A theory of group decision-making applied to the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis decisions

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A THEORY OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING APPLIED
TO THE BAY OF PIGS AND CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS DECISIONS

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Communication Arts
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Lester Stephen Slade
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This thesis, written and submitted by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A THEORY OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING

Nothing is so useful as a good theory.
-Kurt Lewin

The good theory is useful as an aid in understanding the phenomenon of the empirical world. Understanding is aided by the generation of hypotheses about phenomena which can be tested. If the hypothesis is confirmed, then we can cautiously begin to generalize about the phenomenon we observe (Singer, 13).

Twelve years ago Sidney Verba wrote of the dismal state of political theory and of the contribution group theory could make:

The immediate need in political research is not for more facts or more data: rather, it is for adequate conceptual schemes and systematic theories into which fit the facts we have and the facts we shall gather in the future.... Small group analysis can contribute to those broad theoretical...interests of political science (Verba, 4).

This paper attempts to provide a systematic theory of group decision-making into which to fit facts we have concerning the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis decisions.

The process of fitting the facts of past events into a theoretical framework is, in J.D. Singer's words, the "ex post facto experiment." Events are not observed as they occur nor are variables controlled during the occurrence of the events. Rather, the records, observations, and other traces of events are reviewed in an effort to understand why and how the event occurred as it did.

Accordingly, this paper begins with an introduction to the
forces shaping and limiting the study of political decision-making. In Chapter Two a theory of the process of group decision-making based on behavioral research is formulated. In subsequent chapters the theory is applied to the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis decisions. Finally, the concluding chapter attempts to draw together and to summarize the theory and its application.

The Traditional Approach: The "Rational Actor Model"

This study of political decision-making stressing the process of decision-making in a group setting is, in part, a reaction against traditional approaches of political analysis.

The study of international relations is overburdened with historical studies of the interaction between states. The classic approach to the study of a given decision by one government effecting another might be called the "rational actor model". This model treats the state as the entity reaching the decision. The decision itself is seen as behavior that reflects a rational purpose or intent. The central concepts of the model center around the calculated weighing of goals, alternatives, consequences, and choices. The "rational actor model" is the dominant method of current political analysis (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 50 and Allsion, 38).

I will implicitly contend in this paper that the concept of foreign policy as a rational process of gathering information, setting alternatives, and making decisions is not an adequate
tool of understanding. In fact, the "rational actor model" does not make sense out of much political phenomenon (Gelb and Halperin, 28). I will directly contend in this paper that a process model of political decision-making provides an adequate and helpful tool for the understanding of political decisions.

The Process Model

The focus of the process model is upon the individual decision-makers in group settings and the process of interaction among them. Theorists in the fields of political science and psychology have contributed ideas which shape the process model.

In the early sixties political scientists burst forth with a number of theories about the process of decision-making. While differing on many important factors, these theories shared some common orientations which differ from the classic approaches. First, the focus was on the individual as decision-maker (Allison, 144). The state was defined as its official decision-makers whose acts are the acts of the state (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 65). The individual was recognized as operating in an organizational and group context which shaped his behavior (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 103-104 and North, et al, 10).

A second change in political thinking emphasized by the process model is interaction among individuals in the decision-making setting. Richard Neustadt's classic study of Presidential power focused upon the power resources available to the decision-maker. Neustadt recognized that the behavior of politic-makers
is a result of power interaction, not rational design (Neustadt, 179-183). Roger Hilsman, both before and after his service in the Kennedy administration, developed a model of politics which stressed the conflicts between decision-makers and the efforts to achieve consensus. For Hilsman, politics is the process of decision-making, of consensus building, and of conflict resolution in group settings (Hilsman, 1959, 365-366 and 1971, 117 and 135). These political scientists brought new focus on the individual as decision-maker and on power as the means of conflict resolution and consensus building (Allison, 144-162).

While some political scientists have recognized the importance of psychological considerations in understanding the individual decision-maker (see North, et al, 9-10, for example), it was the psychologists who brought such considerations fully into view. Early work concerned with psychological factors was often narrowly limited (Kelman, 1965, 4-7) and frequently of low quality (Rosenau, 509). Psychologist Joseph de Riveria has exhaustively studied five major post-war decisions. De Riveria focused upon the individual decision-maker in a group setting (de Riveria, 212-213). His work provides support for the focus upon the individual as the central decision-maker. De Riveria asserted that the external forces and rational considerations of the classic approach are relevant only as seen through the eyes of the decision-maker (de Riveria, 11-17).

De Riveria's work was heavily influenced by an earlier study by Jerome Frank. Frank's analysis was more oriented towards the
interaction between states than towards the psychology of individual decision-makers; however, Frank offered many psychological insights relevant to an understanding of the individual as decision-maker (Frank, 6).

Frank and de Riveria suggest a third principle for the process model. The process of power exercise takes place within a perceptual context which individuals largely create themselves.

De Riveria's book exerted some influence of its own on Irving Janis. Janis' book uses five post-war political decisions as the substance of his analyses. Janis is much less theoretically analytical than de Riveria or Frank. His theory is simply that amiability or cohesiveness in a group of policy-makers reduces independent thinking and results in irrational and dehumanizing actions (Janis, 1972, 198-199). Thus, Janis suggests a fourth principle of the process model: the perceptual context of decision is shaped by the cohesive group.

Thus, the process model differs from the "rational actor model" in stressing four concepts. First, the individual decision-maker is the focal point of study. Second, the exercise of power is the means of conflict resolution and consensus building which is the essence of political decision-making. Third, the exercise of power takes place within a perceptual context largely created by individuals. Fourth, individuals create this perceptual context within cohesive groups. These four concepts form the basis of the process model and will be developed in Chapter Two.
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Limitations of Application

History depends on who writes it.
- John Kennedy

The inaccuracy of most Washington diaries and autobiographies is surpassed only by the immodesty of their authors.
- Theodore Sorensen

Taken together, the statements by Kennedy and Sorensen are notable because the bulk of history about the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration was written by members of the Administration. Information on the Kennedy years is primarily based upon books by Schlesinger, Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, Hilsman, Salinger, and a deluge of less figures, including cooks, maids, secretaries, et cetera. Only recently have books drawing on interviews of less sympathetic insiders surfaced (for example, those by Halberstram and Allison).

The result of the rather one-sided version of history on the Kennedy years is a scholarly skepticism and caution. Certainly, one cannot take the rationalized treatment given to Bay of Pigs by most Kennedy insiders as reflective of the actual course of events. One learns to take with appropriate amounts of salt the faithful accounts by Sorensen, with appropriate respect the more insightful accounts by Schlesinger, and with appropriate pleasure the more critical accounts by Halberstram and Walton. In short, all the necessary data may not be available, but certainly enough data are available to test a theory.
But who writes the history is not so important as who interprets the data. Allison's use of three different conceptual models in studying the missile crisis well illustrates the importance of finding the best way to look at the same set of events.

Janis has taken a perspective which applies group dynamics theory to a series of political decisions. Sorensen argues that one cannot validly apply research from the more mundane aspects of life to the exalted setting of Presidential decision-making (Sorensen, 1963, 11-12).

The appropriateness of application of research data taken from various settings to the arena of Presidential decision-making is something of a mute point. Sidney Verba, after spending a third of his book justifying limited application, ends by saying something which sounds like "if the shoe fits..." (Verba, 61-109).

Verba's case for trying the shoe on goes as follows:

One of the standards by which the applicability of the research in one area to another can be judged is whether or not the findings in one area confirm general theories developed in the other. Propositions developed on the basis of studies in one field of social research gain greater validity if they can be fitted into systematic theories developed in another field (Verba, 101).
CHAPTER II

A THEORY OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING

I speak without exaggeration when I say that
I have constructed three thousand different
theories.... Yet in only two cases did my
experiments prove the truth of my theory.

-Thomas Edison

Hopefully, this theory will reflect more success than the
2,998 failures of Thomas Edison. The theory outlined below is
aimed at providing greater understanding of the process by which
a group reaches a specific decision.

An understanding of the process of group decision-making
might well begin with the end and work backwards towards the
beginning. The idea behind this backwardness is that if we know
at what point the group is and from what point it started, then
we might know how it got there. The process of understanding
has three steps.

(1) Cohesive groups develop pressures towards uniformity
of opinion on any given issue. The group arrives at this end
by the application of conformity pressures on deviant members.

(2) The direction of the conformity pressures is determined
by the effective exercise of power within the group. That is,
conformity pressures will be brought to bear upon the weaker
members by the more powerful members. Those who exercise greatest
power will determine the particular goal toward which conformity
will be directed. Those who possess less power will be pressured
to conform in the direction of the position of the powerful.

(3) The effective exercise of power is determined by individual and group perceptions and expectations. First, the individual power holder must perceive that an opportunity for power exercise exists. We must feel that we can use our power towards some particular end. Second, the individual must exercise power only in appropriate situations if the exercise of power is to be effective. Our roles, patterns of interaction, and psychological orientations limit the "rightness" or appropriateness of power usage. Third, the individual must perceive the exercise of power to be, on balance, desirable.

In short, in cohesive groups the end of the decision process is conformity. The direction of conformity pressures is determined by the effective exercise of power. And the exercise of power is, in turn, determined by individual and group perceptions and expectations.

**Cohesive Groups Develop Pressures Towards Conformity or Opinion on a Given Issue**

Our wretched species is so made that those who walk on the well-trodden path always throw stones at those who are showing a new road.

-Voltaire

The process of stone-throwing is a less subtle form of conformity pressuring than that employed by most groups. Conformity is simply the uniformity of opinion among members in a group. Cohesiveness is the sum of all the bonds which attract an
individual to the group. Cohesiveness might include, but is not limited to, identification with the group, interpersonal attraction within the group, the desirability of the group's activities, et cetera. While we may not be able to precisely measure cohesiveness, we have a clear idea of its broad nature (Cartwright, 91; Festinger, 1968, 185; and Collins and Guetzkow, 129-130). Because the individual wishes to remain in a group he is subject to pressures to conform. Cohesion is, then, the source of a group's power to force conformity.

The proposition that individuals tend to conform to the opinions of the group is one of the best documented generalizations in small group research literature. In both on-going and experimental groups, researchers have found that individuals will change their views to conform to the dominant group opinion. Conformity results regardless of the "correctness" or validity of the group opinion (Verba, 22 and Janis, 1972, 5). We are clearly reluctant to stand alone against the opinions of our peers.

A wide variety of research data supports the conclusion that cohesiveness increases conformity in groups. Members of more cohesive groups both more readily initiate and accept influence attempts than members of less cohesive groups. The cohesive group, then, attempts more conformity pressures than the non-cohesive group. And, in turn, the members of the cohesive group respond more readily to the increased pressures for uniformity (Cartwright, 104; Collins and Guetzkow, 129-130; Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 152-164; Schachter, 165-166; and Festinger, 1968, 185).
Increases in Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness increases if the group shares a common fate or experiences increased stress.

(1) Research of groups sharing a common fate points to an increase in interpersonal attractiveness and thus cohesiveness. Similarly, if the group is treated as an entity in terms of external rewards or punishments, group cohesiveness will increase (Collins and Guetzkow, 140-143). The cohesion-building effects of shared fate are demonstrated by the closeness of oppressed groups who are treated as an entity by the oppressors.

(2) Leaders of nations wishing to avoid the pitfalls of their follies are fond of creating or using a crisis in order to solidify the nation around them. Actually, this process is an example of the cohesion-building qualities of increased stress. A mass of research data points to increases in group solidarity, integration, cooperation, friendliness, et cetera, in response to stressful situations (Janis, 1968, 80; Hambin, 221; and Lanzetta, 217).

Research by Hambin, however, seems to contradict the previous studies by showing a decrease in group integration or cohesiveness during a crisis. In seeking to explain the unexpected results, Hambin reviewed the previous literature. The reviews and Hambin's own study point to an increase in cohesiveness during a crisis only if a likely cooperative solution is perceived by the group. If a likely solution is unavailable, the cohesiveness will decrease (Hambin, 230).
Increases in Conformity Pressures on the Deviant

Conformity pressures on the deviant increase with the importance or relevance of the issue, the discrepancy of opinion, and the status of the deviant.

(1) Conformity pressures on the deviant increase as the relevance and importance of the issue to the group increases. The relevance and importance of an issue for a group is a matter of ordering priorities. Regardless of the basis for the ordering, the group clearly exercises greater influence in matters perceived as relevant to the group (Schachter, 166 and Festinger, 1968, 184). Less relevant or less important issues probably do not offer as great a possibility for conflict over basic values, goals, or perceptions as do issues of more central concern.

