perfect knowledge of the Self or âtman that all samsâric duality, all virtues and vices bound up in a

¹⁰⁹ Rodhe (op. cit., p. 34) does not subscribe to Hume's translation of pāpa as evil and nāpman as sin. He furthermore declares that nāpman is not to be contrasted to punya but to ânanda. See Brih. 4.3.9.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

¹¹¹ Brih. 3.1; 3.2.10.

¹¹² Rodhe, op. cit., pp. 99-102. See Katha 1.6; 1.23-29; 2.1-3; 2.14; 3.7.

world of karma, are transcended.¹¹³

From the vantage point of moksha, then, neither sins nor virtues are to be cherished, for otherwise they may tend to become idols in themselves, real but relative symbol-tools given a pseudo-absolute status.¹¹⁴ Enlightenment does not annihilate morality, but transcends it so that the immediate basis for all action is the will of the Self rather than the ego. Thus "evil action does not adhere" to the fully realized sage, for all of his works spontaneously are consistent with the divine love and will (grace) and therefore with the welfare of all the manifest world (lokasaṅgraha).¹¹⁵ It is only from the font of eternal tranquility, devoid of anguish and the necessity for planned moral action, that there can emerge a true, spontaneous, and free action, a true dynamism as against mere agitation.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 24.

¹¹⁴ Aurobindo, The Yoga and Its Object, p. 18; Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 152; Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 102-103.

¹¹⁵ See Chhând. 4.14.3; Mund. 3.2.2.; Gîtâ 3.20, 25; 18.17. Roy, op. cit., p. 247n; Rānāde, op. cit., p. 316; Tilak, op. cit., p. 1203; De, op. cit., p. 414; Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 66, 68, 70, 85; Watts op. cit., pp. 117, 121. Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 218 warns against moral codes of negation which invent "sterile" virtues and "imaginary" sins. These, of course, are impositions of morality from "inside" saṁsāra.

¹¹⁶ See Svet. 4.11; 6.12; Kātha 6.10-11; Tait. 2.9., also Rānāde, op. cit., p. 316; Watts, op. cit., p. 30; Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 64-69, 105; Otto, op. cit., pp. 168-175.

Hopkins¹¹⁷ has linked the views of the Teṅgalai sect, with their emphasis upon faith, with antinomianism. While Vedagalai insists upon the performance of proper action even in the stage of prapatti. Teṅgalai sees in this surrender,-- if it is true, perfect, and complete, an abandonment of "all dharmas," a sacrifice of all action, thoughts, and will,-- not to the limited desires of the ego from which evil acts arise, but to and by the divine power-grace which therefore acts through the devotee and therefore transcends all ego-morality.¹¹⁸ The supreme harmony of the divine thus is seen in manifestation as the unitive and separative movements of divine love, experienced before surrender as goodness and evil.¹¹⁹

Christian doctrine repeats, in its own vocabulary, the same contention which again is set forth in I John 3.9.¹²⁰ Maritain,¹²¹ speaking of the spiritual experiences of St. John of the Cross, states that the soul emptied of itself,

¹¹⁷ Hopkins, History of Religions, p. 586.

¹¹⁸ Srīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 536; Gītā 18.66; De, op. cit., pp. 412-415.

¹¹⁹ See Watts, op. cit. p. 117.

¹²⁰ "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God."

¹²¹ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 444-446.

"and having nothing yet having all" has passed through the portal to "the infinite amplitude of spiritual liberty: Here there is no more a path because for the just there is no law."¹²² By more than the law the freed soul of the Christian saint has been raised ^{through} the grace and love of Christ, and moves only in accordance with the impulse of the Holy Spirit.¹²³ Maritain warns, however, that the only error is to seek this liberty from the basis of fleshly license, for "The law is the only way of surpassing the law, on the condition that love passes through it."

The Chosen. In RV 10.125 the Divine Power (Sakti), personified as Vâch (Speech or The Word), declares that to "him that I love I make strong, to be a priest, a seer, a wise man," and in RV 274.49¹²⁴ there is the statement that "no one becomes virtuous unless permitted by the Gods." Hopkins, speaking from within a purely religious rather than a metaphysical frame of reference, looks upon this simple basis as the primitive background for a doctrine of "special grace and predestination" which opposes that of karma and

¹²² Cf. the view of the Reformers as given by Hopkins, op. cit., p. 587: "Justification is from God in consequence of faith; free grace without merit is granted to every believer and is followed by freedom from the law."

¹²³ Cf. Christian Bible, Ezekiel 1.12.

¹²⁴ According to Hopkins, Ethics of India, p. 176.

"salvation through knowledge."¹²⁵ Kathopanishad 2.23, speaking of the âtman in personal terms, declares that "He is to be obtained only by the one whom He chooses, to such a one that âtman reveals His own person."¹²⁶ The language is such as to permit a variety of interpretations. To Sankara the lines indicate that the Self reveals Its own truth to that aspirant alone who seeks the Self, while in a more theistic version the Self revelation is given to the one whom the âtman chooses, or to whom He bestows His grace.¹²⁷ Hume¹²⁸ sees in this the anticipation of "a strict Calvinist doctrine of Election," a view which does not take into account, however, the advaitic relation between the âtman and the ego, the Self and self, for in whatever light of interpretation given to the passage, it is the seeker's own Self which reveals or chooses. In Kaushîtaki 3.9. this same Self (âtman), as world-protector (loka-pâla) and world sovereign (lokâdhipati) who "does not become greater with good action nor indeed lesser with bad action...causes him whom he wishes to

¹²⁵ Hopkins, The Religions of India, pp. 142-143; Ethics of India, pp. 176n, 182-183.

¹²⁶ This is repeated in Mund. 3.2.3.

¹²⁷ Hume, op. cit., pp. 350, 376; Nikhilânanda, op. cit., pp. 143-144, 305; Sivânanda, Principal Upanishads (Rishikesh: The Yoga Vedânta Forest University, 1950), I, 139; Kapâli Sâstry, op. cit., p. 13n; Râdhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgîtâ, p. 63.

¹²⁸ Hume, op. cit., p. 59n.

lead up from the worlds, to perform good action...[and]... him whom he wishes to lead downward, to perform bad action." Hopkins¹²⁹ says that "the doctrine of election is patent here," yet the motion and moral action in question does not pertain to anything extra-karmic nor to ultimate deliverance, but only to those still samsâric states or worlds under authority of the World Protector or World Sovereign,--who is the seeker's Self. It is impossible, metaphysically, for the jîva to perform any action, good or bad, unless ultimately motivated by the power (śakti) and the will (śakti) of the Self,¹³⁰ the Lord of the lîlâ.

Edgerton,¹³¹ without differentiating between the transcendent-immanent Purushottama of the Gîtâ and the Christian God-concept, between moksha and salvation, states that in the Gîtâ "the grace of God is repeatedly spoken of as singling out His elect and bringing them to salvation by His divine choice." In the Gîtâ Krishna speaks of the wise, those constantly united with the Self, as being beloved by him and that he is beloved by them.¹³² He, as the indwelling Lord, the Self of the self, with Self-endowing compassion

¹²⁹ Hopkins, Ethics of India, p. 68.

¹³⁰ See Nikhilânanda, op. cit., p. 63.

¹³¹ Edgerton, op. cit., II, 26, 53.

¹³² Gîtâ 7.17.

gives them the yoga of discrimination (buddhiyogam) by which they realize the integral unity of the atman.¹³³ Krishna, knowing the limitations of the jiva, the inability of the lone ego to transcend its own circle, by his favor (prasa-nna) bestows the grace of divine sight upon Arjuna, permitting him to see the highest of the infinite forms of divine manifestation, a sight "that none except thyself hath ever seen" and one which finite methods cannot reveal.¹³⁴ The vision, though, is not of an eternally separate deity, but of the advaitic relationship of the one in many and the many in one, of the universe, the entire manifold, "standing as one in the body of the God of Gods,"¹³⁵ the Self who, as Krishna, also has said, "I am alike to all beings; none is either hated or loved by Me. But those who revere me with devotion--they are in Me and I too am in them."¹³⁶ Arjuna, who is said to be the chosen one is, again, not to be identified in this respect with any particular historical person or process, but typifies The Man, the aspiring but practical human ego, "the representative human soul seeking to reach perfection and peace," whose dynamic relation to Krishna

¹³³ See Gita 4.36; 9.30; 10.10-11; 15.15; 18.73.

¹³⁴ Gita 11.8; 11.47-48.

¹³⁵ Gita 11.13.

¹³⁶ Gita 9.29.

is that of Nara to Nārāyaṇa, of the separate and finite will of the self to the all inclusive infinite will of its true Self.¹³⁷ The choice is not, therefore, one of exclusiveness, but is universal in nature, and it becomes a fully conscious "choice" in the clear awareness of the integral awakening of Self whenever the Divine Will moves toward full realization in any of its infinite focal points of manifest līlā. It is only within the dawning of that full awareness, the recognition of the proper rôle which is ego-hood and of the jīva's non-separate and sole dependence upon its Self, that there can be any integral and advaitic meaning given to the love of the Lord for His jīva-self in the Now-conscious, eternal and harmonious play of līlā.¹³⁸ The "chosen one," the "favored and beloved" (iṣṭa) here are but terms indicative of and meaningless without Self realization, and all are chosen in that realization, an integral choice made by non-dual will or grace.¹³⁹

A religious concept of predestination and election is therefore impossible in any expression of that metaphysical experience of the identity of ātman-Brahman, of divine

¹³⁷ See Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 51; Roy, op. cit., pp. 5n, 6n.

¹³⁸ See Gītā 18.64-66. Cf. 7.15.

¹³⁹ Such terms are, of course, metaphysical analogy. See Watts, op. cit., p. 150.

immanence, and the will of the Self or Ātman as the ultimate basis and power which determines the non-separate finite will of the ego.¹⁴⁰ There is a tendency, however, for the limited, the jīva, upon its first "contact" with spiritual experience, to look upon this admittedly unearned sight or vision of all-embracing consciousness as a gift and a privilege to one chosen or favored (Prasādavittam),¹⁴¹ but this is only from the ego point of view, its particular reaction to the movements of awakening, either as experienced within the opening of its own consciousness, or as observed in the lives of the Sages.¹⁴²

An immediate, direct and intuitive "seeing" of the all-inclusive Reality is the crowning culmination of Upani-
shadic experience.¹⁴³ In Rāmānuja's commentary on the Vedānta

¹⁴⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 331; The Hindu View of Life, p. 76; The Bhagavadgītā, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴¹ See Böhrtlingk and Roth, op. cit., IV, 1098. The superlative of prasāda+vid, and meaning "someone who is favored...of all others preferred." (Kathasaritsāgara 1.49) See also the Supplement, I-IV, 175 where prasādashūmi is defined as "an object of favor, favorite." (Harshacharita 154.13).

¹⁴² See Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 93-94. Cf. Gītā II.45 where Arjuna says "I have seen that which none hath seen before,"--a statement which all jīvas may make concerning any perception, either from the point of view of the mutability of the finite object seen or that of the ever-changing ego-expression.

¹⁴³ Mund. 2.2.8; Bṛih. 2.4.5.

Sūtras¹⁴⁴ meditation is equated with direct perception, which in turn is considered as equal to smṛiti, not as finite memory, but as "an immediate awareness of what one is seeking, an intimate reference to the constant presence of the subject meditated upon..."¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, vedana (knowledge), which here is the same as upāsana (worship), also is made equal to smṛiti. Therefore smṛiti is the means for final release. With specific reference to Kathopanishad 2.23 the commentary continues:

By means of this passage it is (first) stated that mere 'hearing,' reflection and steady meditation form no means for the attainment of the Self, and then it is declared that whomsoever this Self chooses, by him alone is He reached. For, it is indeed the dearest one that becomes worthy to be chosen. To whomsoever He is unsurpassingly dear, he alone is the dearest to Him. It is stated¹⁴⁶ ...that the Lord Himself, of His own accord, so acts as to cause His dearest one to attain Himself... Hence what is said is this:--He alone, to whom this memory [smṛiti] of the form of direct perception is of itself inexpressively dear, by reason of the inexpressible dearness of the object of that memory--(he alone) is fit to be chosen by the Highest Self; and so, by him alone is the Highest Self attainable.

Self-realization, then is the non-exclusive "choice,"--the will of the Self and the stirrings of the passive self being but reciprocal, though not functionally equal, modes of that

¹⁴⁴ Īśvaradatta, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

¹⁴⁵ Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

¹⁴⁶ See Gītā 7.17; 10.10.

same movement.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, Rāmānuja holds that bhakti is synonymous with upāsana (worship) and smṛiti. He declares, therefore, that "the cessation..of bondage...is attainable by that grace of the Highest Person¹⁴⁸ which is consequent on His being pleased with the worship that is offered in the form of loving devotion (by the worshipper)."¹⁴⁹ Not only is the Lord the "Self, seated in the heart of all beings,... the beginning, the middle, and also the end of all beings"¹⁵⁰ but, in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine of His identity as both the means and end (upāya and upeya), He is also that smṛiti¹⁵¹ which is upāsana, bhakti, and direct spiritual perception.¹⁵²

A logical religious doctrine of predestination and election is also dependent, not only upon the fiat of a separate, distinct and jealous God, but upon the dominant factors of time and historicity. Metaphysical experience, of an order different from the fiat of religion, and one

¹⁴⁷ Rādhakṛiṣṇaṇ, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I, 172.

¹⁴⁸ The Puruṣottama which is the eternal ground, the Self of the self.

¹⁴⁹ Iśvaradatta, op. cit., pp. 21-22, 238. See also Svet. 3.8; Gītā 11.53-54; 8.22.

¹⁵⁰ Gītā 10.20.

¹⁵¹ Gītā 10.34.

¹⁵² See Srinivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 474.

which transcends both of these factors, is of the eternal present which excludes none but which also, in its inclusion of the infinite multiplicity, recognizes all varied levels of conscious awareness of, or relation to, Reality.¹⁵³ Purely within the limits of samsāra these levels range between that which religion calls heaven and hell, and "are not external to the experiencing individuals."¹⁵⁴ Speaking from the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view, Srīnivāsācāhārī declares that the Ālvārs did not claim to be specially elected, that realization is the proper end of all ego consciousness, and that mercy or arul is omnipotent and omnipresent.¹⁵⁵ Thus Viśiṣṭādvaita rejects the doctrine of eternal damnation together with its corollary of a single birth of the self, the exclusion of sub-human life-forms from eventual spiritual integration, and an elect individual or race, as conflicting with the doctrine of the Lord as the Universal Refuge (sarvaloka śaraṇya) of mercy and grace. It looks upon such separative religious doctrines as making for "moral injustice."

¹⁵³ Rādhakṛishṇan, The Hindu View of Life, pp. 19, 31-32, 37; Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 10, 324.

¹⁵⁴ Rādhakṛishṇan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 126. Cf. Huxley, op. cit., p. 229: "Hell is total separation from God, and the Devil is the will to that separation."

¹⁵⁵ Srīnivāsācāhārī, op. cit., pp. 510, 405, 407. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., p. 307; The Hindu View of Life, p. 124.

"unmerited suffering," and the "monopolistic, dogmatic and coercive" violation of that intuitive insight which proclaims "universal redemption and the working of divine mercy through different channels."¹⁵⁶ Based upon a particularly Semitic concept of the universe wherein by a series of catastrophic, supernatural interruptions "the chosen people of God would be restored to their rightful place,"¹⁵⁷ the religious doctrine of final judgment also is declared to be foreign to Viśiṣṭādvaitic views in particular and metaphysic in general. The Nomos and juristic element of religious moral law, linked with the feeling of superiority and exclusiveness necessary for the religious view, looked toward "an omnipotent and just God who would destroy the world and save the righteous."¹⁵⁸ Rādhakṛiṣṇan¹⁵⁹ views this judgment, not as an event in the future, but as an internal process involved in the eternal present, the Now, and Vaiṣṇāva doctrine places it within that karmic justice which, unlike the Christian judgment

¹⁵⁶ Sṛīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 178, 406-410; Huxley, op. cit., p. 214.

¹⁵⁷ Rādhakṛiṣṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, pp. 165, 170-171.

¹⁵⁸ Rādhakṛiṣṇan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 28. See also Rādhakṛiṣṇan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 10; Sṛīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., pp. 404, 405.

¹⁵⁹ Rādhakṛiṣṇan, The Hindu View of Life, p. 73.

which follows redemption, is overpowered by the all-pervasive, inclusive love and mercy of the Bhagavān,--for in essence both justice and love are identified in Dāya, the grace of divine mercy.¹⁶⁰ This love and mercy is not to be confused with its analogy with respect to the ego as an "accidental quality brought on by man's fall." It is identical with the Self, the core of that Self-abandonment which is manifestation, and its "outflowering" in humanity is dependent upon the workings of receptivity in that non-separate manifestation.¹⁶¹ The motion of līlā is essentially free within the emergent and infinite possibilities of its freely willed finite manifestation.¹⁶² According to Srīnivāsāchāri¹⁶³ the doctrine of predestination and reprobation embraces the concept of a capricious and vindictive God of arbitrariness (vaishamya) and cruelty (nairghrīya) and leads to the destruction rather than to the proper abandonment of dharma, and the establishment of license and laxity by the Divine.

Metaphysically, the advaitic Supreme is qualified in the cosmic scheme as a quaternity consisting of Īvara from

¹⁶⁰ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 179, 410; Watts, op. cit., p. 153.

¹⁶¹ See Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 336.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 340.

¹⁶³ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 251, 394, 403, 535, 581.

whom emerges the three modes of manifestation, preservation, and dissolution. Unlike Christian symbolism which excludes the necessary dissonance-factor, thus creating a gulf of ultimate dualism between the triune Being and the mutable multiplicity, metaphysic experiences the cosmic play as "all of a piece,"¹⁶⁴ and consciously recognizes the existence of that which, from the ego view, may be called the "brutal fact of the world." There are, therefore, the many "terrible" forms or aspects of cosmic forces, the necessary counterpart to their beneficial aspects. Siva, true to his name, is auspicious,--but also is a disruptive force, from the jiva view. "Brahmā and Siva," quotes Hopkins,¹⁶⁵ "create and destroy at the will of Vishnu; they are born of His grace and his anger."¹⁶⁶ The "female"-power (Sakti) is free in its expression of both synthesis and analysis, and the dark and stern aspect of the Great Mother, under such varied names as Durgā, Kālī, Syāmā, Chandī, and Bhairavī, are expressive of the discordant element so necessary for a rich harmony, of the corrective discipline needed to balance maternal love,

¹⁶⁴ As Jung also has found it expressed in the symbolism of the "unconscious mind." See Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 73.

¹⁶⁵ Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 413.

¹⁶⁶ Anger, not against the revolting sinner, but anger as a power of dissolution, the power necessary for the removal of detrital material.

of the separative motion of nature which is but the obverse side of a unitive motion. The Purāṇas, the Mahābhārata, and the Rāmāyana stress the coincidence of "good and evil," for even the greatest hero or Avatāra is depicted with at least some small trace of sāṃsāric weakness, and the most vile demon is capable of a modicum of spiritual awareness.¹⁶⁷

The problem of Job, the view of sāṃsāra through the eyes of the ego contrasted with the projected ideal of perfection personified as God, is portrayed graphically in the Mahābhārata,¹⁶⁸ activated by a sense of the unequal distribution of sāṃsāric happiness and sorrow seemingly unrelated to the moral worth of the recipient. Draupadi dramatically accuses the divine will of purposeless arbitrariness, of manipulating captive man as a toy, a puppet in the hands of infinite but fickle brute force or infinite evil. She extends her sense of injustice to the heavenly or infernal regions (but it must be remembered that both the worlds of the Gods

¹⁶⁷ See John Dowson, op. cit., pp. 86-87. Also Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, pp. 31, 131-149, speaks of the Wrathful Deities as the Peaceful Deities in changed aspect,--and both extend grace into the sāṃsāric world, being inseparable from the all-pervading consciousness.

Krishna Prem, op. cit., p. xxiii, says: "It should be further noted that the Kauravas and the Pāṇdavas are cousins. There is none of the ultimate dualism that has marred so much of Christian thought, no God or Devil standing as ultimate irreconcilables. The Daivi and Aśurik forces both spring from the same Supreme Source and in the end both return to it."

¹⁶⁸ 3.30.1 ff.

and of demons are equally saṁsāric and are transcended by Moksha), and presents a concept of predestination limited to these saṁsāric regions. Her husband (Yudhishtira), to whom she is reciting her complaint, admires her nāstika logic but sees its limitation from an extra-saṁsāric viewpoint. The very raising of the question of injustice is, to him a karmic hankering after fruits. "There is no virtue," he tells her, "in trying to milk virtue"; and continues to extol the "inexhaustable grace" (prasāda)¹⁶⁹ and love of the divine which not only is the transcendent but the immanent in man as his true Self.¹⁷⁰ This is consistent with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view that Dayā dominates divine justice as well as saṁsāric manifestation, that the world is "conceived in love," and that this same loving mercy is the Self of the self, the Antaryāmin which is immanent in all beings.¹⁷¹

The Christian attitude toward original sin, man's willful rebellion against God, further emphasizes his consequent inability, of and by himself, thereafter to put aside his guilt even by his own feeling of sorrow for his sin. He is,

¹⁶⁹ As cited by Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 342 from MBh. 3.31.42: yasya prasādāt bhakto martyo ga-chchhad amartyatām.

¹⁷⁰ Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 384-386; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., pp. 340-342.

¹⁷¹ Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 410.

then, an object "of the Divine wrath and abhorrence" for his sin and is "still to be hated on account of it, especially in view of the fact that God is ever entitled to adequate satisfaction which the creature himself can never render."¹⁷²

It is only by the gratuitous intervention of God that this state may be changed, by the restoration of grace which was "withdrawn by God in punishment for our sins." Therefore the withdrawal of grace is not sin, but the punishment for sin, and "is the result of our own expulsion or extinction of justice." Man's rejection of supernatural justice, "itself a grace of God...is at once sin and punishment for sin. It is sin so far as we expel supernatural justice by our sinful act; it is punishment so far as God withdraws this justice from us along with grace and in grace."¹⁷³

In any study of divine determinism as found in Indian thought, the tenets of Dvaita stand as unique. Indian philosophy has ranged from the ultimate materialism of Chārvāka to the varied interpretations of advaitic¹⁷⁴ experience. While the different āstika schools were doctrinally opposed, they were united not only in their Vedic basis, but in their

¹⁷² Scheeben, op. cit., p. 619. Nock, op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁷³ Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 252-253, 255.

