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A comparison of leisure theorists

Nancy Tobin Hornberger

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A COMPARISON OF LEISURE THEORISTS

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Sociology
University of the Pacific.

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Nancy Tobin Hornberger

June 1970
This thesis, written and submitted by

[Signature]

is approved for recommendation to the
Graduate Council, University of the Pacific.

Department Chairman or Dean:

[Signature]

M. Lewis Mason

Thesis Committee:

[Signature]

Patricia Gremban Wagner

Chairman

[Signature]

Donald B. Day

[Signature]

M. Lewis Mason

Dated May 26, 1970
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Social scientists express growing concern about man's capacity to achieve a state of existence greater than that of mere survival. "Popularizers" and writers of "social criticism" echo this concern. Obviously, because of scientific and technological changes, man's participation is needed less and less in the production of economic abundance. He is, therefore, to be free to engage in other pursuits. Awareness of this impending freedom challenges those intellectuals who wish to describe and to anticipate the direction and quality of man's total existence.

THE PURPOSE

This thesis explores a sample of the writings of social scientists and social philosophers who have expressed concern about the present status of American leisure. In addition to describing the traditions passed on by our cultural heritage these intellectuals often become the social critics of these traditions. They choose to judge society as well as to explain it. They may be independent thinkers, unattached to any particular organized interest groups. In addition they represent a wide field of interest and focus and often transcend the boundaries of their own disciplines,
such as literary men, historians, theologians, economists, as well as sociologists. Because of this it is important to know, if possible, the frame of reference from which they derive their interest in leisure, their particular focus within the broad area of leisure, and what they conclude about that focus. The following discussion will speak to these points.

One does not read for long in the area of leisure before asking, What is leisure? Consensus does not exist and one must early face the puzzling secondary question, What is the source of such differing viewpoints? This analysis will emphasize the second question first, as a necessary preliminary to the answering of the first question, and will do so by the analysis of ideologies.

Winston White divides intellectuals into two main ideological camps. One he calls the moralizers; the other, the reformers. The moralizers emphasize values, beliefs, and morals: the "ideal factors" which strengthen and serve as meaningful guides to help control the existent social institutions. To the moralizer problems arise which need solutions because individuals do not abide by basic values. Hence this ideological stand wishes to strengthen the underlying values of the social structure which guides the individual's behavior. The reformer wants to reform social conditions. To him problems arise because "the very structure
of society itself prevents its members from developing their potentials and from realizing the good life."¹

This thesis explores a sample of the writings of some intellectuals who have expressed concern about the present status of leisure in America. White's dichotomy of ideology will supply a framework for the exploration.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Ideology

Edward Shils has said:

Ideologies and those who espouse them allege that they speak for a transcendent entity—which is broader than the particular corporate body of those who believe in the ideology. Corporate carriers of the ideologies, whatever their actual practice, claim to act on behalf of an "ideal," the beneficiaries of which include more than members of the ideological group. Since the ideal always diverges from the existent, the ideology contends for the realization of a state of affairs which, its proponents allege, either never existed or existed in the past but exists no longer.²

Every ideology must arise from the on-going culture process; it is a response to some element in the dominant cultural "outlook" and an effort to bring that element into a more prominent position:


An ideology can't come into existence without a prior existence of a general pattern of moral and cognitive judgments--against which it is a reaction and of which it is a variant--it requires therefore a cultural tradition from which to deviate.3

Therefore ideologies are always concerned with the central value systems, the greater realization of the ideal morality. This represents a primary level of importance to the structural organization within the social system; a basic need for man to achieve a cognitive, moral design for his world. Ideologies can only emerge within this cultural background, against which they strive to present desired change. They not only wish to explain the importance of unattained felt needs of the members, but must also present means to alleviate the existing unacceptable patterns of the social system. As such the ideology attempts to relieve an alienated condition within society by either gaining dominion over or withdrawing from the intuitional patterns representing the status quo.

In order to clarify this thesis' use of the term, several historical variations of the meaning of ideology should be briefly reviewed.4 The first asserts that an ideology primarily offers a viewpoint which aims to simplify and direct the sociopolitical choices for the individual or

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3Ibid., p. 69.

group. The normative and factual elements which determine the ideological pattern of beliefs and concepts do not represent a distortion of the explanation for social phenomena. However, this simplification of the ideological explanation may lead to an unwitting distortion. If the public is to accept successfully the ideology it must remain unaware that the ideas might be distorted:

It is the awareness that our total outlook as distinguished from its details may be distorted, which lends to the total conception of ideology a special significance and relevance for the understanding of our social life. Out of this recognition grows the profound disquietude which we feel in our present intellectual situation, but out of it grows also whatever in it is fruitful and stimulating.

An ideology causes one to fix attention on parts of the situation which might otherwise be obscured and hence ignored. In this view an ideology is an idea which challenges activity to be directed toward maintaining the existing order. Mannheim not only supports this definition of ideology but describes the role which the bearer of the ideology plays. In addition to the social conditions which help to mold thought, "there are social groups whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society. We call these the 'intelligentsia'." A member of this group

6Ibid., p. 10.
will direct his attention to finding the relative truth as it emerges in the on-going complex social process. Louis Wirth, paraphrasing Mannheim's feelings about the role of the intellectual, says:

In every society there are individuals whose special function it is to accumulate, preserve, reformulate, and disseminate the intellectual heritage of the group. The composition of this group, their social derivation and the method by which they are recruited, their organization, their class affiliation, the rewards and prestige they receive, their participation in other spheres of social life, constitute some of the more crucial questions to which the sociology of knowledge seeks answers. 7

A second definition of ideology represents the extreme polarity, either right or left, of the existing sociopolitical program. This type of ideology is constructed almost entirely on hypothetical premises and usually offers a tightly organized closed system of ideas. Shils believes that all ideologies are politically oriented because all embrace the problem of power and authority. For example, the religious ideologies always involve authority. Even Marxism is based on politics because its authority is derived from property relationships which are supported by the power of the state. 8

A third, and most prevalent, understanding of the use of the term ideology is derived from Karl Marx. He criticized the distortion of selected ideas to maintain the status

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7Ibid., pp. xxix-xxx. 8Shils, op. cit., p. 68.
quo of the social system. He called this "false consciousness" based upon illusions rather than scientific theory. This ideological system, "false consciousness," is founded upon the rules of the social order which determine the moral behavior of its participants, such as those operating within religion or politics or economics. It may also be based on the belief systems which support the evaluations of the society, such as the class-determined mental perspective or presuppositions. The social existence, located in the class structure, dictates the ideological falsity which governs behavior.

Karl Mannheim enlarges upon Marxist ideology.9 Because one has multiple group memberships the problem becomes the determination of which one or ones establish the ideological premise. Effort is required by the social scientist to unmask known or unknown distortions or deceptions of various interest groups, instead of just the class-determined ideology based on the economic structure which Marx propounded. Mannheim discusses two types of false consciousness. The first, the particular conception of ideology, occurs when new or differing assertions become psychologically felt as untrue because of one's life situation. If this distortion is not seen as a lie by the individual it becomes

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9Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 70-78.
ideologically oriented. However, Mannheim does not feel that all assertions one makes are perceived as false—some do not have to be ideologically founded to be incorporated into the individual's value system. The second type, however, called the total conception of ideology, involves one's whole mood of thought as determined by his complete environmental setting. The individual's total thought system originates in and is united with his social situation.

Mannheim credits Marx for recognizing the important step of shifting from the individual psychological conception to the social conception; which made it possible for Mannheim to recognize the importance of the change from the particular to the generalized conception of ideology in his formulation of a sociology of knowledge. This view of the "totally distorted mind which falsifies everything which comes within its range" permits the ideological theory to develop into a sociology of knowledge. And so this most frequently used sense of ideology means "both the distortion of thought by interest—both public and private, conscious and unconsciously known—and the study of such distortion . . . non-ideological thinking is thought to be impossible."10

For the purposes of this thesis we must seek both a more explicit and a more comprehensive view of ideology.

10Gould, op. cit., p. 316.
The first seeks to show ideological distortion of ideas which are felt by the user to be factual or scientifically valid. The second requires a view of ideology which is not simply confined to Marx's status quo, or Mannheim's conservative concept of distortion. Several contemporary theorists have contributed to this more dynamic approach to ideology and have provided insight about those concerned with its application in the social system.

A new treatise on the sociology of knowledge believes that what is defined as reality is based on social processes and it is these processes which should be analyzed to find what is "known" in societies. Giving credit to Marx's and Mannheim's contributions, the authors believe that one of the primary concepts of this "social construction of reality" is ideology, "the understanding that no human thought . . . is immune to the ideologizing influence of its social content."\(^1\) They show that any person or group which use ideas as weapons for their social conflicts need solidarity. The resulting ideologies serve to promote this group cohesiveness and become themselves altered according to the needs of the group trying to legitimatize itself. Modern society is pluralistic. Consequently open conflict has been replaced

by mutual accommodation or by varying degrees of tolerance. So the theoretician must redefine his concept of reality to include rapid social change because pluralism itself undermines the traditionalists' conservative position.

One form of theoretician is the intellectual: "an expert whose expertise is not wanted by society at large."\(^{12}\) His is a marginal role in society because he needs to redefine reality. This redefinition, based on pluralism, sharpens his awareness of his loss of theoretical integration in society:

\[\ldots\text{ The intellectual's design for society exists in an institutional vacuum, socially objectivated at best in a subsociety of fellow intellectuals. The extent to which such a subsociety is capable of surviving obviously depends on structural configurations in the larger society. It is safe to say that a certain degree of pluralism is a necessary condition.}^{13}\]

The importance of the intellectual's position lies in his description of the dialectic between "ideas" and the institutional processes which support them. The authors assert that theories are not only offered anew to make legitimate the existent social institutions but that these same institutions can be made to conform with already existing theories. "Consequently social change must always be understood as standing in a dialectical relationship to the 'history of

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 126. \(^{13}\)Ibid.
All ideas exist in the reality of the individual life and cannot be empirically separated from this reality.

C. Wright Mills also was concerned with the dialectic of reality and ideas. He demonstrated, for example, that most social pathologists' concepts of social disorganization are germane to their position in the structure of the American society. His criticism of the ideology of professional social theorists is focused on their similar middle-class socialization. They are trained to think in terms of specific situations, to stay with parts rather than conceptual wholes, to emphasize conceptual justification and presentation in most textbooks rather than offer the higher level of abstraction which might stimulate discovery. They tend to emphasize social process and see all social action as continuous process and thus:

Changes in pace and revolutionary dislocations are missed or are seen as pathological. . . . They also accept the formality and assumed unity implied by "the mores"--this lowers the chance to see social chasms and structural dislocations.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, to the social pathologist rapid social change is considered a problem, usually because he believes that a slow pace of change is normal but also because he utilizes

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 128.

rural norms as the basis for his organized theory of change. For example, Mills asks the pathologists of the urban scene why, if so much pathology exists in the city, is social distance such a bad state of affairs?

The preferred theoretical state for the social theorist is the ability to abstract interpretations on a higher level via several divergent points of view which will permit a new synthesis. This would not be possible if the ideological position of all these theorists did not derive from similar denominators. Thus, to these theorists:

The pathological or disorganized is maladjusted. This concept, as well as the "normal" is usually left empty of social content. It is usually propaganda for conformity to those norms and traits ideally associated with small town, middle-class milieux. . . . The less abstract the traits and fulfilled "needs" of "the adjusted man" are, the more they gravitate toward the norms of independent middle-class persons verbally living out Protestant ideals in the small towns of America.16

Consequently an ideological orientation not only represents an incomplete social criticism of the existent status quo, it also limits the perspective pathologists' viewpoint as to what to criticize and where to locate desired change.

The importance of value imperatives as the basis for normative theories is also Don Martindale's concern in his explanation of social disorganization. Normative theory

16Ibid., p. 179.
can convert empirical theory into needed conditions and "is unique in being addressed to a system of objectives desired by the formulator or by those in whose service he stands."\textsuperscript{17} Therefore the values to be achieved will decide the content of normative theory. The subsequent theory of social change becomes then a complement to a theory of social problems and either empirical or normative orientations may be used to identify and explain change. He felt that when attempting to explain social disorganization both of these focuses must be kept distinct. The empirical approach should not prescribe goals; but the normative approach should not use the theory of social change as the replacement for the desired goals when identifying social problems. Social change theory is only a partial explanation for social disorganization. All critics agree that valuations are present in all social disorganization theories, but "the criticism is frequently marred . . . by the fact that the critic objects to particular evaluation rather than to the confusion of values with facts."\textsuperscript{18}

Martindale feels that if a student of social problems recognizes his judgmentally normative position he might at least separate the empirical evidence from the normative


\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 420.
value orientation. This, unfortunately, does not occur frequently:

... when people are seen as acting on a plurality of interests that lead them in pursuit of limited values and into encounters in which both cannot win; when cooperation is seen as it so often is, as a combination to achieve more effective group conflict; when a peaceable social state is seen as a slow compromise of diverse interest--such perceptions tend to dampen an over-enthusiastic reforming zeal... For these reasons, it is interesting to trace these shifts of emphasis that lead from an empirical examination of conflict processes back to a normative consideration of social problems.19

We can see, therefore, that ideological positions arise from the operation of many social forces which activate value judgments. Martindale, in contrast to Mills, believes that any uniformity of value judgments by social thinkers is a myth, although they tend to follow a more liberal than conservative frame of reference.

This same attempt to separate ideologies from the "value-science integrate" based on empirical data forms the framework for Talcott Parson's definition. "Value-science integrates" are social values--concepts of what the social system believes it can be in its ideal state and formulated on neutral, empirical data. Ideologies are not neutral; their function is always polemic. The process of institutionalization involves four basic forms of social control: values, norms, collective group action, and individual

task-related roles. The primary form of control in the institutional process is through social values. This creates a sense of strain which will always exist between the actual conditions and the desired goals. This gap between the real and ideal worlds causes ideas to be formulated about what creates the gap and how to relieve it:

An ideology is one type of reaction to strain. It is usually a formulation of beliefs about the source of strain and what should be done to eliminate it, although sometimes it can take the form of denial that there is any strain at all and an assertion that "all's right in the world."20

This sense of strain within the social system may come from either external or internal sources. External strain involves cultural upheavals such as may result from religious, scientific, or technological changes. These changes disturb the social system's beliefs about what is possible and tolerable. The development of space science is a current example of this type of external strain. Internal strain, always existent, can be said to be perceived inconsistencies between social values and any of the other three levels of institutionalization—norms, collective group action, or individual task-related roles. For example, if a sudden swelling of the ranks of the unemployed occurred, individual anomie might result because work values would continue to exist with no way for individuals to fill their work roles and norms for

20White, op. cit., p. 6.
work behavior would be thwarted. The system evidences inconsistency as to what it demands and what it allows.

Parson describes four types of ideology which may operate to relieve this sense of strain between the social values and social conditions: the conservative, which emphasizes the status quo; the reform, which wishes to change social conditions; the revolutionary, which wants change in the value system itself; and the counterideology which attempts to make some form of deviant behavior acceptable and justified. All of these show that ideology primarily functions to demonstrate the need for particular programs of action to achieve the desired ends of the ideologist's commitment to his perceived grievances with the social system.

This review of a few of the contributions to the understanding of ideology will, it is hoped, help to clarify the premise for this thesis. Primarily utilizing Parson's concepts, White feels that the sense of strain is perceived by two types of intellectuals, the moralizer and the reformer. Either group carries its own ideas of how society ought to maintain its basic institutional organization, based on its social values. There are many conditions to be satisfied in structured society and how these may be accomplished becomes a source of strain. These strains will vary from condition to condition. For example, the methods of
how our economic resources are to be distributed, how political order may be maintained, or how our domestic socialization of role will be passed on to the succeeding generations will always require social organization in any society. Values will determine the focus for the important conditions needing to be satisfied, but values will not tell us how to do it. And so strain will exist between these values and the means to satisfy them. This will vary from one part of the system to another and also at different times. In addition strain will increase during periods of rapid change. Strain will be perceived differently and those agreeing about a particular remedy will polarize "an ideological interpretation for its cause and cure."21

Ideology itself becomes part of the source of strain and hence part of the definition of a social problem. Lack of recognition of this difficulty by the participant when analyzing his own society might affect his resultant values. Objectivity for the theorist is difficult; it becomes activated selectively. Selectivity leads toward distortion via neglect or ignorance of the parts and hence it is relative to the available knowledge. (It may readily be seen that this paper itself will have to represent a selected and therefore distorted bias about the concept of leisure.)

21Ibid., p. 8.
White, however, justifies the search for greater social scientific knowledge even though this distortion will persist, provided one attempts to perceive and note his ideological biases:

It is not necessary that social science reach perfection before such an analysis is attempted, for the problem is a relative one--pointing out the discrepancy between ideological beliefs and what is currently known to be significant and correct. Of course, social science, as well as all knowledge, is itself selective in that we obviously do not know everything there is to know.22

Leisure

It rapidly becomes obvious that there is no agreed upon definition of leisure today. Yet there is awareness of an urgency to understand the possible relationships between the scientific and technological developments and the participation of man in this resultant changing milieu. One of the variables becomes the concern about the quality and quantity of Western man's life. This may be expressed by the degree of control a person is able to garner over the uses of his own time and energy. These resources, available to all men, have concerned society through the ages.

Josef Pieper probably has offered one of the most thorough statements of the origin of man's concern with leisure. His orientation as a Catholic philosopher, steeped

22Ibid., p. 11.
in Greek scholastics, places man's leisure in the religious realm of divine contemplation "beyond the immediate sphere of his needs and wants." Since Western culture is a derivative of the ancient Greeks, leisure is one of our foundation stones. Quoting Aristotle's ideas about work, he believes "we are unleisurely in order to have leisure." This becomes a primary consideration for the Western conception of work and the resultant distinction between "work" and "art" which will be explained more fully later. For Aristotle the ultimate purpose of any life was the fulfillment of its proper function. Leisure's proper functioning exists when a person's total being, mental, emotional, and physical, is in accord with his control over his environment. Leisure occurs when this total perception of internal and external competence is achieved or potentially capable of being achieved. The achievement of true leisure is contemplation. Life is divided into two planes, "action and leisure, war and peace." "Scholē," the Greek term for leisure, has become our word "school" and is greatly altered in meaning. To the Greek the goal of "scholē" was to educate


24Ibid., p. 24.

or teach the free man to arrive at his fullest cultivation of the mind. Leisure became an end in itself, "a classical ideal of leisure for its own sake."26

Johan Huizinga's fascinating study of play in a culture reasons that the Roman idea of culture and play merits attention only in relation to Greek culture. To find the eternal truths was the reward of the Greek's leisure pursuit. Leisure was in no way related to an occupation. "For the free man any time that was not claimed by State service, war or ritual counted as free time, so he had ample leisure indeed."27 To the Roman, however, the play element was marked by its ritualism. The Roman separated the act from the contemplation. To the Greeks, only the aristocratic elite could achieve a state of leisure. The Romans, however, introduced the idea of rest from work as the purpose of leisure. Cicero stated, "A man is occupied ... and then he rests and recreates himself. ... otium thus conceived is not for its own but for negotium's sake."28

The Christian world separated still further leisure from man's other activities or musings. Contemplation became associated with the divine. The qualitative fulfillment of

26Ibid., p. 21.
28deGrazia, op. cit., p. 22.
man was to be obtained by seeking God face-to-face. Thomas Aquinas pointed the direction: "Religious activity stands above secular activity, but contemplation above all else..."29

The Renaissance encroachment upon the Middle Ages sought to redefine man's image in relation to his environment away from the sacred orientation towards a more secular pattern. The reemergence of the elite class is seen by Huizinga as an attempt to separate itself from "the vulgar herd and live life as a game of artistic perfection."30 This was not, however, the return to the great philosophy of the Greek's leisure, but an invitation to "a gorgeous and solemn masquerade in the accoutrements of an idealized past."31 This masquerade only served to temper the onset of a new and relentless attitude toward utilitarianism for all. Man's real greatness was to be focused on his ability to "subdue nature and bend her to his will."32

The Eighteenth Century was the prelude to a new order in which work became the utopian goal for all, reflected in and supported by Adam Smith's ideas that idleness produces nothing and all should participate in useful production. These ideas broke forth just prior to the Industrial

29 Ibid., p. 28.  
31 Ibid.  
32 deGrazia, op. cit., p. 29.
Revolution when work became the ideal of the age:

This was a new order of things. The classical economists and democrats took over the idea, the anarchists found it just right, the socialists embraced it—all varieties of socialists: the communists, the Christian, utopian, and scientific. Of course, each used a different emphasis, but for all work was good or would become so, was the right of every man, and a duty as well. The philosophic doctrine they held in common was that through work and work alone does man produce and know. The doctrine was that of the Renaissance, the actual time was that of the Nineteenth Century, the ideal of leisure had long before taken its exit.33

It is not within the scope of this paper to trace the rise of the work ethic. It is necessary, however, to realize that a dichotomy arose, which still exists, between the ideals of contemplative leisure in the Aristotelian sense and those of the religious reformers of the Medieval times who gave us the legacy that idleness is evil and those of the developing industrial age that labor achieves a more prosperous nation, a more integrated, happy people.

Joffre Dumazedier frankly disagrees with Pieper and deGrazia that leisure can even be defined in relation to the ancient past. He feels that the Greek philosophers and the Renaissance aristocrats paid for their idleness with the work of slaves or servants. This form of idleness cannot be identified as leisure because "it doesn't complement or reward

33 Ibid., p. 32.
work but takes the place of work altogether."34 Two preconditions must exist before modern leisure can be so identified; they only have come into being since the industrial revolution. The first is that society has ceased to control its activities via ritualistic forms. Some of these activities have become the "unfettered responsibility of the individual, even though the individual's choice in the matter may still, of course, be determined by impersonal social necessities."35 The second precondition for a modern definition of leisure stems from the fact that work can now be separated from the other activities in a man's life. Work is no longer the single dominant outlook in man's social relationships. Both of these conditions can only have emerged within the span of our industrial and post-industrial civilization.

It becomes then the task of the sociologist to explain aspects of human interaction that consist of patterns of behavior handed down "within systems of meaning."36 This then becomes the justification for studying the assumptions


35Ibid.

related to leisure. Those intellectuals who follow either the moralizing or reforming approach to leisure arrive at their "systems of meaning" via different emphases from the cultural heritage. Perhaps by exploring some of these systems of meaning and their ideological components we may better arrive at a concept of leisure itself.
CHAPTER II

THE MORALIZER

INTRODUCTION

The Moralizer's Position

Utilizing Winston White's analysis of the moralizer's position, we shall assume that strain between the individual and society occurs when the social values are weakened; the individual defects from the normative premises of society. White clearly portrays the moralizer's concern: "... there has been a loss of the old values... on the part of the individual, the individual is in conflict with society, and the individual must assert himself..."¹

Why does this defection take place? The knowledge of means has weakened our commitment to ends. The "ideal" factors of the American social system, such as beliefs and values about God, free will, the sacredness of human life, and the uniqueness of personality, all have been undermined or deserted by the individual. An example frequently mentioned is the loss, or at least the erosion, of the Protestant Ethic of individual hard work, self-reliance, thrift, and the search for personal salvation, in favor of the social

ethic in which the group is the source of creativity, of “belongingness” for the individual. William H. Whyte, Jr.’s indictment of large-scale organization is a moralizer’s plea for the individual to resist the system—the social ethic is redundant, premature, delusionary, self-destructive and primarily static! Whyte agrees with deToqueville that America could lose its equalitarianism and sense of social cooperation "by making the individual come to regard himself as a hostage to prevailing opinion, by creating, in sum, a tyranny of the majority."2

In Whyte’s perspective the individual has abdicated his responsibility for shaping social conditions to the group. This slackening process is occurring with many persons simultaneously and meaningful leadership to set the needed direction is absent. As a result power has become misplaced; it now resides in the amorphous group rather than with the individual. The individual seeks security within social group participation rather than relying on his own ability, or "standing on his own two feet." Whyte concludes that the individual must fight the falsely organized structures "for the demands for his surrender are constant and powerful, and the more he has come to like the life of

organization the more difficult does he find it to resist these demands or even to recognize them."

The resultant social strain is also felt because of the increase in the functional capacity of the society, largely residing in the scientific, technological, and economic spheres. The moralizer recognizes that science and technology are powerful solvents of values and that knowledge of the means, via these solvents, has reduced commitment to the final ends of human action: "the vitamin replaces the crucifix; the tranquilizer reconciles man to God's ways." Relying on the less abstract decisions of science permits the individual to avoid the more difficult problem of making moral decisions and evaluative actions. For example, Whyte sees this choice between science and humanity an erroneous one. The danger exists that a false trust in science, "scientism," will be believed as the panacea for what we ought to do in society: "What I am arguing is that the real impact of scientism is upon our values. The danger, to put it another way, is not man being dominated but man surrendering."

In the technological and economic spheres of society the loss of the "rugged individualism" of the past has

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3Ibid., p. 448. 4White, op. cit., p. 27.
5Whyte, op. cit., p. 35.
occurred. This value has been replaced by one of security and conformity because of the growth of large bureaucratic organizations. Whyte sees the industrial revolution as "the great moral tragedy." The "false collectivization," or group, which results is the culprit. "Togetherness" is deemed regrettable. "People very rarely think in groups; they talk together, they exchange information, they adjudicate, they make compromises. But they do not think; they do not create." Or consider the assumed values of group activity, such as consensus, cooperation, and participation, which are offered without meaningful ends--these empty means provided in group togetherness make it more difficult than before for the individual to justify a deviation from these norms:

It would be a mistake to confuse individualism with antagonism, but the burdens of free thought are already steep enough that we should not saddle ourselves with a guilty conscience as well. The hunch that wasn't followed up. The controversial point that didn't get debated. The idea that was suppressed. Were these acts of group cooperation or individual surrender? We are taking away from the individual the ability even to ask the questions.

David Reisman corroborates this view in his study of the other-directed man. Society replaces the functions which once belonged to the individual, such as hard work, saving,

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6Ibid., p. 46.  
7Ibid., p. 57.  
8Ibid., p. 65.
and risk bearing. Because these challenges to the individual are now absent he regresses. The inner-directed youth of a former age found his sense of security in moving to the periphery of the various frontiers and establishing an isolated and recognizable claim on a new piece of territory. . . . If he founded a firm, this was his lengthened shadow. Today the man is the shadow of the firm. Such long term aims as exist are built into the firm, the institution . . .

