An appraisal of the military leadership of General Douglas MacArthur

Leonard Howard Dofflemyer

University of the Pacific

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AN APPRAISAL OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

A Thesis
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the Faculty of the Department of History
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by
Leonard Howard Dofflemyer

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Leonard Dofflemeyer

is approved for recommendation to the
Graduate Council, University of the Pacific.

Department Chairman or Dean:

Malcolm Moree

Thesis Committee:

Donald Crichton, Chairman

Raymond L. De Leon

Malcolm Moree

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the course of history, there have been many great military leaders. Each of these has been praised as well as criticized. One of the most controversial of these military figures was General Douglas MacArthur.¹

This controversial figure, at the outbreak of war in the Pacific, was placed in one of the most responsible positions of the war—Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific. The war in this area centered around the battle for the Philippine Islands. The battle for these islands was an epic of heroic fighting, great strategy, and much suffering. It was also marred by many discords and frictions. These disagreements produced high level errors which greatly affected the war in the Pacific. Douglas MacArthur, a man surrounded by many legends and beliefs, was the focus of some of these conflicts.

It is difficult for people to speak of MacArthur in a neutral manner; they either have great admiration or great dislike for him. He is looked at in various ways by

different people. Some speak of him with great adoration, while others describe his tremendous ego.

The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur since the outbreak of World War II. In order to do this, it will be necessary to review the events in the general's career through World War II, during the occupation of Japan, and the war in Korea. This study will consider also the reasoning behind many of the decisions and movements made by General MacArthur. This will mean a study of the general's personal qualities and dominant characteristics in order to gain insight into the behavior which influenced these moves.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND FOR LEADERSHIP

General Douglas MacArthur was born at Fort Little Rock, Arkansas, on January 26, 1880, where his father, Arthur MacArthur, was stationed.¹

In his earliest years, Douglas was attracted to the military. His earliest memories were of the sounds of guns and warriors telling of heroic charges during the Civil War.² MacArthur stated that one of his first memories was of a 300-mile march made to guard the fords of the Rio Grande from the danger of raids from Geronimo's marauding Indians.³

At the age of sixteen, Douglas became a cadet at West Texas Military Academy at San Antonio, Texas. His academic records were outstanding, and he was an all-round athlete. MacArthur was a football hero; he was the key man on the 1896 team.⁴

²Ibid.
³Ibid.
⁴Miller, op. cit., p. 36.
Douglas MacArthur was appointed to West Point from Wisconsin at the age of eighteen. In 1898 his mother took him to Milwaukee to take the West Point examinations. He achieved first place in the examination.5

MacArthur entered West Point on June 13, 1899, and began to rise rapidly.6 He became a corporal in his second year, First Sergeant of Company A in his third, and First Captain of the Corps as a First Classman.7 On June 11, 1903, MacArthur graduated as a second lieutenant of Engineers. He stated that the words of Elihu Root rang in his ears.

Elihu Root said:

Before you leave the Army, according to all precedents in our history, you will be engaged in another war. It is bound to come, and will come. Prepare your country for that war.8

The first assignment given MacArthur was to the Philippines. He was with the Third Battalion of Engineers on Guimaras Island. The main task was the clearing of the

6Miller, op. cit., p. 54.
7Lee, op. cit., p. 31.
8MacArthur, op. cit., p. 28.
jungles in order to lay the foundations for civilization. MacArthur was commended for his task here, and he later stated that it was here that he attained much knowledge of the Philippines which was to be very valuable later on. He stated:

During my tour of a year I engaged in typical engineering duties in many parts of the islands. I worked on surveys at Tacloban, harbor improvements in Manila Bay, fortification installations off Corregidor, traverses over the steaming wooded hills of Bataan.

Early in October of 1905, Douglas MacArthur was ordered to join his father as an observer in the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese armies had forced the Russians back until, after many months of combat, they stood at the gates of Mukden in Manchuria. It was here that the officer came under heavy fire with the Japanese troops. During this time, he learned much of the Japanese military tactics. MacArthur was suspicious of future Japanese movements. He later stated:

...I had the uneasy feeling that the haughty feudalistic Samurai who were their leaders, were, through their victories,

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9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Miller, op. cit., pp.75-76.
planting the seeds of eventual Japanese conquest of the Orient. Having conquered Korea and Formosa, it was more than evident that they would eventually strike for control of the Pacific and domination of the Far East. 12

In the fall of 1906, MacArthur was appointed aide-de-camp to President Theodore Roosevelt. This appointment was of great interest to the young officer because it was the first time he became associated with a leading political figure. 13

Douglas MacArthur's father seemed to be the controlling force in his life. His father's untimely death on June 2, 1909, was a crucial time for him. 14 Arthur MacArthur died while he was speaking at the Fifteenth Anniversary of the famous Twenty Fourth Wisconsin, which was composed of 90 old Civil War Veterans. MacArthur tells of the scene and the impact:

In the middle of the room the Reverend Paul B. Jenkins began to repeat the Lord's Prayer . . . those 90 old men who had followed him up Missionary Ridge and into the blazing fire of a dozen battlefields knelt by the side of their old commander and joined in. When the prayer ended, he was dead. The adjutant, Captain Edwin Parsons, took from the wall

12 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 31.
13 Ibid., p. 33.
14 Miller, op. cit., p. 86.
the battle-torn flag that he had so gallantly carried and wrapped it around the General. Captain Parsons stood in silence for a moment, gazing at his dead commander, then fell forward over the body and, within two weeks, passed on. My whole world changed that night. Never have I been able to heal the wound in my heart.15

Relations between Mexico and America were rapidly deteriorating, and Mexican raiders began arresting and molesting Americans legally on Mexican soil. On April 21, 1914, American sailors and marines were sent to seize the city of Vera Cruz.16 There were three locomotives behind Mexican lines that MacArthur thought should be captured. He also thought that the reconnaissance of the area would be of value in case of war. MacArthur had a plan to do the job. Disguising himself as a vagrant, he succeeded in penetrating the enemy lines and locating the engines at the risk of his life.17 He had been warned that Washington did not want war, and that they might not like it. The young officer went ahead with the expedition and of its outcome he stated:

15MacArthur, op. cit., p. 36.
16Ibid., p. 40.
17Miller, op. cit., p. 95.
General Wood recommended me for the Medal of Honor. The War Department disagreed.

In deciding to make the reconnaissance I may have been right or I may have been wrong. War did not materialize and the utility of our exploits would never be known, but even my old frontier friends would have agreed that it was a wild night. . . I was promoted to major shortly after my return to Washington and again chosen for detail on the General Staff. Perhaps those gents in the War Department were not so rough after all. 18

When America entered World War I, troops were needed in Europe as fast as possible. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker conceived of the idea of forming a division from the National Guards composed of men from 48 states. 19 The General Staff had voted predominantly against this idea. MacArthur was for the idea, believing that the Guard could be strengthened by voluntary enlistments which could be trained to combat effectiveness. 20 Secretary of War Baker and MacArthur took this idea to President Wilson, who went along with it. When they left the President, Baker asked MacArthur what he considered the best method of carrying out the proposal. MacArthur stated, "I suggest that we take units from the different states so that a division

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19 Miller, op. cit., p. 95.
20 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 44.
would stretch over the whole country like a rainbow." From that time on, this outfit was known as the Rainbow Division.\textsuperscript{21}

Brigadier General William A. Mann was selected to command the division, with MacArthur as Chief of Staff. MacArthur took charge of organizing, training, and evaluating it. This command was part of the American Expeditionary Force under the command of General John J. Pershing.\textsuperscript{22}

MacArthur stated that General Pershing:

\begin{quote}
... rose to the highest flights of his profession. He inspired a self-respect for our national forces and a foreign recognition of our military might which has properly placed us fully equal to the best of the human race. My memories of him sustained and strengthened me during many a lonely and bitter moment of the Pacific and Korean Wars.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Douglas MacArthur led the men into battle at Bacarrot and Rechicourt in France, and was cited for gallantry after leading a large assault. He was decorated by both France and America on June 26, 1918, and was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Lee, op. cit., p. 33.}
\textsuperscript{23}\textit{MacArthur, op. cit., p. 48.}
\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Miller, op. cit., p. 98.}
\end{flushright}
The Rainbow Division withstood large assaults at the Champagne-Marne Defensive. MacArthur's strategy was brought to the attention of his superiors, and he was placed in command of the Eighty-Fourth Brigade. He struck decisive blows, and advanced to the Meuse River in two days. When the Armistice was signed, he led his men into Germany with the army of occupation.  

There was some criticism of MacArthur's breaking of certain regulations. It was said that he never carried a weapon or gas mask. MacArthur explains that in this way:

... I wore no iron helmet because it hurt my head. I carried no gas mask because it hampered my movements. I went unarmed because it was not my purpose to engage in personal combat, but to direct others. I used a riding crop out of long habit on the plains. I fought from the front as I could not effectively manipulate my troops from the rear.

This points to the general's way of placing his own wants and judgments above those of his superiors or army regulations.

He had fought well, had been severely wounded, gassed

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25 Ibid.

26 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 70.
twice, and became noted as a daring leader. In 1918, he became totally blinded as a result of a mustard gas attack. MacArthur refused to go to the hospital and wore a blindfold for days. In a few days, his eyesight was restored. In 1919, he returned home to cheering crowds; he fulfilled his own dictum, "Only those are fit to live who are not afraid to die." 28

Upon returning from Europe, MacArthur was appointed Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point. The academy was in bad shape. In fact, there was a question before Congress as to whether the United States would need West Point or Annapolis any longer. 29

The job of reorganization was a delicate one, for there was opposition. MacArthur not only had trouble with Congress, but also with the tradition-minded professors who felt that he was an upstart. His success was complete, for he constructed a new West Point in the spirit of the old one, bringing the curriculum to modern standards and increasing

27Lee, op. cit., p. 35.
28Ibid.
the requirements. MacArthur stated:

The highest standards of honor were to be demanded as the only solid foundation of a military career—a code of individual conduct which would maintain the reputation and well-being of the whole—a personal responsibility to his mates, to his community, and above all to his country. In many businesses and professions the welfare of the individual is the chief object, but in the military profession the safety and honor of the state becomes paramount. In the final analysis of the West Point product, character is the most precious component.

In 1921, MacArthur reported to the War Department that the Academy was faced with new demands. These demands had to do with the producing of effective officers in preparation for any future war.

In 1925, MacArthur was chosen a member of the court-martial that convicted Brigadier General William B. Mitchell of insubordination. He referred to this task as "one of the most distasteful orders I ever received." The charges


31 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 60.


