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AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE JAPANESE QUESTION 1904-1934

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University of the Pacific

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AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

AND

THE JAPANESE QUESTION

1904 - 1934

By

Phoebe O'Connor White
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Submitted to the Department of History
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I wish to express my grateful appreciation to Dr. Malcolm Eiselen, Professor of History and Political Science and also the chairman of the committee for my thesis. Dr. Eiselen has given me much of his time and many suggestions and much constructive criticism; without this help such a study of public opinion would have been impossible. To the other two members of my committee, Dr. J. W. Harris, Dean of Education at the College of Pacific and Dr. Tully O. Knowles, President of the College of Pacific, I wish to express my thanks for the time spent in reading and criticizing my work.

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express my heartfelt thanks.
INTRODUCTION

In my study of the subject "American Public Opinion and the Japanese Question," I have taken the period from 1904 to 1934 because it represents a period in the relations between the two nations which will probably be of lasting consequence to both. During this period many questions of international importance have arisen, and the reflection of American public opinion on these events is well worth studying.

In this study of American public opinion I have not attempted to build a case either for or against Japan in the many controversies which have arisen between the two nations. The changes and causes which have brought about these differences of opinion have been discussed only briefly without attempt at critical comment. I have tried so far as possible to confine this study to the intangible but important subject of public opinion.

The term "American Public Opinion" I have used to indicate the dominant trend of American thought and attitudes toward the many problems which has arisen between Japan and the United States during the past thirty years. It is, of course, impossible to reflect all the gradations of public opinion in a study of this length. Instead I have tried to present a representative cross section of the public mind upon the various issues which have come up between the countries. In such a study, it has seemed unwise to make too great use of paraphrases, summaries, or generalizations.
Instead wherever possible, I have tried to reproduce the exact words of the speaker or writer. Only in this way is it possible to recapture the hopes and fears, the discernments and extravagances which have beset the public mind upon this important question.
CHAPTER I
THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War the trend of public opinion in the United States was one of decided friendliness to Japan. The friendly feeling between the two nations had existed for many years, in fact ever since Admiral Perry made his visit to the Japanese and they had made trade agreements with us and the rest of the world. Since we had played a leading part in pointing the way to Japan in world trade a friendly attitude had become traditional between the two nations. News of pending difficulties between Russia and Japan was watched with interest by the United States. Japan was new in the family of nations of the world; just what would be her ability in a combat with a nation of Russia's size?

At this time all news of the Far East was received here after first being relayed through Europe, thence to England and finally reaching the American press. This made all news received here highly colored by European interpretation. Of course in many European nations there was a decided anti-Russian feeling, this might account for the friendly Japanese feeling on the European continent. In England we find a very friendly attitude toward the Japanese, which accounts in some degree for the influence the press was to make on the American people in shaping opinions.

Of all the periodicals the Outlook was probably the most
emphatic in her favored attitude toward Japan. In commenting on the situation at the beginning of hostilities the Outlook states:

With Russian aggression in Korea, the Japanese are contending for a perpetuation of political and commercial domination (not annexation) and for territory to accommodate the overflow population. They are contending for what they believe may be the ultimate existence of the Island Empire itself... Japan has been patient. This is not to be taken too optimistically. Diplomats claim unless Russia concedes Japanese supremacy in Korea an armed conflict will follow.

During this time of uncertainty as to whether war was probable or not the Outlook in its weekly section printed an article by one of her staff correspondents entitled "Japan and Russia Face to Face." To quote in part we find a continuation of the Outlook's attitude:

Japan states she is not seeking territorial expansion. Nor has Japan any intention of taking advantage of the misfortunes of her neighbors in seeking territory. As a result of many campaigns Russia has been given a foothold in Manchuria... As a result Russia should be compelled to confirm by international treaty the assurances made to Japan and America concerning freedom of trade in Manchuria.

During the weeks just preceding the actual beginning of hostilities the daily press pictured Japan as the nation calmly but effectively preparing to defend her national integrity. Russia was pictured as being bitter toward the United States. We as a nation were considered to be not concerned over Japanese integrity, but over American desire

1 The Outlook, Vol. 76: Jan. 2, 1904, 2.

2 "Japan and Russia Face to Face", The Outlook, Vol. 76: Jan. 16, 1904, 145.
to control trade in Manchuria and better our trade in the Far East. Again the European influence on Far Eastern news reports was felt in America.

On February 7th diplomatic relations were broken off between Russia and Japan. Favorable reaction to Japan is noted both in eastern and western United States by an article taken from the New York Times and reprinted in the San Francisco Chronicle.

Japan's daring astounds Europe. The general impression is rapidly gaining that the war will be short, sharp, decisive, ... Japan's daring coup in opening the war on Russia's strong position at Port Arthur is most astounding to Europe and also America. This move not only shows the tremendous energy of the Japanese which will force the campaign, but it is regarded as a decisive blow so far as naval operations are concerned.1

The opinion was continually given that Russia was a foe to be feared if she continued her drive in the Far East. In the end either Russian aggression must be definitely stopped or the privileges and trade rights promised through the open door policy could not be expected to continue. This attitude toward Russia was not directed against the Russian people but against the autocratic government.

The Outlook continued its most friendly attitude and justification of Japan's cause. From The Week in the Outlook we find these statements:

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1904.
There is not the slightest animosity to Russia among Americans, but there is a friendly feeling. ... The possession of Korea by Russia would mean in the end the control of Japan by Russia. In the opinion of the Outlook the Japanese did not provoke the war, but it was imposed upon them by the steady advance of Russia to the Yellow Sea. ... In this struggle the American sympathies are with Japan because Japan is the protagonist of Asia as the only country in the Far East which has shown executive genius of a high order, power of organization and that growing sense of personality in which the East is so defective and the lack of which has involved the rest of civilization for centuries.1

Japanese bravery and the efficiency of the soldiers and officers was made much of in the press. The Japanese received much admiration for their ability. This opinion was rather well brought out in a press interview given by General Miles U. S. A. General Miles returning from the Far East said:

The Russian soldier is courageous about saying his prayers before going into battle, but it is the fighting and not the praying which will count.

I have studied most of the armies of the world and the armies and soldiers of Russia, Japan, and China. The success in the East to-day of the army of the Mikado is due largely to their wonderful skill, faithful performances of their duties and remarkable enterprise.2

The periodicals which carried week to week accounts of the war always gave Japan a most favorable position, the general opinion being that Japan was fighting for her own safety and that Russian prowess must be put down. Most of the major naval and land battles were successful for Japan.

1 The Outlook, Vol. 76: March 5, 1904, 535.

2 San Francisco Chronicle, May 14, 1904.
As the war progressed and Japan continued to meet success after success a new thought began to develop in the minds of many Americans. Japan was a nation for the first time engaging in a war with one of the great nations of the world, just what effect would these victories have upon Japan? If she were to be so very successful then what would be her effect upon the open door policy in China which we though neutral insisted must be kept. The great admiration for Japanese fighters began to lessen as the war progressed.

This questioning attitude toward Japan was noticeable in the 1904 session of Congress. Some of these differences in congressional opinion caused many clashes in the various committee meetings. During a committee discussion in pending naval legislation personal opinion regarding the war caused quite a sensational clash, Senators Hale and Nelson being the most outspoken. Senator Hale advanced the argument that the United States' position was one of strict neutrality in the Russian War. Senator Nelson openly accused Senator Hale of being overly interested on the side of Russia. Senator Nelson went on to state, "There is a community interest on the part of the United States, Great Britain and Japan to protect China."  

Senator Hale then crossed Senator Nelson, this time

1 San Francisco Chronicle, March 6, 1904.
advancing the argument that if Japan won the present war the United States would find more danger to her commercial interests from that power than any other.

This debate was short lived with no particular result save that it revealed a difference of opinion in Congress and caused much press comment.

The first real hint of a change of opinion on the part of the American public began about the middle of July. The public realized slowly and surely Japan was getting a tremendous foothold in Manchuria; this control was watched carefully.

Before the war Japan had publicly avowed that its interest in Manchuria was centered in the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese empire. It was first to respond to the HQ note reminding the powers that Chinese integrity had been pledged. This action doubtless aided much in preparing and strengthening the bonds of friendship between Tokio and the United States. Now that Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese she aroused much suspicion of insincerity of her professions regarding the integrity of China.

The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs represented that the Japanese had presented the scheme to him of policing southern Manchuria with the number of Chinese troops in the territory. Since the Chinese had no troops in that territory such a proposition carried with it military as well as the civil control by Japan.
From this time on, which was in the summer of 1904, suspicions of Japanese intent developed rapidly.

To increase the questioning attitude of the Americans towards Japanese intentions, her purchase of the railroad in the Shantung Peninsula added another link. This railroad had been built by the Germans during the Boxer uprising and was considered of no military importance to Japan. The general reaction of the United States was most unfavorable. This was editorially commented upon by saying, "This road purchase shows the object of the Japanese is to develop a commercial conquest of the Shantung Peninsula and ultimately the exploitation of the province."

This is an interesting comment or rather prophecy in view of what later took place in regard to Shantung.

The idea of Japan becoming a trade rival gained strength as the war progressed and she continued her gains in Manchuria and on the Shantung Peninsula.

The term "Yellow peril" also became a slogan with the press as the war advanced and as Japan successfully advanced on the mainland of Asia.

The possibility of the "Yellow peril" is questioned and analyzed by an editorial which says:

Perhaps there is a future menace in the "too marked success" of Japan and her coalition in China. The latter if once

1 San Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1905.
awakened and lead by Japan into such a transformation in half a century as Japan has undergone could pour out enough millions to overrun and conquer the world. There is a possibility that success may inspire troublesome ambitions in the yellow race. But that is a problem the nations of Europe should have solved by checking Russia without leaving it for Japan to do. As they have left it for Japan it will have to be left until it becomes a peril.1

Japan was responsible for bringing criticism upon herself by seizing a Russian gunboat in the harbor at Shanghai. This brought forth much censure in the press which commented:

Japan has committed a flagrant international outrage, which the civilized world cannot overlook. If it only affected China it might be overlooked and merely force her to take a stand as to sides in the war. But the neutrality of China had been guaranteed by the neutral powers and the two belligerants.

It would seem impossible for anyone of the powers to overlook Japanese violation of the rules of war, the covenant of the Hague and the faith plighted in the joint guarantee of neutrality. It is quite probable the Japanese commander acted without authority. However the act will go far to confirm the European impression industriously cultivated that the "Yellow Peril" is a real one.2

The peace negotiations in the summer of 1905 brought out a continuation of the suspicions so rapidly under the articles pertaining to the "yellow peril".

During the peace negotiations the Nation took occasion to discuss the Japanese demands in an editorial entitled, "A Premium On Aggression!"

1 Stockton Independent, Feb. 31, 1904.

2 Ibid., Aug. 12, 1904.
It is not the magnitude of the Japanese demands which the Russians resent, but the pretense, and their feeling will sooner or later be shared by all thinking men ... Japan has said to her opponents, "Get out of here that I may replace you", this in reference to Korea and Manchuria. If Russia pays the indemnity she will be as permanently hostile as of old. ... The novelty in Japan's demands lies in the fact that she no matter with what provocation began the war and struck the first blow, struck it without warning. ...

The Japanese press Russia for indemnity. This high handedness is not going to be dropped by a nation of military power flushed with successes it dared not dream of, and (provided she gets it) millions in sweat money to be immediately put into fortifications, arms and ships of war in the glory of Nippon. Mankind will take warning.¹

Another interesting opinion was given by Mr. Thomas F. Millard, a student of affairs in the orient, who had spent much time there. He felt that the press correspondents fell too much under the glamour of Japan and were too one sided in their reports. He raised the question that ten years before the powers had prevented Japan from doing what she was doing now, saying:

Is there a moral law in international affairs which makes a thing right when gained by military success and wrong when accomplished by diplomacy? ... The time is still far off when Japan can be dealt with only as an oriental nation. ... The Japanese people are feeling very chesty. The feeling of being chesty is not noticeable among the better classes but there is a note of insolence on the part of the waiters and coolies. ... Some of the English and American press may awake to the fact of having been instrumental in the turning of Manchuria over to Japan.²

¹ "A Premium On Aggression", The Nation; Vol. 81, Aug. 24, 1905, 156.
In some quarters the compromise carried out by the peace delegates was looked upon as a cause of future wars. This idea was strongly expressed by Dr. Louis Seamon, a specialist on contagious diseases and army sanitation, who had just returned from spending two years with the Russian and Japanese armies. Dr. Seamon declared:

The so-called Peace of Portsmouth will in my opinion come to be a prolonged armistice. Russia still one of the greatest nations of the earth will never consent to be bottled up and will never be satisfied until she has regained the lost territory and prestige of this war. Russia must have an outlet for her commerce of the future. She will go where she will or may. The siege of Mukden and Port Arthur will have to be fought all over again.

While the Russians are getting ready the Japanese will grow more restive and in some year in the future big Russians and little brown men will fight again. How near this prophecy will come to being fulfilled it is impossible to state.

One of the many comments of Japan's plans will be found in the Overland in an article by Chas. Calame, entitled "Apropos of the War in the Far East". In this article the author feels that Japan was the aggressor. He cites the fact that Japan struck at the Port Arthur fleet before the Japanese ambassador was withdrawn from Russia, and therefore accuses Japan of an act of treachery. He further feels that back of all this is an Oriental idea of supremacy against the whites.

China and Japan will always stand together as orientals against the white man, but the white race is found divided in turn.

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Spet. 2, 1905.
Theorists scout the "yellow peril", but they are simply exponents of idealistic dreams serviceable only to the auditorium. Japan as an insular empire has the natural boundary of the sea, interference is a remote possibility, and she has no claim to have been interfered with, but her coveting eyes are on Korea of which she wants to make herself mistress as a prelude of her intrusion on the continent of Asia.

I quote my proof of this from a statement made by Count Okuma former minister of foreign affairs, "We must follow the example of the United States which owe their importance from the time of the Monroe Doctrine. If we win the war, then Japan must insist that Europeans who are now in East Asia are curbed to her will, and no power should be permitted to have possession in Asia. Japan should make herself the leader of China, Korea, and Siberia".¹

Mr. Calame feels this statement above is proof of what the white race may expect in the future from Japan as an outcome of her success in the Japanese war.

Thus, during the progress of the Russo-Japanese war we passed from an attitude of friendliness to one of questioning Japanese future plans. Japan's appearance on the mainland of Asia brought doubt to the minds of many Americans. Japanese victory over Russia sowed the first seeds of suspicion against her in the minds of the American people. The antagonism was still not deeply rooted, yet the seeds of suspicion once planted only needed encouragement to begin growing in future years.

CHAPTER II
THE SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL CASE AND
THE GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Russo-Japanese war generated the first significant evidence of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. The war, however, was too remote a phenomenon to excite the interest of the average American. It remained, therefore, for a purely domestic issue to fan the anti-Japanese feeling to truly formidable proportions. This issue was the question of Japanese immigration on the Pacific coast.

In October, 1904, the California State Labor Commission made the statement that between 1900 and 1904 over twenty thousand Japanese laborers had arrived in California. This brought forth an editorial comment from the San Francisco Chronicle which said:

It is quite evident that the immigration of the little brown men is becoming quite a problem. Our laws place no restraint on their incoming and they have taken advantage to come unobserved. There is no doubt on the part of any thinking citizen that unrestrained immigration if continued will create as serious a racial and industrial problem as that of the Chinese.¹

This comment and many similar ones had the effect of stimulating antagonism on the part of labor. The State Federation of Labor at its annual convention held in Stockton

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 24, 1904.
that year passed a resolution asking for the exclusion of the Japanese laborers. The act of the Federation of Labor was generally frowned upon. In the words of one editor:

We suppose it was the proper thing for the Federation of Labor to do, but they must have known Congress would not pass a law to exclude the Japanese. If any part of the United States is likely to be permanently injured it would be California, and we doubt if California would vote to exclude the Japanese. Beyond public demand there are international relations and treaty rights that cannot be ignored. There is no prospect that the Japanese will be excluded until such a time as the United States excludes all immigrants.1

In spite of such counsels of caution, the demand for Japanese exclusion grew in volume.

One of the leading papers in this attack was the San Francisco Chronicle, which clarioned, "Whole State Is Stirred By Menace of Invasion. The public and public press are awakening to a realization that Japanese immigration is a menace and an immediate pressing public peril. Vigorous letters from all over the state have been sent to the Chronicle.2

The very next day the editor of the Chronicle wrote:

The American people should consider the Japanese invasion in all soberness. It is far from the purposes of the Chronicle to ignore the fact that the nation of the West took the initiative in bringing eastern and western civilization together. ... The Japanese have no more willingness to have Americans come to Japan to labor and crowd them than we have for them to come here. Japan is a nation of history and character, so is the United States. We each

1 Stockton Independent, Nov. 24, 1904.
2 San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 27, 1905.
have mutual respect and we may have mutual trade. But we cannot live together long in peace. The government of this country and Japan are friendly. In a friendly spirit they should agree while they may upon measures which will maintain peace by keeping the masses of the races apart.1

The following excerpt from the Santa Rosa Republican reflects the influence of the Chronicle's agitation.

The San Francisco Chronicle has started a discussion of the immigration problem which has seriously concerned many thinking Americans of California. It is stated that since 1880 when there were only eighty-six Japanese in California, the number has increased to thirty-five thousand and the immigration is steadily on the increase. ... This fight over the Japanese will be easier than over the Chinese because they have organized labor to assist in dealing with the State Legislature and Congress.2

The San Francisco Post warned its readers: "The immediate menace is the Hawaiian Islands where seventy-five thousand are ready to be dumped on the United States. These are the coolie class".3

The San Francisco Bulletin favored immediate action, while Japan was still distracted by the war. In the words of this editor, "Now is the time to begin an agitation that shall prevent this unwelcome and dangerous immigration, not when Japan is in a condition to enforce her most favored nation clauses of the treaty at the muzzle of her victorious guns."4

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 28, 1905.
2 San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 27, 1905.
3 San Francisco Post, Feb. 26, 1905.
This press agitation was not without considerable effect.

During 1905 the California State Legislature adopted unanimously a resolution against unrestricted Japanese immigration. This resolution merely called the attention of the President and the Secretary of State to the condition of affairs and asked them to take up the problems with the Japanese government and arrange by treaty the control of Japanese immigration.

The attitude of the rest of the nation was at this time decidedly unsympathetic to the California demands for immigration restriction. The dominant feeling in the East was that California was getting excited prematurely on the question.

The Outlook was the most outspoken of all periodicals in its criticism. It disclosed:

The desirability or undesirability of the Japanese as immigrants is being debated on the Pacific coast. At least one San Francisco paper has been urging that the Japanese form an undesirable element of population and that in their own country they are inspired with the hatred against America. This statement is preposterous! As a thing is better known than that the Japanese officially and in mass have the best of feelings toward the United States, as the country which was the means of opening Japan to western civilization, and the country whose people have the secrets of the West. She has found that behind that power lies education. It is Germany, England, France, and the United States who have brought Japan to the front. They are reaping the seeds they have sown. That the harvest will be beneficent the Outlook profoundly believes.¹

In spite of the Outlook's conciliatory attitude, it is

¹ The Outlook, Vol. 79: Apr. 8, 1905, 863.
clear that even before the end of the Russian-Japanese War a subtle change was coming over Japanese relations, though few except on the Pacific coast realized this fact.

In April 1906 San Francisco had a very severe earthquake and fire, in which most of her school buildings were destroyed. When school reopened in the fall the San Francisco Board of Education excluded all oriental children from the schools where white children were in attendance. This arrangement placed both Chinese and Japanese children in the same school. This action was immediately taken up by local Japanese and also the Japanese government. The Japanese held mass meetings and raised a fund to fight this action in the courts.

The prevailing attitude in California was that San Francisco was entirely within her rights. The Chronicle felt this action might be an aid in settling the immigration question. Commenting editorially the Chronicle said:

The report that the Japanese Government is taking up the matter is rot. It might be a good thing if it did, it would probably lead to a rational discussion of the entire racial question by cool level headed men of both countries. In due time it will probably come to that but not just yet. As to the schools the Japanese Government knows or perfectly understands that the people of this State are not under the slightest obligations to tax themselves, to teach Japanese the English language or admit oriental pupils into our schools where their presence may be distasteful to our own people. The Japanese Government knows that in view of the restrictions placed on our people in Japan and its dependencies it is in no position to complain if we decide to exercise the right which the Japanese have formally recognized by treaty to exclude.  

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 23, 1906.
However Japan as a nation was stirred. No doubt many exaggerations were made in both countries. In the United States certain groups became divided. The Methodist ministers became very angry at the treatment of the Japanese.

At a meeting in Buffalo, New York, the general missionary committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church went on record as opposing the anti-Japanese movement in California and passed this resolution:

With a sense of shame as Americans and a feeling of sorrow as Christians we have heard from time to time of the indignities, insults and even violence inflicted upon the natives of China, Korea, and Japan by certain classes of persons who resent the presence of these particular foreigners. We deplore the municipal action of the city of San Francisco which discriminates against the subjects of a great and friendly power. It is a violation of our treaty obligations and the more to our discredit because it is directed against a people who have shown themselves friendly to their foes....

... We are sure we represent the feeling of the entire Methodist Episcopal Church in our hearty and prompt approval of President Roosevelt to make good the treaty pledges of the nation and to relieve our people at large from complicity in or in sympathy with the conduct complained of by the subjects of Japan which under the protection of our government have been humiliated and this in the land that first had their country to rise and be strong in the presence of the earth.1

This was printed in many eastern and western papers.

Many of the churches denounced the action of the San Francisco Board of Education.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the Chinese and Korean children accepted the order and went to the schools assigned and only the Japanese refused. The international aspect of the case developed rapidly and

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 5, 1906.
President Roosevelt sent Assistant Secretary of State Metcalf to San Francisco to study the situation. The President of the Board of Education Alfred Roncovieri felt that the visit of Secretary Metcalf was unnecessary as the exclusion of Japanese children from schools provided for white children was permitted by law. To prove his point he quoted from the California Political Code, sec. 1662:

Every school unless otherwise provided by law must be open for the admission of all children between 6 and 21 years residing in the district and the Board of Schools Trustees of said District shall have power to admit adults and children not residing in the district, whenever good reasons exist. ... Trustees shall have power to establish separate schools for children of Indian, Mongolian or Chinese descent. When such schools are established children of said races shall attend these schools and must not be admitted to any other school.1

Washington was watching the Pacific Coast tangle very closely. Some of the senators felt that it was interfering with "States Rights" for the national government to interfere. Maryland was one of the states which led in this stand. Senators Whyte and Rayner of Maryland presented resolutions to this effect. Senator Rayner's resolution provided that the functions of the chief executive should be limited to the duties assigned him by the constitution... and that there should be no interference by the executive in the legislative or judicial branches of government or the rights of states. This general attitude was backed by many leading Democrats in Congress.

1 California Political Code, sec. 1662.
The delegates from the Pacific Coast states, California, Oregon, Washington, Utah and Idaho planned a caucus to determine the general attitude of Congress. Also back of this plan the Washington Post saw the beginning of a determination on exclusion. This statement shows the feeling:

The Japanese situation is made acute by President Roosevelt's espousal of the cause of the Japanese coolie in preference to the people of California. ... The present plan of those engineering the caucus is to give the President and his administration as good as he sends in the administration's fight to have Japanese coolies foisted upon the Pacific Coast and to keep up the fight until the Japanese are excluded by treaty or by law.1

When Secretary Metcalf returned to Washington the Pacific Coast felt he had taken a decided stand in favor of the Japanese. This brought forth protests from labor leaders. This feeling became so strong in Oakland that they petitioned the Oakland Board of Education to exclude oriental children. However no action was taken.

