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The Perennial Crisis in Morocco

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THE PERENNIAL CRISIS IN MOROCCO

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As an overseas student, I did not trust entirely my knowledge of the English language. As Professor Landau had not enough time to correct my English, I sought the assistance of Dr. M. M. Knight, Professor of economics at the University of California and Mrs. Knight, to whom I also wish to express my thanks for helping me in correcting my English and for the use of their library.

PREFACE

As a student of international affairs, I have been greatly interested in the happenings in Morocco. Although, up to a recent past the Moroccan problem appeared to most westerners as a minor one, in the summer of 1955 it emerged as a major issue in world affairs. Besides threatening to split the world in two, it might also provoke another war on the Indochinese model.

It was the Moroccan problem that brought about the creation of the Arab-Asian Bloc, representing from thirteen to seventeen different countries. The fundamental issue responsible for the establishment of that bloc was that of western colonialism. Now having myself lived under such colonialism, I am naturally keenly interested in the Moroccan problem--even though British Colonialism in Palestine would appear to have been less oppressive than its French version in Morocco.

To the American student of international affairs, this problem should be of vital interest. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in building enormous air bases on Moroccan soil, and thousands of American airmen are living there. Morocco's vitally important strategic position at the entry of the Mediterranean makes of it one of

the natural defense outposts of western democracy. As everybody knows, France has been receiving vast quantities of military equipment and money from the United States. But not everybody knows that a large proportion of that help is being used in Morocco, not against Communism but against natives fighting for the same cause that the Americans had been fighting for in 1776.

I do not speak in the present thesis about either the Spanish zone of Morocco or the International city of Tangier. Neither of these is really involved in what has become known as the Moroccan crisis, which is being enacted in the French zone alone.

I have also refrained from including a special chapter on Communism in Morocco because, so far, there have hardly been any Moroccan Communists. But should Morocco continue to be a center of incessant trouble, it would inevitably become a fertile ground for Communist propaganda, and, eventually, for direct Communist action. Indochina is a telling warning.

In spite of being an Arab, I have tried in my thesis to remain completely impartial, and have, in fact, relied principally on French and not on Arab sources. I hope that my thesis might prove of some assistance to my fellow students who are interested both in the past and the future of North Africa as well as in an important issue of colonialism.

This, in itself, would seem to justify writing a thesis on this subject, especially, in view of the fact that very little material on it is available in the United States.

CONTENTS

THE SETTING

I

Morocco occupies an unrivalled position in North Africa. It faces both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and thus dominates the Strait of Gibraltar, the gate into the Mediterranean, and thus, ultimately, into the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The area of Morocco is about 172,104 sq. miles, or about 20,000 sq. miles larger than California. The basic population is Berber, or pre-Arab, but has been Arabized to varying degrees. All population figures for North Africa are estimates because no accurate census of the Moslem population has been made. However, the approximate figure is nine million. According to the Etude demographique et sociale, "It would be fruitless to give for the Moslem population a picture similar to that for the non-Moslem population. The registration for birth and death has been very incomplete." [1]

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1. Les Algeriens En France, Cahier No. 24, Presses Universitaires De France, Paris 1955, p. 22.

The fusion which followed the Arab conquest, beginning in the seventh century, and the fact that social conditions were to become more or less uniform during the following centuries, made of the inhabitants a fairly homogeneous unit. As the French Geologist, E. Doutte writes; "Morocco can be divided into Arabophones and Berberophones, nomads and sedentary, highlanders and dwellers of the plains; one can discern groups more or less steeped in Islamic civilization. But the distinction between the Arabs and the Berbers is idle, having so far no scientific foundation even from the ethnographical point of view." [2]

The cities for the most part are inhabited by the Arabs who came in the eleventh and twelfth century. The Berbers, who are mainly farmers or shepherds, live in the "bled". [3] There has always been a small Jewish minority. Some of the Jews are descendants of immigrants whose origin still remains a mystery; other reached Morocco centuries later, after having been expelled from Spain in the year 1492. The most recent national group is formed by Europeans (350-400 thousands), the majority of whom are French.

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2. Encyclopedia Britanica, 1912, Morocco.

3. An Arabic word meaning the countryside or mountains.

Morocco is comprised of mountains, fertile plains and desert. Its climate, somewhat similar to that of California, ranges from sub-tropical to Alpine. The Atlas mountains protect it from the hot, sandy winds of the Sahara. The Atlantic coast enjoys a moderate climate. Morocco is potentially rich, its soil in the plains being very fertile, but the irregularity of its rainfall calls for a far greater development of irrigation.

The main agricultural product is cereal crops. According to the available firues (1950), 992,000 metric tons of barley were grown, 665,000 of wheat and 116,000 of maize.[4] After the French settled in Morocco, the production of flax, alfalfa, sunflower seed, and peanuts, soya beans, and varied inductrial crops was encourged. Morocco was known as an exporter of wheat over the centuries. These efforts increased from about 1912 to 1940 but have dwindled since, because of population growth. During some poor crop years since 1940, large quantities of wheat have had to be imported.[5]

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4. Statistical Yearbook, 1951, (New York, United Nations, 1951), pp. 91, 93-94.

5. "Forty Years of French Techinical Assistance to Morocco," News from France, Sixth Year, No. 9, (New York, French Embassy, Press and Information Division), 15 November 1951, p. 9.

Other agricultural exports include new potatoes, tomatoes, onions and dried vegetables, (mainly to the United Kingdom) linseed, sugar, olives, dates, almonds, oranges, tangerines, figs, lemons, raisins and wine. Livestock is of almost as much value to the Moroccan economy as are the crops. The figures for 1925 [6] and 1949 [7] are:

	1925		1949	
Sheep	6	million	0.1	million
Goats	1	"	6.8	"
Cattle	1.5	"	1.8	"
Donkeys	0.5	"	0.6	"
Camels	0.11	"	0.18	"
Mules	0.07	"	0.14	"
Pigs	0.07	"	0.1	"

III

Morocco has mineral deposits of considerable importance, especially phosphates, lead and manganese. Cobalt, petroleum, coal and irom are found in limited amounts. Mineral resources are being actively explored. In the tenth and eleventh century, mercury, lead, iron and gold dust were generally exported from Morocco. With the exception of the phosphates, it is only since the Second World War that the exploitation of Morocco's mineral resources has been taken seriously in hand. This process was accelarated by the recent rearmament of most countries. Morocco is rich in manganese, an essential metal

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6. L' Oeuvre de la France au Maroc 1912-1927 (Rabat, Editions Africaines Perceval, 1948), pp. 109-110.

7. Morocco, 1950 (Rabat, Editions Africaines Perceval, 1950), p. 104.

for the hardening of steel. Though the Societé des Mines de Manganese de Bou Arfa was founded as early as 1912, only since 1948 has manganese been mined on any large scale. The exploitation of phosphate deposits was a far earlier enterprise. Whereas the other minerals are mined by private companies, phosphate production is a state monopoly and rests in the hands of the Office Cherifien des Phosphates, founded in 1920. Morocco has also a number of lead deposits, the richest of which is at Bou Beker. The known deposits of iron ore, zinc, copper, cobalt, antimony, coal and oil are of less importance. Most of the minerals are exported crude, and together they make an important contribution to the country's revenue.[8] The development of these resources can be seen from the following table of production in tons.[9]

	1948	1949	1950
Phosphates	3,226,000	3,693,000	3,872,241
Anthracite	290.000	341,400	367,868
Iron	301,300	356,800	319,190
Metallurgical manganese	195,416	221,900	257,775
Lead	39,183	51,000	65,874
Zinc	3,575	5,580	22,766
Nickle Cobalt		1,739	
Antimony	894	1,200	1,217
Salt	15,566	34,000	60,000
Petroleum	12,916	17,479	39,316
Fuller's earth	3,090	6,270	15,664

8. Landau, Rom, International Conciliation, Morocco, September, 1952, No. 483, p. 345-346.

9. Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summaries and Analyses of Information Transmitted to the Secretary-General During 1951 (New York, United Nations, 1952), Vo. II, p. 68.

Fez has long been famous for beautiful textiles, cloths, embroidery and gold-plate. Marrakesh and Tetuan are the great markets for leather and weapons. At Rabat and Safi, carpets and blankets are woven. The preparation of skins and hides and the manufacture of different leather goods also fill an important place. Although Fez is not the chief leather market in Morocco, there are no less than 3,000 tanners there. Morocco was not especially backward industrially in the pre-industrial era of the world.

IV

Morocco's strategic position and economic wealth have always stimulated foreign appetites. The Phoenecians and Carthaginians established trading centers along the coast three thousand years ago. In the second century B. C., Tingis (the present Tangier) became a Roman city. Roman rule, though limited to the more northern areas, lasted until the fifth century A. C., when the Vandals made their appearance. They were followed by a short Byzantine occupation, during which period the Christian faith reached the Maghreb [10] and some Berbers were converted to the new creed. [11]

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10. Maghreb el Aksa, the Arabic name for Morocco.

11. Independence Party of Morocco, Morocco, Before, After and Failure of the Protectorate, October 1951, pp. 10-11.

The first Arab invasion took place in 682 A. D., under Oqba ben Nafi, who reached Morocco from the East and who is best known for founding the city of Kairouan in Tunisia. However, soon afterwards the Arabs had to withdraw and the real Arab conqueror of Morocco was Mussa Ben Nosseir who in 709 annexed Morocco on behalf of the Ommiad Caliphs in Damascus. Within a comparatively short time, the native Berbers accepted Islam and in the years to come they were to prove among the most passionate, not to say fanatical, of Mohammeds followers.[12]

At the end of the eighth century came the establishment of the first independent Islamic dynasty in Morocco. Its founder was Idris, a member of the Ommiad family who, after escaping from the repression of the Abbaside Caliph, landed in Tangier in 788. In 793, the Eastern Caliph, Harun al Rashid, caused him to be assassinated. Idris the First was followed by his sone Idris II. This new ruler founded Fez as his capital in 808. From Fez, Islamic ways of thought and life and the Arabic language began to permeate the country. The Idrisid dynasty controlled a limited portion of Northern Morocco for nearly two centuries. (In part surplanted by the Midnasa in 922, until displaced by Maghrawa in 988.)

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12. Morocco, op. cit., p. 11.

These two dynasties were followed by the Almoravides in 1061. Their founder was Yousef ben Tashfim, a Berber religious reformer. This new dynasty ruled Morocco, and extended its conquest to Spain and Portugal. In its turn, it was overthrown by another religious reformer, Ibn Toumert, one of the most intriguing characters in Morocco's history. The actual founder of this new dynasty, the Almohades, was Abd el Numin. During this period the Moorish empire reached its peak. At the close of the twelfth century when it also included Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli, extending to the frontiers of Egypt which Saladin prevented it from occupying. The country became extremely prosperous under this new dynasty. The Almohades were great builders and had a taste for beautiful things. Spanish Moroccan culture enhanced the prestige of the Almohades throughout the Moslem world. Ibn Tofa'l and Ibn Roshd (Averroes), the two great Arab philosophers of the twelfth century, who exerted a considerable influence on mediaeval philosophy, were friends of the Almyhade princes.

In the middle of the thirteenth century, they lost Spain and practically everything but what is known now as Morocco.[13] Between 1217 and 1269, the Almohades were overthrown by the Merinides. It was under this new rule that

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13. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

Francis of Assisi despatched to Morocco the first Christian missionaries. The Merinide Dynasty lasted from the mid-thirteenth century up to the sixteenth century. During this rule, the last Moslem kingdom in Spain, Granada, fell, and the Portugese and Spaniards occupied several places on the coast of Morocco.

The next dynasty was the Saadians. Spain and Portugal were waging war against the Moors during this period and Spain was making itself master of the presidios.[14] The Saadian dynasty's patiotism and religious zeal affected all classes. Alliances with Spain and good relations with England were established, while Portugal remained the enemy to fight. The famous battle of the three kings was fought in 1578 when both the Portugese King and two Arab rulers met their death. It must be noted also that during this period the Saadians conquered the Sudan.[15]

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were relatively calm, and Moroccan unity was restored under a new dynasty, the Alaouites. Moulay Hafid, who signed the protectorate treaty with France in 1912, belonged to this dynasty, "the last independent Sultan"[16] of Morocco.

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14. Presidios--armed trading posts.

15. Morocco, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

16. Julien, Ch. André, Histoire de l' Afrique du Nord, (Payot, Paris, 1930), p. 738, quoted from Harris.

Below are listed the main treaties concluded with foreign powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries indicating Morocco's deplomatic relations.[17]

England	... ...Treaties of	1630
		and 1760
Denmark	... ... " "	1757
France	... ... " "	1631
		1682
		1767
Italy	... ... " "	1762
		1765
Netherlands	... ... " "	1610
		1651
		1683
Portugal	... ... " "	1772
		1799
Spain	... ... " "	1787
		1780
		1799
Sweden	... ... " "	1763
United States of America	... " "	1787

17. International Court of Justice Document, Vol II, Annex December 1951, p. 16 ff. (For all the treaties concerning Morocco, see I. C. J. Documents.)

HOW MOROCCO BECAME A FRENCH PROTECTORATE

I

It is generally recognized that Sultan Moulay Hassan, who died in 1894, was the last really strong Sultan of Morocco. He was followed by his son, Moulay Abd el Aziz, a boy of 13 or 14. Moulay Abd el Aziz was a confused ruler, unable to control the widespread disorders which resulted from his weakness. Bandits such as Raisuli,[18] and "Bou Hamara"[19] exercised almost absolute power in their own areas. It is established now that both Raisuli and Bou Hamara were supported and subsidized, by Spain in the case of the former, and by France in the case of the latter.[20] Because of the lack of support from his people, by 1908 Abd el Aziz was forced to abdicate in favor of his brother Hafid, and went into retirement. It was in this atmosphere of disintegration that international intervention in Morocco began to play an increasing role.

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18. Moulay Ahmed ben Mohammed er Raisuli was not born a bandit. He was, in fact, a Shereef, and had received an excellent grounding in law and religion.

19. The French supported Bou Hamara and financed his rising in the Algier-Moroccan region. He exercised almost absolute power over eastern Morocco, and the Sultan's ill-paid and unenthusiastic armies were not only unable to force him into submission but even suffered a painful defeat at his hands.

20. Bechir, Mostafa, Hello Bebitt, Les Cahiers de l'Unite Arabe, Cairo, 1954.

The chief instigator of France's policy in Morocco was the Comite du Maroc,[21] founded at the beginning of the present century. Its founders were influential businessmen with widespread interests in France, Algeria and Tunisia. It would be not exaggeration to say of this committee, and, in more recent years, of its successor, the North African Lobby in Paris, that they were chiefly responsible for French politics in Morocco.[22]

In order to gain control of Morocco, France has to combine three different methods of penetration--financial, diplomatic and military.

II

Dealing with the financial aspect first, Abd el Aziz found hismelf compelled to borrow 800,000 pounds (or nearly three and a half million dollars) from the French, British and Spanish syndicates in the year 1903. In order to guarantee repayment, all custom revenues were placed under French control. To pay the interest on this debt, Abd el Aziz had to impose new taxes, thus further increasing his

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21. The Comité du Maroc came into being at the beginning of the twentieth century. Its chief supporters were certain politicians and representatives of big business and finance with colonial ambitions. For full list of supporters see Manchester Guardian, 8 May, 1911.

22. Morel, E. D., Morocco in Diplomacy, London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1912. p. 111.

unpopularity. It was then that the "stirring up" of the tribes on the Algerian frontier took place. These stirrings were to become a part of the policy followed by the French authorities in Algeria.[23]

Throughout the years preceding the establishment of the French Protectorate, we see a constant interplay between financial and military penetration. Thus, from the beginning of the present century, tribal incidents along the Algerian frontier and cases of violence within Morocco were used by the French as an excuse for imposing financial indemnities upon the Sherifian Government. At one time the Sultan even requested, "Queen Victoria to use her good offices for the establishment of a final boundary between Algeria and Morocco beyond which they (the French) would agree not to advance".[24]

On March 29, 1907, the French occupied Oujda, in the East and Casablanca on the Atlantic, The occupation of the former was a reprisal for the murder of the French docter Emile Mauchamp, (in Marakesh) on the 22nd of March 1907; that of the latter was in retaliation for a riot in the course of which some European workmen were killed. France not only occupied

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23. Ibid., pp. 38 & 48.

24. Nicholson, Harold, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart. Constable & Co., 1930, p. 130.

these cities but also imposed heavy indemnities upon the Moroccan government. Having occupied such decisive strategic and economic areas, France became the financial spokesman for all the creditor nations. In 1910 she presented Sultan Moulay Hafid with a bill for 163 million francs. To meet the bill, a new loan had to be raised from French bankers. The exorbitant rates of that loan and the manner in which it was handled in Paris evoked a passionate protest in the French Chamber of Deputies, especially on the part of Jean Jaures, the great Socialist leader. "In 1911, France occupied Fez, the ancient capital of Morocco and symbol of Sherifian authority. Although the French promised to withdraw their troops from the city, this was not done; therefore, one year before the proclamation of the Protectorate, France was already in the possession of Fez, Oujda, Casablanca and Rabat." [25]

III

Let us now see how the French legalized their control over Morocco by diplomatic means. In order to safeguard herself against the inevitable opposition of other European powers with interests in Morocco, France had to obtain freedom of action. This she did by securing a number of diplomatic treaties with her various would-be-competitors. French

25. Morel, E. D., op. cit., pp. 111, 117 & 121.

domination in North Africa had begun with her annexation of Algeria in 1830. This was followed by her occupation of Tunisia in 1881. Having gained control over these two territories, it was inevitable that France should wish to safeguard and complete her North African possessions by the addition of Morocco. Hew chief competitor in that area was obviously Great Britain. Britain's policy in Morocco rested upon the principle that no single European power should own the country facing Britain's outpost at Gebraltar. England's policy is tersely stated in the instructions given in 1845 by her Majesty's government to its representative in Tangier: "Our permanent object must be to exert ourselves to the utmost in assisting to uphold the authority of the Sultan and to arrest every incident which might threaten it with fresh danger", [26] Morocco's fears of French designs are best illustrated by the fact that in 1871, the Sultan was willing to place his country under an American Protectorate. The Sultan approached the American consul, General Mathews in that sense. In its answer, American State Department declared that it would have to " decline to accept any offer from His Majesty to confer upon the United States of America a protectorate over his domain". [27]

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26. Archives of the British Legation in Tangier, F. O. Despatch of 26 May, 1845.