¹⁷⁴ Advaita in the non-dual sense, not as pertaining to any one approach.

recognition that the differences found in persons demanded equally different approaches in the social, philosophical, and metaphysical spheres. "The many systems of philosophy... were thus conceived to offer different paths for philosophical thinking and living to persons of different qualifications and temperaments."¹⁷⁵ It was but natural, then, that there should evolve in India a philosophy so opposed to advaitic metaphysic that it should favor, in some ways apparently similar to the Christian pattern, a likeness in analogy through an exclusive emphasis upon but one fact of experience, the exaggeration of the "playful pragmatic dualism of the Divine," and the making of it into "an ontological dualism by ignoring the absolute all-comprehensiveness of the Spirit."¹⁷⁶

Dvaita rejects Rāmānuja's doctrine of inseparable attributes (anrithaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa) and Brahman as the "material or immanent cause" (upādānakāraṇa), and interprets scriptural passages so as to make them conform to its characteristic doctrine of pluralism.¹⁷⁷ Dvaitic Reality is based upon eternal relations and differences. There is, in Dvaita,

¹⁷⁵ S. C. Chatterjee, D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950), pp. 11-12.

¹⁷⁶ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

¹⁷⁷ A practice not limited, however, to Dvaita. Quotations are from Rādhakṛiṣṇan, Indian Philosophy, II, pp. 715-749. See Srinivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 547.

a five-fold category of eternal differences (pañcābheda), that is, unique distinctions between Brahman and jīva, Brahman and jāda (matter, the inert), jīva and jīva, jīva and jāda, and jāda and jāda wherein "each of them is itself."¹⁷⁸ There is that in the world, in man, and in Brahman that admits of differences, that which explains the existence of properties without making them different from their substance. This "peculiarity" is called viśeṣa. "The relation between a substance and its properties...is that of identity, but this identity admits of the idea of difference. The reason for this is the presence of the viśeṣa in the things."¹⁷⁹ Thus Dvaita has a basis for unity, but a unity eternally conditioned by diversity and existing only within a particular substance and its attributes or differences.

"Madhva," writes Rādhakṛishṇan,¹⁸⁰ "conceives the Infinite in an abstract manner, and is therefore not able to see any unity between it and the finite," a view which, as such, approaches that of religion. Brahman, here, is independent (svatantra), without limit,¹⁸¹ and contains all

¹⁷⁸ Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 189.

¹⁷⁹ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 119, 183-185.

¹⁸⁰ Rādhakṛishṇan, Indian Philosophy, II, 750.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., II, 750-751. Here Rādhakṛishṇan points out that a "dualism makes the independence of God impossible."

auspicious and perfect qualities. He is all powerful, and nothing is impossible to His will.¹⁸² His existence can be proved only on the testimony of the Veda, and Dvaita interprets it as holding that Brahman is different from the individual selves.¹⁸³ Dvaita is "monistic" and therefore a dualism, for its doctrine declares that the Lord alone is independent (svatantra), all else is dependent (asvatantra), and nothing except Brahman can "exist in its own right."¹⁸⁴ Coeternal with Him is Lakshmi, the personification of His creative power (śakti). She, like the Virgin Mary,¹⁸⁵ is "eternally redeemed" (nityamukti).¹⁸⁶ The world, different although not apart from Brahman, is dependent, and although real, has "derived reality," for Brahman is the different ground of all.¹⁸⁷

Prakriti, as Māyā (also "different"), is the material cause (māyākhyāprakṛitirjāda) of the world of things energized

¹⁸² Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 203.

¹⁸³ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, IV, 76. Sivānanda, All About Hinduism, p. 195.

¹⁸⁴ Hirayanna, op. cit., pp. 190-192, Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 241.

¹⁸⁵ Hopkins, The History of Religions, p. 579; Pohle, op. cit., p. 114; Scheeben, Mariology, pp. 4, 18. (vol. 2)

¹⁸⁶ Rādhakṛishṇan, on. cit., II, 742.

¹⁸⁷ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 10-13, 120-121, 198, 200, 202.

from pralaya by Brahman out of His creative desire through Lakshmi, and both Mâyâ and the manifesting process is under the constant control of the Lord. Mâyâ "may thus be regarded almost as His will or strength (harer ichchhâthavâ balam)."
Mâyâ also is avidyâ and the cause of the world's bondage (jagabhandhâtmikâ).¹⁸⁸

Like matter itself, jîvas, according to Dvaita, are not "created from nothing" nor is there a persistent possibility of being reduced to nothing, a doctrine which does not conform to Christian views. Jîvas are atomic in size and occur in all, even in matter.¹⁸⁹ While differing from Brahman this difference is not absolute, "for they have features like sentience and bliss (though qualified) common to God."¹⁹⁰ Individual jîvas, the "reflections of God," come into being "out of a part of God."--but a part "so far different from God that, though through ignorance the individual souls, which have sprung forth from this part, may be suffering bondage, God Himself remains ever free from all such ignorance and bondage."¹⁹¹ Jîvas are by nature

¹⁸⁸ Dâsgupta, op. cit., IV, 313n, 156; Chatterjee and Datta, op. cit., p. 24; Sivananda, op. cit., pp. 195-196.

¹⁸⁹ Râdhakrishnan, op. cit., II, 743-744.

¹⁹⁰ Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 192; Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 304; Aurobindo, Essays on the Gîtâ, p. 64.

¹⁹¹ Dâsgupta, op. cit., IV, 147, 313. Thus the separation between the jîva and the Divine may be said to be somewhat less in Dvaita than in Christianity.

eternal, self-luminous, and blissful,¹⁹² but, by the Lord's will, karmic bondage to the gunas, which are not natural to jivas, produces avidyā.¹⁹³ In the world and in jivas Brahman is not outside, as is the God of the three "pure" religions, but is immanent as well as transcendent. He is Antaryāmin or inner ruler of man, not as the Self of the self, but as the "Spontaneous expression of perfection."¹⁹⁴ Bondage is a lack of understanding of the dependence of man and the world, and the independence of that Brahman who is the sole and different ground of all.¹⁹⁵ Yet, as all are dependent, it is Brahman who appoints avidyā as the indirect agent of His will or desire, which is His grace. For all, except Lakshmi who by nature is free, "He holds up the veil of positive ignorance...It is again He who gives knowledge to the conscious entities, happiness to all except those demons who are by

192 Cf. Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 198;--"Each jīva is sat, chit, and ānanda. Each has also name and form." Rāghavendrāchār (p. 133) also points out that in Dvaita the sachchidānanda peculiar to Brahman is relegated to jivas, and that "Each self is a Brahman,"--but only in this respect, inasmuch as each jīva is different from every other jīva, and is dependent upon Brahmeśvara.

193 Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 313, 317; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., II, 743; Sivananda, op. cit., pp. 196-197; Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 130.

194 Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 189; Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 202; Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., II, 742; Sivananda, op. cit., p. 195.

195 Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 120, 206, 214.

nature unfit for attaining it, and sorrow also to all except Lakshmi..."¹⁹⁶ The mediator who helps jīvas through their bhakti to attain knowledge and grace is Vāyu, also called the "Dearest Image (pratiṃā preyaśī) or Son of God (hareh sutaḥ)."¹⁹⁷ Vāyu, the son of Vishnu, unlike Christ, is not equal to the Lord, and is thus dependent. Madhva was considered an incarnation of Vāyu.¹⁹⁷

Dvaita conceives of an infinite multiplicity of eternal jīvas which are not attributes themselves (viśeṣaṇas) of Brahman, but are possessors of attributes (viśeṣas).¹⁹⁸ Of all who are dependent by nature only Lakshmi is eternally and naturally free. Devas, rishis and superior men who already have become free are delivered through their bhakti and the grace of Brahman. The rest of mankind fall into three categories determined by God and based upon the three gunas. (1) Mukti-yoga, or those sāttvic jīvas who are eligible and fit for emancipation. (2) Nitya saṃsārinah (the miśra jīva), those ordinary or rājasic men bound for all time to cycles of saṃsāraic rebirth of pleasure-pain in any or

¹⁹⁶ Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 315-317; ^{in p. 155} Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 203, 210.

¹⁹⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, op. cit., II, 744; Sivānanda, op. cit., p. 197.

¹⁹⁸ Sṛīnivāsaśāhārī, op. cit., p. 549; Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 155.

all samsaric regions. (3) Tamoyogya,--those tamasa jivas (demons, etc.) who forever are damned to suffer in the hell "of blinding darkness."¹⁹⁹ "The Gods," says Dāsgupta,²⁰⁰ "cannot go to hell, nor can the demons ever attain liberation, and ordinary persons neither obtain liberation nor go to hell." It is here that Dvaita exhibits its unique aspect, one that sets it apart from all other Indian philosophical systems. The theory of eternal damnation," declares Dāsgupta,²⁰¹ "is thus found only in Madhva, and in no other system of Indian philosophy." This "strange conclusion," according to Hiriyanna²⁰² means not only the eternal persistence of evil as a positive element but also restricts both human freedom and divine grace.²⁰³ Madhva's theory of grace is, according to Rādhakrishnan,²⁰⁴ reminiscent of the Augustinian view wherein:

A man can never deserve to be saved. It is only through grace that he can be redeemed. God is not forced by any consideration of merit. He simply elects some for

¹⁹⁹ Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 155-156; Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., II, 744, 748; Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 192; Rāghavendrachār, op. cit., p. 198; Srinivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 549; Sivananda, op. cit., p. 197.

²⁰⁰ Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 318, also 57.

²⁰¹ Ibid., IV, 58.

²⁰² Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 192.

²⁰³ See Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., II, 750-751.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., II, 747-748.

salvation and others for the opposite state. The divine will sets men free or casts them into bondage.

Rādhakṛiṣṇan believes that Hindu tradition has served to condition and temper the otherwise arbitrary nature of Dvaitic election by proportioning the grace of the Lord to the intensity of the bhakti of the worshipper. Bhakti cannot force, but can increase grace, somewhat like the Catholic doctrine of good works. This observation, however, could have meaning only for that select group of sāttvika jīvas, and therefore is not applicable to the eternally recurrent ones or those eternally damned.

Dvaitins identify this theistic election with the divinely established "order of the world" and assert that "Everything however bad it may be is the means for the perfection of the world," and that the presence of rājasic and tāmasic jīvas "help the realization of the goodness of the good jīvas," and as rajas and tamas are necessary for world sustenance, so are these evil jīvas "inevitable if there is to be any spiritual advancement (for) conflict is the way to growth."²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 205. This is reminiscent of the Christian views concerning the utility of sub-human beings as instruments for the specially chosen species, man. Gilson, op. cit., p. 165, says: "There needed to be different and unequal species in order that all possible degrees of being should be represented and the law of order satisfied, but in all species other than the human the individuals that represent it are destined to perish."

Even the final and perfect state of mukti, surpassing the state of realization (aparoksha)²⁰⁶ and given through divine grace and the discipline of bhakti, is measured in accordance with the capacity of the eternally different and dependent liberated jivas. Inasmuch as Supreme Identity is impossible in Dvaita²⁰⁷ the liberated ones have as their highest bliss the worship of the Lord.²⁰⁸ This enjoyment ceases during pralaya, when "the liberated souls enter the womb of God," but is continued with the next cycle of manifestation.²⁰⁹

There is, then, for the highest type of jivas, a sort of coöperative effort with the Lord wherein both bhakti and grace (prasāda) are identified in the will of the Dvaitic Brahman. In Dvaita bhakti is necessary, not only for realization, but for the higher mukti and the continued enjoyment of the Lord in absolute and unembodied liberation. Bhakti, including continuous pure love (snehu), is the "universal

206 Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 210, 315-317.

207 Being āstika, though, Dvaita would recognize the views of other orthodox schools as āstika, even though it held them to be inferior or mistaken.

208 Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 58, 98-100; Sivānanda, op. cit., p. 198.

209 Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 318. See Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 158, where assimilation into Hiranyagarbha is the "nearest equivalent of the 'heaven' or 'paradise' of the Western Religions."

solvent" for the fit jivas. God is pleased with bhakti and only bhakti, and without it all action is sin. Bhakti and the divine pleasure are simultaneous, yet because of man's dependence upon the Lord it is this grace (prasāda), according to Madhva,²¹⁰ "which is the crowning cause of salvation."²¹¹ This does not mean that grace is achieved only upon final mukti for, according to Rāghavendrāchār,²¹² "...everything in the world is the result of the desire of the Independent."²¹³

The Dvaitic approach toward a doctrine of election

²¹⁰ Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 198. mokshaśācha vishnu prasādēna vinā na labhyate. (vishnu tattvanirnaya). (p. 210)

²¹¹ Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 58, 317-318; Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., II, 748; Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 198; Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 209-210; Sivananda, op. cit., p. 197; Hopkins, The History of Religions, p. 214.

²¹² Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 210.

²¹³ Dāsgupta, op. cit., IV, 92-93, cites Grierson in Hasting's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, VII, in the article entitled "Madhva Charita," for his views concerning the influence of Christianity upon Dvaita. In addition to doctrinal parallels or close similarities, it is said that Madhva was born and flourished near Kalyānapura which was reported to be one of the early Nestorian centers. Legends concerning him tell of his being lost from his parents and later found by them teaching the Dvaitic doctrine. In order to feed his followers he also is credited with causing the quantity of food miraculously to increase. Other stories tell how he walked on the water and on one occasion caused a storm at sea to become tranquil by his "look of grace." He was an incarnation of Vāyu, the Son of the Lord, and as such was the sole intermediary between man and the divinity. Bunnell is said to concur in and support this theory, and he also traces a Manichæan influence through Persian settlements at Manigramam. Dāsgupta believes that the evidence is still inconclusive and does not as yet point to direct Christian influence.

lacked the peculiarly Western sense of time and history. It, as well, is devoid of that absolute and complete separation between God and man which permitted the formulation of those highly intricate and legalistic concepts of predestination and election held by Christians of many different sects.²¹⁴ In addition, the Dvaitic doctrine of the Antaryāmin, immanent in each of the infinite number of atomic jīvas, is still far removed from the equally totalitarian but completely external Divine Authority of Roman Catholic and Protestant Christianity.²¹⁵ Hopkins²¹⁶ further points out the legalistic trend found in the predestination doctrine of St. Augustine, later systematized by Anselm and Calvin, by declaring that "His attitude is genuinely Old Roman, a business or legal attitude, concerned with adjusting relations in a case where there is a guilty party and a plaintiff." This intricate juristic attitude and its resultant involved structure of grace relationships is not found in Dvaita.

In common with the doctrine of karma the Christian universe is conceived to be devoid of chance. Here, though, it is to the providence of the exterior Creator God that the

²¹⁴ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 572; Huxley, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

²¹⁵ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 272, 280.

²¹⁶ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 572.

Christian looks for that order which is based upon the "laws of the higher reason"; that providence whose nature is that of a prescience which "foresees, but respects contingency."²¹⁷ Created by divine decree, and by that same decree sustained in being by continuous creation, the Christian individual was "foreseen, willed, elected by God."²¹⁸ Roman Catholic predestination, as generally conceived in the present, is the "divine will to save" man, to raise him to an end beyond his abilities and one to which he must be elevated by the power and grace of God, that supernatural power which, if man coöperates, unquestionably will achieve its purpose.²¹⁹ This Divine will to save, that is, predestination, in its universal aspect refers to all men, while particularly it "refers to those who actually reach their foreordained end."²²⁰ Universally it manifests through the initial and prevenient "call to grace,"²²¹ followed, if man coöperates, by justifi-

²¹⁷ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 369-370, 373. Gilson, p. 479n, says: "...for God all is present in His eternity. He does not foresee, but sees all that will happen as happening." (A Christian approximation of the eternal Now.) Gilson continues by quoting Duns Scotus, who detects "God's freedom at the root of contingency,"--which somewhat parallels the metaphysical analogy of the perfect freedom of the advaitic supreme Spirit in līlā.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 193.

²¹⁹ Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity, pp. 701, 705.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 701.

²²¹ Cf. the call of Srī Kṛishṇa's flute, heard by all of his devotees.

tification, and that eventual glorification which is the predestined end.²²²

Roman Catholic doctrine, contrary to that of the Calvinists and Jansenists, declares, then, that God wills all men to be saved, even those not predestined to salvation, and modern practice limits the term predestination to this universal choice, reserving the term reprobation for the punishment of the damned.²²³ Thus antecedent will chooses all human souls,

But only those who actually receive baptism, or who respond to god's choice of them up to the very end with a counterchoice of their own, effectively and absolutely constitute the elect, and are separated out from the multitude who are merely chosen in the sense that God has created all men for eternal bliss.²²⁴

Antecedent will, moreover, does not connote salvation "as actually conferred." It signifies the conference of capability upon man, and is conditioned to his response. Man's response and counterchoice, however, is not outside of God's power of prevision which is coeval with His providence.²²⁵

Thus the universal choice of man by God implies the bestowal of that power or grace which should suffice to elevate man to his divine end should he not place an obstacle in

²²² Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 701-702.

²²³ Ibid., p. 724; Pohle, op. cit., pp. 152-153, 155-156.

²²⁴ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 724, see also 707-710.

²²⁵ Ibid., pp. 703, 725.

its way. Merely sufficient grace has full power to aid the human will to perform a salutary act, "but not the action itself."²²⁶ Its inefficiency, then, "is owing to the resistance of the will and not to any lack of intrinsic power," for it is never "insufficient."²²⁷

Absolute and positive reprobation is not a part of Catholic doctrine, and "the pains of hell can be threatened only in view of mortal sin."²²⁸ Man's free will (divinely foreseen, it is true) produced his fall, but a return to and perseverance in holiness would permit his predestination. "God's predestination," states Pohle,²²⁹ "is for many the cause of perseverance, for none the cause of falling away." God's "hypothetical decree of predestination" may remain ineffective because of the foreseen but free power to revolt of the human will, and consequently, as Divine Will, becomes particularized into reprobation or salvation.²³⁰ "In this

²²⁶ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 41, 167-168, 171, 174.

²²⁷ Ibid., pp. 42-47.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 212.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 215.

²³⁰ Ibid., pp. 187-188, 196; also 156. Pohle (p. 212) quotes St. Augustine: "God is good, God is just. He can deliver some without merits because He is good; but He cannot damn any one without demerits, because He is just." Cf. the Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine of Dharma vs. Kṛpā (Justice vs. Agape).

sense, and in no other," declares Pohle,²³¹ "can we accept the somewhat paradoxical maxim: 'If you are not predestined, conduct yourself so that you may be predestined.'"²³² God has foreknowledge of man's effective will and "so on the part of God the will to carry through the impulse...is consequent upon it, and is therefore essentially...consequent predestination."²³³ Predestination, then, as divine foreknowledge, the selection or "preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future,"²³⁴ comprises the way of those whose wills are in conformity with the Divine Will. "God," said St. Augustine's disciple, Prosper,²³⁵ "wills all

²³¹ Ibid., pp. 192-193.

²³² God, who knows all, conducts to the supreme Good the elect, whose "wills are confirmed in grace" (Gilson, op. cit., p. 121), with a certainty which is infallible and immutable. (Scheeben, op. cit., p. 708.) To man the exact and fixed number of the elect is an "impenetrable mystery," such knowledge being reserved for God the Omniscient. While admitting that there are different opinions in the Church, Pohle, op. cit., p. 193, assumes that all will agree "that the majority of Christians, especially Catholics, will be saved. If we add to this number not a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens [note that the members of the two other religions are separated from "heathens" proper], it is probably safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal to that of reprobates."

²³³ See Pohle, op. cit., pp. 234-235: "Free-will is determined by God before it determines itself. If God knows his own will, He must also know the free determinations included therein."

²³⁴ Pohle, op. cit., p. 189. See Scheeben, op. cit., p. 728.

²³⁵ Quoted in Scheeben, op. cit., p. 704.

men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, and He fulfills the design of His will in those whom, having foreknown, He predestined...so that they who are saved, are saved because God willed them to be saved, and they who are lost are lost because they merited to perish.*²³⁶ Inasmuch as this answer does not "exorcise" the "shadow of Manichaeism..."

²³⁶ Loc. cit. See also Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 716, 724; Pohle, op. cit., p. 235 where this resistance of the will is not a truly free act because it is lacking in that free consent of the will proper to it, for "no secondary cause can act unless it be efficaciously determined by the first cause by an application of the latter to the former as of potency to act." (Pohle, op. cit., p. 239) With the power of free consent merely sufficient grace "would cease to be merely sufficient and would become efficacious." (Loc. cit.) Man's pristine liberty was that of "a will created free from servitude to sin...an efficacious power. This free-will abdicated its power in sinning....A liberty that enslaves itself, even freely, is unfaithful to its own essence. For this reason...all diminution of the power of will diminishes the liberty of free will." Grace restores the liberty of the will and heals it. (Gilson, op. cit., pp. 317-318.)

Cf. the views of Molinism (Pohle, op. cit., pp. 256-257) wherein "Sufficient grace becomes efficacious by the consent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains inefficacious--and merely sufficient....," yet it is not the will as such which makes this determination, but "grace which makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts." The infallibility of this grace, however, is due to God's infallible foreknowledge of whether the will will give or refuse consent.

Also cf. the position of Dvaita where, although man's free will is dependent (asvatantra), it is such only in the sense that "its very nature (svarupa) is derived from svatantra [the Independent]. So the freedom of the self in its selection of particular ends, and of the means for realizing them, is not opposed to the truth that the self as a whole is asvatantra. The complete import of its individuality consists in fully realizing svatantra as its ground and the state of this realization is called mukti." Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 241.

left behind by St. Augustine,²³⁷ and fails to satisfy all questions concerning the supernatural determination of each man's decision, as well as the primal gift by God of merely sufficient grace to some, "with which they neglect to co-operate, while on others He showers efficacious graces that infallibly lead to eternal salvation....,"²³⁸ Pohle²³⁹ conveniently states that "in this unequal distribution lies the sublime mystery of predestination... [the] unsearchable judgments of God."

