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Rhetoric and reality in American political pluralism: Jackson-Calhoun controversy in perspective: a thesis ...

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Rhetoric and Reality in American Political Pluralism:

Jackson-Calhoun Controversy in Perspective

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Political Science
The University of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirement for the Degree
Master of Arts in Political Science

by
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This thesis, written and submitted by

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CHAPTER I

HOW STANDS THE UNION?

Our Federal Union -- It must be preserved.
Andrew Jackson

The Union -- next to our liberty most dear.
May we always remember it can only be preserved by
distributing equally the benefits and the burdens
of the Union.
John C. Calhoun

The above toasts, given on an evening set aside to honor the
memory of Thomas Jefferson, dramatized the stances, the strategies,
the ideas and the ideals taken by two major American political
figures, the President and the Vice President of the United States.
Probably few present at the banquet on April 13, 1830 were able to
escape the tension and the power developed by the cordiality of
the eighty toasts offered that evening.

"Mutual forbearance and reciprocal concessions: through
their agency the Union was established. The patriotic spirit from
which they emanated will ever sustain it."^ Martin Van Buren's

1. Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York:

toast completes for us the ideology reflected in the early 1830's. Within the American political framework, Van Buren suggests the means by which consensus and conflict, any faction, could be resolved — by forbearance and reciprocal concessions. These twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh toasts leave an imprint upon the political process and the manner of politics in America.

The rhetoric and the individuals symbolize the differing philosophical positions and processes which each advocated how American politics ought to function. Thus each provided a strategy for responding to a situation. This rhetoric incorporated varying aspects of the philosophy of the Great Philosopher, Thomas Jefferson, with each individual claiming to be a follower of Jefferson. As new dilemmas presented themselves, the inherited political philosophy was employed for strategic responses. This philosophy was held together by an intricate series of interlocking and balanced polarities by men who found themselves in the same political party but representing divergent positions. The unity began to disintegrate as the varying strategies were applied to the different situations, e.g., the Jefferson Memorial dinner of 1830. The holders of the divergent stances, particularly Jackson and Calhoun, all attempted a return to Thomas Jefferson, he who had fragmented the early Federal consensus by founding an institutionalized loyal opposition but yet who had the effrontery when himself elected president of the people to construct

3. Jackson built on Jefferson's theme of democracy and equality of the people while Calhoun turned to his expression on state rights and representation of minorities.

4. Polarity here meaning any tendency to turn, grow, think, feel, etc., in a certain way, as if because of magnetic attraction or repulsion.
a new consensus by proclaiming "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists!"  

What eventuated from the polarities was not so much an alteration of Jefferson's belief system as it was an explosion of that system. The preliminary sparks were ignited in 1828-1833 with the tariff issues; the full impact was felt in the 1860's, even in the 1960's. The situation at point of impact reveals both those forces integrating new values and those resisting change. The Jacksonian Era represents an encounter of political consensus and political conflict at a point of rapid change.

The essential problems of politics are ancient, general, and persistent. A particular political system, such as that of the United States, can be interpreted as a way of coping with recurring problems. Some of the ways a political system deals with problems may be unique, some commonplace. Because it meets its problems in a particular time and place with a special body of past experiences to go on, each political system is unique; so too the American system is unique. But because some problems have recurred ever since civilized men have tried to live together, every political system has had to deal with enduring dilemmas. Its solutions may be unique, the basic questions are not. The focus of this paper is directed toward one particular problem -- the issue of conflict and consensus, political power and political order, in a changing democratic society with politics seen as the means whereby the community balances the


6. New values were introduced not because they were missing in the original philosophy but because they had not been accentuated in that particular way in the system.
tension between conflict and consensus. The American ancestors chose to live in a community, with its numerous and obvious advantages. But, when strong human beings seek the company of one another, conflict seems to be an inescapable aspect of community and hence of the human condition. While conflict has been the focus of attention by many -- philosophers, historians, social scientists, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke -- it is James Madison who perhaps more than any other single individual gave shape to American conflict in his modeling the American constitutional system. He held that conflict is built into the very nature of man, and thus a system must be devised through which it is channeled and controlled. Conflict and consensus, among other things, involve the interaction of power, order, liberty, and flexibility. It is to the Age of Jackson and the political philosophies promulgated by the founding fathers, that this research turns to gain an insight into how "factions" are channeled and controlled in the United States -- to gain insight into basic pluralistic political patterns of the United States.

Politics, as a process of social-conflict regulation, is inseparable from human association. The form and behavior of the political process, however, varies considerably from community to community. These differences are traceable to variations in social relations, constitutional arrangements, and personal orientations.

In America, social conflict is resolved, or put aside, when institutions make binding (legitimate) community policy concerning a dispute. In the community this need not mean definitive settlement of the controversy; rather, conflict resolution implies a
method sufficiently moderating social tensions in order to avoid destructive competition. In the process new conflicts may well be created, if the outcome of policy controversies is disputed. Thus, as a means of reconciling opposing forces, politics aims at a modus vivendi that keeps social disputes within the boundaries of cooperative-competitive relations.

If conflict resolution is to produce effective community policy, citizens must be willing to accept community decisions as binding. In a word, they must frame some medium of consensus. Legitimate policies are those people accept, obey. Sources of this feeling of legitimacy may originate from fear and use of force or from consent. Force does not always produce compliance; if the desire to disobey offsets any penalties, force is of limited effectiveness. If the 1960's taught us anything, surely they taught us that. Consent derives from an understanding between citizens and officials, given where people agree to being governed under specified rules and conditions. To gain obedience, the possibility of personal reward is substituted for the threat of personal deprivation.

Government by consent rests on agreement between governors and governed, and it consists of both written and unwritten rules and procedures for regulating social conflict. It is manifested in traditions, habit, political doctrines, institutions, and ceremonies. Its existence signifies a law or treaty between disputing interests to preserve community association despite pursuit of less inclusive claims. This is not to say that all such rules and procedures are beyond change; many become the subject of hot
dispute. When constitutional conflicts do occur, they normally reflect the efforts of newly emergent interests or those opposing change.

Within the framework of legitimacy provided by accepted constitutional arrangements for adjusting disputes, interests influence community policy-making. By influence is meant the reciprocal relations that exist when an individual or group, in accordance with his interest, induces another to modify his behavior despite desires to the contrary.

Maurice Duverger identifies an institution as "clusters of ideas and beliefs, usage and ways of behavior, and material things...which form a co-ordinated and organized whole." Patterns derived from such activity produce a particularly stable character from the association of clusters of ideas and beliefs, traditions, conventions, and laws popularly accepted as legitimate. Here we are interested in the political institutions and political processes which contribute noticeably to social-conflict regulation for the entire community and the patterns of regulations, e.g., bargaining, competition, persuasion, and command.

In the United States, conflict resolution consists of patterns of behavior by which social conflict is represented and resolved. Representation is a process of communication which makes the conflict known through patterns of participation, opinion, leadership, choice, partisanship, and pressure. Resolution is a process of accommodation

that keeps conflict within manageable limits through policy-making. Officials make binding public policy with acts of formulation, adaptation, application, and adjudication. Politics occurs within a community marked by social diversity, variable doctrinal and policy disagreement but within a political-constitutional consensus. The style of conflict regulation is a blend of competition, bargaining, persuasions, and command. The precise mixture contributes to the democratic character of the political community. The Jacksonian Era provides an excellent period in American political history to observe the precise mixture of American democratic character, the variety of democratic models, and their responses to change within a consensus.

Given the diversity of American society, the problem of factions, conflict, change, and the problem of consent are particularly thorny and complex in the period just mentioned. Until recently, little had been done in the United States to formulate systematic theoretical defense of political pluralism. So secure and "natural" were the pluralistic foundations of government that they could be accepted as the axiomatic point of departure for political practice and public discourse. Alexis de Tocqueville's reflection of self-governing "intermediate bodies" capable of countervailing both an atomistic and a totalitarian state became an exclusive basis for public philosophy. It seemed to be at once descriptively accurate, normatively desirable, and analytically fruitful. Recent research has provided extensive empirical and descriptive literature crystallized around a more systematic approach to the interaction between party politics, group politics, and bureaucratic politics in the United States.
and in the comparative analysis of political systems. The scope of these pluralistic studies includes the various forms of institutional federalism, the functioning of the party system, formal devices for group representation, and decentralization of electoral apportionment, legislative organization, the administrative machinery of government, and informal processes of group pressure and influence upon public opinion formation, elections, legislative, chief executive, administrative agencies, and courts. Thus political pluralism focuses upon the relationship of geography and social organizations to governmental structures and process of policy formation.

This analysis of pluralism is an attempt to illuminate how the fabric of United States politics consists of recurrent attempts to reconcile the diverse yearnings of individual citizens with the transcendent desire to live together as Americans. The intent is to move into and behind the rhetoric, to the situation, and the strategies used to respond to the situation; to observe the conflict and the processes used to dispel or resolve the conflict. The central focus of this analysis is the political process of pluralism, more precisely, pluralism as a consistent tenet in the political rhetoric and political action of John C. Calhoun.

No political party looks back to Calhoun as its founder or rejuvenator, no group of public men proclaim allegiance to his doctrines, no considerable group of individuals outside of South Carolina profess any love for his name and ideals.

Historian William E. Dodd was correct in his observation

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in 1911 that John C. Calhoun's political philosophy was rejected as a result of the Civil War though he since has been revived as a reputable figure in American political philosophy. There remains the question if major threads of American political doctrine is part of Calhoun's action and thought. From de Tocqueville through Max Lerner and Louis Hartz to Robert Dahl pluralism has been considered a basic theme in American politics. Were Calhoun's political philosophy and action variants of basic American pluralism? If basic entities of pluralism are present, what were possible ramifications from his elaboration? e.g., to what lengths may opposition be safely carried before it ceases to be a right and becomes an abuse? What were possible relationships between the theory and fact of pluralism -- the use of each to justify the others. Of course, comprehension of Calhoun's political behavior and philosophy can not be made without consideration of his major political contemporary Andrew Jackson, Jackson's political style and political rhetoric. From the interaction of these two great political leaders the strategies and responses of Calhoun become clearer.

This research is based on the hypothesis that the interaction of rhetoric and practical political activities of John C. Calhoun with Andrew Jackson concerning the tariff issue reveals basic strands of political pluralism. Calhoun's political theories, subtle, even profound though they may have been, were reduced to absurdity and irrelevance by the Civil War. But the process which was basic to this thinking and action reverberates in a variety of forms basic to American political thought. Some students of Calhoun contend that his basic principle has become the organizing principle
of American politics, "that every major interest in the country, whether regional, economic or religious, is to possess a veto or political decision directly affecting it - rule of concurrent majority." 9

Calhoun's conception of political order, which he framed in terms of a realistic appraisal of human nature and the social structure of classes and regions, constitutes a claim to contemporary attention worthy of evaluation. Calhoun's analysis of American sectionalism and the realities of class struggle not only anticipate most social thought of a modern stamp, but is directed by him to showing the mutual dependence of the political and social order. Calhoun, perhaps alone, saw in it (sectional and interest pluralism) more than a rule of expedience, imposed by the country's size and justifiable by results, if at all. He saw in it a basic principle of free government. Calhoun posits a relation and a distinction which at once extended the function of government beyond the negative regulation of human behavior to the positive organization of social interests. The same distinction and relation requires that government accept and work with whatever groups or classes exist or may be generated in the social order.

His suggestions, although deviating in part from the American trends of his time, may offer basic ideas toward the solution of the problem of minority relations today. These ideas have a two-fold contemporary pertinence. First, they constitute a subtle and profound statement of the major issues pertaining

to political organization of minority groups. Calhoun's experience of the problem of conflict was immediate and he had the analytical mind needed to formulate his experience. John Tyler commented:

"Calhoun's mind has been likened to a lens, for its power to bring to a focus diverging rays of light."\(^{10}\) Second these ideas clearly uncover the root issue in minority relations, which is holding a balance between freedom and responsible action. If Calhoun was too willing to sacrifice freedom to security under the pressure of impending conflict, this, of itself, is a lesson for today.\(^{11}\)

Consideration will be given to three levels of Calhoun's political ideas:

1. political program and political actions,
2. descriptive interpretation of the political system,
3. prescriptive theory.

Means of moving into Calhoun and his time and to the process of pluralism will be by focusing upon a particular situation with which he was confronted, the Tariff of Abomination, which reveals his strategic responses as well as those of Andrew Jackson. Also revealed are the ambiguities and conflicts resulting from the two politicians having the same philosophic mentor. After developing the situation and developing pluralism as a basic American political process, the analysis will move to the interaction

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10. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 128.

11. Today is not the focus of this work. Calhoun and his time are.
of President Jackson and Vice President Calhoun; through their rhetoric and their actions, insight into the functions and dysfunctions of American political pluralism can be gained.

This work does not encompass the whole of Jackson nor Calhoun, the whole of pluralism nor any other political model which might be used to describe a political style. It is only to show: distinct differences existed in the political style projected by these two political leaders; pluralism existed as a basic process in part of Calhoun's actions and thoughts; the pluralist model of Calhoun was used to resist change by a minority group which may be a major function served by the negative pluralistic tradition as well as it being seen as a stabilizing factor in America's political pattern.

The choice of a historical study may be seen by modern analysts as vague, diffuse, outmoded in an era of precision and tight conceptualization. But historical studies can serve as a laboratory for consideration of political forms. Such studies have the potential and probability of relationships of ideas and politics by providing a broad and external insight into a situation, which is lacking in contemporary studies. Also this type of analysis gives a more complete contextual framework with the advantage of data collecting activities. Robert McCloskey contended that American political philosophy "performs an important 'reflective' function," in that it truly "mirrors the thought of
An analysis of selected prescriptive theories closely associated with the institutional realities of American politics provide means for exploring a number of the theoretical questions raised by the workings of our constitutional machinery. For example, do the institutions and supporting attitudes of our pluralist politics function to deny to the concept of citizenship a corresponding reality, while at the same time encouraging a view of the public interest that, rather than uniting men, divides them? A portion of American political thought shows the answer to be "yes." While analysis of the political thought of others, such as John Adams or James Madison, whose institutional handiwork is thought to be closely associated with the pluralist thrust in our politics, might support this view, special consideration suggests the appropriateness of the action and thought of Calhoun as a focus for study in this context. For Calhoun is hailed by many as one of the great men in the American conservative tradition, and thus his thought and action has the added inducement of the "hard case." For example, one would not expect to find present in the organic and conservative theory of community advanced by Calhoun such critical ambiguities touching upon the location of membership status in the whole and the identification of a unifying interest as are likely to be found in the procedural theory of order founded upon the liberal flight from community. Yet the frequent identification of

Calhoun's theory with the institutions and practices of pluralist politics, coupled with McCloskey's premise, would lead us to expect that if we were to look hard enough, these same shortcomings would be found embodied in Calhoun's system.

The study of political thought through history can contribute to the tasks of political science by: development of theory and its conceptual and propositional components, and the testing of theory about ideas; and the description and explanation of the political culture (here being an interest in the kind of theory that generalizes about the interrelated expectations of the world -- empirical theory).

It is through theory that our observations become more than mere gathering of facts; it tells us where to go for evidence and what to expect when we get there. As it provides a framework for linking one set of observations to another, it provides the means through which our experience, with the past becomes a basis for expectations of the future.
CHAPTER II

PLURALISM: THE METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Liberalism is a system of Pluralism. It is a system of many centers of power, many areas of privacy and a strong internal impulse towards the mutual adaptation of spheres, rather than of the dominances or the submission of any one to the other.

E. A. Shils

Pluralism as defined in the Oxford University Dictionary is a system of thought which recognizes more than one ultimate principle. It became part of the vernacular in England in 1887 as a term used in opposition to monism. Pluralists define the typical state as one within which public authority will be properly delegated to a plurality of groups. Thus, as a way of ordering and explaining life, pluralism has been at the heart of classic liberal ideology of the Western world, best exemplified in the above quote by E. A. Shils.

Political pluralism has had an honorable lineage, as well as an impressive array of contemporary supporters. Traces of political pluralism can be found in Aristotle in the Fourth Century B.C., Althusius in the Sixteenth Century A.D., and more recently in the works of Hegel and John Stuart Mill. Such distinguished American political scientists as Arthur Bentley in Process of Government,


Pendleton Herring in *The Politics of Democracy*, E. E. Schattschneider in *The Semisovereign People*, V. O. Key in *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, and David Truman in *The Governmental Process*, have contributed to the understanding of the process of political pluralism.

In the context of political thought and the political process, the concept pluralism refers to a specific institutional and behavioral arrangement for distributing and sharing governmental power, to the doctrinal defense of these arrangements and to an approach for gaining understanding of political behavior. Therefore, it is a historical phenomena, a normative doctrine, and a mode of analysis. It encompasses the view that political, social, and cultural systems are constructed from a multiplicity of autonomous but independent groups or may be interpreted in terms of a multiplicity of factors. It may also include the claim that the multiplicity is morally valued, and good.

It is important here to distinguish between pluralism as a social doctrine and the term pluralist in a descriptive sense. The former was expounded primarily by English thinkers at the beginning of this century to counter the theory of state sovereignty, which holds that the state exists as the preeminent institution of society and determines values and commands personal loyalty. Pluralists urge instead that any society is composed of a multiplicity of independent groups, each of which should be permitted to contribute to the formation of individual values and social policy. The state, viewed as only one group among many, has no final word or personal or social preferences. The pluralists' concern with the existence of a variety of social groups emphasizes the fact that multiple
affiliations contribute to the basis for politics. Through multiple group membership they see the basis for the stability of a democratic society. A society designated as pluralistic is marked by the existence and social acceptance of many "autonomous centers of decision-making authority," reflecting a diversity of desires that promote varied interests and social conflicts. In this sense, America has been viewed as pluralistic, in both its social and political (constitutional) dimensions of community life. For example, the organization of popular demands upon governmental officials has been considered markedly pluralistic. Pluralistic societies possess an intermediate layer of stable, organized group life lying between the family and community authority; thus, these independent groups are said to constitute a backbone for socially diverse America and give rise both to complementary and incompatible interests. Tensions among groups render it difficult for any single association to control the whole policy-making apparatus. The fact that one person may belong to many groups limits any one group's influence. Thus groups compete for an individual's loyalties, but encounter trouble in influencing more than a limited area of an individual's behavior. Single groups thereby have difficulty dominating not only the governmental process of the community but also the behavior of their own membership.

Henry Kariel has given six general propositions integral

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to the study of pluralism:

1. Individual fulfillment is assured by small governmental units, for they alone are representative;

2. the unrepresentative exercise of governmental power is frustrated when public agencies are geographically dispersed;

3. society is composed of a variety of reasonable independent (but overlapping) religious, cultural, educational, professional and economic associations;

4. these private associations are voluntary insofar as no individual is ever wholly affiliated with anyone of them;

5. public policy accepted as binding on all associations is the result of their own free interaction;

6. public government is obliged to discern and act only upon the common denomination of group concurrence.

The type of interaction described involves multiple centers of political power; thus, federalism, checks and balances, and the role of majority and minorities become central issues of political pluralism.