27. Archives of the American Legation in Tangier. Despatch Book 1869-74, No. 30, 29 June 1871, and 1861-1880, No. 18, 22 August 1871.

Sultan Abd el Aziz and his successor repeatedly expressed their willingness to introduce long-overdue reforms. But as they also saw the danger of allowing any one foreign power to be instrumental in effecting them, they would accept no Greek gifts. Their best safeguard was, they believed, to accept only such improvements as were brought about by the concerted effort of several. [28]

IV

France wasted no time in winning over its European competitors. To disarm opposition, French diplomacy worked assiduously and successfully during the ten years preceding the final occupation of the Maghreb.

"On Nov. 1, 1901, in exchange for liberty of action in Tripolitania for Italy, France received a corresponding freedom of action in Morocco from Italy," [29] "A similar guarantee of non-interference from England was obtained as a result of the Franco-British treaty of 1904 which laid the foundations of the entente cordiale." [30] At that time Britain was granted

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28. Landau, Rom, "Morocco 1900-1955", Unpublished manuscript.

29. For details of Franco-Italian negotiations, see Reuard de Card, Accords secrets entre la France et l'Italie concernant le Maroc et la Lybie, Paris, A. Pedone, 1921.

30. For text of agreement, see Parliamentary Papers, (1905), C111 (cd.2384). London, H. M. Stationary Office, and Documents diplomatiques, Ministere des affaires etrangeres: Accords conclus, le 8 avril 1908 entre la France et l'Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1904.

a free hand in Egypt in return for one by the French in Morocco...While this general agreement as to spheres of influence gave France almost complete freedom of action, the Sultan and his government were not taken into consideration. There was no one to whom Morocco could turn. It was at that moment that the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, stepped upon the scene.[31]

By 1905 the Kaiser and his Chancellor Von Bülow were acting on the assumption that France was determined to change Morocco's status, and that German commercial interests in that country would thereby be irreparably jeopardized. In his ill-conceived resolve to give France a warning, Von Bulow persuaded the Kaiser to appear personally in Tangier. In March 1905, Wilhelm II landed in that city, and received the Sultan's personal envoy. He greeted him with the words, "I am today paying a visit to the Sultan of Morocco, an independent sovereign; and I express the hope that under his inspired guidance free Morocco will continue to be open to the peaceful competitions of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on a basis of complete equality. The object of my visit is to make it known that I am determined to do everyé thing in my power to safeguard effectively the interests of Germany in Morocco. I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely

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31. Nicolson, Harold, op. cit., p. 150.

independent sovereign, and it is with him that I desire to come to an understanding as to the best means to bring such a result about..." [32]

The Kaiser's intervention was regarded generally as a deliberate affront to France, and it was feared that a Franco-German war might ensue. Partly on the initiative of President Roosevelt an international conference was called at Algecires in Spain in 1906. Twelve nations besides Morocco including the U. S. and Russia, participated in the conference. In the resulting Act of Algecires of April 7, 1906, these powers affirmed the independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his territory, and the principle of the open door in Morocco's economic relations with foreign countries. [33]

Ignoring its obligation under this act, France continued to strengthen its hold in Morocco. On November 4, 1911, France succeeded in appeasing Germany with a treaty in which she obtained a free hand in Morocco in return for ceding to Germany 107,270 sq. miles in the French Congo. The German Foreign Minister announced, "Morocco---you shall have it". He even added, "Establish therein your Protectorate, draw up yourselves the arrangements which shall specify the details". [34]

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32. Morel, E. D., op. cit., p. 110.

33. See Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc, 1905-5, No. 287.

34. Journal Officiel, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 14 December, 1911.

The importance of Morocco to France had produced a situation in which nothing stood in the way a Protectorate over Morocco. Bankruptcy and internal rebellions, partly formented and financed from outside, resulted in conditions amounting to chaos, and forced Sultan Moulay Hafid in 1912 to request French assistance.

MOROCCO UNDER THE PROTECTORATE-1912-1925

I

There are two fundamental problems that call for clarification before we can examine the achievements of France's first Resident General in Morocco, Lyautey. These are;

1. Morocco's true state as a political entity, and
2. The supposedly insoluble conflict between Arabs and Berbers.

It has been argued by some that Morocco represented neither a nation nor a state before 1912 in the usual sense of these terms. Thus, Professor Henri Terrasse, in his Histoire du Maroc, writes; "Moslem Morocco has never been a state worthy of the name...From the days of the Merinides, there has come into being the bled es siba which has gone on increasing in size...The Sherifian Morocco was nothing but an incomplete and unstable agglomeration of tribes; in fact, far from becoming a state, Morocco failed even to achieve the status of nation". [35]

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35. Terrasse, Henri, Histoire du Maroc, Casablanca, Editions Atlantides, 1952, pp. 189-190.

Professor Lévi-Provensal, on the other hand states: "For almost five hundred years Morocco has been the only Islamic country which had the notion, albeit far from clear-out, that it constituted a nation. It was aware of its ethnic and political unity, and saw the birth of a true national sentiment". [36] His views are confirmed by another French expert on Morocco, Professor Ch.-Andre Julien of the Sorbonne, who writes, "In spite of the chronic fights between the northern and southern zones, eternal rivals--Mediterranean North and the African South--and contrary to what happened in Algeria, the persistance of the Moroccan state was manifest." [37]

But perhaps no other opinion carries greater weight than that of Lyautey, undoubtedly France's leading authority on the subject. In a speech delivered in 1916 he stated, "We found in this country, a state and a clearly defined people. Most of the existing institutions still stood on their feet and they represented something real. There existed not only a definite political organization but also an important judicial machinery." On another occasion he said, "The more I see of the Moroccans, the longer I live in this country, the more I am convinced of the greatness of this nation". Another of Lyautey's analyses was this; "Whereas in Algeria

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36. Le Monde, 30 June, 1953.

37. Julien, Ch.-Andre, L'Afrique du Nord en Marche, Paris Rene' Julliard, 1953. p. 140.

we were confronted principally by dust, an amorphous state of affairs where the only constituted power resided in the person of the Turkish Dey, which collapsed upon our arrival, in Morocco, on the contrary, we found ourselves face to face with an historical and independent empire...There are still alive in Morocco several important persons who up until six years ago, (1912) were the ambassadors of an independent Morocco at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Madrid, and Paris, men who negotiated on equal terms with European statesmen..." [38]

II

The Moroccan government before the year 1912 was a limited autocracy, the theoretically absolute power of the Sultan being circumscribed by the religious influence which in a measure supported him, and by the tribes, mainly Berber, which while accepting him as their spiritual leader, often denied his secular authority. The central government is known as the Makhzen (an Arabic word primarily meaning store house). In the local administration there were goberners of provinces and towns, who were nominated by the minister of the interior. In addition there were town officials who were appointed by the governor, not to mention the many Sheiks who directed the affairs of the villages.

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38. All quotations from Lyautey's Paroles d' Action.

The part of the Empire in which the authority of the Makhzen was accepted was known as the bled el Makhzen, (government country). Those regions which did not accept that authority were known as bled es siba (the unsubmissive country). The bled es siba continued as such for more than two decades after 1912. French armies fought continuous and arduous campaigns before they completed the subjugation of the whole country in 1934.[39]

III

The so-called Berber problem has been even more obscured by the propaganda of interested parties, a propaganda emanating chiefly from what has become known as the Berber School at the Quai d' Orsay.[40] According to that school, the Berber people have a homogeneous character and civilization entitling them to the dignity of "nationhood", denied the Arabs; that Berber and Arabsare in uncompromising opposition.[41]

Jean Celerier, in his book Maroc says, "While it is wrong to speak of a Moroccan people, there is a Berber people."[42]

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39. Julien, op. cit., p. 151.

40. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

41. Landau, Rom, "Morocco 1900-1955", Unpublished manuscript, Ch. 3, p. 4.

42. Editions, Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1954, p. 67.

Professor Henri Terrasse states that the Berbers have preserved a strong unity of language, and concludes: "The Berbers represent a triple unity of race, language and civilization." [43]

The following figures of the official French estimate of 1949 give a useful picture of the situation.

29% of the population speak Berber only;

14% of the population speak Berber as their mother tongue, but also have a command of the Arabic,

64% speak Arabic as their first tongue, but some of them have some knowledge of Berber. [44]

Whatever the racial and temperamental differences between Arabs and Berbers may be, we must remember that they share a religion, Islam, and more than a thousand years of common history. The antagonism between them has lost much of its edge.

IV

On March 30, 1912, the Treaty of Fez was signed between France and Morocco, and the Protectorate became a fact. General, later Marshal, Lyautey was appointed as the first Resident General.

It is often said that the natives welcomed the sign-

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43. Terrasse, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

44. Landau,"op. cit.", Section 3.

ing of the Protectorate treaty, and that the new French regime released them from the poverty and chaos that the last two Sultans left as their sole heritage.

General Catroux,[45] at the time in question, was one of Lyautey's close collaborators and a member of his staff. He stated that the Treaty of Fez, "was rejected by the entire Moroccan population, and immediately 'provoked bloody risings', in the course of which many hundreds of French soldiers were massacred in Fez alone. A wave of anarchy submerged Morocco and turned against the French and against Moulay Hafid. By having made common cause with them, he became a traitor to Islam and to his country."[46]

Berbers and Arabs alike rose against the new regime, and it was not until the end of 1934 that France subdued the whole of Morocco. A young French officer, who many years later succeeded Lyautey as Resident General had this to say: "No tribe submitted without resistance and some did not submit until they had exhausted their last means of resistance...Each stage of the advance was marked by fighting. Each check created a new frontier which had to be held by a system of fortifications in which our troops were

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45. In more recent years, General Catroux served as French High Commissioner in Syria, and as Ambassador to Russia.

46. Catroux, General, Lyautey le Marocain, Paris, Hachette, 1952, pp. 131 & 132.

compelled for many long years to mount guard, exposed to danger and without glory." [47]

Though Moulay Hafid, caught in his own net, had to sign the Protectorate treaty, he soon realized his utter impotence, and abdicated. He was replaced by his brother Moulay Youssef.

Lyautey, a man of honor who loved the Moroccans and had an appreciation of Moroccan civilization and history, tried to preserve their institutions and never humiliated the people. For him, force was a secondary means in dealing with the Moroccans. He worked for their interest, but at the same time he had to satisfy the colonial ambitions of his country. Thus, he could not be as fair to the Moroccans as he wanted to be, and found himself in a dilemma. He never tired of emphasizing to those who worked under him that the first condition for the success of their mission was "minutest knowledge of the natives, their chiefs, their traditions, and their needs, and constant and direct cooperation with them." [48]

Lyautey, a soldier, a statesman and a man of action, came to Morocco having in mind that Morocco was undeveloped country. It was his job to change this. Lyautey said in

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47. Guillaume, General A., Les Berberes marocains et la Pacification de l'Atlas Central, Paris, Julliard, 1940.

48. Textes et Lectures de Lyautey l'Africain, edited by Pierre Lyautey, Paris, Plon, 1953.

1925 that he had had no choice in 1912, being unable to fight everyone at once. So he elisted the great feudal barons of the South--Glaoui, N'Tougui and Gaundafi, were the most powerful. He hoped to get rid of them in time. By 1925, two were insignificant (weak heirs, etc)... Lyautey still thought the Glaoui would be worn down eventually.

"He was greatly impressed by the British policy of strengthening the power of the Indian maharajas at the expense of the Congress; consequently he tried to follow the British model by infusing new life into the country's moribund feudal system...In that policy both Lyautey and his successors concentrated chiefly on the 'Glawa clan',[49] who from the very beginning were sufficiently astute to realize that their country was not strong enough to resist the French conquest, and who therefore sided with their new masters."[50]

Lyautey paid far less attention to the middle class than he gave the chiefs. He neglected the spirit of democracy that was growing among the young intellectuals who had already absorbed ideas from France and other western

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49. From this clan came Thami el Glaoui who is at present the power behind Sultan Moulay ben Arafa.

50. Landau, Rom, "Moroccan Profiles: A Nationalist View", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 7, No. I, Winter 1953, p. 55.

democracies. Although he recognized that France was not there to rule the people, but to help and to advise, which is the essence of the Protectorate principly, it was to the feudal lords and the wealthy bourgeois that his attention was mainly given. His autocratic methods often earned the accusation that he was building up his own power. He loved the native customs, tradition, music, art and did not allow settlers to spoil them. When their influence started to grow in Morocco, and they tried to transform it into a colony, he declared that his authority and policy in Morocco should be questioned.[51]

For the European settlers he established new cities, not allowing them to westernize the beauty of Moorish architecture. Even the newly erected cities had to follow the Moorish style. This, however, separated the natives from the newcomers in a geographical sense. Due to that separation there developed a gulf between the two groups, leading in the end to the situation in which there were only rulers and ruled. All this was done without the advice of the Sultan, who was nominally the supreme authority. The Sultan knew about decrees only when they were brought to him for his signature.[52]

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51. Catroux. op. cit., 1952, pp. 70-77.

52. Istiqlal Party, Some Guiding Facts on The Problem of Morocco (Prepared and published by a Group of Independent Students of Moroccan Affairs), Paris, 1951, p. 5.

Lyautey's chief opponents were the opportunists and French businessmen who were lobbying and working toward developing Morocco for their own interests. Great decisions concerning Morocco were taken by politicians in Paris who knew comparatively little about the country. Lyautey warned the French government of the seriousness of this situation, pointing out that, "there are groups of young Moroccan intellectuals who will oppose the French policy of colonization and might revolt and the situation will get out of hand".[53]

There is no doubt that Lyautey introduced the twentieth century to Morocco and got it accepted by the people. There are many and various administrations that must be given credit. Among the most important was the unification of Morocco; he put down the tribal revolts, gradually reducing the bled es siba until the entire country was pacified under the central government authority.[54]

V

Lyautey, as the first Resident General, was faced with innumerable political, economic, and social problems. The first of his actions was to introduce reforms in governmental organization. Morocco was an independent country. To bring

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53. Independence Party of Morocco, op. cit., October 1951, p. 54.

54. Powell, Alexander E., In Barbary, The Century Company, New York, 1926, p. 350-357.

it under the Protectorate system, some changes had to be made to suit the new French administration.

1. Lyautey had to stop the perennial banditry, introduce internal peace, establish order in the cities as well between the tribes, and reform a tribal relationship to the central government which had never been completely stable.

2. The relationship of the Sultan to the Resident General and the officials who were working under both leaderships had to be regulated.

The Sultan as the nominal head of Morocco had no actual power. He stayed on mainly to be used by the French authorities as a tool to carry on their functions and policy. His policy and authority were restricted to whatever the French wanted him to do or execute. On the other hand the French Resident General had a limitless power domestically. His power is limited only concerning those commitments which deal with foreign relationships, such as:

1. The treaty of November 27, 1912, by which France passed to Spain the complete control of the Northern shores of Morocco along the Mediterranean coast.

2. The act of Algeciras which had established complete economic trading equality in Morocco for all foreign powers and set a uniform tariff, was nominally observed but studiously

encroached upon.

3. Certain foreign powers enjoyed the privilege of their own jurisdiction on Moroccan soil. That privilege emanated from the capitulatory rights they had acquired in the past. Great Britain renounced her capitulations in 1928 after which date the United States was the only foreign power to retain its own system of justice for its nationals in French Morocco.[55] Morocco had a long history of established relations with foreign nations.[56] The protectorate put an end to these and the ministries of foreign affairs and of war got into the hands of the French. Morocco's foreign relations and defense policy were directed from Paris and executed by the Resident General who was in fact the supreme authority in Morocco. Only a few offices were left for the natives--those that dealt with Islamic law and charitable foundations. But all decrees or dahirs had to be signed by the Sultan in order to become law.

The Resident General acted as the Sultan's foreign minister, assisted by a few French officials who acted as concilors for the Sultan, (Conseiller du gouvernement chérifien). In addition there were a few municipal councils and Chambers of Agriculture and of Commerce, whose representatives made up a so-called "Council of Government", which

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55. Célérier, op. cit., p. 113.

" The scope of that system was somewhat reduced after the verdict of the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 1952.

56. Seventeenth and eighteenth century treaties mentioned in Chapter 1. For text of these and later treaties see, I. C. J. Documents.

was a consultative body only.[57]

In a backward country such as Morocco, with a governmental and administrative system that had fundamentally advanced little since the Middle Ages, it was imperative for Lyautey to reform the entire administrative machinery. This he did by creating departments to be headed by Frenchmen such as those of finance, public works, economic affairs, agriculture, commerce and colonization, health, education, justice and tourism. The heads of these departments bore the title of Directors, their role and functions corresponded to those of cabinet ministers. All these Directors were French. Beginning in 1947, a few natives were appointed as undersecretaries but with no functions except consultative ones. At the top of this departmental hierarchy was the secretary general, who is French. To assist the Resident General there was a French minister who took over when the Resident General was absent.