(2) Conformity pressures on the deviant increase as perceived deviance increases. As the discrepancy in opinion between the deviant member and the group increases, conformity pressures are stepped up (Festinger, 1968, 185). An initial increase in communication to the deviant is the prime vehicle for conformity pressures. Although the initial response to deviance may be increased communication directed towards the deviant, continued deviance may result in reduced communication and/or psychological rejection from or isolation within the group (Schachter, 166). The amount and intensity of the communicated conformity pressures increase as the discrepancy between group and deviant widens (Collins and Guetzkow, 179-180).

(3) Conformity pressures increase as the status of the deviant
increases. The higher the individual's status, the greater will be the pressures for his conformity to group norms. The greater influence and centrality of highly ranked persons results in an increased amount of influence and communication flowing towards them (Hopkins, 65-67).

The high status individual, however, may be more resistant to conformity pressures than the low status individual. High status individuals build up "idiosyncracy credits" on the basis of past behavior which permit great deviance (Jacobson, 26 and 31). Leaders typically accrue more "idiosyncracy credits" which allow deviance at less cost (Jacobson, 133).

While leaders and other high status members are more resistant to a given conformity pressure than low status members, the high status individual must face more conformity pressures than the low status individual. For example, the leader's representative function and his legitimacy based on group norms combine with his central position in the communication network to assure greater conformity pressures than the non-leader (Verba, 185-189).

Cohesive groups develop pressures towards conformity on a given issue. The group, in effect, directs deviants to move towards the policy of the group. The particular policy towards which deviants will be directed is determined by the hierarchy of power within the group.

The Direction of Conformity Pressure is Determined by the Effective Exercise of Power Within the Group

Power is defined in a behavioral context. An agent has power
over a recipient when the acts of the agent can modify the behavior of the recipient. Power may exist without being overtly exercised by the agent. Power is simply the potential to modify another's behavior (Collins and Guetzkow, 121-122; Raven and French, 400).

Implicit in the concept of power is the power recipient's perception of his dependence on some resource possessed by the power agent. The agent has power because the recipient wants or needs something the agent possesses. The dependence of the power recipient upon the agent increases with the recipient's "motivational investment" in the goals mediated by the agent. The more important the resource possessed by the agent to the recipient, the greater the agent's power. The dependence of the power recipient decreases with the availability of the resource to the recipient outside of the agent-recipient relationship. In other words, the agent's power is lessened if the recipient can obtain the desired resource elsewhere (Emerson, 32 and Jacobson, 2-3 and 66-67).

This concept of dependency of the recipient on the resources of the agent as the essence of power leads to an emphasis on both the resources of the agent and the responses of the recipient. The exercise of power, then, is a process including both the power attempt by the agent and the power response by the recipient.

**Power and Policy**

Samuel Johnson said, among many other things, that "power is not sufficient evidence of truth." However, it is sufficient
evidence to convince many people of the truth. Individuals conform
to the policy desired by the powerful not out of some higher know-
ledge of truth, but by the force of power. Surely, truth may be
power, but power as often begets beliefs which we believe to be true.

Hilsman defines politics as the exercise of power on behalf of
policies by groups of people. He sees the outcome of a policy debate
as the result of power. In short, "policy making is a political
process." And the political process is largely a power process
(Hilsman, 1971, 117 and 135).

So defined, politics becomes not the narrow concern of those
studying government, but the operation of power in any decision-
making context. Decisions are not made according to some formal
rule-book establishing the laws and logic of decision-making.
Decisions made in groups involve people striving for both conflicting
interests and mutual consensus—for what they want and for what the
group wants. These individuals possess different amounts of power.
The resolution of their power differentials determines the direction
of conformity for the group. The group will exercise conformity
pressures on deviants to move towards the policy option of the
most powerful members (Jacobson, 95 and 114).

Power Resources

The different types of power reflect the various resources
available to the power agent. The concept of power may be divided
into five broad types. First, reward power is based on the
recipient's perception that the agent has the ability to reward
him. The recipient is dependent on the agent for the provision of positive valences. Second, coercive power is based on the recipient's perception that the agent has the ability to punish him. The recipient is dependent on the agent for the avoidance of negative valences. Third, legitimate power is based on the recipient's perception that the agent has a legitimate right to influence him by virtue of the agent's position. The recipient is dependent upon the agent due to the recipient's own internalized acceptance of the "oughtness" of the agent's power position. Fourth, referent power is based on the recipient's identification with the agent. The recipient is dependent upon the agent due to the recipient's identification with the agent's person. Fifth, expert power is based on the recipient's perception that the agent possesses special knowledge, skills, or abilities. The recipient is dependent on the agent for these resources (French and Raven, 262-263).

Power Responses

The power attempt is only part of the power process. The response of the recipient is equally important. The power recipient has a variety of responses available to him. The power recipient can respond positively, neutrally, or negatively to the power attempt. Further, the power recipient's response takes place in four areas or fields: overt behavior, private beliefs, interaction with the agent, and evaluation of the agent (Raven and Kruglanski, 77-78). For example, the recipient can respond positively to the
power attempt by changing his overt behavior, while responding negatively by changing his private beliefs in the opposite direction sought by the agent. Further negative responses could include the avoidance of interaction with the agent and increased differentiation between recipient and agent.

Kelman has classified the available responses of the recipient into three classes; namely, compliance, identification, and internalization. Compliance is motivated by the desire for rewards or the fear of punishments. Compliance takes the form of overt behavior or (occasionally) private beliefs. A high degree of surveillance is necessary to assure compliance. Identification is motivated by the desire to maintain a satisfying relationship with the agent. Identification requires the continuation of the relationship. Identification takes the form of positive evaluation of the agent and satisfying interaction with the agent. Identification can be expected to at least lead to compliance in overt behavior. Internalization is motivated by the content of the induced behavior. Internalization requires neither surveillance or a continuing relationship. Internalization takes the form of increased positive behavior and positive private belief change (Kelman, 1958, 51-60).

Having established the available power resources and responses, we can now combine the two in a detailed examination of the types of power.

**Reward Power**

A man of power, Benjamin Disraeli, once observed that "real
politics are the possession and distribution of power." It is likely, given the state of English politics at the time, that Disraeli was referring to the possession and distribution of rewards. Of course, political patronage is the classic example of reward power in operation.

The strength of reward power will increase with the value to the recipient of the reward controlled by the agent. Reward power can consist of either the administering of positive valences or the removal of negative valences (French and Raven, 263). Reward power, as defined here, refers to task-environmental rewards. Rewards derived from interpersonal relationships can be classified under the heading of referent power. A substantial body of research data show that the control of task-environmental rewards is a source of power (Collins and Guetzkow, 120-123). Moreover, it is not necessary for the agent to have direct control of rewards if he can affect or mediate the rewards provided by third parties (Collins and Guetzkow, 140).

The recipient's response to reward power will ordinarily be an increase in positive overt behavior. There will usually be an accompanying increase in positive interaction with the agent, though not necessarily an increase in identification. The resource differences between recipient and agent will operate to limit the extent to which the recipient's evaluation of the agent will be positive. Reward power will not necessarily lead towards positive change in private belief (Raven and Kruglanski, 79 and Kelman, 1958, 54-60). In other words, patronage will not guarantee how a person
will vote in the privacy of the polling booth.

**Coercive Power**

"Minds are not conquered by arms," warned Spinoza. Of course, minds are not, but bodies are. And coercive power exercises its particular influence on overt behavior.

The strength of coercive power depends on the magnitude of the negative valence of the expected punishment (French and Raven, 263). Coercive power, like reward power, will exist only to the degree that conditions for punishment are clear and that compliance can be observed by the agent (Collins and Guetzkow, 133 and Kelman, 1958, 55-60).

The recipient's response to coercive power will ordinarily be towards positive change in overt behavior and negative change in evaluation of the agent. Similarly, we can expect either no change or negative change in private beliefs and in interaction with the agent (Raven and Kruglanski, 80). Research studies indicate that the exercise of coercive power reduced interpersonal attraction and thus limits the exercise of referent power in the future (Collins and Guetzkow, 135). The punishment by the agent will reduce the recipient's identification with the agent's person and, thus, reduce referent power. Coercive power is distinguished from reward power by the decreased interpersonal attraction, decreased or negative interaction between agent and recipient, and increased surveillance needs (Raven and Kruglanski, 77 and Kelman, 1958, 54-60).
**Legitimate Power**

Blackstone provides us with a fine example of the legitimate power of position: "That the King can do no wrong is a necessary and fundamental principle of the English constitution." The legitimate power of the King's position is based upon his subjects' perception of the King's divine right to rule. Legitimate power is the power of position, be it the royal throne, the judicial bench, or the White House.

The strength of legitimate power depends upon the degree of "rightness" the recipient attributes to the agent's power. The recipient must see the agent's position as a "right" source of power in the particular case (Raven and Kruglanski, 74). Role prescriptions and expectations indicate the behaviors in which an individual must engage or behaviors in which he must not engage by virtue of his position (French and Raven, 264).

In the case of legitimate power, the evidence indicates that formal designation as a leader, supervisor, boss, et cetera, will be by itself a source of power. Such designation is, however, only one source of power which can be supplemented or detracted by other power sources (Collins and Guetzkow, 148-150). Leadership power can include the rewards and punishments opportunities officially or traditionally associated with the leader's position (Fiedler, 369-370). In short, the leader's legitimate power may be supplemented by reward or punishment power available to him due to the legitimate role he fills (Jacobson, 24-25).

The recipient's response to legitimate power will ordinarily
involve positive change in both overt behavior and private beliefs. The recipient will decrease identification with the agent, since the possession of legitimate power increases dissimilarities. To the extent that the recipient wishes to avoid the legitimate request to do something he would prefer not to do, interaction with the agent may decrease (Raven and Kruglanski, 75 and 80). Legitimate power does not require surveillance since the recipient's motivation is his own internalized values. Legitimate power does require the continuation of the recipient-agent relationship (Kelman, 1958, 54-60).

Referent Power

People are generally better persuaded by the reasons which they have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the minds of others.

-Pascal

Actually, persuasion is not really so demanding. But persuasive success is more likely when we can identify ourselves and our thoughts with the character and attitudes of the other. We can be persuaded by the thoughts which come into the minds of others as long as their entry into our minds is not alien.

Referent power is simply the process of interpersonal identifi­cation and attraction. The strength of referent power is dependent upon the degree of interpersonal attraction between recipient and agent (French and Raven, 266). Research data show that increased interpersonal attraction of other group members for a single member increases the power of that individual (Collins
and Guetzkow, 128 and Jacobson, 28 and 121).

The recipient response to referent power will ordinarily involve positive change in overt behavior, private belief, interaction with the agent, and identification with the agent. Referent power, successfully used, increases identification by further increasing the recipient's perception of similarity. Thus, referent power, based on identification, increases its own basis when successfully used. Moreover, the perception of similarity will lead to increased positive interaction between recipient and agent (Raven and Kruglanski, 81).

**Expert Power**

When the experts are agreed the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; when the experts are not agreed, then no opinion can be held to be certain.

-Bertrand Russell

Russell perhaps overstates the power of experts because he speaks of matters of truth and not matters of power. The expert's power increases with the extent of his knowledge, skills or abilities and with the dependence of the recipient on these resources (French and Raven, 267). A reputation of competence, regardless of whether the group has observed the competence, will serve as a source of power (Collins and Guetzkow, 145-147). Control over information is also a source of power. The possession of relevant information, even by a small minority of the group is a major source of power (Shaw and Penrod, 19 and Kassarjian and Kassarjian, 491).
The recipient's response to expert power will ordinarily involve positive change in overt behavior and in private beliefs. As in the case of legitimate power, the use of expert power emphasizes the differences between recipient and agent, resulting in negative identification. Expert power may further lead to avoidance of interaction with the agent if the recipient would prefer not to be influenced (Raven and Kruglanski, 80). Successful use of expert power, however, requires neither surveillance nor an ongoing relationship (Kelman, 1958, 54-60).

The link between the power agent and the power recipient in the process of power exercise is communication. Communication is the vehicle or mechanism used to actualize or operationalize power (Schachter, 166 and Jacobson, 42 and 80). Whether we communicate our power to the other is determined by our perception of the opportunity. This perception is formed in and confirmed by the group. An understanding of the determinants of the communication of power is sought in the third proposition.

The Effective Exercise of Power Within the Group is Determined by Individual and Group Perceptions and Expectations

The perception of the world is an active process comprised of filtering, arranging, and distorting incoming experience in order to maintain consistency with past experience and beliefs. In large part, we create the world we perceive (Frank, 97-113). The perceptual construction of reality depends on two processes: a filtering process that determines what is selected
as stimuli and an interpretative process that determines what meaning the stimuli has for us (de Riveria, 39).