Pelagius, although he shared with the Church a lack of differentiation between the ego and Self, the soul and the Spirit, was so impelled by a feeling for that indwelling perfection and fulness sensed by man²⁴⁰ that instead of completely projecting it into the ever-separate Other and His grace he shared it as a property of the only remaining alternate, the soul. The soul, or ego, to him was by nature "so wholly good that nothing can be supposed capable of corrupting it

²³⁷ Gilson, op. cit., p. 120.

²³⁸ See Pohle, op. cit., pp. 188, 378; Watts, op. cit., pp. 106-110, Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 723-724; Rādhakṛiṣṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 126n.

²³⁹ Pohle, op. cit., p. 188.

²⁴⁰ Cf. Gītā 16.5: "Divine properties are deemed to be for liberation, the demonical for bondage. Grieve not, thou art born with divine properties, O Pāṇḍava." Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 274.

to such a point that it will need further grace in addition to that which brought it into existence."²⁴¹ The inheritance of original sin could play no part in such a view, and the soul's experience of evil could spring only from ignorance of its innate perfection through carnal ignorance and false example, a condition from which it could be set free through the power of its natural free-will and grace given it by God from the beginning, and aided by external graces which, instead of being absolutely necessary, are merely helpful.²⁴² Predestination and reprobation, as viewed by the Church, could not operate in Pelagianism. Even though Pelagius' system was devoid of the knowledge of ſtman and limited to a concept of God and the soul-ego, it held that

God does not impel and predestine us to evil, but by His prevision merely foresees evil as an effect in which He has no part, so He can foresee good as a human effect which is quite independent of Him....Grace does not work upon the will itself in such a way as to set it in motion. Grace is but an instrument subject to the will and placed at its disposal....In this conception man really predestines himself...²⁴³

As a "natural corollary from the omniscience of God," the totally other, the "legally minded" Calvinist theory of

²⁴¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 379.

²⁴² Hopkins, The History of Religions, p. 574. See Pohle, op. cit., pp. 82-84; Nock, op. cit., pp. 248-250.

²⁴³ Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 712-713.

absolute predestination followed in logical sequence.²⁴⁴ Here the eternally separate divine will is supreme, with man occupying the all-too-real rôle of puppet manipulated by the whim of an arbitrary God²⁴⁵ who has willed "the fate of each individual long before He called him into existence and has predestined millions to His hatred and to eternal damnation, and with that object He gave them being."²⁴⁶ Thus "men are damned simply to please God"²⁴⁷ by an "unconditional divine decree... [wherein] God produces in the reprobates a 'semblance of faith,' only to make them all the more deserving of damnation."²⁴⁸ Here man's freedom of will, irretrievably

²⁴⁴ Rādhakṛishṇa, op. cit., p. 126n. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 588.

²⁴⁵ Watts, op. cit., p. 112; Rādhakṛishṇa, op. cit., p. 281.

²⁴⁶ Karl Barth, quoted in Rādhakṛishṇa, op. cit., p. 303.

²⁴⁷ Hopkins, op. cit., p. 590.

²⁴⁸ Pöhle, op. cit., p. 212. Cf. the lines of Aurobindo, Sāvitrī, II, 224-225 (Book 9, Canto 2), where Yama (Death), who himself is not external to the movements of the Supreme (see Gītā 10.34), takes upon himself the characteristics of the Creator-God of religion who states: "...out of my void;...

I made the worlds my net, each joy a mesh.
 A Hunger amorous of its suffering prey,
 Life that devours, my image see in things.
 Mortal, whose spirit is my wandering breath,
 Whose transience was imagined by my smile,
 Flee clutching thy poor gains to thy trembling breast
 Pierced by my pangs Time shall not soon appease.
 Blind slave of my deaf force whom I compel

lost by original sin, is swallowed in the workings of absolute predestination and positive reprobation for, to those predestined to salvation neither faith nor justification can be lost, and "the unpredestined are never truly justified."²⁴⁹ Man and nature are naturally evil, are totally depraved, and the blind soul is incapable of any good action.²⁵⁰

The relation of the limited religious analogy of predestination may be seen in the metaphysical approach to the problem of free will. Metaphysic recognizes the dependence of the ego upon its indwelling Self (or its personification as the Lord or Bhagavān), and sees in the finite jīva-will, as the kartā, not a freedom which is absolute, but one which is in a sense determined by the māyā-*"knowledge-power"* of

To sin that I may punish, to desire
 That I may scourge thee with despair and grief
 And thou come bleeding to me at the last,
 Thy nothingness recognised, my greatness known,
 Turn nor attempt forbidden happy fields
 Meant for the souls that can obey my law,...."
 And on p. 227 Yama further states: "I, Death am He; there is no other God."

²⁴⁹ Pohle, *op. cit.*, p. 392, also p. 223. See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 578, and Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 321. Luther's Monergistic views (cf. Tengalai or "cat theory" of Hindu theism) were contested by Melancthon's Synergism (cf. Vedagalai or "monkey theory"). See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 585.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Oscar Wilde, in the Ballad of Reading Gaol,
 "For none can tell to what red Hell
 His sightless soul may stray."

Brahman and the inner ruler (Antaryāmin),²⁵¹ that Self of which the jīva is a mode, "as though mounted on a machine."²⁵² In the samsāric līlā the will of the Self, freely limited to an ego-nature, freely plays within that Self-imposed limitation of the subtle and the gross.²⁵³ When the finite will is sacrificed, made harmonious or surrendered to and by its infinite fulness, this limited freedom is infinitely (not temporally or spatially) extended, and it consciously becomes integrated with the advaitic will.²⁵⁴ The love, or agape, of the Self, freely chooses the ego-hood of self,²⁵⁵ and, equally, chooses to play within and as the finite even unto the integral awakening. The Self is inseparable from the ego, which cannot but love its Self, and the divine power-will (śakti) freely is identified with all movements of the ego,--for even that which is called "hatred" of the divine is but an evidence of this all-encompassing and reciprocal

²⁵¹ Rāmānuja, The Vedānta Sūtras with the Śrī Bhāṣya of Rāmānujāchārya, p. 407. Roy, op. cit., p. 78n. Gītā 4.6.

²⁵² See Gītā 18.61; Kaush. 3.9; Rānāde, op. cit., p. 314; Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 146, 425-427; Aurobindo, The Yoga and Its Object, p. 17.

²⁵³ Rāmānuja, op. cit., pp. 233-235, 407.

²⁵⁴ Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., pp. 146-149. See Aurobindo, Letters of Śrī Aurobindo, I, 333.

²⁵⁵ See Nygren, op. cit., I, 168; Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., p. 71.

love.²⁵⁶

Where religion analytically conceives of the will as truly free only in its pristine or restored state of goodness, metaphysic recognizes the basis of free will only in the fulness of Self-realization which transcends the pairs of opposites yet gives meaning to the determinate and differentiated.²⁵⁷ "...from the standpoint of the Self," states Watts,²⁵⁸ "there is no fate, external God, past cause, etc., which determines it. The Self is self-determining, and only appears to be determined with the ego." Karma works in ultimate harmony with divine will, with that Self whose manifest

²⁵⁶ An enlightening Indian story may well serve to illustrate this view. According to the Vishnu Purāṇa a gate-keeper of Vishnu's heavenly realm became so self-centered and officious that he offended a Rishi who, to cure him of his conceit, pronounced that he must undergo the trials of saṃsāra. Vishnu gave him the choice of seven births as a loyal devotee or but three as the Lord's enemy. In explanation Vishnu said, "If you are born as a devotee you will have certain contacts and works with and within the world, with varied avocations and professions as well as with the ills of saṃsāra, that you will only think of me but an hour or two a day; while if you are my opponent you will hate me, devote your entire life to me, and think of me all of the time." The gate-keeper was then incarnated, successively, as Hiranya-kāśipu (slain by the man-lion avatāra), Rāvaṇa (slain by Rāma), and Sisupāla (slain by Krishna, -- his cousin), and thereafter was united with Vishnu.
 --From an unpublished lecture by Sir C. P. Rāmaswāmi Aiyar, San Francisco, Jan., 23, 1952. See also Dowson, op. cit., p. 294.

²⁵⁷ Rāṇade, op. cit., pp. 314-315. Northrop, op. cit., p. 343. Chhānd. 8.16.

²⁵⁸ Watts, op. cit., 122n.

movements are "organic to man's nature." It is the Self which is the "universal background providing scope and expression for the different possibilities" actualized through its finite will, the will of man. The will "upward to heaven" or "downward to hell" points then, only to "states of the self, and not to places of resort," and these states, too, are impermanent.²⁵⁹ The problems of free will and predestination can flourish only within a point of view which is separated, analytical, and theoretical. They have never found any predominant place in the systems of thought which, for the most part, have held to the purity of their metaphysical ground, and are completely non-existent in the advaitic state of moksha, as well as that condition which may be called one of "natural grace." Emerson, in "Spiritual Laws,"²⁶⁰ emphasizes the purely inferential status of these problems when he states that

Our young people are diseased with the theological problems of original sin, origin of evil, predestination,

²⁵⁹ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 294. Kaush. 3.9. From the trans-theistic view "...reality is neither bound nor free, subjective nor objective, fixed nor moving, divided nor undivided. To be aware of this in fact, as different from simple theory, is Liberation, the realization of the Original or Unconditioned Mind, and this is the goal of yoga." (From A. Watts introduction to Spiegelberg, Spiritual Practices of India, p. xii.

²⁶⁰ Quoted by James, op. cit., p. 164n.

and the like. These never presented a practical difficulty to any man--never darkened across any man's road, who did not go out of his way to seek them. These are the soul's mumps, and measles, and whooping coughs...

Much has been said of the Divine Will, an analogical term necessary, perhaps, for discourse and discussion, but which may all too easily become crystallized into purely human concepts of personality, measured by the human will and intellect even in its projective units of "privation," and limited by necessary causal relationships. It is only when this analogical character of the eternally free creative activity (śakti) of the Infinite is forgotten or laid aside that there can arise religious idolatry.²⁶¹ From an integral point of view, and one that does not exclude the value of different stages of finite consciousness, it is immaterial whether the Divine Will is said to be of the Self, the indwelling Lord or Bhagavān, or the inseparable Consciousness-Power (Śakti) of Brahman or Maheśvara so long as these terms have their common and fundamental basis in the all-inclusive, non-dual Ground of Metaphysic. The realization of Self or of the Beloved in conscious union with the realized devotee "cannot be 'produced,' we cannot reason it out. It is not a 'work.' It comes or does not come independently of our will."²⁶² The "stresses of the personal

²⁶¹ Cf. Watts, op. cit., pp. 65-66, 170.

²⁶² Otto, op. cit., p. 33. See Watts, op. cit., p. 182.

will" in its endeavors to attain independence rather than integration can be but obstacles which becloud the vision of Reality²⁶³ and prevent the

...bringing to consciousness, to earth, what is true all the time...in the Self and spirit which the ego does not know. From the eternal and interior standpoint...the divine will is always done, but this has yet to be realized from the finite, temporal, and external standpoint of earth.²⁶⁴

This realization can occur only when the all-embracing Divine-Reality (spoken of as the Self, the âtman which is Brahman, or the Bhagavân, whichever is in harmony with one's own nature, svabhâva) so wills that the ego ceases its futile fluttering "in this Brahma-wheel,"²⁶⁵ surrenders its finitude

263 Cf. Râdhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 111. Also cf. Wordsworth, in Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abby:--"While with an eye made quiet by the power of harmony, and the deep power of joy, we see into the life of things." The experience, the darśana or reality, appears when that calmness which is prasâda is brought about through that harmonious, coordinating power (śakti) which is inseparable from the power (śakti) of bliss (ânanda).

264 Watts, op. cit., p. 191. It is only when the cloud of avidyâ gives place to tranquil clarity (prasâda), in all of the physical (bhûr), all of the vital (bhuvah), and all of the mental (svah),--that is, in the totality of the regions of the three gunas, that the always present, immanent and "excellent light of the divine Sun...may illumine our minds." Cf. the Gâyatrî (RV 3.63.10):

Om bhur bhuvah svah!
Tat savitur varenyam
Bhargo devasya dhīmahi
Dhiyo yo nah prachodayât. Om.

--Quoted in Ballantyne, Tyberg, Ware, First Lessons In Sanskrit Grammar and Reading (San Francisco: American Academy Of Asian Studies, 1951), p. 228.

265 See Svet. 1.6.

to its infinite Self, and so opens (as a freely limited mode of the Self) to that integral realization²⁶⁶ which permits of full divine consciousness in a lila at all times completely "awake." From an advaitic standpoint "finite and physical existence presents no obstacles to the infinite [and] ... the infinite does not lose its omniscience while simultaneously assuming a finite point of view."²⁶⁷

The eternal will of the Self, or the Divine Will, when experienced by the awakening self or jiva, can be related by the jiva only to that which is supremely greater than the ego, more comprehensive than any other ego-experience. The will of the Self, experienced as its own Self-realization, is at first intuited by the ego-self as grace, a free gift, a revelation. This, then, is the experience of divine grace, the religious analogy to the metaphysical figure of the "will of the Self."²⁶⁸

This divine will is inseparable from divine love. The complete and loving abandonment of the Self in and as the ego is, from that ego-view, a grace which images the Divine in

²⁶⁶ Watts, op. cit., pp. 150, 170. Cf. Jaspers' views of the effects of man facing the "limit situation." Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 194, 197, 236.

²⁶⁷ Watts, op. cit., p. 151.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 150. It is also the kiss which awakens the "Sleeping Beauty" as well as the love with which "Beauty" transforms the "Beast."

temporal form.²⁶⁹ It is that same love which, in the awakening of the Self, permits an integral consciousness embracing not only the transcendence of Supreme Identity but every manifestation of the free play of the Spirit in each cosmic and individual expression or poise.

²⁶⁹ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 206, 209, 218-221, 247, 249. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 29; Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 193.

PART V

CLARITY AND ADVAITIC VEDĀNTA

The term advaita as applied to a particular school of vedāntic philosophy connotes a world-view wherein

Brahman is the sole reality, and it appears both as the objective universe and as the individual subject. The former is an illusory manifestation of Brahman, while the latter is Brahman itself under the limitations which form part of that illusory universe.¹

Fundamentally this sole reality is identical with the Self,² the ātman, which appears as multiform individuals. The manifest world-appearance, apart from the individual, has no independent reality and can evidence no truth other than the Self, for "all other events, mental or physical, are but passing experiences, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the Self [ātman]."³

¹ M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1951), p. 158.

² See Carl Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 72-73 where, from a strictly clinical point of view and one differing from vedāntic terminology, it is declared that "What one could almost call a systematic blindness is simply the effect of the prejudice that the deity is outside man." Jung also states that the "natural tendencies of the unconscious mind" enforce the idea of the "essential identity of God and man."

³ Surendranath Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1951), I, 439. See also Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 77; S. Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 32; Sankarāchārya, Ātma-bodha (Madras: Sri Rāmakṛishṇa Math, 1947), Preface by Nikhilānanda, p. xviii.

Furthermore, this ultimate reality, this advaitic Self, is fundamental and unchanging pure consciousness, the contents of which are said to appear as that change and diversity observed by empirical man.⁴ Chaudhuri⁵ points out that this infinite pure consciousness may be thought of as the bindu, the "spaceless and timeless concentration of the Spirit in itself," and, as well, the sindhu, the "ocean of consciousness," "a vast and limitless self-expression or self-extension" of that "identity consciousness (viññāna)... without there being as yet any sign of individualization." Thus it is that "when the reflection of this primary poise of the Supermind falls upon our stilled and purified self,"⁶ we lose all sense of individuality and realize the truth inherent in advaitavāda," a truth which, being limited to the ultimate, changeless transcendent, here does not seem to be extended to its other poises, i.e., the cosmic and the individual. While recognizing the metaphysical ground as pure transcendent Spirit, absolutely free, "essentially

⁴ Surendranath Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: 1933), p. xxi.

⁵ Haridās Chaudhuri, Sri Aurobindo, The Prophet of Life Divine (Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Pathamandir, 1951), pp. 209-210.

⁶ Cf. prasāda as the purified temperament (antahkarana) or dhātu prasāda. Supra, pp. 46r. See also T. V. Kapāli Sāstry, Lights on the Upanishads (Madras: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1947), p. 8n.

indeterminate and logically indefinable," Chaudhuri⁷ quite rightly cannot envision that freedom of the Spirit as limited by being "incapable of real self-determination...." The indeterminability of Brahman lies in its unlimited freedom from and in its self-determinations. The essential identity of Atman and Brahman is not to be construed, as Chaudhuri has observed in the "current interpretation of advaitavāda," as removed from any possibility or freedom of self-determination and he attributes such an absolutistic view to the "failure to distinguish between transcendent and empirical individuality....," that is, between the Atman-personality and the ego. Guénon⁸ interprets the advaitic principle in this broad aspect which, from the viewpoint of metaphysics, sees in it not a simple negation of one opposite term by the other but, rather, a unity in difference, of the many within the conscious universal principle common to all, a higher synthesis which is possible "because we are no longer confined within a systemization limited to one of these distinctions to the exclusion of all the others..." It is because such a vision ordinarily is not found in the West, particularly when East and West are compared, that it is

⁷ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

⁸ René Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), pp. 153-155.

necessary to survey the fundamental basis of advaitavāda before enquiring into any particular expression of prasāda.⁹

CHAPTER I

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

I. MĀYĀ AND THE SUPREME IDENTITY

Māyā. While the viewpoint of advaitavāda concerning causation is one of a manifestation or transformation rather than of creation, the concept is considered "as wholly empirical and is without any ultimate significance."¹⁰ Man, as ego, is aware of the unstable and illusory phenomena only, the world appearance, and therefore any creation or manifestation of that appearance "is illusory māyā" which may, from the finite point of view, be referred to as manifest by īśvara as "a mere sport" but from the "true point of view" both īśvara and the appearance-manifestation are illusory.¹¹ Brahman, the Self, is the ground, the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) and, as well, the efficient cause

⁹ See P. N. Srinivāsachāri, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943), p. 592. Cf. also Otto, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

¹⁰ Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 158. This is in direct opposition to the basic theory of creation as found in Christian theology.

¹¹ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 438.

(nimitta kāraṇa) of the world which, then,

...is but an effect imposed upon Brahman, is only phenomenally existent (vyavahārika) as mere objects of name and form (nāmarūpa), but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality (pāramārtika).¹²

Thus the world appearance, although in a peculiar and unique sense an illusion, has its origin in Brahman and may be thought of as an "illusion simply in the sense of something imagined by the infinite."¹³ As an "imaging" of the infinite this is not a necessary process but a free possibility of the infinite free consciousness, for "if the infinite could not manifest the finite, it would be neither infinite nor omnipotent."¹⁴ The multiform, engendered by Brahman through a Self-abandonment which "implies no essential privation...motion, nor necessary causality,"¹⁵ although in a sense illusory as appearance, has existence and is not to be negated. The existence of things arises not from the

¹² Ibid., pp. 438-439. See also Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 165.

¹³ Alan Watts, The Supreme Identity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950), p. 62. Cf. Aurobindo, Sāvitrī (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Āśram Press, 1951) II, 274 wherein the Divinity in the aspect of Death speaks:

The world is a myth that happened to come true,
A legend told to itself by conscious mind,
Imaged and played on a feigned Matter's ground
On which it stands in an unsubstantial Vast.

¹⁴ Watts, op. cit., p. 65. See also Jean Delaire, "The Conception of the Soul in the East and West," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, 1:216, Jan., 1934.

¹⁵ Watts, op. cit., p. 66.

possession of "the genus of being (sat)" but because as appearances they are "imposed upon one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience....This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances."¹⁶ Thus the changing world of name and form "is true...in as far as it has the Supreme Being itself for its essence..., if regarded as self-dependent [it] is untrue,"¹⁷ for "everything everywhere is based on reality."¹⁸ The world appearance then, this māyā, can be designated only as the "indefinite," which has "only a relative existence and ultimately will vanish when the true knowledge of Brahman dawns."¹⁹ It is the illusion-appearance of measured, separated form imposed upon the Real which transcends yet,

¹⁶ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, p. 446.

¹⁷ From Sankarāchārya's commentary on Chhândogya-nishad 6.3, quoted in Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 30-31. See also Chhând. 6.10 ff, and Brih. 3.7.

¹⁸ From Sankarāchārya's commentary on Bhagavadgītā 13.14, quoted in Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁹ Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 461. See also Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 156. Cf. Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 68. "Not only does it remain true to say that all that is, save God, might be other than it is, but it now becomes true to say that all save God might possibly not exist."

in a way, includes all form.²⁰ Advaitavāda considers any negation of world-appearance as equally false as that appearance itself. Dāsgupta²¹ states that

The negation of the world-appearance however has no separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false (for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself, and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis, that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being.

²⁰ See S. Rādhakrishnan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāna Kalpataru, I:172, January, 1934. Critics of māyā-vāda rightly contend that the illusionist theory, carried to the extreme which supposes "that the world completely disappears or appears unreal from the standpoint of ultimate knowledge," does not express fully that integral non-duality (nārnādvaita) which encompasses the multifork, not as an illusion, but as a real and true poise of the supreme Reality. Chaudhuri, op. cit., 216, explains further: "To the eye of wisdom purged of all taint of avidyā [cf. dhātu-prasāda] the world rather appears in its proper perspective as eternally dependent upon Brahman and as the rhythmic manifestation of the latter, and not as unreal. What completely disappears from the standpoint of ultimate reality is the world supposed to be existent in its own right, but not the world perceived as the self-articulation of the infinitely opulent and creative unity of the basic consciousness which we call the Spirit."

²¹ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 444.

Brahman. While the experience of the supreme person manifesting as the Bhagavān fulfills those human needs centered about the element of divine love, often to the exclusion of knowledge and works,²² such an experience does not exhaust the possibilities of metaphysical relationships or realization. There yet remains that experience of Fact, that consciousness of identity with

...the truth of things in itself...before time and before plurality...the pure, alone and unmanifest, nothing and all things, that which transcends any definite form of expression, and yet is the basis of all expression, the one in whom all is found and yet all is lost."²³

Thus Brahman, in advaitavāda, is not only the ultimate cause "from which (proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms..., a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination of the mind)," but is "the identity of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness.... It is the Self of us all and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions."²⁴ Otto²⁵ summarizes Sankara's view of

²² See Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 68.