The country was divided and subdivided into regions, or territories, each of these governed by a chef du territoire, or by a controleur civil. Some of these territories were governed by military governors, some of them by civilians. Domestic reforms and community improvements were the aims of many of these governors. In the towns were French-

57. Independence Party of Morocco, op. cit., pp. 57-60.

appointed Chefs des services Minicipaux, municipal administrators, "changed with the control of the native authorities".[58]

In addition to these administrators of towns, there were the Pashas who were nominally appointed by the Sultan but had nothing to say about the affairs of the local French community. Finally there were the many Caids and Sheiks who were traditionally the tribal administrators in the rural areas. They, however, had to consult with the District French Administrators.[59]

Corresponding reforms were introduced in all the other spheres of national life. New harbors, roads and railways were built, agricultural methods were improved and a number of light industries were built. Only in the sphere of the administration of Justice did reforms lag behind. Health services and education too were modernized and extended.

To conclude the Lyautey period of reforms, we can summarize by saying that Lyautey came to Morocco to find it split by tribal rivalries, with little modern agriculture and western-type industries. When his term ended in 1925, he left behind a more prosperous land headed toward unity, much of it pacified, and with the state finances in a sound

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58. Prosper, Ricard, Maroc, Hachette, 1948, p. 47.

59. Célérier, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

basis. The administration, modernized and moderately efficient, had at least a hope of solving its difficulties without appealing to outmoded processes.

Although modernization was not complete, in thirteen years Lyautey laid the foundation of a new and modern state. His good work and good intentions were acknowledged by the Moroccans. His policy was not always followed by succeeding administrations but this is not to his discredit. His achievement was honorable and brilleint. His list of triumphs is even more remarkable for the fact that five of the thirteen years which circumstances granted him, belonged to the period of the first World War, during which the slowing down of his work was inevitable.

We have touched upon Lyautey's achievements and some of his reforms during his thirteen years of administration; and now it might be interesting to note his last year in administration.

Lyautey did not receive much assistance from home; he was always subject to critisicm by the French people who favored a colonial system in Morocco.

VI

By 1924 the Marshal was seventy years old and his life had been a strenuous one. "The opposition he encountered was gradually persuading him that the Morocco of his ideas and

ideals was slipping away from him. He contemplated retirement." [60] It was practically forced upon him in 1925, but he remained active. A left-wing government in Paris resented him as a royalist, bungled the Riffian situation and could not tolerate the old Marshall after events had completely vindicated his judgment.

The war that the Riff leader, Abd el Krim [61] had been waging so successfully against the Spanish was threatening to erupt into the French zone. This Riff leader was not a professional soldier. His troops were not equipped with modern arms like the Spanish. Yet his tribes were waging total war against Spain, which suffered enormous losses and was on the verge of defeat. [62]

Lyautey, as noted earlier, was well aware of the Riffian leader's success in the Spanish zone. It was an open intention of Abd el Krim that after capturing the Spanish zone, he would attack the French. Lyautey was much disturbed by the fact that the situation of the Spanish was becoming desperate and that Abd el Krim was gradually pressing toward

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60. Catroux, op. cit., p. 163.

61. Abd el Krim came from a tribe in the Riff. His father was an influential and greatly respected chieftain with uncommonly progressive ideas. Abd el Krim studied law, then was later employed to teach Spanish officials the Berber language. In 1921, he was imprisoned by the Spanish after a quarrel with one of their officers. It was immediately after his escape from prison that he organized his military campaign.

62. Harris, Walter B., France, Spain and the Riff, London, Edward Arnold, 1927, pp. vii and 322.

the frontiers of the French zone.

On November 23, 1924, Lyautey's telegram to the French government reported that, "the Spanish Protectorate was being replaced along the borders by a dissident area 'subservient and attentive to one single chief'". The successes of that solitary chief were putting new heart into the yet unconquered tribes in the French zone. They also greatly impressed the more restless elements in the already subjugated regions. On December 11, Lyautey despatched another telegram to Paris announcing that, "a Moslem State, arising out of North African nationalism, is establishing itself north of French Morocco," adding a warning that, "Abd el Krim was making no secret of his intention to attack the French zone." 63

In mid-December the cabinet of Herriot approved Lyautey's plans for a campaign against the Riffians. Lyautey recognized that what was happening in the Riff was not merely a tribal rising but the mergence of a new Moroccan State. He had no doubt that, should Abd el Krim succeed, he would proclaim himself Sultan.

As Lyautey predicted, the Riffians concentrated their troops near the French border in April 1925. "The Riffian troops were no longer compelled to make the best of outdated weapons or such as they managed to smuggle through from out-

63. Catroux, op. cit., p. 164.

side; for they had captured a great quantity of arms from the Spanish.[64]

In July, 1925, the French government sent another famous soldier, Marshal Petain to Morocco. Finally, three Marshal, Petain, Lyautey and Primo de Rivera, forty generals and almost half a million Franco-Spanish troops were required to bring the Riffian warrior to his knees. Abd el Krim finally submitted to his enemies, the French. Not suprisingly, Lyautey felt deeply hurt when the Supreme command of the final campain, that he had so laboriously prepared, was given to Petain. He sent in his resignation to the French government, left Morocco a disappointed man, and was replaced by T. Steeg, a former Senator and Governor General of Algeria.[65]

While Lyautey was concerned with the welfare of Morocco, the concern of those who were to repudiate him, while paying fulsome praises to his memory, was the furtherance of their own interests. At the close of his life, Lyautey looked with sorrow upon the weakening entente between France and Morocco.

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64. In his book France, Spain and the Rif, Walter Harris mentions that when Abd el Krim's surrender came about in 1926, his men were in possession of 135 cannons, over 40,000 rifles, 240 machine-guns and large quantities of bombs and ammunition. "All cannons", he states, "the machine guns, and most of the rifles and other material they had captured from the Spanish and French armies."

65. Catroux, op. cit., pp. 224-227 & 245.

VII.

Although Lyautey's successors assured the Moroccans of their respect for Morocco's sovereignty, Theodore Steeg soon revealed his intentions of transforming the country's status as a Protectorate into a colonial one.

Lyautey had wanted only men who knew Morocco well and were prepared to follow his policies. Steeg replaced many of these men by new ones reared chiefly in the school of Algerian colonialism and hardly in sympathy with the Marshal's conception. Unlike Lyautey, Steeg limited his contacts with representatives of native opinion to a bare minimum. Coöperation between the Residency and the Makhzen came almost to a standstill, and all effective power was concentrated in French hands. Lyautey had already complained about this illegal monopoly of power by France. In 1920, he declared unequivocably: "Our regime in this country is based on the doctrine of a Protectorate. We proclaim that doctrine, the Government proclaims it on every occasion. But is it really anything but fiction? We have direct administration in our blood... officials coming from France as well as those coming from Algeria. We are moving more and more towards direct administration." [66] Under Steeg the number of French land-holders in

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66. Circular of 18 November 1920, quoted in La Drame Marocain devant la conscience chrétienne, Paris, Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien, 1953, p. 60.

Morocco trebeled. Unlike Lyautey, he believed in colonisation by small-scale farmers from France. The expropriation of native land increased and was continued for many years to come. This was responsible for the creation of a landless native proletariat and for the establishment of a foreign agricultural community on the Algerian and Tunisian models.

Most of Lyautey's successors continued the Steeg policy, indirect administration more and more by direct control. Purely in terms of economics, they contributed an enormous amount to the modernization of Morocco. But unlike Lyautey, they disregarded the human, social, cultural and political aspirations of the natives.

ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PROTECTORATE

A. The French Version

An evaluation of the achievement of the protectorate cannot be made apart from the political motivation of the French government. At the same time one must keep in mind that the Moroccan's viewpoints are apt to be colored by their nationalistic motivations. Neither the French nor the Moroccan assessments of France's achievements in the Maghreb are unbiased. No observer can hope to arrive at all the correct figures and to unravel their essential meaning. For a great many years both the French authorities and the nationalists have been waging an acrimonuous war of figures. If occasionally their computations agreed, the case was exceptional. The interpretation of given figures depended entirely upon the affinites of the interpreter. It must also be borne in mind that most economic transactions in Morocco have some political motive behind them. Thus, their examination, if unsupported by a knowledge of the motives, easity leads to false conclusions.

For this reason the writer of this thesis feels that it might be wise to review Moroccan progress since 1912 by presenting both French and Moroccan versions. The reader can then decide which explanation is the more acceptable. In the first part of this chapter, Moroccan achievements are described on the basis of French official statements

and figures only. In the second part, the process will be reversed, and the corresponding Moroccan version will be given. The material contained in the present account is taken from three French official publications: L'Oeuvre de la France au Maroc de 1912 a 1947 and Morocco 1950, (both published forthe Protectorate authorities by Editions Africaines Perceval, Rabat, in 1948 and 1950 repectively), and from News from France, (published by the French Embassy, Press and information Division, New York, Nos. 9 & 10, November 15 and December 15, 1951.

II

According to an official French spokesman, "Material changes, improvement in the standard of living, and permanent contact with modern civilization have transformed Moroccan society". This transformation is said to be based upon reforms, "which France initiates and puts into effect. The Protectorate decides in the reform policy and controls its execution". Economically speak ng the reform policy was put into effect by the creation of the Government Council and the Chambers of Agriculture, of Commerce and of Industry. Thus, the "Protectorate's objective was to limit the sovereignty firmly concentrated in the Makhzen by means of consultative organs destined to evolve proportionately to the political development of the people...The agricultural representatives

are now elected by farmers using modern methods and by the members of the councils of the Moroccan Provident Society... The electoral college of the Chambers of Commerce and industry has been broadened to include all classes of licensed businessmen, industrialists and artisan".

After forty years of French technical assistance, there is economic security even in the most remote areas. Morocco is becoming part of the modern world...The Protectorate laid the foundations of a modern infrastructure which would make it possible to organize rapidly an economy designed on the one hand, to fulfill the aspirations of a predominantly agricultural population and, on the other, to develop the country's natural, hydraulic, and mining resources for the dual purpose of providing work for a constantly growing population and of increasing Morocco's participation in world trade.

III

In Morocco there are about 46 million acres of productive land. Out of this amount, the area cultivated was:

	1919	1939
By Europeans	74.000	988.000
By Moroccans	4.940.000	10.868,000

"Morocco's agricultural potentialities raise great hopes if one considers the fact that there are still approxi-

mately 7,410.000 areas of unploughed land, 19,760.000 acres of pasture land and 247.000 acres of recoverable swamp land."

"From 1931 to 1940, Morocco's cereal requirements amounted to a yearly average of two million tons, including 500.000 tons of bread, cereals and 1.46 million tons of secondary cereals. During the same period the average production was 740.000 tons of bread cereals and 1,533.000 tons of secondary cereals. Morocco could thus export an average surplus of approximately 300.00 tons. The situation has changed since 1940 because of the increase in Morocco's population, the changes in food habits of the increasing urban population, and the lack of security reserves due to the disastrous drought of 1945. The production of cereals in 1940-50 totalled 1.8 million tons. Morocco now imports soft wheat and exports barley and corn."

Increase in other cultivate areas in shown in the following table:

	1939	1949
vines	23.800 hectare	29.500 hectare
Various Fruit Trees	28.000 "	99.900 "
Olive Trees	82.000 "	103.000 "
Almond trees	33.400 "	50.000 "
Citrus fruit	10.800 "	23.300 "
Palm trees	21.500 "	59.200 "
Market gardening	25.000 "	52.000 "

1 hectare----2.47 acres.

	Average output under Moroccan methods.	Average output under European methods
Hard Wheat	5.87 quintals per ha.	7.69 Q. P. H.
Soft Wheat	5.47 "	9.75 "

The French claim that before 1912, agriculture in Morocco, "suffered from the greatest insecurity of proprietary rights. The French administration instituted, in 1913 the registration of property, in accordance with the principles of the Torrens Act". The number of estates registered between the introduction of this system and 1949 is as follows:

French		
	Town property	12.323
	Rural property	11.050
Moroccan		
	Town property	9.695
	Rural property	31.427

These figures indicate that the ownership of farmlands in Morocco is almost entirely in the hands of the Moroccans. European hold only 2.47 million acres.

"Moroccan farmers are about 850.000 in number. There are some 6,000 European farmers, 4,300 of whom settled independently on land which they had bought from the preceding owners in the ordinary way, while 1,700 took up allotments between 1918 and 1935 on property officially colonized, by setting aside State lands or purchasing estates from collective or individual owners. The claim goes on to say that these colonists which are majority French play an important part in the economic and technical development of the country.

In 1945, "Sectors for Modernization of the Peasantry" (S.M.P.) were created for the development and modernization farm. Their aim is to: bring under cultivation fresh areas

of arable lands; get the Moroccan farmer to carry out this development by setting at his disposal an extensive ranger of agricultural equipment, and initiating him into modern methods of farming; ensure the productivity of the Moroccan farmer's labors by carrying out collectively, with scientific organization, the conditioning and marketing of his produce.

IV

In 1914 a "Livestock Service" was created, which resulted not only in a rapid increase in Moroccan livestock, but also in improvement, which made possible the expansion of the frozen and canned meat industry. "The trend in the breeding of live stock has been detertined by two factors: the need to reduce the importation of products for the feeding of the population (meat, milk, wool, leather, etc.), and to enable it to export products of which there could shortly be a surplus.

On account of the inhibitions due to the geographical conditions, the efforts of the public authorities and the breeders tended rather to an improvement in the conditions of keeping stock (shelters, pastures, water supplies, etc.), and in its quality by selection and cross breeding than to a mere attempt to increase its numbers.

The number of head of live-stock was severly diminished by the 1945 drought but has since been going up steadily.

In 1951 it stood at:

Camels	194.000	Oxen	1,401,000
Horses	179,000	Calves	501,000
Mules	149,000	Sheep	1,023,000
Asses	637,000	Goats	7,372,000
Pigs	59,000		

"The Water and Forestry Service had endeavoured to preserve the Moroccan forests, in danger of destruction, by launching a reforestation program and regulating the utilization of forest products. Over 14.820 acres of drifting sands have been stabilized by means of beach grass and castor-oil plants. Moreover, a forest servicing program has been gradually carried out, through the construction of 1.860 miles of forest roads (against 139.5 in 1920)."

Not until 1929, the French claim that, "hydraulic development was begun. Its dual purpose was to increase the areas of cultivatable land by means of irrigation, and to meet the country's increasing need of electric power. The hydraulic possibilities in Morocco allow of the irrigation of at least 2.471.000 acres. In 1935, only 37.000 acres were irrigated. In 1950, the total area of cultivated land "submitted to irrigation" is 540.000 acres. Whereas, in 1915 there was not a single reservoir with dams in 1949, there were four.

V

Before the Protectorate, mining was practically non-existent. "In 1920, the Office Cherifien des Phosphates was

set up, with the State as sole shareholder. The principal phosphate centers are Knouribga and Louis-Gentil, which employ 10,000 workers. Production of phosphates rose from 1.720 million tons in 1938 to 3.870 million in 1950 and five million tons in 1953."

In 1919 mining of Manganese started. Production increased from 80,000 tons in 1938 to 258,000 tons in 1950. Total production of lead ore increased from 26,000 tons in 1938 to 66,000 tons in 1950 and 110,000 in 1952. The anthracite deposits at Djerada, discovered in 1928, have been exploited since 1931. Three thousand workers are employed. Production rose from 141,000 tons in 1938 to 253,000 in 1950.

VI

"In the field of industry there are flour mills, paste, cracker and chocolate factories, dairies, cheese factories, distilleries, vinegar factories, breweries, oil mills, sugar refineries, canneries of fish, fruits and fruit juices. Factories began in 1938 when twenty seven construction companies, employing 40,000 workers, were already registered. Then came the chemical, machine and metallurgical industries. Almost a hundred new regular machine shops were installed at Casablanca after 1939. There are six great shipyards capable of repairing all kinds of ships. Industrialization has given work to 120,000 persons, 100,000 of which are Moroccans."

The record of French economic development on Moroccan soil is equally impressive in the fields of transport, telephone and telegraphic communication, radio, and so on.

VII

"The establishment of the Protectorate led inevitably to an influx of country people into the cities, the French claim. The Housing Bureau built 3.240 dwellings in two years and the Department of Public Works, which succeeded it, in 1951 completing 1.270 units while construction is being started on 1.000 more. Finally, a French company with considerable capital has recently been established to finance the construction of low-cost Moroccan dwellings, especially in Casablanca where there is a shortage of 35.000 houses calling for an expenditure of 20 billion francs."

VIII

In the field of Public Health, according to a French spokesman, France has constantly labored to improve public health and hygiene by fighting against epidemics and social disease; by generalizing preventive vaccination; by continually increasing means of hospitalization and medical treatment. Her efforts have led to: a rapid increase in the numbers of the population; an improvement in its physical fitness; a rise in its standard of living. The regular personnel of the health services rose from 340 in 1923 to 1.070

in 1949. Medical care given to the Moroccan people may be summarized in the following figures: 13 million consultations were given in 1950, compared with 2.63 million in 1930; there were 104.000 hospitalizations in 1950 against 40.000 in 1930; 350.000 anti-small pox vaccinations were administered in 1940 against 300.000 in 1 20. The result of the health service's work can be seen in the increase in the Moslem and Jewish populations, which rose from 3.453.100 in 1921 to 3.222.400 in 1947. Among the projects under way may be counted improved housing, nutrition and public hygiene; the construction of modern baths; drainage in rural areas to exterminate parasites and mosquitos; cleaner drinking water; and organization of health propaganda."