A last example of the moralizer's explanation of how individual defection from values occurs involves what Winston White calls the "Hedonism of Consumption" syndrome. Again, to use Reisman' terminology, individuals have become victims of "softness." Our society has turned from the frontier challenge of production to the incipient exhibit of consumption! In contrast to Veblen's man of "conspicuous consumption," who followed an elitist's pattern, the present-day consumer is one who "seeks experiences rather than things and yearns to be guided by others rather than to dazzle them with display."10

The solution which the moralizers offer involves placing the blame for our present problems on the individual who is morally responsible for resisting the seduction of the social conditions:


10Ibid., p. 118.
Whatever structural conditions it sees as contributing to this undesirable state of affairs, the individual is responsible for resisting them; his resistance—with that of millions of others—will bring structural conditions into line. Our salvation lies "in the hearts and minds of men."

The real factors, such as the institutionalized organizations of society, should become the responders to the ideal factors, such as universal free will and reason, instead of being the instigators of the society's beliefs and values. Too often, however, the moralizers are apt to be naive about the structural conditions and vague about specific means of social programming as they condemn the withering away of ideals.

Moralizers of Leisure

The foregoing general explanation of the moralizer's sense of strain offers the ideological framework for many leisure writers. Three main divisions appear among these writers which will serve as a method to identify their primary source of concern.

The first group of theorists, who will be identified as cultural and/or classical moralizers, are concerned primarily with man's loss of serenity and contemplation which should have great importance for man's true attainment of his humanity. The Classic Greek pursuit of the "good life," for example, is summed up by the terms contemplation and

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11White, op. cit., p. 36.
tranquility, both of which when properly combined become leisure. According to one writer the great meaning these values have for us can be realized when we note that man has named two areas of the moon "The Sea of Tranquility" and "The Sea of Serenity." This Platonic search for eternal truth is the proper goal for leisure for the cultural-classical moralizer.

In this view, leisure is incorporated also into the arena of spiritual experience—it is understandable only as a mental and religious attitude. Its ideal form is silence; its ideal behavior is non-active. The cherished goal of the state of "grace" via religious experience is embodied in and through the concept of leisure for this group of moralizers.

The five main theorists to be considered cultural moralizers for the purposes of this paper are Josef Pieper, a Catholic philosopher schooled in Greek scholastics; Sebastian deGrazia, Professor of Political Science at the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University; Clive Bell, an outstanding English literary critic and author, especially of the art world; Johan Huizinga, a German socio-historian of culture; and Robert Lee, a professor of theology at the San Francisco Theological Seminary.

The second group will be described as psychological moralizers. Their main emphasis involves the self-actualization potentials for individual man—health, knowledge, self-expression, character formation, personality, and self-adjustment are among the list of attributes which help make man known to himself. Leisure, via the use of these attributes, becomes a time when man can attain his greatest potential. Those attaining this goal are able to use more effective and accelerated methods for knowing. They live with greater value criteria and so are better able to improve the condition of men. By being more able to conduct their own lives to achieve an improved sense of their own personal worth and enjoyment they also more directly effect others whose paths meet with theirs. The resolution of the work-leisure dichtomy into a unity in which a person is better able to fulfill his intellectual, emotional, and physical expectations permits time and activities to become useful tools rather than dominant forces in leisure pursuit.

The democratic desire for freedom and respect for the individual is a strong pervading theme for this group. For example, two writers show that the word leisure comes from the Latin "licere" which has as its root meaning "to be permitted." Within this context of leisure man must exercise his freedom of choice. This psychologically-oriented goal

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for freedom and autonomy may be accomplished by either restoring old values or reaching for new. "Uprootedness is freedom-giving, and freedom brings with it the task to find new values ... even a new aesthetic philosophy must be sought." Social institutions are seen therefore to be barriers of comfort and ease against insecurity and uncertainty. They are barriers to freedom. Their damaging handiwork, according to one writer, is the enemy of psychological freedom:

The social institution has so often been chosen by the sick, the loveless and inadequate as the vehicle in which to careen ruthlessly over the prostrate bodies of their "friends" and "co-workers" towards a fatuous, hand-made illusion which they call "the top." But in the self-actualized there is no "the top"—only way-stations, all of them marked by leisure—beyond a continuum of growth and adventure. Every man is by necessity insecure, thinking man by necessity uncertain.  

The foremost psychological moralizers for this paper's purpose are Paul Weiss, a professor of philosophy at Yale University, and Hugo K. List, whose dissertation for the doctor of philosophy degree from Michigan State University is the study of a leisure definition via the self-actualization theory. Others whose contributions are similarly oriented include Don Fabun, the Publications

14 Fabun, ibid.

Editor for Kaiser Aluminum Company; Clement Greenberg, Associate Editor of *Commentary* and an art critic; Robert MacIver, former President, The New School for Social Research, professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology, Emeritus; and Joost A. M. Meerloo, a psychiatrist in private practice in New York, born and educated in Europe.

A third group of writers are identified as the social moralizers. Their chief anxiety involves the individual's abdication of values which relate to specific areas within the social system. Their basic concern is that the value judgments made by the individual should guide the structure of society and, hopefully, be reflected in that society. For instance, the question of leisure's relationship to work is of prime concern for the moralizer who does not perceive leisure as a release from the more dominant value of work. Leisure should stand independent; an end in itself in man's valuations.

The questions of the political-economic goals of our nation also concern the social moralizer. The men who wrote the Declaration of Independence expressed the basic right of humans to have leisure. It has only been of recent origin that "the right to work" was included in the Human Bill of Rights. This to the social moralizer implies that we have passed the individual, physically challenging frontiers, in which there was little spare time for leisure, to the
emotionally and socially challenging frontiers, in which the individual now has time to pursue the cultivation of refinement, beauty, and wonder. Consumption patterns obviously become an important theme during this new time of challenge for these moralizers. The roles of play, idleness, the liberal arts, pure science, and even peace to achieve the desired ideals dominate these moralizers' anxieties.

Those chosen who stress this social moralistic ideology include David Reisman, currently Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard University; Bertrand Russell, noted British philosopher, mathematician, and educationist; Russell Lynes, editor of Harper's Magazine; Eric Larrabee, Professor of American Civilization, Columbia University, and an Associate Editor of Harper's Magazine; and Gregory P. Stone, professor of social stratification and social psychology at the University of Minnesota.

Several precautions must be proffered for the reader's consideration. First, this delineation--cultural, psychological, and social--of leisure moralizers cannot be clearly definitive. Several writers are concerned with more than one area of emphasis. For instance, Robert Lee has been identified as chiefly interested in the cultural aspects of leisure. Obviously as a theologian he is also critically concerned about the role of religion as an institution within the social structure. Joost A. M. Meerloo's particular
emphasis on the psychological needs of man brings him to a
direct confrontation with the political goals of freedom for
our society. Johan Huizinga's cultural interest in play is
approached historically. As such its relationship to work
involves concern with the changing ends for both.

Second, this discussion is by no means meant to
present a complete selection of those whose writings are of
this ideological emphasis. The primary purpose of this
paper is to present the viewpoint of some of the major
leisure theorists with the hope of clarifying the current
interest in and anxiety about the role of leisure in our
society.

Finally, it is apparent that most leisure moralizers
deal with similar concepts which pertain to their ideas of
needed definitions and explanations of the problem. These
concepts will be identified for the purposes of this dis-
cussion as time, its meaning and possible use; work, its
development historically and the changes currently emerging;
consumption, its relationship to production and its role in
the supposed mass leisure phenomenon; the political and
spiritual challenges which involve the moralizers' conception
of man's basic nature; and lastly, the moralizers expecta-
tions for the future. Not all theorists speak to each of
these areas but they are of sufficient significance to be
dealt with separately. These common, pertinent ideas will
be examined from the view of each moralizing group. The result should be a clarification of the ideological premises involved in each orientation to leisure.

TIME

The question frequently posed by theorists of leisure is, When does time become leisure? The related question also becomes pertinent, What are the measurements of time? As Sebastian deGrazia emphasizes in his definitive study of leisure, the modern world and its characteristic thought patterns runs primarily on linear time, a time oriented to the space dimensions and a time which becomes independent of the inventor. This is clock time. The Eighteenth Century poet, Ciro di Pers, observing the significance of this change in man's "enslavement" to clocked time wrote:

Noble machine with toothbed wheels
Lacerates the day and divides it in hours...
Speeds on the course of the fleeing century.
And to make it open up,
Knocks every hour at the tomb.16

In addition the various quantity measurements of time (days, weeks, hours) can only have significance within the realm of qualitative measurements to achieve the desired goal. Concepts such as work, consumption, political and economic activity are influenced by the appreciation of

"higher" goals. "Progress," meaning the expectation of social improvement, also becomes one of these concepts which is affected by the use of time valuations. So, to the moralizer, time quality has a special significance which must be understood. The moralizer's use of this concept permeates his approach to these other areas of existence and is best summarized as follows:

Work is the antonym of free time. But not of leisure. Leisure and free time live in two different worlds... Anybody can have free time. Not everybody can have leisure. Free time is a realizable idea of democracy. Leisure time refers to a special way of calculating a special kind of time. Leisure refers to a state of being, a condition of man, which few desire and fewer achieve. Disabusing leisure of free time is one of the principal cares of this book.17

Definition of Leisure Time

As has been suggested, Sebastian deGrazia (cultural moralizer) presents a thorough and fascinating account of the development and function of time in relation to leisure which will be the primary source for the moralizers' views about time. He ranges from this classical presentation to include a helpful tale of the historical changes in our attitudes toward leisure and work as they relate to time. The preferred leisure goals of the classical world, according to deGrazia, contain seven dimensions that might alter our modern concept of leisure, but have come to mean unfortunately

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17 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
the mere attainment of free-time segments: Time cannot be measured in leisure. Because leisure cannot be divided up by time it cannot suffer the fragmentation that free-time does. The behavior of leisure is primarily the activity of the mind, becoming its own goal. Free-time is the antonym for work, but leisure has little relevancy to work or time. Leisure is not capable of being organized and thus is not dependent on others. One who strives for leisure spends his time cultivating his mind in order to give his best thoughts to politics and religion. And, lastly, leisure is never dominated by the idea of "fun." What a man does when released from required action he does for its own goals, but not for the goal of a good time in itself. 18

degrazia emphatically feels that modern society has lost a basic concept of civilization in its use of linear time. The modern world of clocked time requires action and choice that must always be referred back to the time machine. This automatic machine, which produces regular auditory or visual signals, makes of its user an automaton, a slave to regularity! Thus he feels that the use of clock time is an expression of collectivism, not of individualism. Modern feelings of tension and nervousness are permitted to arise because these time units become interchangeable and also

18Ibid., pp. 347-49.
commercially valuable. This kind of time means one's actions are capable of being constantly checked, adjusted, or measured. Today's industrial society operates on this linear image in which time does not repeat itself as it moves constantly onward:

Technology, it seems, is no friend of leisure. The machine, the hero of a dream, the bestower of free time to men, brings a neutralized idea of time that makes it seem free, and then chains it to another machine, the clock. If we but say "free clocked time," the illusion vanishes. Clocked time cannot be free.19

In conjunction with this historical use of linear time two conflicting values developed side-by-side which have permitted a shift from true leisure time to a mere free-time dimension—a loss which deGrazia deplores. Industrialism, the age of the machine, began with the Revolutionary War and produced a sense of uniformity among machine parts and men. The settlement of the frontier, however, produced a sense of individualism. deGrazia believes that the two behavior patterns joined "to steam-roller a lovely country, leaving it for the most part a mess of ugly cities and despoiled wilderness."20 Although education has kept the ideal of leisure from the early American tradition, it has altered its emphasis from the pursuit of leisure to the problem of free-time badly spent. He shows that the goals of our founders, such as Jefferson, Jackson, Mason, and

19Ibid., p. 325. 20Ibid., p. 263.
Franklin, have been changed to mean that only through work can man pursue happiness. The original ideal was the reverse: only through not having to work can men pursue happiness. Many of these men, the writers and approvers of the Virginia Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence, did no real day's work; they adhered to the more classical interpretation of work and leisure. In contrast, today's businesses, unions, physicians, churches, and advertisers see leisure as a problem of time badly spent or existing in overabundance:

I said earlier that an ideal affects conduct. What we have just passed in review [historical development of leisure theory] is not an ideal of leisure. Such an ideal no longer exists in the United States . . . The commercial spirit in business and government both, has no interest that any such ideal, without spending attached to it, should come to prevail. Indeed, an ideal of free time, or the good life, has taken the field. The good life consists in the people's enjoyment of whatever industry produces, advertisers sell, and government orders. This seems to be what we have then. Within it, what does the future hold in store.21

deGrazia sees the problem as a paradox which arose when free-time first became used in a "time-off-the-job" sense and became confused with a sense of freedom. By combining the universal duty of the right to work with the goal of equality all are made beneficiaries of free-time. All attain free-time only in relation to work time. This requires the

21 Ibid., p. 283.
subjective feeling of having to have an activity in free-time and spoils the desired sense of freedom.22

Robert Lee (cultural moralizer) agrees with deGrazia that free-time is an internal enemy to the individual in modern society. Only to focus on time free from work or duty offers no explanation of the more important normative content of leisure. "The distraughtness that disturbs contemporary man is expressed in the revealing phrase 'killing time' in discussing leisure."23 This implies the loss of the sense of leisure and for Lee ultimately becomes the expression of an alienated member of society. Thus, free-time cannot be synonymous with leisure because of the evidence of many, such as the unemployed or the ill, who have free-time but not necessarily leisure. Free-time is only potentially capable of becoming leisure when leisure depends not only upon available time, but also upon the freedom of the person to use that time. Thus leisure represents the opportunity for a person to use a portion of time for ends which are designed by the person himself. Leisure is that time during which we are free to choose what we wish to do within the range of our personal freedom.24

Lee's real concern about the subject of time is how its use may solve the problems of ultimate meanings or values

22Ibid., p. 411.
24Ibid., p. 28.
which were not attained in past history. Time was seen in
the classical culture as an eternal, changeless model; in
the era of the Renaissance and the scientific revolution it
was seen as a continuously evolving form; in the industrial
society as an objective, precise measuring device; in the
exchange world as a source of value for the amount of goods
that can be produced and wealth earned; in community life
as a response to the pressures and demands of work and other
social organizations. None of these avenues serves to give
a complete understanding of time. A dynamic frame of refer­
ence, which includes all of these views and will also include
their meanings and ways to fulfillment, will give man a real
perspective of time (including leisure time) and one which
will help him recognize his responsibility for it. Thus,
"time is the medium of human existence . . . "25 It takes
the following forms: all time is a gift; time consists of
the content which fills it; because God has acted in time so
are we required to act; the true essence of life is found in
the sense of joy which can be nourished in creative use
of time.26 Both of these moralizers, deGrazia and Lee, not
only lament the loss of the pure attitude toward time,
unadulterated by external, lesser goals of physical activity,
but they underscore the need to find these greater ideals

for leisure time use. Their methods, however, remain undetermined.

A psychological moralizer, Don Fabun, agrees that leisure is a qualitative activity, a synthesis of aesthetic, psychological, religious, and physical contemplation, but finds that these categories of activity are all but absent in the modern American society. Man's search for ultimate truths of the use of time, in the classical sense, is turned toward man's psychological search for personal peace and worth amidst the unstable, transient structures of the social system. He artistically compares the use of time to the idea, derived from the study of an ancient Incan village, that the human being has only a certain number of units of time at his disposal before he dies. How one chooses to use these particles of time becomes the basis for our moral and social judgments. To Fabun these judgments, unfortunately, have little validity in our modern world, where the common distinctions between work and play, between free time and leisure cease to be relevant. He feels that the deepening involvement in the mechanized and automated age makes it more difficult to understand what we are doing and what we should be doing. "... our private and social clocks have dissolved into the anomalous topology of an old egg broken into a frying pan."27 He compares human society to sand

27 Fabun, op. cit., p. 4.
castles--castles built from innumerable particles of sand which somehow cling to each other. Inevitably the tide comes to eat away the foundations, but the particles will regather to become another castle another day and

only the fun of it is left and the love that went into its making. It may be that we should consider our own ephemeral society like that, too; a social structure where the work is only incidental but where the fun and the love that went into its making still linger as our shared and common heritage. Perhaps we already are beginning to view our society that way. If not, perhaps we should.\textsuperscript{28}

Hugo K. List also seeks a psychologically holistic view of time. He feels that man's sense of self-fulfillment may not be achieved solely by controlling time and having constructive activities. Man must join his physical and emotional resources with the rational and intellectual ones to be able to achieve the conditions of leisure and self-fulfillment. In this way he is able to synthesize the false dichotomy between work and leisure "into a potential unity and show that persons enjoying leisure are thus more wholly available to and more efficiently fulfill the intellectual, emotional and psychical expectations of the growth-producing educative process . . . "\textsuperscript{29} Time is insufficient in itself to create the necessary conditions to achieve this feeling content of leisure and so activities of unobligated time are not counted as leisure when action is a primary social base.

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 3. \textsuperscript{29}\textit{List, op. cit.}, p. ii.
for man's personality. Power over life, freedom, time, activity, or pleasure, none by themselves are sufficient conditions to achieve this state of self-fulfillment or leisure. It can be attained only when man's "rational faculty is joined to his automatic scanning system to provide him with ongoing maximal content over his human and psychical environment."\(^{30}\)

Paul Weiss (psychological moralizer), by combining the psychological and social possibilities of time use, stresses the importance of the idea that leisure time is made possible by work, could not continue to exist without work, and yet is not a means to work. Leisure is a period in which no work is done. He would appear to combine free-time with leisure, but he then makes a qualitative evaluation about those who achieve maximum free-time—the rich or the institutionalized recipients of public charity who may freely choose to "waste in idleness or to spend in some enriching activity" their time.\(^{31}\) He also identifies others who lack the capacity to engage in leisure activities; who, when freed from life's daily requirements, find free-time a

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 19.

burden to be avoided:

Leisure time for them is a period of exposure, and sometimes of self-discovery, when they are anxious, anguished, and defeated, gaining little except an awareness of their limitation and comparative inferiority. 32

To Weiss the goal of leisure is to make possible the greatest meaning to all other activities of a man's day. One's work life will be enhanced through the attainment of the more whole man via the qualitative use of leisure time. And work will become the beneficiary of leisure.

Different Views for Time Measurements

The complexity of arriving at a single dimension of time and its use becomes readily apparent when the theorist tries to utilize this concept for an empirical analysis of leisure. The moralizer has as his prime concern the quality of a time dimension rather than its measurement into fixed segments of activity. For example, the empirical approach used by two moralizers to describe the ways in which man divides his time segments reflects the ideological orientation of these researchers. Sebastian deGrazia, for one, has spent a good portion of his effort in time dimensions and asserts that there has not been an appreciable amount of increased free-time since 1850. Compared to ancient Greece and medieval Europe, "free time today suffers by comparison,

32 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
and leisure even more."33 Day time is divided into four categories: work, work-related time, free-time, and subsistence time. Work time equals eight hours with approximately one and one-half hours for travel, car service, and parking. Subsistence, which includes sleeping, cooking, shopping, church, repairs, clothes, and dressing, equals ten and one-half hours. Free-time thus amounts to about two and one-half hours. He sees the problem area for study to be subsistence time because the question of motives appears: is the time being used aesthetically, such as newspaper reading for information about one's community, or for work purposes, such as newspaper reading for ads?

Don Fabun, on the other hand, utilizes the Incan concept of a man's total time allotment and represents the above divisions by percentages: 45.8 per cent in subsistence; 3.8 per cent in commuting; 15.6 per cent in work; and 34.8 per cent in free time. In both instances free time is what is left of the time allotment and both deGrazia and Fabun hesitate to identify it as leisure. Both point to the polarity between "work" and "free" which they feel reflects a loss of domination of work over all other values, but which does not relieve the problem of free-time becoming leisure. Both are concerned with whether time can be lost.

33 deGrazia, op. cit., p. 90.
If so, it represents a loss of attainment of the more important goal—true leisure. Fabun says the answer lies in our value of time, in what we feel we ought to be doing. Benjamin Franklin's advice that time is money has become the valued goal, meaning that we do know how time should be employed. For example, the child soon learns that the answer to the question, "What did you do today?" is whatever shows the greatest manifest activity. "Nothing," or "playing," in the sense that the world was happening to the child, is soon altered to the realm of some purposeful behavior. Leisure, as a contemplative activity, is only acceptable for the very rich or the sick.34 (deGrazia reports the same type of response for the child when queried about its behavior. He also suggests that if a man is thinking and smoking, he will answer that he is smoking when questioned about his behavior. This is the accepted social response.)35

In addition, these theorists, especially deGrazia, emphasize concern about the normative content of time for the individual when empirically analyzing other time use dimensions. Studies which show the purchasing patterns involved in household expenditures, recreation, vacations, and even business, medical, and enhancement spending may reveal more than one type of time-allotted dimension. How a

34 Fabun, op. cit., p. 6. 35 deGrazia, op. cit., p. 95.
person feels about the activity will often decide whether it belongs to work, subsistence or free-time categories or perhaps overlaps them. For instance, entertainment is an obvious example of time use for multiple reasons, such as for work enhancement, health improvement, escapism, etc.

Studies dealing with consumption patterns of time also reflect the moralizer's concern about the qualitative factors of time use. Questions arise as to whether telephone usage is work or leisure, whether church participation such as meetings, church socials, and time necessary in food preparation is subsistence or leisure activity. Is food preparation subsistence or leisure when other than necessary foods are offered by the housewife? Is the time spent in purchasing and upkeep of clothing confined to work, subsistence, leisure, or a combination?

Time to the moralizer must not be defined in a narrow sense of easy segmentation between work and leisure. Activities cannot be readily divided into the allotted time parcels of work and nonwork. Evening time, eating patterns, national holidays prompt many more questions about a concept of time use for empirical examination than they resolve. deGrazia suggests that these increasing number of holidays cause discomfort among the leaders of great technologically advancing nations. The attitude of the Sabbath as a day of rest from work, for example, is observed by modern life, yet
certainly it is not a religious holiday. One form of the Sabbath as a parcel of time appears nowhere else in the industrial world: "The ones who chiefly profit from this idea today are the professors, the possessors— but by no means all of them— of one of the rarest blocks of free time in modern life, the sabbatical leave." Or, view the commonly held idea that the executive rarely separates work from play and has the least amount of free-time. "If executives are so powerful a force in America, as they indubitably are, why don't they get more of that free time which everybody else, it seems, holds to be so precious? Strange."37

The moralizer thus has as his concern the loss of the classical sense of pureness of experience, or the search for a better way to comprehend one's own command of time in the modern life. To regain the more ideal values of the social system time must again be made the tool for the individual's use. It is significant that to the moralizer—especially the conservative moralizer— the task is not so much to gain these values, but to regain them, apparently as they once were.

WORK

A Brief History of the Work-leisure Dichotomy

No study of leisure omits some discussion of its relationship to work. The moralizer's concern is that the

36 Ibid., p. 122.  
37 Ibid., p. 138.
domination of work over leisure will stifle the higher goals of individual and social fulfillment. They assert that in the present-day industrialized society the individual has lost his ability to pursue these more meaningful goals. The individual has abdicated his responsibility to maintain the necessary balance between his economic needs and his leisure expressions.

The changing function of work as a result of the incredible growth of the machine process has produced a strain within the social system between the basic needs of the individual and the economic goals of the system. Work becomes a detriment to the attainment of man's most cherished goals of freedom. It produces over-conformity, a highly undesirable degree of security striving, and a compelling passion for social approval. The ideology of the moralizer judges these as undesirable. By the same token the higher goal of individualism, or autonomy, cannot be served solely through the work experience, if at all! Leisure must be the more meaningful possibility for achieving this enriched position.

It is certainly not within the perimeters of this paper to trace the cultural and historical aspects of work. However, some story from the past is necessary to understand why the moralizers feel this anxiety about the role of leisure in our contemporary scene and how they envision that
the dichotomy between work and leisure has occurred. We know that in the most simplistic societies work was not separated from other activities. A man did what was expected, whether it be production, domestic duties, ritual performances, sleep, singing and dancing, conversation, etc. Primitive man probably had more nonwork time than modern man. The process of task differentiation (an interesting exploration itself) is of interest to the theorist of leisure because it permitted the development of the economic division between work and nonwork in a man's life. Differentiation ultimately led to the growth of specialization and mass production, which was the social invention necessary for the industrial revolution and eventually our technologically oriented economic system.

In conjunction with this growth toward the division of functions, or specialization, the longing for the earlier days in which work, as work, did not exist arose as a revered myth. The cultural moralizer relates to this earlier experience with yearning. Pieper (cultural moralizer), for instance, feels that the Golden Age of the Greeks best exemplifies the relationship between work and nonwork; one should only be engaged in work to achieve the more valued ideal of leisure, not the reverse. The existence of the dominant work value to him means the loss of the real meaning of human existence. This distinction between leisure and non-leisure has resulted in an unwanted separation between the goals of
the liberal arts and servile work, between the intellectual worker and the manual worker:

Intellectual activity used always to be considered a privileged sphere, and from the standpoint of the manual worker especially, appeared to be a sphere in which one did not need work. . . . But nowadays the whole field of intellectual activity, not exempting the province of philosophical culture, has been overwhelmed by the modern ideal of work and is at the mercy of its totalitarian claims.38

Today we mistrust all that is not work and place contemplation within this sphere of mistrust. Only that which is gained by effort of toil and trouble is valued; nothing is valued that is a gift. Pieper feels that unfortunately the "worker" today is characterized by three undesirable traits:

. . . an extreme tension of the powers of action, a readiness to suffer in vacuo unrelated to anything, and complete absorption in the social organism, itself rationally planned to utilitarian ends. Leisure from this point of view, appears as something wholly fortuitous and strange, without rhyme or reason, and, morally speaking, unseemly: another word for laziness, idleness and sloth.39

Leisure should not exist for the sake of work. A break in one's work is a pause for work but this is not leisure. Leisure therefore is contrary to the ideal of work; it is a mental and spiritual attitude.40

This classical moralizer yearns for us to return to a former age!