²³ S. Rādhakṛiṣṇan, An Idealist View of Life (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), pp. 342-343.

²⁴ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 437-438. See also Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 164.

²⁵ Otto, op. cit., p. 165. Otto continues, "...all these have, point for point, their parallels in Eckhart--extending even to a surprising identity of phrase."

the supreme Reality as:

Brahman, high above the personal God; the personal God submerged and disappearing in the suprapersonal Brahman; the identity of the soul [âtman] and Brahman; salvation [realization] as identity with Brahman; Brahman determined as the unqualified, pure Being and Spirit, without attributes, without distinctions within itself; the world lacking real being, floating in the indefiniteness of mâyâ and avidyâ...

The Brahman of advaitavâda, then, "is active, but only in principle (therefore 'actionless'), for this activity (kartritva) is not essential to it nor inherent in it, but is simply eventual and contingent (merely relative to its states of manifestation)."²⁶

From the point of view of Advaita Brahman, the supreme Reality, can not be described positively in words or terms which, no matter how precise they may be, are within the indefinite,--the historical, spatial and temporal which is mâyâ.²⁷ Brahman may be thought of as the "no-thing,"--the "essential ground" of the multiform.²⁸ Any attempt to speak of it must be in negative terms,--for it cannot be expressed in logical forms or by any of the form-counters which make up the world-appearance. It can be experienced or known,

²⁶ René Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedânta (London: Luzac and Co., 1945), p. 72, from the Brahmasûtras.

²⁷ See Watts, op. cit., p. 59.

²⁸ Not to be identified with the analogical "nothingness" basic to the Christian theory of creation and which is, as it were, immanent in that creation. See Watts, op. cit., p. 64.

then, as that which is not the error-illusion of māyā, that is, as the "cessation of this world-appearance," for

There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or perception, no vacuity, no matter, no spirit or consciousness [for these are but words], but pure cessation and pure negation, and this is what we mean by Brahman. Its nature is that of pure cessation and it is this which the Sāṃkhya called Puruṣa, the Vedāntists Brahman, the Idealistic Buddhists 'Pure Idea' (Vijñānamātra) and the Nihilists 'pure essencelessness' (śūnya).²⁹

This Void, not a vacuum but a plenum of Sat, Chit, and Ananda, is thus the Real, all else being but impositions of māyā. Gaudapāda³⁰ conceived of the Reality-Void as similar to ākāśa, "which is falsely conceived as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from ākāśa."³¹

29 Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 156, citing the view of the Yogavāsishtha.

30 In the third chapter of his Kārikas, cited in Dāsgupta, op. cit., p. 151.

31 Cf. Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmaṇi (Almora: Advaita Āśrama, 1926), p. 249, śl. 574, "There is neither death nor birth, neither a bound nor a struggling soul, neither a seeker after liberation nor a liberated one,--this is the ultimate truth." This also is found in Amṛitabindopaniṣad, śloka 10. Many qualified observers are aware of the debt Vedānta owes to Buddhism. Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 393, has remarked that "I am led to think that Sankara's philosophy is highly a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upanishad notion of the permanence of self superadded." See also similar views in Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 149, and Saśi Dāsgupta, An Introduction to Tāntric Buddhism (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950), p. 35.

The Ātman and the jīva.

The ultimate object of internal introspection is the liquid radiance in the thousand-petaled center of energy ... (so say the yogins). The ultimate object of internal introspection is the form of the Purusha, ravishingly beautiful all over his limbs, in the cavern (which is the seat) of the intellect, say others (the Vaishnavas). The ultimate object of internal introspection is the exquisitely tranquil blue-necked Śiva with five faces, the help-mate of Umā, abiding in the middle of the halo of radiance in the head, say some others (the Saivas). The ultimate object of internal introspection is the Purusha of the size of the thumb, say yet others, (the votaries of Dakṣa-vidyā). All the diverse varieties spoken of (above) are only the Ātman. He who sees his ultimate object of introspection from the point of view of the Ātman, pure and simple, he alone is firmly planted in Brahman.³²

The upanishadic vision of the Brahman as the "inmost reality of our being"³³ brings into prominence the basic motif of metaphysical realization, for under all of the contrapuntal figures and varied tempos of traditional Eastern expressions of the sanātana dharma lies the organ point of Tat Tvam Asi.³⁴ This all-embracing mahāvākya, bearing witness

³² "Maṇḍala-Brahmanopanishad" 1.4.1-2, found in S. S. Sāstrī, editor, The Yogopanishads (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1938), p. 225.

³³ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 11. See also Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 103.

³⁴ Cf. B. D. Basu, editor, The Sacred Books of the Hindus (Allahabad: Bhuvanēśwari Āśrama, 1918), XX, 5, where the following assertion of identity, to be recited upon awakening, is said to be in use among Sāma-vedi Brāhmanas or, in Upper India, among Yajur-vedis: "I am Divine and not anything else. I am, indeed Brahman, above all sorrows; my form is existence, intellect and bliss; and eternally free is my nature." aham devo na chānyo'smi brahmaivāham na śoka-bhāk | sachchidānandarūpo'ham nitya muktasvabhāvavān ||

to the "con-substantiality of the spirit in man and God [Brahman]" is but "a simple statement of an experienced fact,"³⁵ asserted not only by Vedānta, Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the Sufis, but denied by orthodox Christian theology.³⁶ The Thomistic idea of man "as eternal in God and as one with His own nature..." is far from co-substantiality, from the Supreme Identity of metaphysic, the "numinous feeling of Self" which Otto³⁷ finds alike in Sankara and Eckert, and which bespeaks of an order of awareness which "seems to be a complete and exclusive antithesis of all theism."³⁸

³⁵ S. Rādhakrishnan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāna Kalpataru, I, 172. See also Jean Delaire, op. cit., 213-214; Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 2.

³⁶ Huxley, op. cit., p. 55.

³⁷ Otto, op. cit., p. 100, also p. 184.

³⁸ Cf. Ibid., p. 184, this summary of the Eckhartian view: "Man, even I, stood with God before time was, before the world was; I was contained in the eternal Godhead before it was God. With man, even with me, God created and God is eternally creating. In me He first became God, and if I were not, then He would be as little God as I am I." Otto (p. 206) sees in the "soul-mysticism" of Eckhart, however, no identity with the ātman of Sankara. For the former he claims an active participation in life, in a "hunger and thirst after righteousness," and in justification and sanctification, all peculiarly Christian, "for Sankara's mysticism is none of these things because it springs not from the soil of Palestine, but from the soil of India." In other words, the "soil" of religion is distinct from the "soil" of metaphysic.

The Svetâśvataropaniṣad³⁹ mentions that "...just as oil is hidden in sesamum, or ghee in curds, just as water is hidden in springs, or fire in the churning sticks, even so is the âtman immanent in the body."⁴⁰ From an integral point of view the jīva, the living, embodied, and unrealized man, is thus, as it were, a complex manifested by the "individualizing self-limitation" of the supreme Spirit identical with the eternally free and indivisible âtman and with all of existence,⁴¹ yet does not exhaust the Absolute nor its infinite freedom to manifest in other poises of being.⁴² Praśnopaniṣad,⁴³ after appraising the "psycho-biological self"

39 1.15

40 R. D. Rānade, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926), p. 342. Robt. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principle Upanishads (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 396, gives "...in one's own soul," i.e. the jīva, ego, or self.

41 Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

The exclusive Christian emphasis upon Being recognizes indivisibility as the unique prerogative of God viewed, however, in the sense of a quantitative indivisibility wherein "there are no degrees of divinity." (Gilson, op. cit., p. 48). The result of such a dogma is the construction of an inevitable, basic and unbridgeable gulf between "one God who is Being, and beings which are not God" (Loc. cit.), a situation which does not arise when all-inclusive and advaitic consciousness (inseparable from sat and ānanda) is the ground rather than the single poise of Being. Nevertheless Christians posit a triune Being,--a division of the divisionless wherein all are one. This analogy within Being is a harmonic approach to advaitic metaphysical experience.

42 Chaudhuri, op. cit., 213-214.

43 See in particular 4.7-11; 6.1-7.

and noting the various component factors therein, "says that they are ultimately to be regarded as the manifestations of the highest self [âtman]."⁴⁴ Sankara⁴⁵ asserts that the âtman, the Self of all existing things through

...Itself assuming the limitations of the Buddhi and wrongly⁴⁶ identifying Itself with this totally unreal entity, looks upon Itself as something different,--like earthen jars from the clay of which they are made. Owing to Its connection with the superimpositions, the Supreme Self, even though naturally perfect and eternally unchanging, assumes the qualities of the superimpositions and appears to act just as they do,--like the changeless fire assuming the modifications of the iron which it turns red-hot.

In the Yogasâikhopaniṣad⁴⁷ it is said:

Know (then the Paramâtman) as the mass (of primordial matter) bound by the (seven) Dhâtus⁴⁸ (humors, integument, blood, flesh, fat, semen, bone, and marrow) and displaying the (three) qualities (of rhythm, mobility, and inertia), assuming the character of îva. It is for this reason that the name of îva is attributed to the exquisitely pure paramâtman.

Furthermore, the same Upanishad⁴⁹ states that "the conjunction

⁴⁴ Dâsgupta, Indian Idealism, pp. 35-36.

⁴⁵ Sankara, Vivekachudâmani, p. 85, ślokas 190-191.

⁴⁶ It appears here that a value judgment has been made concerning the âtman's assumption of and its self-abandonment to self-limitation. An inference could be made that the âtman is adjudged in error, notwithstanding the absurdity of such an assumption.

⁴⁷ S. S. Sâstri, The Yogopaniṣads, p. 328, Śl. 1.9.

⁴⁸ See dhātu-prasâda, supra pp. 46 ff.

⁴⁹ 1.69, p. 340.

of the sun and moon, and of the jīvātman and the Paramātman ...is known as yoga.

From an integral view of advaita (pūrṇādvaita) this manifestation or mode of the all-inclusive Brahman functions, so to speak, as numberless, individual "soul-forms," particularized or separated, as it were, each from the other and, apparently, from their Self. This "playful pragmatic duality of the Divine" is not ontological, however, and the free functional differentiation in no way detracts from the indivisible advaitic unity of the supreme Reality. "On the contrary, multiform self division is necessary for the full self-realization of the basic unity."⁵⁰ Again, it may be said that embodied man comprises both a subtle and a gross manifestation of Sachchidānanda as (1) matter and "subliminal material substance," (sat), (2) life and "subliminal vital power," (chit-sakti), (3) mind and the subconscious, (vi-jñāna), and (4) the "psyche" and "hṛidpuruṣa" or the "spark of Divine in nature" (ānanda).⁵¹ Metaphysically, then, man may be thought of as a complex wherein the modes or poises of the non-dual Self, namely the "aspects of particularity, universality, and transcendence," are "fused," as it were, in accordance with the eternal divine will or consciousness-

⁵⁰ Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 30.

power.⁵² Furthermore, the consciousness proper to any or all of these non-separate poises may reveal itself through the antahkarana or internal organ of man.

In advaitavāda there are views of the jīva which are both universal and particular. Ekaīśvavāda holds that the one and only jīva is chaitanya or consciousness revealed through or reflected in avidyā, while the bahūīśvavāda stresses the multiple particular elements in the jīva complex by conceiving of chaitanya as revealed through or reflected in separate and distinct antahkaranas. With both schools of thought, however, jīva is in essence chaitanya, and the revelation of that true nature constitutes that freedom which is identity with the transcendent Brahman to the exclusion and even the denial of any other poise.⁵³ It is only as the transcendent Self that it is Reality. Conceived as separate and independent of its ground it is false and indeterminate.⁵⁴ It is the ātman which is the essence of jīva, the chit conditioned by antahkarana.⁵⁵

⁵² Ibid., p. 194. See also pp. 195-196.

⁵³ See H. N. Rāghavendrāchār, The Dvaita Philosophy and its Place in the Vedānta (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1941), pp. 67-69.

⁵⁴ See Yogaśikhopaniṣad 4.1-2, S. S. Śāstrī, op. cit., p. 371 for the traditional example: "Even as in a rope there is the false conception of a snake, so also should the (false) nature of jīva be understood."

⁵⁵ S. S. Śāstrī, op. cit., p. 69.

spoken of in the Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad⁵⁶ as "The person here who among the senses is made of knowledge, who is the light in the heart. He, remaining the same, goes along both worlds, appearing to think, appearing to move about..."

⁵⁶ 4.3.7. See also Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmaṇi, p. 189.

CHAPTER II

AVIDYĀ AND REALITY

Brahmajñāna. The essential non-separateness which is basic to non-dual metaphysic is free from the necessity to look toward an "outside" aid or gratuitous power of a separate "other" for the realization of supreme Reality. Eternity is thus not something to be "put on," attained, nor is it to be experienced as a new and unique gift bestowed upon something formerly "outside" the eternal. It is without beginning and without end, eternally present in the bindu of the Now, and is identical with the full awareness or consciousness, of that eternal Now. The infinite eternal consciousness, the timeless present, is the omnipresent and is non-selective in that it is not separately withdrawn into a distinct supernatural category impossibly aloof from that which is called finitude.¹ Mukti is but an awakening into that which is, not a grasp of something which should be, or may be, if one but obeys. Thus the only "grace" possible, from this advaitic view, is one integrally non-separate from the eternal and all-comprehensive present,--the integral "grace" of the consciousness-power of the supreme Reality awakening in "clear-awareness" (prasāda) to and as that

¹ See Delaire, op. cit., p. 216.

Self-realization which frees the ego-state from that ignorance which is separate exclusiveness.

Advaitavāda views this "clear awareness" as unobstructed and undifferentiated knowledge, eternal, self-evident and, as chit, is the "ultimate principle of the world," for it is indistinguishable from Brahman. It is on this chit that there is superimposed aīkāṣa, the world of appearance.² Thus it may be said that Brahmajñāna, integral spiritual consciousness or knowledge, "in advaita is jñāna that is Brahman and not of Brahman."³ Edgerton⁴ defines this knowledge as

² Cf. Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmaṇi, p. 90, śl. 202: "The cessation of that superimposition takes place through perfect knowledge, and by no other means. Perfect knowledge, according to the śrutis, consists in the realization of the identity of the individual soul [here the ātman] and Brahman." (brahmātmaikatvavijñānam)

Cf. "This mind [i.e. chit] is the pure Buddha (essence) which is the source of all things and inherent in all men... Differentiation arises from wrong thinking only and it is thus that all kinds of karma are created." Chu Ch'an, translator, The Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind (London: The Buddhist Society, 1947), p. 22.

"This universal mind [chit] alone is the Buddha and there is no distinction between the Buddha and sentient beings, but sentient beings are attached to forms and so seek for Buddhahood outside it." - Ibid., p. 16.

"All the qualities displayed by the great Bodhisattvas are inherent in men and are not to be separated from universal mind. Awaken to them and they are there." Ibid., p. 20.

³ Srīnivāsaśāhī, op. cit., p. xxxviii.

Cf. "This dharma is absolutely without distinctions, having neither height nor depth, and its name is Bodhi." - Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 23.

⁴ Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavadgītā, Translation and Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), II, 29. Typical of the Western view of knowledge as a lever for mechanistic, analytical control ("Knowledge is

"intuitive realization of the supreme metaphysical truth....," yet it is at once that Truth in itself, transcending time and relationship, "the jñāna which is eternal, uncreated, imperishable, and inseparable from the ātman itself."⁵ Thus the supreme Reality which is Ātman-Brahman is not the object of knowledge⁶ "but is the condition of knowledge...it is the eternal light which is not one of the things seen but the condition of seeing" beyond all duality and separateness.⁷

The eternal Truth, the pure consciousness, the Self,

Power"), Edgerton (II, 24.), speaking of Upanishadic doctrine, states: "Knowledge is the magic talisman that opens all doors. He who knows anything controls it; and so, he who knows the Supreme truth thereby becomes master of it, and gains the highest state." It might be better to say that he who knows the supreme Truth is awake to the eternally present Fact of identity with and as IT.

⁵ Otto, op. cit., p. 35. See also Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 128.

⁶ Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 248-259. Here Gilson points out that "an intellect which bears naturally on sensible things cannot naturally have God for an object." "...no created intellect can have God for natural object, for there is no natural relation between creature and God...our intellect is contingent like our existence itself." The natural human intellect is limited to a knowledge of God through His works, by means of reason and its contact with objects of sense, yet it is possible for God, through the power of His grace, to overcome this natural debility by having already implanted within the human intellect a capability for that capacity, for being "raised by God alone to the vision of God's essence." This vision, however, is in time, in the "future," and nowhere is there the identity of the Divine with God-knowledge,--for Christianity has no ātman and therefore the Supreme Identity is not included within its confines.

⁷ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 101. See also Watts, op. cit., p. 52. Cf. "This is pure mind, which is the source

may be spoken of as the self-luminous (svayamprakāśa) for it is

...that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyāve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness, without being in any way an object of consciousness.⁸

In itself inconceivable yet self-fulfilled or self-realized (avasiddha)⁹ the ātman "is the ground of every

of everything...there being no division between the Self and 'other than self'." Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 23.

⁸ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 474. See Watts, op. cit., p. 48. Sankarāchārya, Ātmabodhah, p. 187, Slokas 27-28, states that "The mind, the sense organs, and so on, are illumined by ātman alone, as a jar or pot by a lamp. But these material objects cannot illumine their own self. As a lighted lamp does not need another lamp to manifest its light, so ātman, being consciousness itself, does not need another instrument of consciousness to illumine itself." Cf. Proverbs 20.27 (Christian Bible): "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts of the belly."

Note also Chu Ch'an, Loc. cit., "This pure mind, the source of everything, shines on all with the brilliance of its own perfection, but the people of the world do not awake to it...Because their understanding is veiled by their own sight, hearing, feeling and knowledge, they do not perceive the spiritual brilliance of the original substance."

⁹ Sva-√sidh, the root meaning to "hit a mark." Christian theologians, absorbed in their concept of sin as disobedience, an offense against the majesty of God which makes the sinner the object of God's hatred, have criticized the Greek idea of sin (ἀμαρτανειν-to miss one's mark) as an act of inexpedience. (See Gilson, op. cit., pp. 353, 475n). Svasiddha as the "Self-realized" may be likened to that advaitic union (or yoga) whose essence is that effortless, even motionless "skill in action" (Gītā 2.50 yogah karmasu kauśalam), or "equilibrium" (Gītā 2.48 sanatvaṁ yoga uchyate). Furthermore, in Gītā 6.3, it is said that "for a sage who is seeking yoga, action is called the means

possibility of conceiving, of every thought, of every act of knowledge."¹⁰ Cognition in itself, whatever its object, is said to be not only immediate but self-revealed, and is identical with the knower. "Therefore it is not for the knowledge (of Brahman or the Self) that any effort is needed: it is needed only to prevent us from regarding the not-Self as the Self..."¹¹ Again, knowledge in itself is omnipresent and eternal in its identity and is, throughout, the same regardless of the modulations of its objects. It is "not revealed by an entity that lies outside it" and is, therefore, self-luminous (svayamjyoti), self-evident¹² or clear (prasāda). Absolute consciousness or chit, as svayamjyoti, is called drashtri, that is, the Seer¹³ who, as the all-comprehensive,

[kāraṇam as prāpakaṃ, the cause]; for the same sage, when he is enthroned in yoga, serenity [śamaḥ, (mental tranquility or calmness, equivalent to prasāda] is called the means [kāraṇam as lakṣhaṇam, the mark or sign]." See A. Besant and Bhagavān Dās, The Bhagavadgītā (Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House, 1950), p. 109 and 109n.

¹⁰ Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 33. See Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 50.

¹¹ A. Mahādeva Śāstrī, editor, The Bhagavadgītā with Commentary of Śrī Sankarāchārya (Madras, V. Rāmaswamy Śāstrulu & Sons, 1947), p. 488-489, commentary on Gītā 18.50. See Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 55 for a more comprehensive explanation of both the immediacy and limitations of the finite mode of consciousness.

¹² Evident < Lat. evidens, seeing clearly, clear to the eyes or mind. This, therefore, pertains to prasāda as clarity.

¹³ Rāghavendrāchār, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

is not in itself an agent of revelation although it appears to be so from the standpoint of the ajñāna and ego.¹⁴

Furthermore, advaitic knowledge, being self-luminous and not an object, is undifferentiated, unconditioned by externalities because it is devoid of externalities. Eternally and fundamentally omnipresent as the ground, as chit, it is nitya (eternally abiding), svyāñivoti (self-luminous), and akhandā (indivisible), that is, it is sat, chit, and ānanda (sachchidānanda) which is ever present in the waking, dreaming, and dreamless states (vaiśvānara, taijasa, and prājñā).¹⁵ Self-consciousness, then, is "the ultimate fact of existence" which, as the ground-light of knowledge, has the supreme power (śakti) to "dichotomise" itself into the knower and the known.¹⁶ Chhândogyanishad¹⁷ speaks of the "deathless, bodiless ātman," manifesting as the incorporate, as the Self-consciousness which is luminous in its own "highest light," the one who, "with that divine eye the mind, sees

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 28. Cf. "All (empirical) thought is vain, for you cannot use the mind to seek something from mind, nor the Buddha to seek something from the Buddha, nor the Dharma to seek something from the Dharma."--Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 29, see also p. 16.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁶ Rāṇade, op. cit., pp. 273-274. For a psychological correspondence in the process of introspection note the words of Yājñavalkya in Bṛih. 4.3.2-9.

¹⁷ 8.12. See Hume, op. cit., pp. 272-273.

desires here, and experiences enjoyment" as the all-conscious, non-separate witness. The Absolute Brahman, says Taittiriya-panishad,¹⁸ is the real (satya), it is that knowledge (jñāna) identical with Self-consciousness, and is the infinite (ananta) which is bliss (ānanda),¹⁹ and is to be realized "in the secret place [of the heart]" as well as in all poises of Infinitude.²⁰

Rāṇaḍe²¹ states that

...the Upanishadic philosophers try to establish Reality on the firm footing of Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness to them is the eternal verity. God to them is not God unless he is identical with Self-consciousness. Existence is not Existence if it does not mean Self-consciousness. Reality is not Reality, if it does not express throughout its structure the marks of pure Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thus constitutes the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic philosophers.