IX

According to the French administration spokesman, "before 1912, no official school system existed for the Moslems. The first care of the Protectorate was to develop an administration capable of educating all Moroccan children and of giving them from the beginning, through the teaching of French, contacts with the technical civilization of the West. On the primary level, European schools, Franco-Moroccan schools, and private Moslem schools, were organized. The last was aided by the French but controlled by the Moroccans.

School Enrollment

	1912	1931	1950
Moslem	792	10.289	117.656
Jews	3.742	10.935	31.421

On the secondary level, in accordance with the principle of freedom of education, Moroccans can choose between modern public schools and the traditional education. Moroccans can enter the French secondary schools on the basis of the same age and aptitude required as their European fellows. Higher education is abailable for Moroccans in Rabat and Casablanca and at the universities in France. In 1949-50, 186 Moslems were studying in France. In Morocco itself, 148 Moslems were taking advanced courses. Finally, the establishmment of a Moroccan School of Administration paves the way for a new public administration statute in Morocco. This school is intended to give the young Moroccans who wish to follow administrative careers an indispensible general education in the field of history, as well as in the field of administration and the judicial, economic and financial organization of the modern states. Sixty-one students were admitted to this school in 1949.

B. The Moroccan Version:

I

The main source of our present survey is a publication which nationalists of all denominations regard as authoritative, namely, Morocco under the Protectorate, An Analysis of Facts and Figures, prepared by the Office of the Istiqlal Party in New York, and published in February 1953. Unless otherwise stated, its figures are based either on official French sources or on publications of the United Nations Secretariat, considered to provide the trustworthy documentation.

A nationalist spokesman indicated that the French publication tends to neglect the subjects of native wages and native standard of living...undoubtedly an additional reason why Moroccan statements dwell in great detail thereupon. The following table is given by the nationalists to show the relation between cost of living and wages paid to native workers in commerce and industry.

	Cost of Living	Wages	% 1938 Purchase Power
1945	398	370	93%
1950	1.225	870	45%
1952 (March)	2.786	1.478	52%

These data reveal that while the cost of living has risen twenty two times, wages have increased only eleven times.

Agricultural Worker's Daily Wages
(including payment in produce)

1945.....20-25 francs
1949.....35-100 "
1950-51.....35-150 "

"The agricultural worker earns on the average one-third of what does the poorly paid worker in industry and commerce."

In view of the low wages, family allowances are of great significance to the Moroccan workman. According to our Moroccan spokesmen, discrimination between European and Moroccan workers exists in the payment of family allowances.

Family allowance paid to bus conductors per month:

No. of children	European	Moroccan
1	5.790 francs	364 francs
2	11.031 "	1.404 "
4	21.543 "	2.808 "
6	31.963 "	4.212 "
8	41.963 "	5.612 "

Sugar is one of the staples of Moroccan dietary, and not a luxury as in some other countries. "Its consumption has dropped from 24.4 Kg. per head in the period 1934-38 to an average of 16.7 Kg. in the period 1948-50. (Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Commodity Series, "Sugar", September 1952.)

II

The nationalists point out in their analysis of the economic situation in Morocco that, "the French have followed a 'typically colonialist' policy. As a result of it, 'Morocco

is being drained of its natural resources while virtually all the benefits flow to French colonists and the economy of France. The development of mining, communications and commerce has not benefited the Moroccans who gain their livelihood from the land. Neither has it benefited the 100,000 native industrial workers who work for extremely low wages.

Morocco, rich in natural resources and the low-cost labor served to attract the French to North Africa. The average Moroccan miner received 38 francs (or 11 U. S. cents) per hour. Consequently mechanization of most mines has been retarded.

Thus, the nationalists claim that the French have concentrated on the development of only such industries as would benefit the foreign settlers, and have neglected those that would profit the natives. "The French economic policies have retarded, for example, the development of textile output far behind a great number of underdeveloped countries. This industry has usually been one of the first to be organized because of the relative ease with which the textile industry can be developed. Textiles require relatively little capital, labor is more easily trained, and local availability of raw materials is less essential to economic production." (U.N., Recent Change in Production, Supplement to the World Economic Report, 1950-51, p. 47.) "The Moroccans criticise France for enforcing them to import expensive cotton from France instead of producing their own cheap cotton goods. The same

criticism applies to other industries that are essential to the natives. The Moroccans were compelled to buy almost exclusively from France, even though 'the average price of imports from France was almost invariably higher than goods imported from other countries'. Thus, 'Moroccan trade with France was responsible for over 95% of the unfavorable trade balance experienced in 1950."

III

It is admitted by the Moroccans that a great deal had been done for the irrigation of the Moroccan land, however, nationalists stress that most of the new irrigation schemes have been designed to revitalize land held by French settlers, while lands belonging to natives remain parched. The Foreign Minister of Iraq mentioned in the speech he made on December 19, 1952, in the United Nations Assembly that an American combine had been willing to spend sixty million dollars on large-scale irrigation plants in southern Morocco, to which some 360 thousand acres of new land could be brought under cultivation. He claimed that, "the French had pretended to be in favor of the scheme", but after years of negotiations, had made its execution impossible, "their true reason being that the land in question was chiefly in the hands of Moroccans". He drew the conclusion that the French were not eager for "Moroccan peasants to enrich themselves". (United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, Five Hundredth and Fifteith Meeting.)

IV

In the sphere of public health the Moroccans tried to refute French claims by pointing to the very much higher death rate of Moroccans when compared with Europeans living in the Maghreb. Basing themselves on official French figures they produced the following table:

	Europeans	Moroccans
Death rate	8.52 per 1000	15.08 per 1000
Infant Mortality	84.1 " "	283.6 " "

The figure for infant mortality is among the highest in the world.

The French, the Moroccans claim, are fond of quoting innumerable statistics on the increase in the number of consultations per year, etc. They are strangely silent, however, with regard to the really significant health data, such as infant mortality rate, trends in tuberculosis, extent of malnutrition. There were in 1950, 6.984 hospital beds in Morocco, and of this total, approximately one-third was reserved for Europeans. The rate of one bed for 1.720 Moroccans compares with one per 215 Europeans.

United Nations Statistical Reports show that there were a total of 135 public health physicians available to minister to the needs of the Moroccan population in 1949. Thus, there was an average of only one physician per 43.240 Moroccans. On the other hand, there were, in 1949, 436 physicians

operating as private medical practitioners in the large cities who were available primarily to the European colony. The ration of physicians to non-Moroccans were roughly one per 1.100 Europeans.

V

The policy of the Protectorate in the field of education, the nationalists say has as its purpose the maintenance of mass illiteracy so as to insure a population without intellectual leadership and with a lowered capacity to press for economic and political independence. That they have failed by this means to attain the docile collaboration of the mass of the Moroccan population has, of course, become most apparent in recent months.

The discrepancy in the educational advantages enjoyed by Moslem and European children is further manifested by the shocking differential in funds expended by the Protectorate on the instruction of these children. During 1951, 1.92 million francs were appropriated in the ordinary budget for the education of Moslem children and 2.23 billions for European students. This means that while 32,000 francs were to be spent on the education of each European student only 16,000 francs per student, or half as much was allocated for Moroccan children.

By 1954 the percentage of native children of school age receiving education rose to just over 10%.

School age population		Children in school
Moslem	1.940.000	117.523 or 6%
European	66.700	62.844 or 94%

These figures, state the nationalists, taken from official French sources, reveal the extremes to which discrimination in education has deprived Moslem children.

The preponderence of French teachers in the public educational system is in part a direct consequence of the fact that after forty years of the Protectorate there is not one school for the training of primary school teachers in Morocco.

On private schools run by themselves, the nationalists say; "Although most of the funds for these schools are raised by voluntary contributions, the French interfere in the internal affairs of the schools, and attempt, by intimidating the staff, to restrict their activities. In 1951, for example, ten schools were arbitrarily closed down at Bou Arafa, three at Ahtouka, and so on...The past forty years have witnessed a systematic attempt to substitute French for Moroccan culture in the schools."

VI

The nationalists have more to say than the French on the subject of "human rights". From 1914 onwards, Morocco has constantly been under an official "state of siege". The nationalist, however, maintain the "the suppression of human and civil rights in Morocco is not an extraordinary measure

but the normal state of affairs under the Protectorate. No association, they continue, "could be formed without prior authorization of French control authorities. All sorts of organizations, from student associations to political parties, from athletic clubs to labor unions, have been suppressed. Even the Moroccan Boy Scouts movement has been denied legal sanction". They quote from the official Order of April 26, 1947, according to which 'no private or public meeting may be held without previous authorisation. Only French citizens will be allowed to speak at private or public meetings, and only the French language is to be used.

NATIONALISM

I

It is significant that we hear nothing of Moroccan Nationalism as long as Lyautey was in power. It was only after his policies were altered that nationalism was born. He said, "It would be an illusion to think that the Moroccans are not aware that they are being kept out of their government...A new generation is being informed which is determined to learn and to carry on its own affairs...It will seek to organize itself in order to put forth its demands, as is already happening. These questions will not wait." [67] The warning went unheeded. The policy of the French administration oscillated between ignoring Moroccan's aspirations and repressing them.

An impetus was given to the nascent nationalist movement by the rising of the Riff leader, Abd el Krim against the Spanish. Though, as we know already, Abd el Krim was defeated in 1926 by the combined arms of France and Spain, his valiant stand against foreign domination was an inspiration to Moroccan youth. [68] His first successes against

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67. Parent, Pierre, The Truth About Morocco, Moroccan Office of Information and Documentation, Washington, 1953, p. 63.

68. Montagne, Robert, Abd el Krim, 1951, p. 313 ff.

Spain and near success against France was an impetus. Two main figures of Moroccan youth who were stirred by that were Ahmad Balafrej, and Allal el Fassi. Balafrej in spite of his poorness, was able to attend the Sorbonne University in Paris. At the age of 18 he founded and directed a newspaper called Maghreb in Paris. Later, he inherited his uncle, who was wealthy, but Balafrej used this wealth for building what has become the finest school in Rabat. Allal el Fassi, on the other hand was quite a religious man who received his education at the Qarawiyin University at Fez, and at one time one of the youngest professors, and first and foremost, a Moslem. El Fassi, was a patriot by conviction, his views were, "an independent Morocco in terms of a constitutional monarchy under the Sultan, Sidi Mohammed, with two parliamentary chambers and a secret ballot for all Moroccans irespective of race, sex, creed, and class."[69]

The Nationalist movement contains, of course, a number of other leaders, such as the Lyazidi brothers, Binjallun, Bahnani, Laghzawi, Quazzani, and many other noted men.[70]

It must be noted here that two movements of nationalism were on the march, the one in Rabat headed by Ahmad Balafrej, with the conviction and interest in a new political and social

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69. Landau, Rom, Moroccan Profiles: A Nationalist View, The Middle East Journal Vol. 7, No. 1 Winter, 1953, pp. 47-52.

70. Some of these Nationalists are at present negotiating with France toward finding a solution to the Moroccan problem to end the continuous risings occured on August 20th and after.

reorientation of the Protectorate, the other movement headed by Allal el Fasi contemplating a national revival chiefly in terms of religious reformation and a return to the purity of Islam. Fasi's views were formulated in the following words: "Before reforming others we must reform ourselves. Our belief in God is not so strong as it should be...If we clean our spirit, if we propagate the true faith of Islam, we can lead this country to a brilliant future. Let us liberate our souls in order to liberate our bodies." [71]

By April 1927, the founders of the two movements joined to form the Moroccan League, the ancestor of Moroccan nationalism and more specially of the Istiqlal party. The strength and persistence of the Moroccan nationalist movement can be traced to both the religious and the progressive and democratic character which animated the passion for reform of both Balafrej and Fassi; to the group headed by the latter the essential nature of the movement was not divorced from the spiritual tenets of Islam. In fact this dual character was very much in keeping with the tendencies that have animated most modern reform movements in the world of Islam.

II

The decisive event in the evolution of Moroccan nationalism had taken place on May 16, 1930, when the French

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71. Bernouna, Mahdi A., Our Morocco, November 1951, p. 38.

prolugated the Berber Dahir. This dahir was intended to respect the Berber customary law and to release the Berbers from legislation under Islamic law. It recognized the competence of local tribunals in matters of civil and commercial action (including property) and those relating to personal status. For penal matters, French courts would judge. This took away one of the essential prerogatives of the Sultan.[72] This so-called Berber policy was looked upon by the natives as part of the French divide-and -rule policy.

The political intention of the authors of the Berber Dahir was of course obvious. It is sufficient to read the following abstract from the minutes of the sittings of the French committee responsible for examining the question; "Further, there is no objection to breaking up the uniformity of the judicial organization of the French Zone, when it is a question of strengthening the Berber element in view of the part which it may be called upon to play as a counterpoise. On the contrary, there is even an unquestionable advantage, from the political point of view, in causing a split."[73]

Whatever the officially declared purpose of the new measure, it was just another step towards implementing the so-called 'Berber policy'. As General Catroux puts it, "It seems that the Resident General," (Lucien Saint) "went beyond the advice of his real political counsellors trained

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72. Julien, op. cit., p. 146.

73. Independence Party of Morocco, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

in Lyautey's school, and listened instead to that of a legal advisor who had become the convinced champion of a certain policy sponsored by the so-called 'Berber bloc'. The object of that policy was to set the mass of Berber tribes against the Sultan and the Makhzen, so as to neutralize them. It was effected by giving every encouragement to the Berber's tendency to rotate only within their own closed circle." [74]

Both Berbers and Arabs were governed by the ancient Islamic Sharia; the Dahir replaced the Sharia, the old and tribal dictated of the Berbers, removing Berbers from the legal jurisdiction of the Makhzen, and substituting local of French jurisdiction.

Events proved this was a dangerous and mistaken Frenhh policy. However confused the pattern of Moroccan history might be, one element was always clear and had remained alive. This was the religious dynamism that instigated most revolts and occasioned most reforms. On its face, the Berber Dahir represented generally a judicial administrative measure. Tribal law was to be reintroduced by placing it in the hands of the djemmaas (local assemblies), rather than in the hands of Pashas [75] and Caids [76] who had until then adminis-

74. Catroux, op. cit., p. 293.

75. Pashas, are the urban authorities.

76. Caids, are the rural authorities.

tered it in the name of the Sultan. Lyautey had already reintroduced these judicial djemmaas but as courts they were primarily courts of arbitration and did not invoke the Sharia (Islamic law).

Moroccans, both Arab and Berber, interpreted the introduction of the Dahir as French "interference with dictates of Islam, and as French determination to divide the Moslems and to separate the Moroccans of Berber blood from those of Arab race". [77]

The alarm occasioned by the Dahir and a clever nationalist campaign filled the mosques with apprehensive crowds which, after the ritual prayer, heard a special invocation, "For the Time of the Peril". The Dahir was united not only the"young Moroccans", but also the whole Arab world. [78] Suddenly the entire Islamic world became aware of the existence of a Moroccan problem. Protests were sent to the League of Nations and to the great powers as well as to the French Government. Many sympathetic countries went further to stop all sales to and purchases from france, since France might fear such a boycott. [79]

Moroccan students in Paris organized themselves and edited a newspaper called L' Action du peuple, and a magazine,

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77. Catroux, op cit., p. 293.

78. Julien, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

79. El Fath, Cairo, November 1930.

Maghreb, both written in French which carried the protests of the Moroccans for world opinion. However, both papers were suppressed in 1934.

In Morocco, both Arabs and Berbers demonstrated against the decree. Many of them were in consequence imprisoned or banished. Nationalists established the Moroccan Action Committee[80] whose aim was to keep people abreast of events and aware of what was at stake.

III

"The Moroccan Action Committee, desirious of avoiding any accusation of systematic disparagement or sterile agitation, set to work and drew up a Plan of Reforms, which was submitted on December 1, 1934, to the French Government in Paris, to His Majesty the Sultan and to the Residence-General at Rabat."[81] These reforms included the return to the treaty of 1912, the substitution of indirect for direct rule, greater participation of Moroccans in the administration, the introduction of municipal elections, and the creation of a legislative assembly composed of Moslems and Jews. No mention was made of national independence at that time.

According to the French, the nationalists used methods of intimidation and violence, and thus were a menace to peace.

80. Plan du Réformes.

81. Independence Party of Morocco, op. cit., p. 118.

They attributed to the nationalists anti-French sentiments and maintained that their ultimate goal was to get rid of the French entirely. Identifying themselves, acting as though these assumptions were based on facts, this the French refused any attempt at conciliation. But every police repression was followed by a new wave of nationalist enthusiasm and an increase in the nationalist adherents. This reaction was inevitable, for the modest and moderate reform program expressed the aspirations of most politically conscious Moroccans.

IV

On the 25th of October, 1936, the Moroccans convened the first nationalist congress which did not demand independence but which advocated reforms in the spheres of education, health and the law. In December of the same year, the Resident General Noguès, released some of the imprisoned leaders. In March of 1937, due to strong pressure by the French settlers, this consiliatory attitude was reversed, and Allal el Fassi and other national leaders were thrown into prison without judge or jury. In spite of all these deplorable acts, World War II nevertheless brought Moroccans solidly behind the French in war against fascism. Both the Sultan and the nationalist hoped that by actively supporting France, they would eventually obtain the long desired reforms. When their hopes proved vain, the most active nationalists formed a new party, the Istiqlal--

meaning Independence. In 1944, they presented a charter to the Sultan, and to representatives of both France and the allies which consisted of the following:

1. The protectorate is a regime imposed by force upon the Moroccan people under exceptional circumstances; no better proofof this fact can be given than the record of military resistance maintained by the nation from 1907 to 1934.