In the Book of Common Prayer, we find a prayer to God asking for help for those who cannot see the Lord—"eyes have they, and see not." As some do not see the Lord, some frequently avoid more empirical stimuli everyday. We control the stimuli which confront us by avoidance of situations or sources which might provide unwelcome stimuli. In short, we actively build an environment of friends, books, ideas, et cetera, which provide us with welcome stimuli and protects us from unwelcome ones (de Riveria, 40-41). We can further control the stimuli which confront us by creating welcomed stimuli. The self-fulfilling prophecy involves actions based on our perception which actually produce stimuli confirming the original perception. The self-fulfilling prophecy is made possible by the interactive nature of human behavior (Frank, 145 and de Riveria, 40).

The second process of perception is the interpretative stage. Monsell pleads to the non-believers to "only believe, and thou shalt see" Christ. Often we interpret stimuli on the basis of an almost religious faith. When an event does occur and we do perceive it, the stimuli may still be legitimately interpreted in several different ways. We tend to give the meaning to a stimuli which requires the least psychological change in our beliefs (de Riveria, 22). In short, the human perceptual process enables us to deny or distort data in order to confirm our images and beliefs (Deutsch and Merritt, 182-183).
For a non-religious example, we can turn to the field of international relations. Individuals form images of nations considered to be enemies. Once the image is formed and expectations regarding "their" actions are shaped, information is selected and interpreted to confirm the image (Frank, 116-117 and Scott, 80). A specific example involves the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to one theory, intelligence information indicating the forthcoming attacks was not seen as relevant. The information conflicting with accepted beliefs was interpreted in different ways to conform with our image of the Japanese as too weak and timid for attack. This example clearly demonstrates the degree to which "we construct the reality in which we operate" (de Rivera, 20-21 and Wohlstetter, 691-767).

Naturally, we frequently adapt our beliefs to new data. Our resistances are so strong, however, that they can be overcome only if none of the consistent interpretations can be easily accounted for. For example, we might find that actions based on one interpretation do not work. In the face of failure, we may be forced to alter our interpretation (de Rivera, 35-36).

Role of Stress

The normal selectivity of our perceptual process is aggravated during stressful or crisis situations. During times of stress we are less open to stimuli, consider fewer interpretations, and are more rigid and repetitive in our interpretations (Pruitt, 395-396 and Robinson and Snyder, 457). The further distortion of the perceptual process may be tied to the need for structure and the fear
of ambiguity in the crisis situation (de Riveria, 150). Research indicates that groups in stressful situations make early attempts to recognize structure in ambiguous situations. Moreover, these groups rigidly adhere to initial interpretations despite increasingly conflicting stimuli (Korten, 355).

So far, it may sound as though the individual perceives in a vacuum. Actually, individual knowledge is either the result of personal experience, of observation of another's experience, or of hearing a report about another's experience (Collins and Guetzkow, 38). In any case, individuals tend to seek stability in their beliefs and perceptions through association in groups (de Riveria, 27).

The Realization of the Opportunity to Exercise Power is Determined by Group Norms

Festinger has postulated that we are motivated by a drive to evaluate our opinions which, in the absence of objective or physical data, can only be satisfied through comparison with others (Radloff, 110 and Festinger, 1954, 117-119). The group, then, serves as the validator of our social perceptions. Groups also form our perceptions by controlling the stimuli we receive from them and encouraging limited interpretations of stimuli. We find that the confirmation of perceptual worlds among group members is self-reinforcing since each member is checking his views against those of others who share similar views (Frank, 99-100).

In short, we perceive the way events relate to the power we possess. Available data indicates that in the case of Pearl Harbor,
no major decision-maker perceived of the possibility of attack. Those lesser officials filtered the stimuli available to the major decision-makers, thus precluding the decision-makers from realizing an opportunity to exercise power. The lesser officials interpreted the stimuli they received in a manner conforming to officials' expectations. In so interpreting the information, the lesser officials did not realize an opportunity to exercise expert power by making the information and their interpretations known to major decision-makers. The example of Pearl Harbor is perhaps typical of governmental operation. Leaders ordinarily receive both information and interpretations through channels and organizations. The opportunity to exercise power on the basis of certain information or on behalf of certain options is not realized due to the nature of our perceptual process (see Halperin, 1971, 88-89 and Verba, 1961a, 112).

The Appropriateness of the Exercise of Power is Determined by the Perceptual Images of the Group

Appropriateness is the quality of being allowable or fitting to the occasion. Power which is not deemed appropriate is not likely to be effective. The perceptual images of the group refers to the almost visual set of expectations the group holds regarding roles and interactive behavior. These group expectations are, in turn, effected by the task/interpersonal orientation of the group.

Expectations about interactive behavior are limitations on acceptable types of behavior. A member may not be rude or, in some groups, quiet without violating the group's image of how interaction
will occur (de Riveria, 70). Berne theorizes that groups soon form a collective image of how the group members should interact. These patterns of acceptable interaction form the group etiquette and character (Berne, 92 and 110). The group etiquette serves to limit members in the exercise of power. For example, a group whose etiquette called for cooperative interaction among members would deem the obvious use of coercive power inappropriate. The same group may heavily rely upon and even sanction the appropriateness of referent power.

Role expectations and images form an organizational structure which supports the group etiquette by prescribing appropriate behavior for each person. The individual's role indicates the way in which he is supposed to act consistent with group expectations (Berne, 38). The individual's role operates to direct the individual towards certain behaviors as appropriate and away from behaviors inappropriate to the group's organizational structure (Raven and French, 400).

The group's perception of member roles limits members to the exercise of power only when it is consistent with the role. For example, the role definition of an expert might make the exercise of expert power natural and appropriate. The same expert might be limited by his role from exercising referent power as well. Of course, roles also encourage a power recipient to accept a power attempt. The response to a legitimate power attempt is especially influenced by the individual's role. The failure to exercise power in conformity with role expectations will likely
result in effectual power at best, and a reduction of future power at worst.

The task/interpersonal orientation of the group further aids the determination of appropriateness of power exercise. Bales has postulated that every group faces opposing strains between task-environmental and interpersonal (social-emotional) needs. The accomplishment of task needs requires specialization and differentialization of power, while the satisfaction of interpersonal needs requires similarity and power equality (Bales, 127-131). In other words, the task need requires specialization among group members which increases the differences between them. The increased differences that result from specialization reduce the satisfaction of interpersonal needs. Task needs further require power differences with some members possessing more power than others. These power differences reduce the satisfaction of interpersonal needs which require power consistency.

Evidence for Bales's theory (Collins and Guetzkow, 214-221 and Jacobson, 95-98) shows that task emphasis by the group may produce greater productivity, but reduced interpersonal satisfaction. An interpersonal emphasis will lead to greater satisfaction, but may do so at the expense of task success. An interpersonal orientation is characterized by cooperative, friendly, non-status oriented behavior. A task orientation is characterized by competitive, aggressive, status oriented behavior.

The task/interpersonal orientation of the group will operate to rule certain power attempts inappropriate. Janis offers evidence
that interpersonal orientation in groups reduces critical thinking (Janis, 1972, 198-199). We might expect fewer power attempts in a group with the characteristics of interpersonal orientation. We might also expect the use of referent power to be the most appropriate in interpersonally oriented groups. We do know that interpersonal orientation results in a high degree of conformity due to the greater cohesiveness of such groups (Jacobson, 96-97).

A number of factors operate to determine a group's orientation at a given decision-making point. Bales clearly sees task and interpersonal strains operating in constant tension. The failure to achieve balance between task and interpersonal orientations over a period of time will reduce cohesiveness by neglect of either task or interpersonal goals. In short, the factor of time will serve in a cohesive group as a force for change in orientations towards balance.

Further change in orientations may occur in response to external events. For example, negative evaluation from external sources of the group will lead to an interpersonal orientation (Jacobson, 144). Further, there is some evidence to suggest that groups are more inclined towards a task emphasis in times of crisis (Korten, 356). These external pressures may aid in a determination of a particular group's emphasis during a particular decisional situation.

The Individual Perception of Desirability of Power Exercise Is Determined by his Perception and Assessment of the Opportunity

Individual evaluation of the desirability of the opportunity
includes the following considerations: the importance of the issue; the net advantage to be gained; and the possible effectiveness of the power attempt.

The agent will find the exercise of power more desirable as the importance of the issue increases (Festinger, 1968, 185). The recipient will find the positive response to a power attempt less desirable as the importance of the issue increases. The importance of the situation is a significant determinant of the choice to exercise power (Lippitt, et al., 243-244).

Neither the power agent nor the power recipient will engage in a successful power attempt without perceiving an advantage to their actions. We may, for example, act in accordance with our role expectations in order to continue to conform to group expectations and perhaps receive group rewards (Cartwright and Zander, 219). Or we may act in a manner designed to preserve our power for future opportunities (Hilsman, 1959, 365).

The desirability of initiating power attempts is, in part, related to individual perception of the probability of success. We are more likely to initiate a power attempt if we perceive that we will be successful (Festinger, 1968, 186). Self-perception of power is highly correlated with perception of power by others and in attempted influence (Lippitt, et al., 240-243). Accordingly, we might expect the recipient's perception of his power and the agent's power to determine the degree of resistance to a power attempt. Studies do show that the more confident a deviate, the greater will be his resistance to power attempts (Hochbaum, 683-687).
Certainly, we can expect the recipient to evaluate the strength and probability of success of any given power attempt.

In summary, cohesive groups develop pressures towards conformity on a given issue. The direction of the conformity pressures will be determined by the effective utilization of power within the group. The utilization of power is limited or allowed by the perceptions and expectations of the group.
CHAPTER III
THE BAY OF PIGS

The ill-fated invasion of Cuba in April, 1961 was one of those rare politico-military events--a perfect failure.

- Theodore Draper

Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.

- John F. Kennedy

Perfect failures seem to be destined to be orphaned. Certainly in the case of the Bay of Pigs no one was willing to claim parenthood. John Kennedy stepped forward to accept full responsibility much like the young man who marries his pregnant girlfriend while proclaiming his virtue and virginity to his parents. The Bay of Pigs was more bastard than orphan. And like many bastards, the "father" is difficult to determine.

The Decision: Conformity

Shortly after his election, President-elect Kennedy was briefed on the preparations for the Bay of Pigs operation initiated under the previous administration. At the time, he gave his approval for continuing preparation without actually committing himself to eventual approval of the invasion attempt (Schlesinger, 233).

CIA Director Allen Dulles and his assistant Richard Bissell faced a "difficult challenge" in persuading a new, more "liberal"
President to support the invasion plan. Immediately, these two men, certain that they knew best for the nation, began selling the new President the operation by telling him whatever they thought would persuade (Gelb and Halperin, 28-30). Two days after the inauguration, Dulles and General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the leading members of the new administration. Following the briefing, Kennedy ordered the Joint Chiefs to make a complete study of the plan's military feasibility and allowed the CIA to proceed with the preparations it was making (Schlesinger, 238).

Theodore Sorensen reports that after the invasion failure the President told him of his own deep skepticism from the beginning (Sorensen, 1965, 295). Schlesinger also reports an earlier conversation with Kennedy which indicated the President's doubts about the invasion's ability to "touch off a mass insurrection against the regime". The White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and supposedly the CIA all considered the triggering of an uprising within Cuba to be crucial to the invasion's success (Schlesinger, 246-247).

Despite early skepticism, John Kennedy, all the senior advisors within the administration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, the CIA—all supported the plan. Throughout the period during which the plan was under serious consideration there was virtually no opposition within the administration (Walton, 43). The meetings, Schlesinger reports, took "place in a curious atmosphere of assumed consensus." The key decision-makers met four
times after March 15 to consider the plan. The Joint Chiefs approved of the operation's military feasibility. Robert MacNamara, seemingly preoccupied in his new position, accepted the verdict of the Chiefs regarding the plan's military feasibility and the verdict of the CIA regarding the likelihood of an uprising. Dean Rusk listened "inscrutably", making only a few "gentle" noises about possible excesses (Schlesinger, 250).

Criticism did come from lesser officials within the administration. Schlesinger provided a written criticism for Kennedy, but did not speak out during the March or April meetings. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, learning of the plan while filling in for Rusk who was at a SEATO meeting, was horrified at the group's complacent acceptance of what he saw as a badly flawed plan. His opposition, as we shall see, never reached the President (Schlesinger, 250). From outside the administration, a third voice of dissent was raised by Senator William Fulbright. At the final meeting of the decision-making group on April 4, Fulbright gave a strong and impassioned speech against the invasion plan. Following this strong speech by an outsider, McNamara and the other senior advisors proceeded to indicate their support for the invasion. Kennedy did not call on Schlesinger to voice his criticisms, and Schlesinger did not choose to volunteer them. Thus, the deliberations ended with only one voice of dissent having ever been raised within the group of decision-makers (Schlesinger, 248-259 and Janis, 1972, 42-45).