Modern pluralist states are seen as dividing their central authority between two spheres, one which is fixed and one that is removable. The fixed portion (constitutions or other symbols) hold the loyalty, respect and affection of the people, whereas their inevitable hostilities and discontent can be directed against the removable parts (e.g. presidents, congress, interchangeable parties). In this way change, rebellion, conflict, is licensed and waged more or less peacefully through elections, the alternative of political parties and leaders. The public realm becomes one in which co-existing groups naturally complement one another and the role of

6: Ibid., p. 165.

government is diminished, as it tries to establish or preserve equilibrium, or, at least, control conflict that would be destructive to the system as a whole. Pluralist's theory of balance requires that power be distributed to many units.

One of the most palpable facts of life in society (particularly large societies) is that most resources are generally unevenly distributed in different patterns to different groups and individuals. The interaction tends to create majority(ties) and minority(ies) in terms of conflict representation, as well as different levels of intensity of concern for issues. The issue of intensity was relevant in the distinct responses to the tariff in 1816 as opposed to the response in 1828. The concern for the type of interaction, and the power and influence involved, has become a central issue in American political thought, as a democratic political system.

Another major question arising from pluralistic political patterns is: Is there any particular minority entitled to special protection? What occurs when majorities shift or economically privileged start losing their power? The role and interaction of factions become a core issue for The Federalist Papers, the Constitution, and its impact on the role of change as seen during the Jacksonian Era is significant. Calhoun drew heavily on the above documents, as well as the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.

It is a great and inescapable defect in any system of rule by majorities that on the questions in which the policy of a minority conflicts with the policy preferred by a majority, neither can prevail without frustrating the desires of the others.

What type of process did Calhoun use to respond to the change in economic and political conditions? What alternative constructs did he perceive and use?

Pluralistic political patterns are designed to increase the levels through which an individual or group may enter the political arena and plead his (its) case, as well as limiting the degree of power which any one group or individual may hold. Governmental patterns divide conflict regulation among multiple and often conflicting centers. The federal system and separation of powers provide minorities (Calhoun and the South) a variety of approaches for influencing or controlling power. The presence of semi-autonomous clusters of community officials make it possible for groups to travel a variety of routes in an attempt to make their influence felt on public policy. If one set of governing officials is inaccessible, perhaps another may be open for presentation of interest demands.

In a pluralistic society many groups also tend to be so specialized that they cannot spread their influence over all policy-makers. Specialization though may make it easier for officials to possess autonomy in their own policy areas. But the "checks and balances" scheme was formalized in the Constitution by separating policy-makers into institutions possessing overlapping jurisdictions, yet not dependent upon one another for their authority. A major reason distribution of authority was to distribute power. A pluralist society does need a pluralistic constitutional character to match, in order to be functionally viable.

At the core of the pluralist vision are a number of perspectives that point in the direction of both the desirability and the possibility
of a mechanistically sustained non-directive political society. One such perspective may be characterized by possessive individualism: the view of man as "essentially the proprietor of his own person," or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.  

Man is born morally complete, capable of possessing purpose independent of the rights and obligations of specific membership statutes. He is a self-contained fact in a natural universe that functions as well as an end in itself. "An owner of himself," his rights are founded in natural necessity. 

In this light it is significant that John C. Calhoun, if a pluralist, should view man's preoccupation with self-interest as a fact legitimated by "the great law of self-preservation, which prevades all that feels." The naturalist-founded assertion of man's moral completeness and the subsequent validation of man's desire to better his condition recommends the appropriateness of liberty, as it "leaves each free to pursue the course he may deem best to promote his interest and happiness." Since there is no special context in which men must participate in order to acquire interest or purpose, neither are there any external standards to which men can repair for the purpose of authenticating or invalidating one another's interest objectively. Possessive individualism promises


10. Ibid.


12. Ibid., p. 40.
liberty on the assertion that purpose or interest is a part of the person in the same way an arm is an extension of the body; an individual has a right to liberty beyond the power of others to judge. Ultimately, rights and liberties are viewed as implicit in the "capabilities and needs to equally self-moving mechanism." Rooting liberty, however, in the naturalism of the possessive individualist premise, leads inevitably to two problems: one is the problem of order, the other is power. These are both important organizing perspectives occupying a central place in the pluralist vision. Because of the lack of mutual dependence among possessive men, there is little likelihood that order will spontaneously assert itself. Order can hardly be expected to grow out of the harmony of interest that is obtained when men acquire their purposes from membership statuses in a common corporative system. In such a system the acquisition and legitimation of interest proceeds independently from such a system's existence. Therefore, institutions serve only as the carriers of a universal reason implementing a unifying morality. Given the dissociated character of possessive men, they are, in this sense, "individuals;" it is unlikely that order will be organically mediated by the ends men pursue in the light of the purposes they are educated to chose.

The problem of order is compounded by yet another perspective in the pluralist vision; let us call it the psychology of man the observable actor. In this perspective it is suggested that "while

man is created for the social state...his direct or individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings."

Calhoun's argument here was not that men are wicked. "Man is created for society," he "is accordingly so formed as to feel what affects others as well as what affects himself." It is only that self-regarding feelings are perhaps more universal and more reliable in their operation than are other-regarding ones. The point of the psychology is not to pass judgment on "human nature," not to show why man is either good or evil. Rather the intent is to isolate those natural factors most likely to influence behavior.

What one encounters in the pluralist vision is not a normatively evaluative theory of "human nature" but rather an analytically selective and functionally relevant psychology. If, as we shall see, this psychology is of instrumental value to the solution of the problem of order, it adds nonetheless to the problem's urgency by dramatizing certain behavioral propensities in man. If the possessive premise darkens the prospect for natural harmony of interest among men, the psychology would seem to discourage faith in the ability of men independently to qualify their purposes so as to insure that their actions harmonize with the interest of others.

Order, to obtain, must be consciously concerted. Yet how can order be concerted if there are no objective standards permitting men

15. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 4.
16. Ibid.
to select from among the conflicting interests in society? And of what value might such standards be if there are no neutral men, i.e., individuals sufficiently disengaged from the effects of the public business and thus capable of suspending their self-regarding impulses as they might act in a disinterested manner? Implicit, then, in the problem of order is a problem of power as well.

Power is a process and a relationship. Power may be relatively concentrated or diffused; and share of power held by different individuals, strata, classes, ethnic, racial or religious groups, may be relatively great or small. The analysis of power is often concerned, therefore, with the identification of elites and leadership, the discovery of the ways in which power is allocated to different strata, relations among leaders, and between leaders and nonleaders, and so forth. Differences in patterns or structures of power may be attributed primarily, mainly or in part to the way in which "resources," or "base values" are distributed among individuals, strata, classes, groups in different communities, countries, societies, and historical periods.

The pluralists deal with the necessity of multiple centers of sovereign power rather than one. For them, the issue becomes: Is the pluralistic model functional or dysfunctional -- when, how and why? The function of pluralism in society has been seen to tame power, to secure the consent of all or the majority in a democratic society and to settle conflicts peacefully within the framework of institutions. Political pluralism can be seen as a system which utilizes conflict rather than suppresses it. Pluralists feel that by setting one center of power against another, power itself would be tamed, civilized, controlled and limited to develop human purposes while
coercion would be reduced to a minimum. The functional core is resolving, mediating, conflicts for politics of factions. This process provides an opportunity for minorities to veto solutions they have strong objection to, but would also prove helpful in establishing channels for obtaining consent for all to win in the long run. Because constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary in order to make decisions, citizens and leaders would perfect the process of dealing peacefully with their conflicts, and not merely to the benefit of one partisan, but to the mutual benefit of all the parties.\textsuperscript{18}

The duality of power of a pluralistic arrangement, both social and political, means that individuals are seldom totally dependent either upon particular social groups or political officials for the advancement of interests. Citizens have options and they retain choices in how best to pursue their desires. Since multiple affiliations contribute to, as well as reflect, multiple interest, people seldom put "all their eggs in one basket."\textsuperscript{19} Consequently, there is less tendency to invest any single issue of public policy with an extreme degree of emotional attachment. Single-interest politics, single-issue campaigns, and single-principle parties are rare in pluralistic communities; rather, broad policies characteristically emerge from a process of bargaining and compromising between diverse interests.

Politics is dependent on the interplay of the social structures and the culture in which it is set. By politics is meant the multi-layer complex in which authoritative decisions are made; by culture

\textsuperscript{18} Dahl, op. cit., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{19} Nimmo, op. cit., p. 26.
is meant the repository of habitual ways of looking at things and responding to stimuli; and by social structure is meant the patterns of interaction. The order that makes society possible is basically a property of culture, an understanding embodied in established usage. Over and above this basic level of order the ongoing business of politics proceeds, dealing with conflicts and discordances cast up by individuals, and the social structure. Attempting to handle problems that are new to actions which get on the public agendas, the political mechanisms become involved in redistributing decision-making authority and developing new modes of problem identification. In practice, then, the motivating power of politics as a form of activity is change in the social structure. Culture, itself liable to change, provides an ambience for the functioning institutions of politics and indicates the limits of political activity.

In trying to understand the context of change and the role of pluralism Talcott Parsons offered the following points:

1. Social change always requires enough impetus to overcome the resistance of vested interest.

2. There are many sources of social change and not merely one — offered as "the conception of plurality of the possible origins of change."

3. Change has a variety of repercussions within the social system some of which may be contrary to the direction of change.

4. Change will generally tend to move in the direction that will increase rather than decrease the gratification of members of the society.

5. Change tends in the direction of rationality rather than the converse.


The pluralistic system is one form by which the social structure (i.e., group interests) is organized to respond to the above points concerning change, particularly to assist in providing the methods (i.e., compromise, integration) for orderly change. How did Jackson and Calhoun differ in their strategic response to the situation of change as symbolized in the tariff issue?

Another important issue in regard to change is the impact of ideas as variables in explaining political behavior, the broad tendencies of ideas on the institutions of a society, and, on the regularized patterns of behavior that characterizes a society's political life. What consistency existed in the ideas of Calhoun as they projected on his political process? The forces of culture and social structure merge in the political process of making authoritative decisions about the conflicts, the problems, the afflict society. Political thought fits into the models on the cultural side; its birth identifies as well as shapes the culture. From the political process emerges policy (laws, administration, rules) which in turn, feeds back on social structures by changing relationships among its elements, and/or culture by inducing changes in habitual ways. The interaction of the political process of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, the Hartford Convention and the Tariff of Abomination reverberated off Jefferson's, Jackson's, and Calhoun's political philosophies, revealing the changes taking place and the consequences and conflict caused by change.

Because a pluralistic polity is characterized by diversity of purpose, the meaning of the community interest is confounded. The notions of public interest, national interest, or common good symbolize ideals of common purpose and striving but are frequently
employed to rationalize narrower stands. Occasionally, a single interest may even attempt to elevate its own interest to the level of the entire community as revealed through the tariff issue. In the pluralistic American environment, the legitimacy of the multiple conflict desires have been generally taken for granted. Definition of public interest in this disharmonious collectivity has been contingent upon open conflict. Thus a central problem of a free government is factions. In pluralistic politics the notion of the public interest serves as a term of interest rationalization and as a goal binding community members together. Diversity of experience precludes a consistent social value system. The learning of group loyalties, the origins and intensity of social conflicts, the relations among rulers and ruled, the style of conflict regulations and the perspective taken on the community will are all affected by such pluralism. The fact of plural purposes also affect the character of community ideals and procedures, thus shaping political doctrine and constitutional arrangements.

Charles Perrow has identified two related views of pluralism in the political science tradition which have different implications. One considered the relationship among independent groups and one emphasized the change in individual attitude. The first he identified as "veto pluralism" or pressure group pluralism. Here competing interest groups, homogeneous in themselves, and based on economic and sectional interests, hold countervailing or veto power over one

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22. Nimmo, op. cit., p. 32.

another. Flexibility in a democratic political system is maintained as long as one interest group does not achieve, in the long run, complete power over other groups. Little "socialization" takes place according to this view. It reflects a concern with the exercise of power and the role of material interest which are merged in the compromise view. Calhoun, as a pluralist, shall be viewed from this perspective; for this was the type of pluralism evident in the early 1800's.

There are five points of controversy involved in the compromise pluralistic format:

1. Are the interest of all significant groups in society given representation?

2. Does representation of interest reflect "true representation" and not manipulation?

3. Are there multiple group ties and overlapping membership?

4. Do groups accept defeat and compromise on some interests?

5. Does the commitment to preserve collective effort at the expense of full realization of personal group demands not erode the pluralistic base of society?

For example, could a settlement of the issue of tariff between the North and the South be reached? Calhoun's response was "yes, easily, but...not by the weaker party alone....The North has only to will it to accomplish it -- to do justice by conceding the South an equal right...which will restore to the South, in substance, the power she possessed by protecting herself, before the equalibrium between the sections was destroyed by the action of the government."

But what is the basis for Calhoun's representation? The overlapping membership? Does compromise erode the North's desire to progress?

24. Ibid., pp. 414-417.

In the end Calhoun asked for the restoration of the political principle through the generous exercise of power by those who possessed it. To him true national unity could still be conceived in the terms of a political theory which recognized the full self-orientation of individuals and the restricted perspectives of those many social groups which were so necessary to the very existence of the individual. To Calhoun, true political order depended upon the use of power by those who control it for the ends of principle; and for its continued existence upon a recognition of the rights of finite individuals and diverse groups and upon the relation of these two important factors. 26

Perrow's other type of pluralism was identified as individual pluralism which operates on a more latent level. Individuals in community neighborhoods, occupational or other established non-political institutions, all differ in their overt and latent social inclinations. These differences will lead to an appreciation of the viewpoint of others and to a leavening element in the group which will foster tolerance. Here individual attitudes are changed, whereas in compromise pluralism the attitudes of individuals may remain unchanged even though they must acknowledge the right of others making opinions in planning action.

Human groups and associations of all sorts -- from the family clique, clan and tribe to the largest religious organization and states -- are often in conflict. The assumption is not uncommon, indeed, that "peace within and conflict without" are essential

26. Ibid.
characteristics of group life. Closer examination suggests that conflicts exist within the various groups themselves -- within even the most cohesive and durable -- and contribute substantially to their perpetuation. Whether inter or intra, two kinds of effects of conflict may be distinguished. Conflict may result in the destruction or disruption of all or certain of the bonds of unity which may previously have existed between the disputants. On the other hand, conflict may strengthen pre-existing ties or contribute to the establishment of unifying bonds where none before existed. The conflict over the tariff issue in the early 1800's illuminates the latter point. The nationalistic movement was spurred by the threat of disunion. Communication and transportation drew the rest of the nation together, and as it appeared, as a unified front against a minority.

The concept of conflict involves a policy condition, and communication, which if directive and if accepted, will influence the behavior of the recipient. Policy conditions may be conscious or unconscious. In the latter case, there is no explicit declaration of policy condition -- though it can be inferred from the behavior of the organization, e.g., the South inferring from Jackson's earlier inactivity he would eventually support their stance.

Conflict is for the most part a malleable concept, being stretched and molded for the purposes at hand. In its broadest sense it seems to cover everything from war to choices between ice-

cream sodas or sundaes. The distinction between conflict and non-conflict are fuzzy at best and at worst are not made at all. There is also a persistent tendency to regard all conflict as bad, as susceptible to complete elimination, given "good will," understanding," and as basically different from "co-operation." Levels of conflict as well as intensity must be considered when analyzing strategic responses to divergent views. It is important to note distinctions between latent and overt conflict. In latent conflict, no party is attempting -- by any decision or overt act -- to achieve its policy condition. By contrast, overt conflicts are those in which one or more parties do attempt to effect some change in the situation. Political pluralism is a process whereby overt conflict can be expressed and hopefully channeled effectively, to prevent destructiveness through unconscious outbursts.

A major question concerning conflict exists within the framework of the pluralistic perspective: How can a society face continuous conflict among its members and groups and still maintain social cohesion and the legitimacy of state authority? American political patterns and the Jacksonian Era offer a laboratory for exploring this question. Given Madison's human condition of "conflict" and "action" and the situation of the tariff, conflict exploded with the passage of the Tariff of 1828. What happens to community?

The presence of political community need not imply any single interest for all members other than that of preserving

association; the multiplicity of groups can remain and the plurality of social demand can continue to be preserved. Indeed, pluralistic politics becomes the shaping force of the political community. Another basic question is: What is it that makes a group of people a community? A community comprised of people who desire to share experience, will have purposive activity consummating that desire by settling disputes being labeled "political community." Political consensus is the acceptance or acquiescence — with public officials, rules and procedures, democratic values, and policy choices. Political consensus does not "cause" a particular pattern of political behavior and may not be consistent with a particular pattern of political behavior. It is shaped by social and constitutional patterns, as well as by a consensus of personal convictions. It is thus a working consensus in the sense that it is tentative, filled with contingency, and subject to modification. This working consensus helps define the issue that must be resolved and the effective limits of political conflict at any given time.

Robert Dahl has outlined four pluralistic party strategies available to a political movement or oppositions groups in the United States who arrive at the point of little or no representation, therefore providing a framework for observing Calhoun's alternatives:

1. A separate political party be established to create a cohesive force behind a particular interest.

2. A new coalition party be established by combining with another group that has similar, overlapping, but not identical objectives.

3. The group can remain neutral between the two major parties, act as a pressure group to secure favorable legislation and the nomination and election of sympathetic candidates.
4. The movement could enter one of the existing parties, and become an element in a major party coalition; it could then use its bargaining power to gain influence for the movement within the party.  

The pluralists see political relations whether between or within fundamental parts of the same state, varied; that beyond a certain point they can not be simplified and generalized; they depend more upon agreement and good will than authority. Agreements are reached by an interchange of opinions, compromise or differences and the harmonizing of interests, thus by negotiation. To what degree did Calhoun and Jackson negotiate and upon what level did the discussions take place?  

The pluralist vision as applied to the United States, and in this research, is meant as a way of looking at things political which is congenial to our individualist yet group-structured, interest-impregnated and mechanistically asserted anti-majoritarian mode of political life. The process involves compromise of interest, pressure groups and sections. Calhoun's political rhetoric and practical strategies as revealed primarily from the circumstances and ramifications surrounding the Tariff of Abomination, the political interchange with Jackson, and the deepening economic and social crises for the South, may weave strands of pluralism considered basic to the tenets of American political pluralism not previously accredited to him.

SITUATION: THE TARIFF OF ABOMINATION

"...the Tariff of Abominations, a rather strong title for a quite impracticable piece of legislation, is an almost perfect mirror in which to observe the transient features of the Jacksonian revolution....Nothing else...reflects...the powerful democratic nationalism which opposed itself to the economic nationalism...."  
George Dangerfield

Two matters -- one an issue and one a condition -- elicited from John C. Calhoun the strenuous exertion of systematic thought. The issue was protective tariffs in the period (roughly) of 1828 to 1833. The condition was the division of the Union into free states and slave states, a condition increasingly vexatious from 1835 on. The two matters are linked; the debate over tariffs turned out to be a proving ground for many of the conceptions and intellectual strategies involved in the defense of slavery.

In the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 Calhoun saw complete injustice. His words against these measures are terrifying in their indictment of the protectionists for reckless disregard of the elementary precepts of political rectitude. Calhoun predicted ruin and desolation for the Southern states. The elimination of pro-

tection would relieve the South much more than it would embarrass the manufacturing states.