In the state of Washington labor also took up the discussion of the San Francisco school question. At the Washington state convention of the State Federation of Labor a resolution was passed condemning the President for his position in the school question: "The convention condemns the needlessly bombastic and inflammatory language of the President regarding willingness to use armed force if necessary against our sister state."2


2 San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 5, 1907.
In an open letter from the *Baltimore Sun* to the New
York Herald we read the following referring to Japan's atti-
tude toward foreigners residing in Japan:

The Japanese are painfully derelict in their observance of
the golden rule. ... It is notorious that numerous privil-
ages are accorded the Japanese traveling and residing in the
United States that are denied to Americans in Japan, and the
sooner the American people grip the fact and get rid of the
foolish notion that the Japanese in this country are not
treated as well as they deserve will be better for all con-
cerned. 1

David Starr Jordan took the attitude that the San Fran-
cisco School Affair was becoming more than its name implied;
that it was also becoming a labor issue. He felt that the
whole thing was a question for diplomacy. As he said:

Californians are justified in wishing to keep out of this
country the Japanese coolie, the end is a simple matter not
by legislation, mass meeting or lawlessness. A diplomatic
request to the Japanese government and the thing will be
forthwith accomplished. As to the school I doubt if San
Francisco can discriminate against any one race. It is a
question for the Supreme Court to decide. 2

He also implied that we should strive to be on good terms
with Japan and if there were a break it would be our fault. He
believed the Japanese could be assimilated and become good citi-
zens. He concluded by saying, "We must treat Japan as we
would any other responsible power, and this will require
that we follow one of the best things that President
Roosevelt ever said, 'It always pays for a nation to be a


As the days passed the excitement became greater. It seemed that nothing could be done but to let the matter go before the courts. Preparations for the suit went on and several interesting editorials appeared in the coast papers.

The Chronicle commented editorially by saying:

It is evident that nothing which the Washington government can do to secure a favorable decision will be omitted and it is essential that equal effort be made on our side. It is a square issue between the State of California and a headstrong President and all the resources of the state must be brought into the contest. While the Board of Education of this city is the nominal defendant in the suit the real action is against the State of California. At present the state is in conflict only with the President. We do not think the question will ever come before the Federal Government. We have only contempt for the President's claim to a voice in the management of our schools by reason of the donation of public lands to the state for school funds. When he employs all those resources and legal devices in the interest of the Japanese against his own countrymen the resentment deepens to destruction.  

The Examiner was very strong in its attack on President Roosevelt as shown by the following excerpt:

The people of Japan, and other countries including our own talk a good deal about the possibility of war between Japan and the United States. Japan has declared her rights to citizenship in our country and for citizens the right to our public schools. Japan demands and China will soon demand the right to send yellow people into the United States in countless masses. Unfortunately the President has advocated this: Quote from the President's message to Congress, I recommend to Congress that an act be passed specially providing for the Japanese who come here intending to become American citizens. . . . He threatened to use armed force to compel California to do as he chooses in regard to the

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 19, 1907.

2 Ibid., Jan. 14, 1907.
Japanese question. ... Why should we allow our standard of life, the highest in the world to be threatened by contact and competition with Oriental cheap labor.

We protect our industries and nobody questions our right to do so. Should we not protect our individuals and our citizens?... Mr. Roosevelt speaks with great admiration of the fighters Japan has produced. Japan has certainly produced some very good fighting men, and they have done very well in imitation of Western methods and with Western arms. ... The people of America do not want unlimited Japanese or Chinese immigration. ... They do not want another race problem no matter what Mr. Roosevelt's opinion may be, 1

An injunction was issued against the San Francisco School Board on January 26, 1907. The injunction asked the board to show cause why J. Yasuhara recently excluded from the Pacific Heights school should not be reinstated. The application was made on the grounds that the resolution of the Board was in violation of the treaty existing between Japan and the United States. At just about this same time a large group of Japanese coolie immigrants arrived in San Francisco. The United States Bureau of Immigration stopped them from landing. This provoked much excitement among the whites and the orientals. These coolies came with passports and had contracts as laborers. This created quite a stir on the Immigration Committee in Washington. The committee took the attitude that something should be done to protect the United States against this influx of coolie labor.

In Denver some Japanese children refused to salute the American flag during the exercises at school. This was seized upon by the California press as proof that the

1 San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 20, 1907.
Pacific coast was not the only section where the Japanese were considered a menace.

On the whole the southern congressmen were in sympathy with California. They said the Japanese to them presented another race problem, similar to that of the Negro if allowed to develop. They could not understand why the State of California would not have already placed them in separate schools. Chairman Cullom of the Foreign Relations Committee said, "It is not to be considered for an instant that Japan is so easily worked into a fight that she should want trouble with the United States over the San Francisco School question or any other of such small importance."

At this time it had become evident that perhaps the presence of the school board in Washington might aid in bringing the incident to a close. The Board proceeded to Washington with detailed instructions. Accompanying the school delegation was Mayor Schmitz of San Francisco, who had been elected largely through the influence of labor, but was under a political cloud at the time of his departure. This act on the part of the mayor made people question the whole procedure. The coast took on the attitude of watchful waiting. The President received the San Francisco delegation who soon found that concessions were expected. However there were continual calls on the president from the

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1907.
Japanese Ambassador trying to force a settlement and all this caused continued irritation. Mayor Schmitz was given much social attention in Washington, in fact much more than is usually given a mayor of a city.

It was generally recognized that the school question was only one symptom of a deeper conflict. In the words of one editor:

The administration has doubtless discovered by this time it would be in a more dignified and safer position in dealing with a foreign nation if it were quietly but firmly presenting the side of its own country and letting the other fellows present their side. The main difficulty seems to be that the President is unable to give any assurances of a character sufficiently definite to really want action on our part. What we want is the exclusion of Japanese manual laborers and that not by treaty, which may imply that Japan has any voice in it but by a national statute.¹

This shows plainly that the fundamental question back of the whole affair was really that of immigration.

After a great deal of discussion, a workable compromise was finally drawn. This compromise provided that Japanese children were to be admitted to the white schools of San Francisco under certain restrictions; that skilled and unskilled laborers coming from Japan were to be barred from the mainland of the United States; and that American laborers skilled and unskilled were to be barred from Japan.

Many Americans, especially on the west coast, felt that this agreement conceded too much to Japan. In the words of one editor:

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 13, 1907.
The more thoughtful people of the coast are not satisfied that there has not been a more frank abandonment of all claim in behalf of the treaty making power to a jurisdiction wider than that of the national legislative power.

There will never be permanent friendly international relations until it is fully conceded that all nations have an exclusive jurisdiction within their territorial limits and that no exercise of national authority within those limits is to be construed by another nation as an unfriendly act.

Congressman Edwin Webb of North Carolina declared:

It is within the political power of every state not only to establish public schools, but to govern them by reasonable rules and regulations and provide for a separation of both sexes and races. Such regulations are clearly in the interest of the peace, health, and safety of the community and of the state. I predict therefore that when we hear from the Supreme Court in a decision of the case pending California will be left undisturbed in her right to maintain separate schools, and at the same time the Japanese Treaty will be held constitutional and the school law of California construed by that court as not to conflict therewith. So I contend, Mr. Chairman, first, that there is no conflict between the treaty and California's school law, second, if there is conflict the treaty must give way, for the school law of California is an exercise of the police power and therefore supreme, subject to no authority on earth save her state legislatures.

Another congressional champion of California was Representative Michlalek of Illinois who said in part:

Mr. Speaker, at the last session of this Congress I sat and listened and read speeches of gentlemen who declaimed loudly against the immigration from Russia, Austria and other southern European nations; they were said to corrupt our ideals, morals, and debase our national life. Any yet we are confronted with the spectacle of a nation hardly emerged from barbarism, treated with consideration by this nation that seems to imply some wondrous superiority of this branch of the yellow race over the white races. And strange as it may seem I heard no denunciation or even criticism of the

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 21, 1907.

2 Bancroft Library U. C., California School Question, pamphlet.
Japanese by members of this House who so feelingly portrayed the evils of European immigration upon the house. Mr. Speaker I am for the people of California as against any race or nation, because it is an American state, a part of the United States. ... Whatever may be said in criticism of the San Francisco school officials' attitude on the school question, it cannot be contended that their demands were any violation of any treaty between the United States and Japan. ... The Japanese nation demands the surrender of the rights of a sovereign state to control its own affairs. Rights, Mr. Speaker, guaranteed the people of California by our Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, the demands for a rigid Japanese Exclusion Act not only by the people of California, but by the great mass of American people in other sections is a national issue, that affects the very existence of every wage-earner in every State of the Union. ... This will be settled, sir, when the American people, through their representatives, will come to a realization of the fact that the excluding of all Asiatic labor is just and essential, just as important, just as justifiable as our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine.1

Another loyal supporter of California was Senator John M. Gearin of Oregon who declared:

I do not say they (the yellow race) are inferior to us; they are just different that's all.

The Asiatics and Americans do not intermarry and will never intermarry except in rare instances. We cannot absorb them or take them into our social life, ... I believe the best way to secure protection for American labor is to keep out the yellow labor.

The Japanese coolies that are here may stay but let there be no more competition of that kind forced upon our people.2

It can be seen from the speeches quoted that the idea of immigration, cheap labor, social problems, and race problems was much more interesting to many members of Congress than a mere exclusion of orientals from the schools of San

1 Bancroft Library U. C., California School Question, Pamphlet. Speeches in House of Representatives.

2 Ibid.
Francisco.

As one affair was ending the California Legislature threatened to precipitate another, by introducing a bill to exclude Japanese from the state. This movement led to an interesting exchange of telegrams between Governor Gillett and President Roosevelt. The governor's message read:

Honorable Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States,
A bill is now pending in our Legislature to submit to the voters two years from now the question as to whether or not Japanese labor shall be excluded from the United States. Will the passage of this bill interfere with any of your plans or make it more difficult for you to accomplish what you have undertaken to do in the way of Japanese exclusion? Please answer at once as our Legislature is desirous of knowledge concerning it.

Signed James Gillett,
Governor of California.

To this communication, President Roosevelt replied:

I thank you for your kind and prompt attention to my request. The passage of a bill for submission to the voters of California whether Japanese laborers shall be excluded would interfere with my plans and would make it more difficult for me through the National Government to accomplish what I am trying to do in the way of Japanese Labor Exclusion.

The assumption of power by the voters of California to settle this question, if assented to by the National Government, would immediately end all my negotiations with Japan for a friendly adjustment, because to negotiate a settlement
we must have power to settle, while on the other hand California cannot negotiate a treaty under the constitution.

It is clear that under the Constitution only the National Government can settle the question of exclusion, and such a vote of California as proposed would have to be regarded by those opposed to exclusion as a threat to ignore the constitutional power of the United States and exclude Japanese in defiance of their treaty rights to come in.

I earnestly deprecate the passage of any legislation affecting the Japanese. The National Government now has the matter in hand and can in all human probability secure the results that California desires while at the same time preserving unbroken friendly relations between Japan and the United States. I shall strive to accomplish for California as for all other states or sections of this country, everything that can conserve its honor and its interest. Any such action that you mention would merely hamper the National Government in the effort to secure for California what only the National Government can secure.

Signed,  
Theodore Roosevelt,  
President of the United States.

The negotiations to which President Roosevelt referred were those which led up to the famous "Gentleman's Agreement". This agreement between the United States and Japan was completed late in 1907, and remained in force until it
was repealed by the "Exclusion Act" of 1924. By this agreement, the Japanese government promised not to issue passports to Japanese laborers seeking to enter the United States. Thus it was hoped to reconcile both California sensibilities and Japanese pride.

The "Gentleman's Agreement" undoubtedly did serve to ease somewhat the tension over Japanese immigration.

The Japanese Ambassador on January 5, 1908 made a public statement assuring the United States that the Japanese Government would stop the immigration of coolie labor into this country and that the official pledge of the Mikado had been given President Roosevelt that immigration of labor to the United States would be stopped.

Commenting editorially on this speech the San Francisco Chronicle said:

The language of Japan's determination to keep out coolie laborers was undoubtedly made in good faith, and the Japanese government believes it can control the situation. Japan should be allowed to do so without unfriendly comment by this side. In the end we do not doubt but what domestic legislation will be required on our part, in which Japan may not be referred to by name but which will deal with all orientals.\(^1\)

An occasional voice was even raised in favor of relaxing the restrictions of the "Gentleman's Agreement". This represented the viewpoint of the large employers of Oriental labor.

The outstanding Californian who favored the immigration of Japanese laborers was John P. Irish of Oakland. Mr. Irish  

\(^1\) San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 7, 1908.
had large tracts of land holdings on the delta region of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers. As the demand for action against the Japanese coolie class increased Mr. Irish went on a speaking tour to many of the valley towns such as Stockton, Sacramento, and Marysville. He scored the closed shop idea of labor and declared that exclusion bars should be put up against certain Europeans and let down to allow the entrance of Chinese and Japanese laborers which were essential in developing our river deltas. It was claimed that white men could not and would not work there. Mr. Irish and associates also spoke before the Immigration Committee in Washington and asked for increased immigration of oriental laborers on the ground that the Chinese Exclusion Act had depleted the Pacific coast labor supply.

This was not, however, the typical western reaction to the Roosevelt agreement. It was maintained that the agreement was entirely inadequate; that it contained serious loopholes; that it was an executive usurpation of the legislative function. Everytime an issue came up between the two countries a renewed attack was made upon the "Gentleman's Agreement". An example was the "Picture Bride" controversy of 1916 and 1917. Under the agreement Oriental wives might join their husbands in the United States.

The Japanese wanted wives, and several hundred were sent over from Japan and found their Japanese husband by producing matching pictures. Under the agreement we could do nothing to
stop it, so attacks were made on it in all circulations on the Pacific Coast.

The *Sunset Magazine*, a California publication remarked:

Before the Agreement it was the ebb and flow of workers. Now it is two gentlemen walking down the street, the Japanese subject and his offspring. It is face to face with you. ... Some historian of tomorrow will look back upon this Agreement between two alien civilizations holding the Pacific's future as a turning point in Japanese-American Relations—a turning point revealing the conflict of peoples and race purposes.1

The most outspoken publisher on the Pacific Coast was V. S. McClatchy of the *Sacramento Bee*. He came out with very strong statements editorially in 1918. He declared:

The "Gentleman's Agreement" provides a guarantee on Japan's part that she will not permit Japanese laborers to come to the United States. But every year a number of Japanese guaranteed by Japan are turned back at our entry ports by United States Customs Officials because of indisputable evidence that these men are laborers. Japan's explanation is that it is not practicable for her to avoid being made the victim of deception at times by those seeking to come to the United States.

Last year Japan sent up ten thousand immigrants, this year she will send us twelve thousand. Each immigrant comes bearing Japanese passports and her word as a gentleman that the newcomer is not a laborer. Since Japan passed her word as a gentleman in 1907 there has settled in California alone about fifty thousand Japanese. This number is obtained by comparing California's Japanese population in 1907 and 1918 and making allowances for the recorded births and deaths. It is comparatively easy for any investigator to satisfy himself that most of these immigrants secured places at once as laborers and with the exception of those who graduated into bosses have labored ever since. Every Japanese who has come to this country since 1907 and who has earned his livelihood by labor since, scores a violation of the "Gentleman's Agreement" and Japan's word.

No! Japanese faith and Uncle Sam's blind complaisance

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has made the "Gentleman's Agreement" a scrap of paper.¹

The Saturday Evening Post in a widely quoted article, brought Eastern support to a typically California point of view. Mr. Quick writing for the Post commented:

This is our country and we are under no obligation to admit any foreigner. We should tactfully but firmly let the world know that we claim the right to exclude anyone we wish to exclude, that the life of this democracy depends upon the sort of immigration admitted so that the discussion of the Japanese immigration problem should be encouraged not frowned upon, that there is nothing discreditable to the Japanese in our attitude on the question. We will not admit them because they do not and cannot assimilate and because in economic competition they drive our people to the wall; let them know that we will not admit immigration under such conditions, from any country, no matter what the consideration offered or the consequences involved and that we have the right to make such a decision and the power of enforcement. ... We have become unfitted for competition with such a race as the Japanese. It is because they know their superiority to us in industrial competition that they desire to come, such of them as do so desire. They can pay more for land than an American can pay and prosper at the higher prices and this means they have the power to establish a lower scale of actual wages.

One of our most insoluble troubles as a nation rises from the existence among us of a colored race, and make no mistake we shall never allow another similar problem to grow up among us.²

This article in the Post was hailed in the west as a real proof that even the Atlantic coast was awakening to California's problem. Mr. McClatchy took occasion again to attack the "Gentleman's Agreement" and to comment editorially:

The principles outlined in the Saturday Evening Post article of June 28th are exactly those for which the Pacific coast has always contended. The question is an economic one

¹ Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1917.
² Saturday Evening Post, June 28, 1919, 8-9.
rather than a racial one and where the question of race enters there is no inferiority involved.

There is sufficient reason for refusing the Japanese entrance; and when Japan insists in a gentlemanly manner and keeps her agreement faithfully but is not satisfied, then we must face the facts.

The fact is there could not be a more flagrant violation of a "Gentleman's Agreement" than Japan has been guilty of. She boasts that she always keeps her agreements and through skillful propaganda some Americans have commenced to believe so. Her bad faith is shown in her policies in Korea, Manchuria, and Shantung where there are those who have experienced it, and where the student and investigator may read it.¹

From 1919 on the drive against the "Gentleman's Agreement" and the demand for exclusion gathered force. During the battle over the retention of the "Gentleman's Agreement" in 1924 Senator Griffin of New York defended it saying:

We do not want to open the doors to immigration any wider than they are. We would even be content to have them closed entirely, but we do not want to see them slammed shut in the face of an honorable, highly civilized and courteous race of people. We owe that, I should think, to our own self-respect, as well as to theirs. We have a treaty with them or what is tantamount to a treaty entered into, if you please, by President Roosevelt himself, and no one will dare assert that he was a mollycoddle. If that arrangement does not work satisfactorily the proper course to pursue is to request the treaty making power of the government under our Constitution to secure its abrogation. ... No one is going to benefit by this ruthless abrogation of the "Gentleman's Agreement" but the munition makers.²

After the passage of the exclusion law of 1924 which terminated the "Gentleman's Agreement" the House Immigration Committee issued the following statement of reasons why the

¹ Sacramento Bee, July 3, 1919.
² Congressional Record, Vol. 65, 8245.
Agreement could not be continued:

Congress could not consent to a continuance of the existing agreement or modification thereof, or the adoption of another similar Agreement. Any of these reasons would seem to furnish justifiable grounds for the decision.

1. The "Gentleman's Agreement" is a secret compact and neither Congress or the American public is satisfied to have matters of vital national concern regulated by a secret understanding.
2. Our motto is now and for the future "open covenants openly arrived at".
3. Even the House Immigration Committee which originates or passes on all immigration legislation was not permitted to see this Agreement, even at a time when intimate knowledge of it was necessary if the Committee were to pass intelligently on the request of Hawaii for certain protection to the immigration problem there.1

Thus the "Gentleman's Agreement" after a critical existence was terminated largely because of its secrecy and because of the widespread feeling that it was inadequate, no matter how hard Japan tried to enforce it.

1 Immigration Committee Pamphlet, 1924. Why the "Gentleman's Agreement" could not be continued.
CHAPTER III
CALIFORNIA AND THE ALIEN LAND LAWS

As has been shown in the preceding chapter California was not long satisfied with the protection afforded by the "Gentleman's Agreement". It was a natural transition, therefore, to an agitation for a state land law to curb the agricultural activities of the Japanese. This agitation became increasingly strong during the period from 1908-1913.

During these years many Japanese were still coming in under the "Gentleman's Agreement", while those already here were rapidly becoming serious competitors in some of the valley lands. White farmers were having labor difficulties with the Japanese and western sentiment was steadily growing less sympathetic. The Japanese with their lower standards of living were continually condemned by trade unions, and anti-Japanese societies were formed in large numbers. During this period there was a large influx of Japanese students which acted as a balancing factor in our schools and aided in friendship between the nations. However, the average American working man had little or no contact with these better classes of Japanese. The prevailing tendency was to brand all Japanese as equally undesirable.

Even David Starr Jordan who was most friendly and sympathetic to the Japanese and their problems felt the situation was becoming acute in California by 1913. Not that all
the best farm lands were controlled by Japan, but many acres were, and if allowed to continue it would become a serious problem. He pointed out that "for every Japanese of the gentleman class there were a hundred rice field laborers."  

Upon this psychological background the California Legislature assembled in 1913, confronted with a powerful public demand for the enactment of a drastic Alien Land Law, similar to those already adopted in Arizona, Washington, and Oregon.  

When the Legislature met in Sacramento in the early months of 1913, there were many members who had bills already drawn for an Alien Land Bill. Immediately the Japanese Ambassador in Washington called on President Wilson and made formal protest against the contemplated action. He declared that the suggested legislation was an insult to Japan and to her citizens in the United States. President Wilson expressed the hope that the difficulty could be ironed out diplomatically, and when the bills were not withdrawn he suggested sending Secretary of State Williams Jennings Bryan to California for a conference on the pending legislation. This proposal was accepted both by Governor Hiram Johnson and by the legislature. Secretary Bryan upon his arrival in Sacramento addressed a joint session of both houses of the legislature. He urged delay but gave no special

1 Bancroft Library, U. C., California Alien Land Laws, Pamphlet.
hint of any serious results if the Alien Law was passed. However he did urge that it would be better for all parties if the matter were allowed to be settled by diplomatic agreement. State Senator Curtin asked the Secretary of State, "If we could have some assurances from the Federal Government either by treaty or otherwise that it would curb alien ownership we might defer legislative action now. What assurances of this nature can we take home to our people"?¹

Secretary Bryan replied:

I have no such definite proposition to submit or offer. The President and I have conferred with the Japanese representative. All I can say is it is worthwhile to make an effort. Your governor if he believes an emergency exists can call a special session. What we suggest is that you wait and let us arrange this through diplomatic effort rather than legislative.²

Senator Thompson asked why the California law was considered an unfriendly act when nothing had been said to Washington and Arizona when they had passed similar laws in 1911 and 1912. The Secretary said he had no information regarding these laws, and also replied that this was not related to the question of immigration.

The long-drawn-out controversy over the proposed Alien Land Law gave an abundant opportunity for mobilizing public sentiment upon both sides. As was to be expected, western sentiment was overwhelmingly behind the measure. Governor

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 29, 1913.
² Ibid.
Johnson wrote:

Much has been said of the dignity of Japan. We would not willingly affront the dignity of Japan or offend her pride. But what shall be said of the proposition of a great state, itself an empire of possibilities greater than those of most nations, shall it be halted from the mere consideration of a legislative act, admittedly within its jurisdiction, and so halted by the protest of a foreign power which itself has enacted even more stringent regulations on the same subject? What of the dignity of California? 1

One of the most outspoken of the state legislators was Assemblyman Bradford, who emphasized the point that the Japanese race problem in California was in its infancy and could still be checked but unless it was it could become more serious than that of the Negro in the South. This was especially true, he thought, because the proud and aggressive Japanese would never accept the lowly status imposed upon the docile negro. 2

William Randolph Hearst another Californian who took an active part in supporting the Alien Land Bill claimed it was "Legally and morally right". In an extensive editorial he set forth his views:

The Japanese are not only objectionable but dangerous. They are not, never want to be and never will be Americans.