2. The imposed protectorate treaty has been violated all along, in the spirit and the letter, by those who had officially pledged themsleves to respect it, with the result that Moroccan sovereignty has been wiped out.

3. The policies of the protectorate have been designed to enhance the interests of European colonists and to retard or obstruct the progress of the Moroccans.

4. The recognition of the people's right to self-determination, as underlined by various Allied statements during the war, and particularly in the Atlantic Charter, as well as the presence ofMoroccan armies on the Western Front; all these considerations entitle the Moroccans to the right of a free existence.

For all these reasons, the Istiqlal Party, expressing the wishes of the people, demands the following:

1. Independence and complete unity for all the Moroccan zones.

2. The establishment of a democratic system of government, a similar to that obtaining in the various Islamic states, which would safeguard the rights of all elements and classes composing the Moroccan nation. 82.

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82. Fassi, op. cit., p. 215.

With the foundation of the Istiqlal Party the Nationalist movement crystallized and placed independence at the head of its demands. Their modest request of earlier years had been rejected or ignored. By 1944, they realized that only complete sovereignty and independence would assure Morocco the opportunity to develop along the democratic lines, so essential if their country were to play its role in the modern world.

V

In concluding a discussion of nationalism it must be stated that some criticism of its views is not out pf place. A discussion of Moroccan nationalism would be incomplete without mention of some of its weaknesses. Thus, in the past, the Moroccans themselves only too frequently accepted Sherifian autocracy or the cupidity of the Makhzen. Likewise, in their application of Koranic notions of justice were not always guided by the true spirit of Islam, so the French may have been justified when they contended that judicial reforms was not as pressing as nationalist claims made it out to be. While the nationalists stood for expropriation of land of the French settlers, the demand itself was as much criticism of Morocco's own past as of its present discontent, for some of the worst offenders of the existing system of usury were Moroccans themselves, both Moslems and Jewish. Nevertheless, the mid-twentieth century was not the nineteenth, and the Moroccans had learned a good deal from democracy. Leaders such as Fassi, Balafrej, Abd el Jalil were the first to admit that the future independent Moroccan State would have to be

reformed from top to bottom.

Their contention, however, was that such a reform was impossible so long as they had to live under foreign domination, under a colonialism that was interested in its own profits rather than in reform of the native administration or the native way of life.

Had the French shown some understanding of native demands for equity, justice and progress, nationalism might easily have collapsed, or not even developed. But the French refused persistantly to acceede to even a minimum of nationalist suggestions, and thus kept infusing vitality and zest into the movement toward independence. As Professor Ch. A. Julien states..."Paris has played a fundamental part in the birth of Moroccan Nationalism".[83]

83. Julien, op. cit., 1952, p. 145.

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83. Julien, op. cit., 1952, p. 145.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1947 UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME

I

In 1947 the nationalists gained an unexpected ally, one, moreover, who within a few brief years was to emerge as the leader and symbol of Morocco's aspirations for independence. This was the Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef, who had succeeded his father, Moulay Youssef in 1927. During the first few years of his reign, the new sovereign stayed in the background. His apparent docility made him persona grata with the French authorities while the Moroccan people practically ignored him. But, after meeting in 1943 during the Anfa Conference in Casablanca,[84] the Sultan emerged, as a personality. Those close to him realized that his ideas were akin to the Nationalists' program, and that the days of mute subservence to the French regime were over. But it was not until 1947 when, on the occasion of his official visit to Tangier, that Sidi Mohammed expressed his views openly for the first time, stressing his country's links with other Arab nations and speaking unequivocally about Morocco's legitimate

84. Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, Harper, New York, 1948, pp. 689-690.

aspirations.[85]

As a result of the Sultan's "revolutionary" speech, the Resident General, M. Eirik Labonne, was recalled and replaced by a strong man, General Alphonse-Piere Juin. General Juin was born in Algeria, and much of his military career had been spent in North Africa. He was given unlimited support by the French Government, and had the favor of the colonial lobby in Paris. Upon his arrival, he announced, "My first duty is to re-establish order, without brutality, without compulsion, but with energy...I shall permit no one to indulge in a demagogic bid for power". Then, referring obliquely to Sidi Mohammed's recent pro-Arab declaration, he added: "Morocco, which France has united, must be a western country, and turn away from oriental alliances."[86] Not long afterwards, General Juin declared that Morocco would never secure independence, but would "remain linked to France".[87] It was evident that he did not look with a lenient eye either on a nationalist movement toward independence or on the Sultan's remarks that Morocco was an Arab country having strong bonds with the Middle East.

The new Resident General added five Moroccans to the

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85. Julien, op. cit., pp. 360-362.

86. Quoted by Julien, op. cit., p. 363.

87. Quoted by Julien, op. cit., p. 363.

existing branches of government, attaching them as "assistants" to the French directors, but with only consultative functions. The avowed purpose of this move was to establish a closer liaison between the Residency and the Makhzen. In fact, it meant a strenthening of French authority and direct rule.[88] General Juin's administration was viewed with suspicion by the Nationalists. They saw Morocco being transformed further from Protectorate to a colony.

Allal-el Fassi, of whom we spoke earlier, was in Tangier, early in 1947. Although watched by the French, he succeeded in escaping to Cairo in May, where he met another great nationalist hero, mentioned earlier, Abd-el-Krim. The latter had also escaped and found political asylum in Egypt. Both men worked closely with the Maghreb office in Cairo to aquaint the Moslem world with the Moroccan problem and to declare unswerving loyalty to the Sultan.[89]

After two years in Rabat, and in spite of his determination, General Juin did not succeed in terminating the Moroccan unrest, yet the colonists still saw in him "the inevitable architect of the restoration of an authoritarian policy which they were ready to support without reserve".[90]

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88. Op. cit., pp. 364-365.

89. Ibid, pp. 368-389.

90. Le Monde, 14 February, 1951

Professor Robert Montagne, a scholar in the colonialists camp, described the tendency to centralization as "disastrous" and as 'literally suffocating the country'. "We sterilize its life," he wrote, "by applying our minutely prepared decrees and regulations...one imagines that it must all be a dream when one hears that certain French delegates of a regional assembly are refusing to deliberate with their Moroccan colleagues...one expects from us, after years of a possibly explicable torpor, a greater utilization of Moslem youth, a considerable intensification of educational efforts." [91]

"The General, [General Juin] had neither the qualities of a diplomat nor those of an administrator which might have created an atmosphere favorable to a rapprochment;"[92]

In October 1950, at the invitation of the French President, Vincent Auriol, the Sultan of Morocco paid a State visit to Paris. The French government appeared to show a greater comrehension of, and sympathy with, Morocco's problem than had General Juin. The Sultan made some proposals, to the French Government, including demands for suppression of the direct administration and for revision of the Protectorate treaty. In reply, he received suggestions for certain minor reforms. But the Sultan was less interested in individual reforms than in a radical change in France-Moroccan relations.

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91. Le Dialogue entre Paris et Rabat, in Le Monde, 10 June, 1953.

92. Julien, op. cit., p. 371.

He was convinced that within the existing Protectorate framework it would be impossible to get rid of the direct French administration. This aspect of His demands had been completely ignored in the French reply. The Sultan's second note evoked an equally negative response, and he returned to Morocco early in November, 1950 empty-handed.

II

In the following the events leading to the crisis of 1951, we find the nationalists, becoming more outspoken in their criticism of the French administration. Matters came to a head in the meetings of the Moroccan Section of the Conseil du Gouvernement [93] in December 1950. The first speaker was the rapporteur for the protectorate budget, Ahmed Lyazidi, President of the Federation of Moroccan Chambers of Commerce, and a former officer in the French Army. In his report, Mr. Lyazidi claimed that the financial policy of the Protectorate served only French interests. General Juin, who presided over

93. Conseil du Gouvernement is composed of two sections which met separately-French section and Moroccan section-its members were President, Vice President of Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Chamber of Agriculture, representatives of diverse interests plus a few representatives from the Jewish minority. For the most part appointed by the French administration; their function is to discuss economic and financial particularly the budget. They have no power other than advisory one and the French administration is free to accept to reject their advice. Both sections are resided by the Resident General.

the meeting, requested the speaker never again to express such views in the council.[94] Reports critical of the finance and education budgets followed. On December 12th, Mohammed Laghzaoui discussed the Public Works budget at length, and was so critical of French policy that General Juin did not curtain his wrath. "You have nothing more to do in this Chamber, M. Laghzaoui, because in such assemblies there are limits to insolence and provocation. I request you to leave."[95] Nine nationalist members walked out of the meeting after their colleague. Later these men visited the palace to discuss the problem with the Sultan, further antagonizing General Juin. The Sultan's reply was that, "he was above parties, that he condemned all methods of violence from any quarter and ideologies contrary to the precepts of Islam, but he did not mention the Istiqlal by name".[96]

The cleavage between Palace and Residency was becoming more and more visible and Juin decided to act even more agressively. The first attack upon the sovereign was entrusted to the elderly Moroccan stand-by of successive Residents, Thami el Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakesh. The attack was carefully prepared. In October of the previous year, Thami el Glaoui was in Paris at the same time as the Sultan, and he stayed

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94. Marcel Rouffie, Le Protectorat a-t-il-fait faillite? Editions de la S. I. P. E. F., Casablanca, 1951.

95. Julien, op. cit., p. 375.

96. Ibid, p. 377.

on in France. After the sovereign's departure, he was consulted by various members of the government including M. Auriol, President of the Republic. On his return to Morocco he was received by the French authorities with honors normally accorded only to the monarch. All the leading members of the Administration, headed by General Juin, were there to greet him, as if to demonstrate to the Moroccans that in the eyes of the authorities he was quite as important as the Sultan himself.

On December, the Glaoui delivered his frontal attack. In the course of an audience with the Sultan, he said, "You are not the Sultan of Morocco, you are the Sultan of the Istiqlal." Sidi Mohammed told him to leave the palace and not to return unless summoned.[97] Once the attack had been delivered, controleurs civils (local French governors) throughout the country, summoned the tribal caids and enjoined them to support the Glaoui. The Pasha was sent on a tour of the various districts, and in each place the Administration saw to it that spectacular festivities were arranged.

Early in February 1951, after a trip to Washington, General Juin demanded that the Sultan publicly denounce the Istiqlal party or abdicate. In reply the Sultan declared

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97. Ibid, p. 376.

that he stood above all parties, he added, "if the Istiqlal party had committed any offense, there were courts to deal with these".[98]

General Juin counted on the support provided by the Glaoui, whom the French had used for their own ends on a number of previous occasions. The official French press reported that the Glaoui, in turn, had several hundred thousand Berber tribesmen who would fight if he gave the word.

General Juin's ultimatum not only startled Morocco and France but also shocked the entire Arab world. On the 26th of February, members of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly in Paris asked M. Robert Schuman, the Foreign Secretary, for an explanation of General Juin's action. Avoiding a direct reply, M. Schuman explained that Franco-Moroccan discussions would continue with the only Moroccan representative recognized by France, namely the Sultan. He also stressed the services rendered to France by Sidi Mohammed, and added that the campaign against his person must cease.[99] Mr. Schuman's grasp of the details and implications of the crisis in Morocco was far less unsure than that of most of his colleagues. He was known to disagree with the policies

98. Bennounna, Mahdi A., Our Morocco, 1951, p. 98

99. Julien, op. cit., pp. 378-379.

of the colonialists, and to disapprove of General Juin's methods. But his views were not shared by the majority of the Cabinet.[100]

General Juin, dissatisfied with the Sultans lack of compliance, proceeded to carry out his threats, calling upon the Glaoui's tribesmen to ride in Rabat and demanding that the Sultan sign a protocal within two hours. This time the Sultan acquiesced, in order to avoid bloodshed, and as he later told some foreign correspondants, because of the threat of force. "I signed the Protocal of 25th of February 1951 as a result of the threats made during the negotiations between the Palace and the Residency by some officials of the Residency...and as a result of the movement of a certain number of tribes coming from various directions, tribes which were ignorant of the true object of their displacement, and which installed themselves at the gates of Fez, Rabat and Sale. To avoid the deplorable consequences that might have accrude from the two situations thus created, I felt forced to sign."[101]

General Juin's next move was to arrest prominent nationalists, and separate the Sultan from some of his wisest and most trusted advisors.

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100. General Juin knew that, though his policy was gravely mistrusted by his two chiefs, M. Schuman and Jules Moch, Ministers of foreign affairs and National Defense, respectively, it was defended by the Prime Minister, M. Pleven, and by M. Queuille, Minister of theInterior. (Ibid, pp. 377-78)

101. Landau, Rom, The Sultan of Morocco, p. 97. Robert Hale Ltd. London 1951

III

On the 28th of November 1951, the French Government decided to recall General Juin to military duties in France and General Augustin Guillaume was appointed as the new Resident General. He was an administrator as well as a soldier, knew both Arabic and Berber and had long experience in Morocco. Like Lyautey, he was interested in Morocco, but this interest did not show itself in any noticable change in policy. He arrested nationalists, objected to foreign correspondents showing any sympathy with the Moroccans against the Protectorate administration.

The Sultan nourished hopes that Paris would appoint a mixed commission to study the situation and make recommendations, but his anticipations failed to materialize, and finally, on March 20, 1952, he asked the Resident General to transmit a note to M. Auriol, the French President. This note contained a precise and coherent program: "For many years the colonialists have maintained that the Sultan and the nationalists were aiming at 'kicking the French out' and at taking possession of all French economic interests in the Maghreb. The nationalists have declared in a statement that, 'France has interests and rights the legality of which are recognized by the Moroccans. These rights can be safeguarded and guarenteed in a new convention. There is no question of a complete break with France.

On the contrary, our aim is to assure the continuation of Franco-Moroccan relations, but within a framework that gives satisfactory scope to the aspirations of the Moroccan people." [102] Six months passed before the French government replied, but finally the reply came proposing new reforms, but confirming the position that, "the administration in Morocco has a mixed character, that is, Franco-Moroccan under the control of French authorities." [103]

Sidi Mohammed expressed his profound regret at the nature of the French note: His own legal position had been strengthened only a few weeks earlier by a decision, on August 27, 1952 of the International Court of Justice at the Hague which reaffirmed the sovereign and independent character of Morocco. However, in practical terms this was of little use to him, for those who wielded effective power in Morocco received the pronouncement with the same nonchalance which they later accorded resolutions of the U. N. Assembly.

At the beginning of December 1952, the head of the Tunisian Federation of Trade Union, Ferhat Hashed, was assassinated near Tunis. All Tunisians were convinced that his murderers were French, and, in fact, even by the summer of 1955 they had not been found by the French authorities.

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102. Al Istiqlal, Al Istiqlal Press, 29 March 1952.

103. Communiqué du Palais Imperial du 8 Octobre, 1952.

On December 7th and 8th, demonstrations of sympathy were organized by workers in Morocco in protest against this murder. Clashes between the police and the Moroccans followed and the official death toll was given as thirty three natives, two policemen, and four Europeans. All the Istiqlal leaders whom the French police could find were arrested as well as some citizens who had shown sympathy for the Moroccans.

IV

Under the impact of the Casablanca events, various men in Paris organized the Comité France-Maghreb, which became a kind of a clearing house for information concerning Morocco and a center for efforts toward securing justice for the Moroccan people. Many groups and newspapers in France requested a government investigation of the Casablanca incident, but General Guillaume said he would "never accept any official commission of enquiry, and would rather resign".[104]

The events of 1951 and the Casablanca indident of December 1952 increased the gulf between the Moroccans and the French. Only radical reforms and their loyal application could have redeemed the situation at this late hour.

The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, was eager to introduce genuine reforms, but had little support from his

104. Barrat, Robert, Justice pour le Maroc, Paris, Edicions du Seuil, 1953, p. 38.

colleagues in the cabinet who were influenced by the lobbyists. Unfortunately, the French public opinion was either ignorant of the true issues or accepted unquestioningly the official accounts of government propagandists.

On the Moroccan side, Sidi Mohammed personified the will of many Moroccans, perhaps of the majority of the nation. What is certain is that since 1950, his views were such that the Istiqlal could reasonably claim him as their true spokesman. "The gulf between the nationalists and those who allowed the settlers' claims to count above all others had become so deep that not compromise seemed possible...Both factions had become increasingly embittered and intransigent, and both gave evidence that their sense of proportion was less acute than formerly. Even a French daily in Casablanca, Maroc-Presse, regognized how unhealthy the atmosphere had become. "The French feel injured ran a report of 12 December 1952, 'on account of what they consider the ingratitude of the Moroccans. The Moroccans feel injured on account of the disdain in which they believe themselves to be held. They collect grievences and then call the expression thereof 'patriotism'. They make wisdom out of suspicion, and turn anger into a virtue. Relations between French and Moroccans are unhealthy, and often dangerously strained." 105

105. Landau, Rom. Unpublished Manuscript.

Not only members of the parties, nationalist but Moroccans in general regarded the Sultan as their true leader and defender. The French, on the other hand, opposed him with the following arguments: "Sidi Mohammed's identification with the nationalists was resented by the Berbers, and, thus, threatened to split the nation in two; his refusal to sign and seal the proposals for various decrees that were to introduce what were claimed to be democratic forms, delayed the progress and democratization of Morocco; his refusal was based on his reluctance to renounce any of his autocratic power; his sympathy with the Istiqlal was an offense to Islamic religious orders and organization; his record for the last few years had shown that he was anti-French and that it was impossible for a French administration to cooperate with him; only his removal would assure peace, unity and progress."[106]

During the summer of 1952, the Sultan felt that his throne as well as his person were obviously threatened. His apprehensions grew from day to day. Although the French government had pledged itself to lend constant support to His Majesty against all dangers that might threaten his person or throne, he doubted that the French were his protectors. Being the accredited spokesman of his country's political

106. Landau, Rom, Unpublished Manuscript.

aspirations, he insisted that Morocco was a protectorate and not a colony, that it was his duty to restore his country's legitimate status as a sovereign power, and that the Protectorate, while acceptable and beneficial to Moroccan in the days when it was first established, had outgrown its purpose and should yield to a new relationship between Morocco and France.