The successful operation of strong pressures for conformity is
evident. Schlesinger limited his public opposition partly due to a feeling of futility (Schlesinger, 255). John Kennedy may have contributed to such feelings by saying several days before the April 4 meeting that "we seem now destined to go ahead on a quasi-minimum basis" (Schlesinger, 256). A few days later at the home of Robert Kennedy, Schlesinger was drawn aside by the Attorney General and asked about his opposition to the plan. Robert Kennedy responded to Schlesinger's criticisms by saying, "you may be right or you may be wrong, but the President has made his mind up. Don't push it any further. Now is the time for everyone to help him all they can" (Janis, 1972, 41-42).

Robert Kennedy's pressuring on behalf of the President took place several days before the April 4 meeting at which Schlesinger remained so silent.

The case of Chester Bowles is an equally clear example of the operation of conformity pressures. Bowles prepared a memo listing the reasons for his opposition to the invasion. Upon Rusk's return, Bowles asked his superior to forward the memo to the President or to let Bowles himself present it to the group. Rusk refused to do so, saying that the invasion would be pared down to a quiet little infiltration anyway. When Bowles' opposition became public knowledge following the invasion's failure, he paid dearly with his job and his reputation among the Kennedys (Hilsman, 1967, 36-37 and Janis, 1972, 42).

Thus, the only direct, open, and complete disagreement with the invasion came from Senator Fulbright on the final day of the
group's deliberations. Obviously, the last minute opposition by a lone outsider did little to outweigh the "united voice of institutional authority" and the support of all the senior advisors (Schlesinger, 258-259 and Janis, 1972, 44).

Of course John Kennedy approved the invasion. On April 17 it began, and it soon became obvious that it was destined to be a "perfect failure". The question now becomes one of explanation. How did the group come to such uniform agreement on such an amazing fiasco? As was earlier theorized, conformity pressures develop around policy options supported by the greatest sources of effectively exercised power within the group.

**The Effective Exercise of Power**

How could I have been so far off base? How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?

- John Kennedy

Kennedy's "stupidity" and the "stupidity" of his major advisors was in their responses to the power attempts by Dulles and Bissell. These expert bureaucrats (see power agents) effectively limited the power of the President and his senior advisors by a number of time-honored techniques (Gelb and Halperin, 28-36).

Morton Halperin writes that bureaucracies exercise their power through four areas of policy-making: information, presentation of options, freedom to choose options, and implementation. The control of information is a major source of power for agencies
to protect their interests by influencing policy. The selection of information is different from what the President would like to have and from what he thinks he is getting.

The presentation of options limits the framework in which the President may choose. He chooses between policy option X and Y, but the agency presenting the options chooses the content of X and Y and why there is no Z.

Should options contrary to the interests of an agency become available, the agency will act to limit the President's freedom to choose that option. The President's options can be limited through threatened leaks to the press or claims of infeasibility based on special knowledge.

Finally, losing all else, the agency can implement an unwanted Presidential decision in a manner inconsistent with its intent. It is an easy matter to obey the letter rather than the spirit of a Presidential directive. Easier still is the delaying tactic at which bureaucrats become adept (Halperin, 1971, 88-89).

The exercise of power by Dulles and Bissell on behalf of the CIA is a classic example of the techniques outlined by Halperin. The underlying force behind the success of these techniques is simple power. With these tactical methods in mind, I now turn to a consideration of the exercise of power by those involved in the Bay of Pigs decision.

Reward Power

There is little direct evidence of the exercise of reward power
by the participants in the Bay of Pigs decision. In the absence of direct evidence and examples, I can only point to the existence of the potential and the opportunity for the use of reward power. Clearly, the Kennedy brothers and Dean Rusk possessed potential reward power over their respective subordinates, Schlesinger and Bowles. I think it reasonable to suspect that during the early months of the administration, subordinates would be especially eager to gain the favor and rewards of their superiors. Compliance to the group norm was directly requested by Robert Kennedy of Schlesinger and by Dean Rusk of Bowles. One can assume that Schlesinger and Bowles foresaw a reward to be gained through compliance.

**Coercive Power**

Whenever a President rejects the advice of a major advisor who has staked his reputation and prestige on his advice, a dangerous enemy may result (de Riveria, 235 and Sorensen, 1963, 80). Dulles and Bissell exercised the threat of coercive power in order to limit the President's ability to choose the option of cancellation. Having heavily committed their prestige to the plan, its cancellation would have made "dangerous enemies" of them both (Gelb and Halperin, 30).

Without having to threaten the "leaking" of information by themselves, Dulles and Bissell were able to argue that the cancellation of the plan would become public knowledge through the disbanding of the refugee training program. Dulles frequently
stressed the problem of disposing the trained refugees. At the March 11 meeting he pressed, "Don't forget that we have a disposal problem. If we have to take these men out of Guatemala, we will have to transfer them to the United States, and we can't have them wandering around the country telling everyone what they have been doing" (Schlesinger, 242). The reason "we can't have them telling ...what they have been doing" is that it would be politically embarrassing to administration who campaigned on the do-nothing policy of the Eisenhower administration towards Cuba (Walton, 35-41). As Sorensen puts it, the President would be accused of calling off a plan to overthrow Castro. After all, all that was being asked was for the United States to "allow" the refugees to "return home" (Sorensen, 1965, 306). In short, had the President called off the invasion, he would have suffered considerable political embarrassment to say the least (Janis, 1972, 31).

Referent Power

Dulles and Bissell backed up the implicit threat of political embarrassment should the President cancel the plan with a sizable dose of referent power as well. The third party nature of the leak by frustrated refugees, rather than by the two administrators themselves, enabled Dulles and Bissell to take advantage of the President's political predicament without seeming to actually threaten him with political harm. As a result, the substantial good will directed towards Dulles and Bissell could continue to operate as an effective source of referent power.

Dulles and Bissell were admired for their intelligence and
ability. Bissell especially seemed capable in inspiring great awe in at least some members of the policy group (Schlesinger, 241). Kennedy was sufficiently impressed with Bissell--he probably intended to appoint him to be Dulles' successor as Director of the CIA (Hilsman, 1967, 30). In short, they were seen as "highly prized members" of the team (Janis, 1972, 47).

Irving Janis' interpretation of the invasion decision process places heavy stress on the interpersonal attraction between the new administration and Dulles and Bissell (Janis, 1972, 46-47). Much of what Janis sees as interpersonal attraction or identification seems to be to be an admiration and respect for the abilities of those persons. The difference is important, since referent power is based upon identification with a person. Respect for the skills and abilities of a person is expert power. The ease with which John Kennedy dumped both Dulles and Bissell following the plan's failure and the degree to which he blamed "experts" for deceiving him (see Sorensen, 1965, 302-303) suggest that the referent power of Dulles and Bissell was more limited than Janis believes. More importantly, the great expert power exercised by Dulles and Bissell conflicts with the exercise of great referent power, since expert power creates a distance between people that limits identification (Bales, 129-130).

Referent power may have been exercised to some degree by Dulles and Bissell. Opponent Schlesinger probably used an even smaller amount of referent power on John Kennedy. Kennedy saw Schlesinger as the White House historian and as his link to the
Stevenson wing of the party, not as a close friend or trusted advisor (Anderson, 256-257 and 275). As we shall see later, being linked to Stevenson would almost automatically limit the amount of interpersonal attraction between Kennedy and Schlesinger (see Halberstram, 21-24). In fact, Schlesinger's memoirs and history of Kennedy's administration is less worshipful and self-serving than that of other Kennedy insiders.

**Legitimate Power**

The exercise of legitimate power by the CIA, John and Robert Kennedy, and Dean Rusk all served to further the adoption of the invasion plan by a conforming group. The CIA attempted to utilize legitimate power in order to assure that they alone would be the exclusive providers of information. Dulles and Bissell somehow prevailed upon the President to keep intelligence experts in the Defense and State Departments in the dark (Hilsman, 1967, 30). Thus, the CIA utilized legitimate power to strengthen its expert power by assuring itself of exclusive control of information.

Dulles and Bissell further exercised legitimate power to control the presentation of options. Throughout the meetings the options were stated, defined, and defended by Dulles and Bissell as if only they had the "right" to do so (Janis, 1972, 43).

As mentioned earlier, John Kennedy's position as President and Robert Kennedy's position as his brother were sources of power. John Kennedy's power remained largely as potential, but Robert's baggering of Schlesinger is clearly an exercise of power based on
his special relationship to the President.

Finally, good old quiet, careful Dean Rusk used his position as Secretary of State to keep subordinate Chester Bowles from voicing his opposition and to keep intelligence director Roger Hilsman from investigating his doubts (Hilsman, 1967, 31). Bowles and Hilsman both responded to the legitimate power of Rusk.

**Expert Power**

In the aftermath of the invasion's failure, the Kennedy insiders tended to blame the "experts" for the invasion's adoption. In a sense, while publicly accepting blame himself, John Kennedy saw the CIA as the real father of defeat. It is true that the CIA used massive amounts of expert power. It is also true that the members of the administration accepted those influences and responded to that power.

First, Dulles and Bissell exercised control over information—a form of expert power. For example, the likelihood of an uprising being triggered by the invasion force's landing was solely left up to the expert judgement of Dulles and Bissell. Despite the crucial nature of this judgement, Dulles did not even consult the Deputy Director of the CIA for Intelligence. In short, the President's only source of information for the feasibility of the invasion was the CIA (Hilsman, 1967, 31 and Walton, 46).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their approval of the plan on the likelihood of an uprising inside the island. In approving the plan, the Chiefs made it clear that the ultimate
success of the plan required a sizable uprising. They relied
upon the untested judgment of Dulles and Bissell that such an
uprising would occur (Schlesinger, 238-239 and Tully, 243).

Secondly, Dulles and Bissell exercised expert power to
present and limit the options before the President. As noted
earlier, the CIA officials were the only sources for options
and the defenders of the invasion. For example, Kennedy was
concerned that if the operation failed, he would look very bad.
This perception on Kennedy's part would serve to offset the
coercive effect of calling the invasion off. Dulles and Bissell
defined failure as an infeasible option. No matter what happens,
they assured the group, the force can make its way to the nearby
mountains and take up guerrilla operations. What better way to
dispose of them? In actuality, less than a third of the force
had received guerrilla training; the nearby mountains were
blocked by an impenetrable swamp; and the invasion leaders had
been told to stay on the beaches and wait for United States
support (Gelb and Halperin, 30; The Reporter, May 11, 1961; Cook,
618; and Sorensen, 1965, 302-303). At no time did any member of
the administration question these judgments by Dulles and Bissell.
Dulles and Bissell were asked questions, and they answered them.
No one even bothered to look at a map showing the swamp.

The CIA was also able to rule out the delay option, which is
a favorite of Presidents not eager for a plan they cannot find a
good reason to cancel. Rising to the occasion, Dulles and Bissell
waged a classic "now or never" argument. Arguing that the
Guatemalan government was impatient with the training of the refugees on its soil, that refugee morale was at its peak and would soon decline, that the rainy season would soon turn the landing area to mud, and that Castro would soon receive jets from the Soviets, the CIA said it would require the use of the United State Marines and Air Force to overthrow Castro after June 1 (Schlesinger, 239-240; Sorensen, 1965, 295-296; and Gelb and Halperin, 31). (In short, the Guatemalan government, the refugees, God, and the Soviet government were all enlisted in a push for an immediate decision.)

The CIA was not the only expert power-wielding force operating during the deliberations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did approve of the plan's military feasibility. Following a time-honored tradition (Allison, 125), no one in the administration questioned the expert judgment of the Joint Chiefs. The major flaws of the plan—the first night-time amphibious landing ever and a forgotten or ignored coral reef—made it susceptible to questioning even by relative amateurs (Johnson, 104).

But it was not questioned. The expert authority of the CIA and the Joint Chiefs was largely accepted with little opposition. The flaws were there to see, but no one in authority looked. The necessary information suggesting the uprising would fail to materialize existed in and out of the government, but no one saw it (Hilsman, 1971, 130). Doubts about the plan existed but were not raised (Sorensen, 1965, 306). Arthur Schlesinger wrote about this neglect of potential power. He relates to us that the
publicity the plan had received was easily sufficient to eliminate
the element of surprise and blow the fragile cover story. The
information was public knowledge (even in *Time*), "but no one
in the interregnum seemed to feel final responsibility, and so
matters drifted along" (Schlesinger, 235). The administration
drifted into the perfect failure.