The pure consciousness which is Brahman and Ātman is that absolute and immediate witness-reality, that self-illuminated

¹⁸ 2.1. See Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 269.

¹⁹ See Hume, op. cit., p. 283 and 283n.

²⁰ Cf. Ait. 5. 1-3, Hume, op. cit., pp. 300-301, where all is said to be grounded, rooted and based upon that Self-consciousness (prajñāna as supreme knowledge) which is Brahman. See Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

²¹ Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 270.

clear awareness and eternally free bliss "to which all experience is present," not at a distance, but in the eternal now,²² and "all the knowledge and all the bliss of beings comes from this fountain head and are grounded in it as their ultimate cause of reality."²³

Complete knowledge of the Ātman, then, is impossible from the particular and empirical point of view, for the Self is the knower, the known and, as well, knowledge. Empirical knowledge is but suggestive and analogical, a partial and indefinite view which, though incapable of grasping or containing Reality, does not lie outside it.²⁴ Watts²⁵ states that

...the basic awareness in man, the fundamental identity and knower, is a point of view taken by that essentially infinite and omniscient consciousness which is the ultimate Reality. Consciousness in man is continuous with, and in principle identical with, the All-consciousness. So far from being a mere superstructure of the material universe, consciousness is its very ground. In our own central identity we know Reality intimately and immediately; elsewhere we see only its outer shell.

²² Rādhakrishnan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāṇa Ka-
lpataru, I:171, Jan., 1934. See also Chaudhuri, op. cit.,
p. 208; Watts, op. cit., pp. 54-55, 59.

²³ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 48. See Rādhakrishnan,
loc. cit.; F.S.C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 367; Watts, op. cit.,
p. 56.

²⁴ See Watts, op. cit., pp. 46-48; Rāṇade, op. cit.,
p. 271; Tait. 2.4; Kena 1.3; 2.3.

²⁵ Watts, op. cit., p. 87.

It is this "Eternal Subject" unknowable as object, which is realized as the Self.²⁶

Knowledge, then, may be viewed either in its particular, finite form, or as the all-comprehensive infinite. The Mundakopanishad²⁷ recognizes a higher (para) and a lower (apara) knowledge. Sanatkumāra, in his instructions to Nārada²⁸ distinguishes between immediate metaphysical insight and the thinking of logic which, as "book learning," is called "mere name (nāmena)," regardless of the high esteem with which it must be held. In contrast to "mere discursive ratio (tarka) or reflection...the 'ordinary mode of thinking' (vyavahāra)" there is that "samva-darśanam...the intuitus mysticus, the 'real thinking' (satya-drishti)"²⁹ spoken of by Sankarāchārya:³⁰

Loud speech (...dabbling in mere terminology) consisting of a shower of words, the skill in expounding scriptures, and likewise erudition,--these merely bring on a little

²⁶ Rānade, op. cit., pp. 271-272; Svet. 3.19; Brih. 2.4.14; 3.4.2; 3.7.23.

²⁷ 1.1.4-5. See Rānade, op. cit., p. 326.

²⁸ Chhānd. 7. 1. 2-5; Rānade, op. cit., p. 327; Hume, op. cit., pp. 250-251.

²⁹ Otto, op. cit., p. 221. Here Otto also states the view of Fichte that "pure thinking is in itself divine existence and vice versa, divine thinking in its immediacy is nothing other than pure thought (chinnātra)."

³⁰ Sankarāchāra, Vivekachudāmaṇi, pp. 24-25, śloka 58-59.

personal enjoyment to the scholar but are no good for liberation. The study of the scriptures is useless as long as the highest Truth is unknown, and it is equally useless when the highest Truth has already been known.

The pragmatic need for grace. The view of advaitavāda that Brahmajñāna is eternal Self-consciousness "and that the seeking of divine grace is a concession to the theological faith of the phenomenal ego caught up in the sphere of causality..."³¹ does not make the personal god, the source of such grace, a mere "creation...of the human mind." The Bhagavān "is as real as the universe [even though] in the end both the worshipper and the personal god merge in the Absolute." Yet for one still controlled by māyā it may be that "the approach to Impersonal Reality lies through the Personal God" and those symbolic effects or "external supports" which are sought for "protection, guidance, and grace."³² Thus bhakti, as a purifying and "auxiliary means," "qualifies the aspirant for devotion to knowledge which culminates in moksha"³³ for, as the Gīta³⁴ states:

³¹ Srinivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 369. See also p. 468.

³² Sankarāchārya, Ātmabodha, Nikhilānanda Introduction, pp. 50-51, also p. xiv. Cf. Sankarāchārya, Vivekachūḍāmaṇi, p. 12, śl. 31, "Among things conducive to liberation, devotion (bhakti) alone holds supreme place. The seeking after one's real nature is designated as devotion."

³³ A. M. Sāstrī, Bhagavadgītā with Commentary of Śrī Sankarāchārya, p. 450. See Edgerton, op. cit., II, 71-72; Svet. 6.21, 23.

³⁴ 18.55. Cf. 11.54.

By devotion one comes to know Me, what my measure is and what I am in very truth; Then, knowing me in very truth, he straightway enters into Me.

Sankara was the author of many inspiring and devotional theistic hymns to the Divine Mother, Siva, and Vishnu,--and the very writing of these hymns has been described as an act of grace and compassion (guruprasāda) which, through compassionate identity with the needs of the worshipper, prays "to the Lord for grace to attain liberation from the many miseries of earthly life."³⁵ Throughout these hymns, however, the advaitic ground of all relativity and the aspiration for freedom from ignorance are subtly stressed, and through the musical symbols of poetic name and form shines the radiance of pure consciousness wherein "The devotee catches a glimpse of the Absolute through the form of the Personal God, which is the highest manifestation of the Infinite that the finite mind can comprehend in the relation of love."³⁶

Similarly, it may be said that the revelations of śruti are not derived from "any external message delivered to man from without" but proceed from "a divine afflatus springing from within,"³⁷ a projection of Self, as it were,

³⁵ Sankarāchārya, Ātmabodhah, Nikhilānanda preface, p.xiv. In the same work, p. 268, cf. the Hymn to Siva (Vedasāradivastotram), "...be gracious unto us, O Lord." (...prasāda prasāda prabho pūrnarūpa).

³⁶ Ibid., p. xv.

³⁷ Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., pp. 9, 11.

through the symbol-words of the Vedas³⁸ and the antahkarana of the Seer who "serves merely as an occasion for the creative activity" of the divine.³⁹ This creative activity, this projection-power (śakti) of the pure consciousness through the tranquilized clarity of the antahkarana (dhātu prasāda) may also be viewed, integrally, as the immediate intuition, Self-remembrance or smṛiti which, though not identical with realization, is said to lead toward it.⁴⁰

The Svetāśvataropaniṣad speaks of the divine Self-power (ātma-śakti) hidden in and ruling over the gunas⁴¹ as the great Lord (maheśvara) pervading the whole world "with beings that are parts of Him."⁴² As such, Patanjali recognizes a discipline alternate to the yoga based upon Sāṅkhya doctrine, and somewhat opposed to it in this respect, wherein the difficulty of "Prakṛiti...able to adjust its activities

³⁸ Just as "in religious language this process of exterior projection is called the operation of the Holy Spirit, who inspires (breathes from within) man with divine revelation."--Watts, op. cit., p. 134. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 144; Otto, op. cit., p. 5.

³⁹ Rāṇade, op. cit., p. 11. Rāṇade continues, "Thus the sage Svetāśvatara said that the Upaniṣad which was named after him, was revealed to him through the power of his penance [tapas] and the grace of God [devaprasāda]." See Svet. 6.21; Rāṇade, p. 66.

⁴⁰ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., pp. 155, 11.

⁴¹ 1.3, Hume, op. cit., p. 394.

⁴² 4.10, Ibid., p. 404.

differently to meet the needs of different Purushas; [an adjustment]...inexplicable without a mental or spiritual factor capable of exercising choice,"⁴³ is resolved by this "hidden" Ātma-śakti as maheśvara, the controller or Lord of Māyā (māyin), willing the operations of non-separate Prakṛiti and revealing himself through its purified modifications. This "shining through" of the pure consciousness (chit), inasmuch as it is stamped with the name of a personal Lord, is apt to be considered as an act of grace, a gift of divine mercy. We read in the Gītā, "To these, ever harmonious [satatayuktānām], worshipping in love, I give the yoga of discrimination [buddhiyogam] by which they come to Me."⁴⁴ Within the general framework of traditional metaphysical expression, however, the motif of a grace indivisible from a non-external Maheśvara is entirely compatible with that clear awareness (prasāda) of pure consciousness indivisible from the advaitic Brahman-Ātman. Thus the sādhana, although quite different from realization, is a movement integral within it, and jñāna-yoga, while not jñāna itself, is no wise in dualistic opposition to the ever-abiding light of pure consciousness

⁴³ Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

⁴⁴ 10.10. See Edgerton, op. cit., II, 72.

eternally present as the ground of all modifications.⁴⁵ The dawning of Self-realization appears to effect a harmonious reaction within the indefinite realm of the jīva who, according to the law of his own being is attracted to jñāna-mārga, first exhibits a clarity of discrimination "between abiding and evanescent entities" which checks attachment to the indefinite and promotes that calm and tranquil detachment (vairāgya) leading to equanimity and clarity of mind (prasāda).⁴⁶ Through the purification of vairāgya and its attendant renunciatory discipline, the proper clarifying processes of śravaṇa (study), manana (reflection) and dhyāna (meditation) are possible.⁴⁷ Sādhana and spiritual exercises in and of themselves as 'works' or karma, according to integral metaphysic, properly can not be viewed as levers which the jīva uses to force, to pry open the gateway to liberation. As automatic guarantors of enlightenment, as psycho-physical formulae invariably and mathematically providing the correct answer to the spiritual problem, they form the basis of occult idolatry and superstition

⁴⁵ See S. Rādhakṛiṣṇan, The Bhagavadgītā (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), p. 54.

⁴⁶ See Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 68-69. To the theist this might be called, analogically, the "grace" which permits and gives the power to have right discrimination.

⁴⁷ Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 171-172, also p. 26. See Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 69. This, too, could be viewed analogically and theistically as the grace of purification and clarification (prasāda).

both in the East and the West. As resultant preparatory movements or aids which tend to purify and make clear the internal organ or "temperament" (antahkarana) of the ijva, and which proceed, not from the ego as such, but from the power of the eternally present and Self-luminous âtman, they are inseparable from that supreme power.⁴⁸ The infinite Reality concealed in the gunas⁴⁹ oftentimes is hidden by the rigid form of symbol, practice and rite. As long as these are prostituted for themselves, as long as they are made obscure, dark, and occult through their ego-identification the light of the Self does not penetrate them. It is only when they are moved by the power of divine consciousness rather than by ego desire, when the turbidity of their name and form is removed by that transcendence which is "beyond the symbol," that they have a clarifying effect (prasâda) upon the modifications of the ego-mind and give free and unobstructed passage, as it were, to the light of the Spirit, the master of mâya, the Will which alone is Self-realization.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ See Huxley, op. cit., pp. 274-275. Thus, in yoga, karunâ, as "a kindly feeling for suffering" is a part of niyama and therefore an initial purification practice. See Dâs Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 270.

⁴⁹ Svet. 1.3.

⁵⁰ Huxley, op. cit., p. 283, quotes Eckhart as saying that "He who seeks God under settled form lays hold of the form, while missing the God concealed in it." See also Kapâli Sâstry, op. cit., p. 11; Sankarâchârya, Âtmabodhah, Nikhilânanda preface, p. xiii.

From the viewpoint of Christian theism, as an analogical interpretation of metaphysic, the light of spiritual knowledge is a free and unearned gift dependent upon the grace of an exterior unique Being who bestows it upon His creatures.⁵¹ Works and practices (here usually conceived as exclusively within the moral order) in themselves, that is, as they are in unaided nature,^{are} unable to establish "even so much as an equitable claim to supernatural grace."⁵² Thus man cannot of himself, and by any act of positive preparation or disposition, be the power which compels God to bestow supernatural grace.⁵³ Man's actions must be of a preparatory nature only, and negative inasmuch as they are not compulsive but may tend to remove obstacles and turbidity.⁵⁴ This passivity permits an infusion of supernatural grace which comes from God alone⁵⁵ and which alone provides the necessary conditions for salutary works and their eternal

⁵¹ Joseph Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1917), pp. 131-132, 135.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 139, 142. Note the apparent natural inclination of Christian theology to utilize legal terminology.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 143.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 147.

⁵⁵ Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 13-14.

recompense.⁵⁶ Natural good works, then, are meritless. Salutory good works, being supernatural, become entirely rooted in divine grace, and are deserving of recompense and reward "from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ..."⁵⁷

In advaitavāda, however, the jivanmukti, the Self-realized one, may engage in works, but with no thought of merit, spiritual gain, or results. Eternally at one with Supreme Knowledge which is peace (śānti) he is actionless even when appearing to be active.⁵⁸ This all-embracing īśāna transcends yet does not deny ethical and moral goodness, and even the salutary acts of Christian theism, in the experience of advaitavāda, are but karmic works which are within the exclusive province of the particular, the ego,--within the realm of duality.⁵⁹

Ajñāna and avidyā. Advaitavāda recognizes that empirical experience is initiated by and revolves about an exclusive identification of the Self "with the body, the senses, or the objects of the senses," a necessary prerequisite for all cognitive acts of a "phenomenal knower or

⁵⁶ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 400-401.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 401.

⁵⁸ Sankarāchārya, Ātmabodha, p. xiii.

⁵⁹ See Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 94.

perceiver."⁶⁰ The nature of the Self is one of essential freedom or mukti and its "sense of bondage," this exclusive identification with the indefinite particular, "alone is mithyā" or the illusion of appearance. Knowledge (jñāna) is freedom (mukti), and ignorance (ajñāna) is "not freedom" or the "sense of bondage" which, when removed or cleared by knowledge, destroys the illusion of appearance and permits the full realization of the eternally present akhaṇḍa Brahman, the integral (pūrṇa) supreme consciousness.⁶¹ Ajñāna, or metaphysical ignorance, as māyā, is said to modify, veil, or condition consciousness (chit) and is the proximate material cause of the world of appearances.⁶² In the form of avidyā it gives rise to the internal organ, the antahkarana or "the abode of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term." Chit, or the pure consciousness which is Brahman-ātman, when conditioned by the antahkarana is the individual jīva.⁶³ Thus the jīva has chit as its essence, unknown because conditioned by an antahkarana filled with the turbidity of avidyā. With the clarification of this turbidity the pure light of Self-

⁶⁰ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 435.

⁶¹ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 20.

⁶² Īśvara, then, is the material and efficient cause. See Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 183.

⁶³ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 19.

luminous chit may be revealed. Desire, also a product of avidyā, is the root of all obscuration or turbidity.⁶⁴ Desire and acquisition for the purpose of furthering desire does much to determine and color man's thoughts and actions in the world of phenomena, and also make for the symbolism and objective content of "revelation" (arthārthisaṁbandha). The cessation or clarification of these desires arising from and in identity with avidyā are inseparable from any integral realization of Self, or ātmaavidyā.⁶⁵

The man of Christian theology, in common with all that has been created, has no identity with true and unique Being which is God. All that is created is contingent and "relegated to the inferior status of a quasi-unreality."⁶⁶ Restricted to the dual union of ego (soul) and body, living man thus is limited in this concept to being a creature in and of the "quasi-unreality,"⁶⁷ an ego-creation made to the image and likeness of the Master and owner of all of His Creatures. Therein lies man's only glory, which carries with it the freedom to hold dominion over nature, not in his own

⁶⁴ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 183, compares this desire to the Buddhist vāsanās which are "root desires which want to create a field in which they may be fulfilled."

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 183-184.

⁶⁶ Gilson, op. cit., p. 64.

⁶⁷ The indefinite which is māyā.

right, but by virtue of the power delegated and given him as the adopted son of God.⁶⁸ This constitutes the basic vidvā of Christian man while on earth, a fundamental relation, however, which does not permit even the posthumous Beatific Vision to approach the Supreme Identity of metaphysic,-- and quite properly so, for the Christian soul or ego at all times remains in bondage and in history, either mundane, celestial, or demonic, and never having transcended māya, has not experienced the supreme freedom (mukti) of identity-consciousness. Christian avidyā, on the other hand, is conceived as man's ignorance of his proper creature-nature. He, the ego-soul, by forgetting his true "humble estate...aspires to set himself among the angels, and even to usurp the place of God," thus losing the glory of the divine likeness and thereby "lowering himself to the level of the brutes..."⁶⁹ Thus, Christianity would characterize the mahāvākya Tat Tvam Asi as the apex of ignorance, of the ego aspiring to "usurp the place of God," because the ego is the highest principle natural to Christian man, and the ātman is unknown and unknowable to religious theology of and by itself.

⁶⁸ Gilson, op. cit., p. 216.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 216-217.

The antahkarana. The antahkarana or "internal organ" is a complex or "whirlpool"⁷⁰ composed of all ordinary mental activity or vritti knowledge⁷¹ and may be viewed as the discriminating intellect (buddhi), the conceptual, analytical and questioning mind (manas), the ego-consciousness (ahaṁkāra), and the conscious capacity for retentive observation (chitta).

The notion of egoity (ahaṁkāra), "the most important action of...aīḥāna as obstructing the pure chit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon," is in itself composed of two parts, "one real and the other unreal," for it is a

...union of the true self, the pure consciousness, and other associations such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and associations.⁷²

The "Real" is That which is called ātman or the true Self; the "unreal" is the ego or īva in its most limited sense.

This same antahkarana which is a particular and beginningless modification of aīḥāna, "is called manas in its capacity as doubt, buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and chitta in its capacity as

⁷⁰ Vritti, from √vrit, -turn or roll, like a wheel. Cf. the wheel of saṁsāra.

⁷¹ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., pp. 19, 25, 249.

⁷² Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 458-459.

remembering."⁷³ Similarly Dāsgupta⁷⁴ describes this vritti-complex from the nodal-point of manas:

It is by the activity of manas that the subject-object-less pure consciousness assumes the form of a self-conscious ego.... It is the synthetic function of manas that is called the functioning of the volitional senses by which all actions are performed, and it is for this reason that karma is nothing but manas.⁷⁵ The terms manas, kalpanā, saṁsṛiti, vāsanā, vidyā, pravatna, smṛiti, indriya, prakṛiti, māyā, and kriyā are only different names; in reality, however, they signify the same concept, namely the active functioning of manas or chitta.... They do not mean different entities but only different moments, stages, or aspects.... Brahman is higher than the state of manas. It is by becoming manas that Brahman transforms itself into a thought activity and thus produces the seeming changeful appearances.

Thus the non-dual and eternally present Brahman has no need of an intermediary outside of Itself. For the knowledge of Truth which dispels the binding ignorance of world-appearance, "No intermediate link is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or manas.... This illusory perception of world-appearance is...destroyed by a true knowledge of the reality, the Brahman."⁷⁶

⁷³ Ibid., I, 460-471, 472n. See Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 158.

⁷⁴ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, pp. 157-158.

⁷⁵ Cf. this with the Buddhist view of the identity of ego-sense with karma.

⁷⁶ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 441-442.

The Buddhi. Inasmuch as Christian theology, with its concept of man limited to the ego-soul or jīva, recognizes the utter inability of man to raise himself to the blessed vision of the divine but eternally different and separate "Other," it quite properly looks upon Christian man's salvation as a divine miracle, as an intervention from outside which bestows or infuses supernatural grace. Not only does this grace raise man to justification and the beatific vision, it also bestows that faith which inclines him to accept the prevenient grace offered by his Creator.⁷⁷ Advaitavāda's own expression of the metaphysical view, grounded upon the Supreme Identity, that experience from which emerged the maṇāvākya Tat Tvam Asi, in its philosophy as distinct yet non-separate from spiritual experience, must answer the theistic question which asks--"By what faculty is it that a mystic is able to realize God?"⁷⁸ The very wording of and occasion for this question is purely from the ego view, and implies that man, the unrealized jīva can realize the Supreme Reality, that he is able, somehow, to become aware of the Supreme Identity, the unreal realizing the Real. Put in another way this question asks,--By what faculty is it that the

⁷⁷ See Pohle, op. cit., pp. 36-37, 82, 85, 91-93, 96-99, 104-106, 110-113.

⁷⁸ Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 339.

ego can obliterate itself, as a separate appearance-entity, that is, how can it commit suicide?, an act quite beyond the natural and normal desire of the exclusive ego in its drive toward an expansion or projection of its life-form, its Eros-drive to "realize God."⁷⁹ Metaphysically the question should be reversed into an inquiry concerning the processes, if any, which occur within the jīva when the Self awakens from its Self-abandonment to finitude, when it resolves its willed dichotomy through the clear awareness of the nature of that finitude, and simultaneously and at once realizes the Supreme Identity of âtman and Brahman. Based upon the Fact of such experience philosophy may then attempt to express in meager words the "manner" by which the eternal light of the Self-luminous pure consciousness breaks through the avidyâ-veil of turbidity, revealing all, in its brilliance, as That-consciousness-bliss which eternally Is.

Man appears to possess multitudinous organs of action, faculties which permit him conditionally to adjust to the incessant and momentary modifications of his "external" and "internal" environment. It is but natural to suppose that

⁷⁹ The Eros drive, being in the samsâric realm of duality, is at the same time inseparable from its opposing alter ego, that of Thanatos, the drive toward "death." The clash between the ego's mutability as "appearance" and its desire for immutable perfection and perpetuation is inherent within all samsâric "pairs of opposites."

the organ of action pertaining to his particular state of consciousness, the internal organ or antahkarana which through association with pure chit "is called a jiva,"⁸⁰ could by its basic harmonic integrality with that pure consciousness serve as the "mirror" or "clear window," as it were, for the influx of the darkness-dispelling light of Realization. Philosophic enquiry might then ask,--"Is it Sense, or is it Thought, or is it any supersensuous and super-intellectual faculty of Intuition..."⁸¹ through which the Self illumines the self? The Kathopanishad⁸² states that the Supreme may not be apprehended by any particular faculty of sense or thought, for it can not be comprehended except by the given fact, both unquestionable and certain, that It is. The Kathopanishad also has mentioned⁸³ that the hidden and indwelling Self "is not patent to the eyes of all," that is to the individual and particular egos, but only to the "subtle Seers who can look with the one-pointed and piercing faculty of intuition (buddhi)" is the Supreme Identity, the clear awareness of Self, realizable, for it is the purified clear buddhi, the "subtle Seer," the subtle knower,

⁸⁰ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 460.