33 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 85.
were made against Mitchell because he insisted on the development of air power against orders to stop from his superiors. 34

MacArthur stated:

I was thoroughly in accord with the concept of the massive power of the air and that its development should be greatly accelerated . . . .It is part of my military philosophy that a senior officer should not be silenced for being at variance with his superiors in rank and with accepted doctrine. I have always felt that the country's interest was paramount, and that when a ranking officer, out of purely patriotic motives, risks his own personal future in such opposition, he should not be summarily suppressed. . . . The individual may be martyred, but his thoughts live on. . . . When the verdict was reached, many believed I had betrayed my friend. . . . Nothing could be further from the truth. I did what I could in his behalf and I helped save him from dismissal. That he was wrong in the violence of his language is self-evident; that he was right in his thesis is equally true and incontrovertible. 35

On October 30, 1930, Douglas MacArthur was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Army. This appointment made him, at 50 years of age, the youngest Chief of Staff in the history of the United States Army. 36

With this appointment, MacArthur made a tour of

34 Lee, op. cit., p. 43.


36 Considine, op. cit., p. 36.
Europe, meeting with the military leaders and inspecting their armies. Upon his return, MacArthur found himself in the midst of a battle with Congress over modernizing the Army. The general appeared before Congressional committees time and again warning that the nation needed a sufficient army in order to rank high among the armies of the world.

National dissatisfaction began to grow due to the fact that millions of people were out of work during the depression. Many war veterans marched on Washington seeking to influence Congress to grant a cash bonus for veterans. The tension began to mount; there was bloodshed and killing. MacArthur, watching all this, stated:

If the President gives me orders to act, I would not give this distasteful job to any other officer of the United States Army. If anything should go wrong, it will be the kiss of death for that officer’s future.

When the order came, MacArthur mounted his horse, taking two officers with him: Major Dwight D. Eisenhower and Major George S. Patton. They broke up the encampment of marchers with tear gas and the flat side of sabers.

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37 Miller, op. cit., p. 123.
39 Lee, op. cit., p. 56.
40 Miller, op. cit., p. 127.
Intimate friends told of how MacArthur went into the Bonus Army encampment at night and lent money to needy soldiers who fought with him in the American Expeditionary Force.41

The remainder of his term as Chief of Staff was spent trying to get Congress to do something about defenses.

MacArthur states:

I stormed, begged, ranted, and roared; I almost licked the boots of certain gentlemen to get funds for motorization and mechanization and air power. . . .42

What he was able to salvage was due only to backing given him by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who persuaded him to stay on for an additional year after his four year term had come to an end.43

41Ibid.
43Lee, op. cit., p. 60.
CHAPTER III

MACARTHUR PREPARES THE PHILIPPINES FOR WAR

When Manuel Quezon was elected President of the Philippine Commonwealth, he asked MacArthur if he would come to Manila as military advisor. President Roosevelt gave his consent and MacArthur left for the Philippines in 1935 to build an army.¹

MacArthur had a hard job ahead of him. There was criticism, but he single-mindedly went on with his work. One section of the press charged that President Quezon was asking MacArthur to help him in setting up a dictatorship.² The Filipinos called him "the Napoleon of Luzon." His style and manner of addressing his soldiers reminded one of Napoleon. The people of the Philippines referred to this as "MacArthurian style."³

General MacArthur felt that there was a race against


time to build an army. He stated that the United States had to build strong defenses on American islands in the Pacific as soon as possible. There was some opposition in the United States and MacArthur pleaded:

The Philippine Army represents one of the most heroic efforts a liberated people has ever made to maintain independence and national integrity. It threatens no one. It’s sole purpose is to preserve its country’s peace, its democratic principles and its Christian faith. It deserves the complete support of public opinion in the United States and wherever freedom is the guiding spirit of men’s lives.⁴

MacArthur said that he "was charged in high quarters with being a warmonger and threatening the peace of the Far East."⁵

General MacArthur retired from the United States Army on December 31, 1937, with the highest praise of President Roosevelt. He, with his family, took up permanent residence in Manila where he followed the world situation with intense interest.⁶

President Roosevelt had also been watching the world

⁵Ibid.
situation. On July 26, 1941, he sent a message to MacArthur ordering that the Philippine Army be mobilized under his command. He was called back into active service to command all armed forces of the Far East. MacArthur accepted the challenge:

I am glad to be able to serve my country at this crucial time. This action of the American Government in establishing this new command can only mean that it intends to maintain at any cost its full rights in the Far East.

The President authorized MacArthur to spend $10,000,000 for initial expense of mobilization and preparation. It was as though a reprieve had come to a death sentence. There might still be time to build a defense against sudden Japanese invasion. Carlos Romulo stated:

It was evident that America was planning to show a firm hand to Japan. MacArthur's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East pointed to this. The evacuation of American women, the application of the arms embargo, and the cessation of the

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9 Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
sale of oil to Japan had been the first indications. As a final blow the United States froze Japanese credit.10

The Philippine Commonwealth had a plan, developed by MacArthur, which contemplated a defense of the entire island area, but this was scheduled to go into effect in 1946 when the Philippines acquired their independence.11

The general's prewar assessment of the combat value of the Philippine Army was far higher than was warranted, and his mobilization and training schedule was based on the belief that hostilities would not begin until April of 1942.12 He said that by this time he would have a trained army of about 200,000 men, a powerful airforce of 256 bombers, as well as 195 pursuit planes. He felt that his great strength would assure the defensibility not only of the Philippines, but the entire Southeast Pacific area.13

By December 7, 1941, MacArthur had about 130,000 men in uniform, but nearly 100,000 of them were poorly equipped with only a few months training in close-order drill. The

10Romulo, op. cit., p. 3.
12Ibid., p. 68.
men were willing and enthusiastic, but they could do little more than salute in the correct manner. Most of them hadn't even fired their old rifles. The airforce was in the worst shape; there were 277 planes, of which 35 were flying fortresses. There were only 107 P-40's which were modern combat craft. Nevertheless, MacArthur refused to be panicked, even though strange aircraft had been sighted four nights in a row.\(^{14}\)

The general was compelled to await a move by the Japanese, as he stated:

> My orders from Washington were not to initiate hostilities against the Japanese under any circumstances. The first overt move in the Philippines must come from the enemy. There was apparently some hope that the somewhat indeterminate international position of the Commonwealth might eliminate it from attack. This possibility had support not only from Quezon, but from the American Chief of Staff.\(^{15}\)

Therefore, MacArthur felt that he had to wait before putting plan "Rainbow Five" into operation. This plan provided for offensive air operations in order to further the strategic

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\(^{14}\)Ibid.

\(^{15}\)MacArthur, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 113.
defensive.\textsuperscript{16}

MacArthur stated:

\textldots Whatever might come, we were as ready as we possibly could be in our inadequate defenses; on the night of December 7, every disposition had been made, every man, gun, and plane was on the alert.\textsuperscript{17}

General MacArthur was unaware of the two minor raids on the islands at Mindanao and Aparri. He was positive that the Philippines would soon be attacked, though many Filipino authorities hoped that the Japanese would consider them an independent nation and spare them. The general knew that if he made a wrong move now, his whole plan of local self-defense might collapse. In the back of his mind he also remembered General Marshall's orders: "If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16}Baldwin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{17}MacArthur, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{18}Toland, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 59.
CHAPTER IV

MACARTHUR: THE DEFENDER OF THE PHILIPPINES

MacArthur had ordered all flying fortresses around Manila to be flown to Davao Field on Mindanao for safety from surprise attack. Only about half of them had gone by December 7, 1941, because room had to be left at the Mindanao base for more B-17s which were expected from Hawaii. Formosan airfields were to be bombed as a counter-attack as soon as Japan either made or declared war.¹

The report came that Luzon had been bombed; now there was no question about an "overt act." Far Eastern Air Commander Brereton phoned Major General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, about the attacks. Brereton said that "if Clark field is attacked, we won't be able to operate it." He begged for permission to bomb Formosa, and it was fully authorized too late to hit Takao Harbor as planned. While Brereton's staff planned new missions, the army bombers asked permission to return to Clark Field.²


There were sixteen flying fortresses at Clark Field lined up ready to fight. The three hangars were being camouflaged or repaired. The Japanese pilots were surprised that almost ten hours after Pearl Harbor, every plane based at Clark was a "sitting target." In one stroke the Japanese knocked out the Far East Air Force at Clark Field.

The attack was over almost as soon as it began.

General Carlos Romulo described what happened:

Our planes had been caught lined up on the field in broad daylight. It is true that they had been ordered to take off and remain circling in the air. They stayed up all morning until noon. Then the flyers came down in perfect echelons and were lined up and waiting on the field when the Japanese ripped down out of the skies with their great bombers.

Of the planes parked on the runway, all but three flying fortresses were destroyed. In one raid the Japanese had eliminated in half a day two of America's defenses in Southeast Asia: the Pacific Fleet and MacArthur's air force. America had learned too late what the lessons of war in

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3Ibid., p. 27.
4Ibid., p. 64.
Europe had taught—that a heavy bomber force without adequate protection, air warning and anti-aircraft guns is helpless and useless.⁶

If permission had been granted to launch an attack on Formosa in time, no great results could have been expected, for our strength was too small and inexperienced, and we had little accurate information concerning targets. On the other hand, it would have been far better to utilize our bombers in an offensive mission than to allow them to be caught as they were.⁷

A controversy developed over the incident at Clark Field. Several stories were in conflict. MacArthur had one story, General Brereton had another, and General Sutherland had still another. Several different accounts had to be consulted.⁸ MacArthur never made a comprehensive explanation of this incident, but he stated that General Brereton had suggested to General Sutherland an attack against Formosa before the Clark Field attack on the morning

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⁶Toland, op. cit., p. 70.


of December 8, MacArthur also stated:

... I know nothing of any interview with Sutherland, and Brereton never at any time recommended or suggested an attack on Formosa to me. My first knowledge of it was in a newspaper dispatch months later. Such a suggestion to the Chief of Staff must have been of the most nebulously and superficial character, as there was no record of it at headquarters. The proposal, if intended seriously, should certainly have been made to me in person. He has never spoken of the matter to me either before or after the Clark Field attack. As a matter of fact, an attack on Formosa, with its heavy air concentrations, would have been suicidal.

General Brereton stated that the planes were on the ground because of the long six hour delay taken by MacArthur's office to authorize an attack on Formosa.

General George C. Kenney, Commander of MacArthur's air force in Australia, stated:

Brereton's account of the events of December 8, 1941, shows a state of confusion and indecision that does not sound as though MacArthur had anything to do with the handling of the air force that day. Brereton's contact with MacArthur's Headquarters was General Richard K. Sutherland, the Chief of Staff, who

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10 Ibid.

11 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 38.
received recommendations for the use of the air force, and who often rendered decisions in the name of General MacArthur.12

There are others who seem to share General Kenney's idea of the Clark Field incident. Samuel Eliot Morison, in trying to explain why Brereton, Sutherland, and MacArthur blamed one another, said that "the real trouble was bad blood between Sutherland and Brereton, of which, unfortunately MacArthur seems to have been ignorant."13 Hanson Baldwin, in his book Great Mistakes of the War, suggests that General Sutherland may have taken it upon himself to refuse permission for the Formosa raid, though, at the same time, he blamed Brereton.14 General MacArthur, who had an extreme loyalty to his staff, defended General Brereton:

A number of statements have been made criticizing General Brereton, the implication being that through neglect or faulty judgment he failed to take proper security measures, resulting in the destruction of part of his air force on the ground. . . . Such statements do an


injustice to this officer. His fighters were in the air to protect Clark Field, but were outnumbered and failed to intercept the enemy. ... 15

MacArthur had 11,500 miles of Philippine coastline to defend. He could not have his limited troops everywhere at once and was compelled to await a Japanese invasion. This invasion finally came on the 10th and 27th of December, 1941. They landed in force on the east coast of Luzon. All in all, they moved more than 200,000 men against MacArthur's forces. 16

In northwestern Luzon, MacArthur's forces were outnumbered, incompletely equipped, lacking air support, and were only recently mobilized and organized into regimental groups. MacArthur felt that this left him no other alternative but to fight a delaying action. This was later complicated by other landings in Luzon. 17

Tension began to mount in the Philippines as another landing was confirmed on the southern coast of Luzon.