Governor Johnson has issued a public statement declaring California was justified in passing an anti-alien land law for the reason that the District of Columbia and eight other states in the union now have similar laws without protest from Japan. We are entitled to as much freedom in California. 3

1 California Outlook, Mar. 15, 1913.

2 Ibid.

3 San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 22, 1913.
In Mr. Hearst's New York American appeared another editorial signed by the publisher and evidently designed especially for the Atlantic seaboard. It read:

There is a certain class of people in this country of ours who are aliens at heart, they always have been and always will be. They have never become Americans in spirit, they have never been able to assimilate the American system to appreciate the American point of view. They have been American citizens for years, their fathers and grandfathers have been American citizens, they have descended from our oldest and first families but they are inherently incapable of being American or understanding Americans.

... They take the side always of foreign nations. The hotbed of this kind of Toryism is New York and always has been. ... There has never been a dispute between United States and any foreign nation that these aliens in character and constitution have not taken the side of the foreign nation, without regard to the justice of the American position and without any knowledge of the subject under discussion. The present instance is the case of California. These congenital aliens immediately assume that California is wrong in the decision to exclude unnaturalized citizens from the right to possess lands in California and Japan is right.

They know nothing of the subject as their utterances clearly indicate, but they are convinced that California must be wrong apparently because it is a part of the United States. ... As a matter of fact California is right, legally right, morally right, ethically right, right for her own best interests, right for the best interests for the whole country, especially the State of New York, right for all the citizens of this country including the citizens of New York even the class of congenital toadies and Tories.

California is within her States Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States when she decides that individuals who have not been naturalized may not hold land within her confines.

... California is acting to her own best interests and advantages because the Japanese would not and do not make good citizens. It would bring about another race problem, far more serious than any we have ever dealt with. ... The Japanese begin by occupying a small section of a district and making themselves there so obnoxious by their personal attitude and oriental peculiarities that the Caucasian residents of that district soon become willing to leave the section. The Japanese then buy up these depreciated properties at bargains and bring in more Japanese to extend the ill effects of their colonization.

... California should be commended by the other states
of the Union and sustained in her action by the people of every state.

There is no objection on the part of the United States to the exclusion of our citizens from the privilege of holding land in Japan and there should be no objection on the part of Japan here. 1

It must not be supposed that all of the support for the Alien Land Law came from the west coast. One of the most impassioned outbursts in its behalf was made by Representative Sisson, of Mississippi. The fiery Southerner denounced Japan's stand and felt we should not humor Nippon. As he put it:

If we must have war or submit to this indignity I am for war! I am with the people of California in their efforts to prevent these aliens from acquiring land. I believe that no non-resident should be allowed to own a foot of land in the territory of the United States. ...

All citizens or aliens resident in a state must be held subject to its laws, and to exempt the alien would give him privileges over and above those recorded to American citizens. ...

We must preserve to the American farmer the right to own the soil of our country without competition which would drag down his standard of living.

Treaty making can never deprive the status of a reserved power. ... This Democratic Administration should announce with no uncertain tone to the world the doctrine that Congress proposes to recognize the right of the people of these states to determine who shall own land within the state and that the United States government will not prevent the states from making such laws as they see fit and proper, provided they do not discriminate against citizens of the United States. 2

Somewhat similar views were expressed by Representatives

1 New York American, Apr. 23, 1913.
2 San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 29, 1913.
Garner of Texas and Buckley of Ohio, as well as Senators Newlands of Nevada, Hitchcock of Nebraska, and Chamberlain of Oregon.1

Turning to those who opposed the measure, it is surprising to find the San Francisco Chronicle leading the attack. This was quite a reversal of the attitude which this paper had shown during the "School Affair" and the negotiations for the "Gentleman's Agreement". Commenting upon the pending legislation, the Chronicle said:

We can so easily manage to set the whole country against us. As a matter of fact, the Japanese population among us is not increasing or likely to increase, and there is not among us now enough to effect any interest. ... If our Legislature persists, without what the country will consider any good reason whatever, in legislating in a way to injure the material or sentimental interests of Japan which do not affect other foreigners among us, there is danger that Congress and the country at large may take hold of the situation and make us far worse off than we are now. That there is danger of such an outcome no one will doubt who have knowledge of sentiment in the great manufacturing and producing states. They desire the trade of Japan and will not permit the action of a single state to jeopardize it. There is wise recognition on both sides that it would be unwise and dangerous to bring the masses of the East and the West together in close contact. It would not make for peace or continued friendly intercourse.2

Another expression of California opposition to the proposed bill was made by Professor Payson J. Treat of Stanford University, an eminent authority upon the Far East. Professor Treat said:

The only justification for the proposed alien land laws is

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 30, 1913.
2 Ibid., Apr. 28, 1913.
their necessity. Unless this can be proved it is unreason-
able to take action which may prove to be unconstitutional
and which will occasion the criticism of the other states.
In support of such legislation and in reply to all the oppos-
ing interests it is necessary to show that a considerable
amount of land has already passed under the control of
oriental owners, and that conditions point to a rapid in-
crease in these totals. However the best available inform-
ation shows the present problem is not of the slightest im-
portance.1

From a neighboring state, "The Seattle Chamber of Com-
merce also placed themselves on record as opposed to a land
law which struck only at the Japanese. They felt that any
alien law should apply to all nationalities alike, that any
discriminatory law would greatly embarrass commercially re-
lations with the country against whom it was aimed."2

Most of the opposition to the bill, however came from
Eastern quarters. The Outlook, still an ardent champion of
the Japanese viewpoint declared:

Our treaty of 1911 with Japan is declared by the constitu-
tion to be the "Supreme Law" of the land and is to be so
regarded, anything in the laws or constitution of states not-
withstanding. It is the duty of the people of the United
States to see that this treaty is honorably fulfilled.

The people of Japan can rest assured it will be ful-
filled. I do not believe that any considerable portion of
the people of California desire otherwise.3

The New York Times was equally unsympathetic. In an
editorial entitled, "The California Jumble", the editor

1 San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 28, 1913.
2 Ibid.
3 The Outlook, Vol. 103, Mar. 13, 1913, 360.
observed:

We hope our Japanese friends have a sufficient sense of humor to enjoy the ridiculous aspects of the question of alien ownership in California.

Certain political agitators in Japan have betrayed some excitement, real or stimulated over the California land bills, but the Japanese Government and its officers and agents in responsible places have shown moderation and wisdom in their relation to the matter that have been highly commendable and now find their reward. For the contest over the land bill has degenerated into a vulgar political squabble between parties or factions having no higher motives than a desire to gain an advantage over their rivals. Of principle there is hardly a trace in the proceedings and from such beginning it is highly unlikely that any result calling for serious consideration will emerge. It is of fortunate augury that Representative Sisson of Mississippi is for war, ... He is a radical "states rights" Democrat.

When Sisson is for war it may be assumed as certain that the rest of the country is in a mood so peaceful that by comparison the sucking dove is made to seem boisterous. Public opinion, although it has been a little slow to act in this matter, is now finding expression, and there is general and severe condemnation of the spirit underlying the California Legislative bills. There is moreover a strong feeling of disgust at the political maneuvering for the position in California and elsewhere by some of those who have come to the support of the measures. A good deal of unnecessary fuss has been made about them, ... Consideration of the actual facts of Japanese ownership of land and of the Japanese population in California makes it entirely clear that the bills were uncalled for, that there was no ground for self-protection upon which their introduction into the Legislature was based. They were brought forward to serve the interests of that part of California's public which is responsible for the recklessness of trades union agitation in that unfortunate state and they have deserved attention only because of possible consequences of their enactment. From present appearances the only consequences of importance will be the discrediting of their authors and supporters. ¹

This editorial is fairly indicative of the attitude of the press in the east. The prevailing attitude was, that it was a purely political agitation.

Throughout this torrid controversy, there was little doubt of the bill's ultimate passage. The final action was taken in May, when the so-called Webb Law was adopted by an overwhelming vote. Immediately Japan lodged a formal protest with President Wilson. The protest advanced the argument that:

1. The Alien Land Law violated the treaty of 1911, between the Imperial Government and the United States.
2. The law in question is a discrimination against the citizens of Japan by reason of the convention of 1911.
3. The law is offensive to the dignity of the Imperial Government of Japan and contrary to the traditional spirit and friendliness of His Majesty's Government with the United States.

This statement from Japan caused bitter comment from the west. However, President Wilson's reply said that he did not feel that the treaty was violated, and that there were not adequate grounds for intervention by the national government.

Nevertheless, Secretary Bryan did send a telegram to Governor Johnson urging delay in signing this controversial measure. To this suggestion, the governor returned a forthright refusal. He said:

Our people as represented in the Legislature have overwhelmingly expressed their desire for the present alien bill.

The vote in the Senate was 35 - 2 and in the Assembly 72 - 3. With such unanimity of opinion, even did I hold other views, then I would feel it my plain duty to sign the bill unless some absolutely controlling necessity exists.

1 San Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 1913.
2 San Francisco Examiner, May 13, 1913.
It is with the highest respect for yourself and the President that I feel my duty to my state compels me to approve the action of the Legislature.¹

Signed,
Hiram Johnson
Governor

A few days later, on May 19, 1913, Governor Johnson signed the Alien Land Law. In its final form it was designed to prohibit all "aliens ineligible to citizenship" from owning agricultural land in the state. When the governor signed the bill he issued a formal statement designed to justify California's action in the eyes of the nation.

The statement read:

Californians are unable to understand why an act admittedly within the jurisdiction of the California Legislature, creates tumult and confusion, and criticism, and why this local act of undoubted right becomes an international question. Broadly speaking many states have endeavored to prevent ownership of land by those ineligible to citizenship. The power to pass such laws is conceded. The United States by statute provided that no alien or person ineligible to citizenship who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States shall acquire title to land in the District of Columbia. Arizona in 1912 passed its act of a similar nature, Washington, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Texas all have laws of this character. We of California ask therefore why we of California should be singled out for attack when exercising the same right that has been exercised by so many other states and the United States itself.

Japan until 1910 had an absolute law against alien ownership and in effect has yet.

The character of the present California legislation is the guarantee that it is only legislation deemed absolutely essential for the preservation of the State and the protection of its people. Legislation which has its precedent in the enactment of similar laws in the national government and in the various states shall be passed. Such measures as may be enacted will be considered thoroughly,

¹ Sacramento Bee, May 14, 1913.
calmly, judicially and without prejudice or discrimination.\(^1\)

With the passage of the Land Law, the agitation died down with surprising rapidity. In the East, the public was rather tired of the whole question. Even in California, the first disposition was to give the new legislation a fair trial. It was not long, however, before there appeared a growing conviction in California that the law had failed to correct the evils at which it had been directed. As a result the issue was reviewed once more, this time centering around the demand that further legislation be passed to close the loopholes in the earlier law.

In 1916 Dr. Frederick Starr, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago came out with the statement that expansion fever was gripping Japan. "It has long been the policy of Japan to acquire territory, but her policies of the past are surpassed by her plans and hopes of the present, South Manchuria will be grabbed. ... Japan will not withdraw from the Islands of the South Seas taken from Germany as she has begun an extensive expansion program".\(^2\) Such speeches were widely printed in the Hearst papers together with lurid editorials citing the rapid increase of Japanese population, due to immigration and high birth rate. It was freely predicted that California could expect serious results in the

\(^1\) *Sacramento Bee*, May 19, 1913.

near future. The McClatchy paper also carried editorials denouncing the inadequacy of the 1913 Alien Land Bill. This was the presidential election year however, and the nation as a whole was much more interested in the stand of the candidates on our entry into the World War.

The next noticeable movement for a change in the Alien Land Law came in 1919. This time it was the Federal Government which helped to precipitate the issue by inquiring whether the Government of Mexico had granted certain concessions to Japanese corporations to exploit certain agricultural lands on the Peninsula of Lower California. This caused the land discussion in California to start again. The leader in this agitation was United States Senator Phelan, who announced:

We demand self-determination for other lands and acting within our jurisdiction and rights we deny it to ourselves. Japan would have more respect for us if we had more respect for ourselves. The time to act is not only opportune but vital. ... This is California's problem and the Legislature should advise the President. They have chosen to humiliate California and make its opposition to Oriental aggression the laugh of the world. ... There is only one thing certain if California does not take the lead she will be sacrificed.¹

Representative Kahn also voiced similar sentiments and suggested a tightening of lease restrictions.² However, nothing definite came of these suggestions, as the State Legislature refused to take action.

¹ San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 16, 1919.
² Ibid.
In March 1920 the question of land ownership by Japanese was brought before the public once more. A movement started to place before the people an initiative petition which would forbid aliens not admissible to citizenship to own or lease land in California or act as guardians for minors claiming an interest in land. This law would not mention any nationality and said nothing about immigration.

The *Chronicle* questioned the legality of this law under the existing treaty. However since the law would not be retroactive it was believed that the courts would not take action.

The first official movement on the land situation in California came when Governor Stephens sent a telegram to Representative Harold Knutson of Minnesota and invited the House Immigration Committee to visit the Pacific Coast so that the seriousness of California's problem could be studied.

At this same time Governor Stephens had his own committee studying the situation and was preparing a report to be given later to the Immigration Committee.¹

The invitation of Governor Stephens was accepted and in July the House Committee on Immigration arrived in California and a series of hearings was conducted together with visits to the various parts of the state. One of the first

persons called in the investigation was H. Stanley Benedict of the State Board of Control, who had helped conduct the Governor's investigation. Mr. Benedict declared:

I have no patience with those who feel that war is inevitable in settling the Japanese question. Economic reasons are the fundamental objections for further admission of Japanese aliens in the United States. Under conditions which the Americans allow to exist the Japanese are allowed the privileges of American citizenship without assuming any responsibility. The "Gentleman's Agreement" intended to stop the indirect routing of immigration labor into continental United States through Hawaii, Philippines, Mexico, and Canada, however it has opened a direct route from Japan to the United States by giving Japan exclusive right to determine who is eligible for a passport.¹

The members of the committee were entertained at a banquet in San Francisco where many speeches were made by the visiting Congressmen. On this occasion, Representative Will N. Vaile of Colorado said, "This great California, the front yard of America should remain American territory in every respect. I am in favor of dealing kindly with the Japanese already here. ... The example of the past in our Indian and Negro race problem should warn us against another".²

Mr. Isaac Seigel of New York said, "We recognize you have a problem in California of the greatest importance. We wish to meet the issue through diplomacy. ... We cannot have several million people on the Pacific Coast constantly in fear that they and their possessions will be wiped out."³

¹ Report of California Board of Control 1920. Pamphlet 2, 3.
² San Francisco Examiner, July 15, 1920.
³ Ibid.
John E. Raker, Representative of California, expressed the belief that: "The result of these deliberations and the information which we will obtain will save the west from more race complications. This Japanese problem is a non-assimilable race question which cannot be denied". ¹

Representative John J. Kleczka of Wisconsin said, "A fitting solution of the problem will be offered. This country will no longer stand for any divided allegiance. There is room for only one faith, one loyalty and one allegiance. It is on this basis that the committee will solve the problem". ²

The chairman of this committee was Albert Johnson of the State of Washington. He assured the people of California that some way would be found to settle the situation so that the land of the United States would be saved for the American people. ³

On July 16 the Committee visited Stockton and the delta lands. George Shimma, wealthy Japanese landowner and potato king, invited the Committee to be his guests. Many outstanding Stocktonians were included in the invitation. Several of their fellow townspeople vigorously protested this visit and acceptance of oriental hospitality. Chairman Johnson

¹ Bancroft Library U.C., California Immigration Commission, Pamphlet.

² San Francisco Examiner, July 15, 1920.

³ Ibid.
reminded these persons that the business of the committee was an inquiry not an inquisition, and on their trip they had accepted many kinds of hospitality. George Shimma later testified before the committee at the Hotel St. Francis in San Francisco and said it was merely an illusion that the two races could not assimilate. He also advocated intermarriage and predicted that within a short time the people of California would think nothing of intermarriage between Japanese and whites.1 These statements were seized as evidence of Japanese self assertions that helped to prove the seriousness of the problem. Colonel John P. Irish was attacked by Mr. McClatchy of the Bee who accused him of being on the side of the Japanese because of his financial interests in delta lands.2

Mr. J. Bigger, president of the Stockton-San Joaquin Valley farm bureau, also testified and said, "Once a Japanese always one. ... The Japanese are ambitious but we do not want Japanese in America. They are honest where it is policy, but frequently it is not policy. ... Never forget the Japanese are here for the money there is in it and they have no other sentiment for the country".3

Mr. Albert G. Myra, President of the Stockton American

1 Bancroft Library U. C., California Immigration Commission 1880, Pamphlet.

2 Sacramento Bee, July 15, 1920.

3 Stockton Record, July 17, 1920.
Legion, went before the Committee with this statement:

We are among the sponsors of the anti-Japanese initiative petition and we accept full responsibility for the movement in California. We took up the matter heart and soul when we returned from the war for we recognized the danger. The Japanese are not patriotic, they do not assimilate, we do not want to work with them and we do not want to associate with them.¹

The Committee completed its investigation and went on to Seattle. Before their departure they promised California definite aid in solving her problem which they said was becoming a real one. They promised real aid from Congress. In spite of these assurances, California leaders continued to circulate the initiative petitions in favor of a more effective Alien Land Law.

The New York American carried the following comment upon this movement:

If the people of California do not wish to become a Japanese colony as Korea has done and as Hawaii is becoming it is surely within its right to take steps to prevent it.

They intend next November to vote on the proposal to prevent the rapidly multiplying Japanese from either owning or leasing California land. This is another way of saying they do not want coolie labor fastened on American soil. They have had a sad experience that where this labor locates white labor goes.

We may be sure that if conditions were reversed and a rapidly growing number of white Americans should try to settle in Japan crowding out the native Japanese, the people of Japan would show the same feelings California does. . . . The fact itself is a fundamental of human nature. It is only an accident of geography that it happened to be located on our western coast. . . .

As for the theory that Japanese susceptibilities are too sensitive to make it advisable for the United States to state its position it strikes us as a very poor theory. Other white People have been frank in the same matter,

¹ San Francisco Examiner, July 17, 1920.
Australia, and Canada. Japanese susceptibilities have survived the shock. ... The fact is that California will not tolerate its alienation. The position of California is that of any other state menaced by similar conditions.

This particular editorial was copied by all Hearst papers in the Middle West and East.

In the earlier struggles over Alien land laws California had often been regarded as unnecessarily stirring up conditions. It is important to note, however, that after the World War and Paris Peace Conference there was a decided change in eastern opinion toward Japan.

The New Republic in an editorial reflects this change of attitude on the Atlantic seaboard:

Because the Japanese question of immigration has been agitated largely by California there is a tendency to regard it as a local California question whose importance California exaggerates from a too near perspective. ... Of course any pretense that occidental civilization is staggering under the burden of one or two hundred thousand Japanese is too absurd to be regarded as anything but hysteria. If this were all, Californians would deserve the severe condescension with which their appeals are too often met.

What thoughtful Californians contend is that this is not all, and that in its larger aspects the Californian, not the provincial eastern view presents the true perspective. In this we are joined by the English speaking white peoples bordering the Pacific, by Washington, Oregon, California, Australia and New Zealand. These peoples are only a small part of the white race of the world. But they are its vanguards and its whole representation on the shores of the Pacific, and they are unanimous in demanding the support of the American Union and of the British Empire in excluding Japanese and Chinese. ... Whatever the abstract merits of this race question at least there is only one concrete opinion on it among the outposts of the white man's world. ... So the message of California to the nation is this: On our local problem have patience with us. Admonish us if we need

it, but do it understandingly. On the great problem let this nation resolve as firmly as California is resolved that one side of the Pacific shall be the white man's and the other side the brown man's frontier. Only so is our race, our civilization, or the peace of the world secure.1

This new attitude in regard to the Japanese becoming a world problem is further reflected in an article by Lothrop Stoddard, (Author of "The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy") Mr. Stoddard, who had studied the problem both in America and the Orient, caused much comment by his article in Worlds Work. He said:

The California question is only one phase of a world problem, the relations of the white and non-white races. ... Of late years the non-white races are beginning to wake up, ... The brown have begun to cross into the white world's frontiers, but the white inhabitants of these frontier regions at once take alarm. Relatively few in number they see themselves menaced by countless hordes of colored men threatening them with submersion and racial extinction. ... They erect legal barriers debarring colored immigration from their soil. The barriers are strengthened; the colored pressure against them grows in turn. ... Both sides threaten to make good their cause by the ultimate argument of war.

That in a nutshell is the situation which has developed between the teeming population of awakened Asia and the frontier population of the white world. Its most acute phase to be sure is California, but the reader should remember that what he learns concerning the Japanese in California holds good for the Asians in other parts of our Union, in Canada, Australia, South Africa or every other white region where the man of color attempts to penetrate. It is a true world problem which confronts us and it must be so considered.2

The New Republic later said in another editorial that if the government had placed the Japanese under exclusion


there would be no need for anti-alien land laws. In that
way it placed the blame for the condition in California on
the Federal Government.

Discrimination in respect to the kind of people who shall be
absorbed into our national life and above all discrimination
as to the kind of people who shall occupy the controlling
position represented by agriculture tenure are an essence of
nationalism. ... It may be we are hysterical over a small
matter when we refuse to permit the few Japanese in this
country to own land. But these are matters for Americans to
settle among themselves without pressure from outside. ... If Japanese diplomacy succeeds in forcing California to re-
voke her alien land laws, the only abiding result would be
increasing antagonism for the Japanese, that would tend to-
ward discrimination in shipping trade where it is really an
international matter and toward the friction that makes for
war.]

These excerpts show a great change on the part of the
eastern press in their attitude toward the land question in
California. This change came between 1913 and 1920. This
development may be attributed in part by the nationalist
and isolationist reaction which followed the Great War;
partly to the aggressive and acquisitive policies pursued
by Japan under cover of that conflict.

A few days before election day the following official
statement was given out by Assistant Secretary of State
Davis, at Washington, D. C.

The movement in California to recast the state laws affect-
ing alien land laws has been receiving since its inception
the close and interested attention of the State Department.
The relation of certain treaty provisions to the proposed
measure is being discussed clearly and ably in California
and will doubtless prove an element in the State decisions

as to the adoption or rejection of the measure.

In the meantime the department has had numerous discussions of the most candid and friendly nature with the Ambassador of Japan and it is believed he thoroughly realizes as we have sought to make clear that no outcome of the California movement will be acceptable to the country at large that does not accord with existing and applicable provisions of law and what is equally important with the nation's instinct of justice.¹

The New York Times adds this comment, "The inference from Mr. Davis' statement is that the State Department regards the passage of the referendum as a violation of existing laws and treaties."²

Even on the eve of election the Times advised that California postpone action until a new treaty could be made to take care of the problem.

In spite of this precautionary advice, California adopted by a vote of four to one the initiative measure further restricting the right of aliens to hold land.

Immediately after the election John P. Irish, who had championed the cause of the Japanese on the question of owning and leasing land, gave notice that he was planning a test case on the constitutionality of the new law.