⁸¹ Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 339.

⁸² 6.9, 12-13. See Svet. 3.13; 4.17, 20; also Kena 3; Mund. 3.1.8.

⁸³ 3.12. See Rāṇaḍe, op. cit., p. 340.

which, through identity consciousness, is open to the free "flow" of the non-separate and Self-luminous Self-knowledge. The Gītā⁸⁴ points out that when the mind is quieted and at rest in That which is the Self, "seeing Self by Self,"⁸⁵ there is an awareness of that "Supreme delight" or "most final joy"⁸⁶ which the buddhi "can grasp beyond the senses,"⁸⁷ yet the Gītā already clearly has stated⁸⁸ that the Supreme is beyond even the buddhi. Rāṇade⁸⁹ recognizes the impossibility of any accurate description of the nature of a "faculty of God-realization," of an ego-power capable of realizing the Divine as distinct from that clarity of buddhi (or by whatever name it may be labeled) which opens, or becomes void, to the brilliance of the Self-luminous ātman. For the purpose of explanation to the ego, then, Rāṇade states⁹⁰ that "it may become serviceable psychologically to 'invent' a term, to call it either Buddhi or Intuition, and

⁸⁴ 6.20-21.

⁸⁵ ātmanātmānam paśyan. Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 117.

⁸⁶ sukhamātyantikam

⁸⁷ buddhigrāhyamatīndriyam. Besant and Dās, loc. cit.

⁸⁸ 3.42-43.

⁸⁹ Rāṇade, op. cit., pp. 340-341.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 341.

then to make it responsible for the vision of God." Self-realization, however, needs no responsible faculty other than its own Self-luminosity which, as chit, illumines the clarified buddhi, the antahkarana devoid of ignorance-turbidity, emptied of exclusive ego-particularization, the purified inner organ spoken of in Kathopanishad as dhātuprasāda.⁹¹

The buddhi in Sāṃkhya so "resembles puruṣa in transparency" that, as the result of the mirroring of chit upon the buddhi and the consequent buddhic superimposition upon and attachment to puruṣa,

...the puruṣa cannot realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own...and as a result of this non-distinction the puruṣa becomes bound down to the buddhi....This non-distinction of puruṣa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant by avidyā...in Sāṃkhya....⁹²

Yoga philosophy extends this non-distinction still further through the identification of the buddhi with and as the Self, and "This is the avidyā of yoga."⁹³

This buddhi which is thus bound up with avidyā also may be viewed as an integral part of the advaitic process

⁹¹ Kaṭha. 2.20. See Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., p. 8n, where Śaṅkarācārya is cited as equating dhātuprasāda with sattva-buddhi. See also Rāṇade, loc. cit.

⁹² Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 260.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 261.

of Self-realization. Buddhi or Mahat is, here, "the pure intellect, transcendent relatively to the individual; here we are already situated in manifestation but we still remain in the universal order" as the intermediate "expression of the Personality in manifestation...."⁹⁴ Thus buddhi may be viewed as a common bond, as it were, between the particular and the universal orders, "linking" together, in a way, the "multiple manifested states" of being and relating them to the supreme âtmanic ground.⁹⁵ Guénon,⁹⁶ quoting from the Matsya-Purâna, states that buddhi, analogous to the Alexandrian Logos,

In the universal order...is the Divinity (Īśvara, not in Himself, but under His three principle aspects of Brahmâ, Vishnu and Śiva, constituting the Trimūrti, or 'triple manifestation'); but regarded distributively (under the aspect of 'separativity,' which is, moreover, purely contingent) it belongs (without however being itself individualized) to individual beings (to whom it communicates the possibility of participating in the divine attributes, that is to say, in the very nature of Universal Being, the Principle of all existence).

In the vortex of waking consciousness the Self is identified with myriad illusory things and is led to an egoic separate-

⁹⁴ Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, p. 256. Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedânta, pp. 65-66, 68.

⁹⁵ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedânta, p. 145. See Chhând. 8.6.5-6.

⁹⁶ Guénon, op. cit., p. 67.

ness. In the serenity of dreamless sleep (samprāsāda) however, contact with such phenomena is eliminated and there is a partial realization of the true nature.⁹⁷ In such a state

...the intelligible light is seized directly, that is to say, by intellectual intuition and no longer by reflection through the mental faculty (manas) as occurs in the individual states....In this respect therefore buddhi must be in the state of Prāṇa, which thus will comprise everything which is beyond individual existence.⁹⁸

Buddhi, therefore, seems to have both a lower and a higher advaitic aspect, the one pertaining to man's discriminative faculty and the other to that which inclusively is more than man, the atimānava, and the ātmanic intellect, the vedic Satyam Ritam Vrihat.⁹⁹ Ordinary men are awake in the lower, limited buddhi which is not entirely devoid of the duality of attraction and repulsion (rāga-dvesha), and they are asleep in the higher buddhi-ānanda.¹⁰⁰ It is this all-embracing, advaitic Fact-experience associated with the name buddhi which is identified with Krishna, the Supreme Personality (Puru-

⁹⁷ Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 438. See also Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 29.

⁹⁸ Guénon, op. cit., p. 107.

⁹⁹ Cf. Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 10, 16, 158-159. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 167n, speaks of the trikāya as related to bodhi, in this case the enlightened intellect of a Buddha, in a triple rather than a dual manner:--"The first body is Transcendental Bodhi; the second Reflected Bodhi; and the third Practical Bodhi."

¹⁰⁰ Aurobindo, The Yoga and Its Object (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1949), pp. 9, 21. See Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 19.

shottama) in the Gītā,¹⁰¹ and as mahat is equated with prāñña and "īśvara in Himself..."¹⁰² Furthermore, as there is an identity between the knower, the known, and knowledge,—and the "inwardness" of īśvara in Himself, independent of manifestation, is That Brahman which is ātman, Guénon¹⁰³ states:

Thus, apart from the special viewpoint of manifestation and of the various conditioned states which depend upon it within that manifestation, the intellect is not different from ātma, since the latter must be considered as 'knowing itself by itself,' for there is then no longer any reality which is really distinct from it, everything being comprised within its own possibilities; and it is in that 'Knowledge of the Self' that Beatitude strictly speaking resides.

Such a view appears to approach the identity of buddhi and Self which constituted yogic avidyā,¹⁰⁴ yet it differs inasmuch as the separation between buddhi and purusha is abolished by a higher synthesis, through a higher buddhi as it were, which may be thought of as a ray, undivided and non-separate from ātman, the Self-luminous chit, a "ray which determines the formation of the image and at the same time unites it with its luminous source."¹⁰⁵

101 7.10. buddhir buddhimatām asmi.

102 Guénon, op. cit., p. 108.

103 Loc. cit.

104 Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 261.

105 Guénon, op. cit., pp 67-68.

The Christian analogy, conditioned by a philosophy based upon the peculiar Christian concept of creation, is that of a multiplicity of ideas which "are in God as the forms to the likeness of which all things were made," ideas which do not exist outside of God and are therefore identical with Him. These ideas, as models and causes of multiple creation, are not, however, a way of realization whereby God knows Himself.¹⁰⁶ They form the basis of Christian providence and, as divine knowledge which lies at the root of creative action, thus are directed toward individuality and separate, contingent existence.¹⁰⁷

The view of a lower and higher buddhi, integral to and non-separate from the supreme and all-embracing consciousness, may be compared with the analogous, but always ontologically separate, Christian concept of natural reason and the endowed intellect. Natural reason, always subject to "divine illumination," the "prescriptions of revelation or the hidden actions of grace" directing it toward a supernatural end "becomes legislative in matters of morals only in so far as it is 'informed' by the divine law at each of its degrees (i.e. by natural information, by sacred doctrine, or by infusion)."¹⁰⁸ According to St. Thomas God, by

¹⁰⁶ Gilson, op. cit., p. 157.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 158, 160.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 329. See also Maritain, op. cit., p. 1.

infusing His grace into the "very efficacy of causality... has created an intellect which lacks nothing that it needs, and in particular lacks nothing needed for its proper function, namely, to know the Truth."¹⁰⁹ This active intellect, endowed with a "natural light...in an analogical order and by way of participation,"¹¹⁰ has the ability "on contact with sensible experience, of generating first principles and (with their aid)...it will gradually build up the system of sciences;" but this ability to generate truths is possible "only because it is itself a participation of Truth."¹¹¹ This intellect functions, then, as a builder of "sciences," of theoretic constructs rather than being in itself the supra-logical Fact of integral experience. In the Thomistic concept, then, the divine ideas are attained "through the agency of an intellect which is itself a participated likeness of the uncreated light in which dwell the ideas."¹¹² Metaphysically, the buddhi is not limited solely to a participated likeness, to the "intelligence supernaturalized by

¹⁰⁹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 141.

¹¹⁰ Cf. the Self-luminous pure chit which, however, is not a participative analogy but is, rather, in identity with the Self of man which is Brahman.

¹¹¹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 140.

the light of glory,"¹¹³ for the name pertains also to that nameless glory, to the "uncreated light" Itself.

Objective knowledge. From the metaphysical point of view the religious "intellectual love of God" is limited to the analytical ego-consciousness and its hunger-urge toward That which yet is veiled.¹¹⁴ Metaphysic also recognizes, however, that "all consciousness comes from the one Consciousness. Knowledge is one aspect of the Divine Consciousness,"¹¹⁵ and even avidyā is based upon the ground of chit.¹¹⁶

Objective knowledge, inasmuch as it is within the bounds of māyā, is founded upon some degree of measurement or comparison (pramā,--as measure, scale standard), and therefore is experienced, revealed as it were, by means of pramānas as the "proximate cause of right knowledge."¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Maritain, op. cit., p. 8n.

¹¹⁴ Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, (Bombay: Sri Aurobindo Circle, 1949), II, 96.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., (1951), IV, 85.

¹¹⁶ Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 457.

¹¹⁷ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 35, also p. 19. C.V. Sankar Rau, A Glossary of Philosophical Terms (Madras, 1941), p. 56n, Notes:

"The Chārvākas admitted Pratyakṣa [immediate, clear, direct perception] only as a source of knowledge; the Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas added one more viz., Anumāna (inference); the Sāṃkhyas a third, viz., Śabda [verbal authority, śāstra, āgama]; the Naiyāyikas a fourth, viz., Upamā (analogy); the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas a fifth, Arthāpatti [circumstantial inference, implication, postulation, presumption]; the Bhāttas a sixth, Anupalabdhi [non-apprehension or non-perception]..."

It is said that "These pramāṇas not only reveal the objects of the world; but also point to the fact that chit is the basis of the world."¹¹⁸ The immediate and clear perception (pratyaksha) of objectivity "is that which gives rise to a vritti [modification or activity] which manifests chit," and the activity of this pramāṇa presupposes the egoic "I" as subject, the object, and the internal organ or antahkarana which is "the abode of all vritti-knowledge excluding avidya-vritti."¹¹⁹ Metaphysically, life-manifestation is never apart from chit or pure consciousness, the "one who eternally becomes the many, the many who in their apparent division are still eternally one..."¹²⁰

The inseparable modes of revelation. Saṁsāric man does not question the subjective, immediate, and intuitive identity-knowledge of his existence, of "isness." Metaphysical knowledge, knowledge of the Supreme Reality, equally is

¹¹⁸ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 19.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 35.

¹²⁰ Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā (New York: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1950), p. 478. See also Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 115. Zen expresses this simple advaitic Fact, known in and as its own light, but obscured by rational mentation, in the following lines: "That which is before you is it in all its entirety and with nothing whatsoever lacking." (Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 23.) "It is the substance that you see before you--begin to reason about it and you at once fall into error." (Ibid., p. 16.) "A single thought and you separate yourself from reality." (Ibid., p. 29.)

"irreducible and certain" inasmuch as

in principle the two are the same, all knowledge being a participation in the infinite knowledge, but...for purpose of 'generating' the finite world the ultimate Reality has, as it were, the power of restricting its own knowledge, of becoming finite.¹²¹

Furthermore, there is a certain non-separate continuity between the poles of "sense perception and the vision of the real," not in the sense of logical succession culminating in the demonstration of rational proof, but as the harmonic, tranquil and clear adjustment of finite mental modifications to That pure consciousness, their inseparable ground which "reveals itself in and to them."¹²² Sense perception, then, reveals and carries with it more than the manifold differentiations of spacio-temporal sense data, differentiations which in themselves are dependent, as waves are to the ocean, upon the immediate and indeterminate Reality of pure consciousness or chit.¹²³

¹²¹ Watts, op. cit., p. 49; see also p. 43. Cf. Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa, pp. 35n, 36n, 309, where both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, as inseparable polarities, are grounded upon and undivided from the "Voidness of the supra-mundane mind."

¹²² Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 51.

¹²³ F.S.C. Northrop, "Eastern and Western Philosophy," Rādhakrishnan Comparative Studies in Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 372. Cf. the view of Eckhart as given by Otto, op. cit., p. 65, "Conceptual knowledge means now to grasp and to have in one's self the spiritual essence

The ultimate changeless Reality, that pure consciousness (chit) which is identical with pure and absolute existence-bliss, "is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of the revelation¹²⁴ found in all our conscious states," that is, identical with revelation as the self-evident and unique Fact-in-itself, apart from any memory-fruits or contents,-- of revelation, the timeless That which is the changeless, "absolute, ubiquitous, and homogeneous...consciousness of Self-shining Self." This "principle of revelation, which is called Self or âtman or Brahman" is the Real as distinct from the world-appearance of avidyâ, the indefinite which

of things. They are now in me. As I lay hold of them in idea, spiritualizing them from sense-perception, unifying them out of multiplicity, I lead them in myself to be one in Unity, and lead them back again to the oneness from which they have fallen away in their sensual-space-time separation. And in so doing that I lead them back again into God."

Cf. also Carl G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality (New York; Farrar and Reinhart, Inc., 1939), p. 83, "Thought was an object of inner perception, not intellection only, but sensed as a manifestation--seen or heard, so to speak. Thought was essentially revelation, not something invented, but something forced upon us or bringing conviction through its immediate actuality. Thoughts antedate the primitive ego-consciousness, and the latter is the object of thought, rather than its subject..."

¹²⁴ Cf. J. Saly, Eur-Aryan Roots (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1897), p. 78 where, from Skt. √vas and Lat. √ves, the Lat. derivatives include revelare, to draw back the cover, and revelatio,--a drawing back of the veil.

is mâyâ,¹²⁵ and to that Self-shining Reality "everything else has to be related in order to be known."¹²⁶

The vrittis and objective knowledge. Underlying the movements or modifications (vritti) of the inner organ (antahkarana) is the all-embracing ground of pure chit. Obscuring the clear light of this pure consciousness are the "diversified objects of the world..., transformations of the principle of ajñāna [ignorance] which is neither real nor unreal." Thus ajñāna both "creates" the multiform appearance (vikshepa) and casts a veil over it (āvarana).¹²⁷

The one ajñāna appears to obstruct pure consciousness in a variety of individual modes or actions, the chief of which is the notion of ego, or ahamkāra. These obstructive states (tulājñāna or avasthājñāna) are removable by any "state of consciousness (vritti-jñāna)...[which] reveals itself

¹²⁵ Revelation, then, is not to be limited nor confused with any exclusive, particular, individualized "message" supposedly given to a chosen mystical or religious leader, nor is it solely to be identified with any particular scripture or book.

¹²⁶ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, pp. 165-169. That is, "everything else," while existent in mâyâ and therefore relative and indefinite, must be accepted pragmatically until contradicted through an ultimate relation with Reality which, being "at once in and beyond...all relations and characters," alone sheds light upon the true nature of the world-appearance, including the ego. (see p. 169). Cf. Bṛih. 2.4.5; 3.7.1-10; 4.5.6.; 5.1; Chhāṇḍ. 6.1.1-7.

¹²⁷ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 472.

as the knowledge of an object,"¹²⁸ for "the real as underlying these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the antahkarana, and the light of the real shines forth through these states," rendering them "conscious by coming into relation with revelation."¹²⁹ Not only is this all-embracing transcendent chit the underlying ground of all subjective and objective phenomena and entities, it is at once their "ultimate essence and reality," inseparable from that revelation¹³⁰ which, from the ego-view, appears as a gracious gift (prasāda) yet identical, from the vision of integrality, with clarity (prasāda) of awareness.

In Indian psychology ordinary objective perception takes place when the inner organ or antahkarana, in itself not limited to an exclusive abode in the physical body, extends itself from that body (śarīramadhyāt) and, upon conscious contact with the object, takes on, as it were, the same or corresponding form, that is, it becomes a modification or state (vyitti), "and as soon as this transformation takes place the ever-present chit which is always steadily shining illuminates" the object; for the ignorance (ajñāna)

¹²⁸ Ibid., I, 458.

¹²⁹ Ibid., I, 460-461; Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, pp. 168-169.

¹³⁰ Dāsgupta, Indian Idealism, pp. 182-183.

relative to and veiling that object is removed. Thus the perception or appearance of an object is but the "self-shining of the chit through a vritti of a form resembling an object of knowledge." There is, then, a momentary, partial "breaking of the veil over specific ajñāna forms so that there is a temporary union of the chit as underlying the subject and the object through the broken veil,"--yet the seeming "inner and outer" chit are at once identical.¹³¹ It is this non-dual "consciousness manifested through the vrittis alone [which] has the power of removing the ajñāna veiling the chit."¹³² Vrittis, and only vrittis, then, remove the veil cast by ajñāna, or ignorance, over the ever-shining chit,--for by becoming clear, that is, by becoming void of all that restricts their perfect correspondence to the object, the light of chit which is the ultimate reality or ground (adhishṭhāna) of that object shines forth in clear immediacy.¹³³

¹³¹ Dāśgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 472-473, 480-482. From a relative point of view there appears to be three forms of consciousness involved, that is, (1) that consciousness which is the ground of all objective phenomena, (2) consciousness as the ground of the jīva or the pramātā, the truth-perceiving individual, and (3) that consciousness which is reflected in the antahkarana-vritti. The union of these three constitutes perception,--yet they are not three but the one pure consciousness or chit. (See p. 482, also pp. 450, 457.)

¹³² Ibid., I, 481.

¹³³ Ibid., I, 448-450, 452.

In the limited field of religious theology and dogma constituting the exclusive and analogical ego-view, the Vatican Council proclaimed as an article of faith that by the natural power and light of human reason man is capable of achieving a knowledge of God through the consideration of created things.¹³⁴ There is, then a "two-fold order of knowledge" in Christianity. Natural reason itself, like all of the original powers of human nature, including that of free will, was not destroyed by original sin, but, rather, was overlayed with filth and greatly weakened, needing the supernatural aid and grace of God for its cleansing and strengthening so that it may achieve its proper use and function. There are certain mysteries contained in God, and greatly exceeding a mere "knowledge of God" through His creation, which must be added unto and supernaturally revealed by divine faith which, though, "presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection something that can be perfected."¹³⁵ This does not agree with the Lutheran-Calvanist views concerning the total depravity of human nature, nor with the Pelagian concept of the self (ego) -sufficiency of nature for, according to the Church, although natural man may perform some of the "easier precepts of the

¹³⁴ Pohle, op. cit., p. 51.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 51-54.

moral law of nature" it is impossible for him to be perfect in the full observation of even the natural law without the aid of supernatural grace,¹³⁶ and it is that grace which adds to the perfection of human nature and also permits even the greatest sinner to be able to "pray for grace, which is in itself a distinctly salutary act."¹³⁷

Inasmuch as religion limits man's highest principle to soul or ego an "experiencing knowledge of God" Himself, however, is not possible in the natural order, for otherwise the cherished distinction between nature and grace would be dissolved.¹³⁸ This is analogically proper for, transposed into metaphysic, it is but a reflection of the truth that Self-realization is not to be contained within the state of exclusive egoity.¹³⁹ To the Soul, which at all times eternally is limited to its "soulness," that is, to its ego-hood, divine, supernatural grace is necessary in order to gain even a vision of the ontologically ever-distant Other.

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 55, 73-74.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

¹³⁸ Maritain, op. cit., p. 332.

¹³⁹ It is possible, theoretically, to form a cup from frozen sea-water, a cup which can hold a measured amount of that water, but which cannot contain the entire sea. The limitless ocean, however, not only contains the contents, but the cup as well.

This grace infuses man with the divine gifts of inspired knowledge and wisdom which "raise the mind to know its object in a superhuman mode due to connaturality and charity."¹⁴⁰ Thus, while sanctifying grace is necessary for "an authentic experience of the depths of God" it does presuppose a harmonic "connaturality" and the capacity of the human mind to be "raised."

Revelation and Self-realization. In many respects the processes which take place within the inner organ (antahkarana) when the clear and void buddhi opens to the motionless, all-pervasive, and eternally present light of Brahman-consciousness are similar, with respect to revelation, to those which occur during objective perception. "In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge," says Dāsgupta,¹⁴¹ "the ajñānas removed are only smaller states of ajñāna, whereas when the Brahman-knowledge dawns the ajñāna as a whole is removed." The yogic aim of the antahkarana becoming steady and tranquil (prasāda) permits it perfectly to reflect, transmit, or be at one with the object of meditation.¹⁴² There is thus a contemplation of all things as without

¹⁴⁰ Maritain, loc. cit.

¹⁴¹ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 490-491.