15MacArthur, loc. cit.


MacArthur guessed that all these landings were minor probings; therefore, he held back, waiting for the main landing which was bound to come. He stated that "the basic principle of handling troops was to hold them intact until the enemy has committed itself in force." MacArthur also stated:

I kept a close watch on the low, sloping beaches of Lingayen Gulf, where I had stationed the 11th and 21st Divisions of the Philippine Army at beach defenses. In the deceptive quiet of the gray dawn of December 22nd, the great enemy blow fell at last. A huge invasion force entered Lingayen Gulf... The troops conveyed were... a total strength of approximately 80,000 combat troops. This was about twice my own strength on Luzon...

Though MacArthur and other members of his staff have stated that their forces were outnumbered by the Japanese, Louis Morton in his book The Fall of the Philippines states that the defense forces on Luzon actually outnumbered the invading Japanese by about two to one. MacArthur has been known in the past to have overestimated the size of

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18 Toland, op. cit., p. 104.
an invading force.

MacArthur, realizing that this force was the main division, rushed tanks to the north. He also ordered General Brereton to collect every bomber in the area for a morning strike at Lingayen. Beach defenders were also warned to expect the great invasion. Brereton's air force could do very little due to the fact that there were only a few planes remaining. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese pushed ashore and moved toward the north to meet the force which had landed in northern Luzon and were moving south down the coast.21

When the Japanese opened hostilities, there was a convoy of seven ships, escorted by the Cruiser Pensacola and the Subchaser Niagara, moving toward Manila carrying needed planes, ammunition, and supplies. The convoy was ordered back to Hawaii, which was, in effect, the abandonment of the Philippines. General Marshall hated to tell MacArthur that it had to turn back when it was needed so badly in the Philippines. A meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send the convoy to Brisbane in Australia, and then efforts would be made to take it on to Manila. MacArthur could see no reason why this could not

21Toland, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
be done with reasonable naval and air protection, and he discussed the matter with Admiral Hart.\textsuperscript{22}

The conference that MacArthur had with Admiral Hart was not a happy one. These two men had been in conflict ever since MacArthur took command of the United States Army forces in the Far East the previous July. Their differences worsened with the disastrous events of the first week in December of 1941. Hart disapproved of MacArthur's plan to bring the convoy to Manila by stating that the Japanese would guess what they were doing and throw up a blockade around the Philippines before the convoy could leave Brisbane.\textsuperscript{23}

MacArthur finally abandoned his strategy of holding at the beaches and considered a plan formulated by his predecessors—War Plan Orange III. This plan called for a slow withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula where a last-ditch defensive could be fought until the Navy could send reinforcements if possible. MacArthur had given up this earlier plan for he felt "it was a defeatist move that might well

\textsuperscript{22}Morton, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 146-147.

\textsuperscript{23}Toland, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 103.
lose him the support of the Filipinos." 24

The chief reason for the order to withdraw was the failure of the troops to hold the enemy. Up until this time, MacArthur had had the greatest confidence in the fighting qualities of the reservists of the Philippine Army. He sent word to Washington that he would remove his force under cover of darkness. 25

The withdrawal could easily have been crippled. Manila Bay was full of various types of craft shuttling men, munitions, and food to Corregidor and Bataan. Highway three, leading from Manila, was jammed with everything from trucks to ox carts. One bomb in the right spot could have destroyed the whole plan, but the Japanese flew over the evacuation and did not bomb it. 26 MacArthur stated:

The hazardous timing of this movement was its most notable feature; one slip in the co-ordinated maneuver, and the motor columns from southern Luzon would have been cut off and cornered in Manila. The success of this operation enabled the assembly and reorganization on Bataan of the bulk of my forces, and made possible the subsequent defense of the peninsula. 27

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24 Ibid., p. 134.
25 Morton, op. cit., p. 163.
26 Toland, op. cit., p. 146.
The biggest problem was food. There were 3,000 tons of canned meat and fish already stored on Bataan, and the rest was on its way by water, rail, and highway. The question was how long the road to Bataan could be kept open.  

In order to give time to prepare defenses on Bataan and to permit an orderly withdrawal of men and supplies, Wainwright was to hold back the Japanese along five lines. The object was to hold only long enough to force the enemy to prepare for an organized attack, delaying them long enough to reach Bataan intact. But it was soon evident that Wainwright, with his poorly trained and equipped troops, could not hold out till January 8, as planned; he was worried about holding out till the first.

In Manila everything was chaotic. Military installations were in a state of confusion as personnel were hastily loaded into trucks, cars, and busses. Earlier that afternoon, orders had been given to retreat to Bataan Peninsula. The explanation now was that Manila had been declared an

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28Toland, op. cit., p. 146.

29Morton, op. cit., p. 165.

30Toland, loc. cit.
open city to save it from greater bombing. MacArthur stated:

Manila, because of the previous evacuation of our forces, no longer had any practical military value. The entrance to Manila Bay was completely covered by Corregidor and Bataan; as long as we held them, its use would be denied the enemy. He might have the bottle, but I had the cork.

When the government and the army had left the city, there was a feeling of foreboding and terror. The exodus from the city, which had ceased after the first war scare, began all over again.

The Japanese had completely misunderstood the mass migration. They believed that this was a frantic flight of certain elements of the Philippine Army. The Japanese felt that if they concentrated on the capital, the campaign would be over once it was taken. They thought that MacArthur could probably hold on Bataan a few weeks, so they ignored the migration disappearing into the Bataan jungles and concentrated on Manila.

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31 Ibid., p. 138.
33 Morton, op. cit., p. 234.
The retreat to Bataan had been carried out safely under harrowing conditions. Wainwright had lost 12,000 men and had had many desertions in his delaying fight. MacArthur now had 15,000 Americans and 65,000 Filipinos in Bataan. Although 10,000 were professional soldiers, the remainder was a group of untrained men. This was the force which was to hold so long. Their greatest asset was the mountains and jungles of the rugged Bataan terrain.35

Radio Tokyo acknowledged the receipt of MacArthur's "open city" declaration, but the Japanese in the Philippines were either unaware of it or ignored it. They had flown over the mass evacuation and were bombing Manila, on December 27, 1941, as though the major force was located there.36

During the final days on Bataan, MacArthur and President Quezon sent many messages to Washington begging for help that never came, help which could not have come except for a trickle of supplies by submarine. They were sent only encouragement, when they really needed bullets, men, food, and medicine.37

35 Ibid., p. 171.
36 Morton, op. cit., p. 234.
37 Kelley, op. cit., p. 113.
MacArthur was upset by what he referred to as "defeatism," and wired General Marshall that "if the Pacific is to be saved it will have to be saved here and now." He begged officials in Washington to reconsider their strategy because if the Filipinos discovered they had been abandoned by the United States, everything would collapse. The general said that if the Philippines could be saved, it would justify "the diversion here of the entire output of air and other resources" by the United States. 38

Efforts to transmit any supplies to Corregidor had failed because of a rigid enemy blockade. At least fifteen blockade runners were sunk or captured by the enemy while attempting to get supplies through to Bataan. Several over-age destroyers were also fitted as blockade runners, but none of these succeeded in reaching the Philippines prior to the fall of Corregidor. 39

Corregidor was an island that sat in the mouth of Manila Bay, easily visible from Manila on a clear day. The holder of Corregidor controlled Manila Bay. The island was less than two and one half miles from Bataan, which was to

38Toland, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

39Marshall, op. cit., p. 78.
become the main battlefield on the Philippines. The rock, or Corregidor, was designed perfectly for defense, for here in rock and well hidden were the fort's big guns. On the island there was a hump of solid rock; this was called Malinta Hill. In the hill was bored a great tunnel in which 10,000 men could live without fear of bombing. This tunnel was to be MacArthur's headquarters. The general and his family lived in a small cottage half a mile beyond the eastern mouth of the tunnel.40

MacArthur made a trip out to speak to the general officers of Wainwright and Parker in order to whip up the spirits of the tired defenders.41 The general carried an over-optimistic message:

Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. ... No further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us; our supplies are ample; a determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack. ... I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting enemy attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we fight, we will win, if we retreat, we will be destroyed.42

40Toland, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
41Ibid., p. 179.
42Ibid.
Many of the American noncoms openly jeered at the general's optimism and others suffered disappointment later on. The great majority of the Filipinos took these words as hope and inspiration. On the whole, the general was not a great inspiration to many men during this time, because he rarely visited Bataan.

On January 22, General Sutherland returned to Corregidor from Bataan describing the situation as so alarming that an immediate withdrawal was necessary. MacArthur agreed, and, on January 23, ordered a general retreat to the last line. This was a line which MacArthur said was well prepared.

When this line was reached, General MacArthur ordered the retreating men to attack and restore their lines. They were now manning the Abucay Line which extended from Pilac to Boyac. This line was stronger though the men were weak, hungry, and tired after the long retreat. The retreat had ended and the Japanese, thinking it was about over, attacked MacArthur's flanks from the China Sea side. This was almost

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\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 180.

\(^{44}\)Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

a fatal move on the part of the Japanese, for they landed on five points of land on the west coast. No troops could be spared from MacArthur's front line to face them, but somewhere the needed men were formed from a group here or part of a company there. These makeshift forces held the Japanese on these points, preventing them from coming in the rear of the general's front lines.46

The general's situation was desperate. The futility of the meager efforts Washington was making was accented by 70 tons of ammunition brought in by the Trent. Greater amounts of supplies were needed and MacArthur continued to warn Washington that it was a fatal mistake to continue their present policy. He believed that the 2,000 mile Japanese line of communications should be attacked instead of concentrating on the building up of forces in Australia. The general said that there was one way to defeat Japan: "seek combat, not avoid it."47

Many of the men on Corregidor held on to their hope to the last day. They did not know or believe that only a little while after December 8, 1941, the decision had been


47Toland, op. cit., p. 205.
made in Washington that the Philippines could not be reinforced, and that MacArthur and his men would have to do the best with what they had.  

Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had spent four years as MacArthur's senior military assistant, was called upon to give an opinion by General Marshall. Eisenhower, after pondering the question, realized that reinforcements could only be sent to the Philippines when the Navy was rehabilitated. The only solution, thought Eisenhower, was to "set up Australia as a base for offensive operations." It would have been hard for men suffering on Bataan to accept this decision. MacArthur describes the situation:

Our troops were now approaching exhaustion. The guerrilla movement was going well, but on Bataan and Corregidor the clouds were growing darker. My heart ached as I saw my men slowly wasting away. Their clothes hung on them like tattered rags. Their bare feet stuck out in silent protest. Their long bedraggled hair framed gaunt bloodless faces.