The Sultan outlined his ideas in an official communiqué to his people published on June 17, 1953: "Our intention has always been to permit the country to conduct its own affairs democratically, safeguarding the interests of France and of French people in Morocco. To achieve this aim, we have tried to reach common understanding with the French Government, so that an overall plan, in keeping with modern ideas, might be prepared...In the expectation of such an agreement, and in order to meet the wishes of the French Government, we have already given our consent to certain definite projects...As to municipal reforms, we are anxious to furnish the towns with elected consultative assemblies...But complete agreement (with the Residency General) or reform cannot be reached in a climate of passionate intrigue. In the social field, a plan is required for providing the country with sufficient hospitals, schools, decent homes at modest cost, and modern courts of justice. In so far as legal reform is concerned, we remain convinced that it must remain barren unless it is based upon a separation of administrative and juridical powers and upon modern codes of [illegible]".

law...It is important to facilitate foreign investments and to give them solid guarantees. But to make such investments secure, as well as for the sake of social stability, the establishment of a harmonious collaboration between capital and labor is essential. An elementary condition for such a collaboration is the grating of trade union rights to the working class."[107]

The political situation in Morocco became increasingly strained. In mid-August, Sidi Mohammed sent a last appeal to the President of the French Republic: "The persistance of the subversive moves which are furthered in Morocco by certain persons in authority compels us to address a message to the President of the French Republic, the French Government and public opinion in France. Our aim is to draw their attention to the very grave consequences that those moves might have upon Franco-Moroccan relations...

It seems strange that in Morocco, where the French authorities still maintain a state of siege and where political meetings cannot take place without previous authorization, members of the (present) so-called opposition enjoy the full support of the local press, move about freely, organize demonstrations, and plot openly against the security of the State. This opposition tries publicly to urge the French Government to violate its international engagements in various treaties...

Garrat, op. cit., p. [illegible]

107. Afrique Informations, Paris, August 1953, pp. 16-17.

We reiterate our request to put an end to this situation. Confident in the wisdom of the French Government, we do not cease to enjoin calm on our people...Those Frenchmen in Morocco who inspire and support the rebellion of certain officials can only damage the credit and the higher interests of France... Morocco has never doubted France. May France not betray that confidence." [108]

No reply to this appeal came from Paris, and Sidi Mohammed finally lost all faith in France's good will. In a conversation with Robert Barrat, he said, "If the French Government are not in agreement with all that is going on, why don't they stop it? I no longer place any reliance on them... You know very well that the pashas and caids do not act of their own volition." [109]

On the 13th of August, General Guillaume who had been away in France returned to Rabat, and presented the Sultan with certain demands. When the Sultan inquired what would be the effect of his refusal to accept these demands, he was told by the Resident General that, "If you don't sign the decrees, one telephone call to Paris, and you are deposed".

Events moved swiftly after that. Just one week later, in August, the French deposed the Sultan and enthroned an

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108. République Algérienne, 28 August 1953, p. 2.

109. Barrat, op. cit., p. 194.

elderly relative, Moulay ben Arafa. The official reason given was that this was in order to save the Sultan's life endangered by the Glaoui's tribesmen. Sidi Mohammed, with his wife and children, was flown to Corsica and later sent to exile in Madagascar.

The colonialist press hailed the accession of Moulay ben Arafa to the throne as the dawn of a new era of general happiness. General Guillaume delivered a speech welcoming the new sovereign in which he said, "With the succession to the throne of Your Majesty, high virtues have been recognized by each and all of your subjects and Morocco finds itself at the end of a testing period, and on the threshold of a future rich in brilliant promise."[110]

But the victory of the colonialists was short-lived. It lasted precisely as long as it took the Moroccans to recover from the shock of Sidi Mohammed's deposition.

Within less than a month, native opposition was finding shape and direction. For many years, both Sidi Mohammed and the nationalists had advocated a campaign of legitimate and peaceful methods and had opposed violence in any form. But by October 1953, there was not longer a Sultan to calm the people and all but a few nationalist leaders were in prison. The people were left without guidance. Ahmed Balafrej had

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110. La Vigie Marocaine, 23 August 1954.

escaped to New York and Allal-el-Fassi had stayed on in Cairo. Assassinations of policemen, French settlers and pro-French Moroccans became more frequent. The authorities tried to control the situation by increasing the number of their forces and arrest of many more Moroccans.

While originally the national fight was confined to the cities, it soon spread to the rural districts as well. In the words of the London Times, "Repression calls for terrorism, and terrorism for repression; thus we have anarchy in Morocco." [111]

V

By the spring of 1954, the situation had become graver than it had ever been since 1912. "Terrorism in Morocco is having a field day," wrote Le Monde on the 5th of May 1954. Early in the year, a boycott of French goods was added to assault and sabotage, especially a boycott of cigarettes, which were a state monopoly. In France more and more people denounced the immobilism of the government and the police oppression in Morocco. After December 1952, French public opinion was less influenced by official pronouncements on the subject of Morocco, and better informed of the true state of affairs. "No one in France can any longer rightfully say, 'we did not know'," wrote Francois Mauriac. [112]

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111. London Times, May 17, 1954.

112. France-Maghreb, Paris, March, 1954.

By the summer of 1954, there were many incidents like the one described in the London Times of July 9th, "To the cries of 'Long live ben Youssef', a violent clash occured, followed by a general assault by the demonstrators upon the houses occupied by Europeans."

Meanwhile, the new Sultan, had been signing every decree handed to him by the French authorities.

On September 5th, he abolished the 'Day of the Throne', which had been a national holiday. In less than a month, he had signed and sealed away practically all the powers that at least juridically had remained in his hands. In a few weeks the transformation from protectorate colony was an established fact, legally secure by the seal of the new Sultan.

On September 10, Moulay Arafa signed over his legislative powers to a Council of Viziers and Directors composed of 16 French directors of departments and 14 Moroccans. Legislation approved by the Council was to be placed before the Sultan for his seal; but even if he should disagree, his objection could be overruled by a two-third majority.[113] Since the 14 Moroccan members had been handpicked by the French authorities, the Council had to be regarded as French rather than Moroccan, the ruler, therefore, no longer had unlimited authority in this field: there had been a basic change in the system of government.[114]

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113. The Middle East Journal, Washington, D. C., Winter 1954, p. 82.

114. Ambassde De France, Moroccan Affair, No., 3, Service De Presse Et D' Information, New York, September 21, 1953.

MOROCCO AND THE UNITED NATIONS

I

The unofficial participation of Morocco in the Arab League has historical, linguistic, and emotional grounds. The Arabs conquered the lands of the Berbers in order to preach their faith. The Islamic faith assisted the Arabs in spreading their influence in all Maghreb; it has become one of the homelands of Arabism. Although Morocco has preserved her independence since the Byzantine era, her history has remained linked to Arab history. "All movements both past and present have been connected with the general tendencies and orientations in the Arab world".

The bond of language also prevailed in Morocco with the spread of Islam. The official language in Morocco is Arabic.

The emotional bond stems from both the historical and linguistic connections. The orientation became more formal with the establishment of the Arab league in 1945.

The general purposes and objectives of the Arab League

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115. Fassi, Alal al, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington D. C., 1954, p. 377.

are defined in it's preamble.[116] In addition, Article 2 of the pact re-iterates the concern of the League with "the affairs and interests of the Arab countries".[117]

Thus, 'One of the principle aims of the League at the time of its formation was the liberation from foreign domination of member states not yet fully independent. The League has assisted Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and the Yemen in achieving their respective aims."[118]

The Arab League was the fulfillment of the Arabs' aspiration for a greater unity that has been in the minds and thoughts of the Arab people ever since the World War I, and even before. Negotiations toward the realization of those aims began in 1942 and culminated in the signing of the Arab peoples covenant, on March 22, 1945, by representatives of the following independent Arab governments: Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Lebanon, Yemen and Trans-Jordan.

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116. "Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States; and anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and the sovereignty of these states and to direct their efforts towards the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes; and responding to the Arab public opinion in all Arab lands; Have agreed to conclude a pact towards that end..." (Basic Documents of the League of Arab States, No. 1, Arab Information Center, New York City, April 1955, p. 9.)

117. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

118. Ghali-Boutros B. Y., The Arab League 1945-1955, International Conciliation, Number 498. p. 395.

The covenant includes political, social, cultural, and economic problems. The aforementioned governments agreed on the formation of this loose association on September 25, 1944, in what is called, 'The Protocol of Alexandria',[119] which formulated the aims and proposed constitution of the present Arab League.

Although the Arab governments of the League were convinced of the necessity of bringing Morocco and the rest of North Africa within the Arab League, this was not possible because the three North African Countries were not free to act in such a matter.

Various non-governmental organizations have been urging the extension of the Arab League to include the western portion of the Arab world. An appeal addressed by Jamiyat al Rabitah al-Arabiyah (the Arab bond association) in September, 1944, states in part:

> "It is regrettable that the Arab Maghreb, which is an integral part of the Arab inheritance, and which comprises nearly a half of the Arab territories, should have remained outside Arab unity, although its people have remained loyal to Arabism despite colonial pressure and the attempts of the occupation powers to sever all their relations with the Arab East. The leaders and the citizens of these countries have declared more than once their natural right to join the Arab League. The fact is, that any Arab bloc, whatever be its form, should include the Maghreb portions of Arab lands if Arab unity is to be effective and if it is to vindicate the hopes placed in it."[120]

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119. "The Protocol of Alexandria", (Cairo: Office of the Secretariat of the Arab League).

120. Fasi, op. cit., p. 379.

Action by the League on behalf of Morocco took place on two levels. One was the establishment of the Maghreb Bureau in Cairo, that has already been mentioned. The other was on the international level, which ended in the Moroccan question coming before the United Nations.

By its Resolution of March 17, 1951, the League approached France with 'the submission by the member states to the Government of the French Republic urging the realization of Moorish Independence'. On the 10th of November of the same year, Resolution 385 of the Council of the League was addressed to the Great powers. "A request to the Powers for their intercession with the French Government for a fair solution of the Moroccan question.". In the same Resolution was the final course of action outlined, the submission to the United Nations in case this endeavor failed.[121]

II

Through 1951, negotiations between Morocco and France failed to materialize and the crisis continued. The Arab League's attempts to work out a peaceful solution had failed, and so it was decided to take the issue before the United Nations through its member states in the U. N. The introduction of the Moroccan question into international politics set

121. Ghali, op. cit., p. 429.

the stage for many debates on such subjects as the competance of the United Nations to consider it, the character of the Protectorate, the conflict between national sovereignty and international intervention, and other related matters raised in connection with a consideration of the United Nations's Charter.

As the protecting power the French Government immediately announced that it considered the Moroccan question to be a matter of French domestic jurisdiction.[122] By applying Article 2 paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, France argued that the matter fell outside of the competence of the United Nations. In addition to this legal stand the then Prime Minister Pinay stated that France would not enter into the debate on Morocco if and when the U. N. Assembly considered the question, and he also gave notice in advance that any recommendation made by the General Assembly would be ignored.[123]

Many of France's supporters in the United Nations agreed that Morocco was a domestic concern of France. While it is true that France introduced co-sovereignty and direct administration to Morocco, France did not claim de-jure sovereignty. The sovereign state of Morocco was guaranteed in the Act of Algeciras

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122. For Article 2 Paragraph 7, see end of chapter.

123. The Moroccan Delegation to the United Nations, The Moroccan Question and the United Nations, November 1952, p. 14.

which might be said to be the country's international charter. The Treaty of Fez of 1912 did not annul the guarantees given at Algeciras so far as Moroccan sovereignty was concerned. This was further strenghthened between the two world wars by a decision of the "International Court of Justice" at the Hague. "In November 1922 the Permanent Court of International Justice held, in case brought by the United Kingdom, that Morocco was a sovereign independent State under the sovereignty of the Sultan."[124] As recently as the 27th of August, 1952, the Court of International Justice in the case concerning "Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco" run: "It is not disputed by the French government that Morocco even under the Protectorate has retained its personality as a state in International Law. The decision further stated that "Under the Treaty of Fez, Morocco remained a sovereign state but it made an arrangement of a contractual character whereby France undertook to exercise certain powers in the name of and on behalf of Morocco."[125] (Therefore, a dispute between these two countries could not be regarded as a matter of exclusively French jurisdiction.) Morocco's sovereignty is clearly recognized by international law.

The question then arises: on what grounds does France

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124. The Case of Morocco, op. cit., p. 72.

125. The Moroccan Delegation to the United Nation, The Moroccan Question and the United Nations, November 1952, p. 16.

claim that Morocco is subject to domestic French jurisdiction? The French contention challenges the meaning of Moroccan sovereignty that is to say, Moroccan sovereignty appears to be purely nominal; the fact that Morocco is a protectorate removes it from International jurisdiction. If this is so, Morocco does not in fact possess that independence which is an essential element of a state in international law.

Those who oppose such resoning point out that this is an erroneous premise. There is no general uniform character for protectorates, and no juridical concept of a protectorate can be found in international politics or law. In 1923, the permanent court of International justice after considering nationality decrees in Morocco states: "In spite of common features possessed by Protectorates under international law they have individual legal characteristics resulting from the special conditions under which they were created, and the stage of their development..." [126] At the same time the court rejected the contention of the French government that the "public powers (puissences publique) exercised by the protecting state, taken in conjunction with the local sovereignty

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126. The Moroccan Delegation to the United Nations, op. cit., p. 17.

of the protected State, constitute full sovereignty equivalent to that upon which international relations are based."[127] The court then ruled that although matters of nationality are usually within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state, in this case France could not claim domestic jurisdiction since in view of the international treaties regulating the Protectorate in Morocco nationality in Morocco was not a matter of the French domestic jurisdiction. According to the Asian-African[128] spokesmen, the dispute between France and Morocco had its basis in international treaties (Act of Algeciras and the Treaty of Fez) thus it was an international dispute, and as such fell within the jurisdiction of the United Nation General Assembly. For, they claimed, while Article 10 of the Charter states, "The General Assembly may discuss any question or any matter within the scope of the present Charter; Article 1 charge the United Nations with responsibility for bringing about, by peaceful means, settlements of international disputes which might lead to a breach of the peace. The Afro-Asian spokesmen also deny the applicability of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter pertaining to domestic jurisdiction of France in this regard. They substantiate their contention that the Moroccan crisis is a matter for U. N. consideration by Article

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127. Ibid, p. 17.

128. Asian-African so-called bloc consisted of fifteen nations started its unity for the first time when the question of Morocco was presented to the United Nations.

1, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter:

"1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."

The French said they had abided by Article 73 of the Charter, The Declaration Regarding non-Self-Governing Territories:

"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security:

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific

purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

III

With these basic arguments on the part of both parties, the issue was brought before the United Nations on the 4th of October 1951 when Egypt requested that the question "Violation of the Principles of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights by France in Morocco" [129] be placed on the agenda of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly. With this official action the course of events can be followed through to the present crisis.

An explanatory memorandum stated that the conflict between France and Morocco had again reached a "highly critical phase...also that in view of the ties between the Moroccan people and the other Arab peoples, the Government of Egypt could not remain indifferent to that which not only constituted a violation of the Treaty of 1912 between France and Morocco, but also infringed the provisions of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights." [130] Similar requests

129. General Assembly, Official Records: Sixth Session 1951, Agenda Item 7: Annexes, p. 4.

130. Yearbook of The United Nations, 1951, p. 357.

were made by Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

The question was referred to the Assembly's General Committee at its 75th and 76th meetings on the 8th and 9th of November 1951 when it was considering the provisional agenda for the 6th General Assembly meeting. The Egyptian representative argued that the "Moroccan situation had deteriorated and might endanger international peace and security and it was the duty of the United Nations to take appropriate action."[131] He reiterated that the Act of Algeciras specifically stated that the introduction of reforms in Morocco was based on the three-fold principle of the independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality. He further stated that the Treaty of Fez had as its main objective the introduction into Morocco of a series of administrative, judicial, educational, financial, and military reforms without prejudice to the traditional sovereignty of the Moroccan people under the authority of the Sultan. The position which France claimed for itself in Morocco and recent events there were contrary to the purposes and the principles of the Charter and to the rightful claims of the Moroccan people.[132]

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131. General Assembly, Official Records: Sixth Session, General Committee, 75th Meeting, 8 November 1951, p. 3.