The question now becomes, why did those with the potential
to exercise power respond with only apathy? The effective
exercise of power requires both an attempt and a response. To
"blame" the experts for attempting power exercise is to ignore
the acceptance of that power attempt. Why, then, did the group
respond to the coercive power attempts? After all, the political
damage done by failure exceeded any damage possible by cancella-
tion. Why, then, did the group perceive as legitimate CIA
domination of the information and presentation processes? After
all, the President and his senior advisors surely had legitimate
claims to make as well. Why, then, did the group accept the
expert power exercised by Dulles and Bissell? Other information
was available if they had merely looked. In short, why did the
group allow matters to drift along?

These questions really ask why those who could have exercised
power did not do so. For an answer, I turn to a review of the
perceptions and expectations of the group which determined the
exercise of power.

46
Perceptions and Expectations of the Group

Maybe we've been oversold on the fact that we can't say no to this.

-Dean Rusk

Rusk's reflective statement occurred several days before the final April 4 meeting, as he mulled the possibility of drawing up a balance sheet detailing the plan's advantages and disadvantages (Schlesinger, 257). For whatever reason, the Secretary of State never got around to saying "no". The other decision-makers considering the invasion plan were similarly oversold on the fact that they could not say no. Their own perceptions of the situation and expectations of the decision process oversold them.

The Realization of the Opportunity to Exercise Power

The perceptual process limits the ability to recognize or to realize opportunities for power utilization through the filtering and interpretative processes.

Filtering of Information. Presidents are dependent on their advisors for a wide variety of information necessary for decisions (Halperin, 1972, 310). Usually advisors have their own interests and motivations which lead them to filter the information they provide the President. Advisors will be under strong temptation to provide the President only with information he would like to hear or they would like him to hear (de Riveria, 232).

In the case of the Bay of Pigs, Dulles and Bissell filtered
their information and the President's by excluding all of the concerned intelligence experts, including their own, from the informative process (Schlesinger, 248). In short, by controlling the sources of information, Dulles and Bissell filtered information available to the decision-makers.

Another process of information filtering is simply to ignore or not "attend" to relevant information one does not wish to hear. In May of 1969 a carefully conducted poll of Cubans indicated strong support for the Castro government and virtually no hope of stimulating an uprising against Castro.

A report of this poll and its conclusions was widely circulated throughout the government. Over five hundred copies were sent to the State Department, the White House, and other relevant agencies. The New York Times carried a rather detailed account stressing the report's conclusions. Schlesinger, reading the report after the invasion, wished he had seen it earlier. Despite the importance of the uprising in the invasion's planning, the report was never brought to the attention of the group (de Rivera, 41-42 and Cantil, 4-5). President Kennedy was actually aware of a report in the New York Herald Tribune which concluded that Castro had strong support among the Cuban people. The neglect of these two reports, both available and at least one known to the decision-makers, suggests that information was filtered by the psychological desire not to "see" it (Walton, 46).

Interpretation of Information. Once data is recognized, it is still subject to the interpretation of the individual. Dulles
and Bissell were obviously so biased in favor of the plan that any negative information which got through their filtering process would be likely to be interpreted "away". Bissell recognized the strength of his commitment to the plan and warned the group to discount his bias (Schlesinger, 241). Dulles was apparently less open and candid with himself and the group. To the bitter end, he blamed the invasion's failure on a cancelled second air strike (Dulles, 176). Dulles and Bissell viewed information through the distorted perspective of their own prejudice (Halperin, 1971, 73).

John Kennedy and his closest advisors interpreted incoming information and issues in their own particular way as well. Three forces colored their perspective of the issues: (1) the determined, tough-mindedness of a new, winning administration; (2) the crusading anti-communism of John Kennedy; and fusing the first two forces, (3) John Kennedy's tough, anti-Castro speeches during the campaign.

(1). The Kennedy administration virtually swept into office with the power, confidence, style, and determination to get America moving again. The feeling and image of the new administration was one of virility, of toughness, and of action (Halberstram, 39-41). Sorensen reports that doubts were never expressed partly out of a fear of being labeled 'soft' or undaring in the eyes of colleagues (Sorensen, 1965, 306). Sorensen, moreover, reports that Kennedy perceived his approval "to be a test of his mettle" (Sorensen, 1965, 305-306). Schlesinger also notes that while the
invasion's proponents could "strike virile poses", the opponents were afraid the CIA and the military would see them as "soft-headed idealists" rather than the "really tough guys" they were (Schlesinger, 256). Remarkable admissions, these--unless one recognizes that the new administration did see itself as "tough", "virile", and "daring". The rhetoric and style of the Kennedy administration was not a public image--it was real. Virtually everything that was said must be seen in this framework. Sure, John Kennedy was skeptical; sure, the plan was risky. But risky, bold plans were the type that appealed to "the Kennedy spirit". It was a plan of action and was therefore "irresistable" (Sidney, 124).

(2). While not really fitting the strong anti-communism mold of the Acheson wing of the party, John Kennedy was not "about to rush ahead of events...by calling for changes in the almost glacierlike quality of the Cold War." He was still a cold warrior (Halberstram, 21-24). In the "spirit of the Truman Doctrine," Kennedy eagerly saw Soviet endorsement of wars of national liberation as a challenge to the United States (Fulbright, S29). Kennedy was an enthusiastic supporter of methods to counter guerrilla warfare, seeing this as the mechanism of Soviet power in the future (Halberstram, 409). Sorensen reports that Kennedy had exceptionally strong anti-Castro feelings which may have effected his judgment (Sorensen, 306). After all, Castro was the ultimate example of a successful revolution (although when he became Communist is a matter of dispute).
(3). Kennedy's anti-communism and anti-Castroism, together with his action-oriented, "get America moving" pose, resulted in a political position which reflected and reinforced his bias. In a study of major Kennedy speeches, Eckhardt and White point out that the major expressed values were peace, military strength, nonaggression, and determination. Kennedy saw the Soviets as aggressive and less peace-loving than the United States (Eckhardt and White, 326-328). Kennedy's broad anti-communism focused on Castro particularly. In the 1960 campaign, Kennedy repeatedly pressed Nixon on the do-nothing position of the Eisenhower administration (not knowing of the Bay of Pigs planning). He spoke of the need for a "serious offensive" against Castro, presumably by the anti-Castro forces who offered eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. These "fighters for freedom", he noted, "have had virtually no support from our government" (Walton, 36-38). In short, Kennedy's rhetoric reflected his strong anti-communism and his action-orientation. His rhetoric certainly provided the basis to whatever coercive power the CIA exercised over him.

Whether his rhetoric reflected his attitude or whether, as Sorensen and Schlesinger report, he was skeptical and against the plan, we cannot be certain. Popular leaders tend to believe their own rhetoric (Frank, 173-174). Moreover, Acheson reports an early conversation with John Kennedy which indicates the President's commitment to the plan was greater than Schlesinger and Sorensen would have us believe (Walton, 44). We must remember,
of course, that Sorensen learned of Kennedy's skepticism after the invasion failed. And Schlesinger may have been overly eager to find support in his President. At any rate, Kennedy was mindful that "history depends on who writes it" and may have been covering his tracks. Most likely, I suppose, is that Kennedy was a man of contrasts. After all, skepticism of a bold and daring plan may have existed along with an irresistible attraction to it, because it was bold and daring action.

These perceptual influences help explain Robert Kennedy's pressuring of Schlesinger. Moreover, the view of a tough-minded, anti-communist, action-oriented Kennedy would be somewhat favorable towards the plan. The coercive power of the CIA is reinforced by Kennedy's perception. His willingness to accept the legitimate and expert power influences of the CIA are more understandable when we recognize that he wanted to accept such influences. In short, we now have the picture of a skeptical and worried President—what if the invasion should fail? But the President was also attracted by this bold plan of action—what if it works? John Kennedy wanted to be convinced it would succeed. He was ready and willing to respond to the power exercised by Dulles and Bissell.

The Appropriateness of the Exercise of Power

Power is effectively exercised only in situations where it is appropriate or "right". Rusk's feeling of being "oversold" is, to a large degree, the result of a feeling of inappropriateness
associated with the use of power. This feeling of inappropriateness helps explain the failure to act of many who could have exercised power. Appropriateness is determined by the group's etiquette, roles, and its task/interpersonal orientation.

**Etiquette.** The decision-makers in the Bay of Pigs interacted by a code of politeness and cordiality. The "aura of assumed consensus" which hung over the group was the result of a non-critical atmosphere. Janis' interpretation of the non-challenging demeanor is that it reflected the interpersonal attraction between Dulles and Bissell and the decision-making group (Janis, 1972, 46-47). I have already indicated that the referent power of Dulles and Bissell was limited and that the attraction Janis sees was largely a result of expert power. In light of this interpretation, how does one explain the undeniable presence of a norm against critical challenge of the plan? As we shall see shortly, the interpersonal orientation of the group operated to support an etiquette of polite, friendly interaction. The group was trapped in an image of sophistication which dictated the genteel, club-like atmosphere. The operation of an interpersonal orientation implies a code of conduct more general than the taboo against antagonizing new members suggested by Janis.

**Roles.** Role conceptions operate to define our area of acceptable or appropriate behavior. In at least four cases, the role conceptions of the members of the decision group operated to limit the exercise of power. The exercise of power by Dulles, Bissell, Robert Kennedy, and Dean Rusk was seen by each as an
appropriate activity.

Arthur Schlesinger reports that he felt a mere historian and Presidential aid had little right questioning the heads of major departments. Schlesinger felt that as an aid, he could speak at the request of the President but ought not to volunteer his criticisms (Schlesinger, 240). Of course, the deference of a subordinate towards his superior is a classic example of role limitations.

Chester Bowles was limited in his exercise of power by a similar deference. Upon learning of the invasion, Bowles did not press his criticisms in the absence of his boss. Instead, he waited until Rusk returned to ask permission to express his dissent (Schlesinger, 251). Certainly, Bowles' response to Rusk's desire for him not to press his case is a clear matter of subordinate roles. But Bowles' silence in Rusk's absence, when as Acting Secretary he could be expected to speak out, is the result of his special definition of his own role as Acting Secretary.

Dean Rusk himself never got around to expressing his doubts or permitting Bowles to express his. At the center of Rusk's remarkable silence was his concept of the role of a Secretary of State. Following the example of his mentor and near-hero, Secretary George Marshall, Rusk saw himself as a counselor and mediator, not as an advocate or critic. Rusk "seemed to feel that it was inappropriate for the secretary of state to do battle in the name of the department" (Hilsman, 1971, 169). Rusk's role
as judge and personal counselor to the President meant that the political considerations that are the State Department's concern are defended by an assistant secretary, if at all (Hilsman, 1971, 169). In the case of the Bay of Pigs, they were defended by no one. Dean Acheson, a different kind of Secretary of State, when asked what it took to perform his job replied, "a killer instinct" (Hilsman, 1967, 59). Dean Rusk was not a killer in the sense that Acheson was.

Rusk's unwillingness to exercise the power of his office due to the limitations of his role concept is beautifully summarized by David Halberstram:

Rusk had a great sense of the function of the office; he believed in people playing their parts, that and no more. He believed that if the Secretary and the President did not agree, it was virtually a constitutional crisis. When Rusk set forth his views forcefully at a National Security Council meeting it was a sure sign that he had already conferred with the President, found that they agreed and thus had been encouraged to speak out within the bureaucracy. But in all this, there was one curious anomaly; Rusk, who had risen to what was the second most powerful position in the nation, did not really covet power... He was a modest man in a job which does not entail modesty but demands that the incumbent fight and dominate an entire area of policy making (Halberstram, 345).

Rusk did not fight, and so the battle was lost by default.

The operation of role limitations on other Presidential advisors is less clear. Sorensen writes that many advisors look upon it as their "role" to be "mediators" who support the consensus which seems to be developing in order to aid the President (Sorensen, 1963, 61). National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy clearly saw himself as a mediator, whose role was to see that every view was examined (Anderson, 324-325). Bundy's role in the Bay of Pigs is not well documented, but it certainly was not the fulfillment of the mediator role—seeing that all views were fairly examined. Perhaps that role concept developed in the aftermath of the "perfect failure".

Task/Interpersonal Orientation. The Kennedy administration assumed office with a strong sense of *esprit de corps*. Their style, their brains, their winning—everything was "all-star" (Halberstram, 39-40). Upon assuming office, Kennedy and his advisors had a sense of "enormous confidence" in their luck. They had won the nomination and the elections against all odds and all comers. Thus, entered the new administration as the winning team (Schlesinger, 259). The sense of togetherness, the feeling of being on a winning team, and the friendly demeanor of the group's meetings all suggest an orientation towards interpersonal relations rather than towards tasks.