In 1828 and 1830, Calhoun's political philosophy (particularly his concept of community, of the mutual dependence of the political and social order) and practical strategies to maintain the Union, while preserving liberty of "distributing equally the benefits and the burdens of the Union," became mired in acts of expedience and self-interest. Here the process of Calhoun's political theories is thrust before the American public.

In February 1828, the House Committee on Manufactures brought before the House of Representatives specific recommendations for a new tariff schedule. The result was a lopsided, unequal bill, advantageous to the farmers but wholly inadequate to the manufacturers. Every section of the measure showed marks of political preference and favoritism. On manufactured wool, in particular, the rates were ridiculously disapportionate. An involved set of schedules were drawn depending on price range, not one of which met the basic needs of the manufactures.

Henry Clay and the National Republicans suspected the authors of the tariff desired failure of their own bill. The Jacksonians were accused of writing a bill to force the New England Representatives into joining Southerners on the final vote to kill the unbalanced measure. The blame for the defeat would then reside with the friends of

2. The committee membership, as well as both houses of Congress, was held by a majority of Jacksonian Democrats.

President John Q. Adams, and the National Republicans. The historian
Robert Remini has accused the Adams' men (as well as subsequent inter-
preters) of lacking appreciation for the more subtle forms of political
manipulation in perceiving the Jacksonian's position and in the
Republican's alternative responses to the schedule presented. The
Republicans just convinced themselves that this "abominable" tariff
had been designed to be defeated and that they were expected to
shoulder the responsibility while the Democrats desired to use the
schedule to secure support of the middle and western states for
Jackson in 1828.

Silas Wright, of New York, is said to have divulged the
House Committee's true intention in one of his letters to the New
York Regency:

Why did we frame the bill as we did? Because we had put
the duties upon all kinds of woolen cloths as high as our own
friends in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Ohio would vote them.
Why did we put the duties upon molasses so high? Because
Pennsylvania and our friends west of that state required it
to induce them to go for the woolens. The hemp and flax duty
was also inserted for the same reasons, and the duty of
Irons and the sine qua non with Pennsylvania.

By logic the bill was concocted to suit the interest of
"our friends in the Middle Atlantic and Western States" whose
combined electoral vote was sufficient to decide the presidential
election in Jackson's favor. Specifically, it was expected to reverse
the 1824 results in Ohio, Kentucky, and Missouri, and to secure the

4. Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson

important votes in Pennsylvania and New York.

The bill directly penalized the South, those in the cotton business and those engaged in foreign commerce by increasing the price of woolen fabrics, not widening the domestic market for raw cotton and increasing the price of Western agricultural products for the Southern consumer. The Northern Jacksonians saw the Southerners regarding Adams as the "acknowledged leader" of all manufacturing interests and therefore could not bolt the Democratic party, while trying to kill the measure since no other choice remained to them. Clearly, then, the bill seemed an effectively "strategic" response to a political "situation."

Two plans arose to kill the measure. The Southern strategy was to remain silent during the debate and vote down any amendments that would improve the duties on manufactured goods. In this way some Southerners felt they could compel the "Eastern" New England Representatives to join them on the final roll call and kill the entire tariff. The "Eastern" Representatives had a different plan. They agreed, according to Silas Wright, to vote down the hemp, flax, molasses, and iron duties, and then watch while the "Jackson tariff men" from Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky defeated what remained. The two groups opposing the tariff were unable to get together on a single course of action, and this worked to their mutual disadvantage.

The South went to Jackson's men asking for compromise on the woolen issue in exchange for their support to "sustain" the


7. Remini, op. cit., p. 175.
Meanwhile the Eastern Republicans were submitting long lists of amendments which were voted on April 9 and each defeated in turn; this action received some immediate arrogant praise by some Southerners for their effective strategy, much to the dismay of the New Englanders and Western Jacksonians. Open praise by the Southerners of their plan brought George McDuffie of South Carolina to the point of rage on the House floor over the stupid release of the plan which would alienate the New Englanders and Western friends. Seven Western delegates began muttering that the action of the Southerners could provide a risk to the election of Jackson in their states. The tariff was a rock upon which the Democratic coalition might flounder. On April 22 enough had search their minds to accept the tariff and by a vote of 105 to 94.8

Meanwhile Jacksonian supporters unified their efforts to ensure the election of their leader by arranging a handsome commission from a satisfied public for the support of special economic interest.9 The Senate Committee on Manufacturing proposed several amendments to increase the duties. New England served notice that without a change in the woolens schedule it would reject the tariff on the final vote. The Southern strategy again was to veto amendments and in case of tie votes, rely on Vice President John C. Calhoun to dispose of the vote in their favor. The New Englanders and Southerners

8. Burgess, op. cit., p. 162

combined strength would probably be sufficient to kill the bill outright. 10

An amendment to increase the duty on manufactured wool was passed 24-22, thus accommodating a compromise on the issue for the Eastern states and insuring passage of the bill. On May 13, the final measure was passed by 26-21 vote, the Jacksonian leaders (Van Buren, Benton, Easton) were joined by Northeasterners (Webster, Silsbee, Knight, Chase, Foote). The bill was signed by President Adams on May 19, 1828.

Under such circumstances the inevitable questions arose long before South Carolina was led to nullify the tariff. What recourse existed for a section which found itself hopelessly and apparently permanently outvoted on legislation that it considered ruinous to its prosperity or self-interest? It was this question, as old as the Constitution itself, which eventually led to an overt attempt to dissolve the Union. Towards its solution, Calhoun's political career was implicitly and explicitly directed. Southern opposition would have had to take the form of petitions for the tariff repeal, or resistance to its execution would need moral support, creation of a party of resistance, or the capture of some existing governmental organization by that party or coalition.

At the time of the Tariff of 1828, the South had suffered defeat of its policy by attempting to use its bargaining position within an existing party and the representative structure. It also

was unable to control the voting in either house of Congress alone. The leaders were forced to reevaluate the structural as well as the theoretical positions taken in 1828 for political changes involving: the operating structure of government, the values and policies adopted and enforced, the relative influence of different strata and groups in the policies and decisions of government, and the social, ethnic, religious, psychological and other significant characteristics of political leaders. A variety of alternatives were used before a viable arrangement was reached to end or dissipate the conflict.

The structure of government provided three branches through which the groups could try to maneuver their policy nationally. Also with the federal construction, success with some issues might be achieved in the states which could not be achieved on the national level. Calhoun, as one of the major leaders from the South, attempted to use a variety of structural alternatives available to achieve success for the policy he supported (involving the conflict of sectional interest and the general community). The logical conclusion being if all avenues on the national level were denied to Calhoun concerning the passage or compromise on the policy, there was still the alternative of withdrawing from the general community and carrying on the policy at the state level. Calhoun felt there was much precedent for the conflict and compromise of sectional interests and the general community interest, of political order and political liberty. Calhoun turned to the practical acts of counter-vailing forces in a nation undergoing a surge of strong nationalism. He also turned to the philosophical basis provided by Jefferson, Madison, Adams, and The Federalist Papers. Calhoun
was an astute student of the nation's historical developments.

In the two decades after 1815, the various sections were by no means unanimous or even consistent in their stand on all the economic legislation introduced in Congress. For example, New England representatives voted 17 to 10 in favor of the Tariff of 1816 but 23 to 16 against the Bill of 1828. Southern votes against the measure increased from 35 in 1816 to 47 in 1828, while the Middle States supported both, 42 to 5 and 56 to 6. The Middle States and the Northwest gave the tariff an almost unanimous support, but a majority from New England, the Southeast and the Southwest were in opposition.\(^{12}\) South Carolina voted for the Tariff of 1816 and Calhoun in 1820 did not regard the effort to restrict slavery to be a danger to the South. Also, two new elements had been added to the mechanism of obtaining a congressional majority for legislation: the voting power of the class-conscious commonman who, with the general adoption of white manhood suffrage, for the first time began to exercise the franchise; and the growing political strength of a consciously powerful West. Also, the party structure had become significant in the execution of the political process.\(^{13}\)

The United States was in a period of transition, five distinct sections (Northeast, the Middle States, the Southeast - old South, the Northwest, and the Southwest) in the nation revealed a rapid growth in population, the loss being New England with only

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an eighteen per cent increase over the ten year span of 1820-1830 and the Southeast with only nineteen per cent. The West was growing rapidly. Eleven states had been admitted to the Union between 1789 and 1821 with twenty-two Senators; the original thirteen states had twenty-six Senators. Since none of the five sections was static, but in transition, the future was politically unpredictable.

It was obvious that no section acting alone in Congress possessed sufficient strength during the period to enact or block specific measures. To accomplish its purpose it was necessary for a section to form temporary alliances, now with one section or interest, now with another, to pass or defeat a particular bill. There was some tendency for these alliances to become permanent; each section or interest, in order to attain success on those measures it regarded as most vital to its interest, would yield on less vital measures to insure the necessary support. It was a matter of effecting and preserving a congressional majority for or against particular legislation on which there was acute disagreement throughout the nation.

Precedent and the Constitution were much involved. More significant than the question of whether the tariff was or was not protective was the commentary it offered on the nature of representative government and the role and effectiveness of factions or pluralism. The members of Congress who passed judgment on the bill did so in terms of the effect they believed it would have

upon the fortunes of those whose voice of consent placed them in office (Transportation and communications of the time encouraged close alignment of special interests -- agriculture, commerce, navigation and manufacturing -- with sectional interests.). It was localism, not nationalism, that swayed the voting on both sides, in all but a handful of cases. State and party divisions played a less significant part. The Republicans case 35 votes in its favor to 23 opposed. 15

The protection of this pluralistic process with three checks and a variety of channels accessible to the citizens gave dissent factions alternate routes to accomplish political ends. Madison dealt extensively with this issue in The Federalist Papers, Number Ten and Number Fifty-One.

Since two senators were to be chosen by each state regardless of population, the Senate would be minority's first line of defense. The upper house could reject a measure passed by the lower house, in which representation was based directly on population. Thus the Baldwin Tariff of 1820, after passing the House, was defeated by one vote in the Senate; the Tallmadge Amendment of 1830 restricting slavery in Missouri, successful in the House, was also rejected by the Senate. 16

A second check was the President, who might veto a bill as

15. Ibid.

16. Capers, op. cit., p. 94.
Madison, Monroe, and Jackson did those on internal improvements with the result that a two-thirds majority of each house would be required to override the veto. By the 1820's the effectiveness of this check was severely limited due to the failure of the original plan in 1789, as conceived by some, for the election of the executive to work as a minority check. The same political majority which controlled the House could elect the President, and unpopular vetoes might defeat him and his party in the next election.

Potentially far more powerful as a check on the majority was the Supreme Court, free from any necessity of re-election and changeable only by impeachment, death or retirement, or congressional increase of its membership. Acting on its power as the final judge of the constitutionality of federal actions, the Supreme Court could simply declare that the power upon which a particular bill in question rested had not been delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. Under the broad construction of John Marshall's numerous decisions, however, in case after case the Court had increased the power of the federal government, notably in the *McCulloch vs Maryland* decision of 1819. By increasing the power delegated to the federal government in most instances prior to the Jacksonian Era, the Court actually insured the supremacy of the political majority in Congress over the minority.

It was natural, therefore, that in the early years of the new nation minorities should attack both the assumption of power by the Supreme Court as the ultimate judge of constitutionality, and the validity of specific decisions handed down by the Court sanctioning the right of Congress to legislate on such matters as
the Bank. Despite all that was said and written about the rights of states, however, with the exception of the action of the New England states during the critical war years (1812-1815) minorities had gained relief from measures considered obnoxious only by inducing a majority in Congress to favor repeal. But Calhoun would appeal to the Courts (as one path available in a pluralistic approach) to settle outstanding differences between the sections concerning the tariff issues; he would also appeal to Constitutional interpretations in developing his philosophical argument starting in 1816 through the crisis of the Tariff of Abomination.

The first formal instance of state action came when the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia declared the Sedition Act of 1798 null and void because it violated the First Amendment of the Constitution. The famous Resolutions written by Jefferson and Madison argued that the Constitution was a compact among the states, each retaining "an equal right to judge for itself, as well as infractions as of the mode and measure of redress." No other state supported these two, however, and no act of state interposition was attempted. But in the process of differentiating the spectrum of Jefferson's ideas, it was this "band of color," to which Calhoun turned as a basis for the South Carolina Exposition and Protest. The Resolutions may have been designed by their authors primarily as a political maneuver. The Sedition Act was in force for only two years; when the Republicans defeated the Federalists in 1800

they simply let the measure expire. It was not state action but rather the Republican's acquisition of control the federal government which brought relief.

In order to prevent war with England, Jefferson pushed through the Republican Congress at the end of 1807 an Embargo Act which immediately ruined most of the New England shipping profits and shortly involved the entire nation in a serious depression. In almost identical words, the Massachusetts legislature revived the arguments of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions; but again it was not state action but federal power which brought relief. So acute was the depression that New York bolted the Republican Party, and representatives from that state joined the Federalists in voting to repeal the measure fifteen months after its passage. 18

In the darkest days of the War of 1812, the New England states met in a convention at Hartford to organize for joint action, both against the federal government which was threatening to draft their citizens and against the British enemy which at last was invading them. Taking advantage of the crisis in which the nation found itself and using secession as a tacit threat, delegates from the convention were instructed to proceed to Washington and demand certain amendments to the Constitution which would check the power of the Republican majority. The news of the Peace of Ghent prevented the New England representatives from submitting their ultimatum; the end of the war removed the immediate cause of

New England's discontent. 19

As a member of Congress and a former resident of New England, Calhoun was aware of the full bitterness of New England's revolt against Southern domination. He understood what lay behind the revolt and had sought to remove some causes of resentment through moderate legislation to ease New England's financial bind. Also at this crucial time Calhoun hastily declined the empty chair of Speaker of the House of Representatives when it was offered to him.

Though he commanded the necessary votes for approval, national unity was imperative and he was well aware of the bitterness and resentment in New England at the time. 20 Basically Calhoun was undaunted by the activities at Hartford. Of New England's right to secede he had no doubts, but he was equally sure of their basic loyalty. Yet he warned his fellow legislators of the dangers inherent in a "false mode of thinking."

A minority lacked the right to involve the country in ruin....How far the minority in a state of war, may justly oppose the measures of Government, is a question of delicacy....An upright citizen will do no act, whatever his opinion of the war, to put his country in the power of the enemy....Like the system of our State and General government -- within they are many -- to the world but one....This sympathy of the whole with... every part...constitutes our real Union.

Prior to 1832, therefore, minorities accomplished some success without any basic changes in the Constitution and with a minimum of state action. In each instance time worked to their

19. Ibid.


21. Ibid., pp. 96-98.
advantage. The party in power might eventually be defeated or at least split on crucial measures; by combining threats with bargains, a determined minority might gain its point or a tolerable compromise. In essence and in outcome the nullification crisis of the early thirties was not without precedent. But Calhoun was quite aware of the potential for sectional and minority economic interests during this period of transition. A Southern minority objected strenuously to the high tariffs of 1828 and 1832, which the legislature of South Carolina declared as a violation of the Constitution. When South Carolina took drastic action by confronting the nation with the threat of civil war, a majority yielded on the issue, an act of compromising. A threat to forcibly defy a federal act and possibly to secede from the Union induced a congressional majority to accede to some of the demands of an aroused minority. But the threat must be considered in light of the variety of avenues pursued by Calhoun, and the processes provided in the constitutional structure.

In her major objective of obtaining recognition of the right of nullification, which would have afforded the minority a more extensive check upon federal legislation than the Hartford proposals, South Carolina, like Kentucky and Virginia, did not receive the support of a single state. Had her contentions been accepted as a valid interpretation of the Constitution, a minority of just over one-fourth of the states (and possibly an even smaller numerical minority of the total population) could have set aside a disputed federal act by the simple device of rejecting an amendment delegating to the federal government power to legislate on the matter in question. Calhoun cleverly selected what some considered
an innocuous premise which he could logically develop to the desired conclusion. Both New England and South Carolina met total defeat in their efforts to establish a formal procedure for the greater protection of the minority interests. The Senate, the President, and the Supreme Court remained the only accepted institutional checks upon the action of the absolute numerical majority in the House. But several informal checks existed, and were expanded, e.g., lobbying by interest groups.

It was the tariff which led to the first formal attempt of a state at nullification. The various tariff bills of this era were far more the work of politicians than of manufacturers; the facile conclusion of the 1840's that the early tariffs were a tribute forced on the agrarian South by an industrial New England was an anachronism. The young nationalists in the postwar Congress, Calhoun no less than Clay, had staunchly favored the tariff in order to protect the nation's infant industries as well as to provide revenue for the payment of the war debt and for the construction of essential internal improvements. The divergent economic development of his own section forced Calhoun later to alter slightly his view on this program as well as the excess of revenue accumulating in the Treasury. Henry Clay, on the contrary, continued enthusiastically to advocate the "American System" and expected its popularity to elevate him to the Presidency.

From 1816 to 1832 tariff bills were passed every four years by Congress, with the single exception of the year 1820 when the measure was defeated by a one-vote margin in the Senate. The average rate of protection raised in 1824 to thirty-seven per cent, almost twice that of the original bill of 1816. As each successive tariff bill in the twenties won majorities in the House, it seemed impossible to defeat any general tariff measure (A bill to extend specific protection to a specific item, the Woolen Bill of 1827, failed in the Senate when Vice President Calhoun cast his vote with the opposition to break the tie which existed.\textsuperscript{23} It had become so obvious that an increasing majority of Americans were strongly in favor of the tariff that no prospective candidate for the presidency -- not even Jackson himself -- dared be suspect in pro-tariff areas of opposition to the general principle of protection.\textsuperscript{24}

The strongest sentiment for the tariff came from the Northwest and the Middle States, Pennsylvania in particular; the fact that the rate of population increased in these states was the greatest in the nation made the prospects of defeating it slim. Practically every local interest in the nation, except planters and shipowners, were convinced that they profited from the tariff. As a matter of fact the cotton-goods manufacturers were probably the only group who derived any definite financial benefit, but both the politicians and the people in general were won over to

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\textsuperscript{23} Burgess, op. cit.; p. 162. \\
\textsuperscript{24} Remini, op. cit., p. 74.
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Whatever profit woolen-goods manufacturers derived from the increased price of their finished product was offset by a proportionate increase in the cost of raw domestic wool, which resulted from the same tariff bills. In the writing of the bills there was no objective attempt to determine the ultimate effect of the numerous schedules upon the whole economy of any section, state or major economic interest.

The depression of 1819 severely hurt the Southeastern economy. The simple cause of all the resulting ills were seen embodied in the tariff -- a diabolical plot on the part of the North to cheat proud and superior Carolinians of their well-deserved prosperity. Also certain South Carolinian leaders saw in the tariff the prelude to an attack upon slavery, the central institution of their society no less than of their economy. The Tallmadge Amendment of 1820 had convinced some of a deep-seated design in the North eventually to abolish slavery throughout the entire Union (Calhoun was not one.). The Nat Turner slave-insurrection in 1830 heightened those fears, thus intensifying feelings toward the tariff issue. The interlocking nature of the two issues decreased the areas of effective interaction between the North and South and limited the issues of compromise.

As stated earlier, the South had not wished to endanger Jackson's election, for it looked to him as the future President

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25. Capers, op. cit., p. 100.