Governor Stephens, on the other hand, strongly commend ed the action of the voters. He said:

I am glad to see that the voters of California have passed the anti-Japanese Law and I am here to say it will never

² Ibid.
lead to war. There may be diplomatic interchanges between
Washington and Japan but the law will stand and Japan will
never go farther than protesting. The reason for this is
simple. No foreigner can own land in Japan and no foreign
working man can enter Japan. England, Japan's ally, and
Australia have both placed in force laws similar to the
California Law and Japan has done nothing.\textsuperscript{1}

After the law on land ownership and leasing had been
passed by the people of California Japan continued protest-
ing to Washington and insisting the law was a discrimination
against them. This brought sharp criticism from Senator
Hiram Johnson of California who said her real demand was
citizenship. He also warned against any nullification of
the alien land law by the new treaty about to be considered.\textsuperscript{2}

The Nation, while not agreeing with the Californians on
the land question, felt that since the World War Japan had
lost many friends, as this liberal journal pointed out:

It is not as easy to champion Japan before America as it was
before the war or even a few years ago. The manifestations
of Japanese imperialism to which the war has given rise have
aroused widespread distrust quite aside from the particular
question affecting directly the relations between the United
States and the Mikado's realm. ... We still believe the at-
titude of California and her politicians to be all wrong.
We are still of the opinion that the United States does vio-
lence to its noblest traditions when it forbids Japanese to
become citizens. ... We ought to be the best of friends in
the world and we shall be if only our American and Japanese
imperialists do not prevent.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 8, 1920.

\textsuperscript{2} Pamphlet, California Alien Land Law of 1920.

This was the end of the struggle over alien land laws, and it would seem the World War and developments from the Paris Conference greatly changed the prevailing attitude towards Japan. This is particularly true in regard to public opinion along the Atlantic seacoast, which had been most unfriendly to the Alien Land Law of 1913. The whole subject of Japanese in the United States had become a national issue by 1920.
CHAPTER IV
THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD
JAPAN DURING THE WORLD WAR

Shortly after England declared war on Germany, Japan did likewise. Japan, maintained that her alliance with Great Britain obligated her to do so; her military operations, however, were centered in the Far East where Germany had valuable colonies particularly those on the Shantung Peninsula. Generally speaking the American public felt Japan was only living up to her part of her alliance with England. So many events in Europe were taking place so rapidly that American public opinion was more interested with happenings on the western front than in the subtleties of Far Eastern diplomacy.

Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University, made a statement on the sanctity of treaties and hailed Japan's declaration of war on Germany as proof of her integrity to live up to her treaty agreements. President Eliot remarked:

Many thoughtful Americans rejoice that Japan has engaged vigorously in the great European struggle in conformity with her alliance with Great Britain. Germany has been possessed for twenty years with an intense desire not only to obtain more territory and more ports in Europe but to possess strong colonies in the Pacific and Far East, and close connections through the near East with south Asia. The cooperation of Japan in the present war will transfer the colonies Germany had acquired in the Orient to other control. The active cooperation of Japan will give her a rightful place in the Conference when the time will come to settle the peace of
Europe, and when it is over Japan will represent the best humanitarian sentiments of the Orient.

Europe and America should both be grateful to Japan for reinforcing the public opinion of the Occident with regard to the sanctity and supreme value of humanity in living up to international agreements.1

This quotation is quite complimentary to Japan and on the whole that was the first reaction of the general American public. Headlines giving accounts of battles were better sellers than editorials on what Japan might do with German possessions.

Gradually, however, American writers began to take a more critical attitude. The *Sunset Magazine*, which is a western publication, began early in 1915 to question Japan's policy in her newly acquired territory. Under an article entitled "Japan Has Trouble Letting Go" we find this comment:

Apparently the conquest of German territory in the Far East and in the Pacific by Japan will turn out to have been a far easier matter than the problem of letting go. In the ultimatum to Germany preceding the attack upon Kiachow, Japan declared she would "ultimately" restore the conquered territory to its original owner, the Chinese Republic. At that time it was also the universal belief fostered by the semi-official press of both Japan and England that Nippon would not extend its operations beyond the China Sea. When the extension came when Japan took possession of several groups of German Islands in the Pacific including the Island of Yap near our own Guam it was announced semi-officially that the occupation was only temporary.

Count Okuma undoubtedly was sincere in his far sighted policy in conciliating China and returning to her the territory wrested from the Germans. Now his sincerity, leadership and popularity will be put to a severe test...

If the opposition party carries out its threat and puts

the issue to a vote and the return of the islands is defeated in the diet, it will be difficult for Count Okuma to convince the masses that the best interests of the Island empire are served by the surrender of Kiaochow and Yap. From the diplomatic standpoint Secretary Bryan's polite inquiry as to Japan's future intentions regarding the appropriated islands may have been perfectly correct, but from the standpoint of international psychology it was not good. ... If Japan decides to keep Yap — (nobody knew there was such a reef three months ago) why should the United States have the least misgivings. In the meantime friction is developed between Japan and England because the Japanese press objects to alleged British interference with Japan's activities in the Pacific.¹

About this same time the suggestion was first made that Japan send some three hundred thousand troops to the front and if she did this she would be given a generous amount of the spoils. These suggestions were viewed in America with skepticism. In some circles the feeling was held that when the war ended all European nations would be prostrate, and if Japan wanted to do some rearranging in the Far East there would be no one to stop her except the United States. In this connection the Sunset again comments:

From whatever angle the situation is viewed it is useless to hide the fact that within the last seven years the relations between Japan and America have become more or less strained. There is absolutely no reason for war between the two countries, except the one that kindled the European conflagration, mutual distrust and fear. ... And the arm makers, the battleship builders, the gun factories, the submarine patent holders rejoice in the growth of misunderstanding, mutual distrust and fear that ends in universal catastrophe.

Indications are not lacking that even now with the most powerful, most fearful calamity in history before their eyes, they are using the same old methods to float their output on potential seas of blood. ... In view of these conditions the Allies will do well to consider the influence of their pleas for Japanese aid upon the United States. It can be

asserted that in Western America at least these pleas for Japanese assistance have greatly diminished the vigor of popular sympathy for the cause of the Allies. Western America realizes that Japanese participation in the European trenches will serve to strengthen Japanese "militarism" and thereby add to the burden of the United States.¹

A mild echo of this sentiment was to be found in the daily papers of the middle west and east. Many of them questioned the wisdom of bringing oriental soldiers on the European battlefield and fighting beside the whites. They were complimentary to Japan's fighting ability but questioned the after effects.

Another event which aroused severe criticism of Japan by the American press was the demands by Japan on China in 1915. These demands were extremely severe and were much criticised internationally as a serious violation of Chinese integrity and independence. This episode aroused still more suspicion as to Japanese intentions in the Far East.

Typical of comment at this time was an article in the North American Review entitled "New Menace in the Far East". The author of this article confidently asserted, "There is no doubt whatever in the minds of Far-Eastern experts that the ultimate object of Japan is to replace Great Britain in their own interests as the leading power of Asia and they are starting on their policy to reach that end".²

Even more outspoken was T. F. Millard, a resident of Shanghai and editor of "The China Press". In a widely quoted article in the Century Magazine he accused Japan of a stupendous conspiracy for the domination of the Pacific. These ambitions, the author believed, would sooner or later bring Japan into armed conflict with the United States. Developing this point, Mr. Millard went on to say:

Americans are so engrossed with the terrific struggle in Europe that they seem blind and indifferent to a more sinister and imminent menace to our peace and security that is creeping upon us from the opposite side. As to Oriental peoples and Japan in particular, Americans themselves know that collectively and individually we wish them well, and neither as a people or a nation do we harbor any hostile thoughts or designs against them. What most Americans do not comprehend is that this sincere attitude of ours means little to the Japanese who doubt its sincerity and do not reciprocate. To most Americans war talk seems foolish because most Americans do not perceive anything to fight about. How about the other fellow?

My conclusions are:

1. Japan is making deliberate preparation in anticipation if not actually in expectation of a collision with the United States.
2. Japanese popular thought and feeling have been developed for this by the government, and is extremely hostile to the United States.
3. While Japanese statesman have stimulated and formulated such a sentiment in Japan a Japanese propaganda operating by various processes in America has almost succeeded in lulling our nation into false security and has prevented and retarded measures to prepare our nation against a clash.
4. The fate of China, stability of the Monroe Doctrine (now embracing the new ideal of Pan Americanism) the balance of Power in the Pacific and whether a Yellow Peril ever will become a reality, are questions included in the outcome of the relations of Japan and the United States.
5. The great war has destroyed the balance of power in the Far East, creating a condition disturbing the peace of that region and by reaction also menacing the peace of America.
6. Decided constructive action by the United States is required to create that balance of power in the settlement of the great war and meanwhile this government should strive to preserve the status quo.

Japan, instead of preserving the independence of Korea
annexed her, the "open door" in Manchuria is closed and Japan's course to bring China under her control is still recent. ... 

China is a lure only for a few Japanese peasantry. They long for a higher standard similar to our civilization. This explains Japan's tentative approach in Mexico, the effort to retain their position in California. China is not a satisfactory outlet, and the only really desirable field for immigration (North and South America) is barred by the United States.

I am surprised at the indifference of the people of the United States to this supremely grave issue which confronts our nation, at their failure to realize it exists, at their assurance in their own point of view and indifference to the Japanese point of view. ... 

To Japan the great war spelled opportunity as predicted by Count Hayashi when he wrote, "She will be able to reap advantage for herself". And she has been a diligent reaper. ... Japan's price for sending troops to Europe is a free hand in China and the Northern Pacific. Today Germany is the Western Power which represents Japan's real ideal, while technically at war with Germany, in the Japanese press there are flattering references to Germany and criticism of the United States.

In evaluating this passionate outburst, one would do well to remember the author's long residence in China. It is not difficult to detect his pro-Chinese bias. Nevertheless, Mr. Millard was speaking for a considerable body of American public sentiment in his arraignment of Japanese policy.

In the face of these violent assaults, Japan still had its defenders. Professor Muzzey of Columbia declared, "The development of big naval appropriations in Japan have brought suspicion. Yet sober, informed students in Japan of American affairs did not see us attacking Japan. But such students

are not less scarce in Japan than in the United States.\(^1\) Mr. Muzzey had spent years in Japan at various intervals and he felt that Japanese people were very friendly to America and that it was only the jingo press in both Japan and America which caused so many hard feelings.

The *Outlook* which had always been pro-Japanese continued their sentiment throughout the period of the war. They ran articles which pointed out that the war was a financial affair, and that in comparing Japan's financial returns with those of the United States the disparity was too great to be considered; neither could the productive capacity of the two countries be compared. It also assailed the American press for suggesting that Japan might monopolize trade in Asia, especially Manchuria. It was strongly asserted that, "As for the fashionable talk of the American-Japanese war, it is unthinkable. Before it can possibly come either America or Japan or both must turn into a nation of utter idiots. It is criminal, traitorous, stupidity."\(^2\)

The Japanese government made a real conciliatory gesture toward the United States, when early in 1916, it repudiated the doctrine of "Dual Allegiance". This meant that thereafter Japanese children born in the United States would


be released from allegiance to Japan. The Outlook considered this an important forward step in promoting friendly relations between the two countries. Most American papers, however, seem to have paid very little attention to this significant change of policy.

The entrance of the United States into the World War in April, 1917, threw the Japanese question into a new phase. Since we were now associated with Japan in the war upon Germany, it was politically desirable that a better feeling be created between the two countries. For this purpose, Japan dispatched to the United States a good will mission headed by Viscount Ishii. To supplement this gesture, Secretary of State Lansing issued the following official statement:

Viscount Ishii and other Japanese now on their way home have performed a service to the United States as well as to Japan which is of the highest value. There had been growing between the peoples of the two countries a feeling of suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of the other in the Far East, a condition which if unchecked promised to develop a serious situation. The attitude of doubt was fostered by the Germans, by their campaign of falsehoods secretly carried out. The German government through its foreign policy desired especially to alienate this country and Japan so that at the chosen time it would not be difficult to cause a rupture of our relations. Fortunately this distrust was not general either in the United States or Japan. ¹

Former President Roosevelt, whose sympathy for Japan has been previously noted, likewise took the opportunity to make a strong plea for better relations. In an interview given to the New York Times he said:

Every thoughtful American who dwells on the relations between Japan and the United States must realize each has something to gain from the other. In the present World War Japan has played a great and useful part. That she has had her special and peculiar grievances against Germany goes without saying, so had we. She took her grievances into account. But she ranged herself on the side of humanity and freedom and justice as we did. Her duty has been first of all to drive Germany from the Pacific and to police and protect the Orient.

Gradually as the war has grown she has extended her assistance all over the world.

Yet at this time when Japan's sons are fighting beside ours there are blatant Americans who have played the German game to the limit by seeking to make trouble between Japan and the United States and by doing all that malevolent and unscrupulous baseness can do to taunt Japan into hostility to our country. There are in this country certain demagogic politicians, certain agitators seeking notoriety and certain conscienceless sensation-mongering newspaper owners and writers who are willing to make money or obtain preferment for themselves by any appeal to distrust and suspicion, no matter what infinite harm it does this country. ...

The rights and duties of the United States and Japan toward each other must be treated on a basis of exact reciprocal equality. Each must have full control of all things vitally affecting its own well being, each must treat the other with frank and loyal courtesy and consideration.

The Zimmermann note was an official invitation from Germany to Japan and Mexico to join in dismembering the United States. Unfortunately there were people in both countries many of whom were entirely honest in their beliefs, who accepted every false rumor as true, and aided the German propaganda, by declaring that their government should prepare for the conflict which they asserted was inevitable, that the interests in the Far East were hostile and that every activity of the other country in the Pacific had a sinister purpose.

There is always time to point out the elemental fact that this country should feel for Japan a peculiar admiration and respect, and that one of the cardinal principles of our foreign policy should be to retain her friendship and goodwill. There is not the slightest real or necessary conflict between the United States and Japan in the Pacific, her interest is in Asia, ours in America, neither has any desire or excuse for acquiring territory on the other continent. Japan is playing a great part in the civilized world, a good understanding between her and the United States is essential to international progress, and it is a grave offense against the United States for any man by word or
In spite of such official and individual efforts to keep up an outward appearance of harmony, it is evident that many Americans were not altogether happy in the new alignment. Suspicion and distrust had eaten too deeply during the previous decade to be eliminated overnight by a few cordial gestures. This undercurrent of suspicion is clearly apparent in an article in World's Work, evoked by the visit of Viscount Ishii. This article declared:

Viscount Ishii blamed much of our hard feelings toward the Japanese, onto the Germans and irresponsible yellow journals on both sides of the water. The Viscount's friendly discourses were pleasant to hear and read and aided in eliminating a little strain that had developed. It was well timed and executed.

But he did not go to the root of things. American distrust of Japan was not manufactured by Germany. It was founded on several well known causes, which are:

1. There is a very general impression among American traders that when Japan became paramount in Manchuria she discriminated most unfairly against American trade.
2. Friction between Japanese and American population on the Pacific coast.
3. Americans feel a keen resentment that Count Okuma should have telegraphed an American magazine that Japan would restore Kiao-Chow to China only to find that Japan had no intention of doing it.
4. Americans resented Japanese action in confronting China in twenty-one demands which if China accepted would close the "Open Door" and end Chinese integrity. Despite Ishii's friendly assurances our minds are not quite easy about Japanese intentions concerning the "Open Door". There is something more substantial than Germany's lies to worry about, and both Japan and the United States had better face the facts and solve the problem, than cover the difficulty and let it grow.


The author of this article was undoubtedly speaking for a considerable body of American public opinion. So long as the war lasted, patriotic considerations tended to discourage such frank expressions of incompatibility. It was evident, however, that a strong anti-Japanese feeling still smouldered, and that it required only the stresses and strains of the peace conference to fan it into an open flame.
CHAPTER V
THE JAPANESE QUESTION AND THE
PEACE TREATY

When the Armistice was signed the allies found it necessary to police certain sections which had formerly been occupied by the opposing armies. Because of Bolshevist activities, Japan began occupying parts of Siberia under the guise of policing. This brought about a storm of disapproval in America. Public opinion became heated on the matter. The New Republic editorially said, "America is utterly opposed to the occupation of Eastern Siberia by Japan. False witnesses may testify to a division of American opinion on the subject,... The Japanese themselves surely know that Washington is merely giving expression to a popular feeling that is very intense, very general."

In spite of such rumblings of American disapproval, the occupation of Siberia continued and about the middle of March, Secretary Lansing sent for Viscount Ishii, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, and pointed out the serious implications of the developments in Siberia. He felt that the Japanese military party was being allowed too free a hand there. The exact developments of the discussion were not given out. It was a fact, however, that following this interview, Ambassador Ishii returned to the embassy and sent a code dispatch to Japan. Following this incident there was
quite a political storm in Japan and the peace party seemed victorious.

Another incident which antagonized the public opinion in America was the speech by Ambassador Ishii before the Japanese Society of New York. In that speech he stated that he felt there should be incorporated in the League of Nations Covenant an article prohibiting international discrimination on account of racial differences. It was assumed that this speech had the full approval of Tokyo. The western senators, Senator Chamberlain of Oregon, Democrat, Senator Poindexter of Washington, Republican, both bitterly attacked the statement and the criticism was general.

Much hostility was also expressed to the Japanese demand for an amendment to "grant equal and just treatment to all aliens within their borders who are nationals of states that are members of the League of Nations".¹

The dispute between Australia and Japan over the division of the islands of the Pacific also affected opinion in America rather adversely. We sided with Australia opposing Japanese occupation of the Marshall and Caroline islands.

Such was the tense atmosphere of American public opinion on the eve of the Peace Conference. There seemed to be not a single factor working towards a closer understanding and greater friendliness between the two countries. At the Paris Conference, Japan quickly took the offensive by

¹ Stockton Independent, March 31, 1919.
demanding a formal recognition of racial equality. This proposal was strongly opposed by the United States and Australia. The Hearst papers immediately commented upon this demand:

We do not believe the Peace Conference will go so far as to dictate matters of immigration but it must be borne in mind that Japan is one of the five powers sitting in at the conference and it must be made clear that the United States regards this as a question of self-preservation and cannot compromise it.

Unless a protest is made, however, the doctrine of acquiescence will be invoked to say America is indifferent, and hence it is important that a protest be made that free immigration and equal rights cannot be accorded to oriental peoples without imperiling our own National existence and destroying western civilization.

"The East is the East and the West is the West, and never the twain shall meet". According to St. Paul, "While God made the people of the earth of one blood, he determined the bounds of their habitation." 1

This drive for racial equality from Japan was not successful. So bitter was the feeling aroused, however, that more than once the Japanese envoys threatened to return home.

Early in the peace discussions the control of the Shantung Peninsula was discussed. There was strong opposition in the United States to turning this area over to Japan.

In 1915, when Japan forced China to sign the twenty-one demands under threat of war, it was the opinion of this Government that those demands violated the rights of nations. If we felt that way then we have more reason to feel that way now. . . .

Japan's idea of democracy is benevolent despotism and the reason she asks for a Monroe Doctrine for Asia is not to be able to keep other people from oppressing China but oppressing it herself. It is a deliberate attempt to deceive the world and the worst of it is, she's getting away with

1 San Francisco Examiner, April 15, 1919.
The Hearst papers, traditional leaders in the anti-Japanese propaganda, vigorously assailed the motives of the Japanese government in the war. One such editorial declared:

Congressman Alvan T. Fuller of Massachusetts has just made a most extraordinary statement concerning the sincerity of Japan in the World War. He declared that the French Ambassador to Japan told him that Japan was absolutely insincere in her pro-allied attitude and intended to support Germany the moment she thought the cause of the Allies was lost, and was only prevented from doing so by reports of her mission to the United States that we were going to fight with all our might. ... The sentimentalisists whose feelings are hurt every time anyone suggests Japan needs watching ought to realize we ought not to go to sleep in the profound belief that the Pacific is necessarily bound to remain Pacific.

Late in April, 1919, American public opinion was shocked when the news came out regarding the secret agreement of the Japanese with the entente in February, 1917. Japan based her demands on holding the islands of the Pacific on a secret agreement made with England, France, Italy, and Russia in February, 1917, that they would support Japanese claims to the German Pacific Islands north of the equator and to the Chinese territory of Shantung which she had wrested from Germany.

The existence of this secret treaty came as a decided shock to both China and the United States. The Chinese delegation at the conference immediately asked for an


2 San Francisco Examiner, April 16, 1919.
official statement on the Kiao-Chow question. They were backed in this demand by the United States delegation. Under the decision of the Council of Three all German rights at Kiao-Chow and in Shantung Province were to be transferred without reserve to Japan which in turn was to hand back Shantung to China in full sovereignty and was to retain only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement in Tsing-tao south of Kiao-Chow. A great difference of opinion was to be found among Conference members as to the ultimate effect this would have on Far Eastern Affairs. The opinion in America was very strongly to the effect that China had been tricked.

The most conservative attitude of the Pacific Coast is to be found in an editorial of the San Francisco Chronicle which said:

Japan was to retain Korea, which she obtained a few years ago in repudiation of a solemn treaty not long before signed, and probably Shantung as a successor in interest to Germany which acquired that rich province by brutal aggression which deserved the detestation of mankind. ...

Japan has probably won out by bluntly informing her allies and associates that she must have Shantung or she would have nothing to do with the League. That was in the nature of shirt sleeve diplomacy but had the advantage of rendering any ethical discussion unnecessary. And yet as a result of the war Japan has lost very few men, made a lot of money and is to get for all economic purposes one of the richest provinces of China.¹

The Hearst press was far less restrained in its comments. Mr. Hearst, in a signed editorial, urged constant

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, May 1, 1919.
preparedness as America's only guarantee against the Japanese menace. Mr. Hearst said:

Former Senator Phelan is right about the Japanese propaganda in this country. It is a persistent, cunning, sleepless, tireless propaganda. The Japanese Government finances the so-called Bureau of the East and West, ... the business of this bureau is to deceive the American people. ... It is the business of Iyenagas propaganda bureau to suppress or minimize or deny with the help of foolish college professors and worse the foolish American newspapers. There is not an hour in the day when this propaganda is not at work. Its dupes and tools are particularly numerous in the educational institutions and churches -- men like Dr. Gallick and Soper for examples, and newspapers like the New York Times and Los Angeles Times. ...

But unfortunately for the Japanese propaganda there is a great institution in this country which they have never been able to deceive, coerce, nor to cajole, nor to subsidize, the Hearst Newspapers are that institution, ...

The indictment which we bring against the Japanese autocracy and military caste is this:

First, That in all respects the Japanese autocracy, military caste, and diplomacy are modeled after the overthrown one of Russia, Germany, Austria, and Hungary. As long as the present autocracy exists the assertion that autocracy was banished from the earth and the world made safe for democracy and little peoples by the great war fall short of the full fact.

Second, The Japanese autocrats, military caste, and diplomats hate America in their hearts and are constantly stirring up hatred of America in Mexico and South America, yet planning to obtain naval bases in the Pacific Ocean and make naval and military attacks on our mainland when the United States has been lulled into another period of unpreparedness. ...

Third, That during the war Japanese autocracy, military and diplomats conspired with the Czar to desert the Allies and divide China and the rest of Asia. ...

Time and truth have marched with us and all the malignant hate and abuse of the Japanese propaganda, aided by their willing and knowing or by their deceived and ignorant dupes and tools have been wasted. The American people of the United States are at last awakening to the motives and preparedness of this Asiatic autocracy, to the menace of its treachery and its design, to the worthlessness of its ambitions.

We intend that the Japanese propaganda shall never again lull our people to sleep. ... Surely everybody knows
now that if our Government had possessed enough statesmanship to prepare in 1915, we would not have had to go to war in 1917. ... Countrymen, be wise, vigilant, be prepared! For if the Republic stands armed and with all her mighty strength ready to strike, what enemy can prevail against us or put a conquering foot on our dear land?