39 Ibid., p. 38.
40 Ibid., p. 40; and Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), pp. 5-10. From a totally different orientation the introjection of Huizinga's study
The Golden Age of contemplation with its intrinsic value for the pursuit of truth was eroded by the advent of Christianity. Work took on the concept of penance. It became a human duty for the release of sinfulness stemming from the Garden of Eden, which was a place of no toil. Thus work should be painful and unpleasant—this evaluation still operates! The moralizer concludes that in our culture work is a necessary condition in order for the Christian to achieve some happiness in his temporal life. An important division is made between life on earth and the goal of eternal happiness in Heaven where he will be freed from work for contemplation. Work is a moralistic blessing which will prevent

of play in culture offers a stimulating approach to this contest between work and leisure. Play presupposes a deep involvement with our mental existence; it is not merely matter or action. According to Huizinga:

It adorns life, amplifies it, and is to that extent a necessity both for the individual—as a life function—and for society by reason of the meaning it contains, its significance, its expressive value, its spiritual and social associations, in short, as a culture function. Huizinga's historical study of play shows how the relationship of play to work developed in the ancient Greek's conception of leisure. Leisure in Aristotle's opinion contained in itself all of the delights of existence and was to be pursued and enjoyed by those with the highest aspirations of nobility. Leisure became the object of work. Play was reduced to the idea of repose from work or mere childish activity. Huizinga disagrees that this limited definition should be permitted and would wish that its original meaning be restored—a position consistent with the moralizers' desire to reestablish better values for our social system. Its meaning extends beyond being non-earnest and non-serious and surely must include the idea of seriousness. The rationale for play carries special meaning for man's way of knowing and exists "in the very deep layers of our mental being."
man from misusing his time and energies. Sebastian deGrazia traces the growth of this attitude from the Medieval Age of St. Benedict's edict that "idleness is the enemy of the soul . . . " The monks first developed this new philosophy that manual labor was itself valuable. The innovation of the clock was used to "pull monks out of bed, to send them off to prayers and then to the fields, to mark off the time for work and prayer and contemplation."42

The importance of this change in the meaning of work through history is perceived by most major writers of leisure whatever their ideology. deGrazia succinctly states the phenomenon (he sees it as a problem) that to be without a job in America today is to be a misfit, to lack status:

Perhaps the linking of work to God is no longer so clear as it once was, yet we can certainly see that the shadows of the great reformers fell over the idea of work in America. Here, all who can must work and idleness is bad; too many holidays means nothing gets done, and by steady methodical work alone can we build a great and prosperous nation. Here, too, work is good for you, a remedy for pain, loneliness, the death of a dear one, a disappointment in love, or doubts about the purpose of life.43

Today the dual development of this work ethic with the industrial revolution is readily recognized. Because of the need for more labor which has to be specifically oriented to the factory space system and structured in time to the

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41deGrazia, op. cit., p. 41. 42Ibid., p. 45. 43Ibid., pp. 45-46.
clock-oriented technology, the requirement that work become an intrinsic value to the society was almost an imperative. The relationship that this meaning of work has to leisure today is the reversal of the ancient Greeks' ideal in which one works to attain leisure. Leisure has become a dependent function of work and changes as the nature of work changes:

To the exact extent of greater productivity, capitalism, Protestantism, and industrialism have brought about a separation of work from all that is not work which is infinitely sharper and more exclusive than ever in the past. And as work has become more concentratedly and actively work—that is, more strictly controlled by its purposes, more efficient—it has pushed leisure out of the foreground of life and turned it into the negative instead of positive complement of itself. . . . Leisure, in compensation, has become much more emphatically the occasion for flight from all purposefulness, or rest, respite, and recuperation. 44

We now achieve leisure (actually free time) only in order to work, regrets the moralizer.

With the moralizer's understanding of this historical change in the meaning of work he looks upon the machine as a source of great irritation which deflects the worker from realizing his wholeness. This highly structured division of labor utilizes only a portion of man's abilities. His need to define what he does with the unused, unwanted-for-work portions of time is the source of this irritation. Machine-age

man loses his self-identity, gives up perhaps the real meaning of his existence. Don Fabun effectively summarises this moralizing attitude:

But if ostensibly the whole man is bought by the employer, and only a part is used, or parts wrongly used, and the worker himself is denied right use of his own parts, then his sanity, in the sense of the fullness of his personality, is in danger. Either the unwanted parts atrophy for sheer lack of use, or they are mutilated by misuse, and he ceases to be a whole man.45
deGrazia, the supreme classicist and cultural moralizer, takes the extreme position which laments the advent of the machine and the industrial revolution. Authorities predicted glorious increased spans of free-time. He feels they were in error because this fine dream of increased free-time which was to be provided by the stimulus of the machine has not been a glorious realization. The individual instead finds himself divorced from his greatest dreams of individuality and creativity. "The tender of the automatics may in time have the dull, nerve-racking life of the croupier in the casino. Emaciated, he will watch with alert, lifeless eyes."46

This partial unfolding of man because of his machine-oriented work existence is also deplorable to David Reisman, the social moralizer. He feels that we have

46deGrazia, op. cit., p. 295.
remained too tightly tied to industry, knowing withal that automation may destroy our cultural values, to now be able to resort to leisure as a counter-balance for the ills of work:

The hopes I had put on leisure (in The Lonely Crowd) reflect, I suppose, my despair about the possibility of making work in modern society more meaningful and more demanding for the mass of men—a need which has come upon us so rapidly that the taste of abundance we have had in the past now threatens to turn into a glut.47

Don Fabun (psychological moralizer) more pragmatically carries forward the leisure moralizers' felt responsibility to shore-up the goal system by recognizing the differences which exist in the work world today and showing how these differences affect the individual's need for self-identity. He identifies work as the requirement of a person to show up at a certain place, at a certain time, to perform a specific task for a specific number of hours. Whether this activity is meaningful to the individual is not relevant. "We have constructed a society in which participation in this activity almost becomes the goal of life itself."48

There are present and available two major kinds of work: "object-oriented" work directed toward transforming natural resources into some useful object to man and "people-oriented" work directed toward services to others. He feels


48 Fabun, op. cit., p. 15.
the first, which is repetitive and utilizes only a portion of one's ability, will be replaced by automation and cybernation. The rationale for "progress" via work will continue, however, in our society. This rationale stems from an ideology oriented to the intrinsic value of human activity. This will become "people-oriented" rather than machine-oriented. He regrets that this outdated ethic of work via human action has not yet been adequately comprehended. Studies of horsepower production since 1850 show that in 1950 humans produced less than one per cent horsepower equivalents. Ninety-eight per cent horsepower equivalents were derived from machines and thus:

We are beginning to see the consequences of that changed energy flow, and with it the demand for new ways of looking at work and the role it plays in our society. What has happened and is happening is that the necessity for individual human labor as a means toward progress has begun to change over to the management of inanimate energy sources. When will we realize this, asks Fabun? When will we begin to let go the old work ethic in order to arrive at a new social system with institutions which will value leisure, not work, as the acceptable and desired goals for man? Establish new goals with which the individual may identify, says this moralizer.

Ibid., p. 16.
The Problem of the Work-leisure Dichotomy

As was suggested previously, all leisure moralizers consider work a problem in our contemporary society. A social problem may be defined as the creation of inconsistencies existing between what the social system requires and what the value system prescribes. As one such inconsistency the moralizers indict the work institution which fails to give moral and emotional support to the worker and yet has not permitted an adequate substitute in nonwork activity. Our modern society has been built on the value system that work is more honorable than play. This traditional value originated, as has been shown, from the Puritan ethic's emphasis on production rather than consumption and is most observed in the middle-class; therefore, leisure as a problem has been emerging more slowly than has the work problem because a change in the value systems occurs more slowly than a change in the means systems, such as the impact of technology.

Johan Huizinga (cultural moralizer) interestingly demonstrates a fresh insight when describing the changing relationship of work to play; for play is seen as the mother of culture. It provides the satisfaction of basic needs and it permeates all spheres of social life including work. An important part of our social attitude toward work came from the "agonistic" form of play competition in which every game
or contest had its own reward. The word "gage," the symbol of challenge, was originally synonymous with the word "wage."

This meaning of challenge has changed from the play-oriented idea to a more narrow economic-oriented concept. It has become synonymous, instead, with "salary." Now, Huizinga points out, "we do not play for wages, we work for them."

This represents an over-seriousness which smothers the former play values. This has occurred because of increasing cultural complexity and the more finely organized technology. This "over-seriousness" Huizinga feels is a fatal shift in all aspects of cultural life; sports, games such as bridge, recreation activities, even art, as well as business show this atrophy of the pure play factor. With the advent of industrialism play has become a detour or an escape rather than being the central value of our culture. For example, the use of statistics to establish competitive comparisons permits business to include play. Furthermore, play has become business; industry forms sporting groups within its ranks, viewing potential employees from their physical abilities more than their professional capacities. This loss of the pure play form from our cultural values represents a loss of the individual's ability to develop what Huizinga considers the desired and constructive pure competitive orientation to work.

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50Huizinga, op. cit., p. 51.
It appears that Clement Greenberg has adopted this same criticism of the loss of the pure play element. He is quite critical of the present seriousness toward work:

If serious work—not leisure—can be infused with something of the spirit of the hobby, with something of its unseriousness, well and good; but not the other way around—not as long as leisure remains peripheral, as it must, and the hobby finds its only existence there.\(^{51}\) Greenberg seeks to reunite culture to work and religion. He feels therefore that man must find a way to better control his mastery over work. Man can only attain his greater possibilities and potential within this united sphere of the non-material culture with the economic:

Industrialism, imposing work on everyone . . . has confronted us more explicitly than ever before with work in its aspect as a limitation on human freedom—the aspect the author of Genesis must have had in mind when he described the fall of man (and the beginning of history) as a fall into reproduction, work, and death.\(^{52}\)

The psychological moralizer's theme is heard again; rebuild individuality by restoring the ideals to man's idea of work.

David Reisman (social moralizer) presents the problem of work more as a social phenomenon. Man has been alienated from his most important goals which involve the quality and meaning of existence in his work experience. The Great Depression's impact was to increase the enhancement of the work morality, leaving the right to play only to those who work:

\(^{51}\)Greenberg, op. cit., p. 41.  \(^{52}\)Ibid., p. 42.
It is significant that we have now taken full employment rather than full nonemployment, or leisure, as the economic goal to which we cling in desperation. This is not surprising when we realize how stunted were the play opportunities for the man unemployed in the depression. We could see then, in the clearest form, how often leisure is defined as a permissive residue left over from the demands of work-time.53

In summary then, each of these moralizers views work as an obstacle to leisure experience. Leisure must be relieved of its diametrical opposition to work because work is too limiting an experience to allow the more ideal values of the system to dominate and adequately support the individual. Leisure must be "disabused" of its relationship to work as well as of free time if it is to achieve its greatest attributes.

PATTERNS OF NONWORK EXISTENCE

With the relatively recent changes in the society's work process, a concomitant change is occurring in all other social processes. Consumption of both goods and services has become as equally important as production of goods and services, particularly in an economy based on goals which stress individual fulfillment. This increasing growth of the "nonwork existence" appears to carry the same emphasis on the value of action that has been intrinsic to work since its Puritan origins. This vast area of consumption therefore

necessarily involves the promotion of leisure time activities: with the non-essential elements of living; with the unobligated segments, as well as with the "free time" components of the society as it is now structured.

Why is there this uneasiness about our increased opportunity to consume? What should this change in our economic process offer the individual? Where should the individual look to find the needed direction in this changing milieu? The leisure moralizer finds this new world of abundance in things, time, and services fraught with conflict and challenge. The individual has abdicated his independence to an amorphous group which determines where and how he will perform when not engaged in work. Conformity, via this "togetherness" process, results in stultifying the ideal goals of individual freedom. The phenomenon of mass leisure now present occurs because the individual can no longer find his personal identity in other important living areas, especially in work.

This section will describe some of the more salient aspects of non-work existence about which the moralizers feel strain. Idleness, arising from mechanization, is seen as a major problem. Mass leisure, which permits the individual to give up his responsibility to the group, endorses a lowered standard of values which the moralizer sees as undesirable. Either a return to "individualism" or the
creation of an elitist group are possible solutions to relieve this dreaded phenomenon. Mass communication necessarily is the corollary to mass leisure. Its effects on the individual and his conformity needs must concern the leisure moralizer. And lastly, a special segment dealing with play is included because the moralizer views this concept as much more than mere activity. Indeed, he reasons that its cultural importance in establishing and maintaining the higher social goals should influence the individual's ability to regain his personal identity and freedom.

Idleness Versus Action

Work, as previously shown, became a separate and dominating value for our social system as industrialization developed. Industrialism altered the former agrarian life style toward a more marked differentiation of work and non-work periods. Coupled with this change was the impact of the Reformation's requirement not to work on Sundays. The worker had a form of free-time not known to him before the emergence of these events. A new group appeared on the scene eager to take advantage of this increased amount of free-time in the economic market, the consumer. The worker became the spender, the consumer of the frivolous and the unnecessary. Sebastian deGrazia finds this important change primarily one of an increase in a different kind of time, not a growth of quality in existence. "From this time on,
with opportunity knocking, the word idleness crawls out of its ugly cocoon to turn into a beautiful butterfly—leisure." Unfortunately a moth called free-time actually emerged, not the butterfly of leisure. Free-time to deGrazia is the opposing norm of work; it is really an expression of hostility to the old ethic of work. He feels that we chase after this idea of more time from work only to find ourselves caught in the chase after time to "catch up" or "get done" in the other segments of living needs. Our suburban life styles exemplify this supposed gain of time and space and yet we usually remain deplorably unaware of how to utilize this gain and hence remain committed to this suburban pattern as a means to escape the work syndrome in which idleness is evil. But this is the problem of the work--free-time syndrome and cannot be classified as leisure.

Another classicist, Josef Pieper, agrees that idleness only in opposition to work cannot be called leisure. According to his view idleness is the source of many personality faults, the most prevalent being a lack of calm and a feeling of despair. Both of these faults, revealed in the saying, "work and don't despair," make true leisure attainment impossible. Thus the problem to be solved is that of reclaiming the rights of leisure while the claims of work remain so

54 deGrazia, op. cit., p. 203.
prominent. Work now dominates and therefore obliterates a true leisure experience. Work, expressed in the term "proletariat," is a negative value from which the worker should be freed if this "proletarianization" serves as the reason for the gulf between the worker and leisure. This "deproletarianization" would take place by enlarging the goals of life beyond the work concept and widening the work concept to include the liberal arts. This process might be accomplished "by giving the wage-earner the opportunity to save and acquire property, by limiting the power of the state, and by overcoming the inner impoverishment of the individual."56 As a classicist he perceives the intellectual as the guardian of true leisure. Therefore the one way to achieve this is to designate the intellectual process as "intellectual work" in order to make it belong to the common denominator of work.

Robert Lee also is adamantly convinced that leisure and free-time are not synonymous; that leisure is a state of mind and a spiritual attitude which does not exist necessarily in spare time. He thus sees the concept of time as having potential negative influences on leisure. Two attendant problems may be anxiety and boredom. He shows that the condition of the retired group in our society is fraught

56 Ibid., pp. 51.
with a loss of meaningful life goals. This loss may create such anxiety within the non-working retired person that hostilities toward his community and its projects may materialize; "Retirement, more than menopause, is a sociological death." 57

In summary these cultural moralizers view idleness as work's problem which evolves because the machine permits increasing parcels of free-time. This extreme position finds idleness the culprit of free-time, not leisure. Their concern is the transformation of this potential gain of time into the meaningful goals for the individual which only real leisure can provide.

Robert MacIver (psychological moralizer) offers a different approach to the problem of those who do not know how to use this new release from work. He is not concerned with the cultural definition of free-time as much as with the individual's psychological response to the resulting restlessness, which he calls the "great emptiness." He suggests that two individual responses are presently available to this emptiness, neither of which will probably relieve the anxiety aroused. One is through activity--amassing wealth via property, money, or power. This pragmatic position implies that one must be going in a linear and measurable direction. One never permits the emptiness to break through his active

57Lee, op. cit., p. 205.
pursuit of nothingness. The other course pursues a brief momentary flight into a higher state of excitation, of escape from the harsh reality of meaningless time, of seeking for seeking's sake and not for the thing being sought. One travels a course from excitation to momentary full freedom, which eventually leads to new tensions and a return to emptiness. For the sophisticated few of this second group who have ample opportunity to cultivate this, seeking leisure time presents no problem. But for the many who have no training for leisure, no strong hobbies or interests, no liberation in their work life, who lead dull, drab existences in closed, confining circles, the increase of free-time becomes a threat:

Now, when so many have leisure, they become detached from themselves, not merely from the earth. . . . The leisure is ours but not the skill to use it. So leisure becomes a void, and from the ensuing restlessness men take refuge in delusive excitations or fictitious visions, returning to their earth no more.58

The alienation which occurs, a primary source of concern for either ideological camp, presents itself within the sphere of leisure. For this psychological moralizer the individual's inability to use this newly achieved parcel of time occurs because the needed shift in values from idleness to leisure is not being properly achieved.

Joost Meerloo, as another psychological moralizer, echoes this sense of estrangement for the individual in this cold, push-button world. He feels that mechanized living causes feelings of inferiority which may permit the growth of cowardice and decrease the opportunity for challenge. Challenge is required to keep one from becoming part of the automation process and thus indispensably bound to the total machine process. Unfortunately leisure, instead of being a challenge in this technical age, is an empty time space. Instead of being active and creative leisure surrenders to passivity in play and mentality. It becomes a diversion in which goal attainment ceases to operate:

The tension of the emptiness of boredom is not well understood in our era. When the mind cannot fill the feeling of emptiness and deprivation, war may burst out if only to break the tension of boredom and misused leisure. Mankind has to get away from the seductive call for leisure and laziness telling us that lack of challenge is the best life.59

59 Meerloo, op. cit., p. 101; and Lee, op. cit., pp. 106-23. The delinquency problem, which might be described as a different form of war, is ascribed to boredom and is seen as a consequence of the new leisure society. Boredom, a response to the overabundance of free time, is associated with a sense of meaninglessness and emptiness. Delinquency is the attempt to correct this time filled with nothingness. Lee examines novels which portray this conviction that boredom results in individual delinquent behavior: The Young Manhood of Studs Lonigan, The Catcher in the Rye, and Compulsion. The problem of gang delinquency is also attributed to boredom which social reform projects, such as better housing and supervised recreation, will not successfully alter. "Boredom is essentially a condition of the spirit, and idleness of the despair from weakness . . . "
Idleness is also a primary concern to the social moralizer who wishes to change the value judgments made by the individual to guide specific areas within the social system. For example, Bertrand Russell's famous essay, "In Praise of Idleness," attempts to place our virtuous ascription to work in a secondary place. We have two orientations to work: one is the process of altering the natural world; the second is providing service which involves interpersonal activities. The first is unpleasant, degrading, slave oriented; the second is pleasant, rewarding, and capable of permitting individual growth experience. This second is attainable now by the many, not just the few, if we will reduce the work hours and make work available to all:

The individual, in our society, works for profit; but the social purpose of his work lies in the consumption of what he produces. It is this divorce between the individual and the social purpose of production that makes it so difficult for men to think clearly in a world in which profit-making is the incentive to industry. We think too much of production, and too little of consumption. One result is that we attach too little importance to enjoyment and simple happiness, and that we do not judge production by the pleasure that it gives to the consumer.60

Men can be taught the wise use of this available time. Boredom from sudden idleness, when he is out of work, will not need to ensue. Not to reach for this leisure state, a product of civilized man, is to deny him the greatest fulfillment:

It will be said that, while a little leisure is pleasant, men would not know how to fill their days if they had only four hours of work out of the twenty-four. In so far as this is true in the modern world, it is a condemnation of our civilization.

Idleness then is seen as a problem which is produced by the change in the work process. To the moralizer this condition reflects the loss of important value concepts for the individual. Leisure cannot be achieved until we either restore old values of serenity and contemplation in non-work periods or establish new values of creative challenge in which the individual may realize his greatest potential.

Mass Leisure

The moralizer feels that the focus of society's values should exist within the individual. When individuals aggregate the masses gain control of the value standards. Too often these values are effaced and the individual either is limited in choosing his values or has his values undermined. This phenomenon which occurs in the nonwork, non-obligated time parcels is called mass leisure, and means the surrender by the individual to the group of his opportunity to make choices. The moralizer, critical of mass leisure, feels the individual ought to exercise his responsibility of choice in the consumption process.

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61 Ibid., p. 102.
How does mass leisure become possible? There are two variables present today which affect our attitudes towards the obvious growth of increased consumption possibilities. One is the growing abundance of things far beyond our subsistence needs. Advanced production methods have resulted in this accumulation which requires us to be consumers of the excess. This permits the opportunity to make choices never before available. The second variable is the abundance of free-time for the masses because of the machine process. Both of these variables will condition the response to leisure living because both involve the possibility for the individual to choose his values. When the individual fails to choose he permits the group to assume this privilege which results in the phenomenon of mass leisure.

The moralizers who view this mass leisure process as destructive to both society and the individual suggest two methods to correct the resulting strain. One involves the establishment of an elitist group whose exclusiveness ought to be maintained because they then can and should set the standards for the larger society. The other group, agreeing that mass society deteriorates standards because of its low quality of demand and that the individual feels alienated with a loss of the sense of "community," nonetheless does not wish any special group to hold the key to maintaining cultural standards of taste. These democrats feel the
individual has ultimate responsibility for demanding better quality in his consuming life.62
deGrazia, for example, takes the extreme elitist position that probably only a few can achieve true leisure. Maintaining his cherished ideal he feels that no culture has seen a majority of its people achieve the best standards of taste or demonstrate the greatest intellectual activities that reveal leisure's presence. This means then that just two classes exist, the majority and those who love ideas and imagination. "If we can't be philosophers, we'd be bored with leisure."63 Thus the democratic ideal of equality is inconsistent with the best standards of leisure. For a democratic system to achieve a state of mass leisure would necessitate the destruction of the enslavement to the time concept which dominates work. This would require a breakdown of the value in social "progress." It would require, too, the permitting of one to work when he pleased, supported by a guaranteed subsistence. deGrazia finds therefore that democracy is inconsistent with elitism and therefore with the attainment of leisure because
to take the improvement, the ethicizing, the busily active, the always chasing-something quality out of free time means stealing the doctrine of progress away from

62White, op. cit., pp. 52-63.
63deGrazia, op. cit., p. 379.
democracy, of melioration, of optimism, of the very mobility it prides itself on: that anyone can rise from the bottom to top (and, less proudly, skid from top to bottom). \(^{64}\)

Clive Bell (cultural moralizer) also recognizes as necessary this requirement to maintain a critical attitude and a taste for excellence on the part of a few. It is basic to a society's becoming highly civilized. Civilization is based on material security which can only be achieved through the support by the many for the few who will thus have the needed security and leisure.

If you feel that such inequality is intolerable, have the courage to admit that you can dispense with civilization and that equality, not good, is what you want. Complete human equality is compatible only with complete savagery. \(^{65}\)

To have this civilization the community must be willing to pay for it via a supported leisure class, the same as it does schools, universities, museums, and art galleries. "... unless men are capable of such enlightened generosity, democracy and civilization are incompatible." \(^{66}\) Unlike deGrazia, however, with whom he here shares the designation of cultural moralizer, Bell feels that an elitist group is not incompatible with democracy—a curious twist of values to accommodate an ideological bias!

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\(^{64}\)Ibid., p. 303.

\(^{65}\)Clive Bell, "How to Make a Civilization," Mass Leisure, op. cit., p. 32.

\(^{66}\)Ibid., p. 38.
Russell Lynes, social moralizer and democrat as judged by the above dichotomy of elitest-democrat, would replace deGrazia's philosopher-kings of leisure with the "dilettante," the specialist in directing standards of taste. He suggests that we refer the problems of urbanization, automation, changing sex roles, and the increased premium on consumption, with its accompanying changes in the Calvanist ethic that leisure is only a reward for toil, to the dilettante. This specialist can be assured of seeing the problem from our goals of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (Thus, working from such basic premises, he is not an elitist.) The dilettante originally was the lover of fine arts, the intelligent cultivator of the arts and sciences, the utilizer of the resources of leisure and intellectual satisfaction. Today's dilettante needs to be the ideal consumer, ideal from the standpoint of maintaining standards of quality, whether material or cultural. His function would be to encourage a high degree of performance in whatever his field of interest; he is to be a "watchdog." When we have both the dilettante and the consumer combined the quality of our culture will grow:

The nature of our new-found leisure is rapidly changing the old stereotypes. The businessman who doesn't make some pretense at an interest in culture, who doesn't support the local symphony and museum, who isn't on the library board or out raising money for his college is looked upon as not doing his duty, much less serving his own interests. Babbit isn't Babbit anymore. Babbitt is by way of becoming a dilettante. A lot worse
things could happen to him. In no time at all being a dilettante will not be considered un-American.67

A psychological orientation to the pitfalls of mass consumption allows Lee to focus on his central concern: the morality of choice to each person. Democratically committed, he feels that a group mentality is occurring in which self-surrender to the crowd causes man to experience anomie and individual impoverishment. Instead of extending personal choice, this gain in time and things permits "an increasingly mechanized response; one that is routinized and compartmentalized; one that denies man's self-transcendence and makes him a plaything of mass conformity to current moods and fads."68 To Lee this represents a loss of personal freedom; a crucial loss to the meaning of life, especially now when the diagnosis of our social ills defines alienation, boredom, and meaninglessness as the enemies of man's self-fulfillment. He finds that the analysis of statistical facts pertaining to the use of time and money in consumership usually omits reference to, or concern for, this more significant value.

Another democratically-oriented moralizer of mass consumption is Reisman, one of the most prolific writers of

68Lee, op. cit., p. 23.
this process. He recognizes its effect upon the social processes involving class and status identities. He perceives that a general lowering of barriers is occurring among age and sex groups and social classes in which a uniform life style emerges—the middle-class majority consumer. This represents a filtering-down of leisure class patterns from the leaders of taste standards as well as the promotion of uniformities of consumption patterns by the lower-class similar to the middle-class. Many evidences of consumption activity are cited to demonstrate this two-way pattern—the blurring of the casual clothing of the worker off the job with the simple clothing of the office worker, while their wives both read the same woman's magazine in the same beauty parlor and their children all wear blue jeans. Does this process of equalizing the consumption patterns provide an endless potential for the achievement of a meaningful identity? Or will we become sated with attainment of possessions, travel, and recreation activities? "No doubt, adult educators look eagerly and hopefully at the prospect—for they are in the business of selling intangibles for which the market is totally elastic."69 In The Lonely Crowd automation was seen to be the culprit for the alienation problem. The answer to the loss of meaning in the work experience was to be accomplished in the leisure experience. Now Reisman feels

that increasing additions of leisure might prove "more stultifying than satisfying and that the mass of men would be incapable of absorbing any more."\textsuperscript{70} He is concerned that, as millions of Americans come suddenly upon abundance of things and time in conjunction with the evaporation of the meaning of work, leisure will become primarily a search for satisfaction and status for those previously denied in the social order and a loss of goals for leisure and consumption in the better-educated strata. In the latter groups this loss is seen in the search reflected in psychoanalysis, self-help books, in adult education pursuits which are non-vocational, and in the growing body of serious non-fiction paperback books:

\begin{quote}
\ldots such Americans tend more and more to secure their children's future, not by large-capital acquisitions and inheritances, but by giving them a good education and the motives for achievement that go with it. \ldots It is in such relatively sophisticated Americans that we can see foreshadowed a decline of interest in material goods that may be a long time appearing in the working class and lower white-collar groups.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

It seems that Reisman curiously yearns to combine the democratic view of consumption with the elitists' to resolve his sense of conflict. Although he fears that mass culture will cause people to lose the important life meanings, he nevertheless is encouraged by the modern college student who

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 159.

holds a deep concern with current problems, with reading, music, drama, and literature. He feels that, although most first-generation children of the abundant life misuse its energies in aimlessness, the succeeding generations may be able to see that leisure is not a "dangerous abyss."