132. Moroccan Office of Information and Documentation, Free Morocco, December 25, 1953, New York, No. 8, p. 5.

In rebutting these allegations the French representative stated that to include the Egyptian request in the agenda would be to ask France to account to the General Assembly for the manner in which it was carrying out its Mandate under the 1912 Treaty; that this matter lay entirely within the scope of the French Government which had signed the Treaty of Fez and the United Nations Charter and whose mission was defined in Article 73 of the Charter. Denying that France was violating the universal declaration of Human Rights in Morocco, he stressed the fact that not all members of the United Nations were familiar with the social and legal structure in that country nor with the very special conditions in which the principles of the declaration had to be applied. He maintained that the Treaty of Fez defined the lines agreed upon between the Sultan of Morocco and the French Government for the application of such principles. He claimed that the alleged actions of discrimination by the French authorities against the Arabs in Morocco were unfounded, and that United Nations intervention would be contrary to the Treaty of Fez. He argued that, in the circumstances, detailed discussion of the matter would not be in the interests of the Moroccan people or of world peace.[133]

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133. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, p. 357.

In a draft resolution, Canada recommended that consideration of the question of placing the item on the agenda of the Assembly should be posponed "for the time being".[134] The Arab states rejected this on the grounds of the urgency of the matter and of procedural rules that the committee did not have the power to "postpone for the time being" but only to recommend for inclusion or exclusion or for inclusion for a future session. France, the United Kingdom and the United States supported the Canadian resolution, stating that it was inadvisable to begin the discussion in the Assembly on the item at the present time and also that the request had been made so late that representatives had not had sufficient time to consider the matter thoroughly. The Committee drafted resolution on the 9th of November 1951 was passed by six votes to four with six abstentions.[135] This recommendation of the General Committee (A/1950) was considered in plenary sessions from the 13th of November to the 13th of December 1951. After much debate the recommendation of the committee was adopted by 28 votes to 23 with 7 abstentions.[136]

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134. General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, General Committee Seventy Sixth Meeting 23 November 1951, p. 11.

135. Ibid, p. 11.

136. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, p. 359.

IV

By the autumn of 1952 when the 7th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was to meet in New York, the Arab nations were determined that the Moroccan question should be included on the agenda. They were supported by all the Asian countries and especially by India which is not Moslem. This group, known as the African-Asian bloc, resulted from this initial unity on the Moroccan and Tunisian questions.

On August 8th, 1952, Iraq requested that the question of Morocco be included in the Agenda of the seventh session of the General Assembly, (A/2153).[137] The same arguments were presented as in the previous year, but in addition the General Assembly was brought up to date upon the current situation in Morocco. Without discussion, the General Assembly decided to include the question of Morocco in the agenda of the Seventh Session referring it to the first committee. In the general debate, the French Foreign Minister gave a lengthy rebuttal, citing France's achievements and the dangers of premature independence. The proposal was considered by the First Committee from December 13th to December 17th, but was boycotted by the French. The committee issued a draft resolution on December 19, 1952. Resolution (612) VII[138] of the General Assembly reiterated the principles of equal rights and self

137. Ibid, 1952, p. 278.

138. See end of chapter for text of Resolution. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1952, p. 280.)

determination of peoples, its task of removing causes of misunderstanding among states, and set forth three objectives. The first of these was that France should conform with the purposes and principles of the Charter in Morocco, the second advocates the continuance of negotiations toward developing free political institutions for the people of Morocco under the law of nations, and the third advocates that French-Moroccan relations should be in accordance with the spirit of the Charter. The resolution was regarded as unsatisfactory.

The vote, on December 19, 1952, was 45-3, with 11 abstentions. The decision adopted was sponsored by the Latin American group, while the question had originally been considered at the request of the thirteen Asian and African members. The latter wanted the Assembly to request France and the Sultan of Morocco to enter into negotiations to reach an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco, the aspirations of its people, and the United Nations Charter; but again they supported the Latin American formula when their own draft resolution was rejected.[139]

The significance of the resolution lay in the fact that the United Nations had expressed clearly its competence to deal with the problem. In short, Morocco had become a world problem.

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139. "United Nations Bulletin," Vol XIV, No. 2, January 15, 1953, p. 73.

Nothing, however, had brought the problem any closer to a solution. "France, evidently determined to perpetuate its regime in Morocco, confirmed its complete disregard of the United Nat'ons decision by introducing a regime of the 'iron hand' in Morocco, by arresting not only all the nationalist leaders byt also most of the leading intellectuals."[140]

"Despite the General Assembly's resolution expressing its hope for an amicable and negotiated settlement of the Moroccan question, France had not let up its policy of suppression nor had it taken any steps whatsoever to carry out the wishes of the world body. In fact, France has defied the United Nations by refusing to abide by the General Assembly's resolution and had aggravated the situation in Morocco further by intensifying its repressive policy against the Moroccan people. Moreover, the past two months have been marked by increasing French pressure upon the Sultan to accede to the so-called "reforms" unilaterally drafted by the French despite the General Assembly's exhortations that negotiations take place".[141]

V

Morocco again drew the attention of the United Nations Assembly at its 8th meeting in October 1953. On July 9, 1953,

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140. Newsletter of the Middle East Institute in Washington, February 1953, p. 3.

141. Free Morocco, No. 1, Washington D. C., April 20, 1953, p. 3.

fifteen nations of the Asian-African bloc again requested that the question again be included in the provisional agenda for the 8th regular session, (A/2406). An accompanying memorandum stated that despite the Assembly's previous resolution 612 (VII) of December 19, 1952, the policies pursued by France had aggravated the situation. "Approaches made to the French government to urge it to take liberal measures had been ignored... The situation had been further aggravated by continuous threats and attempts to depose the Sultan."[142]

After the Sultan was deposed on the 20th of August 1953, a new request by fifteen nations to intervene in Morocco was received by the Security Council under Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter.[143] The petitioning nations, with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan who are members of the Security Council requested that they be allowed to participate in the discussion of the item in accordance with the rules of procedure. The Security Council considered the question of including the item in the agenda. France again denied the competence of the United Nations to deal with the matter, maintaining that the removal of the Sultan stemmed from an internal religious controversy, and that in fact France had

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142. Yearbook of the United Nations 1953, p. 198.

143. Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Phillippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen.

fulfilled her three-fold obligation provided in the Treaty of Fez namely, to preserve the personal safety of the Sultan, safeguard the continuity of the throne, and save the peace of the Sherifian empire.

In the subsequent meeting of the General Assembly the petitioning powers used essentially the same arguments as they had used in the 7th session, when they laid the case before the General Assembly, with the additional argument that France had failed to implement the objectives of resolution 612 (VII) of the General Assembly, and that the internal situation in Morocco was worse than ever. "The representatives of Lebanon and Pakistan, contended that the situation was so tense that peace and security were at stake". They also requested the President of the Security Council, "to call an urgent meeting to investigate the international friction and the danger to international peace and security which has arisen by the unlawful intervention of France in Morocco and the overthrow of its legitimate sovereign and to take action under the Charter."[144] As before, the representatives of Colombia, the United Kingdom and the United States opposed the inclusion of the item in the agenda. The Republic of Colombia argued that Moroccan sovereignty in external affairs was consigned to France under the Treaty of Fez. Once again, France boycotted the debate, and left the defense of her case in the hands of delegations

144. United Nations Document S/3085, 21 August 1953.

sympathetic to her viewpoint--chiefly the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries of the British Commonwealth with the exception of its Asian members. The representative of the United Kingdom agreed with the French view that interference in the matter would violate Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter, believing the Moroccan situation to be essentially a domestic one. The United States view was that the situation did not infact endanger international peace and security.. Emphasizing that the present discussion was limited to a point of procedure, the United States delegate also expressed concern that "for the Security Council to depart from its primary function of maintaining peace to deal with other questions under the guise of international security was the surest way for it to undermine its position."[145]

Favoring the petition were the Republics of Chile, China, and the U.S.S.R. The Russian delegate believed that the Security Council was competent to deal with the problem primarily because of the Act of Algeceras, a multi-lateral international agreement. In addition, he argued that the problem fell within the scope of Chapter 11 of the Charter, dealing with non-self-governing territories. In similar opinion, the Republic of Chile felt that the situation constituted a serious threat to the peace. The Chinese

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145. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953, p. 201.

delegate favored the inclusion of the item in the agenda but without prejudice to the question of the Council's competence.

At the Council's 624th meeting on September 3, 1953, the motion that the co-sponsors of the request be allowed to appear before the Council was defeated, by 5-4 vote. The provisional agenda was then voted on, but was not adopted because of the tie, 5-5. Thus, in the Security Council,[146] all efforts came to a deadlock.

On the 17th of September, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, included the question in its agenda and referred it to the First Committee.

On October 9, 1953, a thirteen power draft resolution was submitted, by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonisia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Phillippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen to the General Assembly's First Committee. By a role call vote of 28-22, with 9 abstantions, this resolution was defeated.[147]

It was obvious to some observers that the rejection of this resolution in the First Committee might be interpreted in two ways. "(1) as giving France a free hand to take such action as it deemed fit with regard to the Moroccan people

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146. Greece abstained.

147. See end of chapter for text.

and as justifying all its actions and possible mistakes of policy; and (2) as a tacit condemnation of resolution 612 (VII)."[148]

Bolivia therefore submitted a draft resolution which after due consideration was adopted. The First Committee then recommended the following resolution (A/2526) to the General Assembly.

At its 455th meeting on the 3rd of November 1953, the General Assembly in the plenary session, voted on the draft resolution, paragraph by paragraph by roll call. Paragraph 6 was the operative one and failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority,[149] thus defeating the resolution.

In actual fact 32 votes were cast in favor of the Moroccans and 22 against them (with five abstentions). But since, in the plenary session, a two-thirds majority is required, the resolution failed to pass. Whereas in the previous year the Moroccans had received the support of seventeen of the Latin American countries, this time only five voted in favor of the resolution. And once again the attitude of the western powers was determined by wider international considerations. By placating France on the Moroccan issue, the western alliance hoped to secure France's ratification the E. D. C. agreement. The official American position implied support for French Colonialism, and there were those

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148. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953, p. 206.

149. General Assembly, Official Records: Plenary Session, 455th Meeting, 3 November 1953.

within the United States delegation who doubted whether the right policy had been adopted at least from a long term view. Although the Arab delegates realized the imperative need of the western powers to maintain a front against Communism, they also felt that France could not afford to break away from the western camp. It was left to Sir Z. Khan to point out that the vote on the Bolivian resolution amounted to a repudiation of the whole Charter of the United Nations.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan reminded the Assembly that even in international politics, "certain spiritual principles could not be disregarded with impunity. There is something very much higher than this Assembly, which runs the universe. If we put ourselves in accord with the will of the higher Being, we will act beneficently. If we do not, we must take the consequences. We should open the doors of hope to those peoples (Moroccans and Tunisians) in their frustration and despair, lest they open their hearts to counsel of despair, and proceed to adopt desperate courses. We may congratulate ourselves that we have been of service to France in not passing any resolution on Morocco, and France may rejoice over it. If our lack of resoluteness merely amounts to stifling the urge of a people to attain its freedom, we are paving the way to violence. We are not here to say one t ing and to go on enacting another."

Although the adoption of this second resolution by the General Assembly was disappointing to nationalist leaders and to the Afro-Asian countries sponsoring the request, its result was not considered entirely fruitless.[150] Ahmed Balafrej, Secretary General of the Istiqlal Party of Morocco, had this to say: "When the Moroccan case was put before the United Nations Assembly, the Moroccan people knew full well that the U. N. was not a tribunal with executive powers but merely a public platform where the world's opinion on international affairs could be formed. Thanks to the Moroccan debates in the U. N., the world has been made aware of our claims for independence and of the injustice of French colonialism in North Africa. Our chief gain in the U. N. is the world's awareness of the truth. More than thirty free nations representing more than two thirds of the world's population, have supported our cause in the U. N. We greet them thankfully as our friends, and we wish particularly to express our profound gratitude to the Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark."[151]

VI

The provisional agenda of the United Nations on August 1, 1954, again listed the Morocco question. Again fourteen nations of the Asian-African bloc asked the General Assembly

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150. General Assembly, Official Records: Plenary Session, 455th Meeting, 3 November 1953.

151. "Free Morocco", December 25, 1953, No. 8

to consider the Moroccan question, adding the observation that, "All large cities (in Morocco) are under military occupation and each city ward is cut off from the rest of the world for a period of about three weeks to allow free scope for atrocities. Morocco has been transformed, into a concentration camp, and the inhabitants are subjected to indescribable tortures...repression and violence...in the face of strong Nationalist resistance...have created a situation referred to by the London Times as "a state of anarchy'."[152]

Again the question was referred to the First Committee. "After debate at four meetings, the Committee recommended on December 13th that negotiations between France and Morocco would be initiated regarding the Morocco question, further consideration of the item should be postponed for the time being. The vote was 39-15, with 4 abstentions. The sponsors of the proposal were the same members which had sought to have the question discussed--Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen."[153]

New York Times: August 24, 1955 reports that the Afro-Asian bloc made a new appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations, following the most recent troubles in North

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152. United Nations December A/2682, 29 July 1954, p. 5.

153. United Nations Review January 1955, Vol. 1 No. 7, p. 73.

Africa, to use his good office, etc., and for the first time, Turkey was added in the group.

Once again the U. N. chose the easier way of not taking any responsibility. Yet the experience of the preceding two years might have tought it that France was unwilling, or unable, to implement the suggestions made by that international body. To a devout friend of the U. N. and a student of international affairs it must seem disheartening that the Assembly did not act in a more positive way, suggesting its impotence.

So, once again, the onus fell upon France and once again, the perennial immobilisme of the French government was to become responsible for events in Morocco and that governmental immobility inevitably led to an increased activity on the part of the Moroccan people themselves. Since the outside world would not help them, they must see how they can help themselves.

"The General Assembly, Resolution (A2526)

"Having considered the question of Morocco proposed by fifteen Member States in document A/2406,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 612 (VII) of 19 December 1952,

"Considering that the motives and objectives of that resolution had and continue to have the merit of recognizing the necessity of the development of the free political institutions of the people of Morocco,

"Considering that the fact that this item has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its eighth session indicates that those objectives have not yet been fulfilled,

"Recognizing the right of the people of Morocco to complete self-determination in conformity with the Charter,

"Renews its appeal for the reduction of tension in Morocco and urges that the right of the people of Morocco to free democratic political institutions be ensured."[154]

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154. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953, p. 207.

Joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.60), date submitted, October 9, 1953 which provided, interalia, that the General Assembly should:

"(1) recommend that the existing state of martial law and all other exceptional measures in Morocco should be terminated, that political prisoners should be realeased and that all public liberties should be restored;

(2) recommend that democratic representative institutions for the people of Morocco through free elections on the basis of universal suffrage should be established;

(3) recommend that all necessary steps should be taken to ensure within five years the complete realization by the people of Morocco of their rights to full soverdignty and independence; and

(4) request the Secretary-General to communicate with the Franch Government with a view to the implementation of the resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its ninth Session."[155]

155. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953, p. 203.

"The General Assembly, Resolution 612 (VII) December 19, 1952,

"Having debated the "Question of Morocco", as proposed by thirteen Member States in document A/2175,

"Mindful of the necessity of developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

"Considering that the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of their common ends under the Charter, should strive towards removing any causes or factors of misunderstanding among Member States, thus reasserting the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Expresses the confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the Government of France will endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter;

2. Expresses the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis towards developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations;

3. Appeals to the parties to conduct their relations in an atmosphere of goodwill, mutual confidence and respect and to settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, thus refraining from any acts or measures likely to

aggravate the present tension."

156. Yearbook of the United Nations 1952, p. 285.

Article Two Paragraph Seven of the United Nations Charter.

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Morocco-1955

I

Morocco remained in a state of crisis almost continuously since Sidi Mohammed was deposed on August 20, 1953. Not only was Morocco riddled by violence on the part of the natives but a French counter-terrorism developed as well. "When what is commonly called 'counter terrorism' broke out in June 1954, Europeans in Morocco tended not only to excuse it but often to sympathize with this European violence as a kind of deserved retaliation to the Moroccan attacks... Counter terrorism, called European terrorism by the Moroccans, has turned out to be a movement, not against terrorists, but rather against those French and Moroccans who themselves are opposed to violence...Unscrupulous men used the legitimate patriotic sentiments of the local European population for their own personal interests to maintain a troubled atmosphere and do away with those who sought a just solution to the Moroccan problem."[157]

Mr. Paul Johnson, Paris correspondent of The New Statesman and Nation in the issue of April 16, 1955 expressed a nearly

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157. Howe, Marvine, Morocco in Ferment, Violance as a policy, The Nation, August 13, 1955, p. 134.

identical opinion: "Meanwhile the whole country is drifting into anarchy. Nationalists have responded to force by force... Counter terrorism, too, is now highly organized. According to realiable reports, there are nearly 1,000 counter-terrorists in Casablanca grouped in cells of ten and led by professional policemen."[158]

II

Francois Lacoste, who succeeded General Guillaume as Resident General in October 1954, promised "radical corrective measures to curb terrorism, [Lacoste who knew Morocco well, having been French Minister at Rabat under General Juin, was credited with a liberal spirit and good intentions. But it was generally known that he was not sufficiently strong to oppose himself to the colonialists or to impose upon them whatever liberal measures the government in Paris might wish to take]. Lacoste offered the Moroccans the old French proposal of "studying" the situation. "It would be contrary both to the principle of Moroccans sovereignty and to the very spirit of the revolution that France has undertaken in Morocco, to impose on the Moroccans a ready-made political formula."[159] A slow and gradual readjustment of the Moroccan political structure was intimated and an

158. The New Statesman and Nation, April 16, 1955, p. 543.

159. Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 1954, p. 2.

increased but gradual integration of young Moroccans into the government was considered. Lacoste emphasized the importance of this plan to ease tensions.