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48 Lee, op. cit., p. 240.

49 Toland, op. cit., p. 107.


51 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 135.
President Quezon became increasingly anxious about the situation and sent the following message to MacArthur who forwarded it to Washington:

This war is not of our making ... we decided to fight by your side and have done the best we could and we are still doing as much as could be expected from us under the circumstances. But how long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippine front is of no importance as far as the final result of the war is concerned and that, therefore, no help can be expected here in the immediate future, or at least before the power of resistance is exhausted? ... It seems that Washington does not fully realize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect to our safety and welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here. ... 52

Quezon became more and more impatient as no real efforts were being made to enforce the Philippines. He went to MacArthur proposing that he ask President Roosevelt to grant immediate independence to the Philippines. Then the islands would be neutralized and would no longer be a battleground. General MacArthur forwarded this message to Washington along with a report of his own. Quezon had written a bitter message saying that "there was no denying that we are nearly done," and also added that the Filipino

52Ibid., p. 136.
attitude was one of "almost violent resentment against the United States."\(^{53}\)

President Roosevelt sent a personal message to Quezon which repudiated the idea of independence and declared that the United States Government would never agree to this type of solution. The President expressed his sympathy for the Philippine people and pledged American support no matter what happened to the present force. Roosevelt added that the United States "... shall not relax our efforts until the forces now marshalling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive the last remnant of the invaders from your soil."\(^{54}\)

General MacArthur received the following message from President Roosevelt in answer to his asking for instructions:

I therefore give you this most difficult mission in full understanding of the desperate situation to which you may be shortly reduced. ... Make your resistance as effective ... and as prolonged as humanly possible. ... You, yourself, however, must determine action to be taken in view of circumstances.\(^{55}\)

The general, reading between the lines, now knew that

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\(^{53}\) Toland, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 213-214.

\(^{54}\) Morton, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 354-355.

\(^{55}\) Kelley, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 116.
the Philippines were to be used as a symbol of resistance to the last. He replied to Roosevelt:

I have not the slightest intention in the world of surrendering or capitulating the Filipino forces of my command. I intend to fight to destruction on Bataan and then do the same on Corregidor. 56

Hanson Baldwin, in his book Great Mistakes of the War, stated that it was hard to understand how MacArthur could radio Washington giving tacit approval of President Quezon's message to President Roosevelt only "twenty four days after promising his men that thousands of reinforcements and hundreds of planes were on the way."57 MacArthur, on the other hand, had explained that "such action was necessary to concentrate immediate attention or it would be too late."58

There were bitter rumors of a Washington sell out on Corregidor. Some of the officers remembered that Generals Marshall and MacArthur were not on good personal terms because Marshall still blamed MacArthur for not making him a general when the latter was Chief of Staff. It was

56 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 139.
57 Baldwin, op. cit., p. 75.
58 MacArthur, loc. cit.
feared that Roosevelt and Marshall would let MacArthur rot in the Philippines.59

The men on Bataan at first believed the optimistic reports from MacArthur's Headquarters, but they later despaired. It was here that the "Dugout Doug" stories started. Front line troopers were griping about those on Corregidor who lived in Comfort.60

MacArthur had spent most of his time on Corregidor and he might not have completely realized the great shortage of food on the fighting front. Later, when Wainwright took command, he found the men on Corregidor better fed than those on Bataan.61

Hanson Baldwin stated that the "Dugout Doug" stories which started on Corregidor, were extremely unfair. They cast unwarranted reflections upon MacArthur's personal courage, which was outstanding. In two world wars he had always demonstrated a calm and exemplary bravery.62

During the latter part of February of 1942, General

60Ibid., p. 291.
61Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 38.
62Baldwin, op. cit., p. 73.
MacArthur was ordered to Australia. The general thought that an abrupt departure might result in "collapse in the Philippine area," and he asked to delay his departure until the "psychological time." MacArthur added:

... These people are depending upon me now... and any idea that might develop in their minds that I was being withdrawn for any other purpose than to bring them immediate relief could not be explained. ... 64

General Marshall granted MacArthur this delay in departure. The "psychological time" came six days later on February 24. 65

President Roosevelt knew that General MacArthur's withdrawal would have important reactions, and, at a news conference held on March 17, 1942, made the following statement:

... There is going to be Axis propaganda that will appear this afternoon on their short wave, and tomorrow morning, about how this abandonment of the Philippines is nothing more than another Van Mook having to get out of Java, et cetera. And of course we know what they will say. On the other side of the picture, put it this way, he will be more useful in supreme command of the whole Southwest Pacific than if he stayed

63 Morton, op. cit., p. 357.
64 Ibid., p. 358.
65 Ibid.
on Bataan Peninsula, where of course the
fighting is going on. . . .

The War Department made Jonathan Wainwright Commander-
in-Chief of all forces in the Philippines, promoting him to
lieutenant general in March of 1942. The problem which
Wainwright had to face immediately was the lack of food.67

It was April 1, 1942, that the Japanese attacked
in force.68 The Bataan force held out for eight days and then
it was over. It was not long until Corregidor also surren-
dered. MacArthur wrote of Corregidor:

Corregidor needs no comment from me. It
has sounded its own story at the mouth
of its guns. It has scrolled its own
epitaph on enemy tablets. But through
the bloody haze of its last reverberating
shot, I shall always seem to see a vision
of grim, gaunt, ghastly men, still
unafraid.69

To determine the reasons why Bataan fell, MacArthur's
whole Philippine record has to be taken into consideration.

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66From Franklin D. Roosevelt News Conference, March 17,
1942, in Samuel I. Rosenman (Ed.), The Public Papers of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942),
vol., p. 110.

67Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story,

68Lee, op. cit., p. 195.

69MacArthur, loc. cit.
The general was over-optimistic in thinking that the islands were impregnable. In the early months of 1941, MacArthur had stated that the Japanese had overspent themselves, and felt that there was no reason to fear the Japanese until April of 1942.70

Bataan also fell because of the Japanese strength and the lack of reinforcement for MacArthur's force. These forces were ill due to a shortage of food and supplies.71

The general demanded supplies, but there were reasons why these could not be sent. President Roosevelt, in his Fireside Chat to the people of America on February 23, 1942, stated that:

It is that complete encirclement, with control of the air by Japanese land-based aircraft, which has prevented us from sending substantial reinforcements of men and material to the gallant defenders of the Philippines...72

Looking back on the situation, General Carlos P. Romulo


71 Ibid., p. 36.

In our trap on the Rock we could not know of the tremendous offensive America was concentrating in Europe. Marshall and Eisenhower needed all-out support over them. Enemy submarines were concentrating on the floor of the Atlantic. America's fleet had been destroyed at Pearl Harbor. Washington was desperately building up America's defenses and offensives where they were needed most. America could not spread its offensive across two oceans. The Pacific problem would have to wait.73

There was also much friction which grew during the Bataan fighting and the siege of Corregidor between the branches of the service as well as old personal jealousies.74 All of these things played an important part in the battle and fall of the Philippines.


74 Baldwin, op. cit., p. 72.
CHAPTER V
THE AUSTRALIAN COMMAND

When MacArthur left Corregidor in March, he thought that in Australia he would find men, guns, and planes which he needed to make a counter-attack on the Philippines or at least on the Japanese somewhere in the Southwest Pacific.¹

The general was given a hero's welcome when he arrived in Darwin, but was shocked to find out how few troops were waiting for him there. Instead of finding a great American force assembled, he found Australia in danger of being another Bataan.² MacArthur stated:

The immediate and imperative problem which confronted me was the defense of Australia itself. Its actual military situation had become almost desperate. Its forces were weak to an extreme, and Japanese invasion was momentarily expected. The bulk of its ground troops were in the Middle East, while the United States had only one division present, and that but partially trained. Its air force was equipped with almost obsolete planes and was lacking not only in engines and spare parts, but in personnel. Its navy had no carriers or battleships. The outlook was bleak.³

²Ibid., p. 160.
The force was not large enough for MacArthur to return to the Philippines. The best he could do was to get together those few planes which he had and send them on that last raid on Corregidor and Bataan.\footnote{Lee, op. cit., p. 286.}

MacArthur received a message from General Marshall telling him that due to the seriousness of the war in other areas, there would be a definite limit on what he could expect. This meant that the immediate rescue of the Philippines would have to wait. MacArthur proposed that Russia open a second front against Japan. When all of his proposals were brushed aside, he became convinced that he was opposed by a powerful group of enemies in Washington whose considerations had been influenced by hatred of him.\footnote{Ibid., p. 161.}

In an interview with Bert Andrews of the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} on November 22, 1944, MacArthur criticized Washington's support of the Pacific War. The general stated that:

\begin{quote}
... the Pacific war had been starved in the interests of Europe ... that if he had been given a portion of the force which invaded North Africa, he could have retaken the Philippines in three months because at that time the Japanese were not ready ... We made the same old mistake of intervening
\end{quote}
in European quarrels which we can't hope to solve because they are insoluble. He said that Europe is a dying system. . . . that the history of the world would be written in the Pacific for the next 10,000 years. . . .

The general appears to have been striking back at Washington for neglecting him and brushing away his proposals. In his own mind, he seemed to be striking at powerful enemies who were trying to ruin him.

The Joint Chiefs had appointed MacArthur Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific, Admiral William F. Halsey Commander of the South Pacific, and Admiral Chester Nimitz Commander of the Central Pacific. There was some concern that this type of command might cause friction. Admiral Halsey stated:

I emphasize Supreme Commander to establish the realization that MacArthur and I commanded everything in our respective areas—army, navy, marines, and allies; troops, ships, planes, and supplies. . . . This was my first experience with a composite command, and I was determined that our job should not be slowed by interservice friction. I need not have

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worried. . . .

Sometimes the problem of one commander overstepping another's command occurred, as this entry in the diary of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal testifies:

... Vice Admiral Kinkaid has in his forces under MacArthur six old battleships. Two of these need to be sent back for repair. Nimitz made this suggestion but had to get MacArthur's agreement. MacArthur desires to hold them and has so stated. In exercising his prerogatives of command, if he insists on this order, he will in a sense be overstepping into the broad authority of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. The units MacArthur needs to accomplish his objectives... are obviously a thing of vital interest to him, but the determination of when ships need overhaul or may be necessary for other operations is obviously the interest of... Admiral Nimitz.9

On the other hand, MacArthur spokesmen had frequently stated that their chief was being slighted on material and jurisdiction and might be forced to take a back seat to Admiral Nimitz and others.10

8Ibid.