. . . today, we find among the best of our students many who do not think of themselves as an ascribed elite or even an ambitiously achieving one: they are democratically oriented and they are capable of solidarity and social concern. In fact they are an elite, but one which by its nature may show the way for others. The students may represent a pattern that will flourish, one that will break down the boundaries between work and leisure without getting rid of either.72

Effects of Communication Methods

No discussion of nonwork existence could be dismissed without some reference to the role of the various mass-communication media. In an early study (1955) Fortune magazine editors found the market for leisure to be a rapidly expanding enterprise, $30.6 billion at that time. They concluded that the consumption which occurs during nonwork experience would continue to show tremendous growth regardless of whether or not the rest of the economy did; and that, because this market is dependent on time, extra leisure time would result in extra leisure spending. They predicted that this market may become the primary component for our entire

economy. "For while consumer appetites for necessities may become sated, where is the limit to the market for pleasure."73

The moralizer fears—if not deplores—the eventuality of this expansion since he primarily feels that the methods of mass communication require mass conformity to standards which are "sold" to the individual. These standards for consumption patterns are viewed as having little potential for what moralizers would term the genuine leisure experiences. They therefore conclude that the pressures upon the individual's ability to choose via the mass media should be curtailed.

How is it possible that we have allowed ourselves to be so enticed by mass media, asks the moralizer? deGrazia, as expected, finds that the loss of the central "square" in communities eliminates many possible needed social contacts. Urbanization requires people to seek free-time activities "in commercial, roofed-in buildings, and increases the dependence of public opinion on centralized, house-penetrating means like the radio and T-V."74 In addition, our urban, anonymous life style has become controlled by production and money instead of the traditional status symbols of property


74deGrazia, op. cit., p. 177.
and aristocracy. The American has not turned into the consumer whose old ideology of parsimony and thrift, parodied in the I. W. W. song as "work and pray, live on hay" has now changed to "work and spend, to the end." The advertisers, now have many hats at hand and put on one after another. 75

degrazia criticizes the function of advertising because it not only presents a new item but proceeds to define what it should be good for. The value-producing role of the advertiser thus comes under fire. He does not own the product being advertised and therefore is unable to guarantee what he says it promises. Instead he must constantly be ready to sell the new item because the older one no longer exists or has become too expensive. This also makes the advertiser a vulnerable consumer dependent upon advertising's self-perpetuating goals:

Time and space mark a man's position; position presupposes a stability of intercourse which we call a community; that stability expresses a way of life, and an idea of what life is worth living for. If leisure is the answer, or even part of it, then we must know what leisure is before we can tell anyone how to make life worth living. The advertiser has no free time, loses hours of it daily to win a little space, and in his harried existence must leave truth aside for untruth. 76

How, then, can he possibly know what leisure is and how it should be used? degrazia's primary complaint is that constant innovation requires the consumer to accept the conforming standardization of some supposed value about "progress."

75Ibid., p. 229. 76Ibid., p. 239.
He argues that variation for variation's sake may miss the truer values of freedom and happiness. Thus constant striving may result in the loss of leisure which, in the advertisers' hands, becomes conformity and the loss of individualism.

In addition to censuring advertising's function in producing mass conformity, deGrazia criticizes other institutions: government, business, and education, for example, for their involvement with communication media. The business world utilizes its influence to bias consumption patterns via installment buying, consumer credit, "obsolescence and disappearances of commodities . . ." Government has become business' ally in these ventures via legislation which permits advertising to influence the consumers' use of these purchasing methods. Education fails to preserve the leisure tradition because its goal is the enlightenment of the masses. A liberal education, one devoted to the discovery and drawing out of the greatest potential in the individual, is not attainable with our goal to educate all:

But both in their search for entertainment and in their building and work, men imitate whatever is around them. Therefore it is important that their environment be fitting and beautiful. In a leveling democracy, standards that are not coarse are hard to find, for it asks men who are all right as learners to wear the hat of creators. School learning and book learning, specially on a mass scale, must be superficial things. As a result, at those times when the cultural level of the people is to be brought up to the highest point, it brings down instead whatever standards exist to the
level of mediocrity, a level so low that the work of artisans—wherever they have managed to survive—is regarded as art.77

And so, to deGrazia, advertising stands in direct opposition to leisure, as do democracy and socialism. Permitting mass consumption via mass conformity techniques prevents the possibility for leisure accomplishment. "The argument for leisure belongs on another plane. One barrier is work. The other is equality. The plane is aristocracy."78

Concern about advertising's role in leisure is not limited to the elitist. Reisman, a democrat by our designation, is also concerned particularly about the changing patterns of consumption in the social area of class structure. He feels work has failed to provide needed satisfaction for the masses who have only recently been released from the restricting choice in subsistence experience. They look to consumership activity to appease these unattainable satisfactions which our goals of social mobility have instilled. And so, although there is a decrease among upper-middle class norms of an obvious interest in bounteous spending,

the zeal of the previously underprivileged to make up for lost time brings into the market for gaudy consumption more millions than education presently removes (of course, only in part) from the market. An enormous

77 Ibid., p. 407. 78 Ibid., p. 357.
expenditure for research and budgets have helped postpone the specter of satiation.\textsuperscript{79}

David Reisman also speaks with concern about education's possible role in advertising's grip on leisure. The \textit{Lonely Crowd} repeatedly describes the evils of mass media in determining the consumption patterns of the American. "The child must look early to mass media tutors for instruction in the techniques of getting directions for one's life as well as for specific tricks of the trade."\textsuperscript{80} Reisman challenges those advertisers and interested producers for the child market to establish a fund for experimentation on consumer activities among children. In his interest to achieve self-fulfilled persons he says:

> It would be interesting to see whether children who had had the luck to express themselves through free consumer choice released from ethnic and class and peer-group limitations, might develop into much more imaginative critics of the leisure economy than most adults of today are.\textsuperscript{81}

In summary, in the moralizer's view, the mass media have become mass consumption's collaborator, wittingly or unwittingly assisted by other powerful institutions. The individual must wrest his privileges of choice from these powers. Some moralizers, Reisman for example, do sense a decrease in the undiscriminating commitment to mass-media

\textsuperscript{79}Reisman, \textit{Abundance for What}? p. 288.

\textsuperscript{80}Reisman, \textit{The Lonely Crowd}, p. 149. \textsuperscript{81}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 302.
induced mass consumption in the better-educated strata where there are signs of a decrease in leisure consumption goals. These are being replaced by a search for life's meaning via the moralizer's coveted goals of individual autonomy.

**Play**

A discussion of non-work existence as viewed by the moralizer would have no significance without some analysis being given to play, to activities which do not encompass work or solitude or obligated-time allotments. A study of various recreational pursuits--sports, hobbies, games, entertainment, and amusement activities--is beyond the scope of this paper and does not circumscribe the concept of play as used here. Play as viewed here is a part of the cultural process and for that reason must have significance in the affairs of a society. A social system's need for social cohesion and social continuity in its quest for perpetuation is best served by the advancement of its cultural traits which help to define its higher goals. Play, a culturally defined process, therefore is important ideologically to the moralizer's desire to see the individual achieve his freedom by regaining control of these more ideal values.

Huizinga's book presents a major attempt to describe the cultural importance of play which he feels operates as a main premise for civilization. He identifies six social manifestations of play to emphasize the fact that all play
means something; all play has a significant function. It is not to be confined only to the activity or material aspects of society:

Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite consciously outside "ordinary" life as being "not serious," but at the same time absorbing the play intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with the material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or other means.82

If play serves as an inherent part of culture, how does Huizinga feel about contemporary use of play in society? He feels that many of these play forms have been lost. Thus we can recognize the familiar moralizer's cry that that which was, is no more. Play provides a sense of contest, of strife, in the cultural process which Huizinga feels has become distorted. The competition of a true play spirit which supports culture is being caught up and diverted into the larger contests of modern society. This can be seen by our growing tensions and ambivalences. For example, the transition of the free voluntary forms of play into the system of organized clubs and matches which serves as the starting point for modern sports means that the proper play spirit is lost in the argument between amateurs and professional,

82Huizinga, op. cit., p. 13.
inferiors and superiors. "Between them they push sport further and further away from the play-sphere proper until it becomes a thing sui generis: neither play nor earnest."\(^{81}\)

This indictment of atrophy of the pure play factor is carried even further in Huizinga's example of non-athletic games such as cards or chess. Bridge has become an earnest game, one in which the modern social techniques dominate the agonistic (contesting) style of the game:

Proficiency at bridge is a sterile experience, sharpening the mental faculties very one-sidedly without enriching the soul in any way, fixing and consuming a quantity of intellectual energy that might have been better applied. The most we can say, I think, is that it might have been applied worse. The status of bridge in modern society would indicate, to all appearances, an immense increase in the play-element to-day. But appearances are deceptive. Really to play, a man must play like a child. Can we assert that this is so in the case of such an ingenious game as bridge? If not, the virtue has gone out of the game.\(^{84}\)

To this atrophy of the play factor is added two other possible misunderstandings which Huizinga labels false play and puerilism. The first uses play forms to cover up some social or political design; the second involves a blend of adolescence and barbarity which has run rampant over much of civilized life recently. The puerilism is seen in the habits of gregariousness, via yells and loud greetings, wearing of political badges and signs, and in a desire for sensationalism through mass meetings and demonstrations, clubs which serve

\(^{81}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 197.\) \(^{84}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 199.\)
as flattering self-love organizations:

We have seen great nations losing every shred of honour, all sense of humour, the very idea of decency and fair play. This is not the place to investigate the causes, growth and extent of this world-wide bastardization of culture; the entry of half-educated masses into the international traffic of the mind, the relaxation of morals and the hypertrophy of technics undoubtedly play a large part.85

Let us go back to Plato's spiritual search for truth, pleads Huizinga. God only is worthy of seriousness. Man, as God's plaything, should seek to live the noble life by playing the noble games which will propitiate the gods and win the contest. Seldom has an ideology been more succinctly stated!

Lee, also identifiable as a moralizer although less an elitist than Huizinga, agrees that play is an important agent in the development of culture; play helps in the transmission of norms, mores, and values and serves as an indicator of the parallel development of social processes. He also offers a list of social manifestations for the play element. However, he disagrees with Huizinga that the traditional play forms atrophy and are smothered by techniques of production and organization. Lee feels that if civilization has been enhanced by the play spirit then it must be expected to continue to offer "new cultural enrichment, new forms of relatedness, to emerge from the new leisure opportunities in American society."86 What are these functions which might

85Ibid., p. 205. 86Lee, op. cit., p. 80.
permit the emergence of a new leisure, a new motivation for play? Lee lists five reasons a man might play: for self-expression and communication; for the sheer joy of play itself; to find a security, to escape reality, or as a substitute for work satisfaction; to fulfill a desire for community; and lastly, to find a sense of wholeness in freedom.87

Both of these cultural moralizers provide the ideological base for play's importance to leisure. Other moralizers perceive play as more of a social than cultural process, primarily available in relation to the work structure of our system. One would expect such a position from a social moralizer such as Eric Larrabee, who supports the idea of the work-play duality in his description of the current scene of hobbies. He feels that now work and play may intermingle, both becoming play and, most important, both aiding the individual to realize himself.

Happy the society, perhaps, whose members can no longer tell their hobbies apart. . . . the use of leisure time is a growing national preoccupation, and the vocabularies of behavior which the hobbyist once had to himself are now widely understood.88

Gregory P. Stone is yet another social moralizer who identifies the changing play spirit as an intermarriage with

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87 Ibid., pp. 81-89; and deGrazia, op. cit., p. 376.
work; one in which play has lost its purity of cultural function. The production and consumption characteristics of various sports are traced in which he sees an unwanted bonding of play and work:

Long pants no longer signify the adult male, and, as the symbols of adulthood are captured by children, youth creeps into middle age—men of 45 are "boys." Women are now engaged in all occupations, and boys and girls enter the schools hand in hand through the same doors. The factory becomes a ranch house; the home, a tool shop. The leisure class that inspired the irony of Veblen has become a leisure mass. Religion embraces science and psychoanalysis, and diverse churches unite in national committees. Increments of pay lure the working man out of the day into the night. Saturday no longer mobilizes the household. All these mitigations of distance are ramified in the world of sports and play. For with the loss of the social frame that once insured their separation, work and play have spilled over their former bounds and mingle together in American life. 89

He feels that this historical tide is not to be reversed. Continued mass growth and consumption of sports is to be expected. However, as a moralizer he ponders "how the spectator becomes caught up in the dignity of the game he witnesses to the extent that his consumership of sport is ennobling rather than debasing." 90

The role of play thus has psychological as well as social importance to these moralizers. Reisman feels this stems from our past ethics about work. Play may prove to be

90 Ibid., p. 263.
the one area where the autonomous individual may reclaim his personal character from the demands of his social character. However, this may be because we know little of man-the-consumer (and/or player); whereas we know considerably more about man-the-producer. Reisman suggests that perhaps "a conspiracy of silence about leisure and play is its best protection."\textsuperscript{91} The "other-directed" person, however, cannot tolerate a lack of sociability. This need leaves him anomie and filled with a sense of boredom. He feels responsible to contribute to the fun of the play-group so he utilizes fixed rituals to guarantee the arrangement and organization of play forms to permit subjective participation for all. Feeling guilty if he does not contribute to the fun of the group, Reisman says the other-directed "needs to learn to distinguish between the loneliness he understandably fears and the privacy he might occasionally choose."\textsuperscript{92}

This fear of loneliness stems from the Great Depression, according to Reisman, when the play opportunities were poorly used and understood. Our continuing preoccupation with work rather than nonwork originated from the experience of this psychological deprivation of the absence of work. Great apprehension abounded about the gain of

\textsuperscript{91}Reisman, The Lonely Crowd, p. 277.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., p. 287.
unoccupied time with no concomittant replacement of a leisure value. Our present understanding of leisure is permeated by this residue left over from this former period of work demands:

Thus it looks as if the task of restoring competence to play is almost, if not quite, as difficult as that of restoring it to work. While a change in income relations, or even in the organization of industry, might make for fairer distribution of leisure and a lessening of guilts, it could not of itself teach men how to play who have historically forgotten how and who have turned the business over to professionals. Are we right, then, in supposing that play offers any easier channels to autonomy than work; are not both equally "alienated."

In summary, one can view the moralizers' concern about consumption and nonwork patterns as an inherent part of leisure achievement. They identify as problems between the individual and society the experiences of idleness, conformity to leisure consumption activity, mass communication methods, and the loss of the pure play form in culture. These are viewed from the position that the individual has relinquished a cherished inner state or has failed to achieve the desired personal freedom because the superordinate goals have been diminished by the dominance of lesser goals. They plead: restore to the individual his right and obligation to make the necessary moral choices in his consuming experiences.

93Ibid., p. 289.
THE POLITICAL AND SPIRITUAL ASPECTS OF LEISURE

At this point it is appropriate to look at how the moralizer perceives the basic nature of man as being relevant to achieving the self-realized personality which leisure activity is supposed to permit and enhance. In addition, the concept of freedom, as it is imbedded in political organization, is pertinent to achieving this desired goal; as is the religious and spiritual emphasis in the social order, which the moralizer sees as necessary to strengthen values at all structural levels--values to serve as effective guides. Throughout this portion of the discussion, it will be apparent that there is vagueness about specific programs to be followed and a great emphasis on ideal factors dealing with morals, values, and beliefs. Most of the values discussed are not empirically traceable in the literature; most of the discussions deal with ends and exclude the means to achieve them.

The Nature of Man

Most of the classical moralizers do not speak directly to this issue of the nature of man. It seems safe to assume that their position would correspond to the elitist concept that only the selected few are able to achieve a fully self-realized personality, and hence leisure. However Clive Bell does express the heart of the classical moralizers' thinking.
Begging the issue entirely he pleads for a return to the type of society exemplified by the ancient Greeks as the only basis for human civilization. Civilization, in order to exist at all, presupposes two groups of men--the leisured-class and the slave-class which is needed to support them. In response to Bell's question as to what form of government would be most favorable to this kind of civilization, he confusedly suggests a combination of oligarchy and democracy:

Human envy and suspicion being what they are, is it conceivable that men should ever support freely, with eyes wide open, for their own spiritual good, but to their material detriment, a privileged group of apparently idle, happy, highly civilized people? Only politicians and police-court magistrates can tell for certain of what human nature is or is not capable; and to them I gladly leave the task. Only this I know: unless men are capable of such enlightened generosity, democracy and civilization are incompatible.94

In the psychological moralizer's view, however, we have little or no idea of whether we can or how we can train people for a life with leisure and as a society we are doing little to become prepared for this new dimension in human existence. Yet we do have reason to rejoice at the upheaval resulting from the breakdown of monolithic dogmatic authoritarianism which has hampered the release of the liberal humanistic nature of man. If this rejoicing is valid it is because the moralizer believes man's basic nature is capable of reaching toward the ideals he sets.

94Bell, Mass Leisure, op. cit., p. 38.
Hugo K. List, when a candidate for the doctor of philosophy degree, wrote that he felt man's nature is neutral, or pre-moral, "as gifted with open potentials and as only temporarily limited by what he is able to perceive and conceptualize and by what his environs are capable of offering and communicating to him." This holistic concept of man's nature views leisure from an existential's perspective in human philosophy. Thus leisure attainment becomes synonymous with self-fulfillment and the state of maximum control over man's total environment. In the process of this self-fulfillment, the individual needs autonomy, freedom, time, activity, and pleasure. Counterfeits to this feeling of competence and control are relief and relaxation.

This psychological approach to leisure is also supported by Paul Weiss, a philosopher who feels that leisure time is available when one has satisfied minimal conditions for his intellectual, spiritual, biological, and emotional demands. These conditions are not actually known and, "because so few people do anything to see to it that they have and use not only a body but a mind, personality, and self as well, comparatively few could be said to have any leisure time at all."  

^95 List, op. cit., p. 60. See also deGrazia, op. cit., p. 9.  

^96 Weiss, op. cit., p. 23.
Taking a quite different psychological position of man's nature, Meerloo feels that man is both a tyrant and a slave: a slave to the outer social system, a tyrant to his inner destructive, aggressive drives and will for power. Technology champions the slave response; the passive, submitting response. Man needs challenge and self-assertion to become a person. The basis for the development of our valued cultural patterns is this ability to utilize man's aggressiveness toward constructive goals, such as channeling the child's undirected activity into play or sports. Our technologically-oriented society offers us more ease and luxury yet does not provide the needed challenge and resistance which are important to the development of healthy egos. "Higher goals can only be attained via effort and pain." 97

Obviously these moralizers view man as an entity for whom the best psychological environment should exist in order to achieve his greatest natural potential. Reisman, the social moralizer, also seeks this end. He believes man's nature is capable of reaching this goal of individual autonomy, but a greater surge of creative, utopian thinking will be required. The sense of uprootedness which occurs in autonomous behavior tends to be avoided by many because character-structure formation is more tenacious than social-structure formation. Over-conformity is often a response to

this tenacity, but leisure offers more varieties of attitudes than other social avenues to alter character-formation. He suggests that because much of this is mysterious and unmeasurable Americans might be able to become more aware of their own feelings and aspirations if

the enormous potentialities for diversity in nature's bounty and men’s capacity to differentiate their experience can become valued by the individual himself, so that he will not be tempted and coerced into adjustment or, failing adjustment, into anomie. The idea that men are created free and equal is both true and misleading: men are created different; they lose their social freedom and their individual autonomy in seeking to become like each other.98

Political Involvement

Two political ideals which the moralizer wants strengthened are freedom and individual respect. If man’s nature encourages the best possible leisure state then he will devise a political structure to accommodate this. Can the democratic process as presently conceived permit access to the real leisure state? Two moralizers view this question from opposing positions.

deGrazia, the classicist, fearing that the ideal of leisure might be mistaken for free time and swallowed up on the opposition to work, again stresses the fact that we have historically valued the "good life." He feels that political activity denies this goal. Design on the world, intent to

alter the situation, results in only a partial perspective and a weakened pursuit for truth. The applied scientific method of "theory-plus-practice looks on man and earth as malleable objects, whereas the theory of knowledge for its own sake has no such intent."\textsuperscript{99} The ideal of leisure is to be able to achieve serenity in order to clear the path to truth, to be able to detach oneself from the everyday necessities. Leisure's gift to science therefore comes from the divorcement of life's necessities. "The idea of freedom from necessity or of 'for its own sake' implies no purpose, exploitive or utilitarian or otherwise on objects or persons in sight."\textsuperscript{100}

If freedom is a major benefit of leisure it can only occur in the absence of necessity. Our democratic system is not prepared to offer this kind of freedom because we still believe it is a luxury. We are not ready, says deGrazia, to give the masses the same sense of freedom from necessity and so are not ready to give them the possibility of cultivating their minds, of being sensitive to inspiration and beauty. Therefore he feels that:

In this contemporary view the life of leisure is antidemocratic, antisocial, against organization, opposed to work and to most of the things men work for and indifferent to home, Mother, and perhaps even country.

The life of leisure cannot be justified to the state and

\textsuperscript{99}deGrazia, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 421. \textsuperscript{100}Ibid.
perhaps also, it has exaggerated its independence of the state. It still makes little difference. If it could be justified in terms of the state, then we could speak of its function. If we could do this, the life of leisure would no longer be free. It would have a determined relation to the state. It would become a state functionary. The same subservience would strain leisure were it to be justified in terms of any other society. Should it be possible to confine philosophers and artists in a retreat and say to them, Produce? The life of leisure may accomplish many things; it can promise nothing. Freedom, truth, and beauty are its religion. Let those who will go whoring after commodities and money, fame, wars, and power, too.101

This extreme view which several of the classical moralizers take, based on their allegiance to the Platonic search for absolute truth, is contrary to other moralizers who view democracy as the best hope for leisure achievement. Meerloo ably describes how the democratic value of freedom and respect for the individual operate to enhance leisure's quality. He contrasts these democratic goals to the Oriental's primary goal of freedom from physical want. Leisure, in the Western concept of freedom, means being allowed not to be occupied in duties. "Democracy appeals only to the adult side of man; fascism and totalitarianism tempt his infantile desires."102 Leisure, then, as a basic component of our democratic society, requires man to exercise his freedom of choice. Both groups of moralizers remain committed to the concept that individual freedom and choice

101 Ibid., pp. 431-32.
must be intrinsically a part of any real leisure goal in any political setting.

**Religious Emphasis**

Many moralizers emphasize the superordinate goals found in spiritual or formal religious activity as an integral part of the leisure experience. These essentially form the group identified as cultural moralizers. Their sense of strain derives from the perceived loss of cherished spiritual ends by the individual as he gains the opportunity to successfully achieve the leisure state.

Huizinga, tracing the historical development of play in culture, emphasizes its relationship to the nature and origin of religious concepts. Play is *inextricably bound* to the moral commitment of an individual, which includes his awareness of the purposiveness of life. One must discriminate between beneficial pursuits and those which devalue the individual. The development of helpful pursuits becomes an individual religious act which can be related to the play form basic to all cultures. Religious representation in play form is traced to the sacred performances of ancient groups; to the function of the ritual which helps the worshipper to participate in the sacred event; to the use of feasts and festivals as sheer play forms of religious celebration; to the development of the myth or the sacred symbolism between two things of different kinds, such as his example of the
dance in which the savage becomes the kangaroo and the distinction between knowing or belief and make-believe merge; to modern man's involvement with the mask and disguise which carries one beyond ordinary existence into a purely aesthetic experience. Huizinga adopts this religious expression for play and hence for leisure as well:

Play, consecrated to the Deity, the highest goal of man's endeavour—such was Plato's conception of religion. In following him we in no way abandon the holy mystery, or cease to rate it as the highest attainable expression of that which escapes logical understanding.103

The ritual act remains the act of sacred play.

The importance of the formal religious act inherent to leisure is of prime concern to these moralizers. Lee's writing most effectively establishes the view that, although we have attained via science a vast degree of control over our natural world and eliminated much superstition and fear, we are nevertheless concerned with the basic mystery of where we came from and where we are going. Trying to resolve this question by rational means has left us anxious and without the sense of wonderment. Therefore the evolution of "holy days," ritualistic celebrations, are important in our modern concept of religion. Holidays have become only time free from work. Lee suggests that we should seek a better understanding of the origin and meaning of these holy days and

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103 Huizinga, op. cit., p. 27. See also Pieper, op. cit., p. 59.
festival behavior. By providing a conscious link with our past the desired joy, self-awareness and wholeness of life might provide

times for re-affirmation of meanings and rededication to future actions and motivations. In short, if we blow a fresh breath of life into our holidays and festivals, the historical tap root of leisure, they can become for us sources of true leisure.\textsuperscript{104}

degrazia essentially agrees and consistently has attempted to place leisure \underline{above} the social institutions of our society. He is concerned that dedication to both political and religious values is declining as new demands are made for more free time. He is apprehensive that the expression of leisure in formal religious experience is giving way to a pluralism in which no one component of society, such as the church, has any greater claim on the individual than another. This leaves the striving for leisure subject to all pressure groups, particularly the commercial interests. Religious dedication is declining. Hedonism is gaining: "In this life happiness is possible (no religion says this). In the next life, oblivion."\textsuperscript{105}

degrazia hopes that leisurists will be permitted to help our society learn about itself and its politics in relation to the ideal of freedom. But this is a limited

\textsuperscript{104}Lee, op. cit., p. 192. See also degrazia, op. cit., p. 435.

\textsuperscript{105}degrazia, \textit{ibid.}, p. 160.
perspective with boundaries established by the state. He believes:

A man can hope for more, that through leisure he may realize his ties to the natural world and so free his mind to rise to divine reaches. Man's recognition of himself and his politics in the universe is essentially a religious discovery. It transcends politics.¹⁰⁶

In summary it must be recognized that although the challenge for individual moral commitment is urgently stressed, these moralizers seldom make reference to specific programs. This is consistent with the moralizers' wish to reestablish the "higher" goals which are readily verbalized but difficult to study empirically.