¹⁴² Ibid., I, 272.

distinction of any sort, and as abiding in the Self (Ātman). The elimination of distinction, of the clash of opposing dual appearance-forces springing from ignorance (aīhāna) clarifies the buddhi and the entire antahkarana, and conforms to the clear awareness or consciousness of the ultimate Reality, pure consciousness or chit. Thus, "by the eye of Knowledge (jīhāna-chakshus),... 'intellectual intuition' " (which is not to be confused with rational, discursive conception but is, instead, "a direct awareness and immediate 'sensing'"), the Self realizes and reveals its integral, advaitic wholeness.¹⁴³ This total Self-realization leaves no "room" for the darkness of ignorance (avidyā), the appearance of the unreal. The clarity of buddhi-yoga, this "cool, clear-sighted vision,"¹⁴⁴ according to the Gītā,¹⁴⁵ is inseparable from and identical with that grace (prasāda), compassion (anukampā), or divine integrating will which "destroys the

¹⁴³ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 178. See also Guénon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, pp. 116-117; Aurobindo, Letters of Śrī Aurobindo, IV, 191. Otto, op. cit., p. 35, points out, in more or less religious terminology, that "Such a fundamental 'intuitus mysticus'...lies at the basis of the teaching both of Eckhart and Śankara....This intuition is not a result of dialectic but a first-hand and immediate fact and possession of the mystical mind."

¹⁴⁴ Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 78.

¹⁴⁵ 10.10-11.

ignorance-born darkness by the shining lamp of wisdom."¹⁴⁶ This clear "opening" of the buddhi to Self-realization, however, is not to be confused with the vain and empirical attempt to "use the mind to seek something from mind, nor the Buddha to seek something from the Buddha, nor the dharma to seek something from the dharma."¹⁴⁷ It is in no case an action or process originating in egoity but, rather, is that voidness or clarity experienced in the antahkarana when, through the power (śakti) of the all-pervasive ground of pure consciousness, the all-obscuring appearance of avidyā disappears in the conformity and identity of the clear buddhi-void with the plenum-void of ultimate Reality. This is realized, not in the present-veiling future, but in the Now, and implies nothing more nor less than free, indeterminate,

¹⁴⁶ Rāmānuja adds, in the words of Krishna as the ātman, "...by the luminous lamp called My knowledge, which (lamp) is homogeneous to Myself."—Īśvaradatta, Rāmānuja's Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā (Biher, 1930), p. 190. Cf. Milarepa's utterances in one of his songs:

Lord, from the sun-orb of Thy grace,
The radiant Rays of Light have shone,
And opened wide the petals of the Lotus of my Heart,
So that it breathed forth the fragrance born of
knowledge.

—: Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 143.
See also Rādhakṛishṇan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 337, where it is said that the revelation of pure consciousness and the divine and integral realization, while distinguishable philosophically, "are inseparable from one another. They are two aspects of one process." Cf. Rādhakṛishṇan, "The Hindu Idea of God," Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, I:172, Jan., 1934.

¹⁴⁷ Chu Ch'an, op. cit., p. 29.

all-inclusive, pure revelation in itself, the unmanifest akhaṇḍa-Brahman which includes and is common both to the "formal and formless."¹⁴⁸ It is advaitic awakening (prati-buddhi), devoid of all veiling (i.e. revealed) of ignorance-appearance, and identical with pure consciousness, ātman and Brahman. As such it is "self-luminous (svaprahāśa) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the object of any other consciousness that grasps it...It is the draśṭā (the pure consciousness comprehending all objects [drishya])."¹⁴⁹ Knowledge of things, as a vṛitti-expression, cannot be revealed apart from their manifestation as "objects of consciousness through a mental state,"¹⁵⁰ and

Brahman-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajñāna modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed, only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its own true light.¹⁵¹

Thus it is only when "pure Brahman, devoid of any form or mode," is revealed in the fulness of its Self-luminosity as

¹⁴⁸ See Watts, op. cit., p. 71; Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, pp. 60-63; Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 70.

¹⁴⁹ Dāsgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, 444.

¹⁵⁰ Loc. cit.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 490-491.

svaparakāśa that it is free and awakened drashtā.¹⁵² The metaphysical analogy of the "veiling" of chit through the appearance-constructs of avidyā is mirrored in the literal logic composing Christian religious theories of original sin and the fall. Thus, through original sin, man has lost "the original rectitude of will that made him love the divine" and with it "the soul lost the perfection of the divine likeness." Being man, however, and the creature of God, who is also a person he has not lost "his capacity for the divine" and therefore "he has only to turn to God, by the aid of Grace, to recover at once the divine likeness and that conformity with his own nature which he had lost by sin."¹⁵³ The relationship, then, of divine grace to redemption is but the enactment on the individual level, and in the terms of that necessary logic involved in all duality, of the non-dual and immediate identity of jñāna and moksha, of drashtā and Brahman.

¹⁵² Otto, op. cit., pp. 204-205, with certain religious overtones, sees in the intuitive core-knowledge expressed in the Eckhartian view the ground of "valuation and...higher judgment" which crosses the threshold of man's waking consciousness as the inner voice of conscience, the "witness of the spirit" which is the "unmediated certainty of all ideals, particularly of religious convictions." This power of intuitive knowledge Otto equates with Eckhart's "Godhead," a view reminiscent of the identity of Brahman and "revelation" as the term is used by Dāsgupta.

¹⁵³ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 267-288.

Christian truth, in its "proper and absolute sense ...consists formally in an ontological accord between being and intellect...in a conformity of fact set up between the two." This occurs when "the intellect...becomes adequate to the thing, it is in the intellect that the adequation is set up," thereby making the truth reside in intellect alone, "affirming that things are or are not, and judging them to be this and not that."¹⁵⁴ From the Truth of the One divine intellect it may be said that "the multitude of truths of particular things derive," dependent truths which are relative to the contingent being of the human creature and the divine intellect.¹⁵⁵

Between the soul, aham or iva of Christian man and the God of his theology and church dogma lies a veil that, however tenuous it may become, is never quite removed, for dogmatic Christianity does not know of the Atman and the Supreme Identity. The inscrutibility of man's own ego or soul is ascribed to its participation "in the incomprehensibility of God," for it is "in the mind that God has made

¹⁵⁴ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 255-258. The correspondence here obviously is to the projection of the antahkarana upon the object, as well as the discriminative function of the buddhi.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 259. This is the religious analogy of the underlying ground of pure chit necessary for all objective knowledge.

man to His image and likeness..." the likeness which is not to be an object of knowledge in itself.¹⁵⁶ The Thomistic view that "all knowledge pre-supposes a sense intuition"¹⁵⁷ interposes a "veil of sensible images" between the essence of the soul (which is that of an image only) and the indirect knowledge it has of that image-essence.¹⁵⁸ Self-knowledge for Christian man,--that knowledge which is recognizable whenever the soul delivers itself from "the sense-illusions which cast a veil over its own nature" consists of an understanding of the creature as made to the image of God, the nature and proper place of the created soul, and its duties, rights and obligations so that man may "order himself toward God." Being limited to the ego this is not metaphysical jñāna which is ātman. It is that knowledge restricted to the jīva who, on earth or in hell or even in heaven can never escape samsāra.¹⁵⁹

The Christian ego or soul as portrayed in Christian philosophy, dimly senses "the mystery that underlies the appearance of his human nature" and any tentative probing

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 220-224.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. revelation and objective perception in Vedānta, also pratyakshya pramāṇa.

¹⁵⁸ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

¹⁵⁹ See Ibid., pp. 214-216.

into the cordon sanitaire, the region of sacred exclusiveness which religion has constructed around the divine is said to evoke a "fear and a kind of sacred horror" before a "dark and somewhat terrifying mystery."¹⁶⁰ This, however, is but a proper response from the ego-soul in itself,--that always separate jīva whose "summit...bears the image of God" impressed upon "thought or mens, at the point where the intellect, the form of the composite [man] lies open to the regulative influence of the Divine Ideas." The highest soul-knowledge, then, is not that of identity with the Self-luminous ātman, but remains as "a created participation in the divine light."¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 219-221. This phenomenon is not apt to be encountered in those expressions of metaphysic which stress the Supreme Identity and the integral, non-dual identity of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa. When the gap between the individual ego and the divine personality has been established or exploited as the norm by the prevailing culture, or when the individual dwells upon the "otherness" of the divine personality and chooses or desires to probe its strangeness (as did Ariuna in the Gītā), the probing may result in somewhat of a shock to the still entrenched jīva.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 225. The beatific state, and the light of glory (lumen gloriae) which shines upon the justified Christian soul in the post mortem heavenly state has been described in terms closely approximating the accounts of that illumination by pure chit, through the purified buddhi, which constitutes the final release of the jīvanmukti. M. J. Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), p. 654, speaks of "...the light of glory, the lumen gloriae, wherein God will so suffuse us with His own glory that, like a crystal globe illumined by the sun, we shall reflect it ourselves." Christian theory stops here, however, for its God and His light is never to be identified with the Christian soul inasmuch as that soul, from the light and viewpoint of advaita vedānta, is for all time the separate and saṁsāric jīva, created in a separate and saṁsāric jīva-

It is not Divine Truth in itself, but that which may be used speculatively, "where it serves as a basis for knowledge of Truth..."¹⁶²

Christian revelation also is at one with Christian faith, which in turn is connected inseparably with a temporal and historical conception of revealed, scriptural, and dogmatic truth. A prior or advance knowledge of truth, it is said, is necessary for any moral discrimination.¹⁶³ The underlying and "given" light of faith and revelation thus is made to "transform itself into truth known," wherein the "accord between revelation and reason is an accord of truth with itself..." and serves, according to Christian apologists, to give meaning to Christian philosophy.¹⁶⁴

In the earthly life of Christian man knowledge of the Divine may be apprehended only through God's effects, for He is not to be seen, even distantly, in His essence. Yet,

world, and destined either to a separate and saṃsāric hell and devil or to an equally separate and saṃsāric heaven and God.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 227. The reference here is to Pascal, who, it is said, equates such Truth with God Himself.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 8, 34. Cf. Pohle, op. cit., p. 19: Gratia illuminationis s. illustrationis, as the supernatural elevation by the Holy Ghost of the powers of the soul which inspires salutary thoughts and acts. This "strictly supernatural enlightenment of the mind" is the basis of faith.

through the "special inspiration of the Holy Spirit" the soul may so act, as a "means of knowledge" to express "the feelings actually experienced by the soul," that there is established a likeness to the "touches of connaturality," an inducted experience, as it were, which tends to produce an instinctive inclination toward knowledge or a salutary act.¹⁶⁵ To the beatific state, which can not be achieved in this life, is reserved any immediate and "perfectly experienced knowledge of God,"¹⁶⁶ not the identity-consciousness of metaphysic, but an elevation of the disembodied and purified ego which still retains its own "proper substance" to "full participation in the divine life and to share in the enjoyment of the divine happiness..."¹⁶⁷ This is accomplished by the "penetration," but not the realization of identity, of the intellect by the eternally distinct Other, the divine essence, just as "the impressions emanating from a material object, as required for sensory knowledge, are present to the eye of sense."¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 321-322, 322n.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 305n.

¹⁶⁷ Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 658-659.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 659.

Moksha and clarity. In general moksha or freedom is said to "consist in breaking the bonds of ignorance, and in wrenching oneself entirely free from the fetters of egotism and individuality which are the products of ignorance."¹⁶⁹ As an extension of the predominant Hindu view that moksha "meant the dissociation of the Self from the subjective psychosis and the world" Advaita Vedānta

...held that the world as such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired. As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the Self, the Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections of the Self with the world cease, but because the appearance of the world-process does not represent the ultimate and highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding diversified world...are false in the sense that they do not represent the real truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves really are, but do not also know what the world about us is.¹⁷⁰

Thus with that knowledge which is final release,--moksha or Ātyantika pralaya,¹⁷¹ the Witness to the ultimate Truth realizes at once the unreality of all perceptions of world appearance.¹⁷² This clear awareness or perfect freedom is

¹⁶⁹ Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 167.

¹⁷⁰ Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 440. See also p. 490. At this point the jīvanmukti stops short and has nothing more to do with the "flux of evolution," he stands aside from the samsāric stress which, from another frame of reference, also may be viewed as a significant "cosmic process" of divine "Self-objectification." See Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 169.

¹⁷¹ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁷² Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 441.

the awakening of pure consciousness which has no temporal and spatial distinctions.¹⁷³ It is "the immediate intuition of the Absolute here and now, and not something to be attained or superadded...there is no going or goal, as Brahman is the same as jñāna and mukti."¹⁷⁴ Ātmavidyā, the metaphysical knowledge of one's true Self, is Self-sufficient, for such knowledge is identical with the supreme Reality. Knowledge does not cause moksha for the supreme knowledge is moksha; and moksha has no beginning or end, for it is timeless, beyond causation,--the eternally present pure consciousness.¹⁷⁵

The Mandala-Brāhmanopanishad¹⁷⁶ tells us that

The ijva, the twenty-fifth eternal verity, after giving up the twenty-four eternal verities of his own creation,¹⁷⁷...after being convinced by the realization,

¹⁷³ Chit, even within the projective perceptual function of its antahkarana mode, is eternally free from distinctions of space and time. Werner Woltjer, What is Psychology (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1947), pp. 355-356, speaking from the relatively limited view of modern psychology, nevertheless says, "Psychological events take place in dimensions different from those of physics... '...psychological facts are in general of a non-spatial nature'." (quoting, in part, K. Lewin).

¹⁷⁴ Srīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 468. See also p. 477.

¹⁷⁵ Rādhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 61; Nikhilānanda, The Upanishads (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), I, 103.

¹⁷⁶ 1.4.3-4; Sāstri, The Yogopanishads, pp. 226-227.

¹⁷⁷ i.e., "the five inner senses of perception, the five inner senses of motor action, the five vital airs, the five gross elements, the mind of volition, thought, reasoning, and self-consciousness."--Ibid., p. 226.

'I am the transcendent âtman, the twenty-sixth eternal verity,' becomes a jivanmukti (liberated while yet living). Thus by the vision of internal introspection, having become the ultimate object of his own initial introspection, while remaining in the state of being a jivanmukti, he becomes the indivisible region of transcendent ether in (the Brahman simultaneously with such realization).

Thus, with and as moksha, there is the perfect realization of Self, Brahman, the sat, chit, and ânanda,¹⁷⁸ a freedom or release from bondage to saṁsāra (a state not limited to life on earth) which must be realized in that particular saṁsāric field which generates and reaps karma. Therefore in Kenopanishad 13 and Brihadāraṇyakopanishad 4.4.14 the necessity for Self-knowledge while within the embodied state is stressed.¹⁷⁹ Sankara¹⁸⁰ points to the fact of jivanmukti as the ultimate end and purpose of life when he sings, from a somewhat theistic point of view, yet one which stresses the eternal and supreme Identity:

Blessed am I; I have attained the consummation of my life, and I am free from the clutches of transmigration; I am the essence of Eternal Bliss, I am infinite,--all through Thy mercy [anugraha].

Thus the body in metaphysic, as distinct from religion, is no obstacle to the Supreme Identity,¹⁸¹ for the Self, transcending yet encompassing time, may "take the undifferentiated

¹⁷⁸ Rāghavendrāchār, op. cit., p. 70.

¹⁷⁹ Rānade, op. cit., p. 327.

¹⁸⁰ Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmani, p. 211.

¹⁸¹ Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, p. 170.

standpoint while also being in the standpoint of the differentiated...¹⁸²

Release in this life also is possible during that all-important eternal-moment prior to death, that moment, yet the same eternal Now, wherein but an instant of clarity (prasāda) may dissipate the greatest ego-catastrophe, death, in the timeless light of pure Spirit. Thus the Gītā says:¹⁸³

And he who, casting off the body, goeth forth thinking upon Me only at the time of the end, he entereth into My being; there is no doubt of that. Whosoever at the end abandoneth the body, thinking upon any being, to that being only he goeth, O Kaunteya, ever to that conformed in nature.

The Anugītā,¹⁸⁴ in more detail, states that

¹⁸² Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, p. 354. In addition to īvanmukti, or immediate liberation while embodied, there is said to be kramamukti, deferred and gradual liberation, and videhamukti, liberation after death. See Guénon, loc. cit.; Śrīnivāsācāri, op. cit., p. 469.

¹⁸³ Gītā 8.5-6; Basant and Dās, op. cit., p. 146.

¹⁸⁴ Max Muller, editor, Sacred Books of the East (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1900), VIII, 372.

The element of tranquility, of that clarity which is of the void because there is an utter extinction of all ego-turbidity, is brought out clearly in the Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind (Chu Ch'an, p. 32): "If a man, when he is about to die, can only regard the five aggregates of his consciousness as void, the four elements which compose his body as not constituting an ego, his true mind as formless and still, his true nature, not as something which commenced at his birth and will perish at his death, but as remaining utterly motionless, his mind and the objects of his perception as one--if he can only awake to this in a flash and remain free from the entanglements of the Triple World, he will indeed be one who leaves the world without the faintest tendency towards rebirth. If he should behold the lovely sight of all the Buddhas coming to welcome him, surrounded by every kind of splendor, and yet feel no desire to go towards them; if he should behold all

He who even for (the space of) a (single) exhalation, at the time of the termination (of life) becomes equable, attaining to the Self, becomes fit for immortality. Restraining the self in the Self, even for (the space of) a wink, he repairs to the inexhaustible acquisition of those who have knowledge, through the tranquility of the Self.

The metaphysical realization of the true Self, the ultimate Reality which is to be known by its Self-luminosity when all egoity is removed, abandoned, and cleared away by its power, is reduced, in the religious view, to a samsāric realm of moral values dependent upon the gift of grace by a far-off, authoritarian Jehova-God. The Christian, being immersed in the historical process, at all times is poised on the brink of nothingness and needs must have constant recourse to the sacramental administrations of the Church and recurrent infusions of sanctifying grace to obtain that justification which, "Both as an act and as a state...possesses three distinct properties; it is uncertain, unequal, and capable of being lost."¹⁸⁵ Until the beatific vision, which can occur only in the next life, the Christian is in constant

sorts of evil forms surrounding him and yet have no feeling of fear, but remain oblivious of self and at one with the Absolute, he will indeed achieve the formless state. This is a fundamental principle."

¹⁸⁵ Pohle, op. cit., pp. 300, 378.

peril of losing justification through sin,¹⁸⁶ a view, however much it borders on peccatiphobia, which is necessary to and inescapable from the religious outlook unaware, even in the beatific state, of the Atman and the Supreme Identity. Christian final perseverance or the perseverance by man in righteousness unto the end of life, therefore is impossible without the grace of God and His authorized channels for that grace. In addition to merely sufficient grace, "final perseverance is a special grace, or more correctly, a continuous series of efficacious graces,"¹⁸⁷ saving gifts made by that always separate Other-God to the Christian ego which has no Self.

There is a certain temptation inherent in any analytical evaluation, inasmuch as such a speculative venture is entirely within the ego's field of action, to label non-theistic release of moksha as resulting from mechanical techniques or yogic "tricks of the trade." This view gratuitously and without warrant assumes that the power to compel freedom

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 248, 326, 378-385, 391.

Protestant theory (p. 378), however, looks upon justification (when obtained) as absolute, certain, and equal in all men. Inasmuch as neither Catholic nor Protestant knows of the Atman, and their theories of justification pertain to the ego or ijva alone, the Protestant view of absolute justification is untenable as it presupposes a changeless condition of "wholeness" or holiness at variance with the limited nature of the ego, which the Protestant views as evil.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 123-125.

arises within and from the jīva who, like the operator of a push-button mechanism, or the player of a coin-operated device, repeats certain formula-actions and automatically achieves certain results. It interprets sādhana as a bit of jīva-powered knowledge-magic which, through the "grace" of a technological process, produces moksha.¹⁸⁸ It is to be understood that the immediacy of Self-realization may lead to the mistaken theoretical interpretation of mechanistic necessity, and the emphasis upon works in some schools may lend weight to concepts of the automatic,¹⁸⁹ but it must be kept in mind that works as movements arising within the jīva may be but incident to the awakening of Self, jīva-movements harmonic to the dawning of realization and in themselves impotent, for "technique without inspiration is barren."¹⁹⁰ In Advaita Vedānta, where the one Reality is pure chit, the ātman-Brahman, all else being unreal appearance, no action-process, no "scientific" technique of and by the unreal, can of itself lead to the Real. Darkness does not

¹⁸⁸ Cf. E. Washburn Hopkins, The Great Epic of India (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1902), pp. 188-190; E. Washburn Hopkins, Ethics of India (New York: Yale University Press, 1924), pp. 82-83, 176; Edgerton, op. cit., II, 64. See Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 205.

¹⁸⁹ See Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 149-150, also 104-105.

¹⁹⁰ Rādhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 188.

reveal and neither does it produce light, nor does metaphysical knowledge proceed from avidyā-knowledge."¹⁹¹ The movements of sādhana, of all yogic endeavors, can "receive" their power only from the ever-present ground of enlightenment,¹⁹² that timeless (therefore not to be attained or grasped), eternal Self-"gift" of freedom or moksha (a term which also means the "solution of a question" as well as "abandonment or relinquishment").¹⁹³ "Action [ego-motivated karma] cannot destroy ignorance," states Sankara,¹⁹⁴ "for it is not in conflict with ignorance. Knowledge alone destroys ignorance, as light destroys dense darkness." Thus "means" and "end" are truly inseparable, for the terms can be but "figures of speech" pointing toward the identity of knowledge and

191 Cf. Mund. 3.1.9.--"...the whole of man's thinking is interwoven with the senses. When that is purified, the ...(ātman) shines forth." Cf. dhātu prasāda as the purification of the internal organ.

192 Arthur B. Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), p. 580; Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. xxxviii.

193 Alfred A. Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 236.

194 Sankarāchārya, Ātmabodhan, p. 157, śl. 3. See also pp. 65-66, śls. 149-150; p. 200, śls. 43-44; Guénon, Man and His Becoming According to the Vedānta, pp. 167, 182; Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 52; Srīnivāśāchāri, op. cit., p. xxxix. See Edgerton, op. cit., II, 67-69, also Gītā 2.48-72; 11.22-25 where tranquility of mind, stability or equilibrium (śamatvam) are equated with yoga. Cf. Gītā 4.41-42; 5.2, 4-5.

deliverance in and as the true Self which is Brahman.¹⁹⁵ With the integral realization of true insight (saṃvaddarśana) the Self-luminous pure consciousness-intellect (chin mātra) affirms in clear awareness the Experience-Fact of Supreme Identity.¹⁹⁶ This Fact is not the inevitable reward for following a certain technique or method, yet it does not negate sādhana as an integral movement incident to, but not compelling, Self-realization. Otto,¹⁹⁷ in his comparison of Sankara and Eckhart states that

...their method is the same, it consists in this--that in reality they have none! All that we usually term 'mystical method,' all purposeful self-training for 'mystical experiences,' all soul-direction, schooling, excercising, the technique for attaining a spiritual state, artificial exaltation of the self--this is far removed from them and lies aside from their path.