Early in 1942, the Japanese had gained a foothold at Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen; this was strengthened by the construction of a chain of air and staging bases to the west at Madang, Wewak, Hollandia, and to the Indies. They decided to move down the coast to the Buna-Gona area in Papua, where they set up a base and continued a drive overland to Port Moresby.\textsuperscript{11}

The concept in Australia seemed to be one of passive defense. General MacArthur felt that this could only end in defeat. The general stated:

\begin{quote}
I decided to ... move the thousand miles forward into eastern Papua, and to stop the Japanese on the rough mountains of the Owen Stanley Range of New Guinea--to make the fight for Australia beyond its own borders. If successful, this would save Australia from invasion and give me the opportunity to pass from defense to offensive, to seize the initiative, move forward, and attack.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

MacArthur was able to launch his offensive in September of 1942, due to the arrival of a division of American troops, with the holding of the enemy in check outside Port Moresby. The general had long since marked


\textsuperscript{12}MacArthur, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 152.
the Milne Bay area as a probable Japanese landing point, and as early as June he had moved in a strong force of Australian troops, keeping them well under concealment. The Japanese force which landed here was counterattacked before they could dig in, and were wiped out in a week of fighting. Fighter planes from the Port Moresby strip provided cover for an increasing number of bombers flown over from airfields in Australia. These bombers made heavy raids on supply dumps in the Buna-Gona region which was cutting the enemy facing Port Moresby off from food and ammunition. They soon began to retreat as Australian and American forces pressed them back. 13

... The Japanese troops, severed from all reinforcements, their leaders lost in action or by suicide, their bodies worn with starvation and sickness, and their morale shattered by the unrelenting blows of their attackers, were finally forced to yield their positions. On January 2, 1943, the Buna Mission fell; Sanananda followed, and on January 22nd, the Papua Campaign, after six months of bitter, ceaseless struggle ended. 14

Thus for the first time in World War II, MacArthur

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14 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 165.
took the offensive by land, sea, and air. This offensive
was small, but it was the most important news to come out of
MacArthur's Headquarters in a long time. This was the first
big air-borne troop transporting job taken on by the United
States in a theater of operations.\(^{15}\)

The Japanese began to strengthen garrisons at Lae and
Salamaua on Huon Gulf after defeats at Buna and Gona. This
was to be MacArthur's next objective. A convoy was sighted
on March 1, 1943, heading to reinforce Lae. General Kenney,
MacArthur's air chief, now readied his American-Royal
Australian Air Force in Papua, and attacking the convoy
accomplished one of the most devastating air attacks on ships
of the entire war with the exception of Pearl Harbor.\(^{16}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan in May of
1943, which called for the unconditional surrender of Japan.
This would require a large supply base. The plan called for
the taking of island bases which could be used as "stepping
stones." Admiral Nimitz was to conduct operations through
Japanese held islands, while General MacArthur was to proceed

\(^{15}\)"Toward a Japless New Guinea," *Time*, 40:31,
November 16, 1942, p. 31.

\(^{16}\)Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II*, (Boston: Little, Brown, and
northwest along the New Guinea coast.\textsuperscript{17}

MacArthur stated that "ground, air, and sea operations were thoroughly co-ordinated," and that "it was a new type of campaign--three dimensional warfare--the triphibious concept."\textsuperscript{18}

General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey agreed that the first step of the drive was to reduce Rabaul. Rabaul was the center of things in the South Pacific. If Japan could be denied the use of Rabaul, MacArthur could drive up the New Guinea coast with his seaward flank and secure this base. The Central Pacific assault could then begin without fear of Rabaul's bombers. To get Rabaul a base was needed in the northern Solomons. MacArthur and Halsey agreed on Bougainville.\textsuperscript{19}

In order to win the Huon Peninsula, MacArthur landed a force at Nassau Bay, which lies eleven miles south of Salamaua. This was a town located on the south side of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18}MacArthur, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
\end{itemize}
Markham River. In order to isolate Salamaua, the general took Lae. Once he had done this, its occupation would cut the supply line of Salamaua. On September 4, the general landed an Australian regiment east of Lae, and on the next day, an American parachute regiment was dropped to grab the airfield of Nadzab, 19 miles northwest of Lae.\(^{20}\)

General MacArthur's forces, supported by the Seventh Fleet, secured Papua. Admiral Halsey was able to take an airfield in Bougainville from where the airforce could bomb Rabaul.\(^{21}\)

In both parallel operations, MacArthur and Halsey used a strategy called "leap-frogging." The idea of this was to by-pass the strong islands and land amphibious forces where there were relatively few Japanese troops. Here they would build an airfield and, along with allied naval supremacy, could cut off the by-passed islands.\(^{22}\)

MacArthur stated:

It was practical application of this type


\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 93.
of warfare—to avoid the frontal attack with its terrible loss of life, to bypass Japanese strong-points and neutralize them by cutting their lines of supply; to isolate their armies and starve them from the battlefield; to, as Willie Keeler used to say, "hit 'em where they ain't"—that from this time forward guided my movements and operations. This decision enabled me to accomplish the concept of the direct-target approach from Papua to Manila.23

The "island hopping" could have taken years, according to Samuel Eliot Morison, but MacArthur's idea of "leapfrogging" changed this. Before he died General Tojo told MacArthur that "leapfrogging" was one of the three principal factors that defeated Japan.24

Japanese counter-strategy was to fortify a new defensive perimeter from Saipan through Truk and the Bismarcks to Timor. Their purpose was to delay and wear down the American and Australian offensives, maintain the East Indian frontier with strong ground forces, and to get ready to catch the United States Pacific Fleet off guard.25

The strategic position in the fall of 1943 in the

23MacArthur, op. cit., p. 166.


Southwest Pacific was this: MacArthur's Australian-American forces had secured eastern New Guinea and were preparing to invade the Bismarcks. In two years of fighting, the United States had yet to take any land which had been taken from us or one of our allies since the war began.26

The strategic leadership of General MacArthur along with the energy of his air commander, General George Kenney, combined to produce a most effective air-ground partnership. MacArthur's strategy was to use land-based planes to cover leaps up the New Guinea coast and into the Philippines. The Army got its leaps covered, and the air force got island bases from which to gain air supremacy and advance to where its bombers could get at Japan.27

MacArthur, at the age of 64, was as air-minded as the youngest pilot. He had learned a great lesson of the air age. He had learned that it was poor strategy to needlessly expose troops or ships to an enemy with air supremacy. Wewak was a strong base, and instead of immediate invasion, MacArthur had Kenney send a contingent of his air force to

26Hough, op. cit., p. 125.

make raids on the base. 28

Rabaul had always been the main objective of Operation Watchtower, and it was a shock to MacArthur when General Marshall suggested that he leapfrog Rabaul instead of assaulting it. Rabaul's substitute was to be Kavieng in New Ireland and Manus in the Admiralties. The great leap, coupled later with a decision to bypass Kavieng as well, proved to be fortunate. There were still close to 100,000 defenders under a tough and resourceful general on Rabaul. Since it had been a stockpiling base for various invasions which never came off, the Japanese garrison had plenty of weapons, ammunition, and supplies. This leap that isolated Rabaul was made by MacArthur with a reconnaissance force. The general thought that a force of this size was large enough to make a brisk retreat if the enemy was there in strength. The general decided to let this force remain and to reinforce them quickly. MacArthur, from his knowledge of Japanese ground tactics, rightly predicted that the enemy would commit his army piecemeal, and that each small group could be defeated. 29

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29 Ibid., p. 294.
MacArthur stated:

Rabaul was being steadily emasculated. Enemy thrusts from that once-powerful stronghold were becoming weak and ineffectual, and by the end of February, 1944, had no air support whatsoever. In spite of replacements and reinforcements, the once-powerful Japanese air force in this area had been defeated almost to the point of extinction.30

With Rabaul sealed off, MacArthur's next move was to leapfrog the strong Japanese force at Wewak into Hollandia, where he would set up new advance headquarters. General Kenney had been making massive air assaults, which had almost knocked out Hollandia as an enemy air base. There was not one enemy plane which rose from the five target fields to intercept carrier-based bombers.31

On the night of April 21, 1944, cruisers and destroyers began firing the preliminary bombardment, and after dawn, the latter day, landing forces moved in against the beaches of Aitape and Hollandia. This was preceded by intense fire from rocket-gun boats. Resistance was light in both places. By April 23, all the airfields were in American hands and our


fighters were being set up on Aitape air strip.  

Hollandia was the crucial move in the Pacific; this move was as important to the end in New Guinea as Leyte was to the conquest of the Philippines. The Japanese were caught off guard and resistance soon faded. MacArthur joined the invasion forces, for he wished to set up a major base at this point. The Americans were able to capture some valuable supplies at Hollandia, for the Japanese had used it as a supply depot. As the forces moved inland resistance was tougher, but by August of 1944, the conquest of the northern coast of New Guinea was completed.

General MacArthur needed no urging to push westward rapidly along the coast of New Guinea. He had already outlined to his staff a series of assaults which pointed toward Mindanao by November 15, 1944.

It had been the general's intention to proceed by a series of envelopments up the coast of New Guinea and into the Philippines. By this time, he had superiority of the sea and air. This enabled MacArthur to land his forces where the

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32Pratt, op. cit., p. 269.

33Ibid., pp. 269-270.

Japanese were the weakest and confine their stronger forces to areas in which the Japanese were caught in pockets from which they could never break out. This resulted in hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops being isolated in Pacific jungles at the time of surrender.\(^\text{35}\)

In little more than three months, MacArthur advanced 550 miles from Hollandia to Cape Sansapor. He had acquired three big Japanese air bases: Hollandia, Wokde, and Biak, which he picked up enroute and a fourth, Wewak was leap-frogged.\(^\text{36}\)

These results had been achieved through expert planning and great teamwork between the Army, Navy, and Air-force of the United States and Australia, but as Samuel Eliot Morison has stated: "It is questionable whether they could have been attained under any other commander but MacArthur. Those who served under him, in whatever arm of the service or from whatever country, greatly respected his military judgment and leadership. His operations were smartly executed, and took place on or close to the set


target dates with very few snarls. 37

The general had reason to move fast; he was imbued with a burning determination to return to the Philippines and avenge the humiliating defeats which the Americans had suffered in 1941 and 1942. There was also the obligation of the United States to the Filipino people, and this could not be ignored. 38

MacArthur felt that Hollandia would give him a jumping off place for Mindanao, the southernmost island of the Philippines, where he was sure there would be substantial Philippine support. 39 The general sent the following to the Joint Chiefs:

It is my opinion that purely military considerations demand the reoccupation of the Philippines in order to cut the enemy's communications to the south and secure a base for our further advance. . . . Moreover, if the United States should deliberately bypass the Philippines, leaving our prisoners, nationals, and loyal Filipinos in enemy hands without an effort to retrieve them at the earliest moment, we would have the gravest psychological reaction. . . . 40

37 Ibid.
38 Cannon, op. cit., p. 2.
40 Cannon, op. cit., p. 4.
General Marshall cautioned MacArthur to "be careful not to let personal feelings and Philippine politics" override the great objective, which was to end the war. He also pointed out that "bypassing" was not the same as abandonment. 41

General MacArthur was invited by General Marshall to attend a conference at Pearl Harbor in order to confer with Admiral Nimitz on future plans for the war in the Pacific. When he arrived, the general found President Roosevelt, who invited the officers to dinner, took out a map, pointed to Leyte and said, "Well Douglas, where do we go from here?"42

The Navy proposed a move going directly into Formosa from Saipan and Mindanao, bypassing the Philippines. MacArthur was still intent on liberating the Philippines and using Luzon for the springboard to Japan.43

General MacArthur, as he later explained it, made a strong emotional argument:

... Militarily, I felt that if I could secure the Philippines, it would enable us to clamp an air and naval blockade on the flow of all supplies from the south

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 5.
to Japan, and thus, by paralyzing her industries, force her to early capitulation. . . I felt that Formosa, with a hostile population, might prove doubtful to serve as a base for attack against Japan itself. I was also critical of what I regarded as a major blunder in originally abandoning all effort to relieve the Philippines. . . . It was not only a moral obligation to release this friendly possession from the enemy . . . but that to fail to do so would not be understandable to the Oriental mind. Not to do so, moreover, would result in the death of thousands of prisoners, including American women, children, and men civilians, held in Philippine concentration camps. . . .