SUMMARY OF THE MORALIZERS' GOALS

One of the oldest rules of political science holds that men come together to keep alive; they stay together to live a good life. In this country men have refused to budge from the first stage; they have acted as if there were a wilderness yet to conquer, some great work to do, that keeps them from the second stage. What is this great work? The frontier ended with the 20th century, and the wilderness long before.¹⁰⁷

This statement poses the question about the future of leisure for the moralizer. A society cultivates what it honors. When our nation was expanding there was little spare time and so leisure had little opportunity for development. Now that expansion has diminished it is possible for an era of cultivation and refinement to ensue. The liberal arts and

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 434. ¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 5.
pure sciences, whose goals like leisure pursue beauty and wonder, may be able to flourish in the absence of national expansion.108

Meerloo, particularly, suggests that this opportunity is available only during the peaceful periods of the nation's history. It is necessary during these "breathing spells" to install the desired ideals. If this is not accomplished at these periods new forms of terror may allow the people to surrender or lower their critical barriers. The contemporary system of communication, as seen by

the overflow of words and ideas that threaten to drown us, drugs which prolong life span and lure us into passivity; mental manipulation by advertising and propaganda; and the extreme methods of brainwashing, genocide and mentocide--to these man is only a robot.109

How might this yearning for the individual to find his fullest expression of freedom occur? To review the ideological framework of this position one finds the stress placed on strengthening the values, the vague ideal factors which appeal to one's "higher" sights. The commitment to the goals, rather than emphasizing the means to achieve them, is to be kept constantly in blazing lights. In addition the individual is the agent to accomplish these goals; his self-fulfillment is a basic requirement to establish the ideal conditions for a leisure society. So the moralizer requires

an emphasis on the abstract personal behavioral needs. This is often stated as the need to live a "meaningful" life which consists of experiencing a sense of completion of a goal. These experiences of fulfillment are viewed as answers to abstract needs, hopes, and expectations of the individual.

The moralizers suggest several areas which the individual might pursue to reestablish or alter his values in the search for leisure. Education certainly is touted by almost all. (It serves as the great panacea for both ideological camps.) Religion necessarily carries importance for the moralizer because its abstract, non-empirical aims support the moralistic bent of these leisurists. The work experience cannot be avoided for long by leisurists. Its changing norms reflect and will be reflected by leisurists; especially the moralizer, whose orientation to superordinate ends causes him to be anxious lest the unnecessary or already accomplished production goals will stamp out the individual's capacity to reach higher.

Education

As suggested, education is advanced as a primary hope for both ideological camps. The moralizer wishes this experience to be aimed very perceptively toward the individual. Lee, for example, feels that, "As plays the child, so lives the adult."\(^{110}\) Therefore teach him attitudes which lead to

\(^{110}\)Lee, op. cit., p. 104.
full and creative imaginative use of time. Be less concerned with scheduling activities and behavior. List specifically requests an anticipatory and optimistic environment so that the person who emerges will be his desired "democratic" character.

The leisure hypothesis, as applied to education, suggests that the impulse toward self-achievement is congenital and needs only sensitive guidance and a helpful atmosphere to actualize its emergence.\textsuperscript{111} The personality to emerge will have a desire to effect the long-range objectives of the social institutions and those others for whom this perception is permitted to incorporate. The person will come to govern himself internally and thus avoid becoming dependent on the external social system.

Weiss feels we must use some of our increased leisure time to accomplish this task of making leisure more effective. "The awareness, for example, that men's interests need awakening, refinement, expansion, and direction points up the necessity for an education program."\textsuperscript{112} On the other hand Fabun says we have no real concept of how to train for a leisure life. We are not even sure if people are able to accept this style of living. He sees the pluralistic diversity of values as the best hope to find new aesthetic values and relationships between men.

\textsuperscript{111}List, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{112}Weiss, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25.
These moralizers consistently present these goals of leisure education in abstraction. Only Lynes' suggestion for the dilettante offers a specific course of action in formal education, but this semi-elitist position is not supported by most moralizers and certainly by no other democrats:

Our most effective know-how has been in the production of leisure, a commodity filled with promise and booby traps. It is the engineer with his slide rule who knows how to produce leisure, but it is the dilettante who knows how to use it and make it productive.

It will be as dilettantes and consumers that we will, in the long run, determine the quality of our culture. We will determine not only the gadgets of our civilization but the fate of its art as well. We will determine whether the pursuit of happiness has, after all, been worth it.\footnote{Lynes, Mass Leisure, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 353.}

Even Reisman finds that secondary and university education lack organizational form "which would permit the channeling of our surplus in ways which would improve the quality and texture of daily life."\footnote{Reisman, \textit{Abundance for What?} p. 172.} However in a later paper he feels that many of our best college students use leisure admirably by involving themselves with concern in current issues, in music, drama, art, and literature. These college students, representing the democratically-oriented citizen, may develop the necessary synthesis between work and leisure, between the individual and the social system to
achieve the desired aim. But again is heard the bleating call of vague hopes, clouded designs and ambiguous methods which "education" is supposed to offer the individual.

**Religion**

Religion's importance to leisure, having been established, needs only to be reinforced in the future, according to the moralizer. Pieper, the classicist, for example, finds the combination of religion and education as the essence of leisure's future. The original source for Pieper is the ancient Greek "schole."

Lee emphasizes a needed psychological reformation: a new statement of purposes and ideals of what has value, based on a spiritual experience in which personal change in attitude and individual reevaluation occurs. "Be still, and know that I am God," from Psalm 46:10, serves as Lee's concluding statement about the future need for man's highest attainment:

Surely the work/leisure rhythm is one where new values must be realized; the perception of what is important in life is another; what it means to "be still" is yet another. . . . We must learn that man is a player who renews his strength by waiting upon the Lord.115

In chorus with Lee, Huizinga, to the question of what is the right way of living, responds, "The human mind can

only disengage itself from the magic circle of play by
turning towards the ultimate. Logical thinking does not go
far enough.\textsuperscript{116} At the bottom of all serious searching
remains an unanswerable problem. It is in this sense that
Huizinga says, "All is play," because it is as this point
that logic ceases:

One drop of pity is enough to lift our doing beyond
intellectual distinctions. Springing as it does from a
belief in justice and divine grace, conscience, which
is moral awareness, will always whelm the question that
eludes and deludes us to the end, into a lasting
silence.\textsuperscript{117}

Work

Our valuations toward work must change to make leisure
possible, insist the moralizers. We have the economic sur-
plus; we must cultivate the system so as to be able to relin-
quish the concept of work as the dominant worth for a man.
With the goal of leisure, work "becomes prostitution, the
bending of mind and money for hire." deGrazia urges one to
abandon this work-nonwork ethic:

Work, we know, may make a man stoop-shouldered or
rich. It may even ennoble him. Leisure perfects him.
For those who do like that future, the next thing is to
lean back under a tree, put your arms behind your head,
wonder at the pass we've come to, smile, and remember
that the beginnings and ends of man's every great
enterprise are untidy.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116}Huizinga, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 212. \textsuperscript{117}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{118}deGrazia, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 387.
Greenberg, certainly no classicist, nevertheless corroborates this attitude that work has a limited relation to human freedom. He feels that if man is to continue expanding his potential and discovering his historical possibilities he will have to gain mastery over his work, particularly industrialism which has imposed work on everyone:

Five thousand years of urban history have gradually separated these activities, with their implicit ends, and sealed them off from each other, so that we at last have art (or culture) for its own sake, religion for the sake of things knowable only outside life (or, like art to some degree, for the sake pure and simple of states of mind), and work for the sake of exclusively practical, "objective" aims. The problem now is to restore intimate relations between the three, or--with religion, as I think, ruling itself out as a social form--between the two. For if culture cannot again be closely related to work, it cannot be related closely enough to that reality which has again become fundamental for all of society.119

Reisman advances this position also by attempting to correlate work to leisure on a more co-equal basis. He eventually amends the position taken in The Lonely Crowd that leisure will reverse the trend toward automation and achieve a more meaningful existence. Unceasing additions of leisure, he has concluded, could become oversatiating.120 He doubts whether we can provide an "infinitely expandable package deal" for the satisfying expenditure of time and energy and for the attainment of an adequate personal identity: "The

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120 Reisman, Abundance for What? p. 159.
future seems 'impossible,' whichever way we look at it. Leisure marches on, while the understanding of its impact escapes these reporters, and invention and design of its opportunities escape all of us."\textsuperscript{121}

In a collaborated article with Robert A. Weiss, Reisman has tried to advance the changing issues of leisure's future. Recognizing the problem of increased amounts of leisure for the industrial worker, who because he is unprepared will experience aimlessness, they ask what sort of adult education should be utilized, what sort of changed perspective of both his work and himself are needed, in order to achieve the greater goal of individual development? If leisure is supposed to be informal, spontaneous, and unplanned and unobligated time, then any movement towards planning represents a reversal toward these unfettered goals. On one hand, Reisman and Weiss feel that this planning tends to "overideologize particular leisure-time activities, exaggerating their importance and their potential contribution to individual character and the fabric of society."\textsuperscript{122} On the other hand, just a short time later they feel that:

When we confront such problems, we are inclined to think that significant changes in the organization of leisure are not likely to come in the absence of changes in the whole society: in its work, its political forms, and its cultural style.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., p. 153.\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., p. 180.\textsuperscript{123}Ibid.
In other words, they recognize the paradox of trying to plan for what should be an uncommitted part of life. This closely effects the different class strata. The middle-class ideology opposes too much planning by others and would oppose a government-sponsored program for leisure which the industrial worker would accept. But the working class would oppose too much planning for self-expression. The authors feel obliged to suggest that there are many variations possible which, if we could become aware of the pleasing qualities of our modern existence, would permit a greatly varied and individual latitude of planning. "Very likely, people have different rhythms or personal 'seasons' of work and nonwork which they should learn early in life and to which they should seek to adapt their careers."¹²⁴ Leisure can be packaged in many ways, such as delayed entrance into the labor force, shorter work days, commitment to voluntary organizations, more time spent at home, longer weekends or vacations, alterations of educational periods with work periods, new occupations, or early partial retirement. These suggestions represent a distinct shift from Reisman's earlier contention that leisure will be the single best answer to the alienation from technology. But his adherence to the moralizer's goal of permitting the individual to determine the ways to reach the

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 183.
objective of self-fulfillment through leisure experience is in no way jeopardized.

Each of these moralizers, from the extreme classicist to the psychologically oriented theorist, to the socially structured exponent, feels the future must provide means for the individual to gain, or regain, control of important ideal goals. These higher values must first be thrust upon the individual and wrested away from the group. Only then might the individual and the society experience a new growth and added insight into how to relieve the existent strain between the two. The "how" is left for the individual to ascertain for himself.
CHAPTER III

THE REFORMER

INTRODUCTION

The Reformer's Position

To the reformer ideology is seen as a process of interpreting, selectively, a particular idea of what society should become. This conception of "ought to be" involves the resolution between the values of society and the conditions presently existing; a resolution of the "strain" which has developed. The reformer, the person Winston White calls the "social structure-oriented" ideologist, feels that strain is the result of social conditions which need reforming.

The reformer does not feel that the values of the system are the basis for concern. Given the proper social conditions, man is essentially good. For example, the economic institution, the political institution, bureaucracy, or the mass culture syndrome are so overpowering to the individual that they shape or mold his entire outlook toward his environment. There is too much control over man because the ends which man desires are subverted by the means being used by the social system. To use White's explanation, man has arrived at a state of purposelessness in life; "... this purposelessness has come about because means have
become dissociated, or alienated from ends and, in the process, have displaced them.\footnote{1}

The key concept for this reform ideology is alienation, the loss of personal identity, as it is for the moralizer. The moralizer sees alienation as the result of interference with the on-going social processes or disintegration of the structural units which give the individual a sense of identity via his ability to understand what is expected behavior. When these processes, such as labor, personal relationships, use of property, and political concern, become disrupted the individual suffers a loss of identity. For example, C. Wright Mills describes the breakdown of the former property value. Property, which was independently owned and democratically operated by the owner, has given way to the class property or managed property which others are hired to operate. \footnote{2} "... the owner manages the working life of the non-owner. Democratic property means that, in order to live, man must submit to the authority which property lends its owner."

White suggests several explanations for this strain between means and ends which causes alienation for the


\footnote{2}{C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 114.}
individual. The economic factors of production and consumption effect the choices available to the individual. They operate to force one to consume the products of the over-abundant economy. The society has become so efficient that the individual is dulled from recognizing that within the economic structure production becomes the end in itself. It no longer serves the individual but is served by the individual. This structural control of production and consumption is not seen by the reformer to exist because of individual weakness, as the moralizer conceives it. Instead it represents the victimization of the individual. To Herbert Marcuse this becomes an even more advanced state of alienation which is related to the whole system:

In a provocative form, this proposition reveals the political aspects of the prevailing technological rationality. The productive apparatus and the goods and services which it produces "sell" or impose the social system as a whole. The means of transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with the prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers, and through the latter to the whole. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a way of life. It is a good way of life—much better than before—and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas, aspiration, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. They are
redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension.3

Freedom is curtailed by the modern industrial society in which the technological instruments become ends in themselves and limit the possibility of the choices available to individual man. The status quo of this growing production of technology and science in our industrial society becomes the desired end; one which closes the system against alternatives and becomes static.

Concurring with Marcuse about the stalemated position of the economic conditions, John Kenneth Galbraith feels that having advanced beyond the era of "poverty, inequality, and economic peril of the past," we have failed to replace an inadequate economic theory with one which places a lesser importance on production. An affluent society, having choice, should adjust its social policy so as to remove the existent poverty instead of merely adjusting to it. He assumes the reformer's position that we have failed to secure for all the minimum income needed for decency and compassion when the means are available.4

Another source of strain for the reformer resides in the political features of bureaucracy and industrialism,

3Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Reason Press, 1964), pp. 11-12.

according to Winston White. These involve the questions of power and authority. Alienation occurs because these large-scale organizations take from the individual the power to choose what he wants for himself. The greater the degree of organization at society's level the less the range of individual freedom of choice and opportunity to exercise personal control. In addition, the power source becomes anonymous. In the present impersonal and anonymous system of control such concrete, specific responses are no longer possible, resulting in anxiety and tension for the individual.

C. W. Mills describes the feeling of impotency or manipulation which results:

Manipulation as we have suggested, arises when there is a centralization of power that is not publically justified and those who have it don't believe they could justify it. Manipulation feeds upon and is fed by mass indifference. . . . And so insecurity and striving are not attached to political symbols, but are drained off by the distractions of amusement, the frenzied search for commodities, or turned in upon the self as busy little frustrations.5

The last source of strain involves the reformer's focus on the lowered quality of standards which are offered the masses by high-pressured techniques. "Mass culture is the result of the loss of consumer sovereignty: the masses do not get what they want but are 'oversold.'"6 As consumers they are controlled by either the producers of mass culture,

6White, op. cit., p. 63.
represented by Madison Avenue, or by the nature of the intricacies of the economic market itself to which they feel impotent. In contrast to the moralizers' approach to mass culture, the reformers feel that the masses have the capacity to know and strive for the proper standards for our society but are thwarted by the external conditions of the society itself. When power is transferred from the individual to the system the individual becomes a commodity in the economic-political arena. He is sold to the market of interpersonal relationships just as much as he has been sold to the economic market as the result of advanced division of labor. Man has thus become a conformer because he is powerless to resist the social condition of bureaucratic enslavement. The individual is unable to continue the needed self-evaluation. He experiences the sense of alienation as his personality is swallowed up in the mass culture:

At the level of society, the alleged priority given to productivity and organization detracts from the emphasis on human needs; the "system" ("everything is just too big these days") is running along--if not running away--on its own standards at the expense of individual decision (the more "system," the less individual autonomy).7

The resultant strain is seen by the reformer as a failure of past social conditions to make possible the desired future goals. The paramount focus is upon the "hard

7Galbraith, op. cit., p. 14.
realities" of the given situation which are in need of reform to accomplish the desired values. The existing social structures prevent society's members from attaining the "good life." The cure is seen to be possible via the method of dedifferentiation which should reduce the alienating effects. That is, power should be restored to each man by involving all in joint decision-making, especially in politics and economics. The sense of community, now lost, will be restored because each individual will participate both physically and intellectually and the anonymous authority of the social structure will be diminished or cease to exist.

Reformers of Leisure

The foregoing explanation offers the basic ideological premises for the reformer. The leisure reformer utilizes this framework with some individual alterations as he considers the problem of leisure today. This group is essentially divided into two camps which for clarity will be identified as the extremists and the moderates.

The extreme reformer primarily is desirous of involving the political institutions to a greater degree in leisure pursuit, to the end that the sense of communal ties which are important to the individual's need for belongingness and identity may be restored. The source of guidance, so often lost in the alienated, anonymous, and impersonal bureaucratized social system, can best be regained via
changes in the political structures. For instance, the needed personnel to achieve leisure in political spheres will consist of many diversely trained persons whose combined efforts will afford more democratic solutions to leisure living. In this way the political structures will more effectively respond to the individual's growing opportunity for leisure experience. In addition, hindrances from external forces, such as urbanization and unemployment, may more adequately be diminished and/or controlled when properly planned leisure programs are instituted. Finally, the individual's ability to enhance the meaning of his existence will be best abetted when various institutional means are altered, ultimately allowing needed change in the institutional goals to permit the augmentation of personal leisure experience.

Family, community resources, education, and recreation are some of those institutions whose goals will profit when their means become altered in leisure existence.

The reformers designated here as extremists are Nels Anderson, professor of education and head of the Department of Occupational Information and Guidance at the North Carolina State University; Charles K. Brightbill, late professor and dean of the Department of Recreation and Municipal Park Administration, University of Illinois; Marion Clawson, Director of the Land Use and Management Program, Resources for the Future, Inc., and formerly with the Department of Agriculture;
James C. Charlesworth, Professor of Political Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Parks Association; Paul F. Douglass, former president of American University and presently Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Practical Politics at Rollins College; Robert W. Crawford, Commissioner of Recreation, Philadelphia, and formerly of Oakland; Martin H. Neumeyer, Professor of Sociology, University of Southern California, and his wife, Esther S. Neumeyer; Jay B. Nash, Chairman of the Department of Physical Education, Health and Recreation, New York University; Norman P. Miller, Professor at the University of California at Los Angeles; and Duane M. Robinson, Professor at George Williams College. As may be noted, many of these leisure reformers are involved in the formalized recreation institutions and others have had direct relationship with political structures.

The second group, the moderates, are so labeled because, although they are structure-oriented, they present a less distinct commitment to the political processes. To the moderates man's alienation via the economic process prevents the enjoyment of his fruitful capacity. They wish to make work more pleasant and individual, to lessen its centrality and dominance of individual's needs by increasing the importance of leisure experience both within and without the work experience. Conformity, a major concern in all
ideology of leisure, is viewed by this moderate group as being compulsively forced on the individual. One's role as wife, worker, spectator, or child is formed by the norms which the institutions require for expected behavior. These become the concepts needing study and redefinition to relieve the strain which has developed because of social conditions. This group would restore the individual's control through joint participation in leisure activity, and through education to make one more aware of the operation of the institutional process and his role in it so that he would be freer to make his choices or alter the structures in leisure attain-ment. The reformers representing these wider, less restrict-ive views include Max Kaplan, a former professor in both music and sociology at the University of Illinois, who created and directed the Arts Center of the School of Fine and Applied Arts at Boston University, and is currently a full-time lecturer, writer, and consultant; Bennett Berger, chairman of the Department of Sociology, University of California at Davis; Kenneth Robie Kimball, whose dissertation for the Doctor of Education from State University of New York at Albany attempts to describe leisure as a new and dominantly-emerging institution; John Kenneth Galbraith, noted Professor of Economics at Harvard; Robert Dubin, sociologist and Pro-fessor of Social Research, Oregon University; Lawrence Lee Suhm, whose Ph.D. dissertation from the University of
Wisconsin studies the economic and social implications of mass leisure in South America; Margaret Mead, noted American anthropologist; Harvey Swados, novelist-writer and currently teaching professor at Sarah Lawrence College; and Alfred C. Clarke, professor of Sociology at Ohio State University.

As with the moralizers, the reformers should not be rigidly confined to either described group. For example, Kaplan's most comprehensive study, of major importance to the sociology of leisure, views the wide spectrum of the social system's processes involving leisure and Nels Anderson's commitment to the importance of the political process does not prevent his exploration of other major social structures needing reform beyond their political implications.

Finally, as with the moralizers, so also do the reformers deal with simpler concepts which pertain to their approach to definitions and explanations of the problem. These concepts will be identified as time, its quantitative dimensions and uses; the role of work and its relationship to prestige and status needs; urbanism and its resultant sophistication, anonymity, challenges of mobility and programmed recreation; the social implications involving the family, community responses and political behavior which organize a hierarchy of values and solutions for leisure behavior; and lastly, what the reformers want planned by the
existing social structures to achieve a better leisure state in the future. These ideas will be examined from the view of each reform group which should help to clarify the ideological premises involved.

TIME

The leisure reformer, like the moralizer, addresses himself to the concept of time. To him the leisure experience is primarily quantitative. Although he is concerned about the aesthetic qualities of time use, he is essentially preoccupied with how the society measures time to achieve its goals. For example, Kenneth R. Kimball, Jr., (a moderate) feels that the change in time use has and will cause changes in the relationship of work and play in our culture. He defines leisure as time not gainfully employed and not engaged in obligated duties such as eating, sleeping, etc. It is "unmortgaged" time. 8 Time represents a segment of life's experience which, if used efficiently, releases the individual from work to leisure. Nels Anderson (an extremist) succinctly draws this juxtaposition when he says, "We sell time so that time not sold may be used as we like. We find

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that production and consumption are opposite uses of time and in both kinds of activity time may be measured in money values."\(^9\)

**Time Dimensions**

Our attitude toward time will obviously influence its role in leisure. The extremist's concern about changing the social structures views the time concept as essential to the prevailing importance of the work process. Because modern man is success-driven and progress-oriented, both positive value concepts to Nels Anderson, he must receive more value out of time as well as more production out of work. Anderson feels that modern workers are showing this capacity to satisfy the work demands of management while at the same time feeling "in command of their own time outside."\(^10\) This reformer maintains the attitude that the individual is not sacrificing his values to the system; a far cry from the moralizer's view!

However, Anderson also recognizes the compelling quality of mechanical time in our modern, industrial, urban society. He is concerned about the compulsion to be time-bound even on vacation, thinking and acting in precise time segments and always wearing a watch "as he must, for all others do the same."\(^11\) The first sign of conformity's evil

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\(^10\)Ibid., p. 74.

\(^11\)Ibid., p. 55.
force is raised, but unlike the moralizer Anderson feels the individual is compelled to submit to the clock instead of "going soft."

This importance of conformity to time in all spheres of social living is reiterated by Marion Clawson who presents the extreme view that conformity can be made helpful by involving the political structures nationally to relieve the alienation found in unbounded use of time. He calls leisure "choosing time," because it affords greater choice of action than time required for subsistence. This opportunity for individual expression, however, presupposes a society which is highly organized. Much of a person's leisure activity, such as T-V programing, education and work hours, and recreational facilities, are operated and determined by the timing of diverse social organization.12

Clawson, following the extreme position that political institutions should be more involved in leisure pursuit, feels that because this "choosing time" often results in a state of anonymity, freedom, and nonconformity, social control mechanisms are more important and necessary today than before.13 He takes the definite position that we should

13 Ibid., p. 16.
become concerned on a national level with time—it will become a more important resource and vital element than money in our future economy. Therefore, to this extremist reformer, the role of time should be the major responsibility of the social structures, most especially the political institution, in order to accomplish the growing opportunity for leisure.

This position was also taken by the extremist Charles K. Brightbill who felt that those in society who have accumulated some wealth and time should give direction to the greater and deeper goals of our society. In suggesting this solution he recognized the importance of nonwork activity to our total economy and the increasing importance of the leisure market. This attitude stems from the definition of leisure as the opposite side of the time-work concept: "Perhaps the best we can say is that time which does not need to be spent in accumulating wealth is available as leisure." Time in this sense becomes the quantitative tool of leisure to be utilized as social organization requires.

The more moderate position of the reformers views time as one of man's tool inventions which becomes a part of the larger culture. Its uses and meanings become important to the activities of that culture. Because leisure attitudes are closely related to the culture, time becomes

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a basic tool as well of the culture in which it functions. For example, Max Kaplan (a moderate) feels that in addition to our interest in the manipulator of leisure, as seen in the organizer and professional leader and salesman, we should include also the consumer and the user of time who is also a complicated man for whom generalizations may not apply; he, too, is necessarily tied in his outlook on time and its uses to the social controls of family, education, mental and emotional disposition, income, place of residence, health, age . . .

L. L. Suhtm's study provides an important insight into this larger cultural implication of time, which as a moderate reformer he hopes will usefully permit our society to experience leisure in greater depth. He feels that our North American culture has been so preoccupied with the quantitative aspects of leisure, dealing with free time from work, etc., that the study of the qualitative aspects have been hindered or nonexistent. These qualitative aspects exist in all segments of life; no one has total leisure but no one is without some leisure. This became apparent to him in his study of the Latin Americans' preoccupation with leisure value in opposition to work values. Their strong value orientation toward leisure should help us realize that the degree of freedom from externally-imposed obligations on time is provided by the individual perception and hence complete

\[\text{15Max Kaplan, } \text{Leisure in America} \text{ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 13.}\]
scientific objectivity in the study of leisure is impossible. "The degree of leisure depends upon the degree of control individuals are able to exert over the uses of their own time and energy, the two resources of which all people everywhere are possessed."16 He hopes that this type of cross-cultural study of leisure will help our own cultural studies to be freed of the cultural norms.

The Significance of Time Use

Employing the reformers' overall definition of leisure as a component part of the time element in man's culture, it is easy to stipulate the uses of time for leisure activities. Modern time is concretely measurable in economic living as well as in the obligated and non-obligated segments unrelated to work. As Nels Anderson has said, natural time has been replaced by mechanical time in the modern urban industrial society. The effectiveness of time use in the work world, plus automation, has forced industry itself to accept and adjust to gains in leisure time. "Unwittingly industry, in adapting itself, contributes to a new conception of time use . . . "17 Industry finds that its increased efficiency capacity in work offers new leisure outside work but also


17Anderson, op. cit., p. 67.
offers leisure within the work arena. Witness the increased facilities for meetings and food consumption, the encouraged intergroup social communication systems which include extracurricular sports, games and clubs sponsored by the industry.

A second and more important aspect of time use for leisure deals with the obligatory segments, other than work, of man's life. The moralizer feels that the aesthetic perception of this part of existence will determine its value to the individual. The reformer is more concerned with how the social process might utilize this segment of time for the improvement of society's goals. Anderson feels that too many have been overconcerned about people receiving more leisure than they know how to use properly. He feels that this concern (primarily that of the moralizers) overlooks the amount of nonwork and non-leisure demands made on most people's time. It is in this sphere of time that the major portion of social integration occurs. "In the performance of his obligations the individual is integrated into family life, group life and into the life of the community, participating variously in the community with interest."18 His summary position states that adults today are under the greatest pressure from obligatory time segments other than work, not from leisure time segments:

18 Ibid., p. 41.
It seems that the better-adjusted and the more socially-integrated the individual becomes the less his central, life-satisfying interests are identified with leisure. He may spend more time on his family, social, community, and other obligations than on his work. Some leisure may afford diversion, but it does not constitute a central life interest.19

And so this leisure area of one's life should constitute the major emphasis for achieving the goals which society desires as a result of time changes, according to this reformer.