27. Ibid., p. 250
to redress the wrong inflicted against its section. Jackson's vague tariff stand prior to 1828 is best revealed in the 1824 campaign:

So far as the Tariff before us embraces the design of fostering, protecting, and preserving within ourselves the means of national defense...I support it...Providence has filled our mountains and our plains with...grand materials for our national defense, they ought to have extended to them...protection, that our manufacturers and laborers may...produce within our own borders, a supply...essential to war...This...judicious...Tariff...possesses...the remedy.

Many Southerners were also banking on Calhoun being Jackson's successor. In 1824 Calhoun supported a free trade policy but favored tariff if necessary to insure certain industrial productions.29

Few Southern representatives had intentions of antagonizing Westerners, whose political support was essential against the growing power of an industrial North. Western increase in representation was important in the sway of balance for Congressional decisions. And since the essence of any political tariff involves the whetting of appetites, so the Tariff of 1828 was designed for special advantages, to specific interests, for directed purposes, particularly those of the West.

The campaign of 1828 was not fought upon the issues of any well-established difference in political and economic politics for the specific tariff issue crossed part lines and Jackson ran more on personality than concrete political facts. He appealed to the masses on his image of having been cheated out of his right in 1824, and the whole past of official secrecy under the present


administration. "The People" must take hold of government. Party divisions in 1828 were still largely dominated by consideration of personal partisanship, and the organization of the two parties, which had emerged from the all-encompassing Republican party, still lacked strong competition.

Lying between the simple extremes of unprinciples politics and rigid morality, union and disunion, order and chaos, is a domain of action called the "ethics of responsibility." Strategies engaged by the politicians in response to the tariff situation had in some manner to weigh the consequences of various alternatives. The American tradition at that point rejected fanaticism and rigidity as too simple for the complex process of achieving political order and liberty. Conflict resulted. What processes, strategies, were used in response by Jackson and Calhoun?
CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIES: AMENABILITY/PRUDENCE/FORCE

Their object is disunion....The laws of the United States must be executed. I have no discretionary power on the subject; my duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution.

Andrew Jackson

Let it never be forgotten that power can only be opposed by power, organization by organization; and on this theory stands our beautiful federal system of government.

John C. Calhoun

The Tariff of Abomination was passed just prior to the election of 1828 and dominated the political interaction of Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun. The ambience for the tariff confrontation between the two men was: The Bank Issue, the Peggy Eaton Affair, power of the Supreme Court, extended suffrage, party alterations. Three high points mark their exchanges: Jackson's First Address to Congress -- Calhoun's South Carolina


Exposition and Protest; the Jefferson Memorial Dinner, and its ramifications; and the Tariff of 1832 -- The South Carolina Nullification -- Jackson's Force Bill.

The exact details of Jackson's and Calhoun's conduct during the critical years from 1828 to 1831 cannot be established. For example, while Calhoun secretly wrote the *South Carolina Exposition and Protest* in the early fall of 1828, he never avowed his authorship nor officially committed himself to nullification until his public letter of July 4, 1831. But the interaction of what Jackson and Calhoun officially said and officially did provides a basis for analysis of political styles.

The Jacksonian Era was dominated ideologically by the revolution and reinforcement of certain basic American political commitments (e.g., Constitution, Bill of Rights) and democratic political procedures -- fixed spheres of political authority. The "Spirit of the Age" reflected rising nationalism, a "national identity," where more attention was given to the role of the federal government and the people as one unit. Political democracy revolved around the medium, and process more than the achievements of Jackson's party.3

The tariff issues engaged all comers, particularly the forces of nationalism, sectionalism, and economic interests. The shifts in the economy and in population plus the increase in franchise heightened the tension for the nation's political figures -- removable

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spheres of political authority. As numerous historians have explored, many themes ran through the Jacksonian Era: equality, privilege; liberty, domination; honest work, idol exploit; natural dignity, factitious superiority; patriotic conservatism, alien innovation; progress, dead precedent. These interactions involved factions and conflict, compromise and consensus, for the American political system. Jackson's and Calhoun's method of persuasion, of response to this period of transition, differed although they grew from the same roots of Jefferson's philosophy.

Both men were national figures prior to the election of 1828. Jackson, with his frontier education and keep attachment to that section of the nation, was thrusted into the national lime light with the Battle of New Orleans and remained there with his activities in Florida, his one session in Congress and his bid for the Presidency in 1824. Calhoun's constituency was also basically national. New England educated, he returned to the South only to be elected to Congress in 1811, served as Secretary of War under Monroe, and elected Vice President in 1824. His New England education and residency had deeply embedded in him the commitment of the North to the Union, while enriching his own national commitment.

4. A counter thesis is Richard McCormick's analysis of voting turnout patterns which show none of Jackson's elections involved a "mighty democratic uprising," in the sense that voters were drawn to the polls in unprecedented proportions. When compared with the peak participation records for each state before 1824, or with contemporaneous gubernatorial elections, or most particularly with the vast outpouring of the electorate in 1840, voter participation in the Jackson elections was unimpressive. Richard McCormick, "New Perspectives on Jacksonian Politics," American Historical Review, LVI (March, 1960), 288-301.

The uplands of South Carolina spawned both men. They were descendents of the same stubborn Scotch Irish stock; and neither was likely to yield a conviction. Calhoun once declared that "Life is a struggle against evil." So too did Jackson see his presidency as a moral crusade against evil. Whereas Jackson turned to the frontier experiences for political and moral guidance, the political activities in South Carolina helped to mold Calhoun's political thought and behavior, e.g., representation and source of power.

The lowcountry of South Carolina had sought to maintain a century old vested economic interest against the sheer weight of numbers. The upcountry demanded political equality which would carry with it the power to rectify the economic inequality between the sections. It was to this sectional struggle that Calhoun referred forty years latter when the prosperity of the entire South was challenged by a numerically stronger interest. It was an important influence in determining his future career and in molding his political creed. Calhoun's father, a major leader of the compromise, had been on the side of the numerical majority in 1790. Wealth, aristocracy, cultural and political control were the characteristics

6. Location of Jackson's birth was in disputed territory between North and South Carolina; at the time of Jackson's birth it was held by South Carolina, though later granted to North Carolina. Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nullifier, 1829-1839 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 19-21.


8. This is a basic thesis of Martin Meyers, op. cit., pp. 3-10.
of the low country. For two generations the lowcountry had feared the potential dominance of the uplands while the latter resented with grouping bitterness its enforced subjugation. In 1790 a compromise was reached. Representation of the upcountry increased substantially in both houses of the state legislature. New electoral districts determined with equal regard to population and taxation, so that money and political power would not necessarily be synonymous. The arrangement still left the low coast in control of the Senate and the hills increased control in the House. A concurrent rather than a numerical majority, not of one portion of its people over another but two great interests, had been given protection against each other and this very action was responsible for mutual attachment. This was seen as a device for securing justice for all minority (major) economic groups within the population. Further elaboration was to be Calhoun's great contribution.

The caricature "Man of Iron" has been used descriptively for both Jackson and Calhoun. The "Man of (Malleable) Iron" was used by John William Ward to illuminate the image of Jackson:

Through his career, Jackson was lauded as a man of iron; his iron will was central to innumerable descriptions of his character....The several actions in Jackson's life...show the irresistible strength which heaven has granted to an honest purpose. They show the homage which men pay to an iron will, based upon the consciousness of right intention...(not) a man of will which might prove to be unbridled egotism.


Calhoun has been cast in a slightly different image of iron, cast iron. Harriet Martineau after a tour in the South reflected on the harsh conditions as well as the major national figure who seemed to embody the character she wanted to portray. Calhoun was a "cast iron man who looks as if he had never been born, and could never be extinguished."\(^\text{11}\)

Calhoun was a gentleman possessing the social graces and charm of the Southern plantation class but his portraits show him, and as many of his contemporaries saw him, a dispassionate, a direct, and a lonely man whose mind followed a logical path unobstructed by emotion. Clay caricaturized him as:

...tall, careworm, with furrowed brow, haggard and intensely gazing, looking as if he were dissecting the last abstraction which sprung from metaphysician's brain, and muttering to himself, 'in half-uttered tones, 'This is indeed a real crisis.'\(^\text{12}\)

Robert B. Rhett of South Carolina said, "He understood principles... but he did not understand how best to control and use...man."\(^\text{13}\)

The paths of these two "Men of Iron" crossed early in their careers; in 1818 Jackson toasted Calhoun as "an honest man," "the noblest work of God." In 1825 Jackson wrote "Calhoun was the only friend I had in the Cabinet;" though in 1830 he referred to Calhoun


\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 77.
as "an ambitious demagogue who would sacrifice friends and country and move heaven and earth to gratify his own ambitions." The early amiability between the two diminished to the point that sulphurous clouds of personal abuse at times all but obscured the major issues before the country.

JACKSON'S FIRST ADDRESS TO CONGRESS - CALHOUN'S SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION AND PROTEST

In 1828, with an electoral vote of 178 and 171 respectively, Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun were overwhelmingly voted into office. Immediately the signs of the fundamental maxims of Jeffersonian philosophy were joined, then were pitted against one another. As Jackson wrote his first address to Congress, Calhoun listened to the responses of the nation to the South Carolina Exposition and Protest. Calhoun's epistle was written prior to Jackson's primary victory and, in fact, it advocated the election of General Jackson as a Southern means for reducing the tariff.

The Exposition advocated a supposedly constitutional method by which South Carolina could disobey a tariff passed by Congress and still remain in the Union. Numerically the South had lost in Congress, a Congress declared by Calhoun in 1812 as the bulwark of democracy. The South had lost, and, it was unable to form a coalition or negotiate a compromise. Other avenues would have to

be pursued, i.e., the election of Jackson which Calhoun not only foresaw as a method reducing the tariff but also cementing a South-West coalition.\textsuperscript{17}

The \textit{Exposition} consisted of three major points. The first was a realistic survey of the economic effects of the tariff, stating the numerous reasons why it was unconstitutional, and unjust. A major point emphasized was that the South was responsible for two-thirds of the nation's exports, but was politically no more than one-third of the nation. Therefore the tariff was a clear case of oppression by the majority.\textsuperscript{18}

The second point was a detailed description of the allegedly constitutional method by which South Carolina could reject the tariff, and yet remain in the Union without fear of coercion from the federal government. Here Calhoun drew upon an assortment of weapons from the armories of John Taylor of Carolina, Robert Turnbull, Judge Spencer Roane and the \textit{Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions}. There was, he said, in effect, no division of sovereignty between states and the general government. Government was one thing, sovereignty another. Government was strictly limited, sovereignty resided in all its amplitude in the people of the several states. Thus the Constitution itself was merely a compact between sovereign states.\textsuperscript{19}

The third point asserted that the state would delay nullification, though it was clearly her constitutional right, in the hope that the


\textsuperscript{19} Anderson, op. cit., p. 9.
majority would come to its senses and grant her relief. The basis for this hope was the anticipated election of General Jackson who would restore "the pure principles of our government."20 Should Jackson fail, South Carolina would proceed with "her sacred duty to interpose; -- a duty to herself -- to the Union -- to the present, and to future generations -- and to the cause of liberty over the world."21

Calhoun's motives in writing the Exposition and in his subsequent conduct were by no means self-evident, and they are still subjects of much dispute. Probably the simplest explanation is that of the leading scholar on the question, Frederic Bancroft, who regards the whole business as merely another instance of Calhoun's jockeying for the presidency. The Vice President "believed that he could slip on Jefferson's clothes of 1798 and, sooner or later, walk into the White House."22 But there is some evidence to support the contrary position that Calhoun was sincerely concerned for the welfare of the South and the preservation of the Union, and was willing to subordinate his personal ambitions. The tariff appeared to be a tremendous burden, if not ruinous, to the South; anticipating the frontal attack upon slavery by extremists soon to come, he was also attempting to establish nullification as a defense in advance of that attack. If the preservation of the Union was his major concern, he was indirectly striving to avoid a situation where a disaffected minority might in desperation take action which would lead to dissolution or to civil war. This he

20. Ibid., p. 40.
21. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
would do by simply giving the minority sufficient power to protect itself against the tyranny of the majority.

It is plausible that to Calhoun's mind these three objectives, his political ambitions, the welfare of the South, and the preservation of the Union, merged. In a letter written in September, 1830, a year before Calhoun was compelled publicly to announce his support of nullification, to Virgil Maxcy of Maryland, he commented on his political future:

I must merge my interest in the higher sense of duty... in future advancement... however strong may be my ambition, my sense of duty is till stronger.

Calhoun went on to say that he realized many of his northern friends expected him to check the nullification movement. But only Jackson, in his opinion, could do so, by lowering the tariff and granting the Nullifiers what they were threatening to accomplish by independent state action. Calhoun said compromise and concessions come from strength which was held by sections other than the South.

If, I really believed, that civil discord, revolution or disunion would follow from the measure contemplated, I would not hesitate, devoted to our system of government, as I am, to throw myself in the current with a view to arrest it at any hazard, but believing that the State, while she is struggling to preserve her reserved power, is acting with devoted loyalty to the Union, no early consideration would induce me to do an act, or utter a sentiment, which would cast an imputation on her motives.

Finally Calhoun stated that the tariff was merely the occasion of the controversy, but that the "peculiar domestic institution of the Southern States" was the basic cause. Slavery as well as the soil and


climate placed the South as a minority in a position vulnerable to the current legislative program of the congressional majority. In his opinion, "if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the States," the Southerners in the end would be forced to rebel, or submit to having their permanent interests sacrificed, their domestic institutions subverted, and themselves and children reduced to wretchedness. 25

Whatever may have been Calhoun's conscious objectives in writing the Exposition, there were three definite consequences relative to his own political future. Undoubtedly he had in mind Jefferson's tactics of 1798 when the Republican leader, as a Vice President hostile to the current administration, secretly wrote the Kentucky Resolves and gained the presidency for himself two years later. Calhoun needed to undercut the strength of the radicals in his own state, to forestall extreme action on their part. He needed to encourage Southerners to vote for Jackson, as well as apply pressure on Jackson, after his election, to reduce the tariff. Extreme action by the radical hotheads like Rhett or Hamilton, before the election in November, might have created a situation that would compel Jackson to commit himself on the tariff, and thus loose potentially crucial votes in the North or the South (The Vice President did temporarily win the confidence of the Radicals, while not losing support for keeping his penmanship a secret.). 26

Calhoun had recognized the significance of the votes cast by

25. Ibid.

Van Buren and Easton for the amendment to the tariff of 1828. He feared that the General might forget his desire for tariff reduction should it appear unpopular with the majority wing of his party or with the general public. Here Calhoun may have been building a backfire. He desired and encouraged the threat of independent action in South Carolina for tariff reduction with the expectation that Jackson's fear of alienating Southern support, or possibly of civil war, would influence him to force a lower tariff through Congress regardless of Northern opposition.

The political strategy of the nullification proposal, written secretly and without comment at the moment, might have been a sort of trial balloon and at the same time insurance against an unpredictable future.

In February 1829, South Carolina presented a formal protest to Congress which emphasized that all tariff acts were unconstitutional except as incidental to raising the revenue or regulating commerce; and charged all tariffs as politically and economically unequal, where their operation and impact would oppressive aspects for all sections of the country.

The language of the paper was respectful and dignified, moderate but forceful, with no threats of disunion, violence or unlawful restrictions. The message followed the clues presented in the Exposition in considering alternative channels of power: a new coalition with the Democratic party, a switch in party alliances, the formation of a new party, the hope of Calhoun becoming President, the use of the Courts, or the change in the cabinet membership.

27. Ibid., p. 123.

28. Ibid., pp. 120-122.
The *Exposition* was followed in tactics as well as philosophy.

In discussion political remedies, Calhoun has stated:

No government based on the naked principle that the majority ought to govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense, and under proper restrictions, can preserve its liberty even for a single generation.  

To moderate tariff systems for revenue, affording incidental protection, the South would agree:

We have suffered too much to desire to see others afflicted, even for our relief, when it can be avoided. We would rejoice to see our manufacturers flourish on any constitutional principle, consistent with justice.  

Which to Calhoun was the binding element of the Constitution.

Here was the crux of the matter. A uniform law for the whole nation could act with great injustice. Alexander Hamilton had understood. Society, the great Federalist leader had written, must not only "guard against the injustice of the other part....If a majority be united by a common interest, the ...minority will be unsafe."  

Only those governments which check power, which limit and restrain within proper bounds the power of the majority, have had a prolonged and happy existence. Like Madison responding to the Shay's Rebellion, so Calhoun sought to control a majority which passed a tariff which he conceived as making the South "serfs of the system."  

It was a constitutional means short of secession, for resisting the majority took the form of state nullification. With careful logic, in order not to repeat the "governmental partners

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29. Ibid., p. 123.  
31. Ibid., p. 408.  
32. Ibid.
in compact" mistakes of the Webster-Hayne debates, the Exposition showed the powers of sovereignty belonging entirely to the several states therefore the right of judging whether measures of policy were infractions of their rights under the Constitution belonged to the states. When a state convention, called for that purpose, decided that constitutional rights were violated by any statute, the state had the right to declare the law null and void within its boundaries and to refuse to permit its enforcement there. Nullification would be binding on both the citizens of the state and the federal government. Here the state was the intermediary agency which held and distributed power.

In his position as Vice President Calhoun removed himself directly from the happenings in South Carolina but indirectly, as the anonymous signer of the Exposition, he tried to guide a moderate course, a compromise similar to the agreement achieved in the 1790's between the coastal area and the uplands of South Carolina.

Salient to Calhoun's political process was a desire not to be pressured into systematically opposing the North.

Our true system is to look at the country and to support such measures and such men, without regard to section as are best calculated to advance the general interest...

In 1816 Calhoun's strategy was compromise, for the sake of the Union. Advocating the tariff bill in 1816, Calhoun said it would "bind together our widely spread Republic." At the same time he warned against disunion. "This single word comprehends almost

the sum of our political dangers, and against it...we ought to be perpetually guarded."34

Calhoun left no doubt as to his meaning. Despite his later concession to a "small permanent protection," he was supporting the new tariff as a gesture of unity and concession, from a position of strength, for the nation and not for South Carolina. He was convinced the tariff would bring a harmonious balance to the great interests of the country.35 Calhoun's objective and fear in 1816 were the objectives of a lifetime. His goal was constant: to preserve the union, and to hold back all forces which might send the union apart. Twelve years later he withdrew his support for a tariff bill for it, he felt, was designed to do the reverse. His tactics had changed, not his strategy.

In 1816 Calhoun had probably supported Monroe with little thought to the sectional question (He was only thirty-six and six full Presidential terms would have to pass before he would reach the average age at which the office had up to that time been filled.). Immediately following his appointment as Secretary of War, he was made aware in cabinet meetings that John Q. Adams and William H. Crawford were already candidates for the election of 1824.36 Adam's unpopularity in the South was not changed by his stance on the Missouri Compromise; thus it would be difficult for him to poll strength to carry that section in the next election. The election of another Southerner, particularly one of Crawford's radical posture, would

34. Ibid., p. 219.
alienate the North further and possibly create the dangers of 1814. Calhoun, having been New England trained, knew as well as any man how deep-seated was the feeling of the North and East against the long line of Southern Presidents.