Chittavrittinirodha. William Blake¹⁹⁸ has said that
 "If the doors of perception were ^{cleansed} even this world

¹⁹⁵ See Guénon, op. cit., pp. 166-169; Watts, op. cit., p. 43; Otto, op. cit., p. 261. Cf. Mund. 3.2.9: "He, verily, who knows that supreme Brahma, becomes very Brahma." Also Keith, op. cit., p. 580.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Otto, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁹⁸ From "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," quoted by Howard H. Brinton, The Mystic Will (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 159n.

would appear to men as it is, infinite."¹⁹⁹ This similarity to that clarity of vritti as it corresponds to the clear awareness of pure chit is exceeded in advaitavāda by an ultimate relinquishment of the initial vritti state of knowledge, the total abandonment or "solution"²⁰⁰ of all modifications even unto the "doors of perception" mentioned by Blake. Moksha, therefore, is of a transcendent nature from this point of view, and is the true light of the "pure, infinite, and unlimited Brahman."²⁰¹ Thus, from a slightly different standpoint, Advaita Vedānta stresses the fact-experience of that identity-union (yoga) with ultimate Reality which Patañjali, as an initial definition of yoga, has termed chittavrittinirodha, or the cessation of the modifications (vritti) of the mind.²⁰² Sankara, in his commentary upon Gītā 18.50²⁰³ has said:

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmāni, pp. 147-148, 184: "When the external world is shut out the mind is cheerful (manasaḥ prasannatā), and cheerfulness of the mind (manahprasāde) brings on the vision of the Paramātmān." "The result of dispassion is knowledge, that of knowledge is withdrawal from sense-pleasures, which leads to the experience of the Bliss of Self, whence follows Peace."

²⁰⁰ See Macdonnel, op. cit., p. 239.

²⁰¹ Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 490-491.

²⁰² Cf. Rādhakrishṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 56.

²⁰³ A. M. Sāstrī, The Bhagavadgītā with Commentary of Śrī Sankarāchārya, p. 488.

...it is only a cessation of the perception of the differentiated forms of the external world that can lead to a firm grasp of the real nature of the Self. For the Self is not a thing unknown to anybody at any time, is not a thing to be reached or got rid of or acquired. If the Self be quite unknown, all undertakings intended for the benefit of oneself would have no meaning...It is moreover, the Self-knowledge which is the aim of all endeavor. Wherefore, just as there is no need for an external evidence by which to know one's body, so there is no need for an external evidence by which to know the Self who is even nearer than the body.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ The Pûrnayoga of Sri Aurobindo, see Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 205; Aurobindo, Bases of Yoga (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1949), p. 22, takes a more integral view of the advaitic Reality which is not limited to an exclusively static and transcendent mode. Inasmuch as it does not adhere to the interpretation of strict mâyāvâda, Pûrnayoga states that the calming or tranquilizing of the mental modes permits the possible manifestation not only of pure chit but other and varied states of consciousness which, though higher than the human, are not necessarily of the nature of unobstructed chit. In addition, the experienced clarity or tranquility may be indicative of that "first touch of realization" or that "Presence" which, though it may not be defined or imaged, is made known by the "grace" of a vast and clear calmness, the response to which can be but a corresponding clear acceptance and "openness." (Bases of Yoga, pp. 5-6.) As a will-force proceeding from the Supreme Personality (Purushottama), which transcends not only îśvara or Saguna Brahman but the silent and aloof Nirguna Brahman (see Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II, 266), it "comes upon us when we make ourselves one in all our consciousness and action with the Purushottama" (Anilbaran Roy, editor, The Message of the Gîtâ as Interpreted by Sri Aurobindo, London: Geo. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1946, p. 270. See Bases of Yoga, pp. 4-5.), when the "personal mind is still," and acts as a power of divine transformation. (See Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 91-92). The "calm mind" thus is different from the vacant mind (here there is a certain similarity to the "void"), for within its unfettered calmness vrittis are sanctioned and directed, moving, yet leaving no trace upon its clear placidity. (Bases of Yoga, pp. 1-3).

Furthermore, as described by Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 80-81, Pûrnayoga "insists not upon a doing away of the mental

This vyritti "cessation" is that "voidness" of mentation or speculative thought, the indescribable extinction (nirvāṇa) of the unreal, of ignorance, which "is not the voidness of nothingness, but a state of supramundane mind..." or, to be more precise, that pure chit which transcends yet includes all states.²⁰⁵ It is the "clear light" (hōd-gsal) of the Tibetan tradition which states that

It hath been said that the unmodified phenomena-transcending mind (or mind in the yogic state of non-thought) --which is the Thatness of all things and inseparable from the Voidness, the Ultimate,--while experiencing the thought-transcending Great Bliss (of Ecstatic Illumination) is the Clear Light....²⁰⁶

In the experience of the "Clear Light" the "gloom of Ignorance" (avidyā), which is the 'gloom of night,' is illuminated in a super-conscious glimpsing of Nirvāṇa, or Enlightenment!²⁰⁷

apparatus but upon its conversion into a perfect, thoroughly transmuted instrument of action of the Divine Will. The stilling of mental functioning is for Pūrṇavara not a preliminary to its total rejection, but a step to a new widening of its scope, a new heightening of its power, and a new orientation of its action through divine transformation." Sri Aurobindo's deep concern for complete and total "terrestrial realization" is brought out further by Dilīp Kumār Roy, Sri Aurobindo Came to Me (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Āśram, 1952), pp. 168, 184-185.

²⁰⁵ Evans-Wentz, Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa, p. 142n.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 145n. In his letters Sri Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 153, has stated that without this Void "one cannot realize the Silent Brahman."

²⁰⁷ Evans-Wentz, op. cit., p. 156n. Guénon, op. cit., p. 172n, states that this calm, tranquil and lucid clarity is the "Pax Profunda" of the Rosicrucian tradition; the word Shekinah, in Hebrew denotes the 'real presence' of the Divinity, or the 'Light of Glory' in and by which, according to Christian theology, the 'beatific vision' is brought about...."

The eternal experience of the Supreme Identity is that of being "united with tranquility"²⁰⁸ or prasāda. This calm, pure clarity, the clear self-luminous Viśv-consciousness-plenum, is the identity of the "means" and "end," the identity of grace and clarity which is prasāda.

Avidyā is co-existent with and equal to ego-mentation which forms sense attachments that bind man "like a beast by means of ropes (gunena).²⁰⁹ Yet it is through that "self-same mind," purified and made clear,²⁰⁹ that the light of pure chit is realized as the all-embracing Reality.²¹⁰ The destruction of avidyā-bondage is not to be accomplished by any samsāric energies or acts. There is no means, in and of itself, for accomplishment, for when means and end are identical the "sword of [metaphysical] knowledge" is that purification of the antahkaraṇa (dhātuprasāda) as well as the Clear Light. This purity or "complete intellectuality" in the

208 Guénon, op. cit., pp. 172-173. Cf. Gitā 18.54, Besant and Dās, op. cit., p. 320, "Becoming Brahma, serene (prasanna) in Self..." (Brahmabhūtaprasannātmā).

209 That is, when the mind of unreal appearance has become devoid of the equally unreal appearance constituting its ignorance-identity,--when avidyā is "blown out" in nirvikalpasaṁādhi.

210 Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmaṇi, pp. 75, 79, ślokas 169, 173.

211 See Ibid., p. 69, śl. 147. Cf. Watts, op. cit., p. 73: "Only when the mind and soul [ego] is empty, like clear glass, does it let through the light of God." See also Dāsgupta, op. cit., I, 439, 489; Rādhakṛishṇan, The Bhagavad-gītā, p. 57; Svet. 3.2.14.

metaphysical sense of the "higher buddhi" is called by Dvivedi,²¹² from the Yogic viewpoint, "adyātma prasāda," that correspondence which immediately is present when

...the qualities of rajas and tanus being entirely annihilated, so to speak, and sattva alone remaining... it is possible to experience the bliss consequent upon true recognition of the puruṣa. The puruṣa which is all bliss, all knowledge, and ever free is then seen and experienced in his true character. This is prasāda the joyous, contented state of mind [chittaprasāda].²¹³

Dhātuprasāda, the purification of the internal organ

²¹² Manilal N. Dvivedi, The Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali (Bombay: R. Tukaram, 1890), p. 26, also p. 21.

²¹³ Cf. Sankara's commentary (Sāstrī, op. cit., p. 470) to Gītā 18.37 where this blissful pleasure is said to be "born of the purity of one's own buddhi or antahkarana; or born of the perfectly clear knowledge of the Self." (tatsukhaṃ sātṭvikam proktamātmabuddhiprasādajam). See also Rāmānuja's Commentary (Īśvaradatta, op. cit., p. 341); Rādhakṛṣṇan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 363; Arthur W. Ryder, The Bhagavadgītā (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 132; Jayadayal Goyandka, Kalyāṇa Kalpataru, XIV: 189-190, Aug. 1948; Edgerton, op. cit., I, 71. Cf. Gītā 17.16, where manahprasādaḥ, clear, calm, serenity of mind, is identified with mental tanus or "Self-incubation." (etattaponānasamuchyate) (See Jung, op. cit., p. 245). Cf. Gītā 2.64-65 for a similar usage of prasāda.

Kaṭha 2.24 notes that one who is not tranquil (nāśāntaḥ) or who is not of peaceful mind (nāśānta mānaṣaḥ) can realize the pure intelligence; and Mund. 3.2.4-5 mentions that even the Seers (rishi) must be tranquil (prasāntāḥ) in order to realize the Supreme Identity. Waiṭri 6.34 (partially duplicated in 6.20) contain two stanzas which state that

Saṁsāra is just one's own thought;
With effort he should cleans it, then.
What is one's thought, that he becomes;
This is the eternal mystery. (Cf. Dhammapada 1.1.2.)

For by tranquility [chitasya hi prasādena] of thought,
Deeds (karma), good and evil, one destroys.
With soul [ātman] serene [prasanna], stayed on the Soul
(ātman)
Delight eternal one enjoys! (Hume, op. cit., p. 447.)

or antahkarana, may be carried beyond the sāttvika state, not through any extension of ego-power, but by the power (śakti) of the pure chit, the Self, alone, Sankarāchārya has said²¹⁴ that "By means of the regulated mind and the purified intellect (buddhiprasādat) realize thy own Self....," yet the ego, of itself, is powerless inasmuch as it is an unreal "awareness." The Mundakopanishad²¹⁵ stresses this limitation of power by stating that the realization or "seeding" of the advaitic, inseparable Self, while impossible through empirical means, occurs in the serene, pure intellect, the "peace of knowledge" (jñānaprasāda).²¹⁶ The metaphysical identity of "means and end" may not be self-evident in any point of view still tinged with samsāra. In addition that same identity may be seen as polarized identity-modes of the ever-free supreme personality wherein the integrating power (Śakti)

Chittaprasāda, however, being of a sattvic nature and a "state of mind," must be transcended in a higher and integral clear realization which, though, is not necessarily aloof from sattva. Cf. also Hopkins, Ethics of India, p. 141.

²¹⁴ Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmani, pp. 57-58, śl. 136. See also Śāntinātha, Sādhana (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1938), p. 121.

²¹⁵ 3.1.8.

²¹⁶ Hume, op. cit., p. 375. See also Nikhilānanda, op. cit., pp. 301-302; Śivānanda, Principle Upanishads (Rishikesh: The Yoga Vedānta Forest University, 1950), p. 387.

of the pure intellect may be felt as the "grace of wisdom"²¹⁷ which comes "in a whisper, in a silence, to reveal itself"²¹⁸ by the free power (śakti) of unseparated limitation or particular manifestation.

This may be the basis for the double use of the word prasāda as (1) "grace or favor" and (2) "clarity-tranquility," an apparent difference in viewpoint which, metaphysically, becomes identical through the advaitic unity of means and end in chit-śakti as that consciousness-power which is inseparable from Self. Thus the theistic, gratuitous interpretation of dhātuprasāda in Kathopanishad 2.20 as the exclusive "grace (prasāda) of the Creator (dhātri),"²¹⁹ is but a particular view of that "purity of temperament" which, by a self-transcendence in and as integral Voidness, is at one with the ultimate clarity.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Sivānanda, op. cit., p. 388.

²¹⁸ Otto, op. cit., p. 26, quoting from Eckhart. See Kaṭha 6.12.

²¹⁹ Hume, op. cit., p. 350. Cf. Hopkins, The Great Epic of India, p. 188.

²²⁰ Cf. lines by Śrī Aurobindo quoted in Dilīp Kumār Roy, op. cit., p. 229:

"And in the silence of the mind life knows itself
Immortal, and immaculately grows divine."

Cf. Kapāli Śāstry, op. cit., pp. 8, 8n, 155, 157; Rāṇade, op. cit., p. 341; Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā, p. 383; Nikhilānanda, op. cit., I, 141-142; Otto Böhtlingk and Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch (St. Petersburg: 1855-1875), IV, 1097. Cf. Sankarāchārya, Vivekachudāmaṇi, p. 64, śl. 147, particularly the theistic interpretation of Dhātuprasāda in the translation. See Supra, pp. 46 ff.

It has been said²²¹ that a spiritual experience limited to the realization of a featureless Brahman, limited, as it were, to an impersonal aloofness toward its jīva-"appearance,"²²² an indifference and lack of concern bordering upon unawareness, falls short of that free and unlimited identity-consciousness basic to integral non-duality (pūrṇādvaita). Pure consciousness, denied advaitic, inseparable modifications and manifestations, also is denied an effective and free consciousness-power (chitsakti) integral with the power of will. The jīva, emptied and exhausted²²³ of individual and separate egoity (its antahkarana purified and made clear) through a conscious realization of the jīva-rôle or līlā by the supreme consciousness-will of the true Self, is not excluded necessarily from that all-embracing and always present clear-awareness which is never to be identified exclusively with the silent and featureless aspect of the Absolute. The realized-jīva, from the integral view, is a present, eternal and inseparable, though not necessary, possibility or conscious personality-manifestation of the eternally free Purushottama who transcends both the opposites of personality

²²¹ Kapāli Sāstry, op. cit., p. 71; Chaudhuri, 2. cit., pp. 215-215

²²² See Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, II, 266.

²²³ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 129.

and impersonality. Realization is that consciousness power and will of the âtman which chooses, not as the separate personal God nor as the exclusive and aloof aspect of Brahman, but as Purushottama, to awaken to its integrality rather than to the "fruit" of the ego-effort alone.²²⁴ The purification of the antahkarana (dhâtuprasâda) and the clear awareness (prasâda) which is identical with the consciousness-will of Self are one and inseparable, the always present, eternal, and therefore free "gift" (grace from the limited theistic view) of Self to its identity-self.²²⁵

This integral aspect of "grace" as the jîva-view of the gift of supreme, clear chit is touched upon by Otto²²⁶

²²⁴ Kapâli Sâstry, op. cit., pp. 12-13. See also Râdhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 103; Rânade, op. cit., p. 345.

²²⁵ Cf. Watts, op. cit., pp. 48, 182; Râdhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 103-106; Kapâli Sâstry, op. cit., pp. 13n, 158; Aurobindo, Letters of Sri Aurobindo, IV, 609; Katha 2.23 (=Mund. 3.2.3). Cf. Eckhart's view, expressed by Otto, op. cit., p. 197, that "the soul does not have the Son, she is the Son. She does not have knowledge of God, but is fundamentally God's knowledge of Himself."

²²⁶ Otto, op. cit., pp. 147-148. Otto, in this instance, evidences an understanding which rarely is found in the views of religious authorities, yet it must be pointed out that even here there is the religious bias for the theistic concept of 'grace' as the norm, the confusion of âtman with soul, the inability to conceive of a "world of contrasts" based upon that which transcends a "creator-God," the confusion of manifestation with creation, the purely mechanistic approach to yoga, as well as the unfortunate insertion of purely religious terminology, such as 'salvation' and 'sacrilege,' into metaphysic.

who states that

Sankara cannot admit a 'grace' of Brahman. Brahman as the higher or supreme ātman, which is identical with every ātman cannot strictly speaking be gracious. But the fact that a man can achieve the highest state not in mere isolation like the yogin, but only in and through the attainment of Brahman, has indeed an analogy to the Bhakta's 'salvation by grace'...

.....
Just as Brahman must of necessity be seen as īśvara the creator-God when a world of contrasts appears in multiplicity, so salvation in Brahman, seen in the refraction of 'lower knowledge,' must appear as a revelation of grace. A doctrine of grace as the reverse side of this mysticism is not merely a concession--the relationship can also be expressed thus: 'It lies on the one hand in the character of Brahman itself, that, when a world appears in the magical mist of avidyā, it must appear as a world of order, of wisdom and justice. But it also lies in the nature of Brahman that when a world appears, there are found in it souls which attain to salvation and overcome avidyā.' To that extent, to speak of a 'grace of the adhyātman' is not a mere slip of the tongue.

In any case, it is true that in Brahman alone lies salvation. To seek salvation without Brahman is sacrilege. It would be an overweening attempt at 'self-realization,' a conception foreign alike to Sankara and to Eckhart.

Rādhakṛishṇan refers to Albertus Magnus²²⁷ as a Western interpreter of spiritual insight, of "union with divinity" realizable through that clarity which is synonymous with the cessation of mental modifications. Quoting Albertus he says:²²⁸

When thou prayest, shut thy door, that is, the doors of the senses. Keep them barred and bolted against all

²²⁷ Rādhakṛishṇan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 245-246.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 246.

phantasms and images. Nothing pleases God more than a mind free from all occupations and distractions. Such a mind is in a manner transformed into God for it can think of nothing, and understand nothing and love nothing except God. He who penetrates into himself and so transcends himself, ascends truly to God.

The particular Christian concept of nature as "the order of secondary causes" flowing from the "Creator's will" is one of utter dependence upon that free and unfettered will to which nature "owes its existence." Nature is not necessary to God, for "He can always produce the effects of secondary causes without the help of the secondary causes themselves, or even other effects that lie beyond the power of these causes."²²⁹ There is, then, in created nature an inherent possibility, an obediential power of pure passivity, of "becoming what God can will, and does will, that it shall become."²³⁰ This obediential and passive possibility, however, definitely and pointedly excludes "as by definition all aptitude for self-realization," such an aptitude being outside "all that God makes of nature, and the powers He retains of actualizing it."²³¹ Thus to the concept of the gratuitous creation of nature is added, analogically, the idea of the supernatural order and the concept of "a nature

²²⁹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 376. See also p. 365.

²³⁰ Note here that nature is the passive factor while God retains all "Godward" action.

²³¹ Gilson, op. cit., p. 378.

gratuitously restored...at the fiat of God's will."²³²

Human nature, then, has the obediential power, the capacity, derived from that Creator to whose image it is made and from whom it receives "its power of knowing," for the attainment of the beatific vision. Religibus theism can define and conceive of this capacity, this inherent ability passively to obey the will of "god" only as "The capacity for Grace..."²³³ The God of Christian dogma is not the true Self, the âtman, of the soul or ego. He is, rather, unique Being separated for all time from the creature. His will, instead of being that all-embracing advaitic power (śakti) identical with the true Self, proceeds from Himself as the loving, yet distant and projected divine "Other" and, as an infusion, is conceived as acting upon the inferior, dependent and totally different "other" which is man. This is the only relation proper in a basically dualistic and theoretical religious concept devoid of an advaitic experience of âtman and the Supreme Identity.²³⁴

Final beatitude, occurring in the "Other" world, is not an integral realization of the self by the Self within the Supreme Identity, but is "an outpouring of the divine

²³² Ibid., p. 379.

²³³ Ibid., p. 235.

²³⁴ Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, pp. 320-321.

nature upon the creature," the "disclosing of the depths of the divinity"²³⁵ through "an intellectual knowledge of the divine essence which will be sovereignly clear and limpid"²³⁶...the immediate actuation of our intelligence...²³⁷ This limpidity, however, is not that advaitic removal of all sense of apparent separateness between samsāra and nirvāṇa, but is, to use an analogy, the clarity of vision elevated and optically amplified so as to bring a chasm-separated and distant "other" object apparently face to face with the beholder. The two faces are forevermore separate, however, for they are those of the image-reflection and the Original. "The beatific vision," says Rādhakrishnan,²³⁸

requires a beatific consciousness (lumen gloriae) which is distinct from ordinary consciousness (lumen naturale) and prophetic consciousness (lumen gratiae). Even then the divine essence will not be comprehended.

Exclusive and separate duality continues to manifest within a samsāric heaven. Not of the religious ego, but of the integral Watcher may it be said that

²³⁵ Scheeben, op. cit., p. 653.

²³⁶ Prasāda as clarity.

²³⁷ Maritain, op. cit., p. 382.

²³⁸ Rādhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 278.

He heard the secret Voice, the Word that knows,²³⁹
 And saw the secret face that is our own.²⁴⁰

Furthermore, that religious knowledge or consciousness which not only stops short of identity consciousness but denies it remains within the limitations of samsâric duality. Advaita, as fully integral (pûrnâdvaita), does not limit the Self to any mode or poise, and places no boundaries about, above, or below the supreme consciousness-power. Therein metaphysical Self-realization or awakening may be spoken of as

A consciousness of beauty and of bliss,
 A knowledge which became what it perceived,
 Replaced the separated sense and heart
 and drew all Nature into its embrace.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Cf. Vâch.

²⁴⁰ Aurobindo, Sâvitri, I, 27-28 (Book I, Canto 3.)

²⁴¹ Ibid., I, 28. (Book I, Canto 3.)

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CORRECTION SLIP

Page 13 occurs twice, as pp. 13a and 13b.

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Page 489 immediately follows and is the continuation of p. 486.