Thirdly, when examining the non-obligated sections of modern time experience, the reformer is primarily preoccupied with its quantitative availability, rather than its aesthetic qualities which engross the moralizer's concern. The reform position is more likely to be similar to that of the Fortune editors mentioned earlier—that time more than income may limit the future potential for leisure.20 Marion Clawson is an example of such a position. He breaks down the uses of leisure into daily use, a weekly pattern, vacation time, and the variations available to different age groups. He predicts an increase in leisure time primarily because of the increased number of people in our nation, their age differentials, and positions in the life cycle. For example, there will be many more young and old who will require

19 Ibid., p. 258.
leisure in greater amount and variety. There will be greater choice also in the length of the work-week based on group decision. In conjunction with the possible varieties of work time comes the possible varieties of leisure size and timing. Clawson feels that increased daily leisure would be wasted in the total accounting of the individual's year. To increase leisure time in large packages will necessarily be reflected in the community and business world, as well as education and recreational worlds. However, the most important concern for Clawson is that time will become more important to man's leisure activities than money. Barring any major catastrophe, income levels will continue to rise but economic growth will not increase the total time available. As an extremist concerned with the status of the social structure he has been concerned for a long time with the national income as measured in money and asks: "... should we not now become equally concerned with national time, measured as a resource and as the vital ingredient of life."\(^2\)

The moderate position among reformers, which is more concerned with the quality of this increased segment of man's existence, is best depicted by an early study of leisure done in the 1930s. This study apparently represents a major landmark in leisure concern. It was an attempt to explore the

\(^2\)Clawson, op. cit., p. 20.
change in leisure value as a result of masses of people obtaining greater amounts of free time via union benefits, an increase of workers' spending power, and the breakdown of exclusiveness for a leisured few. The authors explained that the distribution of time expenditure is as important to the analysis of the social pattern of the group and its well-being as is the distribution of the money pattern:

The justification for such study is found in one of the most general and deep-seated beliefs of the race, namely, the conviction that the main satisfactions of life are to be found in the time and the activities which remain when work, .. sleep, and the activities necessarily incidental thereto are done. On the basis of this axiom, implicit in the behavior of people themselves, questions of the social well-being of groups must ultimately be measured largely in terms of the amount of leisure which they have and the uses they make of it. 22

In their summary they stress the significance of finding not only how much time is spent in leisure activities but the variations found in the qualitative uses of the eight types of leisure-time activities tabulated: eating, visiting, reading, public entertainment, sports, radio, motoring, and club activities. For instance, they stressed the importance of not only noting how much time was spent listening to music on the radio, but also the quality of the music selected. There is a socially significant difference in

listening to a symphony or to a rock group. The classic statement of the reformer's ideology is put by these authors when they ask:

... shall the guidance and the opportunity be provided by such agencies as the school, the public library, and the recreation commission or by cheap magazine stands and cabarets. We have shown that the qualitative variety in pursuit of leisure is perhaps greater and more significant than the quantitative; the latter is largely beyond local control and hence outside the province of recreation and park commissioners. The true opportunity of such organizations lies in the possibility of improving quality.23

In summary, the reformer feels that because time is a tool of man's culture it should be used to the greatest advantage by the individual to mold his social structures to serve his purposes. Brightbill best described the potential value of time for the reformer when he said, "Education for leisure takes time."24 Education is a social process by which one attempts to gain social competence, maximum individual development, control and selection of one's environment. These goals may be accomplished in the use of "discretionary" time. They should be made available via the means provided in the social system.

23Ibid., p. 196.
The historical development of our Western society's attitude toward work was traced in the preceding chapter. It can be concluded that the modern position is one in which leisure has become a by-product of work. In contrast to the more simple society ours is one of strenuousness, evidenced by our striving to extend our work areas into all facets of life, to make work the chief value in life. Paradoxically, however, leisure time results from this strenuous, all-absorbing interest in work. The benefits, via efforts in technology to improve the work sphere, have provided the means to achieve more leisure time. Many examples of these efforts to achieve more free time can be seen in the factory system, city-complexities, transportation, and communication improvements. In addition, we have been able to produce more with less labor which gives both more free time and an increased need to consume the products of our strenuous work efforts.

In the ideology of the moralizer this free time and an increased need to consume represents a threat to the individual of the loss of dignity and identity which ultimately undermines his ability either to establish his own goals or to achieve those most valued by society. The reformer, on the other hand, recognizing that mass production, which necessitates mass consumption, often requires conformity and
uniformity, feels that a coordination of efforts and interest and a call to collectivize work and play can diversify the society, provided it remains adaptable and flexible in accepting new skills, habits, and manners--innovations to relieve the tension created in an affluent society in which work will remain an important value regardless of what may be said to the contrary. Thé Neumeyers' study of recreation represents an example of this need to create organized solutions to the changed work-leisure perspective. They show how the recreation movement grew from the extension and commercialization of leisure as a result of the birth of the machine with its myriad of attending problems, such as monotonous working conditions and overcrowded living in urban situations. These extremist reformers, wishing to see the social structure altered to better serve the individual, feel recreation "... is a positive movement rather than a negative one because it seeks to bring about adjustments to situations through the organization of activities"25--a classic statement for the leisure reformer.

The Problem of Work Prestige

The importance of the work-leisure problem to the reformer follows a continuum from one extreme, which views

leisure as the secondary character to the more dominant work value, through a median position which hopes to integrate the two experiences more equably, to the other extreme which views the desired relationship to be dominated by leisure. The position taken by these reformers will vary, roughly with whether or not they can be identified by our categories of extremist or moderate; that is, depending upon whether they are committed to maintaining the traditionally-established social systems or synthesizing a new set of processes. In either case they adhere to the ideological position that the focus should be placed on the means to accomplish the inevitable or the desired changes in society.

James C. Charlesworth, for example, views the leisure time values as more important because of the failure of work to provide man's cherished goals. He, representing the extremist reformer, would replace the work means for leisure means by utilizing the political systems. He makes two very startlingly strong value judgments concerning leisure which permeate his ideological position. First, leisure is growing more rapidly than our capacity to use it wisely. Second, and even more arresting, is that the more monotonous the workers' employment the more monotonous will be his recreation pursuit in free time. "There is no question that automation and semiautomation have created not only a problem of unemployment
but also a problem of barren boredom."26 He suggests five principles to be followed to achieve better leisure which include:

1. Avoiding empty time for idle hands by using the "more wholesome, creative and elevating" leisure rather than work.
2. Instigating programs by the government for the side use of leisure—a public responsibility.
3. Repudiating our preoccupation with the growth of the gross national economic product—we need better distribution than production of goods.
4. Substituting the value of leisure for the value of work so that the wise use of leisure is education and can be its own reason for existing.
5. Refusing to imitate a leisure pattern from the past, but developing one compatible with our economy, "our cultural pluralism, our fetishism of equality, and our social intelligence."27

These goals are premised on this reformer's ideology that the government, that is political institutions, should be the prime agent in achieving this state of leisure. He further suggests that we should have a state department of leisure with the needed legal and financial status as in other state departments, such as education, health, or transportation.

Another extremist who views the political institutions as the most effective source to procure leisure is Nels Anderson. He, however, takes the view that not only is work


27Ibid., p. 36.
the dominant value but that it must remain so in order for leisure to exist. He feels that both work and leisure must be viewed from their functions as agents of social integration. He traces the rise of "prestigious patterns of leisure" for the lower-middle and upper-lower classes as the result of industrialism. For example, unemployment has become a social evil, dreaded by both the idler and the worker. Status is achieved in our society not only from the kind of work one does but merely from the fact that he has work, even though it may be dull, monotonous, and unrelated to the worker's personality needs. This has created a problem for our children because this double standard results in an artificial situation where the child is indoctrinated to prepare for a life of work but has little opportunity to gain first-hand experience. Anderson suggests, therefore, that "the young person must be educated to use his time and to get satisfaction out of it, not his work time alone."28 However, if work security is an absolute necessity to man over which he has very little control, man can really have no leisure unless he has this security in the middle years of life. Recognizing the onslaught of the machine in the future world of the worker, Anderson suggests that citizenship activity might be able to replace material production as a way to earn a living. Public services can become, therefore, a means to maintain the status

28Anderson, op. cit., p. 147.
values. (However, this citizenship might also absorb much of the leisure time which the machine has afforded, he cautions.)

Anderson also feels that because the government exists to serve the people it has a great opportunity to accomplish this aim with respect to work.

Because of the increasing global interdependence of work and the now recognized inability of free enterprise to ensure full employment or free markets, national governments must assume greater leadership in overall work planning and in promoting global relationships favorable to trade.29

In addition both private associations and public services for leisure are suggested as solutions to the leisure side of this work-leisure integration. Private associations occupied with leisure problems should operate to establish standards and act as the primary contacts between the community and the public services.

This position, which is here defined as the median point in the work-leisure continuum for the reformer, maintains that both are necessary factors in the social system so both should achieve a close interrelationship, rather than the dichotomous roles too often presented. This integrating factor, which a reformer feels inherent to the work-leisure context, suggests the possibility that new attitudes toward work may be brought from the nonwork spheres of life and vice

29Ibid., p. 226.
versa. Max Kaplan, a more moderate reformer than Anderson, offers examples of this possible interrelationship in the growing number of professional government workers and others whose work permits their participation in nonwork activities. For example, the different roles a man plays in such diversified experiences as home, office, church, and recreation permit a blending of similar values. Attitudes such as "industriousness, perfection, rewards, response, gratification, etc."\(^{30}\) are now stressed in nonwork as well as work activity. In addition there are an increasing number of recreational facilities aimed toward mass appeal which will be reflected in the work relationships. Certainly the force of working women has altered the concept of leisure. Use of labor-saving devices, pleasant working conditions, needed facilities for dependent children outside the home have posed questions about what, where, and how much leisure action should be utilized by women. **Reform of work goals is therefore possible through the achievement of leisure goals.**

Kaplan is also concerned about the depersonalization of the individual and the problem of unemployment as a result of the impact of automation, which requires the individual to seek other ways to obtain his needed psychological satisfactions

and avoid alienation. Kaplan describes the four types of leisure with which man was formerly concerned:

1. The permanent, voluntary leisure of the rich.
2. The temporary involuntary leisure of the unemployed.
3. The regularly scheduled leisure of those on holidays or vacation.
4. The temporary or permanent incapacity of the disabled or retired.

To this last group must now be added those who by the social system are deemed "unneeded" or "unable" but who do not perceive this incapacity themselves—the unemployed from automation. A fifth group emerges which Kaplan identifies as "those to whom increased automation will mean cycles of work and nonwork with no stipulation or psychology of unemployment, with continuing pay, and with a dramatic interweaving of free time and work time."31 The worker who will be retained on the payroll schedule because his experience is needed only at certain times to support or supplement the machine, such as is now seen in some food-processing plants, exemplifies this fifth group. Kaplan supplies us with one of the most comprehensive analyses now available from a leisure theorist of the function of the family, the urban and the rural communities, the state, and religious groups which should be available to reorganize and reorient our leisure values and permit man to gain his creative potential and to

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31 Kaplan, ibid., p. 47.
relieve the sense of alienation. As a reformer he sees the need for the system to alter its methods to achieve its goals.

From a more historical approach Margaret Mead traces this same integrative force which may exist between work and leisure in the middle of this continuum. Leisure in the past always had to be earned, even by the child who through learning and growing earned the right to play. Unearned leisure "comes under the heading of vice--where the pleasure comes first and the pain afterwards--instead of virtue, where the pain or work precedes the reward."32 The term "recreation" is the epitomy of this work-leisure sequence. It comes from Latin which means to restore or refresh in order to revitalize one so that he may be more prepared to return to activity that is non-recreational, meaning work. This work orientation is characteristic of a culture which has had to expend great energy in order to survive. However, many conditions have emerged since World War II to alter this concept of work: a rising standard of living; rising wages; altered conditions between work done, money earned, and products available to buy; a lowered standard of work proficiency; easy installment purchasing; a fear that prosperity will not last, that atomic war will ensue, and that automation will produce a terrible depression. In response to

these conditions the emphasis of values has been shifted from work to the home which now becomes the focus for working; a shift from the religious sphere to the home for community services; a shift of vacation and holiday use from the value of work release to the value of family solidarity. Mead asks if this shift to family life has really become leisure. If so, then family life should be easier by definition than it is in the play-leisure concept. The job, however, is becoming recreation in the physical sense—a relief from the demanding home conditions, "a chance for a little peace and quiet, a quiet, small time to collect one's thought."33 The career is becoming the subsidiary segment of the work-play sequence. As a moderate reformer Mead suggests a change in this relationship in which the role of recreation (or leisure) serves to alter both the economic and family institutions making them more meaningful to the individual:

This must be a revision [in recreation] which will make the members of society—where delight in high level proficiency should now replace dogged willingness to work long hours for very limited rewards—able to integrate shorter hours of work and the new engrossing home rituals into some kind of a whole in which these outmoded sequences, heritages of an age of scarcity, can be overcome.34

Moving along this continuum of work-leisure values one observes a recognition of the growing importance of leisure

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33Ibid., p. 15. 34Ibid.
activity. One of the most important writers on economic sociology, Robert Dubin, in an essay devoted to the worker's significant perception of his world, states that his research shows first that three-quarters of the industrial workers do not derive their primary life interests from their work sphere. This is occurring, he feels, because the role of secondary relationships in our highly-urbanized, impersonal social system permits work to become secondary. Secondly, the significance of his research shows that because ninety per cent of the workers preferred primary relationships away from the industrial job, the relationship between the individual and the complex, bureaucratic economic organization can hardly fail to be disrupted and less than a satisfying source of human social experience.

One hypothesis Dubin tested was the assumption that a person's participation may be necessary to him in some aspect of his life experiences but may carry no significant importance to him. This hypothesis is important because of the great concern about the meaninglessness of the work experiences resulting from technology which makes work monotonous and repetitive. This, it has been repeatedly stated, brings human alienation, disorder, and indifference. Dubin finds, however, that industrial work has an important focus for integrating the technical environment to the larger society. This interdependency, rather than being alienating to the
individual, "may be functional for society because it sharply etches for the individual some awareness of the division of labor and its resultant interdependency."\textsuperscript{35} Urbanism is a very heterogeneous, often isolated and diverse experience which has resulted from the division of labor. And so it is on the job that this urbanite may learn more acutely than anywhere else how dependent he is on others, but social consensus among the workers is not necessary to achieve the desired results within the technological experience.

Of what significance are these conclusions to leisure? Dubin (a moderate) feels that this realization will help reduce the strain created by our changing technological condition by placing the modern work experience in a redefined position. The worker's central life interest need not be work and yet he has a well-developed sense of the importance of work and the work arena. Dubin feels therefore that much of management's efforts in personnel and industrial relations to restore work as a central life interest operates contrary to the social development of the individual's desire to find his main expression at the community level. He concludes his study by evaluating this social movement in positive terms:

Weber emphasized the impersonality and efficiency of modern bureaucratic organization. The efficiency can remain along with the impersonality, providing there are other points in the society [such as leisure activity] where the primary social relations can be experienced.

... Our great social inventions will probably not come in connection with work life; they will center in community life. This research certainly suggests the importance of this insight.36

Nothing could better demonstrate the divergency of views of theorists of leisure than a comparison of this with the position of, say, deGrazia. Not only is release from the work ethic desirable, it has begun!

Harvey Swados' study of Akron's Goodyear rubber plant corroborates Dubin's viewpoint. One of the first large industries to permit a shortened work-week, Goodyear's experience has aroused interest and concern about whether people will use increased leisure time wisely, whether moonlighting will increase, what social effects will result to the family, etc. Swados' study showed many variables which operated in use of time, including high female employment on a permanent basis; seniority expectation, paid vacations, and retirement pensions; high consumption rates, especially of autos and homes; extensive use of recreational facilities; and active church participation, mostly revivalism and fundamentalism. This would seem to agree with Dubin's contention that one's central interest less and less is in the work sphere.

36Ibid., p. 227.
One startling observation caused Swados to sound the reformer's call of the need for change in the social structure of our higher goals: extensive moonlighting. Not alone is moonlighting widespread. It is also complex. It exists not so much from boredom as from a recognition of the needed shift to a service-oriented job in order to hedge against automation. In addition, the worker is a servant to his union who has engineered this shorter work week and with whom he must agree. His employers look the other way when he moonlights because this absorbs his energies and makes him more malleable to their needs than the worker whose sole reliance is on one job. Lastly, he is primarily the result of the Depression or is a young man with a family who has made commitments for extensive payments for consumption products, who is basically insecure and who wishes to make, save, and spend while possible. Swados is gloomy and dismayed at this aspect of future leisure based on a shortened work-week:

When the dust has settled--and a good many human beings have suffered in the struggle to achieve it--we will probably find ourselves in the era of the shorter work-week. Then Mr. Achlesinger's warning of a populace trained to work but not to live will be seen in all its force--and in all likelihood it may be too late to do anything about it in a missile-maddened, consumption-crazy society premised on lunacy and buttressed by hypocrisy.37

What does he as a moderate reformer suggest to resolve this type of strain in our society? We must incite the imagination of our social scientists, in much the same fashion as physical scientists' imagination is stirred to conquer other spheres, to

... break free of the internal isolationism, the exclusive concern with career and family, which has pre-occupied them in common with most Americans for the past decade and more; ... [so they] will undertake audaciously the task of outlining a social order in which both work and leisure will be rationally based. What is needed is a social order in which, most important of all, the masses of man will be protected against the swelling flood of "entertainment" opiates in order that they may be energized to search freely for new patterns of spontaneous living for themselves and their children.38

As we move toward the leisure end of the work-leisure continuum in which the reformer hopes to see the emergence of leisure as the dominant value over work, theorists become insistent that strain caused by the imbalance between what society is and should become can best be relieved when the individual is released from the now unnecessary work ethic. For example, John Kenneth Galbraith--the economist whose concerns for the social order are numerous--feels that we have not adequately understood what has resulted from achieving greater than sustenance levels economically. The only action which has resulted in our economic institutions in response to affluence has been a reduction in the work-week. This reflects a decline in the "marginal urgency" of goods, a

38Ibid., p. 362.
decline in the importance of goods. This has not been understood and instead has been explained as a change toward the growing importance of leisure as a value. Galbraith suggests that other methods than reduction in the work-week should be implemented as a response to affluence. Work can be made more pleasant and easier. He feels making working conditions more pleasant is as important as making the home pleasant because "to a degree, he [the worker] can escape the latter but not the former."39 Another alternative response to increasing affluence in the work-leisure syndrome is for fewer people to work. Both the young and the old should reap the benefits of this declined urgency of goods. The old, if they can be retired because many goods have a low urgency, can be given a satisfactory standard of living. Likewise, "if we are affluent enough to dispense with the product of juvenile labor, it again follows that we are affluent enough to provide the education that takes its place."40 Lastly Galbraith suggests that the labor force may not be needed at all times in this state. We should therefore be willing to provide them with an accustomed standard of living which covers what they customarily need.

But the greatest possibility to our society is to eliminate toil as a required part of our economic institution.

Galbraith recognizes that a leisure class, based on absence of toil, has universally existed until our modern times in which idleness is no longer valued. This group has been replaced by another, much larger group, "to which work has none of the older connotation of pain, fatigue, or other mental or physical discomfort." All forms of work have been erroneously lumped as being toil. This is now recognized as false, for many kinds of work are enjoyable. The goal of this new large emerging class therefore becomes the indoctrination of our children in an occupation which will provide these satisfactions in work. Galbraith discusses this as a class phenomenon, having mobility, hierarchy, socialization requirements, and evidence of superiority feelings.

More importantly, however, the decline of those who normally toil should be regarded with approval. This goal will be the counterpart of the new major goal in our society to extend this new class, via qualitative and quantitative education, to be as inclusive of all in our society as possible. Galbraith, in his final statements about the ultimate goals of our society, eloquently expresses the reformer's desire to alter the social system in response to the needs of the individuals:

Ibid., p. 263.
Why should men struggle to maximize income when the price is many dull and dark hours of labor? Why especially should they not seek instead to maximize the rewards of all the hours of their days? And since this is the plain and obvious aspiration of a great and growing number of the most perceptive people, why should it not be the central goal of the society?42

Surely L. L. Suhm's study affords additional insight into the differentiation between toil and work which is suggested by Galbraith. This differentiation might permit leisure to become a dominant cultural norm in our society. He maintains that the Latin American is incapable of leisure experience because of the toil-produced exhaustion in a subsistence-oriented environment. Few Latin Americans experience work in any sense of social experience; most are involved in toil. This attitude can be summarized as "leisure is better than work" when work means only toil. They will go to great extremes to avoid toil, or to do as little as possible because this represents a loss of time and energy for something which cannot be replaced—the desire to control their own individual expenditures of time and energy.43

Therefore Suhm, a moderate, disagrees with those who write that leisure is to be regarded as time off from work or as non-productive consumption of time. He concludes that:

Leisure properly, employed can be just as productive (if not more productive) in an economic or any other

42Ibid., p. 268. 43Suhm, op. cit., p. 56.
sense, as those activities and processes commonly thought of as opposed to leisure; that is, work and labor. The sooner we realize this relationship between work and leisure the sooner and more effective will be any effort to help the Latin Americans to achieve the unity between their rich cultural expressions and the material economy which will enable them to enrich the meaning of their lives. By implication, Suhm stresses the need to incorporate the leisure norm found in Latin America with our work ethic to permit our system the achievement of more meaningful leisure.

It would appear that in looking at the reformers we have come full circle in this exploration of the relation of work and leisure. That is, we have seen that there are those who hold that leisure can only emerge from the work sphere; those who insist that work and leisure must be recognized as a social unity; and those who hold that leisure might best dominate the work arena. In all of these positions, however, there is the basic commitment to alert the social system so that the individual's important goals might be achieved. The economic institutions need to reform not only their value concepts but the means by which they are to be utilized to advance the goals of the society. A special position which the reformers employ should be noted which contrasts with

that held by the moralizers—they usually offer specific suggestions about the means to make these reforms.

URBANISM

Because the reform theorist is wedded to the attitude that strain is produced as a result of unsatisfactory social conditions it seems reasonable to expect he will be greatly concerned in, if not directly involved with, changes in societal living patterns. Urbanization represents one such pattern. That this phenomenon is closely connected with industrialism seems obvious. The question which concerns reformers primarily is what will happen to leisure as a result of urbanism: how will the individual attain his greatest satisfaction of needs through his use of leisure in an urbanized society?

Nels Anderson effectively summarizes the reformers' position toward this interrelated process of the industrial-urban complex. Urbanism means to him a moving toward anonymity in mass living, impersonality in the automated industrialized work relationships, and a growing interdependence of the urbanites coupled with a wide variety of choice in time use. Cities, because of their accumulated wealth, need to: provide new methods to offer services; better influence work and production; control more effectively the time allotment services which a competitive urban, mobile people require; and give
better administrative coordination to offer the individual more freedom from the mechanics of this complicated urban-industrial social organization.\(^{45}\) This will result in a new leisure, a man-made leisure based on technological inventions of production, of transportation and communication, and heterogeneous living conditions which contrast significantly to the village pattern of folk festivals. The reformer thus not only describes the change in social organization but necessarily then must suggest means for the various structures to enhance the organized processes: in this case to offer ways to provide better leisure opportunity to the urbanized individual.

The Sophistication of Urbanism

Urbanism offers multiple different opportunities for the individual to express his personality. Industrialism, because it is a major part of this urban process, affords much greater opportunity for leisure time and choice. This has been substantiated in the previous discussion. In addition to this there is the greater degree of sophistication possible in the urban environment; in the attainment of fashion in our dress, manners, possessions, and reading and artistic materials.

The pursuit [of these types of fashion] is more of an interest today because we are more an urbanized people than ever before. We have more leisure than ever before, and it is in leisure that sophistication shows itself, especially in the competitive social phases of leisure.46

Anderson feels that this process of sophistication arises from the accumulation of industrial wealth and thus urban wealth. More importantly he sees this inevitable accumulation of our knowledge in libraries, museums, art galleries, and science laboratories, not only as an opportunity to attain more sophisticated leisure, but as "efforts of urbanites collectively to make themselves secure against want, a problem that the man living with the resources does not have."47 Sophisticated leisure to Anderson is thus justified and desirable.

Another concomitant to the accumulation of urban wealth is the growing mobility of people which Anderson sees operating at two levels simultaneously. More leisure provides more mobility opportunity for the non-city-living people coming to the city to spend their money and time before returning home. Also there are more work-seeking mobile strangers who come to the city to live, thereby stimulating competition. These may cause disruptions for awhile but eventually assimilation is achieved. The two types of mobile people, vertical and horizontal, to the urban scene he feels must learn to

work and play together because leisure provides this orientation to mobility. It is government's responsibility to recognize these various types of mobile groups and provide means to permit adaptations for them, according to Anderson—the extremist's wish to have the political structure provide the impetus for needed change is again sounded.

Max Kaplan also stresses the unique position of the city to provide facilities such as museums and art centers which the large tax structure makes possible. He, a moderate however, adds other distinctive factors which an urban area may provide for leisure involvement—parks with good facilities and leadership, transportation facilities in and out of the urban region, education to meet every kind of interest, creative centers and persons with specialized interests who can be called upon to provide ways to produce groups and clubs for hobbies or teaching amateurs in artistic works, "volunteer citizens' organizations whose function it is to work for recreational facilities in the community," and "large commercial enterprises for recreation that depend on concentrated populations."48

He contrasts the city person's need and use of leisure to the rural person who has longer periods of consecutive free time, is in a less hurried atmosphere, is free from

leisure fads, and experiences most leisure within the family and church atmosphere. The rural dweller has less need for the professional leisure leader because there are fewer choices and more possible development of the resources native to his area. Kaplan sees this as producing less strain on the individual, less need for leisure to act as a solidifying force, and "less psychological and emotional need to relax for therapeutic reasons," than that which the urban dweller experiences, and thus there is less need for the social systems to provide the ways and means to help the individual achieve leisure satisfaction.

Anonymity of Mass Living

Both the moralizer and reformer are concerned with the rising specter of mass-society. The moralizer fears that the individual's inability to resist the impact of technology and automation will swallow him up into an alienated, non-identifiable, malleable clump of clay who has relinquished his right to make choices and establish goals. The reformer sees mass living as also involving an alienated, conforming person who has had his freedom and individuality removed from him by the impact of the modern industrial-urbanized society, but whose freedom to choose can and should be restored by the means within the social structures themselves.

49 Ibid., p. 136.
To Nels Anderson, mass society is synonymous with mass organization, administration, production, distribution, transportation, and leisure.