In correspondence with William Plumer, Jr., a personal friend of both Calhoun and Adams, Calhoun stated that for years he had been in favor of giving the North the next Presidency, leaving the North to select the man. His trip through the Northern and Middle Atlantic states in 1821 reaffirmed the belief in the integrity and well-meaning of most northern countrymen. To Plumer he also expressed his own preference for the candidacy of Mr. Adams. Calhoun described Adams as a man of talent, of integrity and correct political opinion. At this time, Calhoun inquired if Adams had the support of united forces of the North, which would be necessary for his cause, given the antagonism in the South.36

During the Congressional debates in late 1821 it appeared Adams increased his unpopularity in New England and would be deserted by New York and Pennsylvania.37 At the same time Crawford was gaining strength in the Middle States and might secure a majority, given more time. After consultation with his advisors, Calhoun declared his candidacy, then again corresponded with Plumer. He asked that Adams be informed that his candidacy was to split the South, to defeat the upsurge of Crawford.38 Calhoun was probably not only motivated by his belief that the North should have the Presidency in 1824,

36. Ibid., p. 245.
37. Ibid., p. 243.
38. Ibid., p. 223.
but also a desire to stop the personal Presidential plans of Crawford (Jackson had not declared his candidacy and Calhoun felt Clay would have little impact.). Calhoun had been at odds with Crawford since he interfered with certain military bills Calhoun as Secretary of War wanted passed by Congress in 1817. 39

Thus having assisted in what he conceived as the political process of retaining the Union in 1814-1816, and 1821-1824 by compromising with the North, and having suffered defeat by a numerical majority in both Houses of Congress with the Tariff of Abomination, Calhoun turned in late 1828 to the Presidency, and the Constitution for assistance in the protecting of minority group interests, sectional and economical, and preserving the Union. Calhoun turned to General Jackson to reinforce the Southern position.

Early in the campaign Jackson's advisors had pressed him to be discreet so as not to make difficulties for sectional leaders of the party. The object was to insinuate the General as a friend on the East of protection, on the West as a Federal road and canal advocate, and on the South as a very mild tariff and improvements man. The strategy proved effective as revealed through the ambiguities in the response to his first inaugural address. In the address Jackson promised nothing, except to clean house among the Federal officeholders. He advocated no policy, and the host of special interests could read into the address whatever they desired when Jackson promised not to confuse the delegated power of the federal government with the reserved rights of the states. He called for:

39. Ibid., p. 179.
The introduction and observance of the strictest economy... a Judicious tariff, combined with a fostering care of commerce and agriculture, and regulated by the principles before adverted to, a just respect for state rights and the maintenance of state sovereignty as the best check of the tendencies to consolidation....

The editor of the Charleston Mercury said the President would:

uphold the states...in their just power, sedulously avoiding encroachment on their rights. He will regard the preservation of the Union as the polar star in his conduct. And Calhoun on September 22, 1829, stated, "That Jackson is in principle true to the ground on which he was elected." 42

With regard to a proper selection of the subjects of impost with a view to revenue, it would seem to me that the spirit of equity, caution, and compromise in which the Constitution was formed requires that the great interests of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures should be equally favored, and that perhaps the only exception to this rule should consist in the peculiar encouragement of any products of either of them which may be found essential to our national independence. 43

Jackson's message to Congress on December 8, 1829, did not prove itself so beneficial to the manufactures or so injurious to commerce and agriculture as had been anticipated. The existing schedule of duties, he declared, had proved less beneficial to the manufacture than had been hoped, and less harmful to agriculture and commerce than had been feared. He regretted all nations would not abolish tariff but since they did not, a tariff was necessary policy of the United States. Jackson suggested a gradual reduction

41. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 46.
42. Ibid., p. 112.
of duties on articles not coming into competition with domestic products, e.g., tea, coffee. Jackson could not and had not avoided the tariff issue in his address but approached the tariff controversy with extreme caution.\textsuperscript{44}

South Carolina was disappointed by the expression of the President's view for some Southern politicians felt the promised return for its votes in the 1828 election had not been fulfilled.\textsuperscript{45} The President had recommended noting that in the long run could be satisfactory to South Carolina.

In addition Calhoun was disappointed by Jackson's cabinet choices. Cabinet apointees reflected sectional and economic interests. Calhoun viewed Jackson as not responding to the major coalitions within the Democratic Party, for Jackson appeared to respond more to Crawford's southern influence in his choice of nominations than to Calhoun's.

JEFFERSON MEMORIAL DINNER AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

Andrew Jackson's toast at the Jefferson Day Memorial Dinner, April 13, 1830, presented not only a challenge but a rebuke to Calhoun: the "Federal Union...must be preserved." An evening set aside to honor Jefferson, the spiritual father of the two highest elected public officials in the United States, was the only public encounter between them over the tariff issue during those controversial years.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., pp. 435-441.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 47.
The strategic responses made that evening by both revealed differences in political styles, personal ambitions, controversies over the nature of the Union, and the role of minority groups. Jackson's response was a moral directive, forthright, and stated with confidence, of the force to attain the stated goal.

Jackson and Calhoun were caught on a tidal wave of change in American political development. Jackson moved with the wave of nationalism, with Calhoun caught in the undertow of state rights. Each used the Jeffersonian image as a theoretical base and as a tool of persuasion for the validity of assuming the political mantle of leadership, i.e., Jackson -- common man, Calhoun -- state rights. And the Jacksonian moral polemics in the campaign of 1828 ripened the sense of the past in the deepening party struggle. Both ideas were part of Jefferson's basic philosophy but in that era of transition, and in direct response to the tariff situation, the political commitments became countervailing forces. The double image pointed to the ironic recognition that the father of the symbolic creed which shielded the South and the father of the symbolic creed which threatened to destroy it were one and the same.

Calhoun's response supplied a significant qualification to Jackson's toast, revealing ambiguity and humility, but firmness.

The Union -- next to our liberty most dear. May we always remember it can only be preserved by distributing equally the benefits and the burdens of the Union.

The qualification was consistent with his political actions and political philosophy, and it appeared to be an exact logical statement of the principles advanced by Jefferson in 1798.

The state rights' and minority rights' premise was often reflected in Jefferson's thoughts, primarily his early ones. For example, in 1797 he said:

All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle that, though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; and that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate it would be oppression.

And on August 23, 1799, he wrote to Madison:

Determined were we to be disappointed in the repeal of the unconstitutional act by Congress to sever ourselves from the union we so much value, rather than give up the rights of self government which we have reserved and in which alone we see liberty, safety and happiness.

In the crucial eighth resolution of Jefferson's original draft of the Kentucky Resolutions were two sections later omitted:

1. that every state has a natural right in most cases with the compact to nullify, of their own authority, all assumption of powers by others within their limits,

2. (that each state) will take measures of its own for proving that neither of these acts (the Alien and Sedition Acts) nor any other of the General Government not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories.

Jefferson's closing statement, "Nullification...is the rightful remedy," was incorporated in the Resolution of 1799.


No man may fairly be held accountable for all the twistings and turnings of his intellectual offspring; yet the meaning of an idea reaches beyond its original context and purpose. It is unfolded in history. Jefferson's state rights' doctrine afforded an illuminating instance. It was capable of being appropriated for purposes, possibly alien to his own, in any crisis of federal relations that might arise, and the power of the Jeffersonian symbol, combined with the memory of 1798, made it expedient to appropriate them.

Jackson's first year in office had ended with no indication that he would initiate legislation to lower the tariff. When McDuffies' bill for reduction was tabled without discussion in February 1830, certain South Carolina leaders decided that it was time to increase the pressure on the administration by more drastic action. An active campaign began in the West, the South and in the state of South Carolina to press for the support of nullification, or at least for a program of concerted action rather than verbal protest. The emphasis was placed on "State Rights and Free Trade." Some leaders in South Carolina organized a radical party calling for a state convention "where the people in their sovereign capacity should decide what ought to be done." The radical party supporters lost a two-thirds vote necessary for calling a convention in South Carolina in the autumn of 1830.

The Webster-Hayne debate in the spring of 1830 was an outgrowth of the introduction of the Foote Resolution. Hayne saw the opportunity for a political alliance between the South and West directed against the tariff, and the restriction of land sales.

50. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 52.
Webster adroitly centered the debate for nationalism against nullification, for union against disunion, thereby turning the sympathy of a large majority of Westerners and even of Southerners, against the radical proposals from South Carolina.

The Southern idea of nullification was taken by Calhoun and sharpened into an organic law of the federal system. To enhance the image of nullification the best possible strategy was to link the cause with Jefferson. Jefferson could serve as the Nullifier's armor of safety and flag of victory. In 1829 the Memoirs, Correspondence and Private Papers of Thomas Jefferson made their first appearance and the South sought to capitalize on them.

Some South Carolinians in the bid for federal support in 1830 counted on the association of Jefferson's man. Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton (pro tariff) arranged the celebration of Jefferson's birthday, anticipating it to become a party rite, an annual "recurrance of fundamental principles, and a declaration of adhesion to the republican doctrine of the great apostle of American liberty."51

Reverberations of the toasts bounded off the federal buildings' walls for weeks following the dinner. Both opposition and administration spokesman at once turned Jackson's declaration against South Carolina. Some Southerners felt defeated by Jackson's toast but the stigma of nullification was attached to Jefferson and despite vigorous counterthrusts, despite Jackson, the impression was planted and could not be wholly rooted out.

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51. Peterson, op. cit., p. 54.
With the disappointment in Jackson and the decreasing chance of executive leadership for tariff reduction and lacking sufficient votes in Congress despite continued efforts of men like George McDuffie (suggesting the tariff schedule as revenue should be placed in the hands of the National Committee on Ways and Means rather than the Committee on Manufacturing which was chaired by John Q. Adams), Calhoun turned to the courts for a constitutional interpretation and to another effort for executive support. He echoed James Hamilton Jr. in referring to the Constitution as always having been "the refuge for minorities." 52

In 1830 the case of Tassel vs Georgia, the Supreme Court made an exhaustive review of the Indian relations of the United States and of provisions of the statutes of Georgia. The Court asserted that the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth over the Cherokee lands and over all persons residing or being on them, unconstitutional, null, and void. The Court upheld the arrest, trial and sentence of Cherokee Tassel. Mr. Worcester, a test case for state rights, was under a similar indictment. The state of Georgia authorities paid no attention to the decision. The President failed to see that the Court ruling was carried out. The Commonwealth of Georgia simply defied the Court successfully; the President and Congress acquiesced in the revolt. The President agreed in opinion with the Georgians upon the subject, and the doctrine which here triumphed was one more plank in the platform of the Jacksonian democracy, a real "state rights" principle. 53


53. Ibid., pp. 310-312.
Georgia had nullified a decision of the Supreme Court in the first of the Cherokee cases, and Georgia was still in the Union. Pennsylvania had done likewise in the earlier Olmstead case, but the Union still stood firm. Why should the tariff and South Carolina's notion of nullification dissolve the Union?

Encouraged by the course of events in Georgia, South Carolina embarked on a similar case, hoping for similar results. It did not seem to have fully realized that President Jackson did not agree with them in their view of the unconstitutionality of the tariff as he had agreed with the Georgians in their view of the Indian question.

South Carolina politicians were unaware of certain personal elements entering the decision-making process. Jackson had assumed Calhoun was his defender in the Court martial case and discouraged a trial for disobeying orders or acting in excess of orders during the Seminole War, and that Crawford was the instigator. In 1830 those close to Jackson, Eaton, Van Buren, Governor Forsyth of Georgia, convinced Jackson that it was Calhoun who had pressed for arraigning him. Jackson demanded an explanation of Calhoun but the reply did not satisfy him. Thus from this point on any movement against the Government or the laws of the United States headed by Calhoun would be considered by Jackson as rebellion.54

On July 4, 1831, two conventions were held in Charleston, the South Carolina Union Party, and the South Carolina States' Rights and Free Tariff Party. At the Union meeting, a letter from Andrew Jackson was read (He had declined an invitation to attend the meeting.). Jackson made clear by implication that any move to

54. Ibid., pp. 310-325.
nullify would be met by force. The enlightened citizen should know

...that high and sacred duties which must and will, at all hazards, be performed, present an insurmountable barrier to the success of any plan of disorganization by whatever patriotic name it may be decorated, or whatever high feelings may be arrayed for its support.

Although he had sustained Georgia in her refusal to carry out the Supreme Court's ruling in the Tassell case and had gone so far as to withdraw the United States troops from that state at the demand of Governor Gilmore, Jackson was preparing to take drastic action against the Nullifiers in South Carolina. It cannot be unequivocally demonstrated that the distinction arose out of his quarrel with Calhoun, but it is not unlikely. The President had stated more than once that only the Supreme Court could determine whether an act of Congress was unconstitutional; but during the summer of 1831 he took great pains to see that the constitutionality of the Tariff of 1828 did not get to the Court for a decision. The Holmes case, trumped up by McDuffie for the purpose of testing the law, was about to come to trial. The defendants had refused to pay duty on certain imported goods on the ground that the law was invalid. The United States Attorney in Charleston resigned rather than bring suit on the posted revenue bonds. Jackson's first inclination was to refuse the resignation and impeach the officer, but he decided on merely to appoint a more pliant prosecutor. 56 In the meantime he proposed to send a private agent to look and inquire, and take the necessary testimony to expose all who are engaged in "this act of intended treason against our


56. Ibid., p. 113.
Jackson had been informed that Calhoun positively supported the activities and that was enough to convince him that the Union was threatened. James A. Hamilton, Jr., who was then United States Attorney of New York, gave Jackson detailed advice as to how the suit might be managed to avoid sending it to a jury or, failing that, to restrict the evidence to the single point of the validity of the bonds. The latter procedure was followed; the Nullifiers lost their case, and with it all chance of getting a Supreme Court ruling on the tariff. The direct interference of the President in the affair was not known to the Nullifiers, but it was known to the Unionist leaders, thus strengthening their hands in the South, as did their clarification of the process of nullification.

Of the twenty-four states in the Union in 1830, Delaware the smallest, with only half of one per cent of the total population, could arrest the operation of any law or treaty passed by Congress and even set aside a decision of the Supreme Court. Should the majority attempt to pass on amendments that would give constitutional sanctions to a law previously nullified, the seven smaller states, containing eight per cent of the total population could defeat the amendment. Few Southern states would probably grant such tremendous power to such a minority. Many of them had benefited from legislation enacted by slight majorities or had in mind future measures vital to their interests.

60. Delaware, 76,748; Rhode Island, 97,199; Mississippi, 136,621; Missouri, 140,455; Illinois, 157,445; Louisiana, 215,739; New Hampshire, 269,328. Their combined population was 1,093,535 out of a total of 12,866,000. Capers, op. cit., p. 133.
Nullification could wield a two-edge sword which would injure the wielders no less than their opponents. Thus it was possible the Southern and Western states understood the basic point of nullification and applied to it a reductio ad absurdum.

First of all, despite attempts by some Southern leaders in 1830 to gain passage of a compromise tariff, and secondly, to prove the unconstitutionality of the existing tariff, they were given no quarter by Jackson. His second annual message to Congress asked for the continuation of the present tariff. Although the tariff might need some corrections in detail, no law reducing duties could be made which would be satisfactory to the American people. Jackson's political strategy would maintain the status quo for the South or isolate them politically and economically.

Already a national hero by the time he was elected President, Jackson became the great partisan protagonist of his time, Jackson caused a great polarity of attitudes, for his contemporaries and subsequent scholars.

Andrew Jackson was intimately identified with the full flowering of American democracy, and as long as democracy remains preeminently the distinguishing feature of our society, the period and the symbol of its triumph will remain controversial...the paradoxical character of the Jacksonian democratic impulse...(as) the frame of reference has served a valuable purpose...by leading historians to the different elements of the complex Jacksonian past. 61

Jackson accepted the issue of executive power. It fitted the President's conception of his office. Jackson had been accused of thinking of himself not as administering a government but leading

an army, which he called a party and which he confused with the people. Van Buren revealed that Jackson yearned to lead in person the 35,000 troops he was prepared to summon to march against the South Carolina nullification in 1833 before the impasses was compromised. An army did not compromise with its foes. It battled to extermination. Neither was there any halfway house for loyalty in Jackson's mind. One was for him or against him. If for him, one obeyed orders without question; if against him one was a suspected traitor.

Jackson's political style represented one of presidential power and aggressive leadership, a policy-making rather than a mere law-making official of government. He exercised strong executive powers whether dealing with the legislature or judicial branches of government, with friends or enemies or with other governments. He vetoed twelve Congressional bills and pocket-vetoed others, justifying the vetoes with the explanation that expedience was deemed efficient. As recipient of the mandate in 1828 he knew better than either the Congress or the courts what was good for the country and what was constitutional, e.g., the Cherokee cases, and the reported remark "Justice Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it," was exemplary of his style. The cabinet was under his control, not responsive to Congress, e.g., the position of Secretary of Treasury. He, as opposed to Calhoun, was a man who learned by dealing with


actualities rather than by intellectual analysis. The complexity of the Presidency has not easily lent itself to this posture but Jackson often responded to issues in personal terms: "who is not for me must be considered against me." 65

Jackson first strengthened the role of the Presidency by use of the veto which led to an acquisition of irreverence for the delicate checks and balance process that was developed by his predecessors. 66 Jackson was the first to employ the veto against bills that he did not like, irrespective of their presumed unconstitutionality. 67 His conviction was that the veto power was the weapon of an independent and coordinate executive branch, to be exercised in judgment on both constitutional and policy issues. The veto afforded an occasion for a show of force and an opportunity to formulate and articulate views about the nature and breadth of presidential power.

The relationship of the chief executive, the bureaucracy and the legislative body was slightly altered during Jackson's administration. The fact that he removed two Secretaries of the Treasury because of their refusal to execute his order to withdraw funds from the Bank of the United States, shows the increased strength in his position, and his public support. Congress tended to view the operation of the Treasury as partly under its control. Although Jackson was censured for his activities, his image as public defender was not altered.

65. Ibid.


67. The veto power partially represents or responds in the same manner as Perrow's negative veto used by the pluralists.
Freedom from any hard and fast social philosophy permitted Jackson a flexibility as to policies that was to put him in the front rank of American political leaders. Instead of initiating what came to be called Jacksonian Democracy, the already developing movement by and large appropriated the General as its symbol and leader. Jackson, by intuition, sensed the course the public mind would take. Thus he followed when he seemed to lead. No doubt Jackson was like most able political leaders, more or less unconsciously a pragmatic opportunist.

Secondly, Jackson circled about him a coterie of devoted and expert politicians who persistently sought the centripetal issues to hold intact the Democratic group coalition. His kitchen cabinet became one of his enduring claims to fame. The body itself functioned as a party catalyst. Jackson reorganized and renovated the Democratic party and through the party structure increased his control over Congress. For example, the power of committee appointments was removed from the hands of the Vice President (Calhoun) and placed in the hands of the party hierarchy within the Senate.

A third consideration of Jackson's presidency and his personal style was the use of the patronage device. The development of patronage cannot be attributed to Jackson, but he used it most effectively as an instrument for institutional control and as a tool for image building. Through its power, the President gained a tool for the assertion of his will on the bureaucracy and enhanced

69. Ibid., p. 219.
his equipment for playing an energetic role in the control of governmental policy. The control of the Washington press and congressional papers was a favorite target of patronage and political control.