It was finally decided not to bypass the Philippines, but to support MacArthur's invasion of the islands by way of Mindanao. There was also, at the same time, to be a vigorous advance by the fleet toward either Formosa or Luzon. The President approved these plans and it looked like the Navy and MacArthur would be working together in harmony in the Pacific. MacArthur approved and said that he would change his plans accordingly.45

There seemed to be no strong disagreement between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Leahy stated:

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I personally was convinced that they together were the best qualified officers in our service for this tremendous task, and they could work together in full agreement toward the common end of defeating Japan.46

There were others who favored the Philippines first also. Samuel Eliot Morison stated that Formosa "would have been a difficult island upon which to obtain a lodgment," because "its steppingstone to the mainland of Japan would not have materialized, since by that time Japan firmly controlled the entire coast of China."47 Admiral Leahy stated that "from a purely strategical point of view, I was in favor of the Philippine operation."48 Admiral Halsey felt that it was necessary and profitable to go into the Philippines, for he considered them to be "the vulnerable belly of the Imperial Dragon."49 General Wedemeyer stated that the move to the Philippines would "immediately cut the enemy lines from Japan to his conquered territory to the southward."50

46Ibid.
48Leahy, op. cit., p. 229.
49Cannon, op. cit., p. 5.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that none of these currently selected objectives could be by-passed. They, therefore, continued to find a means by which the war in the Pacific might be stepped up.51

51Cannon, loc. cit.
CHAPTER VI

THE RECONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES

The purpose of the Leyte Campaign was to establish an air and logistical base in the Leyte area in order to support operations in the Luzon--Formosa--China coast area and particularly to nullify Japanese strength on Luzon. It was hoped that the Leyte Valley could be used for major airfields and base sites from which large-scale operations could be launched against the rest of the Philippines.¹

The Joint Chiefs ordered General MacArthur to prepare plans for a return to Mindanao, southernmost island of the Philippines, with a target date of November 15, 1944. On June 15, MacArthur issued a plan for the retaking of the Philippines.² MacArthur stated:

My plan, called "Reno," was based on the premise that the Philippine Archipelago, lying directly in the main sea routes from Japan to the source of her raw materials and oil in the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Indo China, was the most strategic objective in the Southwest Pacific area. Whoever controlled the air and naval bases in the Philippine Islands logically controlled the main


²Ibid., p. 2.
artery of supply to Japan's factories...

"Reno" enabled our forces to depart from a base closest to the objective, and advance against the most lightly organized positions of the enemy's defenses, effecting a decisive penetration...

Initial lodgments were to be effected in southern Mindanao on November 15, and at Leyte Gulf on December 20th.

The major effort of this operation was to be an amphibious landing with forces mounted from New Guinea for the taking of bases on Leyte. Leyte would then be made into an excellent springboard from which to launch later attacks against the Japanese in Formosa or in the rest of the Philippines.

When the Joint Chiefs asked MacArthur and Nimitz their opinions on advancing the target dates by by-passing any presently selected objectives, the commanders were in agreement. They both stated that it was impossible unless certain conditions changed. General MacArthur added that by-passing any objectives before the seizure of Formosa was not practical. An attack against Formosa would have no land-based air support, for they were based on Hawaii 5,100 miles away. He felt it was necessary to take Luzon and set

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4 Cannon, op. cit., p. 6.
up land-based aircraft first.  

As plans stood, General MacArthur would continue his advance along western New Guinea, Truk was to be neutralized by fast carrier strikes, the Marianas were to be occupied by Central Pacific forces starting June 15, and Mindanao was to be taken by MacArthur, supported by the Pacific Fleet, in November of 1944.  

Early in 1942, General MacArthur's headquarters began to receive messages from guerrilla forces in the Philippines. Recognition was slow at first, for the general wasn't sure that they were from the guerrillas. By August, he had tried to get in touch with members of the movement. Two radios were set up, and these furnished MacArthur information on Japanese activities in the area. As a result, the general was able to piece together a fairly good picture of Japanese strength, dispositions, and fortifications on Leyte. They were not only a great help in intelligence, but bolstered the morale, spirit, and loyalty of the Filipino people.

On August 31, 1944, General MacArthur issued his first

5Ibid., p. 3.


7Cannon, op. cit., pp. 18, 20.
formal directive covering projected operations in the area of the Philippines. The Leyte operation was to be known as King II. The forces of the Southwest Pacific were to capture areas on Mindanao, Leyte, and Samar in order to set up air, naval, and logistic bases to cover later Philippines operations.8

On September 13, Admiral Bull Halsey, discovering the weakness of Japanese air power in the Philippines, suggested that all the Palau, Yap, Morotai, and Mindanao landings be called off in favor of an immediate thrust on Leyte.9

Halsey conferred with MacArthur and sent messages to Admiral Nimitz and the Joint Chiefs, recommending that a joint assault be made on Leyte on October 20, two months ahead of schedule. The Joint Chiefs concurred.10

General Marshall received a message from MacArthur which demonstrated notable strategic flexibility: "Subject to completion of arrangements with Nimitz, we shall execute Leyte Operations on 20 October...MacArthur."11

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8Ibid., p. 23.
11Cannon, op. cit., p. 9.
In early October, MacArthur's military forces and Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet began to concentrate at Manus, Hollandia, and other places along the New Guinea Coast. On October 10, the Northward movement began, and by October 18, all the islands commanding the entrances to Leyte Gulf had been secured by rangers.12

The Joint Chiefs directed Admiral Nimitz to support MacArthur's operation against Leyte. Admiral Nimitz ordered Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet to "destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine area."13

Three weeks before the great naval battle at Leyte, October 14, 1944, the Joint Chiefs decided to liberate Luzon and Manila as General MacArthur had always wanted. Formosa was rejected on practical grounds. It was decided that if the landings on Leyte went well, the five divisions used here in reserve would be ready for a second amphibious operation before the end of 1944. Landings at Lingayen Gulf in northern Luzon were put on the program for December of 1944.14


MacArthur stated:

I had no illusion about the operation. I knew it was to be the crucial battle of the war in the Pacific. On its outcome would depend the fate of the Philippines and the future of the war against Japan. Leyte was to be the anvil against which I hoped to hammer the Japanese into submission in the central Philippines—the springboard from which I could proceed to the conquest of Luzon, for the final assault against Japan itself. . . .15

MacArthur gave General Kenney's air force its mission. This mission was to make aerial reconnaissance, co-ordinate with carrier-based aircraft to neutralize hostile forces in range of the islands, to protect convoys, and to destroy Japanese shipping and installations in the area.16

MacArthur stated that the ground operations would be in four phases:

. . . Phase one covered minor preliminary landings to secure small islands lying across the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Phase two included the main amphibious assaults on Leyte from Dulag to Tacloban, and called for the seizure of the airstrip, an advance through Leyte Valley, and the opening of San Juanico and Panaon Straits. The third phase consisted of the necessary overland and shore-to-shore operations to complete the capture of Leyte and the seizure of southern Samar. Phase four

15MacArthur, op. cit., p. 212.

16Cannon, op. cit., p. 27.
contemplated the occupation of the remainder of Samar and the further neutralization of enemy positions in the Visayas.17

During the night of October 19-20, destroyers near the shore shelled the Japanese forces on land. The American forces were safely within Leyte Gulf, for the big event had arrived.18

The invasion of Leyte precipitated the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Japanese naval force moved in three columns, converging on Leyte Gulf. Three Actions followed. There was one in Surigao Strait; one off Cape Engano; and one off Samar Island; together they became the greatest naval battle of the war.19

There was later comment that the golden chance to destroy the entire Japanese Navy at one time had been missed. However, the victory achieved was enough to convince the Japanese that they should never again risk their vessels in a fleet action.20 Admiral Halsey stated:

18Cannon, op. cit., p. 59.
The key point is that we had two fleets in the Philippine waters under separate commands: My Third Fleet was under the command of Admiral Nimitz; Tom Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet was under the command of MacArthur. . . . In my opinion, it is vital for the Navy never to expose itself again to the perils of a divided command in the same area.21

MacArthur stated:

. . . . It was a dramatic situation fraught with disaster. . . . Should the enemy gain entrance to Leyte Gulf, his powerful naval guns could pulverize any of the eggshell transports present in the area and destroy vitally needed supplies on the beachhead. . . . Ashore, all I had been able to do was call for carrier air cover over the Leyte beaches. Under the divided command setup, I had no effectual control over the Third Fleet. . . . 22

The landings on Leyte were easy, compared with most amphibious operations in World War II. The weather was perfect, there was no surf, no mines or underwater obstacles, slight enemy reaction, mostly mortar fire. Therefore, "liberation of the Philippines was off to a


good start."23

The landings took place less than six weeks after Admiral Halsey had sent his first message reporting light Japanese resistance. This was the result of one of the fastest pieces of major battle planning on United States record.24

General MacArthur, President Osmeña, General Romulo, and other officers waded ashore on the third assault wave. To millions of Filipinos MacArthur spoke from the beaches over a portable radio transmitter. The general said:

People of the Philippines,... I have returned,... Rally to me,... Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on as the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike.

The American people joyfully received the news of the success of the American forces in establishing the first foothold in the Philippines. President Roosevelt congratulated MacArthur saying that: "you have the nation's


gratitude and the nation's prayers for success as you and your men fight your way back. . . ."26

The airfields of Dulag and Tacloban fell into our hands on October 21, and Army Engineers immediately went to work improving them.27

There was lighter resistance during the first days of battle, and because of the successes, General MacArthur thought it would not be necessary to use the 77th Infantry Division, now of Guam, on Leyte. On October 29, he transferred control of the division from General Kreuger to Admiral Nimitz. Shortly afterward, the Japanese began their reinforcement of Leyte, and a captured Japanese field order revealed an all-out offensive would be launched against American forces in mid-November. This led MacArthur to ask Nimitz to direct the 77th Division to the Tacloban area on Leyte. Nimitz replied that they were being sent to Manus, and when they arrived, operational control would revert to MacArthur. The general then ordered this division to Leyte on November 15, where they were to be controlled by General

26Cannon, op. cit., p. 84.