While the Peace Conference was still in session in Paris, this is the type of comment which was being given to the American public by the more sensational papers.

Public opinion was certainly turning more and more against Japan. Her method of exploiting the Shantung Peninsula was being generally attacked. The Literary Digest believed that Japan had won a notable victory and that China had suffered a serious loss at the Paris peace conference.

This was also the view of the New York Herald which said:

Japan has won the most signal victory of the Peace Conference, ... she is not only buttressed in a paramount position regarding China, but is further strengthened by the regional policy clause which was added to the League of Nations Covenant to protect the Monroe Doctrine. It means Japanese control of the Orient is comparable only to American dominance of the western hemisphere.

The Philadelphia Ledger said:

From the beginning the Japanese have been building steadily in a diplomatic way toward the result finally achieved in the Peace Conference. They used the weakness of the Entente and the collapse of Russia to extort, first from England, then from France, treaties recognizing Japan's reversionary rights to all German possessions in China and the northern Pacific. They have used the same situation to obtain from the United States the Lansing-Ishii agreement recognizing

1 San Francisco Examiner, May 14, 1919.

2 Literary Digest, Vol. 61, May 17, 1919, 16.
Japan's superior interests in the Far East. Japan has now used President Wilson's need to get a League of Nations accepted to obtain further and more explicit recognition of the same principle to secure rights which Chinese say mean not merely domination of a province of three million people, but also through control of the railroad running from Peking to Tientsin, the practical economic mastery of the Chinese Empire.

Another feature of the Paris peace settlement to be widely criticized was the decision to give the Island of Yap over to Japan. This island, previously unknown to the average American, quickly assumed a position of vital national interest. It was contended that Yap was almost in sight of Guam, the principal cable terminal in the Eastern Pacific, and that in Japanese hands it would be a constant threat to the American line of communications.

Congress was not slow to respond to these expressions of popular disapproval. The dominant note in both houses was decidedly hostile to Japan and to the provisions of the Peace Treaty which seemed to strengthen her position in the Far East.

Senator Sherman quoted from the Treaty of Paris Article 156 which read:

Germany renounces in favor of Japan all her rights, titles, and privileges particularly those concerning the treaty of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables. ...

Article 157 - The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made. Senator Sherman then addressed the chairman saying, "What, Mr. President, is the limit which these rights give to Japan in point of time?"

1 Literary Digest, Vol. 61, May 17, 1919, 17.
How long will she keep these port cities and territory? Is this merely a temporary exercise of the rights and privileges gained under these articles? So far as appears from the treaty there is no time limit. The occupancy of that territory lasts as long as human government may remain on the earth!

This speech of Senator Sherman was but one of many challenging the Shantung settlement.

One of the most heated speeches came from Senator Norris of Nebraska, who said in part:

China was one of our allies. Her loyalty has never been questioned. You cannot say that about another ally that is getting the major portion of graft out of the treaty. In other words you cannot say that about Japan,... China was practically denied admission to the Peace Conference where her own throat was cut and where by these articles in the treaty everything that was sacred and dear to her was taken away and given to her worst enemy. In all the history of the world there is not in my judgment a more shameful treatment of a friend or ally than the treatment in this instance of China as she is treated in this treaty. We ought, it seems to me, to reject the treaty until all the possessions of the former German Empire in China are restored to China,... We could just as well have protected the rights of China at the Versailles Treaty Conference.2

That same day Senator Reed of Pennsylvania said that he understood the Japanese were practically excluding all foreigners from trade in Shantung. His opinion was that Japan by a binding agreement should be made to return Shantung to China, otherwise the Senate should not ratify the treaty. After Senator Reed was seated Senator Kellogg took the floor. He was strongly opposed to the settlement, and

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 58, 2732.

2 Ibid., Vol. 59, 3844-5.
quoted the following written by John Dewey in the New Re-
public March 3, 1920:

American apologists for that part of the peace treaty which
related to China have the advantage of the illusion of dis-
tance. Anyone living a few months in China sees the strange
arguments. He reads in Japanese papers that Japan must pro-
tect China as well as Japan against herself, ... by keeping
control of Shantung.... The history of European aggression in
China gives this argument great force among the Japanese who
for the most part know nothing about what goes on in Japan.
... Whatever the motives of the American Senators in complete-
ly disassociating the United States from the peace settlement
as regards China, their action is a permanent asset to China
not only in respect to Japan but with respect to all Chinese
foreign relations. ... Foreigners resident in Shantung say
they see no sign whatever that Japan is going to get out,
but everything points to strengthen her position. How long
ago was the treaty of Portsmouth signed, and what were its
nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian Territory?
Not a month will pass without a pretext for delay.1

Another Senator very much opposed was Senator Borah.
His opening statement was a quotation from Theodore Burton,
a student of oriental affairs, who said, "The Shantung ques-
tion is regarded as the beginning of the dismemberment of
China". ... Senator Borah continued, "It is fair to say of
Japan that Japan has never promised to return anything but
the shell. She has never made any engagement to return the
economic rights and interests which she received from Ger-
many".2

This Japanese angle in the Peace Treaty of Paris was
unquestionably a strong factor in the defeat of the treaty

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 59, 3841.
2 Ibid., 3845.
by the United States Senate. It was likewise an important factor in widening the gulf of misunderstanding between the United States and Japan.

During this period there were not many voices raised in defense of Japan. One of the few periodicals which sought to defend Japanese gains in the Far East was the Outlook, which declared, "It is not necessary to take up ridiculous pretensions, such as Japan is aiming to gain military and economic control of China. Japan has not the slightest intentions of ever attempting to dictate to another country how it should regulate its affairs."

This was, however, decidedly a minority viewpoint. So far as a great majority of Americans were concerned, the war and its aftermath contributed materially to the growing distrust for Japan.

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1 The Outlook, July 2, 1919, 379.
CHAPTER VI
THE JAPANESE QUESTION IN THE
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

As has been seen in the preceding chapter, relations between the United States and Japan were not very satisfactory at the close of the World War. In addition to such familiar issues as immigration and alien land laws certain new questions had come to the fore. Chief among these new questions was the growing naval rivalry between the two powers, the question of naval and military bases in the Pacific area, and the ultimate fate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had been causing considerable American concern.

There is little doubt that this unsatisfactory condition of Pacific relations was one of the chief factors behind the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Questions, which assembled at the invitation of President Harding in November, 1921. It was recognized that in this conference the most important roles would be played by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. On the eve of the Conference, the prevailing attitude toward Great Britain was definitely conciliatory and cooperative. Toward Japan, however, there was manifest considerable suspicion and distrust.

There were certain papers which had a very questioning attitude toward the whole Disarmament Conference. The New
York Call was of the opinion that, "The people of the United States can expect the same disillusionment from the Washington Conference that followed the war to end war".¹

It will be recalled that Secretary of State Hughes opened the Conference with a proposal for drastic naval reductions upon the ratio of five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan. The Japanese delegation immediately asked that Japan's fleet strength be increased to a ratio of 10 - 10 - 7. The New York Times saw in this request a grave menace to the peace of the Pacific. Said this paper:

Japan's home waters may now be said to extend to the Caroline, Marshall, and Marine Islands except Guam over which the American flag flies. It is true Japan holds these under mandate that inhibits their use for war supplies and purposes. But in a conflict with the United States it is not to be supposed that Japan would pay scrupulous attention to the terms of the mandates. In defending her own territory and in making strategic use of the mandates for offensive warfare against possessions of the United States in the Asiatic Pacific and against an American fleet sent out to protect them, Japan would have more than a fair chance of victory even with fewer capital ships and inferior strength in cruisers, destroyers, submarines and airplanes. ... The Japanese have counted upon availling themselves of a great strategic advantage to overcome the disparity of capital ships in favor of the United States. It will be seen that to concede to Japan the newly conditioned Mutsu, like the Nagato equal in power to the new Maryland would be to imperil peace in the event of "grave diplomatic complications".²

Commenting on the position of Japan the San Francisco Chronicle said:

¹ Literary Digest, Vol. 71, November 26, 1921, 8.
² New York Times, November 21, 1921.
It is now time to set in plain language exactly the position of the Japanese. The Chronicle assumed when the Conference convened that Japan in accepting the invitation and approving the agenda did so in good faith. No such opportunity was ever before offered to any nation to rise to the leadership of the world in respect to the things in which the whole world is most concerned. The admiration of mankind and the trade preferences which it carries were and still are within the grasp of the Japanese people. We had such confidence in the statesmanship and astuteness of the Japanese Government that we felt sure that no such opportunity would pass unimpaired. It begins to look as though we had overestimated the competence of that government. It is now time to open up the proceedings to the public. The world wants to know in words which can have but one meaning what Japan proposes to do.1

The Literary Digest felt that Japan stood alone as the great obstacle in the way of amicable settlement of the Pacific and Far East question.2

The Brooklyn Eagle, however, did not believe that this opposition would be permanent. This paper pointed out:

Japan will soon agree to act in full accord with others. Otherwise Japan would find herself completely isolated. She has everything to gain by subscribing to a general agreement. No one will take up the rights Japan is asked to relinquish. Foreign investment will flow into China as a result of stabilization and there may be more American than Japanese money put into Chinese railroads, but Japan will reap most of the benefits, for she has every advantage over competitors in the general Chinese market. Our manufactures cannot compete with Japan and the leaders of Japan realize this, and there is little doubt that the Japanese representatives at the conference will ultimately accept the program favored by Western nations.3

1 San Francisco Chronicle, December 3, 1921.

2 Literary Digest, Vol. 71, December 3, 1921, 5.

3 Ibid.
This prediction was justified by the event, when about December 11 the general terms of the Four Power Pact were given out and it was announced that England, France, Japan and the United States delegates had accepted them. This agreement terminated the unpopular Anglo-Japanese Alliance and replaced it with an agreement for joint consultation among the powers concerned.

Just as the Four Power Pact was being concluded the American cable to the Island of Yap was sealed without notice. This caused much unfavorable comment and the United States began pushing the demand to internationalize the Island. Japan claimed a four-fifths interest in the Island of Yap according to the Treaty of Versailles. Each of the other allied nations had claimed a fifth interest and they had turned their interest to Japan giving her a mandate over the island. The cable had been a Dutch-German line before the war, and we were to have cable rights.

This development produced an unnecessary and unpleasant situation while the conference was in progress, and necessitated a treaty. It also did much to excite resentment against the Japanese.¹

The Four Power Treaty between England, France, Japan, and the United States was an agreement between the powers regarding fortifications and also a form of protection for the peace and trade of the Pacific. The importance of this treaty is shown by the following:

Article I

The high contracting parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions in the regions of the Pacific Ocean. If there should develop between any of the high contracting parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific Question and involving their said rights which if not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them they shall invite the high contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration.

Article II

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, the high contracting parties shall

¹ Literary Digest, Vol. 71, December 10, 1921, 8
communicate with one another frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken jointly and separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

Article III
This agreement shall remain in force ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of the high contracting parties to terminate it upon twelve months notice.

Article IV
The agreement shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratification in Washington and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan concluded in London, July 12, 1911, shall terminate.

The American representatives signed with these reservations:
1. The treaty shall apply to the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean provided however, that the treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude the agreement between the United States of America and the mandatory Powers, respectively, in relation to the mandated islands.
2. That the controversies to which the second part of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers.

Commenting on the Four Power Pact the New York Times said:

The most important point in the new treaty in the opinion of men in touch with negotiations is the one providing that in case of disagreement between two contracting parties the remaining parties shall be asked to mediate and arbitrate. This will also help Japan's accepting a sweeping cut in naval armaments and acquiescence in the 5-5-3 ratio of capital ships insisted on by the United States Government. It is understood that Japan will give up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided she can be assured against attack.

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 62, Part 5, 3042.

2 New York Times, December 9, 1921.
This same newspaper felt that the Conference would settle such questions as the status of possessions and dominions in the Pacific, the American-Japanese controversy over the Island of Yape, and the Chinese-Japanese problem over the Shantung Peninsula. Therefore, it believed that the whole Conference had been a success in the settlement of the affairs of the Pacific and Asia.  

The Pact was no sooner drawn up than Senators Reed of Missouri, Stanley and Watson of Georgia and Borah of Idaho began an attack. Senator Borah argued that the United States would be as much bound morally to go to the aid of its co-signatories in the event of aggression by some other power as it would have been under Article X of the League of Nations.  

Senator Reed of Missouri looked upon the Pact as a great victory for Japan. In a denunciatory four hour speech he declared:

I charge that the Secretary of State on yesterday admitted that the term "insular possession" included all of Japan. We are bound under the Four Power Treaty to protect the Japanese Empire. Japan is all islands and clearly if Japan were attacked anywhere on any of these islands it would be an attack on Japan. How else, I ask, can you construe it? In its terms this treaty is confined to the Islands of the Pacific, but did you ever stop to think of what the Pacific is? Its waters wash about two-thirds of the earth and Great Britain and Japan claim all the islands in the Pacific. Let us not be fools, war is war and once started cannot be confined to any one spot, island or otherwise. Do we need any better proof of this than the last few years. The treaty


2 Ibid., December 17, 1931.
holds all the vices but none of the virtues of the League of Nations Covenant.1

In an interview for the Hearst newspapers Senator Reed was very strong in opposing the Four Power Pact and also in condemning President Harding, Secretary Hughes, and Senators Lodge and Underwood for their part in it. He went even further and accused these men of deliberately planning to deceive the American people.2

Senator Hiram Johnson of California doubted the wisdom of the treaty and begged the President and Senators to study it carefully before adopting it. He added:

There was universal approval of the original purpose of the Conference and substantial hope that armaments would be limited. Any results just to the participants lessening armaments will be cordially and enthusiastically welcomed. But because we favor disarmament and would make almost any sacrifice for peace is no reason why we must accept anything which may be tendered us in the secret name of peace or under the guise of disarmament. Out of the secrecy of the conference has come first an unexpected treaty, unrelated to the original purpose and unconnected in reality with the line of arms. The treaty is of transcendent importance to California and of only less importance to the nation. It should be carefully studied before we are committed to it.

We have been through one period of national hysteria and sentimental emotions over the League of Nations. ... Apparently the British-Japanese Alliance was the subject of discussions and Japan insisted if it was to be abrogated something as good must be found, and got something better.3

No doubt the most outspoken against the Treaty was the Hearst chain. The New York American saw in the Four Power

1 New York Times, December 17, 1921.
2 New York American, December 18, 1921.
3 San Francisco Examiner, January 5, 1922.
Treaty:

Not an agreement for peace but a "waf" breeder, and the ratification by the Senate would mean the surrender of our old safeguards and the acceptance of partnership with the only three imperialisms and militarisms left in the world England, France and Japan. To go into partnership with these international highwaymen is to become a usurer of their stolen goods -- to pledge our military, naval, and financial help to the thieves whenever the rightful owners of the goods try to regain their property, is a disgrace.

Senator Reed of Missouri has called the new treaty "treacherous, treasonable, and damnable". It is all that. It is nothing more or less than a proposition to refer our rights to a tribunal of four in which we have but one voice.1

The fact that nothing definite was done about the Japanese in Siberia and Manchuria brought more unfavorable comment. The San Francisco Examiner said: "The United States representatives have been satisfied with the mere statement from Tokyo that Japan would leave Siberia. The people of Russia have looked to the Washington Conference for relief from the Japanese yoke."2

Speaking of the Siberian question the New York Times said:

Secretary Hughes recalls Japan's past promises to withdraw from Siberia but the Tokio delegates offer no further commitment. This is seen as a victory for Tokio. The complete victory of the Japanese diplomats in the Siberian issue brings the end of the Washington Conference nearer.3

The Conference adjourned February 6, with most of the papers taking the attitude that Japan had made the most

1 New York American, January 8, 1922.

2 San Francisco Examiner, January 25, 1922.

substantial gains in the conference. They were generally of
the opinion that Japan would retain her "strategic supremacy",
military and political on the continent of Asia.

Mr. Elmer Davis in a discussion of the results of the
Conference in the New York Times said that in three months
none of the nine participating nations would be any worse
off than when they entered, but that the chief gains would
go to Japan. Mr. Davis wrote:

As the score stands at present, it seems hardly too much to
say that this Conference has been the greatest success in
Japanese diplomatic history. Japan has won more at other
conferences but always at the expense of hard feelings left
behind. ... Between Japan and the United States the feeling is
better than three months ago. ... Naval rivalry at least in capital ships is stopped.
That rivalry was a source of much ill-feeling and it was a
competition in which Japan was to be distanced very soon.
The Four Power Treaty ought to remove much suspicion of
America and much American suspicion of Japan. ... Much of the important provocations that might lead to
troubles have been removed. Japan retains her strategic
position, a supremacy, military and political, on the con-
tinent of Asia, and is reasonably sure that if that suprema-
cy should ever be challenged by Russia or China, Russia or
China would fight alone.1

Mr. Norman H. Davis, former under-Secretary of State
and now American Ambassador at large for the United States
was somewhat less favorable to the treaty. Mr. Davis pointed
out:

The last war involved the whole world, including the United
States; it grew out of issues primarily European, with which
we are not supposed to be at all concerned. After that ex-
perience how is it possible to believe that questions in the

1 Literary Digest, Vol. 72, February 18, 1922, 9.
Pacific Ocean merely concern the United States, Japan, England, and France? ... Other nations equally interested in the Pacific were ignored at the outset by not being invited to join. Any alliance composed of powerful nations which ignores or violates the rights and claims of weaker nations would be repugnant to the fundamental and historical American principles of freedom, equality and justice.

Mr. Davis' criticism was widely quoted by the opposition during the Senate debates on the treaty. The debates in the Senate became very heated at times as the various treaties came up for ratification. The opposition, although clearly in a minority, furnished most of the forensic fireworks.

The motivating spirit of the opposition was well expressed by Senator Watson of Georgia who declared:

American Independence was won on the battlefield. ... It is worth preservation, and I do not believe that any considerable people of the country are willing that our independence should be surrendered by statesman here in the Senate, and surrendered to and surrendered in part to the most peridious nation on earth—Japan!

The biggest battle over any of the Washington treaties came on the Four Power Treaty. Many veteran and well known Senators fought it. The California Senators, Johnson and Shortridge, were divided, Johnson opposing it and Shortridge voting for it. Senator Johnson stated:

I recognize fully the peculiar psychology with which we have to deal today, and I sympathize wholly with the yearning of all good people who desire to forever put an end to the horrors of war. I do not oppose and never have opposed consultation among nations. I am unable to understand why if we seek consultation we do not plainly say so. ...

Instead of conference and consultation the treaty before

1 Congressional Record Vol. 62, Part 3, 2928.
2 Ibid., 3012.
us provides for the maintaining of territory and meeting aggression. ... With the past so indelibly stamped in my memory, with my knowledge of the world situation, a knowledge perhaps greater than that of many of my constituents, I cannot by my vote take my country into a partnership with other nations which will inevitably lead us into unknown perils and do just that against which we so vigorously fought. The dangers, aye, the consequences, of just such agreements as the one under consideration are written in all the bloody pages of history. I oppose this present treaty which would carry us into a pact no stronger than that which carried us into the World War.  

Senator Borah denounced the treaty in much the same view. He declared that its obligations were obnoxious and as binding as those embodied in Article X of the League of Nations.  

Senator Colt on the other hand upheld the treaty. He declared that it was a measure not for foreign entanglement but for the purpose of preserving peace in the Pacific.  

Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin went so far as to say that if the treaty were defeated it meant war.  

The Four Power Treaty was finally ratified with sixty-seven votes in its favor, twenty-seven votes against and two not voting. Recorded in opposition were such prominent Senators as Johnson, California; Borah, Idaho; Glass, Virginia; France, Maryland; La Follette, Wisconsin; Reed, Missouri; 

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 62, Part 5, 4306.  

2 Ibid.  

3 Ibid., 4309.  

4 Ibid.
Leaders of the majority which voted to ratify the treaty were such influential spokesmen as Senator Lodge, Massachusetts; Underwood, Alabama; and Watson of Indiana.

When the treaty regarding fortification of the islands in the Pacific was brought up Senator Johnson of California felt it was wrong for us to not fortify the Philippines when Singapore and many other islands were to be fortified. However he said he would yield his personal views and vote for the treaty in the hope that it might in some way be an aid to the peace of the world.  

During the debates upon the various treaties many amendments were proposed. In every case however, ratification was secured without significant alteration. The Senate in spite of the strong minority opposition was determined to uphold the delegates to the Arms Conference. In each case the necessary two-thirds vote was ultimately forthcoming.

The opinion seemed rather general that with all its faults the Arms Conference of 1922 had served to improve American-Japanese relations and that it had at least slowed up the armament race in certain of the heavier types of fighting craft. After the treaties were duly ratified by the several nations, they were accepted as a definite step toward world peace.

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 63, Part 5, 4330.

2 Ibid., 4707.
CHAPTER VII

JAPANESE EXCLUSION

It will be recalled that the first battle over Japanese immigration had been fought during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt. This struggle had ended in the adoption of the "Gentleman's Agreement", whereby Japan agreed voluntarily to refuse passports to coolie laborers seeking to emigrate to the United States. This settlement was frankly a compromise, and like most compromises, was not wholly satisfactory to either nation. However, the land law agitation and the distracting influence of the World War served to keep the immigration question in the background for more than a decade. It was not until about 1920 that there arose a determined drive for the revision of the "Gentleman's Agreement", with total exclusion as the immediate goal.

Mr. McClatchy of the Sacramento Bee was one of the leaders in this new drive for exclusion. Mr. McClatchy stated to the Immigration Committee that he had official figures from the Japanese Agricultural Society which showed that Japanese holdings were now 427,029 acres, an increase of 400% in ten years, while the crop value had risen to six million in 1919.

The publication of these figures in the McClatchy papers served to fan the flames of indignation against the Japanese
in California. Governor Stephens insisted on formally presenting a copy of the findings to Secretary of State Colby. Specifically, state officials demanded a stricter guard over the Mexico border, close regulation of Japanese fishing launches in southern California and the outright exclusion of Japanese from immigration.

At Tacoma, Washington, at a meeting of the Anti-Japanese League of the Veterans of the Foreign Wars and the American Legion, Major Bert O. Ross of Seattle demanded absolute exclusion of Japanese and the denial of American citizenship to American-born Japanese. He also made the charge that hundreds of Japanese entered this country on passports in violation of the agreements.

During the summer of 1920 the House Immigration Committee announced that it had definitely located an underground system on the Pacific Coast by which thousands of Japanese were smuggled into the United States. Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington, Chairman of the Committee, announced:

We have found that the underground system begins in Yokohama, thence to Honolulu, extending across the Pacific to Guaymas on the Gulf of California and from this point are smuggled by various ways into the United States. When in the United States he is taken by the Japanese Association to the bank and his credit established. Then he hides in the vineyards for five years. When he comes out and is questioned by officials he takes the authorities to the banks and establishes his bona fide residence of five years. We find records of the association very confusing.1

1 Stockton Independent, August 3, 1920.
This statement by the chairman of the Immigration Committee proved to be an entering wedge in the drive for outright exclusion.

Papers in all parts of the United States ran headlines on this underground system of smuggling in Japanese. The various labor organizations again increased anti-Japanese agitation, this time insisting that it was unfair competition rather than race prejudice which motivated their opposition.

This year of 1920 was a presidential year. Efforts were made to get a statement from both major candidates as to their attitude on the Japanese situation. Since many eastern newspapers were thoroughly opposed to the idea of exclusion the candidates were placed in a difficult position.