Like Jefferson who took an active part in the establishment of the National Intelligencer in 1800 (The first President to have an administration organ of his own choosing), Jackson realized the full import of an administration press. Jackson’s victory had brought into existence a new governmental organ published by Duff Green, the United States Telegraph. Green also had acquired the Senate printing contract. Duff Green’s support of Calhoun resulted in Green losing the Senate contract, and the establishment of a new administration mouth piece, the Globe. Green was eventually fired, and finally the Telegraph expired. 70

A basic change which occurred was that the executive no longer relied on the Congress for office or power, but owed its allegiance to the people. Of all public officials, the President alone came to represent a national popular constituency (and nearest to resemble the embodiment of an "American Will"). The President was the people’s representative-at-large and he should consequently uphold the "People’s Interest" against a sectionalized Congress. In the disputes with the Whig party, Henry Clay, the Bank nullification and Calhoun, Jackson represented the "people." His frontier and military experiences provided force as the method of resolving conflict. Jackson’s personalization of issues meant diverting the hostility into conflict, for change from means to object. Thus seeking channels for

compromise, bargaining, were made extremely difficult. Unlike Jefferson and unlike Calhoun, Jackson was less concerned with method than with reality.

Andrew Jackson represented the individual of native forces who was able to transcend forms because he was in touch with the reality that gave the forms meaning. 71

"The Bank is trying to kill me, but I will kill it." 72

And with this single-mindedness of an Apache, he pursued Biddle and the Bank to the bitter end. Jackson's alleged deathbed regret, apocryphal but in character, was that he had never had an opportunity to shoot Henry Clay or hang John C. Calhoun. 73

Woven into this stream of Jacksonian thought are several threads of the Jeffersonian vision: the friend of limited and frugal government, equal rights and equal law, strict construction and dispersed power, all as the defender of the Republic. The political myth of Jacksonian Democracy formed around the ideas of return to the Jeffersonian foundation and of continuing popular struggle in the image of Jeffersonian politics. Jefferson appeared not only as the sainted "Father of Democracy" but also the symbol of a pure and noble way of life. 74

Most Jacksonians were intellectually and emotionally predisposed to view their world through the Jeffersonian categories of government and society, for Jefferson was considered the originator of democracy

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73. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 40.
74. Ward, op. cit., p. 54.
and Jackson the executor. The three symbols -- the Jeffersonian symbol, Democracy, and the Democratic Party -- scarcely existed in the public mind apart from each other and attempts to disengage them met with fleeting success. Even Jackson believed the role he played:

I have long believed, that it was only by preserving the identity of the Republican party as embodied and characterized by the principles introduced by Mr. Jefferson that the original rights of the states and the people could be maintained as contemplated by the Constitution. I have labored to reconstruct this great party and bring the popular power to bear with full influence upon the Government, by securing its permanent ascendancy.

Jefferson thought is characterized by a serious dualism as a consequence of the attempt to lay almost equal emphasis on liberty and equality, on individual welfare and the general interest, which was at the heart of the conflict between Jackson and Calhoun concerning the tariff issue. Jefferson stood for absolute liberty (natural rights) as well as for equality. "The true foundation of republican government is the equal right of every citizen..." It is upon the idea of equality which Jackson built his political platform, reinforced by Jefferson's statement of dedication to nationalism of the highest order:

The first object of my heart is my own country. In that is embarked my family, my fortune, and my own existence. I have not one farthing of interest, nor one fiber of attachment out of it.

Jackson's own presidential messages were ragged political philosophy, tendentious accounting, crude policy. Like many successful

75. Peterson, op. cit., p. 64.
76. Ibid., pp. 72-73. 77. Ibid., p. 312.
78. Russel B. Nye, This Almost Chosen People (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1966), p. 64.
Presidential candidates he entered office with no articulated, comprehensive plan of action. But his rhetoric revealed:

An exhaustive repertory of moral plots which might engage the political attention of the nineteenth-century Americans: equality against privilege; liberty against domination; honest work against idol exploit; natural dignity against factitious superiority; patriotic conservatism against alien innovation; progress against dead precedent.

Jackson was a very personal individual leader, a national hero, a great popular leader, a great party catalyst, and a great public figure. He had a powerful impact on the presidential office, on his times, and subsequent times as revealed by Woodrow Wilson in an analysis of executive power.

He came into our national politics like a cyclone from off the Western prairies. Americans of the present day perceptibly shudder at the very recollection of Jackson.

In retrospect, Jackson provided two-fisted presidential leadership, which his enemies branded as capricious and dictatorial. As a beneficiary of the New Democracy, he led the West and the underprivileged in politics, and left the White House more popular than when he entered. He fought the plutocrats in the interests of the democrats. He upheld the Union against the nullifiers of the South. He overthrew the constitutional checks and balances in favor of the executive. In a sense he attempted to remake rather than to survive the presidential office.

THE TARIFF OF 1832 - THE SOUTH CAROLINA NULLIFICATION - JACKSON'S FORCE BILL

The personal political styles of conflict regulation of

Jackson was one of command and persuasion with power. Calhoun's strategies, style and rhetoric reflected compromise, factions and bargaining with diversification of power. Jackson and Calhoun both harkened to Jefferson's proclamation of unity as the highest national goal. But the diversity in human behavior challenged that goal.

As stated above, Shils captures the essence of pluralism in his quote:

**Liberalism is a system of Pluralism. It is a system of many centers of power, many areas of privacy and a strong internal impulse towards the mutual adaptation of spheres, rather than of the dominances or the submission of any one to the others.**

Calhoun's political style, political strategies and political rhetoric has thus far reflected a process with many centers of power, many areas of privacy, and with a strong internal impulse toward mutual adaptation of political spheres as well as attempts to counter what he perceived as a growing dominance by one interest and the submission of another.

Basic to Calhoun's strategic responses to the tariff conflict were alternative routes to conflict representation in the political arena. When one proved inaccessible, attempts were made to approach another. Systematically each branch of government was exposed to Calhoun's strategy to get a responsive hearing: a modified tariff in Congress; Jackson's executive influence for proposed reductions; the Supreme Court appeal; and, resistance through the vehicle of the

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81. The Appendix provides a chronological listing of the major events in the development of the Jackson-Calhoun political conflict.

82. Shils., loc. cit.
Democratic Party. Other alternative considered were: a separate party (State Rights and Free Trade Party); a new coalition with the West; and neutrality between the two parties; and, a considered coalition with the Whigs. Appeals were made via press and interest group coalition for a dramatic moral impact (use of the Jeffersonian image). As the intensity of the conflict increased to Calhoun's strategic response to the alternative constructs in the "removable spheres" of the modern state, he suggested a release for the dominated section by altering a fixed portion of the "spheres of authority" by the tool of nullification. The avenues left, beside changing the basic structural premise of the community (the Constitution), were use of force or withdrawal.

Calhoun endeavored to achieve resolution through accommodation that would keep the conflict within manageable limits though policy-making seemed futile. Thus 1832 has been projected as the year Calhoun crossed the Rubicon, moving from nationalist to nullifier.83 His tactics changed, his strategy remained the same.

In late 1831, Calhoun finally committed himself to open support of his theory and the belief that the very preservation of the Union hung upon an adequate solution to the problem of security for the minorities. For loyalty to a government depended upon the security and progress of the governed. The only recourse was the exercise by the states of their reserved right of nullifying acts which exceeded the power delegated to the federal government. Re-

83. Capers, op. cit., Chapter 9.
cognition of the sovereign right of the individual state to exercise its suspensive veto would in most cases deter (a negative veto power) the congressional majority from thrusting upon a helpless minority a bill certain to be nullified. On the other hand, a state for various reasons would hesitate to apply its veto, and the operation of certain automatic factors would prevent its abuse.

Despite universal condemnation of the tariff in 1828, only after four years of strenuous campaigning did the Nullifiers succeed in electing a legislature pledged to calling a nullifying convention in South Carolina. When this convention met, the delegates provided for a considerable delay before nullification would become effective, partly to give Congress a chance to yield and partly because they feared a clash with federal authority. The effective date was later postponed an additional month, during which the tariff was reduced and the nullification ordinance was withdrawn.\(^\text{84}\)

The very factors which would check liberal use of the nullifying power by the states -- the economic disadvantages of separation from the Union, the danger of coercion, and the conflict in the loyalties of citizens of the state -- would operate even more strongly against a resort to secession were nullification answered by a successful amendment to the Constitution. But since the power to nullify was derived from state sovereignty and the compact theory of the Constitution, Calhoun defended the equally logical power of a

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\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 155.
state to secede.

Growing emotional intensity and increased feeling of isolation without cross references to counter them led to rigidity in the system, shutting off possible areas of compromise. Much depended upon the current interpretations of the President's actions as indicative of his ultimate positions on the tariff, and upon his attitude towards nullification should it finally be attempted by the state. In turn, both Jackson's action and that of South Carolina were influenced by the response of her sister states, not merely to the theory of nullification, but to nullification as a fait accompli.

Never at any time during his first four years in office, in fact not until he actually signed the tariff bill which passed Congress in 1832, was it certain that Jackson would not force a drastic tariff reduction. He was generally regarded in the West and the South as an advocate of state rights. By his veto of the internal improvement bill in 1830 and the bank bill of 1832 he positively committed himself to strict construction. In his various messages, he was vague on the tariff, perhaps deliberately.

As long as the income from custom duties was applied to payment of the debt, the tariff remained technically a revenue measure difficult to challenge on constitutional grounds. In answer to South Carolina's ordinance of nullification, Jackson's proclamation of December, 1832, made clear his intention to compel obedience to federal laws.

Would South Carolina's sister states, even though they rejected the theory of nullification, actually permit the President to coerce
South Carolina. Were they willing to risk a civil war? Would Jackson carry out his drastic proposals of coercion if the cooperation of a majority of states or even of the Southern states was doubtful?

Had Jackson been able to carry out the degree of tariff reduction promised to the South Carolina Unionists in his message of December, 1831, the nullification movement in that state would probably have died a natural death and the above question avoided, for the present. The prospects of such an outcome increased when the President, towards the end of his first term appeared to favor the policy, advocated for some time by a West-South alliance, of combining cheap land with tariff reduction as an effective means of preventing a surplus in the treasury. In the summer of 1832 this plan was defeated in Congress by Clay and his followers, who presented Jackson instead with a tariff, still protective in principles, which he dared not veto with the presidential election upon him.

The President's annual message to Congress in 1831 had contained much more distinct and decided recommendation for the reduction of duties than he had ever before expressed. He called attention to the prospect of reducing the public debt, when the annual installment to the sinking fund would be no longer needed, and recommended that Congress should at once deal with the question of the reduction of the duties to a point where they would produce no more revenue than would be necessary for an economical administration of the government. He further recommended the readjustment of the duties with a view to equal justice to all national interests, and said that the interests of both merchant and manufacturer required that the change should be in better balance. 85

The cleavage of the tariff controversy by then was moving beyond the point of rational discussion. Intelligent men on each side thought those on the other side were bent on destruction, and each side thought the other willfully, rigidly, and maliciously wrong. Many, perhaps most, of the members of Congress, and innumerable plain citizens the country over, thought the contest had gone far enough and that it was time for compromise; but everyone wanted the concessions to come from interests other than the one he particularly represented. The belligerent attitude of South Carolina only stiffened the resistance to change on the part of the manufacturing states. By 1832, the charge of the Jackson press, through constant repetition, had begun to assume the outward aspects of truth; and Northern men who might have been receptive to compromise began to believe that the Southern doctrines actually were intended to rationalize separation of the slave state from the Union. At a time when the highest statesmanship was needed, an issue that threatened the very existence of the nation was made a matter of partisan and sectional politics.

Among those who were convinced at the start of the session that the tariff must be reduced was John Q. Adams, chairman of the House Committee on Manufacturing. Adams maintained that the duties should stand until after the payment of the public debt, and in this he met no objection from Calhoun. In fact, the South and Calhoun regarded Adams on their side and commended him for it.

Adams' bill reduced duties on the average to the level of 1824 and deleted most of the "abominations" of 1828, but since reductions

86. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 135.
were almost exclusively on noncompetitive items it was in essence more purely protective than any previous measure. It received, nevertheless, a majority of the Southern votes, including those of three South Carolina congressmen.

The other eight members of the South Carolina delegation joined in an unanimous statement to their constituents on the day before Jackson signed the measure:

> Convinced that all hope of relief from Congress is irrevocably gone, they leave it with you, the sovereign power of the State, to determine whether the rights and liberties which you reviewed as a precious inheritance from an illustrious ancestry, shall be tamely surrendered without a struggle, or transmitted undiminished to your posterity.

The Tariff of 1832 was obviously a critical incident in a complex chain of causation. It did not logically justify the drastic and dangerous resort to nullification to either most of its contemporaries or to posterity. The majority of South Carolinians, however, aroused to frenzy, saw their situation in an entirely different light. They regarded their state as a nation to which they gave their whole loyalty and allegiance. And it was under attack.

On the whole, it was doubtful if the bill, with the changes imposed upon it by the Senate, would prove to be any relief to the South. Many of the Southerns claimed that it would increase the burden upon that section, while none of them appeared to think it would lighten the burden. What now were the planters to do? They had waited for the abolition of the debt, and for the period when the

87. Capers, op. cit., p. 151.

88. Ibid., p. 117.

89. Ibid.
Treasury would no longer require the sixteen million dollars per annum applied to its cancellation. But instead of this, they were now offered as a final solution of the tariff question, a slight reduction of duties on articles coming into competition with home products, a partial abolition of the duties on those which did not come into competition with home products, and an increase in the expenses of the government to the amount of the receipts, whatever they might be.

Long before the victory of the Nullifiers in the state election, Calhoun had outlined in detail their strategy and the reason for their confidence in its success regardless of strong opposition. Once South Carolina had nullified the tariff laws by formal action, the only recourse of the protectionists would be to call a convention of the states to pass upon an amendment granting the power in question to the federal government. The Unionists had proposed that the state delay action until such a convention had been called. On the contrary, argued Calhoun, South Carolina must interpose first, as it is only by such action that a necessity of acting on the subject could be imposed on the other States, and without such necessity, nothing would be done. 90

The involved events of the crisis during the several months following the passage of the ordinance can be simplified by citing certain facts of basic significance. South Carolina never actually interfered with the collection of the duties. Nullification was only threatened and was not put into actual execution at any time. The

90. Ibid., p. 156.
state yielded, said the Nullifiers, because she had accomplished her objective when Congress passed Clay's bill for a gradual reduction of the tariff.

In view of their earlier repeated assertions that recognition of their right of nullification was their major purpose, and of their later threats to secede if the Force Bill should pass, the outcome was a definite defeat for Calhoun and his colleagues. They used the compromise tariff as a face-saving excuse for the surrender of their original objectives. Every southern state, even Virginia, rejected nullification as contrary to the Constitution. By unmistakable words and acts Jackson prepared to use force against the state the moment overt interference with the collection of duties was attempted. His request for specific congressional authorization of coercion was almost unanimously approved in the Senate by a vote of 32 to 1. 91

Faced with the certainty of armed resistance from the large minority of Unionists at home and of invasion by a large force of militia from without, and doubtful of military aid from other southern states, South Carolina chose an avenue of accepting a partial concession on the tariff. Through an alliance which Calhoun arranged with Clay, South Carolina was spared the bitter indignity of being seen as yielding to Andrew Jackson -- at the price of waiting ten years for a reduction in the tariff equal to that which the Verplanck Bill at the outset had offered. 92

South Carolina's course was influenced by the tremendous pressure

91. Ibid., pp. 160-165.
92. Ibid., pp. 171-173.
on the Nullifiers resulting from the positive steps taken by the
President in the interim to meet their challenge. Never an enthusiast
for protection, in recent messages he had advocated a reduction of the
tariff to a revenue basis. In his message of December 4, 1832, he again
made such a recommendation, indicating his dissatisfaction with the bill
of the previous summer which he had signed. Later in the month, he
consented to the introduction of a measure by Congressman Culian C.
Verplanck of New York for a series of reductions until rates reached
an average of between fifteen and twenty per cent by 1834. Thus he
effectively reverse the South Carolina strategy of translating
anti-tariff sentiment into pronullification sentiment; by
eliminating protection as an issue he reduced the controversy to
the essential question of the right of the state to annul an act
of Congress.93

In his proclamation of December 10, 1832, he had thundered
defiance to the heresy of his native state in clear and forceful words:

I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United
States, assumed by one state, incompatible with the existence of
the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution,
unauthorized by its spirit....The Constitution...forms a government
not a league....Those who told you that you might peaceably
prevent (the execution of the laws) deceived you -- they could
not have been deceived themselves....Their object is disunion;
but be not deceived by names; disunion by armed force is treason.94

Jackson was not one to rely upon words alone. Since early
autumn he had maintained close contact by letter with Joel Poinsett,
leader of the Unionists in the state, and had taken numerous steps
to strengthen federal forces around Charleston. It was his original
plan, as soon as he received official proof that the legislature had

94. Capers, op. cit., p. 158.
military measures, to call upon the governors of certain states for sufficient militia to enforce the tariff laws.

The determination of Jackson to suppress overt nullification by force frightened friends and opponents, and all neutral parties as well. It produced a dual effect of winning votes from protectionists as the only means of avoiding civil war and of placing the Nullifiers under pressure they could no longer bear. All the parallel developments -- the prospect of invasion, the adverse response of Southern states, the compromise efforts of Virginia, and Congressional consideration of the Verplanck Bill -- sobered them into strategic caution.

Early in the crisis the scene in Washington focused upon the personal battle between the President and Calhoun for the support of the Senate. Calhoun's response to Jackson's Force Bill was given from the floor of the Senate and not from the position of Vice President. In December, the Nullifiers recalled Hayne from the Senate and elected him to the governorship and the legislature chose Calhoun to fill the vacancy thereby created. Thus Calhoun became the first nationally elected officer to resign his position in the United States.

Despite his positive convictions and his powers of logic, the new Senator faced almost insurmountable obstacles. Events made clear that South Carolina was isolated and the President was not bluffing. What alternatives were left? For fifteen years Calhoun had not indulged in public speaking, yet his chief antagonist in the Senate debate by which the outcome of the contest might well be determined was certain to be Webster, ablest orator of the day and ardent supporter of Jackson's

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bold stand for federal supremacy. Regarded by many of his fellow citizens as a traitor and by most of them as chiefly responsible for the ugly crisis at hand, Calhoun was facing political ruin. Upon his actions depended, in no small degree the fate of his native state and his nation.

Surely he was consulted in advance in regard to the suspension of the nullification date by the Charleston meeting on January 21; it is not improbable that he suggested the move himself. Assuming that the Verplanck Bill then before Congress would pass, the Nullifiers could claim victory by asserting that their action alone had at last brought about the reduction and that they had voluntarily called off their plan to nullify. At the same time the indefinite suspension of the date made federal use of force unnecessary, and would encourage the rejection by Congress of the President's request (Force Bill).

But Jackson did not permit Calhoun and his colleagues to retreat with such impunity. South Carolina had raised the issue by formal action; it was by equally formal repudiation of the right of a state to annul a federal law. He insisted upon his Force Bill to make it clear that federal authority was supreme and that the government had not been intimidated in the slightest. In South Carolina secession was threatened if the bill passed Congress. Calhoun told the Senate:

If it were approved and an attempt be made to enforce it, it would be resisted, at every hazard -- even that of death itself. Death is not the greatest clamity: there are others still more terrible to the free and brave; and among them may be placed the loss of liberty and honor.