An interpersonal orientation is marked by cooperative, non-challenging interaction among members. The group does not wish to stress differences in power, so no challenge of asserted power is made. It is easy to see how Dulles and Bissell, who did not feel the euphoria of the new day, were able to step in, exert their power, and go unchallenged. To challenge the respected experts would have been to spoil the whole feeling. No one felt the responsibility because no one cared that much about the task at hand.
The Desirability of the Exercise of Power

The interpersonal orientation produces an atmosphere of consensus since there is a friendly, cooperative character to the interaction among members. The atmosphere of consensus, in turn, reduces the willingness of members to use power, since the desirability of power exercise is partly dependent upon a feeling of potential success. In the interpersonal oriented group, members do not perceive the possibility of success and accordingly suppress their doubts.

Presidential advisors, like virtually anyone, are afraid to take a stand alone. They fear that they will earn the reputation of a nuisance or incur the "disapprobation" of the group (Sorensen, 1963, 62 and de Riveria, 233). Schlesinger reflects the feelings of one advisor who held back in anticipation of failure which would "have accomplished little save to gain me a name as a nuisance" (Schlesinger, 255). Rusk, too, held back at the White House meetings, though he was a "penetrating" questioner at State Department meetings (Hilsman, 1967, 58).

Assuming the uncritical approach of the interpersonal orientation meant agreement, the decision-makers felt that the expression of their own doubts would be a futile effort that could do them harm. Perhaps they were mindful of the desirability of protecting their future power by not wasting it on a lost cause (Hilsman, 1969, 365). At any rate, the decision-makers may have seen the desirability of power exercise as limited by the appearance of "unanimity" and "assumed consensus" (Janis, 1972, 38-39).
In summary, the Bay of Pigs decision was a decision made by a cohesive group of men under heavy pressures for conformity. The direction of conformity pressures was towards the policy options advocated by the most effective user of power, the CIA. Dulles and Bissell relied heavily upon the expert power they possessed through control of information and options to dominate every meeting. A subtle use of coercive and legitimate power and the limited use of referent power backed up the influence exercised from knowledge and competence.

Why was the CIA allowed to be the only source of expert power? Why was the coercive power effective in light of the more painful political consequences of defeat? The answers to these questions are to be found in the perceptions and expectations of the group. The perception of the Kennedy administration of the decision process was biased towards acceptance by the President's tough, action-oriented anti-communism. The role limitations of several major advisors kept them from expressing the doubts which would have disturbed the "atmosphere of assumed consensus" which hung over the group's meetings. And finally, the interpersonal orientation of a new administration weakened concern for the task at hand. "No one accepted final responsibility," because there was more concern with getting along than with getting the job done. The "illusion of unanimity" which resulted from the cooperative, friendly atmosphere of interpersonal orientation operated to reduce the desire to exercise power by members who saw their efforts as futile and even harmful. The members of the
administration had been "oversold" on their inability to say no to the invasion plan, but it is doubtful that they ever knew what hit them.
CHAPTER IV
THE AFTERMATH TO THE BAY OF PIGS:
PRELUDE TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

It's a hell of a way to learn things, but I learned one thing from this business— that is, that we will have to deal with the CIA.

-John Kennedy

John Kennedy's view of the Bay of Pigs as an embarrassing learning device made possible by the CIA reflects the attitude of the entire administration. Hilsman writes that the lessons of the Bay of Pigs enabled Kennedy to avoid future mistakes in the Missile Crisis (Hilsman, 1967, 30). Sorensen reports that Kennedy was later "grateful that he had learned so many major lessons...at so relatively small and temporary a cost" (Sorensen, 1965, 308). And Schlesinger concludes that the lessons learned in the failure turned the Bay of Pigs from a "misfortune" to a "benefit" which "contributed to success in Cuba in 1962" (Schlesinger, 297).

What did they think they had learned? Who was, after John Kennedy's almost pretentious acceptance of full responsibility, really the father of defeat? The major analysis of the invasion by Sorensen probably closely reflects Presidential thinking. Sorensen learned of the invasion only after it failed through extensive discussions with John Kennedy. And while this after-the-fact process may limit Sorensen's creditability when speaking about what happened, it increases his creditability when speaking
about what Kennedy thought happened.

While recognizing Kennedy's errors, Sorensen's thrust is towards the failures of the CIA. "It was clear to him," Sorensen writes, "that he had in fact approved a plan bearing little resemblance to what he thought he had approved. Therein lies the key to the Bay of Pigs decision" (Sorensen, 1965, 301).

Sorensen attributes the gap between reality and Presidential perception to the newness of the administration, the pressures of time, secrecy, and the disorganization of crisis planning. Implicit in Sorensen's analysis is that the newness of the administration limited Kennedy's judgment of his advisors (meaning he did not question "the recognized experts"). The pressures of time and secrecy imposed by the CIA limited "realistic alternatives" and resulted in "no realistic appraisal", and no strong "voice of opposition". And while the new administration was not yet organized for crisis planning, others such as the CIA and the Joint Chiefs were (Sorensen, 1965, 304-305). In short, the "experts" in the CIA and the Joint Chiefs were clearly the villains of the Kennedy piece and the "fathers" of defeat. Robert Kennedy reflected John Kennedy's reaction to the defeat by telling an aide the day after the failure that on the basis of the information presented, the decision was correct. "But," he continued, "the information was not wholly accurate" (Guthman, 112).

The first tangible change in the administration in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs reflects the lessons Kennedy thought he had learned. The power and cohesion of the "generalists" in
the administration increased while the power and attractiveness of the "experts" declined. Bundy and Sorensen gained great influence on Kennedy (Anderson, 241). Moreover, Kennedy, a generalist by nature, called around him men whom he, in effect, licensed to be generalists and to do what generalists do best—namely, question and distrust experts (Anderson, 234 and Guthman, 114). Bundy's influence in particular increased in the wake of the apathy of Dean Rusk at State. Bundy's office became a virtual "little State Department", often dominating that department in the foreign policy process (Halperin, 1972, 315-316 and Anderson, 318-319).

The second result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs was the increase in the toughness and determination of John Kennedy. Kennedy felt he had appeared indecisive to Khrushchev. The tough-minded realists in the administration were strengthened. Kennedy looked forward to his June meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna as the battleground where he could show Khrushchev, face-to-face, that he was as tough as the old Russian. The President left Vienna badly shaken by the bullying given him by the older Khrushchev. By the end of Vienna and the Bay of Pigs, John Kennedy saw his central problem with Khrushchev to be one of convincing the Russian of his determination and nerve (George, 98-99 and Halberstram, 72).

Bundy, the tough and newly powerful advisor, commented in his calm, cool manner on the day after the invasion failed, "just a brick through the window" (Halberstram, 67-68). A brick, the
feeling was clear, thrown by the experts. And so the experts were banished and the administration proceeded to the brink of nuclear war in the missile crisis, confident a valuable lesson had been learned.
CHAPTER V

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

It was now up to one single man. No committee was going to make this decision.

-Robert Kennedy

Almost every President is reluctant to overrule the determined opposition of his advisors as he is to veto an act of Congress. He rules, to a degree, not only with their advice but with their consent.

-Theodore Sorensen

Robert Kennedy strains for a climax in his dramatic story when he writes that, following days of deliberation by a group of advisors, the final decision would be one man's. As Sorensen notes, that single man would be highly unlikely to reject the advice of a committee of advisors including his brother and most trusted friends. He decided, then, with their advice and their consent. John Kennedy himself admitted that the support of the majority for the course "we finally took...made it much easier" to decide (Sorensen, 1963, 81). The story of John Kennedy's decision is, then, the story of a group of advisors striving amidst conflict for consensus.

The Decision: Conformity

Having been informed of the intelligence data indicating the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, John Kennedy pulled his closest advisors around him. The fourteen men included McCone, Bundy, the new CIA Director John McCone, Sorensen, Paul...
Nitzc the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Allison, 185). The group, designated ExCom, met intensively from Tuesday, October 16, until the final decision on Saturday morning, October 20. In the beginning, these men "whistled many different tunes."

Before the final decision on Saturday "a majority whistled a single tune: the blockade" (Allison, 200 and Janis, 1972, 144). The process by which this consensus emerged is a process of power.

On the first day the choice seemed to lie between an air strike or some non-military option such as diplomatic action. The non-military course was supported forcefully by two powerful advocates—Robert MacNamara and McGeorge Bundy. Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon (Secretary of the Treasury), and Dean Rusk forcefully opposed the non-military alternatives. The President indicated his rejection of such action at the outset of the meeting and at the end confirmed his continued desire for military action. By Wednesday, October 17, the non-military alternatives were virtually ignored as the ExCom focused on two military alternatives: the air strike and the blockade (see Allison, 200-202 and Schlesinger, 803).

On that Tuesday and Wednesday, the air strike seemed to appeal strongly to the members of ExCom. Kennedy's preference is revealed in a Wednesday conversation with United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. Meeting on Wednesday, October 17, without the campaigning President, MacNamara first launched an attack on the air strike alternative. Moved by visions of nuclear
disaster, MacNamara switched his support to the naval blockade as a way of blocking the more harsh air strike. Robert Kennedy may have swung the balance of support towards the blockade when he joined MacNamara by arguing the moral superiority of a blockade to a surprise "Pearl Harbor" type of attack. Dean Acheson sharply dismissed Kennedy's moral argument and his analogy with Pearl Harbor as emotional and intuitive rather than serious and analytical. By the time John Kennedy returned on Wednesday night, MacNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Sorensen had formed a "triple alliance" in support of the blockade. The Joint Chiefs, McConne, Rusk, Nitze, and Acheson lined up behind the blockade (Allison, 202-204; Sorensen, 1965, 683-684; Schlesinger, 804-807; Robert Kennedy, 37-42; and Acheson, 76).

On Thursday, October 18, ExCom continued to meet without the President. The blockade emerged as the choice of the majority. That evening the President returned to the group for a meeting running well past midnight. At that meeting Dillon switched and joined the blockade group largely on the basis of Robert Kennedy's moral arguments. Bundy also switched over on the basis of MacNamara's argument for "maintaining the options" by beginning with blockade and moving to an air strike if necessary. The President indicated a "tentative decision" in favor of the blockade and ordered Sorensen to begin speech writing (Abel, 80-81; Allison, 205; Robert Kennedy, 43-46; and Sorensen, 1965, 691).

On Friday, October 19, as the President prepared to leave on another campaign trip to keep up appearances, the Joint Chiefs
prevailed upon him to delay his flight in order to plead for an air strike or an invasion. Following this meeting, Kennedy called Sorensen, disgusted with the continued conflict, and directed him and the Attorney General to "pull the group together quickly." Friday morning when ExCom met, it was clear the President had left behind a restless group of advisors. Acheson still waged war against the blockade option. Bundy was again uncertain of his earlier choice. And Rusk expressed his usual mild doubts. And, of course, the Joint Chiefs were certain about what they thought was necessary for the nation's security.

Robert Kennedy, striving for consensus, flatly stated that his brother could never order a surprise air strike. Sorensen, trading off his special relationship with the President and frustrated by his inflamed ulcer, warned that "we are not serving the President well." By nightfall Friday, the air strike was a lost cause. Dean Acheson, the leader of the air strike proponents, left for his Maryland farm feeling he had come to the end of his usefulness. Robert Kennedy then called the President in Chicago and told him the group was "ready to meet with him" (Abel, 83-89; Allison, 207-208; Schlesinger, 806-807; Sorensen, 1965, 692-693; and Robert Kennedy, 47-48).

On Saturday, October 20, the group approved or acquiesced in the blockade option. Far from unanimity, a straw vote indicated eleven for the blockade and six for the air strike. Although voting for the blockade, the President stressed that it was a first step only, which did not rule out a future air strike.
Sorensen writes in exaggeration that by the time the President finished, "those members of our group who had come to the meeting still advocating an air strike or invasion had been essentially won over by the course he outlined." The weakness of the conformity process Sorensen sees is reflected in the bitter battles which immediately broke out over the diplomatic moves to accompany the blockade and in the frequent conflicts throughout the remainder of the crisis, as ExCom faced the choices forced by the "maintaining the options" approach (Allison, 208-209; Sorensen, 1965, 694; Schlesinger, 808-809; Robert Kennedy, 48; and George, 127-128).

Most members of the Kennedy circle viewed the missile crisis decision process as the antithesis of the Bay of Pigs process. It was for them the ultimate test of the lessons they had learned. It was almost an atonement for past sins (see MacNamara in R. Kennedy, 14 and Guthman, 112). Irving Janis likewise sees the missile crisis as the "counterpoint" of the failures of the Cuban fiasco a year and a half before. Janis credits the group with an openness and willingness to criticize that existed despite the normal conformity pressures. This openness was the result, Janis feels, of a new group norm operating to require criticism (Janis, 1972, 142-150). The question is, then, to what extent did pressures towards conformity operate? Conformity pressures operate, if successful, to reduce openness and criticism, once a consensus has emerged.