Kreuger.28

On December 7, the 77th Division was landed three miles south of Ormoc. This placed the Japanese forces in this area between two fires. The Ormoc area was taken and by the end of December, the whole island was cleared.29

The Japanese had lost more than half their navy. Leyte was to the war in the Pacific what St. Lo was to the war in Europe; it was the crushing blow. Documents, captured from the Japanese, showed that they were completely deceived by MacArthur's landing on Leyte in 1944, for they expected a two prong attack in northern Luzon and Mindanao.30

There were strong disagreements which developed between the War and Interior Departments as to who should administer Civil Affairs in the Islands. The Interior Department wanted a civil representative of the High Commissioner of the Philippines to accompany the assault troops. MacArthur insisted that he should not. The President stepped in and resolved the argument in favor of MacArthur, who was to

28 Cannon, op. cit., p. 276.
devise his own policy for civil affairs during the reoccupa-
tion of the Philippines. The general created a civil affairs
unit in his headquarters and outlined the policies to be
followed. MacArthur would delegate the administration of
civil affairs and relief in the liberated areas as soon as
possible to a representative of the Commonwealth Government.
The only restrictions on Filipinos would be those required
by military necessity. The Philippine Commonwealth was, by
arrangement with MacArthur, to determine the guilt or
innocence of collaborationists, but United States commanders
were to have authority to deal with suspects if necessary.31

The general also set up financial policies to be
followed. In liberated areas a new series of Philippine
Treasury Certificates would be introduced. These would have
an exchange rate of two per American dollar. Wage rates
were to be paid to Filipino laborers at an established rate,
and ceiling prices were set.32

Eight Philippine Civil Affairs units were attached to
the Sixth Army by MacArthur, which were to aid the field
commanders in the administration of civil affairs and relief.

31Cannon, op. cit., p. 199.
32Ibid.
As soon as conflict ended in an area, a civil affairs unit stepped in to restore normal living. Organized resistance on Leyte had no sooner ceased than a new assault was planned; this was the reconquest of Luzon. MacArthur stated:

In the campaign for the liberation of the Philippines, I now faced my final and decisive objective, the recapture of Luzon. It was a difficult and dangerous problem, for the Japanese ground forces greatly outnumbered my own. I needed one last stepping stone before a main attack could be launched. The island of Mindoro was selected. It was located just south of Luzon in a central position along the coast. Its possession would enable me to return to my strategy of never leaping ahead of my own air cover. Midway between Leyte and the Lingayen Gulf area of Luzon, an airfield on Mindoro could be used to cover a landing at Lingayen, which was to be my point of assault on Luzon.

The general by-passed many strongly held islands, striking at Mindoro in the central Philippines, just south of Luzon. There came several setbacks, but finally two American airfields were set up on the island by December 23, 1944. The battle for Luzon was near, and the gate to

33Ibid., p. 200.
34Fuller, op. cit., p. 377.
36Hough, op. cit., p. 317.
Lingayen was Mindoro; the keys were now held by MacArthur.\textsuperscript{37}

On November 13-14, of 1944, MacArthur urgently requested that Admiral Halsey continue strikes on Luzon. The concentration was to be on the Japanese reinforcements which were being moved in.\textsuperscript{38}

It was calculated that nine divisions would be needed. The five divisions in Leyte would be ready for another operation before the end of 1944, and it was decided that these would be enough to invade Luzon. The Joint Chiefs had planned the landings at Lingayen Gulf in Luzon for December 20. This was a hard time-table to follow as resistance on Leyte was prolonged; there had been revived Japanese air power and Kamikaze raids. The Japanese had decided that Leyte was a loss and they were concentrating on defending Luzon.\textsuperscript{39}

The Lingayen landings in northern Luzon were postponed a couple of weeks and took place on January 9, 1945. The general had utilized the same spot, Lingayen Gulf, that


\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 476.
the Japanese had used three years before. The initial resistance was light, for the main force seemed to have taken to the mountains on either side.40

Generals MacArthur and Krueger went ashore, and meeting with other commanders, stressed the urgency of occupying Manila as early as possible in order to free the Allied prisoners and internees, who were slowly starving to death. General MacArthur stated that our losses had been small and predicted that the Japanese would evacuate Manila rather than defend it. This was the Japanese intention, but orders were not carried out.41

The Japanese evidently did not want to risk fighting on the broad central plain, and had taken to the mountains, leaving the route open to Manila.42

The move to Manila was slow, and along the way natives displayed American and Philippine flags welcoming their liberators with touching demonstrations. The Japanese had ordered Manila evacuated, but 20,000 troops refused to give

40Hough, op. cit., p. 317.


42Hough, loc. cit.
up and fought on to the bitter end. The fighting turned to a house to house, inch by inch fighting as many Japanese defended Manila.  

MacArthur stated:

I was fighting on ground that had witnessed my father's military triumph nearly fifty years earlier and my own campaigns at the beginning of the war. I knew every wrinkle of the terrain, every foot of the topography. I was able to avoid many a pitfall, to circumvent many an enemy trap. To have saved lives in this way is perhaps my most gratifying memory of the war. My staff did not like my frontline activity. . . .

It had taken nearly three weeks to take Manila. During the months of battle, the Japanese defense forces were wiped out almost to a man. By March 4, 1945, the city of Manila had been cleared.

Before the fighting ended, MacArthur called a provisional assembly of Filipino notables to Malacañan Palace where his father had served as military governor. In this gathering he declared the Commonwealth of the Philippines permanently reestablished.

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43Morison, op. cit., p. 488.
44MacArthur, op. cit., p. 246.
General MacArthur was not satisfied with the liberation of Leyte, Samar, and Luzon. He wanted to chase the enemy from the entire area. In February of 1945, the Visayas and Mindanao were to be liberated by the Seventh Fleet and Eighth Army. The Joint Chiefs didn't immediately approve of these plans, as General Marshall had told the British at Yalta that he had no plan for using major forces of the United States to mop up in the Philippines; the remainder would be done by Filipino guerrillas. It looked as if the Seventh Fleet and the Eighth Army would not be needed for Iwo Jima and Okinawa, so the Joint Chiefs let MacArthur do as he chose.47

The campaign was finally closed. MacArthur stated:

On July 4th, I announced the official end of the Philippine Campaign. Some minor isolated action of a guerrilla nature in practically uninhabited mountain ranges was to be expected, but the great land mass of 115,600 square miles, with its population of 17,000,000 was now free of the invader.48

President Truman had been in office only a short time after the death of Franklin Roosevelt, but he wired the

47Ibid., p. 490.

48MacArthur, op. cit., p. 259.
following message:

My sincere congratulations to you and your command. You have swept the enemy from all the Philippines and redeemed the promises of the American people to the loyal Filipino people. . . . I am confident that the powerful base we are now fashioning in the Philippines will play its full part in the final knock-out blow against Japan and restore the world to peace, freedom, and sanity. 49

Strategic mistakes were made by both MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs during the time of the Philippine mop up. MacArthur, as it later turned out, could have leapfrogged the Visayas and Mindanao. The Filipinos in these islands were not suffering greatly and the Japanese were cut off from reinforcement and would have surrendered anyway at the end of the war. These forces could have been used in Java and Sumatra, where the Dutch colonists were suffering greatly. When MacArthur did propose the move, the Joint Chiefs should have found the necessary shipping, but the war was not expected to end so fast. The general proposed such a plan in February of 1945, to be carried out the next June. Higher officials held up the plan until August when it was too late. By that time, MacArthur had all he could

handle with the occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{50}

CHAPTER VII

THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

The Atomic Bomb, which was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, brought the Pacific War to a rapid conclusion. It was on August 14, that President Truman received the Emperor's acceptance of the surrender terms. The President then announced to the world that Douglas MacArthur would be Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers for the surrender and the occupation of Japan.¹

On August 15, 1945, MacArthur sent the Japanese an order by radio for "immediate cessation of hostilities" and to send "a competent representative" to Manila to receive instructions for the formal surrender and the reception of occupation forces. The date for the first landings was set for August 26, at Atsugi Airport.²

The basic charter for surrender and occupation was the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945. This document ordered the demobilization and occupation of the country


²Ibid., pp. 359-360.
until its terms were met. Warlords were to be permanently eliminated. MacArthur's task as Supreme Allied Commander was to carry out this order. 3

The task was four-fold. First, to eliminate Japan as a military menace; second, to collect indemnities and reparations demanded by countries which had suffered from Japanese aggression; third, to establish a "peaceful and responsible" government, pointed toward democratic principles; and fourth, to recreate an economic structure which would support the islands. 4

Ambassador William Sebald stated:

. . . the Occupation generally was regarded within Japan as General MacArthur's one-man show. His personality dominated nearly everything done by the American authorities. His many statements and press releases set the tone of the entire Occupation, and to most Japanese he was the fountainhead of Allied power. . . . 5

Sebald went on to disclose that this idea was pushed by

4Ibid.
MacArthur's policy of remaining "aloof from the Japanese" which gave him the "appearance of replacing the hitherto inaccessible Emperor." 6

One of the small controversies which arose during the Occupation was the conflict between MacArthur and the Far Eastern Commission. Even though the general was governed by basic and detailed directives formulated in Washington during the closing days of the war and the beginning of the Occupation, the policy was eventually set up by the Far Eastern Commission, composed of eleven Allied powers which sat in Washington. The Commission had no direct authority over MacArthur, but sent what was referred to as "terms of reference." 7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were the transmitting agency for policy decisions reached by the Far Eastern Commission and sometimes prepared these as directives to MacArthur from the United States Government. This cumbersome arrangement at times caused dissatisfaction within the Commission over MacArthur's implementation of its policy decisions. Many times the general, anticipating what might be coming,

6Ibid.

7Ibid.
placed policy in effect without waiting for it to be authorized.\(^8\)

William Sebald was MacArthur's deputy on the Far Eastern Commission, and of the general's feeling for this body he stated:

MacArthur made no secret of his dislike for the Allied Council, which he regarded as an unwanted intrusion into the Occupation and an undesirable vehicle of Soviet propaganda.\(^9\)

Sebald stated his own feeling about the Commission as follows:

\[\ldots\text{I regarded it as a highly important element in the regime and control of Occupied Japan and a useful organization for the United States.}\ldots\] \(^{10}\)

In Japan, General MacArthur was respected by these people for his benevolence rather than his power. He believed that military occupations could only set up a framework for democracy. The real job had to be done by the people themselves, for democracy at "bayonet point" would not work. It would be overthrown as soon as the

\(^{8}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 55.\)

\(^{9}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 62.\)

\(^{10}\text{Ibid.}\)
force was removed.  

The general had to begin with political and social reforms for which there was little precedent. It was necessary to know something of the Japanese history and culture, for a spark had to be restored to the beaten Japanese to produce the will and energy to go ahead. MacArthur aligned himself with the masses against their autocrats. Food was brought in for the people who were starving, and the general's own forces were ordered to eat any of Japan's indigenous food products.

The Japanese, of their own free will, wrote into their Constitution a provision outlawing war. MacArthur explained this act by stating that these people above all others "understand atomic warfare," for they "counted their dead and buried them."