Calhoun replied to the Force Bill on the Senate floor with

96. Anderson, op. cit., p. 112.
three resolutions which summarized his contentions as to the nature of American government. Briefly, these asserted that the people of the United States had never formed and did not compose a nation; that the states alone were sovereign; and, that they retained the sole allegiance of their citizens as well as the right to decide the powers which they had reserved to themselves and those which they had delegated by the compact of the Constitution. Had the Senate acted favorably on these resolutions, the Force Bill would have been defeated in advance, but various contrary resolutions were at once introduced. Shortly a majority voted for the priority of the bill itself. 97

After much jockeying for position between the principals, in the middle of February the great debate between Webster and Calhoun began. Resorting to the closest legal and historical reasoning, each contestant refuted the other, and ended as they began with irreconcilable premises. In a tone of dignity and sincere conviction Calhoun defended in detail both his own actions and those of his state; South Carolina had not acted rashly but her sister states tardily. 98 Senators listened respectfully but remained obviously unconvinced. When the final vote on the measure was taken on February 20, Calhoun and other states righters dramatically withdrew, leaving John Tyler of Virginia to cast the single negative vote. 99

At the beginning of March both the Compromise Tariff and the Force Bill were finally approved by both houses of Congress and Jackson

97. Ibid., pp. 115-120.
98. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 311.
signed the measure. But the compromise tariff did not provide for swift reduction to a revenue basis in two years. Reduction was to proceed slowly for eight years, then rapidly during the next two. Calhoun had abandoned his attempt to remove some of the objectionable provisions of the bill when Clay threatened to let him "fight it out with the General Government." 100

Actually Calhoun had no alternative to the subtle strategy which he followed. Otherwise both he and South Carolina would have suffered the humiliation of subject surrender to Jackson or almost certain defeat in a military conflict. As it turned out, the state proudly claimed a significant victory, while Calhoun received its adoration as the hero who had worked the magic. Moreover, as an immediate consequence in the practical politics of the movement he had robbed Jackson and Van Buren of credit for tariff reduction which would have strengthened their following in Southern states in the upcoming election.

The controversy was the climax of Calhoun's career, and its various consequences fixed the pattern of his political future. Independent state action had proved impractical, he spent his remaining years in an effort to unite the whole South into a political bloc, trying at the same time other strategies by which he hoped to protect Southern rights and thus preserving the Union. The virtue of nullification, to his mind, had been the fact that it would accomplish both these objectives. Not until 1850, the year of his

100. Capers, op. cit., p. 161.
death, when the South was fighting a losing battle against legislation fatal in his opinion to her security, did he reluctantly give serious consideration to secession.  

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101. Ibid., p. 165.
CHAPTER V

CALHOUN: PLURALIST

Calhoun believed in language for what it could do rather than for what it was, and this belief later became the core of his political philosophy.

Margaret Coit

The often unseen and undetected causes which work deep within society became Calhoun's concern. He conceived his theoretical problem to be the understanding of the relation of political order to those often hidden social causes. Undoubtedly Calhoun's political theory served to explain and justify, to rationalize, his practical efforts on behalf of the South. It was also a rational construction which dealt with an aspect of society often neglected in political thought. His acute observation of social facts extended beyond the harsh conflicts of sectional patterns to the "tendency to conflict in the North between labor and capital, which is constantly on the increase," to the conflict produced by banking and financial interests, and to the realities of social life in frontier communities, mining towns and eastern cities -- indeed, to all the different interest, orders, classes, or portions, into which the community may be divided."}


Thus his understanding of the complex issue of minority relations which actually structured society, an understanding stimulated by his allegiance to the cultural minority of the South, provided the fundamental theme in his restatement of political theory.

Calhoun had been defeated in his fight against the tariff by the single power of the minority, and so it was the legitimacy of that power which he called in question. Government by a numerical majority, unrestrained by any power on the part of the minority interest to protect themselves, was as absolute as any dictatorship, and could by legal means destroy all opposition. Constitutional government was a system which set up some other power to balance that of the numerical majority. The basis for this balancing power Calhoun found in Madison's organization of society into interest groups, arising from diversity of pursuits or conditions.

To note the threat of the growing Northern majority to the Southern minority was to observe the obvious. To deal with this threat as effectively as Calhoun did against the tide of circumstances was a political achievement. To point out that this was potentially a threat to all minorities, rooted in a misidentification of the political order with a part of the social order, and to suggest, moreover, a conception of political order which, in principle, might recognize minority groups was a primary intellectual achievement.

A true political unity must be one able:

...to cause the different interest, portions, or order -- as the case may be -- to desist from attempting to adopt any measure calculated to promote the prosperity of one, or more, by sacrificing that of others; and thus to force them
to unite in such measures only as would promote the prosperity of all.

Calhoun thus came to conceive the function of political order as "intended to protect and preserve society" in all its aspects. He could not regard as true a conception of political order impotent to deal with the real diversity of American social life unless imposed despotically upon some of its "elements." And he accepted the responsibility of his dissent from the simple political uniformity of nationalistic tradition. He formulated and offered to the American people a political philosophy which sought to relate political unity to the diverse productions of human force and aspiration, the complex of contrary and conflicting moments and intensions which in fact constituted American life.

The pluralist vision is present in this philosophy as it had been a political process for Calhoun in approaching the tariff controversy. Pluralism itself is undeniably a contradiction in terms. Sovereignty by the very nature of the concept cannot be divided, though it may be delegated. Pluralism as a concept must be modified to fit the nature of the modern state or the state itself must be redefined in terms which leave some measure of autonomy to its component elements. It is this task which Calhoun undertook. In all governments in which individuals are free Calhoun found a variety of lesser organizations through which the wills of different groups were

4. Ibid., p. 38.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 40.
expressed, the will of the community as a whole being compounded by these group wills. The exercise of sovereign power by such governments were conditional upon the concurrence of each of these group wills. Where interest differed, only two courses were open: Coercion and compromise. Any government resorting to coercion as an absolute, its citizens ceased to be free. The doctrine of the concurrent majority is, therefore, a thorough-going defense of minority interests against the arbitrary exercise of power by the majority; and the correlative doctrine of nullification served as the justification of the vehicle for minority protest.

The theory carried with it a concurrent veto, which Calhoun first developed and defended in terms of the Constitution as it was interpreted in his day. In form, the question debated was state versus national sovereignty; but in substance, it was a struggle between a vested agricultural interest antedating the Revolution and a growing industrialism whose rise was predicated upon protection from foreign competition.

Up to the time of the nullification controversy, Americans had assumed without becoming particularly technical about it, that sovereignty in the United States was more or less equitably divided between state and federal governments. This to Calhoun was a contradiction in logic, for sovereignty implied supreme power, uncontrolled. Since sovereignty could not be divided between state and federal government it must reside with one or the other. Calhoun claimed the states ratified the Constitution, the states have

7. Ibid., p. 37.
8. Ibid., p. 21.
been sovereign and equal. The Constitution was therefore a compact between equals and could not create a new entity, superior to the compacting parties.

The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead of the whole being a unit and the parts the factions. The federal union exercised a portion of sovereignty, without possessing the whole of it, which even the nationalists did not claim.

During the period of controversy over the tariff and the Force Bill, Calhoun identified the concurrent majority with the constitutional-making power, and held the subsidiary law-making power to be the function of the absolute or numerical majority. 10 He was arguing from the Constitution, so he phrased his case in language suited to the purpose. In the Disquisition, however, he argued that the concurrent majority must be unanimous, a majority of those associated with each interest concerned. 11 The apparent discrepancy is due to the form in which, for practical purposes, the earlier argument was cast. Although he contended that the states were the fundamental units concerned, he was thinking in terms of interests which were not confined to single states. By dropping the geographical boundaries, Calhoun was free to express his views in more universal terms. The distinction drawn between governments was not of the one, the few, the many, but between absolute and constitutional. 12 Any interest could be its negative block to all action tending to enrich others at its expense. Compromise was the great conserving principle of

9. Ibid., p. 68.
12. Ibid., p. 36.
constitutional governments.

Calhoun felt political order which did not deal explicitly with the diversity of groups would fail:

The human race is not comprehended in a single society or community. The limited faculties of man, the great diversity of language, custom, pursuits, situation and complexion, and the difficulty of intercourse...have...harmed a great many separate communities acting independently of each other. Between these there is the same tendency to conflict; and from the same constitution of our nature, as between men individually; and even stronger...Self-preservation is the supreme law, as well with communities as individuals. 13

An enduring political order, Calhoun realistically argued, must be built upon the facts of man's self-oriented wants and desires, upon the circumstances of the diversity and conflict of social groups, and, further, upon the complex dependence of the individual on society.

In view of these facts, as Calhoun saw them, the need for political order was clear. It was needed, first to supplant with the benefits of unity the discord and confusion produced by the diversity of individuals and their motives. Second, it was required to replace group bias and conflict by social harmony. And, finally, political order was essential for relating man to society in such a way that his dependence upon it for his very existence and progress would be maintained. Calhoun saw the need for political order in his realistic observation that the disparate motivation of individuals in relation to society and the diversity of group purposes in society tend to produce that anarchy and conflict which might destroy man and possibly his achievements; thus political order was inevitable.

13. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
"There is no difficulty in forming government....Necessity will force it on all communities in some one form or another." 14

When considering the problems of order and power, Calhoun noted that man enjoys a claim to liberty based upon the natural "impulse of individuals to better their conditions." 15 "For this purpose, liberty and security are indispensable." 16 Here then is the possessive premise at work: the right legitimating activity is viewed as implicit in the naturalness of the impulse out of which such activity arises. At the same time, natural diversity is a condition of mankind, "as individuals differed greatly from one another." 17 Such diversity creates discontinuities among the interest of men, i.e., with regard to property, there was "a corresponding inequality between those who may possess and those who may be deficient in them." 18 Next we note the psychological premise: "The tendency to a universal state of conflict between individual and individual," since in response to the "constitution of our nature...each...is ready to sacrifice the interest of others to his own." 19

In the Disquisition (though not in the Exposition) Calhoun avoided the expression "selfish feelings" because, "as commonly used, it causes an inference of something depraved and vicious." 20 For Calhoun however, "selfish" did not connote vice. Like the framers of the Constitution, Calhoun recognized that man's nature remained un-changed by change of condition. Selfishness was one of the facts of

16. Ibid., p. 41. 17. Ibid., p. 25.
20. Ibid., p. 4.
the world and part of that science which would explain the world. Given the discontinuities among the interests different men pursue, and in light of our nature, conflict was inevitable and would

If not prevented by some controlling power, end in a state of universal discord and conflict destructive of the social state and the ends for which it is ordained.

Complementing the problems of order in teaching the pluralist to fear the liberty he is impelled to affirm, is the problem of power. For those very forces promoting the necessity of government, i.e., of an external "controlling power" capable of obtaining an orderly consent to the difficulty of meeting the tests of legitimacy. For does not government imply governors? And what then will prevent the governors, who are after all only ordinary men, from advancing against the interest and liberty of the governed? Since all men feel what affects them more strongly than what affects others, and since the enjoyment of right, the safety of interest, requires a containment of conflict which only the exertion of controlling power can effect, neither the placing of governors over governors nor the weakening of government itself promised to be adequate solutions to the problem. Granted that it is possible by the device of the suffrage to transform "irresponsible rulers" into "true and faithful representatives of those who elect them," still political responsibility can only protect a portion of the governed by transferring control over the governors to the governed. As long as the community is divided among a number

21. Ibid., p. 5.
22. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
23. Ibid., p. 12.
of different interests unequally affected by the acts of government, interest will contend to gain its control in order to advance their own "isms" before the rights of others. Man's finite capacities and great diversities, and other causes, lead to the formation of independent communities. For Calhoun, as for Publius, it was "a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, constituted nations natural enemies."25

Political responsibility, implemented by the representative principle, only serves to shift the axis of contention from one between governors and governed to one between the governing portion of the citizen-body and the governed portion. In the first case the likelihood is great that the few would abuse the rights of the many, while in the second case the reverse is the greater probability. Unrestrained rule of the many, however, is viewed by Calhoun as implying not only a threat to the liberty and interest of the few, but to the very wellsprings of human progress as well. The rule of the many must lead to an equalization of condition, particularly with reference to the distribution of property in society. Democracy, in other words, threatens to dissolve the gap consisting of the inequalities which separate society's leaders from its runners-up and which "gives to progress its greatest impulses." It is by virtue of the efforts of leaders and followers to maintain and overcome this gap that progressive change creates.27

24. Ibid., p. 9.


27. Ibid., p. 44.
The problem of power, in Calhoun's view, can perhaps best be formulated as follows: How can inequality (a prod for progress) be maintained without denying the equal rights of all to strive to advance? The liberty informing the diversity of interest (read: possessive) in society and serving as the prod to progress at the same time also permits the conflict and disorder which acts "to weaken the impulse of individuals to better their condition and thereby retard progress and improvement."28 Where there is no government or controlling power, there can be no progress, since there is little security. Where irresponsible government exists, there can be no progress because there is little if any liberty. And where responsible or representative government obtains there can be little progress since there is little prospect for the survival of diversity. Liberty and diversity, it would appear, enjoy a mutually reciprocal causal relationship while functioning independently of one another as requisites to progress. Yet the efficacy of each is contingent upon the existence of order. Order requires the exercise of power. And in the generation and exercise of power there is entailed a logic that denies to both liberty and diversity that opportunity to coexist which is absolutely necessary to the natural progress of man; but this progress is alone capable of justifying the utility of liberty and the powers of government!29

Before a consideration of the strategy of mechanistic balance as the solution advanced in the pluralist vision to the twin problem

28. Ibid., p. 41.
29. Ibid., pp. 32-34.
of order and power, one or two comments seem appropriate on the illogic in Calhoun's argument as it bears upon the authenticity of his conservatism.

Calhoun contended man was born into the social state. Belief in the "state of individuality supposed to have existed prior to the social and political state" is to him both "false and dangerous."30 But why then, if men are born into the social state, and not descended from the state of nature, do they seem to possess paramount interest in a conflict in character unaffected by the fact of membership in a common antecedent collective? If men are social by nature, if they acquire their purpose from society, why do they place opposing interest, hinting at a pre-existing individuality, before the common interest informed by their membership in the same society? In what why is the condition of Calhoun's society different from the classical liberals' state of nature, in the view of the common attributes and rights of their inhabitants and the resulting need for government in both cases? Calhoun may deny a state of individuality as existing both ethically and causally prior to man's political obligation but he proceeds to argue nonetheless along the lines of natural right and possessive individuality when he takes up the subject of political authority. Perhaps Calhoun's unwillingness to admit that natural rights exist for all men, black and white, coupled with his inability to escape that legacy of voluntarism, instrumentalism, and social atomism so deeply embedded in the American political culture, accounts for his rejecting the state of nature construct while arguing nonetheless as if he accepted the

30. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
set of theoretical assumptions it represents. Furthermore, the
effort to mask one's liberal premises while striving for conservative
conclusions capable of justifying a bourgeois-individualist society's
most cherished values (liberty and progress) must at times be viewed as
productive of embarrassing ironies, to say the least. It must, for
example, seem rather curious to some that God should create society
for man while failing to make man sufficiently socialbe. Even more
curious, however, must be the fact that while ordaining government for
the purpose of correcting this error, God should fail to endow those
upon whom this blessing is bestowed with those necessary virtues capable
of insuring that government may function to achieve its intended effect.

Even if man seems unwilling or incapable of harmonizing his
actions with the interest of others, there are still valid grounds for
hope. For the laws of nature themselves point to the efficacy of a
mechanistic constitutionalism as the means of achieving the non-directive
balance necessary to remedy this defect. The belief of pluralist
psychology that certain constants and universal tendencies in human
behavior may be isolated and made to serve the task of constructing a
political order appropriate to man reflects the Enlightened faith that
the regularity of causes and of the powers of natural reason permitting
physical science may have their counterparts in the affairs of man.
Calhoun, who as a conservative should have little faith in the efficacy
of reason to sustain a manipulative science of human affairs, and even
less faith in one founded upon the mechanical assumptions of astronomy
as opposed to the organic principles of biology, nevertheless declared

Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford University Press,
1962), pp. 16-17.
early in the Disquisition:

...it is indispensable to understand correctly what that constitution or law of our nature is in which government originates. Without this, it is as impossible to lay any solid foundation for the science of government as it would be to lay one for that of astronomy without a like understanding of that constitution or law of the material world according to which the several bodies composing the solar system mutually act on each other and by which they are kept in their respective spheres.

Constitution is utilized here as indicating a principle of fundamental regularity in which all motion originates, both in man's world and in the heavens. It is this solid foundation of universal constants, this rule of law in nature, that makes possible the experimental and manipulative sciences. As a natural being, man is no different from the other elements of the universe; he too is subject to a law of his own nature harmoniously related to the laws of process and motion organizing the more inclusive nature of which he is a part. Because, Calhoun contended, man in motion is "subject to laws as fixed as matter itself," there can be little reason to suppose that politics and legislation are not themselves proper subjects for the "High power of men which has effected such wonders when directed to the laws which control the material world." 33 "The time will come... when politics and legislation will be considered as much a science as astronomy and chemistry." 34

It is the function of "the science of government," according to Calhoun, to enlist on the side of man's social feelings his stronger

32. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 3.
34. Ibid., p. 167.
individual feelings and to unite the two in promoting the interest of the whole as the best way to promote the separate interest of each. The two orders of feeling are united when the most reliable of those behavioral tendencies isolated by the pluralist's psychology are marshalled to sustain a Newtonian-inspired design of balance. The recipe of language employed in Calhoun's solution for the problem of power is strangely reminiscent of Madison's, and without any doubt placed him in the mainstream of the American pluralist tradition. Thus Calhoun observes that there is only one way to prevent "any one interest or combination of interests from using the powers of government to aggrandize itself at the expense of the others." A balance of tension among the contending interests of society must be effected by appropriately ordering government's "own interior structure:" "power can only be resisted by power...and tendency by tendency." Those features in the interior structure of government capable of rendering operative the much sought after balance compromise which Calhoun called the "constitutional" or "organism of government." The constitution stems the abuse and preserves the power of government, as government in turn preserves and perfects society. Specifically, the


38. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

39. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
constitution includes the democratic suffrage and a system of separated powers allowing each interest in the society a concurring or veto power over legislation vitally affecting its own welfare. The suffrage will suffice to protect the numerical majority. But only by making "the several departments the organs of the distinct interest or portions of the community" and by clothing "each with a negative on the others," can the separation of power be made to work its intended effect of sustaining that balance necessary to keep the governors responsible to the governed without exposing one portion of the community to the danger of abuse by the others, e.g., Tariff of Abomination. The chief virtue of constitutional government, i.e., of popular government safeguarding the rights of the minorities by the device of the concurrent majority, is its ability, according to Calhoun, to combine greater measures of power and liberty more perfectly with one another than would be possible in either a pure democracy or an outright autocracy. The former can only maximize liberty at the cost of the governmental power necessitated by the problem of order. Autocracy, on the other hand, suppresses liberty as a necessary price for the power it generates. Power, of course, is required by government if it is to preserve society; but liberty is necessary as well for the progress in society that perfects man. Progress, however, results only from the impulse of individuals to better their own lot. This impulse will not be translated into beneficial activity unless each man is left free to pursue his own interest with the confidence "That he will not be deprived of the fruits of his exertions." 41 The concurrent

40. Ibid., pp. 25-30.
41. Ibid., p. 40.
majority is advanced as legitimately compelling cooperation among
anturally competitive men possessing discontinuous interests, so as
to permit an optimum measure of individual liberty without inhibiting
the generation of the necessary measure of power required by govern-
ment for the preservation of society.