One paper strongly opposed to exclusion was the Philadelphia Inquirer which says:

Japanese exclusion placing Japan in the same class with China is absolutely inadmissible, for such procedure would be tantamount to a declaration of war, and the American people are certainly not going to go out of their way to pick a quarrel with the Japanese or anyone.

The New York World took a similar attitude and said:

In all its length and breadth California embraces no more law-abiding citizens and industrious people than its Japanese inhabitants. ... Somehow we feel it difficult to become excited over the prospect of eighty-seven thousand Japanese submerging more than three million whites even of the California variety.

1 Philadelphia Inquirer, July 26, 1920.

With this background in the east and quite an opposite background of opinion in the west the presidential candidates were compelled to choose their words carefully. Mr. Harding, the Republican candidate, sought to conciliate western sentiment by asserting:

The nation owes it to the Pacific Coast States to stand behind them in necessary measures consistent with our national honor to relieve them of their difficulties.

The problem incident to racial difference must be accepted as one existing in fact and must be adequately met for the future security and tranquillity of our own people. No one can tranquilly contemplate the future of the Republic without an anxiety for abundant provision for admission to our shores of only the immigrant who can be assimilated and thoroughly imbued with American spirit.

I favor such modification of our immigration laws and such changes in our international understandings and such a policy relating to those who come among us as will guarantee to this Republic not only the assimilability of alien born, but the adoption by all who come of American standards, economic and otherwise, and a full consecration to American practices and ideals.¹

The San Francisco Examiner commented most favorably on Mr. Harding's remarks on the Japanese question. This paper believed that the Republican candidate realized it was an economic as well as a racial problem and that he really was an exclusionist.²

The San Francisco Bulletin in its issue of October 2, 1920, claimed that Mr. Cox was equally strong in his advocacy of exclusion. So far as the Pacific coast was concerned both parties sought to make political capital from the

¹ Literary Digest, Vol. 67, October 9, 1920, 15.
² San Francisco Examiner, September 10, 1920.
exclusion issue.

It is not necessary to take up in detail the development of exclusion sentiment during 1921, 1922, 1923. The arguments upon both sides were largely a repetition of those which had gone before. It was noticeable that even in the eastern part of the country, exclusionist sentiment was growing.

Even the Outlook, which had previously taken a distinctly pro-Japanese attitude, was willing to admit that:

The question whether the American people will abandon their aversion to race mixture is for the present at least academic. There is no prospect of any change in their point of view on the subject. If anything appears to be certain it is the determination of the American people to prevent masses of people of the yellow and brown races from flooding our western states. They have shown that determination by acts excluding the immigration of Asiatic peoples. ..., The United States and Japan can respect each other in no better way than by each respecting the other's rights to define its own citizenship.¹

One of the important questions to be decided by Congress in the spring of 1924 was that of immigration. The country as a whole realized that in the immigration bill something would be said regarding the Japanese exclusion but just how would Congress handle it?

The chairman of the Immigration Committee was Representative Johnson of Washington. On this same committee was Representative Baker of California. With these veterans on the Committee, (each had served twelve or more years) the country could be pretty sure something definite as to Japanese

¹ The Outlook, Vol. 132, November 29, 1922, 555.
exclusion would be taken up.

The Immigration Bill became known as the "Johnson Bill." The main purpose of this bill was to establish the quota system of immigration restriction applying to all immigrants except those from North and South America. However, the part which concerns us in this study is the section of the Johnson Immigration bill directly aimed at the Orientals, particularly the Japanese, though no mention is made of either. Section 120 of the original House bill reads:

"No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless such alien is admissible as a non quota immigrant, (as the wife or unmarried child under eighteen years of age)." ¹

The Johnson Immigration bill brought an immediate protest from Secretary of State Hughes. He claimed that the bill singled out the Japanese for "exclusion" and that the passage of such a bill would be inconsistent with the treaty of 1911. Secretary Hughes added, "I believe such legislative action would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments which had so greatly improved our relations with Japan." ²

The Secretary of State said he would have preferred that a quota for Japanese be worked out rather than total

¹ Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 6, 6248.
² San Francisco Chronicle, February 14, 1934.
exclusion and he expressed the belief that Japan would aid us in enforcing such a quota. He further stated that such an arrangement involving a double control over the Japanese would result in less than two hundred a year to come in, (the amount to be based on 2% of the census of 1890) and this would accomplish a much more effective regulation of the non assimilative and undesirable classes of Japanese immigrants than it would be practicable for us with our long land frontier line on both north and south, to accomplish by attempting to establish a general bar against Japanese subjects without the cooperation of the Japanese Government. Secretary Hughes summed up the opinions of the administration by saying:

I am unable to perceive that the exclusion provision is necessary and I must strongly urge upon you the advisability in the interest of our international affairs of eliminating it. The Japanese Government has already brought the matter to the attention of the Department of State and there is the deepest interest in the attitude of Congress with respect to this matter.¹

In spite of the Secretary of States protest, the oriental exclusion clause seems to have caused surprisingly little comment in the House at the time of original passage. The chief discussion came later in the consideration of a relatively unimportant Senate amendment. The original House bill had not set any specific date for the exclusion provisions to become effective, but the Senate had inserted

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, February 14, 1934.
a qualifying proviso that, "this subdivision shall not take
effect until March 1, 1925, before which time the President
is requested to negotiate with the Japanese Government in
relation to the abrogation of the present arrangement."
(referring to the "Gentleman's Agreement").

This amendment would mean that from July 1, 1924 (when
the House bill would otherwise have gone into effect) to
March 1, 1925 some eighty Japanese would have to be admitted
under the quota system.

At the time when the House was about to consider the
changes suggested by the Senate, Ambassador Hanihara, sent
a formal letter to the Secretary of State, again protesting
pending legislation on immigration which he insisted singled
out the Japanese. The following is the body of the Japanese
Ambassador's letter which was to be such a powerful factor in
the debate on exclusion which followed in both houses of
Congress.

The "Gentleman's Agreement" is an understanding with the
United States government by which the government of Japan
voluntarily undertook to adopt and enforce certain adminis-
trative measures designed to check the immigration to the
United States of Japanese laborers. In return the Japanese
Government confidently trusts the United States Government
will recommend if necessary to Congress to refrain from re-
sorting to a measure that would wound the proper susceptibili-
ties of the Japanese nation.

... It is indeed impossible for my Government and people
and I believe it would be impossible for those of your people
who had made a careful study of the subject to understand why
it is necessary for your country to enact as the law of the
land such a clause as section 12c of the House Immigration
bill. ... The manifest object of 12c is to single out Japan
as a nation, stigmatizing them as unworthy and undesirable in
the eyes of the American people. And yet the actual result of the proposed bill if it becomes a law would be to admit only one hundred forty-six Japanese a year. ... Relying upon the confidences you have been good enough to show me at all times, I have stated or rather repeated all this to you very candidly and in a most friendly spirit, for I realize, as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between the two countries. Accept sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

M. Hanihara.1

As will be shown subsequently, this admonition produced a wave of indignation in the Senate. For some reason, the House appears to have reacted less emotionally. There ensued in the House a searching and comparatively rational discussion of the exclusion policy. One of the members very much opposed to the policy of exclusion was Representative Griffis of New York who felt:

Section 12 should never have been written. If the agreement of 1907 has not been lived up to, so will this statute be evaded. ...

Immigration is a domestic question until you begin to discriminate between nations. Exclusion should be handled diplomatically. ... I am not in favor of admitting Japanese to citizenship, but I do not think this Immigration bill corrects the difficulties.2

Another member of the House very much opposed to the exclusion clause was Representative La Guardia of New York who felt the bill was not an immigration bill at all saying, "Instead of basing it on logic and economic conditions of

1 Congressional Record. Vol. 65, Part 6, 7289.
2 Ibid., 8245.
the country you have based it on passion, religious hatred, and racial prejudice."1

Representative Longworth of Ohio likewise declared: "Japan went farther than others in the meetings at the Disarmament Conference in meeting us half way, should we not meet them with a similar manner in this case?"2

These remarks by the leaders of the opposition in the House brought an immediate reply from Representative Johnson of Washington, "We pride ourselves that this bill treats all nations alike. We have not picked out a single nation for assault by the United States. Certain people are not eligible to citizenship. We have a Supreme Court decision to that effect, and now we are trying to get our laws adjusted in harmony with that fact".3

Representative Moore of Virginia and Representative Box of Texas were strong advocates of the exclusion policy. Their arguments were that the Negro had been a black cloud over the South for years and surely the Japanese would become a yellow cloud on the West, if allowed to grow.4

There was much argument over the amendment setting March 1, 1925, as the effective date of exclusion.

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 6, 8245.
2 Ibid., 8230.
3 Ibid., 8246.
4 Ibid., 8228.
Representative Raker of California informed the House that the President would sign the bill provided that clause remained. 1

Representative Longworth pointed out that the West had really won their long fight and surely a little delay would not injure anyone but might help diplomatically.2

The final vote in the House on the amendment respecting the time of enforcement was: yeas 189 - nays 170 - not voting 69. The final vote on the Immigration Bill was yeas 323 - nays 71 - 41 not voting.3

An analysis of the House reveals certain definite sectional tendencies on the exclusion issue. All of the western states including Colorado, New Mexico and the Rocky Mountain region were for exclusion. On the whole the South was also very sympathetic to the principle of exclusion. Several of the Middle Western states especially Missouri, Kansas, Illinois, and Indiana also gave exclusionist majorities. Michigan and Ohio were rather divided on the question; while the chief opposition to exclusion came from New York, Pennsylvania, and the New England states.

The greatest battle over exclusion took place in the Senate. This is particularly true for several reasons,

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 6, 8229.
2 Ibid., 8330.
3 Ibid., 8322.
first, the two California Senators were particularly determined on the subject of exclusion; second, the serious effort was made in the Senate to place the Japanese on a quota basis; and third, the letter of the Japanese Ambassador which I have quoted seemed to antagonize the Senators more than the House; it also gave both Senators Shortridge and Johnson a new weapon to wield in influencing votes and working up public opinion toward exclusion.

When the exclusion bill was first presented to the Senate there was considerable sentiment for changing it in favor of the quota system. An amendment to that end was introduced, and appeared to have a good chance for adoption. Then came Ambassador Hanihara's letter and immediately the temper of the Senate changed. One Senator after another arose to denounce the "veiled threat" implied in the phrase "grave consequences". Typical of the prevailing antagonism were the remarks of Senator Moses of New Hampshire who stopped Senator Shortridge in the midst of a speech to observe:

May I inquire of the Senator why he repeatedly uses the words "veiled threat"? The Senator knows perfectly well that in the compiling of diplomatic communications "grave consequences" are not veiled. ...

The letter of the Ambassador, Mr. President, has created a situation which makes it impossible for me to support the pending amendment. This amendment1 has now assumed the dignity of a precedent and I never will consent to establish any precedent which will give a nation the right to think they can stop by threat or compliment the action of the United

1 The amendment here, referred to was the one proposed in the Senate to place Japanese immigration upon a quota basis.
States when it determines who shall come to its gates and become a part of its citizenship. That is a decision which belongs to the United States alone and from that there can be no appeal.1

The expression of Senator Reed of Pennsylvania who was in charge of the amendment on the floor was:

I think I speak the feeling of the entire Committee on Immigration when I say that the last thing we had in mind was to do offense to the Japanese, and one of our purposes in putting this amendment in was to recognize the "Gentleman's Agreement". Now, however, I am speaking for myself alone, I think the situation has changed. I think it ceases to be a question whether this is a desirable method of restricting the Japanese, the Ambassador puts the unpleasant burden upon us of deciding whether we will permit our legislation to be controlled by apprehension of "grave consequences" with other nations if we do not follow a particular line of legislative conduct.

I, for one, feel compelled on account of the "veiled threat" to vote in favor of the exclusion and against the committee amendment.2

Senator Swanson of Virginia said, "I have great respect for the Japanese as a people and for Japan as a nation, but I for one shall never consent that our immigration problem shall be settled by an outside country".3

Senator Sterling of Nebraska objected to the turn the discussion was taking. He said:

I want to express my regret that this discussion should turn on the question of a letter from the Japanese Ambassador to this country. If we are going to exclude Japanese immigrants let us do so because it is the right thing. Let's not make the Ambassador's letter a pretext. I cannot agree that this

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 8, 3332.

2 New York Times, April 15, 1924.

3 Ibid.
letter is an abrogation.

In spite of this plea, it quickly became clear that the Senate situation had been greatly changed by the Ambassador's protest.

Arthur S. Henning, one of the most competent of the Washington correspondents, reported:

A week ago there was only a small minority in favor of Japanese exclusion. Then the letter of Ambassador Hanihara was published as well as read in both Houses of Congress. This stirred up a great deal of indignation and made votes for the exclusion provision. It was felt that the Ambassador was butting into a matter that was no business of his or his government and the tone of his threats offended the Senators and altogether produced an unfortunate result. Consequently I should not be surprised if the Senate passed the exclusion provision.

This prediction was verified by the event. The quota amendment was rejected by the overwhelming vote of 76 - 2. Shortly after, the exclusion amendment was adopted without a dissenting vote. Finally on April 18, the immigration bill as a whole was passed by a vote of 62 to 6. The bill next went to the conference committee to iron out the differences between the two houses. There a final effort was made by the administration to modify the exclusion clause. This

1 *New York Times*, April 15, 1924.

2 *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 14, 1924.

3 Ibid., April 15, 1924.

4 Ibid., April 16, 1924.

5 Ibid., April 17, 1924.
effort was without avail, and the measure went to the President with the exclusion clause unchanged.

Strong pressure was brought to bear upon President Coolidge to veto the entire bill on account of the exclusion clause. Viscount Ishii called on Poincare in Paris asking him to use his influence to prevent the passage of the exclusion bill. The French Government refused to have anything to do with the affair.¹

Strong protests against the exclusion policy were also made by such Americans as Jane Addams of Chicago, Executive Secretary of the Women's Institute League for Peace and Freedom, and Arthur Deering Call, Secretary of the American Peace Society and the National Council for the Prevention of War. Various religious organizations likewise urged the President to veto the bill.²

The advocates of exclusion likewise brought strong pressure to bear on the president in behalf of the bill. State Senator J. M. Inman of California sent a telegram to President Coolidge strongly urging him to sign the Immigration Bill and to see that it was not weakened in conference. This telegram read:

I believe the Pacific Coast States and I am sure California is deeply and vitally interested in watching developments at

¹ New York Times, April 28, 1924.
Washington. I feel sure the people of California would deeply resent any capitulation to Japan. I am safe in saying the people of California are looking to you to bring an end to the long struggle for white supremacy. California asks protection against this menace at the hands of its president. Congress has spoken in no uncertain terms. Let this verdict stand.¹

The Hearst and McClatchy papers also sought to mobilize public opinion in favor of the presidential approval. Other influential organizations such as the American Legion, Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, and the California Federation of Women's Clubs joined in this movement to secure favorable executive action.²

Because of the pending presidential election, it was necessary for President Coolidge to act cautiously. His cabinet was divided on the question. Favorable to exclusion were Hoover, Secretary of Commerce; Wilbur, Secretary of Navy; Davis, Secretary of Labor; Weeks, Secretary of War; Work, Secretary of Interior; and New, Post-Master General.³ On the other hand the following cabinet officers very much opposed to exclusion: Hughes, Secretary of State; Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury; Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture; and Stone, Attorney General.⁴

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, April 30, 1924.
² San Francisco Examiner, May 2, 1924.
³ New York Times, May 1, 1924.
⁴ Ibid.
Finally on May 26, President Coolidge signed the Immigration Bill with this statement, "If the exclusion stood alone, I should disapprove it without hesitation if sought in this way at this time. ... I must therefore consider the bill as a whole and the important need for legislation of the general character".¹

President Coolidge in his acceptance speech on August 14, 1924, again referred to the Immigration Bill. As there had been considerable resentment on the Pacific Coast to his remark in signing the bill, he perhaps felt a further statement necessary to clarify his position. He said:

I should have preferred to continue the policy of Japanese exclusion by some method less likely to offend the sensibilities of the Japanese people. I did what I could to minimize any harm that might arise. But the law has been passed and approved, the incident is closed. We must seek by some other means than immigration to demonstrate our friendship for Japan. Restricted immigration is not an offensive but a defensive action. It is not adopted in criticism of others in the slightest degree, but solely for the purpose of protecting ourselves. We cast no aspersions on any race or creed, but we must remember that every object of our institutions and government will fall unless America be kept for Americans.²

The attitude of the press toward the exclusion act ranged from bitter condemnation to whole hearted approval.

The Philadelphia Public Ledger said:

This protest of Japan is restrained and dignified. It is the voice of a friend protesting against unfriendly action and a note of sorrow and hurt pride runs through this legal

¹ San Francisco Chronicle, May 27, 1924.

² California Joint Immigration Committee, Pamphlet, Acceptance Speech of Calvin Coolidge, August 14, 1924.
argument. We are reminded that the treaty of 1911 gave liberty of entry, travel, and residence to the people of both nations and that this has been supplemented fully and satisfactorily by the "Gentleman's Agreement". We are told that all the friendly efforts of the last sixteen years have been wasted. We are shown what everyone in America knew, that we were needlessly outraging Japanese pride. Japan has been willing and is still willing to revise the "Gentleman's Agreement" and further reduce the number coming to America. She does not challenge our right to make our own immigration policy, but she reminds us that other nations have rights and other nations have pride. She does challenge an action that has lowered her prestige in the Far East, where prestige is vital. 1

The Chicago Journal declared:
Leaving aside all the rhetoric and bombast which seem to befog the question on the other side of the Pacific; Japanese leaders have pinned their case to a contention that does not lack merit. They have what is virtually a treaty in the so-called "Gentleman's Agreement". The law just passed and signed by the President tears up the "Agreement". A bargain between two nations is nullified by the legislation of one of them. Any nation might object to that.2

The Brooklyn Times however said, "The Japanese protest must be taken with a grain of salt".3

New York Times said, "On merely technical and legal grounds, Japan's 'solemn protest' is not able to make out a conclusive case".4

The Washington Post said:
The United States Government has acted in obedience to

1 Literary Digest, Vol. 81, June 14, 1924, 8.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
the national will in excluding Japanese immigration. However unfortunate the motive, or the method employed it is an act that can not be undone, and it is a policy that will not be modified, no matter how serious may be the interruption of good relations between two countries. The continued influx of Japanese into the United States would be intolerable and would lead to grave consequences.\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{The Detroit Free Press} stated:

Certain parts of the Japanese propaganda seem to be for home consumption. The so-called "pride" which the Japanese are exploiting in their protest is the pride of a spoiled child. The Japanese complain because they are getting a little taste of the very medicine they have been handing out to others, notably the Chinese, Koreans, and in some degree to all foreigners including Americans. The Japanese are deepening an impression that the methods Congress adopted in dealing with them were the only methods that could be used.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{The Boston Transcript} said:

We are exercising an absolute and inherent national right in excluding their laborers as immigrants. In doing so we are exercising a restriction which we make quite general. That is all there is to the situation, and it must not be supposed either that we shall abandon the right or that any serious attempt will be made from any quarter to force us to abandon it.\textsuperscript{3}

One of the by-products of the Exclusion Act was a decided flurry of war talk. This as usual was most prominent in certain newspapers of the more sensational type. The Hearst papers were particularly loud in announcing the dangers of an immediate war. Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Literary Digest}, Vol. 81, June 14, 1924, 9.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 10.
made public a letter to Secretary Wilbur which sounded the keynote of this agitation. His letter spoke of the need of preparedness for the impending conflict. Admiral Fiske then went on to say:

... We believe that Japan would like to own the Philippines, we believe that Japan would like to take the Philippines, if ever the resentment of her people against us should reach a height sufficient to assure the Government of their support. ... Of course I do not mean to suggest that war is even possible, but nevertheless it may be pointed out that the Japanese and Americans have taken attitudes that are irreconcilable and that the Japanese have virtually broken off diplomatic relations by giving their Ambassador a vacation. Such acts and such attitudes usually precede wars.

It was from such letters as this and statements from persons in high authority which started the drive of war propaganda. An example of such a statement comes from Secretary of the Navy, Wilbur. While in California early in 1925, he asserted:

The navy is of particular importance to the Pacific Coast, not only because of the belief that the last acts of the drama of civilization will occur in and around the Pacific Ocean but because of the economic significance of the fleet on the Pacific Coast. ... It has been a great personal satisfaction to me to come down the coast with fourteen thousand sailors wearing the American uniform, in ships adequate for their own protection, and for the protection of our coasts, east and west from the aggression of any people influenced as all people may be, by some extension of the mob spirit, and some outbursts of passion and some real or fancied insult. There is nothing so cooling to a hot temper as a piece of steel.

The Nation which had quite an extensive editorial on

1 Nation, Vol. 120, March 25, 1925, 322.
2 Ibid., 323.
"Our War Advertising Campaign" felt it was a very serious and dangerous state of affairs and closed its editorial by saying:

Only a strong minded American can stand out forever under this continued pelting of assertions, hint and innuendo. But what this propaganda does to us is not the gravest cause of alarm -- it is its inevitable effect in awakening uneasiness and distrust not only in Japan but in the whole Orient.1

This war propaganda and jingo press comment was widely condemned by more responsible writers. The Hartford Times commented, "If President Coolidge can chill the Japanese and American militarists into silence and arouse the people against them he will have accomplished something upon which his administration can base claims for the full approval and gratitude of all civilized men".2

The New York Evening Post said:

Somewhere behind the fogbank of propaganda, sinister unseen hands are seeking to destroy the peaceful relations between this nation and Japan. There is always this perennial clamor that Japan is an enemy to be watched, distrusted, armed against, and finally fought. The task for America and Japan is to end this hysterical agitation of phantom issues and keep dead issues buried deep. The people of Japan must not be misled. There is no will in America to make war against them. Americans must not be deceived. Japan is right well and truly bearing herself as an honorable and peace loving nation should. The vicious circle of armament against armament and the inevitable war has been broken and must not be again inscribed. The dark forces in both Japan and America must be checked and driven back into their shadowy caverns of greed, ambitions, and hate.3

1 Nation, Vol. 120, March 25, 1925, 323.
2 Literary Digest, Vol. 84, January 3, 1925, 5.
3 Ibid., 6.
The Nation which had always been rather pro-Japanese felt there was great need to make Americans aware of the friendship of Japan and the national danger coming from our sensational jingo press. In an editorial called "Japan - Enemy or Friend" the Nation said:

We should like to help make America aware of the essential humanness of Japan as of all the other picturesque far-away nations — a nation of people very much like ourselves with militarists and imperialists in positions of power and a liberal movement struggling for expression, with labor and capital in bitter conflict. We should like to help the American people to understand the subtle propaganda which is poisoning their minds and building up here a conviction of inevitable hostility. Americans are too little aware of the forces at work. We should like the American people to realize in time that if war with Japan ever comes it will not come as a result of our immigration laws ... but as a by-product of a sordid scramble for the major share of the profits to be made out of exploiting China. Fair slogans shall be coined when the time comes and we shall be asked to make Asia safe for democracy, but traders, profiteers and concessionaires alone will profit. Let us see these things now, while it is still possible to stare facts in the face and we shall be cool to the hot emotion of the hour of crisis. Japan may become the bridge between the East and West — or it may lead to a great revolt of the East against exploitation by the West. Soviet Russia might be glad enough to join in such a program, Germany might see in it a possibility of release from her chains. Today we ostracize Japan and regard her with uniform suspicion. England is building at Singapore and we are playing war games in the Pacific, thereby strengthening the hand of the militarists in Japan rendering doubly difficult the slow task of the liberals. If instead of drifting along in such fatal policies we shape our minds for the preservation of a historic friendship we may remake the future of the Pacific. Japan offers us a convincing test of whether we really meant our catchword the "war to end war". ¹

¹ Nation, Vol. 120, March 25, 1925, 309.
Nevertheless the question is still not altogether dead. Many thoughtful Americans, even on the Pacific Coast, feel that a quota system might well be substituted for the present policies of rigid exclusion.