Janis himself indicates an occasional doubt about the openness
of the ExCom. John Kennedy forced his decision on the group for a military option, and MacNamara and Bundy quickly abandoned their position in the face of Presidential opposition (Janis, 1972, 142). One cannot escape the feeling that the President decided in favor of the blockade on Wednesday, and the discussions Thursday and Friday were to "bring the hawks around" (Hilsman, 1971, 129-130). After all, the President must have the support of his advisors, and persuasion is a more lasting force than is command (Hilsman, 1971, 24-25 and Neustadt, 34).

The "engineers of consensus" on Thursday and Friday were Robert Kennedy and Sorensen, who acted on the basis of their special relationships to "bring the group around" on Friday and to solidify the conversions of Dillon and Bundy (Allison, 207-209). The psychological rejection of Acheson, indicated by his sudden departure and bitter attitude, and the subsequent attacks on Stevenson for his Saturday argument for patient diplomacy, indicate the operation of a strong conformity pressure (Halberstram, 28; Walton, 119; and Allison, 209).

Despite the conformity pressures, Janis is right to a degree. There was an openness of conflict and a display of power present in the missile crisis decision-making process that was absent in the Bay of Pigs. The exercise of power, so clear and so diverse, determined which option that the eventual conformity pressures would operate around.
The Effective Exercise of Power

And Crispin Crispin shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.

- Shakespeare

The Bard's comment about the end of the world has a slightly frightening note to it in conjunction with the missile crisis. More frightening is the fact that the sense of comradeship in arms represented by the Bard was a favorite piece of Kennedy verse (John Kennedy often referred to his advisors as "we band of brothers"). The role of these feelings of an elite esprit de corps in the determination of the outcome of ExCom deliberations was a significant one.

Reward Power

Any President or any Secretary of State exercises reward power over his advisors. The power of a President to reward advisors he likes or appreciates is a natural function of the power of the office (Neustadt, 179). Seen in this light, the President's initial instructions to ExCom that "something be done" seems capable of producing the quick retreat of MacNamara and Bundy. After all, given the determined opposition of their superior, they had much to gain by conformity.

Coercive Power

Opposition to a superior also threatens the punishment a
superior can often exercise. Certainly, John Kennedy did not threaten Bundy and MacNamara, but they must have been mindful of the treatment Chester Bowles received following the Bay of Pigs. And John Kennedy's harsh treatment of Adlai Stevenson's late Saturday dissent must have served notice to those who contemplated future deviance.

Kennedy sharply attacked Stevenson at the Saturday meeting, leaving Stevenson badly wounded (Abel, 95-96). Moreover, despite repeated denials, subsequent press stories quoting a high White House official as saying Stevenson "wanted a Munich" and generally being highly critical of the UN ambassador's role were "leaks" from Kennedy. A magazine editor has revealed that the Munich line was from Kennedy himself, who insisted it be printed. As in the Bowles case, Kennedy was not adverse to using the damaging coercive power of "leaks" to punish those who crossed him when he was in no mood for it (Halberstram, 27).

Coercive power is also exercised by a dissenter in a Presidential decision. The use of leaks to charge a lack of consultation or just to distort the picture of the decision process (as Kennedy in Stevenson's case) is a major source of coercive power (Sorensen, 1963, 80). Certainly, Acheson, the Joint Chiefs, and Stevenson as dissenters possessed this potential power.

But John Kennedy's response to this potential threat was to cover his tracks carefully. Kennedy's blockade decision was carefully phrased as a first step only to reflect his desire
for a clear record (Hilsman, 1971, 129-130). Further, the
President met individually to consult with Acheson, thus
weakening Acheson's basis for complaint (Allison, 207). Kennedy
personally sought the advice of the Air Force Tactical Command
on the military feasibility of a surgical air strike and delayed
his Friday trip to hear out the military, thus weakening their
claims to inadequate counsel (Allison, 124 and 206). Stevenson,
consulted late on Saturday, October 20, might have felt shut out,
but Kennedy attacked Stevenson first in an effort to discredit
any future criticism Stevenson might make. In short, John
Kennedy's response to the possibility of punishment was to cover
his tracks, not to follow the path of dissent.

Referent Power

John Kennedy would clearly have been less able and willing
to offset the coercive effects of dissenters if MacNamara,
Sorensen, and his brother had been among them. But the referent
power of these three made it unlikely that he ever considered
opposing them.

Robert Kennedy's influence over his brother is well-known
and extensive. He exercised a personal, intimate influence
unsurpassed by anyone else. Sorensen's influence was more
generalized but equally strong in its own way. Sorensen was a
man virtually absorbed by John Kennedy. He said without
embarrassment or regret that he "had given eleven years" of his
life for John Kennedy, and for him during that time, "he (John

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Kennedy) was the only human being who mattered." His 1963 divorce is perhaps understandable. At any rate, Sorensen was the major liberal influence on John Kennedy's political thinking (Anderson, 223-224). Robert MacNamara was similarly a personal friend and a popular and much-admired figure in the Kennedy circle (Halberstram, 245-246).

Of course, all of these men were influenced by the President and by interpersonal attraction. MacNamara, for example, became a virtual "brother" in the Kennedy family, being called upon many times in the tragedies that fell upon them in the years ahead. Asked once who his friends were, MacNamara could only say, "the Kennedys--I like the Kennedys" (Halberstram, 223-224). Sorensen's devotion to Kennedy is painfully obvious, and he took much ribbing due to his tendency to copy even the social mannerisms of his President (Anderson, 242). The attraction between Robert Kennedy and Robert MacNamara which grew during the missile crisis receives eloquent testimony from MacNamara's forward to Kennedy's book: "And common exposure to danger forges bonds and understanding between men stronger than those formed by decades of close association. So it was that I came to know, admire, and love Robert F. Kennedy by his behavior during the Cuban missile crisis" (in R. Kennedy, 13).

Thus, the supporters of the blockade formed a "triple alliance" of the President's natural friends, supporters, and "brothers". Contrast this group of natural associates with the group of outsiders supporting the air strike: Acheson, McCon
the Joint Chiefs, and (sometimes) Rusk.

Acheson has made his personal aversion to the process of decision-making in ExCom quite clear. His personal dislike for the emotional Robert Kennedy and his bitter and intense exchanges with the President's brother could not help but alienate Acheson from John Kennedy. Moreover, Kennedy was posed between the Stevenson and Acheson foreign policy wings of his party and thus found it difficult to be personally attracted to either man (Halberstram, 21-24; Acheson, 76-77; and Abel, 64-65).

John McConne's appointment as Director of the CIA would be comparable in shock value and diversity of opinion to, say, Richard Nixon's appointment of Daniel Ellsberg. McConne was a California millionaire with a tarnished right wing. He was John Kennedy's third choice and was primarily a political ploy to keep the conservatives on the Hill off his back. That McConne did, but it did not win him any popularity contests at the White House. For example, Strom Thurman said on the Senate floor that McConne "epitomizes what has made America great." With friends like that, McConne did not need enemies. His friends were not Kennedy's friends, and that says it all (Halberstram, 152-153).

The Joint Chiefs exerted virtually no referent power over the administration. General Maxwell Taylor, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, possessed some personal influence (Halberstram, 162), but was overshadowed by the less subtle and impressive members of the Staff. The President viewed the military as insensitive to the forces of world politics and was appalled by
their narrow military parochialism. An example of the insensitivity with which the military viewed the international scene is provided by the vocal Air Force Chief, Curtis LeMay. On Sunday, October 28, after the Russians had agreed to withdraw their missiles, he urged the President to "attack Monday in any case" (R. Kennedy, 118-120 and Allison, 206).

Following the weak performance of Dean Rusk and the State Department, the President's confidence and trust of Rusk slipped badly (Hilsman, 1971, 163-164). Rusk's conception of his role and his total lack of "Kennedy style" separated him from the President's circle of friends. Unlike MacNamara, Sorensen, or Bundy, John Kennedy could never bring himself to call Rusk by his first name. John Kennedy and Dean Rusk were not on the same wavelength at all (Halberstram, 343-346).

A final word about Adlai Stevenson: Stevenson labored under the additional burden of being regarded as weak and indecisive by the Kennedys. He was the subject of "thinly veiled contempt" by the White House and of humiliating jokes about his indecisiveness. He was someone "to take Jackie to the theatre" (Halberstram, 26-28). Perhaps Kennedy would have been less harsh on a man he did not find so contemptible.

Picture how things must have looked to President Kennedy returning the evening of Wednesday, October 17. MacNamara had swung over in support of the blockade. He had received strong support from the President's brother who used moral arguments about what a President could and could not do. Finally, Sorensen
added his support. Against the President's "band of brothers" was Acheson, an ex-Secretary of State who reflected to the cold warrior wing of the party. There was McConi, the conservative friend of Strom Thurmond, et cetera. There were the Joint Chiefs, who really wanted an all-out invasion. And there was Rusk, who was more indecisive than convinced. Bundy's presence in the air strike camp was the one advantage in terms of referent power they had. And it took all day Thursday and heavy pressure Friday, but he too was finally won over (Allison, 206-207). Given the power of identification to induce change in personal beliefs and given the strength of the referent power operating in favor of the blockade, there is little doubt that John Kennedy acted with his advisors' advice and consent.

Legitimate Power

Exercise of legitimate power is a natural assumed function of the man who is President. His orders and his decisions are accepted with little questioning. Acheson never had any illusions about who made the final decision. And yet, even the legitimate power of the President is not a power that can be taken for granted.

The military responded to the Presidential decision by pledging to loyally carry out his orders. What the military did was blatantly ignore a Presidential order. The President ordered the blockade line to be moved from 800 miles out to 500 miles out to provide the Russians with more time for decision. In a classic
example of the weakness of legitimate power, Secretary MacNamara confronted Naval Chief of Operations Anderson at the war room in the Pentagon. Following a heated exchange about the operation, Anderson ended the conversation by saying, "Now Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade." As evidence now makes clear, the Navy ran the blockade 800 miles out, which was in direct contradiction with a Presidential command (Allison, 130-131).

The explanation is that the legitimate power of the President was limited. Presidential operation in the missile crisis overstepped the bounds of legitimate Presidential power in the eyes of the military in two ways. First, the President ignored the hallowed tradition and the basis of military command, the chain of command, by communicating orders directly to officers on ships at sea. Second, the President was making tactical decisions about local matters which are the unquestioned right of local commanders only. Even top generals and admirals do not question the local battlefield judgment of the commander in charge. By overstepping the legitimate reach of his power, the President could not count on the unquestioned obedience of the military (Allison, 129-132).

Expert Power

Expert power includes the control of individual skill and ability as well as the control over information. We have already seen how the skills of "generalists" like MacNamara, Robert Kennedy, Sorensen, Bundy, and Acheson had become highly prized
following the Bay of Pigs. McConne and the Joint Chiefs, by comparison, were the institutional incarnations of the expertise now so distrusted. The President was openly skeptical, for example, about LeMay's assertion that the Soviets would blandly accept an American invasion of Cuba (R. Kennedy, 36).

While the power that comes from being an "expert" may have been reduced in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, the power which comes from the control of information remained a constant. MacNamara particularly excelled in the use of facts, figures, and knowledge (Halberstram, 234-235 and Hilsman, 1967, 43-44). His early argument that the missiles did not pose a significant military threat may have been impressive, but ExCom was not dealing with matters governed by quantifiable facts. ExCom was persuaded not by the alternation of military balance, but by damage to United States prestige. MacNamara could not use his facts and statistics to refute this argument (George, 92). In short, the response to MacNamara's control of information was to go around it by raising issues about which quantification was not available.

When MacNamara turned instead to support of the blockade, his was not Robert Kennedy's moral argument, but first and foremost an argument based on one critical piece of information. The Joint Chiefs had advised the President that a surgical air strike—one which would only take out the offensive missiles—was "militarily infeasible." The Joint Chiefs instead attempted to limit that option by pushing their own option for an air strike...
of virtually all military installations and eventually an invasion (Gelb and Halperin, 30-31 and R. Kennedy, 34).

This information had a powerful influence contrary to the hope of the military. The military hoped the information would serve to limit the air strike option and thus pave the way for the more dramatic military invasion. It is, of course, a classic example of the idea of limiting options through expert power that Halperin outlined. What the information did do was to eliminate the air strike option and thus pave the way for the blockade. The military was too insensitive to see what they were doing in their insistence that a surgical air strike was impossible (Allison, 206).

The power of the information is implied by Acheson, who complained later that "the narrow and specific proposal" he favored "became obscured and complicated by the trimmings added by the military" (Acheson, 76). I would call an invasion a little more than trimmings, but the point is that military control of information provided some control over options (Gelb and Halperin, 30).