Here it might be appropriate to note certain inconsistencies
and ambiguities incidental to Calhoun's argument. Calhoun defended
government as necessary to society in the light of the problem of
order because of the individual's own dependence on society for per-
fection. This certainly suggests a conservative perspective: man's
dependence upon submission to authority as necessary to the acquisition
of purpose and completion. But the perfection which Calhoun's incomplete
man can acquire only in society results not from the moral sustenance
provided by his encounters with corporate hierarchies, but from the
 technological progress that comes only from the selfish impulse of
atomized and competitive individuals to have more.42

In contending that constitutional government more perfectly
fulfills the ends for which government is ordained, Calhoun strikes a
theoretical posture that places him somewhere on the continuum of
pluralist political engineering between Adams and Madison. Like,
Adams, he matched up institutional and social cleavages with one
another rather than following Madison's strategy of arranging an inter-
section of institutional and interest group boundaries. On the other
hand, Calhoun's system more closely approximated Madison's in its degree

42. Lerner, op. cit., p. 921.
of mechanistic complexity. Like Madison, Calhoun spoke of a large number of interest and combinations composing society rather than of the one, the few, and the many to which Adams referred. Calhoun also relied much more heavily than Adams upon the reliability of mechanistic process and the unintended consequences of spontaneous individual activity to achieve the pluralist's much sought after political equilibrium. (witness Calhoun's political strategies between 1828 and 1833). There was little room in his system, for example, for the exercise of that measure of wisdom and independent judgment Adams required of the President as the agency of balance in his tripartite representative scheme or which was embodied in the actions of Andrew Jackson during the tariff controversy of his first term as President.

Inasmuch as Calhoun is depicted by some as the champion of tradition, community, and hierarchy in America, his political argument provides an opportunity to test the assertion that the denial of the public interest and of citizenship are implicitly in American political life; does such a denial follow logically from those elements of the pluralist vision already noted as present in a system of political thought frequently cited by those defending the appropriateness of the pluralist mode of political organization and conduct? On Calhoun's supposed conservatism, August O. Spain commented that by rejecting the doctrine of natural right, and by asserting in its stead that man can only achieve moral perfection in political society, Calhoun irrevocably "departed from the individualistic American tradition" with its


44. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 44.
"doctrinaire limitation and fixation of governmental functions," thereby triumphantly claiming "for American thought the heritage of the modern western world from ancient Greece." In a similar vein Clinton Rossiter has stated that central to Calhoun's "conservative" philosophy are: "A flat assertion of the primacy of the community; a completely non-Jeffersonian theory of liberty;" and "a belief based upon his own understanding of the Southern way of life, in the organic cellular structure of the good society."

Much of Calhoun's writing at first glance might seem to support these contentions. There is, for example, Calhoun's antipathy toward the competitive and impersonal world of the industrial North, his belief in the inevitability of a stratified society in which one portion of the community progress from the labor of the less fortunate, his conviction that it was the responsibility of the exploiting class to care for the welfare of those who populate the lower orders, and his confidence that the slavery of the South, rather than the wage labor regime of the North, provided the most humane way to organize the unavoidable features of the human condition. Indeed, Calhoun saw the disorder and class warfare of the North as the direct consequence of the atomized condition of workers who were made to suffer the neglect of irresponsible employers. In the South, on the other hand, such tensions would be difficult to uncover. The workers by virtue of their slave status were integrated into an organic community governed by a


47. Lerner, op. cit., pp. 924-925, 932.
tradition that safeguarded their general interests and welfare:

The Southern states are an aggregate, in fact, of communities not of individuals. Every plantation is a little community with the master at its head who concentrates in himself the united interest of capital and labor, of which he is a common representative. These small communities aggregated make the state in all, while labor and capital are equally represented and perfectly harmonized.

Indeed, such perfect unity and organic integration allowed the South to act as a balance between the hostile forces of labor and capital in the North. The benefits of the South's organic unity are seen then;

...to extend beyond the limits of the South. It makes that section the balancer of the (constitutional) system; the great conservative power which prevents other portions less fortunately constituted from rushing into conflict.

Ultimately the atomized, individualistic, possessive, voluntarist, and mechanistically organized North would have to look for stability to the existence of the hierarchically and cellular structured, organically cemented, and tradition-directed community of freemen and slaves in the South.

Yet, notwithstanding these claims, and the evidence in the vocabulary of the Disquisition, as well as, of an anti-rationalist, anti-individualist posture on Calhoun's part (e.g., see the amply use he made of such terms as: "harmony," "organism," "wisdom," "providence," and "community") a closer view of his system does reveal a perspective on the public interest and a view of citizenship that can only be appreciated as reflecting what is thought to be most typical of the liberal tradition: the flight from community. Against the background of the theory of concurrence and the assumptions that inform it, Calhoun's

48. Spain, op. cit., p. 239.

cellularly structured organic community dissolves into a collection of mechanically integrated bourgeois interests. Thus, in proceeding to shape and defend the mechanism of concurrence, Calhoun's chief end of government is not the encouragement of restraint to insure order but the protection of liberty to insure progress; that society is composed not of organically related estates possessing original and inherent rights and purposes of their own but of competitive and clashing interests belonging to status anxious individuals; and that the most appropriate means for achieving public order is not an appeal to the corporative loyalty of all but to the private interest of each.

Calhoun believed that the anarchy of conflicting forces which man faces in his individual and social life inevitably forces an appeal to principle. In such circumstances, man's essential relation to the ideal was a matter of necessity not of choice. Human power must be put at the disposal of the political order which such an appeal to principle establishes, because man has not other recourse in the circumstances of his life.\(^5\) Yet Calhoun had no illusion that the exercise of power in this way would as inevitably tend toward actual justice. Quite the contrary, the power placed at the disposal of the government will, he argued, normally be subordinated to the ends of some individuals and groups at the expense of others.\(^5\) The appeal to political principle will not prevail and the established political order will not endure and be effective, unless both are rooted deep in the realistic circumstances of their origin. An enduring political order

\(^{50}\) Calhoun, op. cit., p. 8.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 10.
must be so constituted as to accord to the individual his rights, and to protect those social groups, minority and majority, which make it possible for the individual to live and progress:

...it (United States) must discover what the South already was discovering, that numerical democracy, unrestrained by constitutional limitations on its will, is no friend to political justice. The crucial test of every government is the measure of protection afforded its weakest citizen; and judged by this test or democratic state, when power has come to be centralized in few hands, may prove to be no other than a tyrant....

Enduring justice, he said, can be maintained only when men come to understand that the true principle of political order is a unity which preserves the integrity of the individual and the minority, and only when men will accept the full responsibility of their understanding. Then and then only will ideal principle prevail and become a living and enduring party of reality. 53

Calhoun's discussion of the sense of the community and the common good noted:

...the voice of the people -- uttered under the necessity of avoiding the greatest of calamities through the organs of a government so constructed as to suppress the expression of all partial and selfish interest, and to give full and faithful utterance to the sense of the whole community, in reference to the common welfare -- may, without impiety, be called 'the voice of God.' 54

But what is this sense of the "whole community" of which Calhoun spoke other than "the sense of all its parts?" 55 And how else was this sense taken apart from the veto power of the system of concurrence granted to those partial and selfish interest which Calhoun asserted

53. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 45.
54. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
55. Ibid., p. 29.
are in opposition to the "common welfare."

It is this mutual negative among its various conflicting interests which invests each with the power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each where only they can be surely placed, under its own guardianship.

Rather than a product of education or leadership, the public interest is little more than the summing of private interests, little more than the result of a mechanistically guided process of negotiation and compromise mobilizing the private interests rather than the public loyalties and civic capacities of man.

If the community interest was only the sum of those interests that existed prior to and independent of the mechanism through which the common good found expression, and the mechanism in question here functioned only to safeguard those same private interests, then obviously the individual could never be integrated into the community in the way Calhoun intimated was possible in his idyllic plantation model of political society. In terms of the concepts, processes, and ends Calhoun offered, there simply was no interior life to be shared, no common integrating vantage point to which all men could repair to assess the relevance of their varied interests to their own lives considered as independent and unified wholes capable of benefiting from the experiences and criticisms of other whole men. Citizenship in Calhoun's community was less a matter of moral growth and contribution to the common life than a mode of self-justifying pressure group activity (i.e., pressure group activity in behalf of pressure group activity):

56. Ibid., p. 28.
By giving to each interest, or portion, the power of self protection, all strife and struggle for ascendency is prevented, and thereby not only every feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed, but the individual and social feelings are made to united in one common devotion to country. Each sees and feels that it can best promote its own prosperity by conciliating the good will and promoting the prosperity of others...the interests of each would be merged in the common interests of the whole...and hence instead of faction, strife, and struggle for party ascendency, there would be patriotism, nationalism, harmony, and a struggle only for supremacy in promoting the common good of the whole.

Thus do Calhoun's conservative values follow after his own denial of community? It was only because the mechanism of the concurrent majority provided an effective means for the defense of special (i.e., private) interests, that attachment to the common good (i.e., to the defense of the private interests of all) was possible. Only because the mechanism of concurrence required a willingness to compromise if men wished to advance their own independent purposes, was one able to call into being the conservative properities of "Harmony, unanimity, and devotion to country,"

To speak of citizenship in terms of devotion to country in the context Calhoun did raised some important difficulties. For if citizenship consisted of the participation of equals in the ordering of the common life, there was little opportunity for citizenship in the pluralist society. The pluralist vision denies the reality of a common life outside the ambit of political organization engineered to mobilize and balance hostile interests, not common ones, private motives, not public ones. Thus as a concept standing for membership status in the whole, citizenship was without a corresponding reality

57. Ibid., p. 38.
58. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
in the pluralist society. Citizenship in the pluralist society, in fact, could be little more than selfishness masquerading as civic virtue. By denying the existence of an independent and concrete unifying public, the pluralist separates citizenship from membership in political community and thereby disengages it from politics as well. One is then ultimately confronted not only with a public interest that divides rather than unites, but by an order in which the pursuit of private advantage is looked upon as the foundation of good citizenship. Citizenship in this "unpublic" is the pursuit of interests one possesses independent from the whole through institutions belonging to the whole. The pluralist citizens' involvement in the public is inseparable from his flight from the public. But the real paradox is that this flight from what divides men does not bring them closer together but merely serves to perpetuate and strengthen their relations as strangers and potential rivals. The ambiguities of citizenship and the public interest are the consequences of the possessive individualist, psychological and mechanistic perspectives of the pluralist vision.

Calhoun formulated and offered to the American people a political philosophy which sought to relate political unity to the diverse productions of human force and aspiration, the complexity of contrary and conflicting movements and intentions which in fact constituted American life. He sought to incorporate these realities into an expression of American political meaning; he argued for the uniqueness of regions, for the rights of sections, for the integrity of diverse classes and groups, for the sanctity of the individual, and,
through these only, for the attainment of political unity. Calhoun urged that the various aspects of society be made the mechanism for the expression of political significance of life in America. He envisioned the ideal unity of a nation incorporating a diversity of individualist motive, a complexity of sectional aspiration, a variety of parties and group interests bound together so that "every interest will be truly and fully represented." ⁵⁹

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CHAPTER VI

STRATEGY: PLURALISM

The principles which Calhoun called -- rather obscurely -- 'the rule of concurrent majority,' has become the organizing principle (pluralism) of American politics.

Peter Drucker

The unsettled nature of a transition period renders it a particularly felicitous time to study politics. Politics in a period of change is particularly valuable because it forces persons to ponder the fundamentals of a system whose institutions and practices they could easily take for granted in more placid times. To acknowledge the necessity for our political institutions to adjust to change is not enough. We must also consider how far this change can go without threatening our basic political traditions: What is permanent within our political tradition and what is transitory? What is fundamental and what is contingent upon a particular time, economy, culture, or ethnic group? What must be retained at all costs and what can be sloughed off? A delicate sense of discrimination is involved in such a choice since men, carried away by the passions of the moment or lulled by familiarity of accustomed practice, often confuse the permanent with the temporary.

Pluralism as a political process has recommended itself as a mode of organizing and reflecting a fluid society: in its capacity to reflect the diversity of man, in its capacity of working toward a more amenable solution of societies conflicts. The feud between the "House of Have" and "House of Want" for political and economic power and order is as old as social union and can never be entirely quieted. The negative pluralism (Perrow) provides a way of looking at things politically congenial to individualist yet group-structured, interest-motivated, and mechanistically asserted anti-majoritarian mode of political life. Calhoun's political rhetoric and practical strategies reveal basic tenets of this process. Pluralism as a process dealing with change, is more of relations than just structures, and of consequences more than just causes. The theory and practice tends to assume the existence of multiple centers of power, none of which is wholly sovereign. Each will help to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully.

Strategically the process involves channels of interaction to help disperse intensity and allow, as well as accommodate, diversity. In one sense, he who acts in a powerful political process and views decisions as interim, relative, conceives of a perpetual state of unresolved conflict with decisions being partial resolutions of conflict. The majority does not rule, a majority decision is simply a setting of the time under which the minority continues the discussion—which presumably goes on forever. It is to this type of process Jefferson's philosophy became entangled with the tariff situation.

The philosophy of state rights, nullification, and consequently
concurrent majority was used to rationalize practices that would otherwise be difficult to justify. Were the weighting of the vote and the denial of political equality alien or subversive? The defenders of the system could convincingly deny this, and rather, claim that, in supporting the rights of the minority, they were protecting the individual liberties which were the cornerstone of American political belief. Was this static system an impractical retreat before the leading social and economic forces of the time? No, according to the theory, it was a realistically structured politics, keyed to actual economic interests and geographic areas, rather than one based upon an abstract world of perfectly equal individuals. Calhoun thus proclaimed that he was in the mainstream of the American political tradition.

While Andrew Jackson's basic premise was egalitarian, Calhoun followed a more anti-majoritarian theory. Within the tradition of Madison's pluralism, Calhoun visualized American society being composed of groups or localities of varying sizes, and considered the main aim of the political process was to achieve a consensus among them rather than to reflect the will of an abstract majority of single individuals. Calhoun's pluralism responds to five of the general propositions Kariel saw integral to the study of pluralism: small governmental units; power dispersed; number of voluntary, independent associations; public policy binding on all associations as result of their own free interaction; and, public government obliged to discern and act only upon common denomination of group concurrence. A weakness at the time was the lack of a number of overlapping associations. But this apparently.

approach, no one group, or "factions" in Madison's phraseology, could dominate the government and exert its will over the others:

...the struggle of interests is a safe, even energizing, struggle which is compatible with, or even promotes, the safety and stability of society...In a large commercial society the interest of the many can be fragmented into many narrower, more limited interests...the mass will... seek small immediate advantages for their narrow and peculiar interests.3

Where Aristotle has rested the preservation of the balance upon the maintenance of relative equality between the opposing forces, Calhoun rested it upon the form of contract which gave to those who are parties to it a right to oppose any infraction of one of their number. He moved from resolutions of conflict in the "removable sphere" of government to infringing upon the "fixed spheres." Calhoun saw the country living simultaneously in a world of Jefferson's beliefs and in one of the realities of pragmatic politics. Out of these two Calhoun's concept of "the rule of the concurrent majority" alone could make one viable whole.4 The technique of concurrent veto, exercised in a variety of forms by those special interests would respond to the lag between social or industrial changes and to the formal changes in governmental structure which came slowly.

Calhoun saw in concurrent majority a basic principle of free government:

Without this (the rule of concurrent majority based on interests rather than on principles) there can be ...no constitution. The assertion is true in reference to all constitutional governments, be their forms what they may: It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, -- and the positive which makes the government. The one is the power of acting; -- and


the other the power of preventing or arresting action. The two, combined, make constitutional government.

...it follows, necessarily, that where the numerical majority has the sole control of the government, there can be no constitution...and hence, the numerical, unmixed with the concurrent majority, necessarily forms, in all cases, absolute government.

...The principle by which they (governments) are upheld and preserved...in constitutional governments in compromise; --and in absolute governments is force....

As a pluralist, Calhoun dealt with the necessity of multiple centers of sovereign power rather than one. He saw one function of pluralism was to tame power. Pluralistic political patterns are defined to increase the levels through which an individual or group may enter the political arena and plead his (its) case, as well as limiting the degree of power which any one group or individual may hold. Calhoun strategically sought out every avenue provided by the pluralistic framework to rectify an imbalance in the distribution of national resources.

Calhoun's rhetoric and strategies symbolized the subtle differences of philosophical positions he held from Jackson. Jefferson's inherited political philosophy was employed by each as a strategic response to the tariff controversy. The constitutional veto power of the states over national legislation, by means of which Calhoun proposed to formalize the principle of sectional and interest compromise, has been substituted in actual practice with a much more powerful and much more elastic but extra-constitutional and extra-legal veto power of sections, interest and pressure groups in Congress and within the parties. But his basic principle itself: that every

major interest in the country, whether regional, economic or religious, is to possess a veto power on political decisions directly affecting it, the principle which Calhoun called -- rather obscurely -- "the rule of concurrent majority," has become the organizing principle of American politics. Sectional and interest pluralism has molded all American political institutions. It is the method -- entirely unofficial and extra-constitutional -- through which the organs of government are made to function, through which leaders are selected, policies are developed, men and groups are organized for the conquest and management of political power. The need for a formulated foreign policy and for a national policy of industrial order is real -- but not more so than the need for a real understanding of the fundamental American fact that pluralism of sectional and interest compromise is the warp of America's political fabric -- it cannot be plucked out without unravelling the whole.
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APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY

1767 Andrew Jackson born
1782 John C. Calhoun born
1790 South Carolina Compromise
1798 Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
1811 Calhoun elected to House of Representatives
1815 Battle of New Orleans
1816 Protective Tariff
1817 Calhoun accepts position as Secretary of War
1819 Congress considers chastizement of Jackson for Seminole Affair
1821 Calhoun declares himself a Presidential Candidate
1824 Jackson defeated by Adams for position of President
1825 Calhoun inaugurated Vice President
1827 Calhoun broke tie in Senate to defeat Woolens Bill
1828 South Carolina Exposition and Protest circulated
   Passage of Tariff of 1828 (Tariff of Abomination)
1829 Jackson inaugurated President
   Calhoun inaugurated Vice President
   Jackson delivers first message to Congress
1830 Congress fails to pass a Compromise Tariff
   Jefferson Memorial Dinner
1831 Calhoun declares himself author of South Carolina Exposition and Protest
   Cherokee vs Georgia
1832 South Carolina drafts a Nullification Ordinance
   Force Bill presented to Congress by Jackson
   Calhoun resigns as Vice President and accepts seat in United States Sen-
1833 Congress approves the Force Bill
   Compromise Tariff is passed
   Nullification Ordinance is withdrawn
1849 Calhoun completes Disquisition