Perhaps the most active organization now working in behalf of the quota system is the Pacific Coast Council on Oriental Relations. The present officers of the council are L. W. Hartman, Portland, Oregon, Chairman; Samuel J. Hume, Berkeley, California, Executive Secretary. Each of the major Pacific Coast cities has its own local committee. The mouthpiece of this organization is a small paper called the Quota. The Council's chief objective is to eliminate the exclusion clause of the Immigration Law of 1924 and to substitute the quota system for Japan and China and possibly other Asiatic nations. The organization estimates that under the present quota provisions only one hundred eighty-five Japanese would be allowed to enter annually.

The argument advanced by the advocates of the quota system is that the evils of exclusion have far outweighed the benefits. They feel that exclusion has served to create international ill will to destroy American markets in the Far East, and to strengthen the hands of the Japanese military party. All this, they maintain is too great a price to pay for the privilege of keeping out one hundred
and eighty-five Japanese a year.¹

This may be taken as fairly representative of the more thoughtful opinion during recent years on the subject of Japanese immigration. It is not likely that this represents the view of a majority of the American people. Politicians, labor leaders, and most journalists seem entirely willing to let the issue rest. There seems no immediate prospect of any change in the present system of total exclusion. There is little doubt that recent developments in the Far East have served to alienate many liberals who were once friendly to the Japanese point of view.

¹ Summarized from recent statements:
Chester A. Rowell; Mr. Howard, Chairman of the Board of Scripps-Howard Newspapers; Chief Justice Chas. E. Hughes. Quota, July 1933.
President Sproul of U. C.; President Ray Lyman Wilbur Stanford University. Quota, October 1933.
President Knoles of the College of Pacific. Quota, November 1933.
CHAPTER VIII
RECENT JAPANESE - AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN THE FAR EAST

It is rather surprising how quickly anti-Japanese agitation died down in the United States after the enactment of the exclusion law of 1924. To judge from the columns of the daily press, American - Japanese relations would appear to have been upon an unusually friendly basis. A few of the more sensational papers at times felt it necessary to worry the American public over possible Oriental aggression. However, from 1926 to 1929 the United States was in a rather prosperous condition and the general public were not especially interested in war talk.

The Survey in 1926 expressed the opinion that the major issue between the United States and Japan was not immigration. In its opinion the big issue was the exploitation of China, the northern provinces in general and Manchuria in particular. The article went on to say:

The heart of the business is the exploitation of China. And what can the United States do about it? One of many things if anything at all.

The United States can give the Japanese a rather free hand on the mainland. That was the policy which President Roosevelt followed when he acquiesced in the annexation of Korea and the advance of the Sun banner in Manchuria. There is something to be said about it. The Japanese know the Orient better than American business men and if allowed to exploit the mainland will doubtless borrow more money and buy more goods in America than China at least in her present state.

There is the policy of bluffing which Secretary Knox
was inclined to favor.

There is the policy of righteousness. Shake the Japanese loose by war if necessary. That a reeks to paper strategists, a few concession hunters and some apostles of the higher life.

Loyal cooperation with the British in enforcing Nordic domination in the Orient and a division of the spoils of the joint enterprise. There is something Hindenburgian in that. London appears to be prepared for it, but our economical president does not seem to be able to discover any favorable balance in the ledger and it might be embarrassing to the missionaries in China.

The policy of working ourselves into a favorable position by playing Japan and Russia off against each other. Roosevelt did that with great finesse, but Coolidge shrinks from associating with the wicked Soviet Republic. Since there are sixty million Japanese against four hundred million Chinese it is felt that it might overshadow them. And the young Chinese who are trying to free their country from the foreigners' grasp are also trying to free it from the English and Americans as well.¹

In view of later developments this comment is of considerable interest. It was not, however, until the autumn of 1931 that the Far Eastern situation became one of vital concern to the American people. Then suddenly and without warning Japan struck. In rapid succession came the attacks on Manchuria, on Shanghai, on Jehol. The Japanese militarists were in the saddle and were riding hard, whither no one exactly knew.

Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities the Department of State announced that our policy would be one of strict and undeviating neutrality. However, it was stated officially that the United States, under treaties guaranteeing Chinese integrity, would disapprove permanent Japanese

occupation of Manchuria. The Japanese claimed that their troops would be withdrawn as soon as China could guarantee that Japanese life and property would be protected. From the very beginning, however, American public opinion was inclined to greet such professions with extreme skepticism.

The Washington correspondent of the San Francisco Chronicle wrote:

The Japanese deny they have been waging a war. Their occupation of Mukden, Augenchi and Tsitsihar and their whole thrust into the heart of the so-called Russian sphere of influence adjacent to the Chinese Eastern Railway are described as the inevitable result of the defensive measures which Japan had to take for protection of the lives and property of her citizens against Chinese soldiers and bandits. There may even be some new treaties with China which will seem to give political sanction to what Japan has done.

But when all these devices have passed into tortuous history of the Far East, Washington officials expect the one fact to stand out, that Japan is in Manchuria to stay.

Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has just blurted out in his candid way, what everybody else in Washington realizes but refrains from saying, "Japan is destined to dominate Manchuria because it is her national will and determination to do so", says Senator Borah. That is recognized to be the brutal truth. In Washington there are many foreign diplomats who know the Far East. What is now happening in Manchuria takes few of these men by surprise. They see it merely as an expected materialization of matured Japanese plans. One of these old world representatives recalls a conversation with Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Foreign Minister, a few years ago, during the time when China was in the midst of one of her chronic civil wars. The Occidental asked the Oriental statesman why Japan didn't seize the moment to consolidate her position in China, especially Manchuria. "Wait and see" was Shidehara's reply. Well the world now sees.

The Japanese withheld their hand until a time when Europe and America would be engrossed with matters more important than "Chinese integrity". Not only has the economic depression paralyzed the powers of enthusiasm for adventure on the other side of the globe, but Europe is immersed in such a mess of political turmoil, suspicion, and tension that Tokyo has little reason to fear opposition from the
The foregoing may be said to represent the prevailing reaction to the Japanese advance. It was fairly charged that Japan had had this Manchurian act well rehearsed and had patiently waited until the time was ripe to strike.

On January 7th the American government gave Japan official notice that it would invoke its treaty rights in the Far East and could not recognize any resulting regime impairing the "open door" policy, the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. The text of the note read:

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed.

The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan.

But in view of the present situation and its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments or agents thereof which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, independence or territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the "open door" policy and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties.2

1 San Francisco Chronicle, November 2, 1931.
2 San Francisco Examiner, January 8, 1932.
The prevailing reaction to this official statement was that we should have taken this step sooner. There was, however, no general agreement as to what we should do to enforce our position. A few Americans felt that the time had come to apply economic or even military sanctions in an effort to nip in the bud this serious threat to world peace. There were others who seemed to welcome the prospect of a war in the Far East as a way out of the depression. Others felt that the Stimson vote was merely a futile gesture, that Japan regarded these treaties "as mere scraps of paper" and would act accordingly.

Eugene Young, staff correspondent for the San Francisco Chronicle, in reviewing developments following the Stimson note said:

Many Americans have been asking in a cynical way what we are going to do about the Manchurian situation and what we can accomplish which the League of Nations could not. Under these circumstances it may be well to recall what this American policy of the "open door" and political and economic independence of China has done without any violent action on our part.

First, It prevented partition of China in 1899-1902 by the intervention of Secretary Hay.

Second, It prevented the absorption of Manchuria by Japan after the Japanese war by the intervention of President Roosevelt.

Third, Forced a modification of the twenty-one demands by Tokyo in 1915 through the intervention of President Wilson.

Fourth, Forced the admission by Japan that Manchuria was an integral part of China, and a promise by Tokyo to give up Shantung in 1922 through the intervention of President Harding.

Fifth, Forced Japan out of Siberia through the intervention
of Secretary Lansing and Hughes.

Sixth, Prevented intervention by the powers in China in 1927.

Seventh, Forced Japan to limit her activities when she took Shantung in 1928 and helped to force her out of that province again.

We have never done more than to assert our policy and be vigilant in upholding our rights. We have always been patient and in the end every nation that has tried to upset our doctrine has felt compelled to give way rather than to go to the extreme that would bring us into action.

Japan knows to her cost what it means to overthrow our policies. It is in the records that she spent over $300,000,000 to absorb Eastern Siberia after the World War only to give up in the end. How much the Shantung cost her is not revealed. All these losses are outside the Chinese boycotts. ...

Now we face Japan with a clear proposition. She has taken over Manchuria and she is insistent that a regime shall be set up there responsible to Tokyo and be guided by Japanese advisers. But we have served notice we will recognize no such regime. We will go right along on the basis that Japan has no business controlling territory or administration outside the railway zone. ... Friendship with the United States is necessary. Hard as the Chinese boycott has been on Japan a breach with this country would be worse.

Twenty-five per cent of her trade is with China and forty-two per cent with us. ... There will be attempts to frighten China into submission before it breaks the home front in Japan. But it is safe to say that whatever Japan does and wherever she goes she will have insistent reminders that the Nine Power fact is on the job and this will be a very discouraging factor even to her militarists.1

The idea of loss of faith in Japan and the intimation that she had not lived up to her word was very prominent in American opinion. The feeling was widely expressed that Japan by her action had forfeited the respect of mankind.

The attack on Shanghai was characterized as "Japanese

1 San Francisco Chronicle, January 17, 1932.
military efficiency gone mad. Little they care what the world may think. That is not their business. The bullet, the boycott and the bomb are their trade".1

The New York Times commented editorially and said:

The government spokesmen in Tokyo are anxious to have the world take note of a vital distinction between Manchuria and Shanghai. The Japanese reply to the peace suggestions declares bluntly that it is the settled policy not to accept neutral intervention in the Manchurian question. Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy would have public opinion in the United States understand that Japan looks upon Shanghai in an entirely different light from the Manchurian situation. Manchuria is a matter of life and death for Japan. "Shanghai is only a passing incident which we are anxious to close as soon as possible so we may withdraw our troops".

To this summary there is but one rejoinder. If it is true that Manchuria is a matter of life and death with Japan what is Japan doing in China? If it is true that Japan's action in Manchuria is justified by the laws of self-preservation what shall be said of a procedure that has progressively alienated a large body of foreign sentiment, which at the beginning was prepared to give Japan a fair hearing. After the first shock of the seizing of Mukden had worn off there was no inclination on the part of informed observers to accuse Japan of acting without reason, ...

This state of foreign comment began to change as the Japanese campaign in Manchuria expanded. ... But when we see the same hacking through methods brought into play at Shanghai for the purpose of suppressing a trade boycott the aspect of things changed. It must be plain to the authorities at Tokyo that Shanghai undermines their case in Manchuria. If this mailed fist is found operating at Shanghai which is only a "passing incident" it is hard to escape the inference that in Manchuria too the mailed fist has been swinging not because Japan has succumbed to a passion for delivering blows. At Shanghai the Japanese have done much to sap their position in Manchuria.2

The Washington Post said: "The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the Japanese Government is either...

1 San Francisco Chronicle, February 8, 1932.

overpowered by a war machine that is running amuck or deliberately pursuing a war policy of unparalleled audacity, with a curious inability to justify its course by a standard of right or law".  

The Washington News said:

The Shanghai crisis cannot be attributed to Japanese imperialism or anything else that connotes plan or thought. It is a case of plain madness. Certainly this Shanghai savagery cannot possibly profit the Japanese in any way. On the contrary it is turning the world against her. And far from ending a Chinese boycott it will make Chinese hatred of Japan in the future almost a religion. Japan has outlawed herself. That act carries its own retribution. No nation can live unto itself alone. Some day -- maybe in a month, maybe in a year, maybe longer -- Japan will come back and beg to be respected and trusted again. Then she will pay heavily for this madness. Then she will learn, as other nations have learned before her, that her militarists destroyed her.

Many well known Americans also attacked Japan for her attitude. Dr. Samuel Parkes Cadman, lecturer and radio minister praised Secretary Stimson and severely condemned Japan for her bombing of Chinese civilians in Shanghai. He said, "Japan claims she has not violated any treaty but did you ever find anyone guilty of aggressive methods actually to confess they had violated obligations. This is not the end for Japan".

Rabbi Louis Newman, lecturer and feature writer for the San Francisco Call-Bulletin said:

The United States can point the way to the settlement of a major international conflict without resorting to war on her own part, at the same time the peace loving liberals in Japan must take the power out of the hands of the military

2 Ibid.
3 *New York Times*, February 1, 1932.
caste. In the meantime the United States has the right to ask the nations of Europe to do nothing that will abet the military conspiracy of Japan. It is obvious that this country and Japan are drifting close to the brink of war.\(^1\)

Early in February, England and the United States, with the approval of France and Italy, offered a five point peace plan. It was generally conceded that if Japan refused this she would continue to lower her prestige in the eyes of the world. Also there seemed to be an indication that Japan might welcome a way to back out of China.

After this five point program was presented the Hearst papers began a series of editorials stating that the United States should stay out of entangling foreign affairs and we should not interfere with the Japanese and Chinese at Shanghai. Floyd Gibbons, a well known newspaper correspondent for the San Francisco Examiner and a representative for the Hearst papers in the Orient reinforced this viewpoint with a series of highly colored dispatches from Shanghai. The Nation took a similar view in an article called "Dynamite at Shanghai":

Japanese arrogance, encouraged by the treachery of Washington and Geneva to the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty has resulted in an explosion at Shanghai. It is now probably too late for diplomatic action. ... An attempt at this hour to invoke the Kellogg Pact or any other peace agreement, or to enforce an economic blockade, or to withdraw diplomatic recognition from Japan could hardly have any effect but to inflame still further the Japanese military leaders and their government in Tokyo, who have shown that they mean to do as they please in China, though in doing so they violate every treaty in existence and set the entire world at defiance. In any case the authorities at Washington have now taken the position that there is nothing left in the Far East worth saving, except American rights. They have sent a note to Tokyo not to remind the Japanese of their obligations under the various peace agreements nor yet to confront

\(^1\) *New York Times*, February 1, 1932.
them with the enormity of their crimes at Shanghai, but merely to insist that whatever happens in China the rights of the United States and its citizens must be observed, and to support the note they sent additional warships to China! Defense of our national rights though it means war, rather than defense of the peace of the world, has become our greatest concern. 

All the peaceful pressure Geneva and Washington could have brought to bear on the Japanese might not have served to restrain them. But the undeniable fact remains that neither the League of Nations nor the United States has taken a single sincere step toward saving the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty from destruction at the hands of the Japanese. They have lodged at Tokyo not one clear, direct and forceful protest. To this extent the Western Powers must be held morally responsible for the Japanese invasion of the Yangtze valley. ...

A united front at the beginning by the Western Powers, that is immediately after the capture of Mukden would have told another story. Then was the time to exert economic pressure, or to withdraw diplomatic recognition from Tokyo...

We can now only hope and pray that Washington will move with great tact in handling the Shanghai situation. ... We should withdraw completely from the troubled area, taking out all our citizens, troops, and warships. ... Our commercial treaty rights can be left to another day for consideration. ... It is too late to save the peace treaties, too late to prevent further Japanese aggression by peaceful persuasion, but not yet too late to save ourselves from being drawn into a Far Eastern war. In their present mood the Japanese militarists cannot be trusted. We can by our presence in China tempt them to turn upon us. We have only one course — to withdraw now and leave "American rights" to some future conference.1

The New Republic was another paper which warned that an economic boycott might easily end in war. This periodical declared:

Agitation for American cooperation with the League is rapidly gaining headway in the United States. A statement signed by Newton D. Baker, President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard and numerous others urges this policy. There is no reasonable doubt that Japan has violated not only the League Covenant but also that the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty to which this country is a party. ... In this country it is the

1 Nation, "Dynamite at Shanghai", Vol. 134, February 10, 1932, 156.
fashion to advocate a boycott as a substitute for war. Clearly no such distinction is recognized under the Covenant of the League. We are drifting toward a war with Japan, and those pacifists whose plan to safeguard peace is based on the League conception of sanctions constitute the principal force in that drift. The question before us is, ought we to fight Japan even as allies of the rest of the world in order to punish her?

The New Republic believes with all the force of its convictions that we cannot cooperate with the League in an effort to discipline Japan without going to war. Nor is it realistic to pretend that a boycott is a substitute for war in any case. ... It is indeed difficult for anyone with a sense of humanity to watch Japan pursuing her present policy without lifting a finger to prevent her. But there is not an argument that may be used for stopping her by violence which was not used for the same course against Germany. The fact that Japan's cause probably has less justice than Germany's has is not essential in this respect. In this case the basic economic situation of Japan is such that her present course can in the end lead only to disaster for herself. ... We cannot have a reliably peaceful world until nations are so organized and instructed that they seek the objectives which can be attained only through peace.1

The Washington Evening Post likewise asserted, "For the United States to go to war with Japan to prevent the seizure of China, or to compel its release if seizure were already affected would be monstrous injustice to the American people, a sacrifice of American lives and American treasure for which there would be no justification".2

Concerning the possibility of such a war, Mr. Erbaine of the Hearst papers admonished:

It is said this country would not tolerate another war: the big war is too close to us! That is inaccurate. Flags would fly, drums would beat, propaganda would spread, race hatreds would be invoked, "right or wrong my country" would be printed in the biggest type. And within a week he who would

1 New Republic, Vol. 70, March 2, 1932, 58.
today safely protest against war would be called a traitor unless he expressed a desire to wipe out the life of every enemy Asiatic.1

This warning, coming from one of America's most adept practitioners of propagandic journalism, was not to be treated lightly.

On February 23, 1932, Secretary of State Stimson addressed a significant open letter to Senator Borah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This letter, clearly intended for Japanese ears, bluntly accused Japan of violating the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg - Briand Pact. The public reaction to the Stimson letter was very favorable, but with a strong undercurrent of feeling that it had been too long delayed to be effective.

The Japanese saw rising against them the moral sense of civilization. Her flippantly defiant replies to foreign diplomatic notes put her in contempt of the court of world opinions. Her evident intent was to notify the other signatories to the Nine Power Treaty that she felt herself strong enough under existing conditions to carry out her program of aggression and other nationals would like it or lump it. Japan evidently looked on that as the last word.

But it was not the last word by any means. While the interested powers proposed no military action against Japan and even suggestions of economic boycott were discharged, the Japanese found themselves in moral quarantine. Secretary Stimson's letter was a yellow placard on Japan's front door.2

The Nation commented on Secretary Stimson's letter by saying:

Mr. Stimson is to be congratulated for that part of his

1 Literary Digest, Vol. 112, February 13, 1932, 6.

2 San Francisco Chronicle, March 1, 1932.
letter to Senator Borah which set at Japan's door the responsibility for having violated the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, though the letter does not mention Japan by name in this connection. "It is not necessary to inquire into the causes of the controversy or to attempt to portion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved," said Mr. Stimson. "But there is not a doubt in anyone's mind that he was speaking directly to Japan..." We sincerely hope that the section of the Stimson letter dealing with the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact will have the desired effect. But Mr. Stimson has again acted belatedly. Had he in his equivocal note of January 7th taken the position he has now assumed we might have been saved the bloodshed at Shanghai. Better yet, as we have repeatedly stated, had he taken as firm a stand immediately after the capture of Mukden in September it is entirely likely that the Japanese militarists would have been checked. The Japanese today are too excited to listen to reason, war fever has gotten the better of their usually calm judgment. This, Mr. Stimson himself recognized by addressing his statement of policy not to Tokyo directly, but to Senator Borah. In this he was undoubtedly wise.

Shortly after Secretary Stimson's open letter, the Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops from Shanghai. Many American papers expressed the belief that the stand of the United States government had helped to bring about the evacuation. There was also general agreement that Japan had gained nothing and lost much as a result of the Shanghai offensive. The prevailing feeling was that Japan could no longer be trusted in the family of nations. It was noticeable that Japan had completely alienated the liberal support which had once stood ready to take her part.

As military operations in the Far East gradually entered upon a period of quiescence, the question faded on the front pages of the American press. The advent of the

1 Nation, Vol. 134, March 9, 1932, 212.
Roosevelt administration served to divert public attention to questions of domestic policy. It was the obvious policy of the new administration to let well enough alone in the Far East. The Hoover doctrine of non-recognition was retained, but passively rather than actively. Then suddenly on April 18, 1934, the Japanese government exploded a diplomatic bombshell in the form of an official statement virtually proclaiming a Japanese protectorate over the entire Far East.

The official spokesman announced that Japan would use force if necessary to preserve peace in the Far East, and then declared:

Japan and Japan alone will determine whether efforts to help China really imperil peace. It is our responsibility. We must be the judge.

Where these principles conflict with treaties to which Japan is a party, the treaty will be respected, but there may be differences in the interpretation of the treaties.¹

This strong statement was immediately seized upon by the American press and diplomatic observers as constituting a Japanese Monroe Doctrine far surpassing even the broadest claims of our own Monroe Doctrine. It was felt that this represented the most startling announcement of Japanese policy since the twenty-one demands made on China in 1915.

The Stockton Independent was one of the few American papers which sought to justify Japan's Monroe Doctrine.

In an editorial entitled, "Why Not a Japanese Doctrine?"

¹ Stockton Record, April 18, 1934.
this paper observed:

Americans who express surprise on a "Monroe Doctrine for Asia by Japan", must remember our South and Central American brethren may not agree with us. To our southern neighbors Japan has as much right to assume protection for Asia as the United States has to adopt that prerogative for them.

It has long been a sore spot to the Central and Southern Americas that the United States should assume full responsibility for them. Japan's announcement that she will use force if necessary to maintain her stand is not much stronger than America's own attitude under its Monroe Doctrine.

So we in the United States may express shocked indignation at Japan's "effrontery", but we must remember that in Pan-American circles the same attitude has long existed toward us. 1

This type of comment was generally attacked both locally and in other sections. The opinion was expressed that the Monroe Doctrine of the United States and the one suggested by Japan were not at all comparable. It was pointed out that the United States had prevented European powers from colonizing Central and South America and thus allowed the maintenance of independent nations there while Japan had ruthlessly extinguished the independence of those regions where it had been able to make good its authority.

Chester Rowell, one of the most influential editors of the Pacific Coast, thus explained the difference between the two policies:

Japan has for years been trying to set up an analogy between the American Monroe Doctrine and Japan's aspirations to a protectorate of Asia. Even in unofficial conferences, Japan has often insisted on putting the Monroe Doctrine on the agenda, though it had no more direct relevance than the plebiscite on the Saar or the Polish corridor. The purpose

1 Stockton Independent, April 19, 1934.
was to manipulate Americans into a formulation of the Monroe Doctrine which might serve to shut our mouths from protesting against what was assumed to be similar action in Asia. ...

The Japanese proclamation, if the world wide understanding of it is correct, is to exactly the contrary effect. It is notice to Europe and America that the independence of China is not to be respected, and that any Western power which deals with it as an independent nation will have Japan to reckon with. Nothing could be more diametrically opposite to the Monroe Doctrine, as originally proclaimed by America. ...