Allison writes that the information was wholly inaccurate and that such an air strike was in fact feasible. No one in ExCom, however, questioned the expert judgment of the military. Civilian leaders, unaccustomed to examining the details of military plans, did not question why an air strike must be followed by attacking all military installations and eventually an invasion. The virtually unquestioning acceptance of the expert advice of the Joint Chiefs suggests that the Administration learned its lesson only partly (Allison, 124-126 and 205 and Sorensen, 1965, 691-697).
In summary, MacNamara and Bundy's abandonment of non-military options was a result of the reward and referent power exercised by a determined President and the weakness of MacNamara's expert power in a non-quantitative argument. The choice of the blockade by the President was largely the result of superior referent power exercised by the alliance of Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, and MacNamara. The blockade received further substantial assistance by the military's unwitting provision of information indicating the military infeasibility of the air strike alternative.

A number of unanswered questions remain: (1) Why did John Kennedy exercise power on behalf of military options so early? (2) Why was the advice of the military accepted without questioning by a group originally favorably disposed to the bludgeoned alternative? The contrast between the consensus-laden aura of the Bay of Pigs and the open conflict of the missile crisis suggests a final question: why was power exercised more freely and openly in the missile crisis? For an answer to these questions, we turn to an examination of the perceptions and expectations of the decision-making group.

Perceptions and Expectations of the Group

Courage is the thing. All goes if courage goes.

-Sir James Barrie

Like the knights of yore which Barrie brings to mind, John Kennedy saw his courage being challenged by the Red Knight.
Khrushchev banishing a silver missile. Feeling his courage and will challenged by the old man who bullied him at Vienna and feeling pressured at home by opponents to live up to his rhetoric, John Kennedy entered the arena swinging (George, 98-99 and Walton, 103-120).

The Realization of the Opportunity to Exercise Power

The perceptions of the Kennedy administration of the events of early October operated to limit opportunities for power utilization. Viewing the world through their particular perspective, the Kennedy administration hardly considered the non-military options. Three forces shaped the perception which limited the choices.

(1). The administration viewed the world through red, white, and blue glasses. The strong anti-communism of John Kennedy was less warlike than that of Acheson, but still well within the bounds of Cold War tradition (Fulbright, S29). Kennedy's campaign rhetoric and his foreign policy reflected an anti-communist feeling of which the Bay of Pigs is but one example (Walton, 3-10 and 202-234).

(2). While Kennedy's policy attitudes may have straddled the line between Acheson and Stevenson, his method of operation was the hard-liner Acheson approach. The drive for toughness, the maschismo quality, the determination, all increased following the failures in Cuba and Vienna. John Kennedy's rhetoric reflected his drive for military strength and determination and his
stereotypical view of the Soviets in an aggressive position. Sure, he wanted peace and non-aggression, but the Soviets had to be shown he could be tough, too (Eckhardt and White, 238). Cold warrior Joseph Alsop rejoicing in Kennedy's Stevenson image and his Acheson toughness said after his election: "Isn't he marvelous? A Stevenson with balls" (Halberstram, 24).

(3) A third force shaping the perception of the October crisis was the watchful eye of the voter. With the election in November, the public was watching as Republicans gleefully turned the tables on Kennedy who had attacked Nixon so hard on Cuba in 1960 (Abel, 12-13). Senators Keating, Capehart, Thurman, and Goldwater were needling the administration of the rumored presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba. The needle drew blood. Since the Bay of Pigs, Cuba had been the administration's "heaviest political cross" and in 1962, the Republican Congressional campaign committee pronounced Cuba to be the "dominant issue" of the campaign (Sorensen, 1965, 669). In response to this pressuring Kennedy issued statements on September 4 and 13 warning that the United States would not tolerate the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba (Walton, 108; George, 91; and texts in Larson, 3-4 and 15-16).

These forces shaped the President's perception of the "crisis" from the very beginning. Kennedy's initial response when told of the missiles was anger. He was "furious" at having been deceived (Schlesinger, 801-802). Robert Kennedy echoed the feeling of angered betrayal to an aide the next day: "We kidded ourselves,
the Russians have lied in their teeth" (Guthman, 118). The feeling of having been betrayed and tricked produced similar shock and anger among other members of ExCom (R. Kennedy, 27 and Walton, 117).

After the initial shock, Kennedy's more reflective feeling was that this was the challenge he had been expecting Khrushchev to make since Vienna. He felt that he now faced the "supreme risk" that was necessary for him to face in order to convince Khrushchev of his determination. To convince Khrushchev, Kennedy could not use words; "he has to see you move," the President told a reporter in the aftermath of Vienna (George, 99 and Walton, 118-119). Accordingly, Kennedy decided early against non-military alternatives. As Robert Kennedy remembers, "He knew he would have to act.... What that action would be was still to be determined. But he was convinced from the beginning that he would have to do something" (R. Kennedy, 33). That action was military action, as the President made clear at the first meeting on Tuesday.

The desire for military action was supported by the politics of that October. On the first Tuesday, he sent for a copy of his earlier statements on Cuba. These statements "made it unlikely that he would respond" by anything short of military action (Sorensen, 1965, 34-45). Thus, did the considerations of high strategy (must impress Khrushchev) and of politics (must impress voters) reinforce each other to rule out all alternatives short of military action (Steel, 219-220).
The feeling that he was responding to a challenge to his courage is reflected in the President's announcement of the blockade. Kennedy placed great stress on the "deliberate deception and offensive threats" of the Soviet move. Kennedy then termed the action a "deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted...if our courage and commitment are ever to be trusted again" (in Larson, 41-46). "Our courage"—how much it sounds like the fears of being "soft" rather than "really tough" which were expressed in the Bay of Pigs. Even poor, soft Adlai Stevenson was pressed into service to deliver a tough, White House-supervised attack on the Russians in the United Nations. Stevenson attacked the Soviet "nuclear deceit" so hard one almost wonders whether the missiles bothered anyone at all (in Larson, 137-141).

John Kennedy's interpretation was largely shared by those members of ExCom who eventually supported the blockade. The Joint Chiefs' view of the event was even more strikingly anti-communist and tough-minded. The Chiefs viewed the missiles as an opportunity to launch the invasion to get rid of Castro, which they had wanted since before the Bay of Pigs. Their single-minded devotion to this alternative explains the insensitivity that led them to bludgeon the air strike option they would have preferred to the blockade. The military's inability to see the consequences of their action illustrates how easily our interpretation of events can distort our judgment and preclude the exercise of power on behalf of options we prefer (Allison, 123-126 and 206

In short, the perception of John Kennedy resulted in an interpretation of events which ruled out the use of power on behalf of non-military alternatives. The perception of the Joint Chiefs resulted in an interpretation of events which ruled out the non-invasion alternatives. In their zeal the military also ruled out the only viable alternative to the blockade they opposed so strongly.

The Appropriateness of the Exercise of Power

While the limiting of options was taking place, the atmosphere of the group allowed substantial freedom to appropriately exercise power on behalf of those two options which remained.

Etiquette. The group etiquette required a more open exercise of power among equals. The criticism of alternatives was encouraged as appropriate behavior by the group. It was as though a group norm had developed approving criticism in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs (Janis, 1972, 149-150). There is widespread agreement among the participants that the meetings were open clashes of opinion among "equals" (Schlesinger, 802-803; Acheson, 46; R. Kennedy, 46; and Sorensen, 1965, 679).

Of course, as Acheson does note, the members of the group were not equal in terms of power. Rather, they were equal in the sense that no individual assumed the position or role of a leader or otherwise exercised authority of position. For example, Paul Nitze openly clashed with his superior, Robert
MacNamara at the opening of the first meeting (George, 92).

Roles. The limitations of roles operated to reduce effective power in two cases and to expand it in one. Dean Rusk's role concept of the Secretary of State as the personal advisor of the President had the disadvantage of seriously limiting his influence. Rusk attempted to follow in the footsteps of his mentor, George Marshall, but he did not have Marshall's reputation, which provided Marshall's power base. The result was that Dean Rusk had little effect on the outcome (Halberstam, 344 and Hilsman, 1971, 169).

McGeorge Bundy's role of mediator seeing that every option was heard may account for his strange behavior. Initially supporting a diplomatic approach, then switching to the air strike, and then slowly and hesitantly moving into the blockade camp, Bundy may have been acting out his role by seeing that every view was examined. "I almost deliberately stayed in the minority," he recalls. "I felt very strongly that it was very important to keep the President's choices open" (Anderson, 324-325). While I am uncomfortable with attributing such control and calculation to a decision-maker during a crisis, Bundy's role certainly limited his power to advocate any one option. He, of course, exercised a power in the direction of free options as a goal.

Finally, the role of the Joint Chiefs as the sole and unquestioned providers of military judgments was a strong one. The dilemma facing civilians when faced with military judgments is twofold: first, there are few alternative sources of information and advice on military matters; and second, the prestige and
influence of the military on leading members of Congress makes rejection of their advice a dangerous course (Halperin, 1972, 310-311). The acceptance of the military role suggests that the Kennedy administration may have learned not to trust experts, but not how to go about it.

**Task/Interpersonal Orientation.** The interpersonal orientation of the group during the Bay of Pigs was replaced by a task orientation of the ExCom. Three forces operated to alter the orientation of the group. First, over time the group sought a balance of orientation. With a previously heavy interpersonal orientation, the group sought the balance necessary for cohesiveness by instituting greater task emphasis. Second, following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Kennedy administration came under heavy and continuous political attack for its handling of the operation. External criticism of an interpersonally oriented group's failure will result in a greater task orientation. Third, the missile crisis was a period of greater stress than the Bay of Pigs. The stress faced by the ExCom could be expected to increase task orientation. Thus, we can expect the ExCom to have operated in a manner more indicative of task orientation.

As has been noted earlier, task orientation is characterized by clear power differentials and a critical focus on the job at hand. As we have seen, the etiquette of the ExCom reflected the characteristics of task emphasis. Janis sees the more open and critical approach of ExCom to be the result of a group norm that is the legacy of the Bay of Pigs. I offer an explanation of the
force behind that norm: the task orientation resulting from external criticism of an interpersonal orientation.

The Desirability to Exercise Power

A focus upon the task, especially so important a task, provides the individual with greater desire to exercise power. An interpersonal orientation pits the desire to move the group towards a particular policy option against the larger priority of maintaining close interpersonal relationships. A task orientation poses no conflict for the individual since the desire to move the group towards a particular policy option is consistent with the priority of solving the problem at hand. Robert Kennedy said, "Each one of us was being asked to make a recommendation which would affect the future of all mankind, a recommendation which, if wrong and if accepted, could mean the destruction of the human race" (R. Kennedy, 44). In short, they took the responsibility to act because of the serious consequences of inaction. They believed it mattered how they chose.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The successful application of the facts, as we know them, regarding the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis into a theory of group decision-making supports the theory. The process model seems to be an adequate tool for understanding the events surrounding these two decisions.

Moreover, it is difficult to understand how an analysis of these decisions could reasonably ignore the factors isolated in the process model. Does the Bay of Pigs decision make sense without an understanding of the CIA's exercise of power? Does the silence of other potential power exercisers make sense without the concepts of etiquette, roles, and interpersonal orientations? Does the reference power of blockade supporters aid in the understanding of how the blockade alternative was adopted? Does the open conflict of the missile crisis decision group make sense in contrast with the assumed consensus of the Bay of Pigs group without an understanding of interpersonal perceptions? In short, the answer I would provide is that political decisions can be understood only by viewing the process of how they evolved.

The limitations of available facts pose serious challenges for someone attempting a process analysis. The dominance of the "rational actor model" as the mode of political analysis leads insiders to write not of the details of the decision process, but
of the reasons for the decision. In short, the details of who said what to whom and with what impact are often overlooked. But the dominance of the "rational actor model" has its advantages. Not recognizing the importance of the details of decision process, sympathetic insiders will often betray themselves by disclosing what they think of as a harmless detail. For example, the disclosure by Sorensen and Schlesinger of the perceived threat to the Kennedy image of toughness and determination posed by inaction in either the Bay of Pigs or the Cuban Missile Crisis is a little-noticed detail of great importance if seen within the framework of the process model. Regardless of how many such details exist, we will probably wish to remain open to future data. Accordingly, no analysis can ever be final in the sense of being closed to future revisions or changes. The real question is whether enough information exists to make a profitable analysis. I think enough information exists on the decisions discussed here.

The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile crisis decisions indicate that Presidents, like other mortals, are subject to power exercise and perceptual limitations. The image of the lonely President pacing outside the French windows of the White House deciding in solitude the fate of the world is a false image. Presidents decide in crowded, smoke-filled rooms just like other mortals. Presidents exercise power by virtue of their position and the rewards and punishments that position grants them. Presidents also exercise power based on their personalities and skills. And, of course, Presidents are subject to the power exercised by their advisors.
They decide with their advisors' advice and consent.
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