We must recognize anonymity as a national development, a social and psychological necessity for mass living. ... He [the urban dweller] must be selective in his contacts, and fortunately in the urban milieu it is possible to be selective.50

Therefore the urban scene can become both the source of alienation and yet the means to relieve this sense of conflict arising from mass living.

Anderson feels those most concerned about anonymity in the urban scene center this concern on leisure rather than on work relationships. To them work affords firm and regular forms of human stabilizing association, but leisure offers more temptation and so a less stabilizing influence. He feels this fear is ungrounded because leisure also provides many compelling interdependent relationships. Conformity to him is a positive, not a negative concept—it provides the individual with the means to achieve a state of freedom he desires by meeting the required expectations of society. In contrast to the rural scene, one may belong to a more transient primary group or to a more formally organized group, but it requires of him the same kind of conformity and loyalty as does the rural primary group. In all the various types of

50Anderson, op. cit., p. 8.
groups to which the urbanite belongs, "the intimate ones in primary groups, the special interests in the secondary groups and his civic interests in relation to the law, modern man is anything but a person loose in the crowd." Anderson thus feels there is no philosophical rationale needed for this urban existence.

It should be enough if one is able to live in his milieu in some integrated, orderly and satisfying fashions; if he can work when he must and not feel frustrated, or play when play is in order, without losing social balance. The rural citizen's rationale for his existence is achieved in the situation itself. The urbanite, whose existence is more complex and changing, will need help in learning to use his leisure and adapt to the changes more rapidly. This help must come from the urban system—the existent social structure capable of providing the means for individual fulfillment, and most especially the political structure.

Totally disagreeing, Charles K. Brightbill feels that lack of space, enforced leisure, and the urbanization process are all interrelated in causing many of the modern problems facing our society, the greatest one being alienation.

We need both privacy and people, but people who care. Urbanization breeds not only status seekers, image seekers, and personality erasers, but also noise needers to whom a moment of silence is an hour of thunder.

\[51\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 207.} \quad 52\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 247.} \quad 53\text{Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, p. 29.}\]
Most reformers make concrete suggestions for what they consider the leisure problem, especially the extremists. With respect to this alienation problem Brightbill's last book finishes with a chapter entitled, "Prescription for Action: What Government and People Can Do." Among other specific suggestions are included the need to build the urban centers, to jettison the outmoded and unsuccessful zoning separation of business and residence, to revamp the dated and poor zoning and building codes.

Place the human in a beautiful, attractive environment where he lives and works, and the first step is taken toward enriching his life, toward his enjoyment of the leisure for which he has been or will be educated. Note, according to this extremist, the goals will be accomplished primarily through the political institution.

Urban planning needs also involve an important segment of Miller and Robinson's comprehensive study of recreation in our leisure age. To these theorists the satisfaction available via the community process to provide the individual happiness, especially through leisure, involves the use of his free time. Therefore recreation leaders must exist and function to assess the community's needs and resources for leisure and recreation. A study of Los Angeles is cited in which this metropolis was divided into nine different types of subcommunities each requiring slightly different

54Ibid., p. 179.  55Ibid., p. 183.
recreational services to meet the felt needs—such as the reduction of the delinquent juvenile gangs of the least-advantaged areas. In assessing whether these problems could be resolved via leisure activity the authors offer two solutions: one which involves specialized programs serviced by intensively and specially-trained personnel including individual as well as group guidance programs; the other involves a larger over-all urban recreation program to give training in societal values to the youth via public-operated and voluntary programs. This hopefully would reduce or redirect unsupervised leisure time activities contributing to delinquency:

The complexity and magnitude of the problems of urban life have resulted in efforts to review urban community life, to correct problems of unplanned sprawling metropolitanism, and to provide for basic community services, including housing, schools, open spaces, and recreation.56

They are primarily extremist reformers who place the major emphasis on government-sponsored recreation programs.

Recreation Needs

It is not within the perimeters of this paper to review the birth and status of recreation in our society. However, as can be noted from the previous section, recreation is a large part of leisure and represents an important emphasis

for many leisure theorists, most especially the extreme reformers. Recreation to the reformer, like play to the moralizer, becomes part of man's basic needs seen in his cultural expressions. As explained earlier it means to restore, to revitalize, and to re-create energy lost from other action.

The Neumeyers have traced the emergence of recreation as an institution serving both the group and the individual. Social processes, such as competition and conflict, accommodation, assimilation, and socialization via learning the folkways, mores and law, are all explored to establish the breadth of this cultural expression. As extremist reformers they feel our modern recreation is the most highly-developed expression of leisure which has been accomplished only within the last fifty years. The main purpose of this movement is "to provide adequate facilities for wholesome recreational activities for all inhabitants through governmental support and control." Why is this needed now? What factors have occurred to make such a program a solution to the strain produced in our social system? Among others, the Neumeyers list

the industrialization of labor with its attending monotony in many occupations, the high degree of specialization required for many professions, ... the increasing amount of money available for recreation, ... the congestion of people in our cities ... 

57Neumeyer and Neumeyer, op. cit., p. 9.
58Ibid., p. 297.
59Ibid., pp. 121-22.
And so the recreation movement is seen as a response to the strain arising from our modern urban-industrial society and it functions to reduce these conflicts for the individual through its growth as an institutional process. This position is also taken by Nels Anderson who feels that "institutional recreation is perhaps the principal influence in defining for people what leisure is and how it should be used."\(^{60}\)

Paul F. Douglass and Marion Crawford agree and describe recreation as one of three major institutional innovations of the twentieth century arising in response to increasing quantities of time, energy, and money. The innovations are mass media of communication and geographic mobility resulting from transportation inventions. They trace briefly this historical development up to the 1960s at which time two events occurred which will decide the future direction of leisure. One was the 1962 report of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission to the President and Congress of the United States which "brought to cultural analysis, recreation forecasting, planning, and development of a scientific methodology."\(^{61}\) The second factor is cybernation which will

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\(^{60}\)Anderson, *op. cit.*., p. 44.

probably, according to these authors, alter the conventional concept of work to such an extent that it may cease serving as a valid part of the economic theory of how our national product is to be allocated.

According to these extreme reformers, ten areas for action with which our social structures should be concerning themselves include:

1. Improvement and unification of career professional recreators.
2. Cabinet-level executive departments of recreation to meet the administrative needs.
3. Graduate school corroboration which should not only instruct but do research for recreation education.
4. "Bridgemanship" between the recreation industry and the recreation profession.
5. Utilization of mass-media, especially advertising, "to escalate the standard of living on top of the present high level of consumption."
6. Informational-research service at the professional level as well as at the consumer level to compete successfully with other industries for free time use.
7. A strong organizational structure in local government to coordinate planning, development, and financing of recreation with other associations and groups in the local government.
8. Community corroboration which involves effective use of volunteers and their agencies because "community service is one of the highest forms of leisure activities that one can engage in."
9. Personnel development to effect greater competence.
10. Value criticism of the quantities of disposable time, money, and energy to be accomplished by the establishment of a new social tool which could be titled the Council on Social Values.

To these reformers of leisure the recreation movement is the
answer to help shape the American ideals, and to "help man become the kind of being inherent in the promise." 62

Miller and Robinson's comprehensive study of recreation naturally deals with the development of professional recreation and the various personnel involved. It is their stated hope that our society will work to build our communities and institutions to escape the "perpetual victimization by the hidden persuaders and waste makers," become more free from status buying, and achieve the creative leisure-seeking life which will support our goals of individual welfare based on ethical and meaningful human relationships. They feel, therefore, that

a vast mobilization of the constructive forces in the communities and the nations must take place. Among these constructive forces must be an enlightened public interest and an alert and forward-looking recreation profession that will advance education for leisure, community organization for recreation, and a public policy in support of such broad values. The hope is that the growing recreation profession will dictate its efforts to these goals. . . . 63

In summary, all of these reformers recognize the urbanization process as a casual factor in the increased amount of strain which the individual experiences in modern industrial existence. Professional recreation and urban

62 Ibid., pp. 56-69. See also Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, pp. 144-59.

63 Miller and Robinson, op. cit., p. 470.
planning are the means to resolve the conflicts which concern the extreme reformers. The moderate reformer focuses on voluntary organizations to provide needed leadership and programs for the increased leisure opportunity which the urban milieu affords.

SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Leisure behavior can be viewed, as can all forms of behavior, as an element of human existence in which the individual becomes a major component of the larger social collective life. According to Don Martindale, sociologist and theorist of institutions, human behavior consists of four elements: impulses, the disposition of the person to act; means, the instruments of action; values, the end or goal of the action; and consequences, which may or may not involve the actual achievement of the goal.64 Man's behavior thus is the result not only of his individual biological response but of the social environment in which he learns the goals and means via established social practices. These practices commonly take the form of institutions which are recognized as the organized solutions to collective needs of man. And so social structures exist as responses to special ways of organizing interhuman behavior. They also represent reference

systems—methods of establishing a hierarchy of values.  
(This becomes the premise for Kenneth R. Kimball's doctoral dissertation in which he concludes that leisure not only is becoming institutionalized but will replace other institutions in dominance within our social system.)

A basic explanation of the social behavior approach is given by Martindale in which he describes the emergence of a new ethic of "togetherness" as a replacement for the former individualistic attitude. He sees a new national self-consciousness arising in which the member of our society has gained material wealth and sudden leisure, but is "bewildered by what to do with his free time—-for as old forms are being cast aside there hasn't been time to recast a new effective synthesis of the cultural form of the mass world."\(^65\) Thus the reform theorist must review the cultural and social structures to determine the means to relieve the strain which has occurred between the individual and his society. Some of these conditions producing this strain in the leisure experience with which this section will be concerned involve the society's basic values, the community or group response, the changing family, passivity and spectatoritis, and the political process.

\(^{65}\text{Ibid.}, p. 359.\)
Values and Goals

The impact of three major developments in the twentieth century has caused us to examine our goal systems, according to Miller and Robinson: the growth of modern science has permitted better understanding physiologically, psychologically, and socially of man's needs; the great increase of free time has prompted the need to examine the potential plus and minus use of leisure; and there has been a greater understanding of the values of the "good life" for man because he has been somewhat successful in organizing his economic and social life "to permit him to survive and live at a level of comfort, decency, and dignity, and to pursue the arts of leisure with his basic needs secured."66 The recreation movement, a distinct segment of leisure to the reform theorist, exemplifies for these two theorists the interrelationship of values and social needs of man. It fills the need for group association and provides a source of social responsibility to enable the individual to further his personal satisfactions.

The individual cannot attain some satisfactions by himself, as an individual. He must do so as a part of a group, of a society. The society, its members working purposely and harmoniously toward common goals of interest and satisfaction, create the means for this.67

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66 Miller and Robinson, op. cit., p. 102.
67 Ibid., p. 181.
The reformer thus believes that the individual is basically responsive to higher values and capable of achieving them if given the means to do so. Sometimes, however, it will be necessary to change the means in order to alter the goals. This becomes necessary because of the impact of changed social conditions. For instance, in his first book about the leisure challenge, Charles K. Brightbill took a critical position about the importance of ethics and morality. When we attempt to establish a standard for leisure based on right or wrong, idealism or hedonism, we are changing our moral and ethical positions. If we cannot change ourselves we can change the rules or standards. More importantly, he suggests that to accomplish these lofty needed changes, "new channels and new programs [must be] added to our institutions,"

such as an improved educational system which will offer guidelines for stimulating leisure motivation. This extremist wants leisure to be used as the means to shape our higher goals, as well as to be one of the goals to be pursued.

A more moderate position concerning our ultimate goals and the means to achieve them in the leisure experience is taken by Bennett Berger. He finds two different groups implicated in the leisure problem: those who actively direct

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68Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, pp. 126-43.
social programs and those who are concerned intellectually about the masses. First, he asks, whose leisure usually becomes a public concern: the aged, children, the unemployed, the handicapped, the ill--those who lack full competence. Who are those concerned about these people: the "do-gooders." Second, he presents the concern of the intellectual and cultural elites who "feel the power of the masses in the culture market and the threat of the traditional values of high culture." As a result of these two traditional approaches leisure is not neutral activity in neutral time. Meanings of work and leisure can only exist in relationship to the cultural norms which are defined by their place in the value hierarchy of the social system. He suggests that the way to discover the moral identity of a society is by studying the behavior of groups under conditions where there is the least constraint from manifest considerations. These conditions he feels are to be found outside the realm of work. Thus the problem which arises is not too much time or money, but too little. Succinctly stating the ideological position of most reformers, he says:

Leisure styles are created by the kinds of leisure activities that, empirically, tend to cluster together;

these are not random, and the sociological analysis of them is the study of how social structure facilitates or obstructs the efforts of men to find in their freest time the moral satisfactions which value systems must provide.70

Kimball believes that this normative approach to leisure experience may result in formalized institutional processes. His doctoral dissertation, utilizing Sumner's theory of institutionalization, asserts that institutions emerge and grow because of common needs of society's members. These achieve customary behavior patterns based on approved norms. In addition, institutions have a discernible structure which affords cohesiveness and gives the values reality. Each is a unitary system and yet each is interrelated with all others. Kimball feels that each of the requirements for an institution are validated in leisure: man's need for a rhythm of work and sleep, body exertion and rest, recreation and practical activity, and regular muscular exercise can only be fulfilled through group effort. The difficulty of recognizing the permanency of the leisure institution results from our reluctance to release the outdated attitude and habits toward work and free time. Yet, "leisure has not only become so firmly entrenched in our American way of life that it has developed relatively stable attitudes and behavior but it also determines appearance and dress."71 The required

institutional structuring can be observed in the participation in and observation patterns of sports, art, music, dance, drama, hobbies, holidays, autos, clubs, etc. Each has its own norms which determine the behavior of the members and role playing defines the privileges and obligations of the members.

The various theories relative to social institutions are formulated by men which are based on the values of society. This may explain the problem of understanding leisure phenomenon—changes in all the recognized social institutions tend to increase the importance of leisure.72

Thus an increase in the importance of leisure or a decrease in the importance of other institutions when leisure successfully competes with them may permit the establishment of the leisure institution of equal (or in some cases greater) magnitude to the other institutions.

Let us now look at some of these social structures with which leisure is involved and attempt to see how the reformers suggest they should be changed.

Family

The family, the basic source for the nurture and education of the individual and his primary needs, necessarily has an intimate relationship with leisure values. To the leisure theorist of a reform persuasion it follows that any significant change in the family pattern will effect the
role of leisure. Miller and Robinson, for instance, feel that stable patterns of family life and a satisfying environment become the basis for normal development and emotionally healthy experiences. They found that recreation can support these goals, but

the problem in modern American family life is that profound and disturbing changes have taken place in the institution of the family which have upset the traditional family life and have required tremendous and upsetting adjustment.\(^{73}\)

The working wife, increased divorce, desertion, crowded living conditions, etc., are seen as disorganizing forces destructive to the family and marital morale. The demand is often placed on recreation to cushion the effect of this disorganization to the family and its individual members. Their solution is that organized community recreation should exist to support and strengthen family life as well as to establish relationships with others in satisfying activities which may offer aspects often missing from family life. The opposite side of the coin also exists--the family acts on recreation to change and enhance its resource potential as a means for affording the family emotional satisfaction. For example, "The marital relationship itself offers potentially

\(^{73}\)Miller and Robinson, op. cit., p. 251. See also Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, pp. 35-36.
the important aesthetically fulfilling play experience of life." \( ^{74} \)

These possibilities are also seen by Nels Anderson who feels the home is one of the first institutions which offered play and recreation experiences and still functions to permit closer personal relationships which will serve as an important means of marital adjustment when this newly formed unit must immediately face work obligations. This is particularly important when one realizes that modern marriage has a "one-generation character--a closed group standing in competition with other equally closed families." \( ^{75} \) Anderson is concerned with the demands of family obligations on the individual which may rob him of important personal satisfactions:

\[ ... \text{the individual who spends the middle phase of his life cycle in family living, working for the family, is party to an economic arrangement which financially in the long run only a little more than breaks even. What he gets out of the experience must be reckoned in other values; enjoyment of life perhaps heading the list, and enjoyment of life in some measure means the enjoyment of leisure}.^{76} \]

The role of the wife is a complex problem for most reformers of leisure theory. Miller and Robinson find that

\(^{74}\text{Ibid., p. 264.}^{75}\text{Anderson, op. cit., p. 159. See also Neumeyer and Neumeyer, op. cit., p. 410.}^{76}\text{Ibid., p. 179.}\)
the working wife represents a threat to family stability. She forces a new concept of equalitarianism which may not be accepted by the husband if he follows the traditional unequal framework.

For these reasons, as well as for reasons of family relationships, the family and the strength and vitality of its life are important considerations for recreation, which assumes as one of its key functions, the strengthening of family life. Anderson concurs that the working wife displays greater personal and intellectual independence, but because she continues in her role as homemaker she becomes a "kind of keeper of the material culture department." She becomes the prime consumer of home expenditures—80 per cent of all American consuming spending is done by women. Anderson sees this fact as conducive to keeping the family together in the home. The working woman therefore "makes greater demands for leisure and means." However, he expresses surprise that the family fails to question the consuming attitudes of the wife—if she fails to save is she responsible for the family's conflict between the Puritan doctrine of thrift and the growing consumer pattern?

Of all the reformers Charles K. Brightbill made the most emotional plea for the family to meet its educational

77 Miller and Robinson, op. cit., pp. 254-55.
78 Anderson, op. cit., p. 171.
79 Ibid., p. 178.
obligations for leisure living. He would require the parents to guide play and recreation by "helping the child select the right toys and the right company at the right time;" to establish home recreation centers, exposing children to "the best of leisure pursuits;" to keep informed of their children's use of free time as well as guiding them in it; and finally to provide "an open ear as well as an open heart" to permit the child to be released into adulthood. "The quality of family life, including leisure as an increasingly large part, is crucial to our social survival."80

These reformers of leisure are in agreement that the family institution should be one means to reduce the existent strain resulting from the changing economic patterns. This should largely take place via the process of increasing the family's value toward, and thus use of, leisure experience.

Community Response

According to Martindale an institution "is a recognized solution to a problem of collective life."81 According to George Homans:

If we examine the motives we usually call individual self-interest, we shall find that they are, for the most part, neither individual nor selfish but that they are

80Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, p. 178.
the product of group life and serve the ends of a whole
group not just the individual.82

Both of these statements support the reformer's interest in leisure. The reformer, in his quest for improved individual leisure experience, examines the methods used by the group to balance the existing social structures. The problems of retirement, juveniles, entertainment facilities, and educational resources are community responsibilities which the reformer believes should be better organized to provide the individual more satisfaction.

Nels Anderson chastizes the lack of relatedness of work to most other living experiences. The aged will have to depend on attachments formed outside of the work arena and whatever economic resources he has accumulated to face the non-work existence. He finds that most aged, formerly having been overly engrossed in family and work, lack competence to believe in their ability to develop new interests. The challenge, as Anderson sees it, belongs to the community to help the retired feel needed:

In every previous society they performed what might be called a balancing function. . . . The old are not being utilized if they are pushed aside to find their laughter among the old. "Laughter must be shared, . . . it is socially defined as the prime part of the interactive process of the give and take of social life." Community wholeness is not realized if the laughter of

82Homans, op. cit., p. 95.
children is treasured while the old are left, if they can, to laugh alone. 83

This position is also taken by Bennett Berger, more of a moderate than Anderson, who feels that each problem of leisure cannot be understood, much less solved, without knowledge about the group which is having the problem and the nature of the economic and social changes creating the problem. He asks, for example, what is it about our social structure that accounts for the transformation of the bowling alley from a haven of thieves, murderers, and con men, into an evidently respectable place to take the family for an evening of wholesome fun, whereas the poolroom has been unable to lose its unsavory reputation? 84

The position of the teen-ager, a rapidly growing group, also should be of concern to our society according to Brightbill. He summarized most dramatically the changing role and attitudes of this age group. They are an increasingly important consuming force. In addition, the teenage group is becoming dominated by the young woman who determines the largest part of the spending pattern. Teenagers mature more rapidly physically than formerly and hence are faced with more adult responsibility earlier. Being more mobile they are freer of adult supervision and thus more susceptible to suggestion. They lack a strong community identity.

84Berger, op. cit., p. 212.
Believing that this group is reaching, not reneging on, their complex responsibilities, he criticized those who, feeling the financial squeeze and competition for the dollar, would curtail advancing programs for leisure education for this teen-age group. With a characteristically idealistic plea of the reformer he feels that

if we can spend billions for defense, billions to put a man on the moon, and still live as luxuriously as most Americans do, we can afford to do anything which will enrich life. Education is a conditioning and maturing as well as learning process.85

The role of education will not be dealt with in depth, but obviously much has been written about its functions and responsibilities concerning youth and leisure. Brightbill took the extreme position that our educational system should include compulsory leisure education, the same as we compel reading, attendance, etc. The most important subject of man should be man himself: "Not powerful, affluent, and possessive man, but resourceful, selfless, and creative man--and with leisure, recreative man."86 This attitude is endorsed by Miller and Robinson who suggest four specific areas in which schools should contribute leisure education: formal curricular activities, extra-class programs,

85Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, p. 206.
86Ibid., p. 200.
school-centered community recreation programs, and provisions of facilities for other community recreation agencies.\textsuperscript{87}

In each of these areas of strain for the individual the reformer asks the community to accept the responsibility to provide new avenues to enhance personal satisfaction. Leisure experience is a primary means to this goal.

\textbf{Passivity and "Spectatoritis"}

The film "Marty" has a recurrent wail, "What'll we do tonight?" Great anxiety is felt in our society because of the Puritan view that idleness is a vice. Free time looms large as a threat to a society which values so highly the curious, deeply-interested and committed person, the "doe-not-sitter." Concern is felt by the leisure theorist that the individual is being carried along a path of mediocrity in his non-subsistent living choices—a path which does not achieve the valued goal of a "meaningful" life. The moralizer feels that the individual gives up his initiative to act against this mass mediocrity. The reformer feels the individual is being acted upon by outside forces to respond in a mediocre manner to his values.

Charles K. Brightbill felt that leisure might become the center of our culture, but he was concerned that we might become bored because we do not know how to use leisure

\textsuperscript{87}Miller and Robinson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 267-73.
constructively and thus feel guilt about having it. For example, he asks us to examine the relationship between mental illness and leisure. We take for granted there is a relationship between hypochondria and leisure and yet he suggests that this relationship could only be taken for granted in a society which stresses the morality of work and is suspicious of leisure. We should convert our attitude of unease toward inactivity into an endorsement of unhurriedness.

Can we not occasionally, in our leisure, soft-pedal the shallow conditions of restlessness, aimlessness, frivolity and amusement for the deeper and more lasting ones of tranquility, direction, purpose and actions of consequence?\(^{88}\)

This sounds like the moralizer, except that Brightbill's solutions to these goals demand change in the social structures, most especially the political systems.

Nels Anderson concurs that passivity may be a positive response in this fast-paced and changing modern scene. He finds that some passivity has existed for all men in all societies but he objects to the stereotype, such as Riesman holds, that the American is "shallow in his thinking, free with his money, automatically friendly, and yet not quite sure of himself and his values."\(^{89}\) The challenge which

\(^{88}\)Brightbill, The Challenge of Leisure, p. 27. See also Neumeyer and Neumeyer, op. cit., p. 15; and Jay B. Nash, Philosophy of Recreation and Leisure (St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Co., 1953), p. 128, on the conflict of idleness and health.

\(^{89}\)Anderson, op. cit., p. 83.
Anderson wants met is to find a different tempo in leisure activity for the person who is so well-oriented to work activity. This requires a sense of casualness foreign to the work experience and a release of the sense of guilt when one ceases to be active (a Western man's trait) resulting in society's suspicion toward someone who does not feel restlessness when idle. Anderson hopes we are learning to give up this sense of guilt as our leisure grows—a needed change in our valuation of the idle-active process: "Even while becoming less uncomfortable with leisure he is not less the individual taking pride in being in command of himself."90

The reformer therefore relates leisure primarily to activity, rather than to passivity, but feels that our ability to enhance our values toward acceptance of leisure rests on redefining the concept of idleness. The individual will be best served by this change in the meaning of idleness, according to these reformers.

Spectatoritis is, on the other hand, an example of a type of leisure inactivity which most reformers reject. Obviously the word itself contains a negative concept, if it is not downright condemnatory. The best indictment of this phenomenon is that offered by Jay B. Nash, an extremist: "When the risk—the fire and water—goes out of the dance of

90Ibid., p. 220.
life one easily succumbs to boredom." This boredom from too much smoothness then enters our community life.

By constantly repeating the doses of passive entertainment in his leisure time, a man becomes an addict. ... Life becomes really a burden; therefore, seemingly the only outlet to the monotony is through manufactured pleasures, sold at mass production prices. What are these manufactured pleasures which Nash condemns? They include the newspapers, radio, television, movies, casino, amusement parks, and spectator sports. It is increasingly easy for individuals to "kill time" and pay the price of the growing amusement business. For example, he feels television and radio programs are only entertainment:

Education assumes the establishment of behavior patterns; facts alone do not do this. At best, many offerings are far from good, the audience is forced to listen. It is inactive, hence, largely ineffectual. To be educated, children should be active in problem solving. Education is a going-on process.

To break down this cycle of "boredom, fatigue, entertainment, more boredom" a society must enrich the play activities of youth and expand recreational potential for adults. He sounds the reformer's basic plea for changing the means to relieve the strain.

On the other hand, the criticism of the passive-spectator nature of some leisure activity as "a new national

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91 Nash, op. cit., p. 128. See also Neumeyer and Neumeyer, op. cit.
92 Ibid., p. 131. 93 Ibid., p. 134.
94 Ibid., p. 137; and Kimball, op. cit., p. 69.
affliction" is refuted by Alfred C. Clarke.95 His study shows that respondents at all class levels devoted most of their time to non-spectator activities. (The Editors of Fortune report also reflects the decreased spending for all spectator sports and amusements.) Similar criticism about commercialized amusements threatening the "basic values of the society" were also found to be incorrect. "Even though commercialized recreation has become one of the nation's largest business enterprises, it still does not occupy a large share of leisure time of the adult population."97 This moderate reformer believes the individual is basically capable of discerning his needs given the best climate in which to exercise his choice.

Political Concerns

The concept "alienation" concerns both ideological camps. The reformer of leisure fears that the structural components of society will fail, or be inadequate, to provide the individual with a needed sense of personal identity. This especially involves the political structures which formally espouse the cherished goals of the society, such as

freedom. The reformers therefore are interested in better support for these goals or in provisions for new means to prevent alienation.