Fortunately, the position of the Western nations is exceptionally simple. We do not have to tell Japan what to do. When we (including America) tried that, in the League of Nations, and Japan refused to do it, we found ourselves in a very embarrassing position. We had to do either more than we were willing, or else nothing at all. So we did nothing and Japan got away with it.

Now it is easier. All we have to do is to inform Japan that we regard the various treaties which we have signed as binding on us, and we propose to comply with them. We take it for granted (so we say) that Japan, having signed the same treaties, will likewise comply with them. Then, if Japan does not intend to do this, she will have to be the one to say so, to us, ...

We would be violating our obligations under those treaties, (signed by us), if we treated China otherwise than as an independent nation, if we sought or asserted any special rights or privileges there, or if we recognized any right of Japan (also a signatory to the same treaties) to do so. We are obligated, not to deny China help, but to extend that help in transforming its theoretical status into a working reality. We are required in the interval not to take advantage of the present situation in China. If any of us does so, the rest have agreed to consult what they will do about it.1

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., former Governor General of the Philippines, looked upon Japan's stand in the Far East as also one to be reckoned with in the Philippines.

He said:

The recent official statements of the Japanese, bring home a realization that the United States never has considered properly the international political status of the Philippines. American-Manila policies heretofore have been

1 San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1934.
dictated by national economics and sentiment. Americans, have ignored the dominating position of the Philippines in the trade routes of the Orient, a position no nation seeking Asiatic domination would overlook.¹

It was necessary that the United States government take some official cognizance of the Japanese pronouncement. Otherwise it might find its hands tied in some later crisis. Accordingly a note was dispatched to Tokyo, pointing out that Japan's self-asserted economic and political supremacy over China was a virtual violation of the Nine-power treaty. Japan was reminded that "treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them".²

Most of the major countries of Europe also reminded Japan of her treaty responsibilities and emphasized the importance of maintaining the "open door" policy.

Walter Lippmann felt that the State Department had handled the Japanese policy "very diplomatically". He wrote:

The administration has handled the Japanese declarations sincerely and quietly. It has followed the sound rule in diplomacy which is not to become excited by words and not to be drawn into a discussion of vague generalities about the future. ... No doubt exists of course, that the Japanese policy is what the spokesman said it was, however undiplomatic may have been his language. Japan intends to be the predominant power in the Far East and the arbiter of its destinies. What this is to mean to the future no one can now foresee. But it is a break with the assumptions of the past.

No one now knows what the Japanese policy really is, where the Japanese are going and what they intend to do. The Japanese themselves most certainly do not know. But they

¹ San Francisco Examiner, April 25, 1934.
² Ibid., April 30, 1934.
say frankly they will be the judges of what they must do and how far they must go, and that while they will respect our rights under the treaty of 1922 they and not the Western powers are to be the judges of China's rights.¹

The United States government, having placed a formal protest upon the record for future reference, took the attitude that the incident was closed. Both officials and general public, however, recognized that this was only a truce; that Japan had yielded absolutely nothing in its announced determination to dominate the affairs of Eastern Asia. The next Japanese move was awaited with suspicious interest. It came, early in 1935, with a new military drive for the strategic control of Mongolia. This development however falls outside the chronological confines of this study.

¹ Stockton Record, May 4, 1934.
As the event has proved, the Washington conference represented merely a truce in the race for naval armaments. Its first influence was to relieve the pressure of naval competition on both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It will be remembered, however, that the Washington Conference did not make any definite agreements concerning the submarine, light cruiser and airplane carrier craft. Before many years had elapsed, it became evident that the competitive spirit had been merely transferred to these categories -- that the building race was still going on. With these facts in mind President Coolidge invited the powers to another disarmament Conference to be held at Geneva in 1927. In calling this conference, President Coolidge suggested that:

The American Government for its part is disposed to accept, in regard to those classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty an extension of the 5-5-3 ratio as regards the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. ... Ratios for capital ships and aircraft carriers were established by treaty which would not be affected in any way by an agreement covering other classes of ships.1

England and Japan were quick to accept President Coolidge's proposal for a conference.

Many American editors enthusiastically hailed President Coolidge's invitation as a worthwhile step in the direction

1 Literary Digest, Vol. 92, February 28, 1927, 6.
of world peace. It was hoped that such a conference would make possible an agreement to complete the work of the Washington Conference. Nevertheless, there was considerable comment especially in the jingo press, definitely adverse to further naval negotiations. This was the view of the Chicago Tribune, which declared:

When the United States went into the Washington Conference it had something to offer. That was potential sea superiority. It had only to continue its building program to have the first navy in the world. The money to complete the ships was here. Competition meant broken taxpayers in Great Britain or any other country. We realized there were dangers in this position.

For good or bad the United States relinquished its position on the sea. It accepted the ratio which it gave to be in equal strength to Great Britain, and superior in strength to any other Power, and of its own volition it has maintained that position.

In a second conference it has nothing to give up unless Great Britain gave up more, or unless it wanted to further abandon the standing of the Washington Conference. ... The Tribune distrusts conferences in which American idealists meet European realists and this distrust is without any feeling against the realists.1

Mr. Hugh Gibson, American Ambassador to Switzerland and American chairman for the United States delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, presided at the opening of the Conference June 20, 1927. Mr. Gibson, defining American policies declared:

It is our desire to have a real naval limitation which would obviate the necessity for extensive building programs in the future, and we feel that we should therefore keep in mind these facts. The fixing of unduly high tonnage for various classes of auxiliary vessels would not be calculated to achieve this result.

We must not underestimate the difficulties of the task we have before us; but I feel we may approach it with optimism. We have none of us a right or interest to maintain a naval force which would constitute a threat to any one of us. We have every right to maintain a navy sufficient for

1 Literary Digest, Vol. 92, February 28, 1927, 7.
our legitimate requirements of national defense.\footnote{Literary Digest, Vol. 93, July 2, 1927, 7.}

It soon became evident that agreement would not be easy. The chief bone of contention was the question of large versus light cruisers. The United States with few naval bases, favored the large cruiser; while England, with abundant naval bases in all parts of the world wished to develop a smaller type of vessel. The presence of a large number of professional naval men and of naval lobbyists, such as Mr. Shearer, also worked against a successful agreement. Finally, after weeks of deadlock between the United States and Great Britain the Conference adjourned with no material accomplishment to its credit. It is interesting to note however that so far as the general public was concerned, the villain of the Geneva fiasco was Great Britain rather than Japan.

If anything came out of the Geneva Conference it was to create a feeling of hostility toward the British and perhaps ease our feeling toward Japan. The American press generally paid little attention to the Japanese demands in the conference. Indeed the conference itself evoked surprisingly little comment. It will be remembered that this was the summer preceding the 1928 election and the public was much more interested in possible presidential candidates.

Shortly after President Hoover’s inauguration in 1929
Hugh Gibson, who had presided at the Geneva Conference in 1927, made a speech before the League of Nations emphasizing the need for some definite strides toward world disarmament. As a result of this feeling which was shared by the other great naval powers the London Conference was convened on January 21, 1930. The King of England formally opened the Conference; Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, was the chief representative of the United States. Secretary Stimson in his opening speech said the real aim was to remove secrecy, rivalry, and mutual irritation which inevitably attend competition in armaments.¹

Very early in the conference the Japanese delegation showed its hand by announcing that unless she was given a seventy per cent ratio and America reduced her cruisers to 10,000 tons she would immediately leave the Conference. This forthright demand brought Japan into conflict with Great Britain, which was not anxious to strengthen the Japanese position in the Far East. Secretary Stimson is given the credit for smoothing things out and keeping the Japanese in the Conference.²

This Japanese demand, which was somewhat in the nature of a "Trial balloon," was not well received in the American press, especially the Hearst papers, which had always been


² Ibid., February 16, 1930.
quick to condemn Japan. Japan was characterized as determined to have her way or else act as a spoiled child.¹

Much time was spent discussing ratios, total tonnage, number of vessels and size of guns. Again as in 1927 the chief controversy was over the number and size of cruisers. Finally after several months of negotiations a treaty was signed between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. This treaty set a definite tonnage limit for the various classes of smaller warships on a ratio of approximately 10-10-7. The figures were set high enough so that no scrapping of vessels would be necessary, and provision was made for still further increases if non-treaty nations should adopt intensive building programs.

The signing of the treaty created little excitement in the United States. President Hoover declared the Conference had been a success and a decided step forward in securing world peace, and assurances of American parity in naval strength.²

The Nation was less optimistic. This periodical felt the worst joker was the elastic clause which allowed England to increase her program if France and Italy became too strong. This in turn would give Japan an excuse for building to keep her seventy per cent cruiser ratio. This would

¹ New York American, February 17, 1930.
² Literary Digest, Vol. 105, April 26, 1930, 8.
force the United States into an extensive building program.¹

The Literary Digest summed up the results of the Conference by saying:

But most important of all, it has been able to finally turn the tide of constantly increasing naval arms and the poison of suspicion and ill-will generated by constant naval rivalry. We have been able to create a situation where there is no inferiority or superiority in the naval strength of the United States.²

Henry Kittridge Norton writing for the New York Herald Tribune says of the Conference, "America got parity and limitation and even a metaphysical reduction. ... Japan bettered her ratios a bit and reserved still larger claims for the next conference".³

The treaty was signed on April 22, 1930, at London. The following day the delegates sailed for home. Secretary Stimson upon his arrival in Washington presented the treaty to President Hoover who in turn gave it to the Senate where it was referred to the proper committees. The Outlook describes the treatment of the London Treaty. Commenting, the Outlook said:

The Senate tossed the treaty back and forth between two operating rooms – the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Naval Affairs. ... Lest anyone conclude that the treaty really puts the United States at a disadvantage in its

¹ Nation, Vol. 30, May 28, 1930, 634.
² Literary Digest, Vol. 105, April 26, 1930, 8.
³ Ibid., May 3, 1930, 10.
relation to Japan or Great Britain it should be noted that eminent groups of Japanese and British hold that it puts their nations at a disadvantage with America.¹

Since the Senate took no action on the treaty during the regular session of Congress President Hoover called a special session for July 2, 1930. Up to this time there had been really very little excitement either over the treaty as a whole or over the provisions relating to Japan.

When Congress convened President Hoover made a plea for the adoption of the treaty. The President made a comparison of the fleets of Japan, Great Britain and the United States, and said that under the London Treaty the comparison was United States 100, Great Britain 102.4, Japan 63.6. He went on to explain the savings to the taxpayers and also stated that we had real parity because of sizes of guns to be used.

He continued his message saying:

The question before us now is not whether we shall have a treaty with three or more eight inch guns. ... It is whether we shall have this treaty or no treaty. It is a question as to whether we shall move strongly toward limitation and reduction or shall enter upon a disastrous period of competitive armament. ... This treaty has been favorably reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Every solitary fact which affects judgment upon the treaty is known, and the document itself comprised the sole obligations of the United States. If we fail now the world will be again plunged backward from its program toward peace.²

One of the ardent backers of the treaty was Senator Swanson of Virginia. He announced to the Senate before he

² Congressional Record, Vol. 73, 10.
began that his speech was to place before the group the importance of this treaty to the peace of the world, therefore he would not yield to anyone until he had completed his remarks. He wanted no one to feel offended but all must hear him to the finish. He gave a very vivid picture of the delegations, the negotiations and triumphal finish. He said that under the London Treaty the American Navy was large enough to defend the country and enforce the Monroe Doctrine in all parts of the world. He closed with some very effective statements:

Mr. President, from a military and selfish viewpoint the United States cannot afford to reject this treaty.

From a higher and nobler purpose the treaty should have our approval. It is promotive of peace, conducive of goodwill among the nations involved and I hope marks the beginning of a more complete treaty for the limitation of naval armaments.

For the United States to reject the treaty would be for her to abandon her moral leadership in the world and declaring at the same time that she is an imperialistic nation. It would create in the rest of the world an apprehension that we had a sinister purpose to serve when we rejected the treaty, and would create a mistrust among all the nations of the world and would result finally in political combinations against us to our detriment and menace. This situation would injure our foreign commerce and retard our development.

Mr. President, whether controlled by selfish material interests or broader and nobler purposes of promoting world peace and betterment, the best interests of the United States demand the ratification of the treaty.

Senator Robinson of Arkansas also made a strong effort to get the treaty ratified. He said.

... We have heard a good deal about fortification in the Pacific and how the United States is committed to a very
dangerous policy by the terms relating to that subject in the Washington Treaty. ... We had just as well understand that the United States receives just as much security as Japan receives by virtue of the understanding and agreement that neither would fortify certain possessions in the Pacific Ocean. Indeed Japan went farther than the United States. She made a concession probably greater than that of the United States. Instead of endangering our possessions in the Pacific, instead of imperiling the safety of our commerce there, this treaty will have the wholesome effect of strengthening the ties of friendship and giving adequate security to our commerce, not alone because we have a better Navy with the treaty than we would have had without it, but also because the fear and anxiety of Japan will be relaxed and our relationship with her will grow better and better as intercourse continues.¹

Senator Hiram Johnson was the acknowledged leader of the forces opposed to the treaty. He opened his attack upon the treaty by denouncing the fact that confidential notes between Secretary Stimson and President Hoover had not been placed in the hands of the Senate.² As a result of Johnson's denunciation, the Senate adopted a resolution calling upon the president to turn over all pertinent notes and other documents. President Hoover, however, refused to comply with this request, explaining that the correspondence in question was too confidential to be made public. As a concession to the Senate, he was willing to allow individual Senators to examine the documents under pledge of secrecy. In fact he said many Senators had already availed themselves of this opportunity.³

¹ Congressional Record, Vol. 73, 121.
² Ibid., 90-99.
³ Ibid.
Senator Johnson continued to make political capital out of the President’s refusal and finally the Norris resolution was passed which said in effect that since the correspondence was not open to all that if the Senate ratified the London Treaty it would do so with the distinct understanding that there were not secret agreements involved.¹

Throughout the Senate debates, Senator Johnson continued to denounce the treaty as a base betrayal of American interests, a supine surrender on the part of the executive. These charges were echoed by such Senators as Robinson of Indiana, Moses of New Hampshire, and Couzens of Michigan.² From first to last, however, it was Johnson who carried the great burden of the opposition.

After two weeks filled with hot-tempered discussions the treaty was finally ratified on July 21 with 58 in favor, 9 against, and 29 not voting.³

Some of those opposing the treaty were Senators Bingham, Hall, Hiram Johnson, McKeller, Moses, and Robinson of Indiana.

Senator Johnson remarked after the ratification he had never been so proud of a fight in his life as the one over the London Treaty.⁴

¹ Congressional Record, Vol. 73, 112.
² Ibid., 165, 174, 251, 257.
³ Ibid., 268.
Concerning the ratification, the Hearst papers commented, "The pact is signed, a pact prepared by Japan and England limiting the size of weapons on American cruisers to six inch guns".¹

More temperate was the comment of the *Baltimore Sun* which remarked, "The public should take care to neither over-value or under-value the treaty. ... There is to be a halt in competitive naval building for six years between England, Japan and the United States".²

On the whole, public opinion appears to have been rather apathetic toward the whole question. It can be fairly said that neither the Geneva nor the London Conference aroused the interest or excitement in the United States that the Washington Conference had. This was due partly to the influence of distance and partly to the distracting effect of economic conditions.

As the event has proved, the London agreement had little practical effect upon the arms situation. Naval rivalries became worse rather than better. The depression produced a world wide intensification of nationalism, and as usual nationalism expressed itself in terms of militarism. President Roosevelt in 1933 announced an intensive naval building program; within a few months Britain and Japan had matched

² Ibid.
it with building programs of their own.

Early in 1934, Walter Lippmann made the following comment on the existing situation:

From every quarter of the globe come reports of measures to increase armament on the sea, on land and in the air. Frequently the remark is made that the world is threatened with a race of armaments and that something must be done to prevent it. But the dreadful truth is that the race of armaments is not a threat. It is a reality. The race began two years ago and what we are witnessing today is the race itself.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the setting up of Manchukuo as a Japanese protectorate were consummated in the winter of 1932. As Secretary Stimson pointed out at the time, this action not merely violated the Kellogg Pact but it destroyed one of the main foundations of the Washington Naval Treaty. For the agreements to limit naval armaments, which were arrived at in 1922, rested on a bargain; in return for a Japanese promise to respect the integrity of China and to refrain from aggression, the United States agreed to have a navy incapable of waging war in the western half of the Pacific. In 1932 Japan deliberately scrapped the bargain. Having scrapped it her position was no longer safeguarded by international treaties. It rested entirely on force, and recognizing this, Japan proceeded immediately to increase her armaments.

She had decided that her interests did not lie within the framework of treaties. They lay, therefore, within the framework of her military power. Once it was made clear that Japanese purposes no longer were limited by treaties but only by the power of Japan, the basis of competition in armaments was laid. ...1

During the summer and fall of 1934, all of the great naval powers began to put out unofficial feelers with an eye to the conference to be held in 1935 to revise the Washington and London treaties. Japan was very determined to have naval equality; to this both the United States and Great Britain were opposed as both countries felt the 5-5-3 ratio should be continued.

1 Stockton Record, March 17, 1934.
The idea of keeping the 5-5-3 ratio was foremost in the minds of the House Naval Committee as shown by the statement of Chairman Vinson who said:

This country cannot grant naval parity to Japan even at the price of wrecking the treaties. It is my earnest hope that the treaties can be continued. If they are not, however, I and my committee will demand a consistent American program for the construction of five tons of fighting vessels for every three Japan builds. ¹

It was felt that Chairman Vinson reflected the views of the Roosevelt administration. The opinion was prevalent that even though the Americans did not care to go into a naval race yet we could not allow our defense to stand still, and in a naval race Japan could and would be beaten.

Richard Washburn Child writing for the San Francisco Examiner said:

... The plain-thinking American patriot can now stand with the simple thinking disarmament pacifist and both can observe that the whole spirit of negotiations appears to have turned away from the questions of how small navies can be made ... to how high can each nation climb in various forms of ratios and armed forces. ... Japan is quite firm about equality. ... One of her official spokesmen has even been audacious enough to suggest that if the United States wants a superior naval strength, it must be because we want aggression!

He overlooks the length of our coast line, our Pacific possessions and the range of our part in world commerce.

He overlooks our Monroe Doctrine, a doctrine which has protected Latin America from alien political domination by any powerful nation.

He fails to point out any motive for aggression. ... If the reason given by Japan for claim to naval equality is that the United States may become an aggressive invader, then the naval disarmament negotiations have

¹ Stockton Record, November 28, 1924.
reached slapstick comedy.

If our plea for disarmament downward fails and if on top of that our plea to keep ratios and limitation down fails, the best policy in the whole bag of policies for Uncle Sam is to say: "Well I did my best, this is as go as you please, I can afford to build two while the others build one".1

The same idea was expressed in a broadcast by Edwin O. Hill one of radio’s most popular news commentators. Speaking early in December 1934 Mr. Hill said:

Japan is a cocky little nation with a chip on her shoulder waiting to have it knocked off. But one great thing may come from this throwing treaties to the winds, it may bring forth some kind of an agreement between John Bull and Uncle Sam. When these two begin building boats they can build two to Japan’s one. It is quite probable that when Japan realizes that these two nations will stand shoulder to shoulder united to preserve the peace of the world she will take off the chip and throw it in the nearest ash can.2

In an attempt to clarify the naval question, an informal conference was held at London in the fall of 1934 between representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The general opinion among the American delegation in London was that if Japan denounced the existing treaties it would be a tremendous blow to the system of collective security in the Pacific. The delegates took the view that when Congress ratified the Washington Naval Treaty political treaties guaranteeing Chinese integrity and the Open Door were pledged and if the Washington Treaty were abrogated then Japan would be close to achieving naval and military

1 San Francisco Examiner, December 1, 1934.
supremacy in the Far East.

At the same time, however, the Americans refused to consider any treaty which did not maintain the existing ratios. The Japanese delegation was equally insistent upon the principle of parity. As a result, the conversations at London terminated in a spirit of hopeless disagreement.

On December 29, 1934, Japan formally denounced the Washington Treaty, the termination to become effective December 31, 1936. Secretary of State Cordell Hull told the Japanese Ambassador that he received the notice of the abrogation with sincere regrets. Secretary Hull said:

We, of course realize, that any nation has the right not to renew a treaty; also that any movement toward disarmament to be successful must rest on agreements voluntarily entered into.

Each nation naturally desires, and we stand unalterably for that view, to be on a basis of absolute equality with other nations in the matter of security.

Experience teaches that conditions of peace or measures of disarmament cannot be prompted by the doctrine that all nations, regardless of their varying and different defensive needs, shall have equality of armaments. The American government is ready to enter upon negotiations whenever it appears that there is prospect of arrival at a mutually satisfactory conclusion.1

Admittedly the present state of public opinion on both sides of the Pacific is not favorable to an agreement on naval armaments. The people of the United States are firmly convinced that naval superiority is necessary to safeguard American interests both at home and in the Far East. The people of Japan are equally convinced that naval equality

1 San Francisco Chronicle, December 29, 1934.
is essential to their national prestige and security. Rightly or wrongly, each regards the other as a potential aggressor. Such an atmosphere of suspicion and ill-will is not conducive to an early settlement of the naval question.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION

This study in American opinion has traced the growth of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States during the last thirty years. This development has been the result of many causes.

The first cause came in the San Francisco School Affair in 1906-1907. Fresh fuel was added to the flames by the California agitation which culminated in the land laws of 1913-1920. However, it was not until the World War and the Treaty of Versailles that the prevailing attitude in the Eastern part of the United States swung from pro-Japanese to anti-Japanese. This would seem to represent the critical turning point in Japanese-American public opinion. This change was reflected in the adoption by an overwhelming vote of the Exclusion Act of 1924. Had there been no further adverse developments, it is probable that this would have marked the peak of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. Freed from the threat of large scale immigration and with the naval issue temporarily relieved by the Washington agreement, the American people might have been able to settle down and iron out the remaining difficulties with Japan in a friendly and cooperative spirit. Instead there arose two new developments to strain the relations of the two countries almost to the breaking point. These were the Japanese aggression
in the Far East and the revival of unreasoning naval rival-
ries.

As 1934 came to an end, one could hardly see any real
encouraging signs of increased friendliness in American - Jap-
anese relations. By that time American public opinion seemed
to be almost completely united in one general idea, that Jap-
an had become a dangerous aggressor, whose reckless policies
threatened not only her immediate neighbors but the peace
and security of the whole world.

Thirty years ago, public opinion in America was whole-
heartedly friendly to the Japanese both as individuals and
as a nation. During the intervening years, public opinion
has been undergoing a slow but persistent transition, so
that today the Japanese nation is regarded more as an enemy,
than as a friend. The American public seem to feel that
Japan has brought about this change by continually defying
the western nations. What changes the future holds no one
can foretell, but at this time the prospect does not seem
encouraging.

One of the most serious developments has been the gener-
al opinion that Japan has become a nation whose promises are
not made in good faith. If this opinion continues it is
doubtful if she can continue to hold the respect of other
nations. With this thought so much before the American pub-
lic there seems little possibility of ever reestablishing
the cordial relations formerly enjoyed.
It is futile to try to assess the responsibility for this breach which has sprung up between two nations which traditionally had been friends. Partly it has been the fault of the American people with their persistent disregard for Japanese sensibilities and Japanese pride. Partly it is the fault of the Japanese people, who have been too quick to assimilate that dangerous triumvirate of western civilization — nationalism, imperialism, and militarism. The fact remains that this breach exists. It will require consummate wisdom and restraint upon both sides of the Pacific if this mounting wave of antagonism is not to culminate in the crowning catastrophe of war.
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