The nationalists opposed any such plan, claiming that it was another device of the traditional French policy of devide-and rule. Furthermore Nationalist leaders were unwilling to begin negotiations about any of the issues until the question of the throne was settled. "This meant first of all that some agreement had to be reached with the exiled Sultan, which placed Mr. Lacoste and the French Government in a rather awkward corner. They were willing to admit that Ben Youseff's dethronement had been a mistake, but they were not prepared to bring him back and reinstate him."[160] These concessions were possible only because the rightwing cabinet of Mr. Laniel had been replaced by that of Pierre Mendés-France. By dispatching Mr. Lacoste to Morocco, Mendés-France hoped to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the deteriorating situation; a solution perhaps similar to the one outlined two months previously in Tunisia. In a speech on August 27, 1954, the French Premier intimated that the restoration of the Sultan was not forseeable in the immediate future as a part of the overall solution. Mendés-France had to consider public opinion. He also had to

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160. Stevens, Edmund, Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1955, p. 6.

consider the threatened civil war by El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh, who was the native instrument of the settlers and the lobbies that represented them in Paris. Glaoui decried bitterly the French failure to support Arafa and initiate the reforms promised when the legitimate Sultan was deposed. What in actual fact Glaoui resented was that the deposition of Moulay Ben Youssef did nothing to increase his own power and influence. Since he had become the chief power behind the throne of Arafa, any reform that added to the authority of the latter would have automatically raised the stature of Glaoui himself. In an effort to introduce fundamental reforms in Morocco and Algeria the Government of Mendés-France fell on the 5th of February, 1955.

On the 22nd of June, 1955, Faure appointed Mr. Gilbert Grandval as the new Resident General to Morocco. As usual, a new plan was to be carried out.

Three basic principles were to be applied:

1. "The Government would never renounce or allow to be disputed the permance of a French presence in Morocco.

2. The Government was determined to abolish progressively direct administration by Frenchmen in Morocco.

3. The Government would aim to create progressively in all spheres the modern institutions to which Morocco aspired."

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161. Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 23, 1955, p. 7.

III

The interpretation of a protectorate treaty must obviously be based on its terms that determine the relationship between the protected State and the protector. According to the treaty of 1912, France was not given the right to introduce direct administration into Morocco, and had the duty to protect the person and authority of the Sultan. The deposition of the legitimate Sultan Sidi Mohammed on August 20, 1953, thus, represents violation of international agreements, namely, the act of Algeciras and the protectorate Treaty of 1912. France claimed that the reason for removing the Sultan was the fact that he was hated by his people and that it was her duty to remove him in order to avoid bloodshed and chaos within the country. The real reason however, was that the Sultan refused to sign a large number of laws which would have increased French control at the expense of the Sherifian powers. The events since August 1953 have already proved that the Moroccans have vowed not to rest until the damage done in August 1953 is repaired.

IV

M. Faure, the Prime Minister of France, himself has, by implication, admitted that France had not abided by the terms of the Protectorate Treaty. He said in the General Assembly

in Paris. "It is time to return to the true conception of the Protectorate which should not be confused with direct administration." (Assemblée Nationale. No. 53, 22 June 1955, p. 3179.)

The New York Times, on July 19, 1955 states, "At the moment the French are reduced to maintaining order in Morocco by force of arms. This method cannot be used indefinitely by a nation which at Geneva and elsewhere has taken an international stand for 'freedom'. Somehow or other the freedom of Morocco must be planned and achieved. In this instance, as in others, the ultimate safety of Western civilization lies in doing exact justice."

"We need an exceptional man," the Premier Edgar Faure told Grandval. "You are that man."[162] Grandval, as newly appointed resident general in Morocco landed at Rabat Airfield. Two days later he drove into Casablanca, got out of his car, walked over to a Moroccan and extended his hand in friendship. But the colons hated him for his liniency with the natives. Time Magazine of September 5, 1955 had this to say, "Under pressure from the colons, French bureaucrats in Morocco systematically sabotaged Grandval's reform program. His orders were not carried out, telegrams were not delivered. Grandval appealed to Paris, but the colons were there before him. Conservative members of Faure's coalition threatened to bring down the government if Grandval got his own way."

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162. Time Magazine. September 5, 1955, p. 22.

Grandval in consultation with Premier Faure had repeatedly warned the French Government to take a step of appeasement with the natives before the approach of the second anniversary of the deposition of the Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef, (August 20, 1955). By August 13th, a plan unanimously adopted by the French Government called for Moulay Ben Arafa to form a government representing all elements of the Moroccan population. However, Moulay Ben Arafa refused to form a government unless it be from among his own followers in the French protectorate. At the same time the French Government proposed a meeting between five French ministers on one side and native representatives on the other. Up to this date, the Sultan had refused to vacate the throne on his own as Grandval had hoped.[163] It might be well to note here that the French cabinet was divided within itself. Those who supported the colons, thus encouraging Moulay Ben Arafa to stay on the throne and opposed the Grandval reforms, therefore, asking for the recall of Grandval, while on the other hand we had those who supported the Grandval plan and wished to appease the natives.

The second anniversary of the deposition of the Sultan, on August 20th, proved indeed a black day both for Morocco

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163. New York Times. August 27, 1955.

and Franco-Moroccan relations. Native risings, chiefly by Berbers, resulted in the massacre of about two hundred French people and the death of many more hundred Moroccans at the hands of the French. The Manchester Guardian of August 25, 1955 reported that event saying that, "French North Africa must hope never to see another anniversary like Saturday's... In fact this bloody anniversary must be a spur to the [French] government to act decisively and cut through the dynastic tangle...It has become plainer that without this there can be no settlement." The colons had accused Grandval of not taking the appropriate step to avoid the situation at hand and of being too easy on the natives which gave them a chance for those acts. "To the impassioned colons, however, Gilbert Grandval was to blame. Grandval had bargained with the Moroccans, the Moroccans committed the murders. Therefore, Grandval was an accomplice", ran the colon argument.[164]

Premier Faure, influenced by the right-wingers in his Cabinet, decided to recall Grandval and replace him by General Boyer De Latour. This new General was not as acceptable to the natives as had been his predecessor. Even the Berbers who had been long supporters of Thami Glaoui and the French Administration sided with the nationalists. Berber Caids and Pashas petitioned the French Government

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164. Time Magazine. September 5, 1955, p. 22

declaring their support for the nationalists and denouncing the French Administration as well as their support for the Glaoui. The Berber rioters as well as the petioners called for the return of Mohammed Ben Youssef. It was a profound disappointment to the French Government to see their policy of divide and rule come to an end.

Finally Moulay Ben Arafa left, delegating his seals of office to a cousin, Abd el Hafid. This apparently was a concession to French colonials who had bitterly fought the Government's ouster of the Sultan.[165]

Thami Glaoui, the powerful Pasha of Marakkesh, seeing his tribes turning against him, had no choice but to join the nationalists thus throwing a political bomb-shell into the Moroccan political scene. "I share entirely the joy of the Moroccan people over the announcement of His Majesty Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef's return to France," he declared. "I make my own the wish of the Moroccan people, which is that throne. Only his return can bring unity and calm to the spirits and to the hearts of the Moroccans---My aspiration is identical to that of the entire nation--the independence

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165. Time Magazine. October 10, 1953, p. 32.

of my country within the framework of interdependence with France."[166] With this dramatic and unexpected announcement, France was suddenly facing an entirely new situation. The position of the nationalist was now immeasurably strengthened, and the position of Paris correspondingly weakened. Paris was facing a Morocco, united in demanding the return of Mohammed Ben Youssef as Sultan. The French government now rushed to make arrangements for the return of Ben Youssef. On his arrival in Paris, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef was received as a sovereign ruler rather than an exiled Sultan. Thami El Glaoui was one of the first to meet him, and he asked for forgiveness, declaring, at the same time, his loyalty and support for the Sultan. Upon his arrival in Morocco, the Sultan was received with overwhelming enthusiasm. In his speech on the Day of the Throne, on November 18th, he made it clear that he considered himself the sovereign ruler of an independent nation, even though allied to France.[167]

The Sultan's first aim was to bring about the formation of a purely native government. The nationalists would, of course, have to play the decisive role in it. Yet some of the more extreme nationalists were reluctant to enter the proposed cabinet. They resented Sidi Mohammed's declaration regarding

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166. New York Times. October 26, 1955.

167. Al Ummah. Tetuan, Spanish Morocco, November 20, 1955

Morocco's future interdependence with France. Their aim was complete independence untramelled by any conditions or restrictions. The Sultan, wiser than they, knew full well that, for some time to come, Morocco could not stand entirely on its own feet, and would need the assistance of a foreign power, such as France. Finally, however, moderate counsels within the Istiqlal Party prevailed, and it decided to enter the new cabinet. That cabinet was formed on December 7, 1955 under the premiership of Si Bekkai, the former Pasha of Sefrou, and one of the Sultan's closest friends. His cabinet included nine members from the Istiqlal Party, five independents and six from the Democratic Independence Party. A complete innovation was the inclusion of a minister of the Jewish faith, a step that completely disproved the persistent French propaganda that in a self-governing Morocco the Jews would be crushed.[168]

The purpose of the newly appointed cabinet was to prepare for negotiations with the French Government regarding the future relations between the two countries and the status of an independent Morocco.[169] Immediately after the formation of the Cabinet, the Sultan began to replace French administrators, such as provincial and urban governors, by native ones.

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168. Le Monde. December 9, 1955.

169. Le Monde. December 6, 1955.

It was during the days when Bakkai Ben Mubarak was forming his Cabinet that the Istiqlal Party, no longer illegal and living in hiding, met in a big congress at Rabat. The demands of the Istiqlal Congress were as follows: Complete independence, native army, native diplomacy (foreign affairs), and equal rights for women.[170] The Congress revealed that the Istiqlal stood for democracy, progress and modernization, while Mazzani's Democratic Independence Party appeared to represent the views of the more conservative elements among the Moroccans.

Thus, by the end of 1955, Morocco could look forward towards self-government and independence. Contrary to many predictions, it had attained its goal without foreign assistance but by its own efforts and by the united will of its people. Only the future can tell whether it would not have been preferable if some of the western powers had not lent the Moroccans a more whole-hearted assistance. Only the future can tell how the short-sightedness of those powers will affect the future relations between them and Morocco--a country predestined by geography and History to be a link between the worlds of Islam and Christendom, between the East and the West.

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170. Le Monde. December 6, 1955

CONCLUSION

MOROCCO AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Moroccan people had hoped that the United States would come to their aid, at least during the debates in the United Nations. They had always regarded the United States as a country rooted in the principles of integrity, justice and democratic principles. They had hoped that the United States, traditionally sympathetic to the rights of weaker nations, would come to the aid. In their eyes it was the United States that had killed the Moroccan demand in the United Nations.

Americans might feel that the Moroccan people are entitled to some measure of support from the United States. By lending them this support, the United States would only be following its own traditions, and upholding its own principles. It is interesting to recall the long history of friendship between the United States and Morocco. Morocco was one of the first nations to recognize the American independence and to sign a treaty of friendship with this country. Washington in 1789 wrote to the Sultan of Morocco:

> "The encouragement which Your Majesty has been pleased, generously, to give to our commerce with your dominions, the punctuality with which you have caused the Treaty with us to be observed, and the just and generous measures taken in the case of Captain Proctor, make a deep impression on the United States and conform their respect for, and attachment to your Imperial Majesty."

Unfortunately, to all appearances, the United States is supporting the colonial policy of France. This can only be prejudicial to American prestige in Morocco.

The Moroccan People are eager to cooperate sincerely to reach a workable solution to the mounting tentions in Morocco. The task of the free nations should be to make France understand her true interests, not to support her colonial policy.

In a cablegram sent to the President of the United States on July 17, 1955, by the Moroccan office in New York will indicate the Moroccan hope in regard to the United States:

> "At this moment, when the eyes of the world are on Geneva and mankind looks with hope towards an era of peace and freedom, the French colonialists, using American weapons, have renewed their aggression against the unarmed and defenseless people of Morocco. This vital and strategic area is torn by war and insecurity. We beg you, Mr. President, to demand that the French Government put an end to the present aggression and massacres in Casablanca. We beg you, Mr. President, to insist on the liberation of Morocco from French colonial domination and on the return of the Sultan which alone can restore peace and security."

However, as the New York Times noted on August 23, "the withdrawal of French divisions from NATO is causing a great concern in the United States." The United States by her support to France is furthering neutralism in the Asian and African countries. These countries had freed themselves from colonialism only in recent times, and are still strongly

anti-colonialists. One of the reasons for their friendly attitude toward the United States was the latters not being a colonial power. But by supporting the colonial powers the United States is, in the eyes of the African-Asians placing itself in the ranks of the colonialists.

Colonel Nassir, the Premier of Egypt, in his speech made at the Bandung Conference said, "On what grounds can anyone condone the fact that the countries of North Africa which, for centuries, were independent nations and the seats of great civilizations, are now being degraded to the status of non-self-government territories? Are such policies conduce to peace and co-operation among nations?"

VI

Whatever the errors of the Moroccans in the past, and whatever the virtues of the French administration since 1912, we cannot afford to forget that an efficient government can ever be an adequate substitute for self-government, moreover, no nation can learn to govern itself except by governing itself. The Moroccans had governed themselves for 1200 years, and there is no reason to assume they should not be able to do so again.

Undoubtedly, for many years to come, they will have to depend upon the advice and assistance of Powers better versed in modern methods, but in the Midtwentieth century, French

assistance should never imply political domination and economic enslavement. Such assistance should be requested, and given freely. The very concept of a colonialism rooted in the subjugation of the weaker by the stronger must be an offense to any human being to whom the ideals of fairness, justice and freedom are still of some vital significance.

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APPENDIX 1

THE FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT

of April 8th, 1904

Declarations respecting Egypt and Morocco

ARTICLE 1.--His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they concur with the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present Agreement, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, but only on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885.

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be intrusted to a French expert.

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

ARTICLE II.--The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virture of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed British vessels since 1901.

ARTICLE III.--His Britannic Majesty's Government, for thier part, will respect the rights which France, in virture of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

ARTICLEIV.--The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this proviso is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

ARTICLE V.--His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

ARTICLE VI.--In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

ARTICLE VII.--In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Givraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the hieghts which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

ARTICLE VIII.--The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Govennment. Any agreement which may be arrived at on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE IX.--The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Dedlaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

APPENDIX 2

PROTECTORATE TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND MOROCCO

Signed at Fez, on March 30th, 1912

The Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Shrifian Majesty, desirous of inaugurating a regular regime in Morocco based upon internal order and general security, which will make it possible to introduce reforms and to ensure the economic development of the country, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1.--The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty the Sultan have agreed to establish in Morocco a new regime comprising the administrative, judicial, educational, economic, financial and military reforms which the French Government may see fit to introduce within the Moroccan territory.

This regime shall safeguard the religious status, the respect and traditional prestige of the Sultan, the exercise of the Mohammedan religion and of all religious institutions, in particular those of the Habus. It shall include the organization of a reformed Sherifian Makhzen.

The Government of the Republic will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government regarding the interests which this Government derives from its geographical position and territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast.

In like manner, the city of Tangier shall retain its recognized distinctive characteristics, which will determine its municipal organization.

ARTICLE 2.--His Majesty the Sultan agrees that henceforth the French Government, subject to prior notification to the Makhzen, may proceed to such military occupation of the Moroccan territory as it may deem necessary for the maintenance of good order and the security of commercial transactions, and may exercise every police supervision on land and with the Moroccan waters.

ARTICLE 3.--The Government of the Repbblic pledges itself to lend constant support to His Sherifian Majesty against all dangers which might threaten his person or throne, or endanger the tranquillity of his states. The same support shall be given the heir to the throne and his successors.

ARTICLE 4.--Such measures as the new regime of the Protectorate may require shall be established by decree, upon the proposal of the Brench Government, by His Sherifian Majesty or the authorities to whom he may have delegated his power. The same procedure shall be observed in the matter of new regulations and of modifications of the existing regulations.

ARTICLE 5.--The French Government shall be represented to His Sherifian Majesty by a Commissioner Resident-General, representative af all the powers of the Republic in Morocco, who shall attend to the execution of the present Agreement.

The Commissioner Resident-General shall be the sole intermediary between the Sultan and foreign representatives and in the relations which these representatives maintain with the Moroccan Government. In particular, he shall have charge of all matters relating to foreigners in the Sherifian Empire. He shall have the power to approve and promulgate, on behalf of the French Government, all the decrees issued by His Sherifian Majesty.

ARTICLE 6.--The diplomatic and consular agents of France shall be charged with the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests abroad.

His Majesty the Sultan pledges himself not to conclude any act of an international nature without the previous approval of the French Repbblic.

ARTICLE 7.--The Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Sherifian Majesty reserve unto themselves the right to determine by mutual agreement the basis of a financial reorganization which, while respecting the rights conferred upon bondholders of the Moroccan public loans, shall make it possible to guarantee the commitments of the Sherifian Treasury and to collect regularly the revenues of the Empire.

ARTICLE 8.--His Sherifian Majesty declares that in future, he will refrain from contracting, directly or indirectly, any public or private loan, and from granting in any form whatever any concession without the authorization of the French Government.

ARTICLE 9.--The present Treaty shall be submitted to the Government of the French Republic for ratification and the instrument of the said ratification shall be handed without delay to His Majesty the Sultan.

In faith shereof, the undersigned have drawn up the present Act and have affixed their seals thereto.

Fez, March 30th, 1912 (11rebiah1130).