Nels Anderson, for example, believes that because Western mass society is contractual it relies on formal agreement between persons and groups which are enforced by law. Therefore, records are painstakingly kept. "For the citizen the record may be basic to his feelings of security; in it he finds the political equality of citizenship." 98 This sense of citizenship is also available in his leisure experience via his membership in various organized groups, public and private. Anderson feels that this service of active citizenship functions to assist living in our mass society. It serves to buffer the conflicting strain between work and leisure and hence is seen by this reformer as helpful to bridge the dichotomy the individual might otherwise experience in the changing milieu from a work-oriented to a leisure-oriented society.

Individual freedom, a dominant democratic ideal, is the necessary corollary to personal identity in the modern Western society. Charles K. Brightbill, another extremist, feels that because freedom of choice is basic to both leisure and democracy, "leisure can help keep man's free will alive

98Anderson, op. cit., p. 17.
and help shape his inner laws and principals." His second book strongly underlines the importance of wisely-administered government programs to permit people to collectively accomplish which is not possible individually. "Let the government at all levels encourage the citizens in their innate inclination for beauty, the recreative restoration of mind and body, and their organic link with the natural environment." Government should abet freedom, with the capacity to choose and hence encourage self-development by offering adequate protection of and services for leisure activity. Greater governmental resources will be needed to provide the opportunities and to administer wisely the increased leisure interests and skills which the family and the schools will be emphasizing. Seven specific suggestions for governmental involvement in leisure attainment are discussed at length. There was no question in Brightbill's mind about the validity of political involvement in leisure as seen in his response to a rhetorical question:

But the most convincing of all reasons in a democratic society for government interest in leisure is that the people have so willed it! Why should government not have a hand in leisure and preparing for it? It is in everything else related to our well-being--health, education, technology, and culture. Government programs are needed to ensure that leisure is a part of the overall enrichment of society.

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100 Brightbill, Education for Leisure-Centered Living, p. 185.
security, and law enforcement—and with high quality programs.\textsuperscript{101}

Kenneth R. Kimball takes a more moderate position about possible reform measures. His criticism is that too often there is little governmental concern about the great amounts of free time or energy being wasted via poor use of time. Only when time is used destructively will governments feel responsible.

Then they spend millions of dollars for law enforcement, protection of public property, penal and corrective institutions, and campaigns against vices and other debilitating and socially destructive activities which result, in large part, from their having failed to supply the proper education of leisure and the means of making use of leisure.\textsuperscript{102}

In summary, leisure in America is a widespread phenomenon. It is impossible to discuss many of the relevant social implications of free time which the reform theorist has identified. Education has been far too briefly presented here as one of their main panaceas to resolve strain in the social system. Other social processes, such as juvenile delinquency, vacation behavior, hobbies, and voluntary group associations, are usually noted in passing but there is often little more presented than a hoped-for possibility of helping the individual achieve better leisure experience and relieving

\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 188. See also Miller and Robinson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 273-77.

\textsuperscript{102}Kimball, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159. See also Suhm, \textit{op. cit.}
the strain which our rapidly changing economic system is creating for the individual.

FUTURE PLANNING

Essentially, the reform theorist feels that our society's problems of increased non-obligated time, which is to them the essence of leisure, can be relieved through organizational planning. The reform theorist especially feels that the values of our society are intact, but that the means to achieve them present the source of strain. "The level of culture is not declining--look at the long-range perspective; great masses are not helpless when faced with leisure--people who continue to be experimental in work, will also in leisure." 103 The reformers place the responsibility for the future attainment of our "good life" on changes in the social conditions which prevent the individual from achieving our cultural values. Specifically the most frequently mentioned methods to improve leisure employ the use of educational and governmental institutions.

Nels Anderson perceives the important dichotomy between the reality and the imaginary elements of leisure, which often is the point of separation between the reformer and the moralizer. People give two responses when asked about leisure choices--what they consider socially expected

103Anderson, op. cit., p. xiii.
and what they have actually done with this type of experience. The first, or "would-do" leisure, requires organization and planning; the second involves little planning, cost, or effort. Anderson feels that the goal of integrating the individual into family and community life involves making the proper choices of time use. For people to learn how to use time fully, guidance will be necessary. Guidance implies pressure from social and economic sources. In addition to guidance, hindrances from the following sources must also be resolved:

The first of these practical obstacles is unemployment. The individual cannot assure himself continuous employment, that calls for wider organization and planning. Mass society must be equally organized to guard against the maldistribution of population, especially in the urban agglomerations. There must be the assurance that mass-society enjoys reasonable health and is not exposed to health hazards. The environment must be safe. If people are to enjoy leisure there must be the necessary public or other facilities.104

Miller and Robinson concur with Anderson that leisure will continue to grow provided the social system removes the obstructions now present. They enumerate sixteen major trends in leisure requiring organization and planning by the existent social structures. These are named with the knowledge that certain problems must also be resolved. Poverty, for example, must be eliminated. A proper balance of recreation under public, volunteer, and commercial auspices must be accomplished.

104Ibid., p. 235.
A philosophical and conceptual framework is needed that "identifies the recreation worker's competence to deal with broad social problems in leisure time along with other helping professions . . . "\textsuperscript{105}

Marion Clawson also feels that the growth of leisure nationally is indisputable, barring catastrophic war. Primarily its distribution and availability will rest upon choice by the group, such as the labor unions, large employers, and the federal government, because it will be determined by the economic forces of production and consumption. Although he wants to be neutral about the endorsement of increased leisure, he pleads "for careful consideration and rational decision, from a broad public or national viewpoint as well as from the interest of the individuals or groups directly involved."\textsuperscript{106}

The "Agenda for Action Toward 2000 A.D." suggested by Douglass and Crawford, presented in the section on Urbanism, endorses Clawson's economic views. Their premise is that our social system has been historically based on comparative economic abundance—a prime factor in determining our goals, institutions, and individual behavior. This perception permits them to believe we will continue in the same

\textsuperscript{105}Miller and Robinson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 482.

\textsuperscript{106}Clawson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20.
philosophical orientation. "As the floodgates of that abundance are now being thrown open, the technical and human task of the recreator is to clear his decks for strategic action to help man become the kind of being inherent in the promise." 107

James C. Charlesworth carries this theme specifically to the feet of government: "The thesis of this paper is that the government should take the prime responsibility for the wise use of leisure." 108 A state department of leisure should be established which would parallel with public education and be appropriately budgeted. States should be pressured to establish and empower departments of leisure. In addition, public instruction in leisure activities should be compulsory throughout all of school attendance and continue throughout adult life.

It should be remembered . . . that in our education system we do not stop at purely functional objectives. . . . We compel youth to study literature and history; we are not satisfied when they have learned enough to read street signs and the newspaper. Most people who derive great satisfactions from English literature were compulsorily introduced to it at a tender age, and they did not enjoy the initial exposure.

And so it is with a minority of our citizens who were pushed by understanding parents into the mastery of leisure skills. 109

107 Douglass and Crawford, op. cit., p. 69.
108 Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 36.
109 Ibid., p. 38.
Charles K. Brightbill's commitment to a leisure-oriented society caused him not only to concur with Charlesworth about political and educational needs but to include all social structures in the leisure search. His tendency to sermonize consistently permeates both of his books. The "oughts," "shoulds," "failures," and "wrongs," are so plentiful that it might appear he should be considered primarily a moralizer toward leisure. However these highly value-laden terms serve essentially as the writer's stylization for a very specific platform of needed reform in our economic, educational and political organizations. He feels the individual is ultimately to be served by the social structures and only in this way will his needs be adequately satisfied. Education, government, family, religion, business and labor, social service agencies, and ecological services are all assailed with plans for offering more opportunity to achieve leisure. For example, he lists many arts and science groups which are existent and should be spreading out their services for leisure needs:

In short, the activities and opportunities for leisure and leisure education cover the whole spectrum of artistic and scientific activity, providing an avocational laboratory and learning headquarters for almost anybody. That the development brings public, private, civic and individual interests into a working partnership, that it wedds education, recreation, and urbanization to a beautiful natural environment, makes it a model for what can and will happen through public-civic-private resources as we move closer to leisure-polarized living.110

L. L. Suhm's study of Latin America probably offers one of the best analyses of our cultural norms toward leisure. By observing both social systems—Latin American and North American—he perceived the social conditions which give rise to these different norms. In Latin American culture leisure takes precedence over work values. Conditions exist in that system which undermine economic and social incentive leading to production. North American culture in contrast is so permeated by the work ethic and its quantitative rewards of free time—paid vacations, labor-saving devices—that we are unable to investigate the qualitative aspects of our life such as may be expressed in leisure. After exploring this work-leisure dichotomy he draws this conclusion about leisure in Latin America:

... many of the social problems which now exist are due, in large measure, to the improper use of the large amount of available leisure. ... It is not only the scarcity of financial resources that leads to social problems. Nor can it hardly be said that these people have too much money. It is often a matter of either not knowing how to more effectively make use of leisure, or else of not having sufficiently attractive alternatives to present leisure uses.\footnote{Suhm, op. cit., p. 140.}

Suhm suggests that the roles of industry, schools, and governments should be utilized to make opportunities for leisure an asset rather than a liability in Latin America. Lotteries, expensive fiestas, additional mistresses, and
drinking are cited as liabilities to leisure experience which should be diminished by the social system. By implication he makes the analogy that proper education for the proper use of leisure is important for our social system as well as theirs.

But to John Kenneth Galbraith a society must go beyond its concerns with its goals of happiness and its success in diminishing pain, sorrow, and ignorance. A society must insure its own survival. Ours has set as its highest goal, unfortunately, "the production of private consumer goods" which will continue to be reflected in all of our attitudes on public decisions. Regardless of the external excuses, such as the arms race with Russia, we must remain faithful to the scientific and technological frontier which will provide our means for survival. Production of private consumer products will not support these needs. "As matters now stand, we have almost no institutions that are by central design and purpose directed to participation in modern scientific and technological progress and its large-scale application."\textsuperscript{112} The problems of a burgeoning population and lack of space for graceful living, depletion of natural resources, and the need to find activity for the human who is no longer desirous of accumulating consumer goods can only be solved

\textsuperscript{112}Galbraith, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 274.
by **reliance on our education**, which is in the public domain and thus subjected to the whims of both public and private allocation of resources. The moderate reformer's attention to the obligation of all social structures to respond to the strain resulting from the changing social goals and hence conditions is seen in Galbraith's requirement to guide these resources effectively, aptly expressed in simile:

To furnish a barren room is one thing. To continue to crowd in furniture until the foundation buckles is quite another. To have failed to solve the problem of producing goods would have been to continue man in his oldest and most grievous misfortune. But to fail to see that we have solved it and to fail to proceed to the next task would be fully as tragic.\[113\]

CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The comparison of leisure theorists results in an awareness of the ideological conflicts which arise concerning the instrumental, or means values, and the intrinsic, or ends values in a society. The instrumental goals tell how men should live in society; the intrinsic goals explain why men live in social organization. Both of these orientations exist in each and every human experience, either individual or group originated. Each ideology, as has been shown, describes strain between the way things are and the way they should be and tries to bridge the gap between the real and ideal factors. The moralizer tends to view the human situation from an individualistic orientation; the reformer emphasizes the social environment.

A comparison of these ideological camps should expose this pre-existent and usually selective process, because any future decisions concerning the role of leisure in our society will be affected. First, all of these theorists hold a concept about the quality of life which defines the core of leisure experience. Each also describes the phenomenon of leisure existence as a social problem and joins an ideological camp which implies that change is needed in a particular
direction. This theoretical search for yet another key to unlock the Good Life—and recognition of man's failure thus far to do so—centers around the ideologists' conviction of individualism in our society and the surrender to a conforming behavior pattern which decreases the opportunity for individual choice or any ambiguity of action; a leveling of differences in all areas of social behavior, whether individual or group-centered; and lastly, a resultant alienation from, or loss of awareness of, that which is considered desirable in human existence and hence a loss of personal identity.

Specifically, the moralizer's ideology says that the individual has relinquished to the group his right to choose; the ideal factors have been abandoned by the individual because the technological knowledge of means has surmounted former commitment to ends or values. Leisure moralizers decry modern man's losing the values of inner serenity, contemplation, silence, and non-activity which they believe are intrinsic to leisure. The self-actualized potentials for individuals must be encouraged in conjunction with individual freedom and autonomy. These ideal factors should determine the direction of the real factors in leisure pursuit so as to reduce or eliminate the present strain. On the other hand, the reformers believe that the individual is capable of knowing what is good for him but that he has been
victimized by the social conditions which interfere and control his opportunity to make wise choices. The real factors—production and consumption, bureaucratic and political structures, mass communication media—become ends in themselves which curtail his freedom and decrease his effectiveness in establishing personal standards. Reform ideologists focus primarily on the political institutions and the need for them to alter some of their goals to permit a better leisure experience for society. In addition, other real factors in the institutional structures of education, family, religion, and economics are all held accountable for the achievement of the desired goals of restoring to the individual the right to attain the Good Life.

What are the succinct comparisons to be made between these ideological camps of leisure theory? Time becomes the pivotal dilemma. The reformer defines all time away from the work and subsistence experience as leisure. It is a quantity which can be measured and manipulated and thus is capable of being evaluated. If it is man's tool it should be used by him to determine how his social structures will meet his needs. In complete disagreement, the moralizer believes that time is not mere achievement of the non-subsistence experience. Leisure is an intrinsic activity of a man's mind and hence is part of his basic equipment to give meaning to his existence in all other forms. Only when the rational,
emotional and psychic experiences are united in leisure experiences will man be free to use time as his own tool in the pursuit of the Good Life. Time is a dimension of quality, not a measurement of quantity.

The moralizers feel therefore that modern man has lost the meaning of human existence because work and leisure have been transposed. One must now work in order to achieve needed status and hence leisure, formerly an intrinsic value, has become the function of work. Man is alienated from his goals, from the meaning of existence, because work, via the machine process, has failed to give the needed moral and emotional support. Man can no longer find an identity in work which is done perfunctorily and in which he rarely has knowledge about the finished product. This process, the effect of industrialization, results in over-conformity, a desire for security, and a passion for social approval, all of which stand in opposition to the moralizers' goals of regaining individual freedom and autonomy. Their suggested solution is to undo this misalliance between work and leisure. The reformer, on the other hand, misses this focus of the work problem entirely. He selects the solution of making politics, economics, and education the sources for needed changes in work and leisure. In his view work conditions must be made more pleasant and agreeable by adapting new work attitudes of industriousness, reward, and personal response
learned from the nonwork spheres. By collectivizing work and play in organized recreation examples may be provided for other kinds of coordination and organization or work and play values. Ultimately the reformer desires a change in the value of work itself as well as its means so that the sense of individual worth may increase. This will be achieved when work is no longer the dominating value of our society, when leisure is felt to be just as productive as work is now.

With respect to the social and nonwork spheres of man's existence the reformer finds that within the process of urbanization the sense of anonymity and impersonality results in a new ethic of "togetherness" to replace individualism. Greater interdependency occurs. The individual is bewildered by what to do with his increased free time because old methods have been eliminated and new forms have not yet been defined. What conditions have caused this hiatus between means and goals according to the reformer? Because of modern science, the increase of free time, and the greater possibility to understand the goal of the Good Life, we have achieved a level of social organization which can permit existence in comfort, decency, and dignity. Therefore, change whatever organizational structures necessary in order to continue this achievement--provide stability in the family by offering community resources, encouraging individual participation in community needs in such problem areas as entertainment, juveniles, and retired citizens; enlarge educational
resources to help redefine ideals of idleness and passivity (by providing a better climate in these organizational processes the individual will be able to make sound choices and discern his own best interests in all forms of leisure pursuits, especially spectator entertainment); use citizenship roles available in free-time segments to serve as a buffer between work and leisure goals; and lastly, provide collective patterns and group experiences to arrive at the meaning of the Good Life.

The moralizer finds these methods inadequate and insufficient because the crux of the matter is that the individual has forfeited his personal freedom, lost the meaning of life, and is unable to make the necessary choices to achieve the Good Life. Anxiety and boredom are the rewards that he now finds in increased free time. Problems of idleness, conformity, loss of any pure play form, and inability to resist mass media's sale of mediocre consumption patterns arise because the individual has lost his inner state of knowledge about what is best for him. Man's basic nature is capable of reaching the goals he sets for himself, of which commitment to autonomy, personal authority, freedom, time, activity, and pleasure are the components to be exercised and realized. We must restore both his rights and obligations to rediscover and make these moral choices. One way to rediscover these inner values is through a state of
freedom in which one is allowed not to be occupied in duties; to be relieved of having to provide subsistence, such as was possible in an elitist society. Another solution is to bring all to the level of the self-actualized goals. In either solution a moral commitment to superordinate goals is demanded in the leisure experience. Because no one group should have a greater claim than another on these goals, pluralism threatens leisure attainment and presents the opportunity for vested interests and pressure groups to decide superordinate values.

In summary, the leisure moralist emphasizes the individual as the agent to achieve these "ideal" factors; his self-fulfillment is the basic requirement to the establishment of any ideal conditions. The moralizer emphasizes the abstract personal behavior needs and wishes to utilize any educational process which enhances the self-actualized personality potential for internal sources of authority. Within this context work has a limited concept for man; time is a total, unsegmented phenomenon. Thus leisure should be kept uncommitted and unplanned by institutional processes. The greatest goal for the moralizer is that leisure be packaged in many ways in order that the individual may be unfettered in making his own choices of meaningful experiences.

The reformer of leisure, however, finds that the values for the Good Life are intact, but the individual is
browbeaten by the social structures to conform to existent means. The reformer believes that what one expects to do should be the focus to relieve the strain and this will be accomplished through organizational planning, primarily by governmental and educational agencies. Public planning will resolve any conflicts which will arise over how to use leisure and will provide attractive alternatives to make leisure an asset to the individual, not a liability as it is now felt to be.

Conclusions

The role of the intellectual ideologist is to interpret the present situation in a given society from the particular focal point of what he feels should be accomplished. His primary concerns are: where does the individual become absorbed by society, where does freedom give way to conformity, where does the leveling of differences create a mass culture which destroys values because valuation requires discrimination? The moralizer and the reformer are both committed to increasing the potentials for personal discrimination and hence demand that the corresponding ends or means be changed to achieve this goal. Each necessarily distorts and selects considerations to support his view of the desired goals. This may imply criticizing existent conditions as having become worse than those previously existing, or distorting various theoretical approaches by omitting important
factors which the particular ideology is unable to explain. However, care must be taken not to overly criticize the role of the intellectual ideologist because he distorts or selects his material. Agreeing with Winston White, this writer feels that our standards of what we expect from life continue to be raised and hence we sense a state of "relative deprivation" which makes what actually exists appear to be unfavorable or worse than what has previously occurred. The ideologist serves as the agent to describe this relative change in the existent standards and social phenomenon.

What has thus far emerged is awareness brought by the ideologists of leisure and confirmed by general sociological theory that no time or action is spent free from normative constraint. The problem of leisure is inescapably bound up with technological innovation which renders work less compelling, less meaningful, and hence less moral. This problem occurs when a value system becomes incapable of giving honor to the typical situation existent in the social system. Therefore the changing normative pattern of work means that new forms and values which command moral identity and public assent will be found in the nonwork sphere—in activities whose norms make them most valuable and are done for their own sake, not in response to an outmoded norm.

In addition, because the intellectual ideologist is the agent who identifies and describes the problem areas,
he thereby challenges others to develop new areas of focus, new data to help formulate new theoretical frameworks with which to help solve the present problems. This, therefore, is a method which correlates the relationship between interest in problems and theoretical knowledge. Ultimately when the formulation of theoretical knowledge occurs as a direct result of an interest in a social problem, when this knowledge becomes sufficient to eliminate or effectively reduce bias and distortion, the ideological commitment fails because it has accomplished its purpose.

If this is so, what posture should a sociology of leisure assume, what is its present status, and what are the future prospects for leisure? Sociology has incorporated the ideological area in its development as a source of knowledge about the contemporary scene primarily from the humanities. This implies that sociological theory in general searches for a sense of wholeness which unites an analysis of both real and ideal factors, and which recognizes that neither by itself can provide a sufficient explanation. This focus stresses, therefore, the search for pure knowledge as an important asset to sociological theory.

With respect to a sociology of leisure this writer finds that both ideological camps help create a needed focus on a contemporary change in leisure experience. By demonstrating these areas of ideological distortion and selection
with respect to leisure new and more significant questions and answers may be obtained to formulate a more valid body of knowledge about leisure and ultimately about the social system.

Research is needed to effectively measure quantitative aspects of time, money, and space relationships with respect to the various social classes and categories of worker-citizen (study of these relationships has been historical up to now). This would involve the study of the various age and interest groups represented by such categories as juveniles, aged, vacation behavior, hobby involvement, voluntary group associations, and mobility and immobility patterns of time and space use, such as attendance at sporting or cultural events in comparison to reading and television activities. One specific approach to these categories which is needed now is the gathering of extensive data on personal time budgets. Research is also needed to evaluate leisure culturally—to find tools to measure the specific goals and means to educate for leisure and ultimately to effectively implement leisure programs, both public and private. Joffre Dumazedier asks three questions, all of which suggest methods of approach for furthering this research:

Will commitment to leisure values be balanced by commitment to occupational, associational, political, and spiritual values, thus placing in jeopardy the active participation of citizens in directing the future of their society? Finally, since leisure values are themselves diverse, will the values of entertainment and
unfettered personal development join forces to create a new ideal of individual happiness and social well-being? Or, on the contrary, will the values of entertainment, artificially hypertrophied by an irresponsible commercial system, come to play, in certain countries, the role of a new "opiate of the people," while in certain other countries a unilateral and oppressive government policy for leisure activities risks truncating the complex phenomenon of leisure, encouraging boredom and malingering by way of reaction.1

Dumazedier focuses on an initial question posed by this writer which still remains unanswered: is leisure becoming institutionalized, assuming a patterned way of performing needed functions for normative integration, or is it only exemplifying a source of social pathology existent in the present institutional patterns?

Following an eclectically-inclined approach (evolutionarily-oriented) this writer will attempt a risky but hopeful glimpse toward the means-goals factors which seem to be developing within our social system. Projecting current trends is difficult, but is a necessary part of anticipating change intelligently. In addition, allowance must be made for creative adaptations which are going to be needed to handle unexpected developments.

Most significant for a projection of leisure into the future is the theory of freedom required in the face of economic abundance and relief from scarcity. Freedom as

used in the democratic sense means the belief that humans can learn to be responsible and self-fulfilling agents if given an opportunity—a "dignity of man" ethic. This means not just "more" or a change in degree of life-situations for the masses, but a change in the kind of life situation. Work, in its traditional sense of toil, becomes by this theory not just less in degree but different in substance—the less we work the more we produce! The second factor changing more in kind than in degree is time. It becomes a new human resource at both the individual and community levels. Thus free-time, the absence of toil, is potentially capable of becoming leisure in the context of the democratic society's expanded and expanding search for freedom. In other words, the conversion of free time into leisure by a social system dedicated to freedom means a dedication to activities which will enlarge human choices of thought and action beyond the work-free-time dimensions. The ultimate question, therefore, becomes that of values—new goals to be sought aligned with new means to accomplish them. What will make life meaningful in this new dimension? How will we establish standards to know whether we are accomplishing the goals? The evidence seems to point toward an evolutionary process in which man, with his accumulating and symbolizing potential, steadily develops his capabilities. Change is inevitable. Man as his own agent of creativity and innovation
is able to direct the course of his future. He need not be victimized by it. Trial and error has been man's tool and an important way for him to find meaning and hence value in his existence--the evolving pattern to personal fulfillment and social freedom. This experimental process requires asking questions, challenging the status quo, deciding on a course of action which may require altering institutional patterns, assessing the results, but in its method (problem-solving) lies the key to freedom--the attainment of new values! This is the search, the challenge, and the excitement to be found in leisure.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX

CHAPTER

II. THE MORALIZERS

Cultural and/or Classical Moralizers:

Bell, Clive; an outstanding English literary critic and author, especially of the art world.

deGrazia, Sebastian; Professor of Political Science at the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.

Huizinga, Johan; a German socio-historian of culture.

Lee, Robert; a professor of theology at the San Francisco Theological Seminary.

Psychological Moralizers:

Fabun, Don; the Publications Editor for Kaiser Aluminum Company.

Greenberg, Clement; an associate editor of Commentary and an art critic.

List, Hugo K.; whose dissertation for the doctor of philosophy degree from Michigan State University is the study of a leisure definition via the self-actualization theory.

MacIver, Robert; former president, the New School for Social Research, and professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology, Emeritus.

Meerloo, Joost A. M.; a psychiatrist in private practice in New York City, born and educated in Europe.

Weiss, Paul; a professor of philosophy at Yale University.

Social Moralizers:

Larrabee, Eric; professor of American civilization, Columbia University, and an associate editor of Harper's Magazine.
Lynes, Russell; editor of Harper's Magazine.

Reisman, David; currently the Henry Ford II Professor of Social Science at Harvard University.

Russell, Bertrand; the late noted British philosopher, mathematician, and educationist.

Stone, Gregory P.; a professor of social stratification and social psychology at the University of Minnesota.

III. THE REFORMERS

Extremists:

Anderson, Nels; a professor of education and head of the Department of Occupational Information and Guidance at the North Carolina State University.

Brightbill, Charles K.; the late professor and dean of the Department of Recreation and Municipal Park Administration, University of Illinois.

Charlesworth, James C.; a professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Parks Association.

Clawson, Marion; Director of the Land Use and Management Program, Resources for the Future, Inc., and formerly with the Department of Agriculture.

Crawford, Robert W.; Commissioner of Recreation, Philadelphia, formerly of Oakland.

Douglass, Paul F.; former president of American University and presently professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Practical Politics at Rollins College.

Miller, Norman P.; professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Nash, Jay B.; Chairman of the Department of Physical Education, Health and Recreation, New York University.
Neumeyer, Esther S.; the wife of Martin H. Neumeyer.

Neumeyer, Martin H.; professor of Sociology, University of Southern California.

Robinson, Duane M.; a professor at George Williams College.

Moderates:

Berger, Bennett M.; Chairman of the Department of Sociology, University of California at Davis.

Clarke, Alfred C.; a professor of sociology at Ohio State University.

Dubin, Robert; sociologist and professor of Social Research, Oregon University.

Galbraith, John Kenneth; noted professor of Economics at Harvard.

Kaplan, Max; a former professor in both music and sociology at the University of Illinois, he created and directed the Arts Center of the School of Fine and Applied Arts at Boston University, and is currently a full-time lecturer, writer and consultant.

Kimball, Kenneth Robie; whose dissertation for the Doctor of Education from State University of New York at Albany attempts to describe leisure as a new and dominantly-emerging institution.

Mead, Margaret; a noted American anthropologist.

Suhm, Lawrence Lee; whose Doctor of Philosophy dissertation from the University of Wisconsin studies the economic and social implications of mass leisure in South America.

Swados, Harvey; a novelist-writer and currently teaching professor at Sarah Lawrence College.