During the Occupation there was a controversy over

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11Brines, op. cit., p. 61
12Ibid., p. 59.
problems between MacArthur and the State Department. This was largely due to the general's conducting, on his own, business which was considered by the State Department as its jurisdiction. As time went on, this point was never settled, but MacArthur was polite about the situation.\textsuperscript{14}

There were many misunderstandings between MacArthur and Washington before the outbreak of the Korean War which were critical enough for concern. There were times when the general pursued his own plans until one of his objectives had been completed and then accepted by Washington. If there was any complaint from Washington, MacArthur would condemn the "Washington interference, especially by the State Department crowd."\textsuperscript{15} One issue was over MacArthur's wanting his own code to transmit messages to Washington. Perhaps the most serious single issue between MacArthur and State Department officials was over the status of Formosa. This centered around a number of arguments outlined by the State Department which minimized the importance of Formosa in case of attack. This was taken by MacArthur as abandonment.

\textsuperscript{14}Sebald, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 119.
Many rumors went around during 1949 about a State Department takeover of the Occupation. As this continued, the general became more and more irritated and annoyed. These rumors seemed to imply that the State Department could do the job better than the general.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 120-121.}

On one occasion MacArthur charged that a State Department clique was trying to undermine him. This occurred because a British diplomat wanted to see the general and, due to the heavy burden of Korea, had not been received. The British Embassy in Washington asked the State Department about it. They, in turn, wrote to Mr. Sebald who consulted MacArthur. When Mr. Sebald asked the general if it might not be useful for him to occasionally meet these diplomats and brief them on Korea, MacArthur stated that "this would serve no useful purpose."\footnote{Ibid., p. 117.} The general then went on in such a way that his egotism began to show:

\begin{quote}
... Why, as a sovereign, should I? President Truman doesn't do so, nor
\end{quote}
does the King of England or any other head of state. . . .19

It seemed as though MacArthur felt that he was performing not a single army assignment but an exalted historical mission. He was swept up in the process of reconstruction with a feeling of spiritual purpose in a moment of unsurpassed national disaster.20

During this time MacArthur was often in a philosophical mood as he contemplated his handiwork in the Occupation. The general stated in 1948:

My major advisors now have boiled down almost to two men--George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. One founded the United States, the other saved it. If you go back into their lives, you can find almost all the answers.21

The general seemed to know that he needed public support, but his military background rebelled at the need of either defending his actions or explaining them. He expected the same type of absolute authority as in wartime and the same unquestioning support. To the general, the

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19Ibid.
21Ibid., p. 93.
critic was unpatriotic and dangerous.22

There was another old problem of the general's that showed itself during this period of occupation, and this was his sensitiveness to press criticism. The press kept a close watch on the Occupation and there was plenty of criticism. Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in their book The MacArthur Controversy, state:

The wonder of the occupation, the mounting sense of historic mission, the protective adoration of the staff—all these made the Supreme Commander's headquarters morbidly sensitive to any criticism.23

A less sensitive person or a more practiced politician would have ignored the attacks, but the general never could. Ambassador William Sebald stated:

The hypersensitive general . . . often replied to the attacks on him . . . thus furnishing the press with more copy and adding fuel to the controversy of the moment. Neither MacArthur nor his advisors seemed to understand how often this tactic helped to enlarge and prolong issues that otherwise might have died from undernourishment.24

22Brines, op. cit., p. 68.
23Rovere, op. cit., p. 93.
24Sebald, op. cit., p. 111.
MacArthur made many ill-advised attempts to dispute published stories in the world's newspapers. There were times when he launched out at representatives of the State Department for reporting what was being printed. Ambassador Sebald stated that in 1948 he was ordered by MacArthur "to draft a lengthy press release of rebuttal, based upon the accounts of the press campaign transmitted to Tokyo in routine State Department telegrams." 25

The quarrels between the general and individual news correspondents became famous while the Occupation was in the headlines. Most of the time these skirmishes were magnified. These were battles which the general could not win, for the last word was always had by the press. 26

Ambassador Sebald stated:

... I was concerned that these public statements far from convincing the world that the United States meant business in Asia, gave aid and comfort to the enemy by demonstrating divisions in our leadership and weaknesses in our national purpose. 27

Though MacArthur was first of all a militarist, he

25Ibid.

26Ibid., p. 113.

27Ibid., p. 125.
found himself bogged down with problems of economics and human psychology. This was completely a new experience. From the outset three goals were to be accomplished. First, to insure that Japan would not become a major menace to the United States or to the peace of the world; second, to bring about the eventual setting up of a peaceful and responsible government; and third, the clear United States objective of keeping Japan out of the Communist camp. The first two goals were achieved quickly, but the other was a little harder to accomplish.

Ambassador William Sebald stated:

The achievement of the three major objectives was in large measure the result of the initiative of General MacArthur . . . But even MacArthur might have been impotent if Washington had failed to recognize in time that the pressures of events had out dated many of the carefully prepared plans for conducting the Occupation. . . .

One of the general's biggest accomplishments in Japan was land reform. Land ownership was in the hands of the few at the close of World War II. In two years time, about five million acres of land changed hands. About two million

28 Ibid., p. 293.
29 Ibid., p. 294.
tenants became landowners. This made it possible for Japan's agriculture to be one of the quickest national activities to recover. 30

General MacArthur has stated that he believed that "the termination of military hostilities should be a definite thing." He also stated that the Japanese respected and admired the American way of life. They had been told that America was the most brutal of all nations, but when they found that this was not true, they wanted "to follow us and to copy what we did." 31


31Hearings, op. cit., p. 310.
CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR IN KOREA

When World War II came to a close Korea was divided at the 38th Parallel, and its internal affairs soon became chaotic. The United States and Russia became involved in a dispute over the division of the peninsula. In December of 1945, at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, it was decided to establish a joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission over Korea. The United States tried to use this commission to set up some type of agreement for nearly two years, but no decisions were possible.1

In 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that 45,000 troops stationed in Korea be evacuated. It was felt that this would not impair the military position of the United States in the Far East.2

General MacArthur agreed with the Joint Chiefs in favoring the withdrawal of troops at this time. In September


of 1947, the general said that "there was nothing peculiarly threatening at that time in Korea." He also went on to state that there had been considerable pressure from South Korea for the removal of these troops. President Truman stated that our commander in Korea, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, reported that the Koreans felt that under the dual occupation no real freedom or independence could be accomplished, and that "they wanted their independence and were beginning to think that the Allied powers were not sincere in their promise." Hodge also added that "it was growing daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government would not greatly improve as long as the dual occupation continued."4

When the North Koreans plunged across the 38th Parallel in 1950, the American government received its first report from the United Press News Service instead of from the military personnel in Korea. General MacArthur was


4Truman, op. cit., p. 318.
asked for a report.\textsuperscript{5}

MacArthur made an aerial reconnaissance of the combat area. When it was completed, he said that the South Koreans were in good defensive positions and should be able to hang on. The general indicated that upon his return to Tokyo he would request commitment of United States troops.\textsuperscript{6}

The President of the United States and his advisors unanimously agreed that the North Korean invasion must be repulsed. As Truman stated, there was "an almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done."\textsuperscript{7}

The United States official policy was that it was responding to the aggression in Korea as part of a concerted United Nations action, just as were other members of that body. It was understood that the United States would be the major contributor because of its interest in the Pacific. The United Nations Security Council, on July 7, 1950, set


\textsuperscript{7}Truman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 334.
up the only workable arrangement by recommending that a unified command be established in Korea, and that the United States name the commander.\textsuperscript{3}

President Truman immediately ordered MacArthur to use American air and naval power to support the South Korean Army. The American forces were, however, to limit their operations to the area below the 38th parallel. When MacArthur let Truman know how desperate the situation was, and asked for a counter-offensive, the President authorized him to use ground units. All three branches of the American armed services were committed.\textsuperscript{9}

There was some concern about MacArthur's appointment to this new assignment. James Reston, in his column in the \textit{New York Times}, stated:

\begin{quote}
... MacArthur is a sovereign power in his own right, with stubborn confidence in his own judgment. Diplomacy and vast concern for the opinions and sensitiveness of others are the political qualities essential to this new assignment, and these are precisely the qualities General MacArthur has been accused of lacking in
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{9}Truman, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 337-338.
the past.\textsuperscript{10}

This statement began to show itself to be true; MacArthur still seemed to lack these qualities.

When it looked like the ground situation in Korea was desperate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a directive which not only gave MacArthur control of the Seventh Fleet, but also gave him permission to attack military targets north of the 38th Parallel.\textsuperscript{11}

General MacArthur, during the Senate investigations following his dismissal, stated of his early defensive tactics in Korea:

\ldots I felt that it was entirely problematical whether we could save any remnants of the South Korean Army or establish any position in Korea. My directives were to establish a beachhead in the neighborhood of Pusan and take such steps as I felt I could within the means I possessed to support the Korean government and help maintain the South Koreans.\textsuperscript{12}

The general's immediate problem was to halt the advance of the enemy ground and flank units. The force that MacArthur had to work with was worn out from World War II,


\textsuperscript{11}Karig, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{12}Hearings, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 231-232.
and had old equipment from this period also. He had requested more troops, but had been turned down by Washington. One reason for this was the fact that in the first dark days of the war, Washington was hoping for a speedy containment. This was because it was felt that Korea might be a move to divert attention from an amphibious move elsewhere.\textsuperscript{13}

One of the big problems that arose during the Korean War was the question over the use of Formosan troops. In the early days of the war MacArthur had advised against the use of Formosan troops in Korea because he felt that this would not only weaken that country's defense, but that they would need so much logistical training that they "would be an albatross around our neck for months."\textsuperscript{14} Later the general wanted to use these troops against the administration's wishes.\textsuperscript{15}

President Truman sent Averill Harriman on a mission to speak with MacArthur and clear up the question of Formosan troops. When the meeting had taken place, the President hoped that this would clear up the situation, but these hopes

\textsuperscript{13} Middleton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 99.
were soon shattered. A few weeks later the general sent a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars criticizing American-Formosan policy. 15

One of the outstanding events of the Korean War was the Inchon Invasion. The original idea for an amphibious landing at Inchon was General MacArthur's and his alone. The idea was conceived in early July and the general had argued for it with every senior military commander in the Far Eastern Theater. This was to be the most brilliant military success in a career of many successes, but also the start of a chain of events which was to lead to his removal. 17

The day after Seoul fell, MacArthur stood on the banks of the Han River planning his next move. He decided on the amphibious invasion of the Port of Inchon on the west coast of Korea. This port was about 25 miles from Seoul. This seemed to be the natural operation for MacArthur to think of, for it was this type of maneuver which had brought him his successes of World War II. 18

15ibid., p. 100.
17Carig, op. cit., p. 159.
18Middleton, op. cit., p. 102.
The obstacles to the Inchon invasion were great, but so were the opportunities. General Edward A. Almond, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, stated that this was the "worst possible place for an amphibious assault, but it was also the only place where our assault would carry out its purpose." This purpose was to cut off and destroy the enemy. A successful landing would force the North Koreans to retreat in two places at once and would take the pressure off the Pusan beachhead. This would place the United Nations forces next to the principal supply routes that ran north and south of Seoul. MacArthur stated that "the history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off."20

The plan had many critics, and the general stood against them all. He insisted that only the capture of Inchon and Seoul would accomplish what he wanted—"to cut the enemy's supply line and seal off the entire southern peninsula." He had a talent for a forceful presentation, but often left many logical questions unanswered. The critics were more concerned with the problems Inchon

\[19\] Karig, op. cit., p. 165.

\[20\] Ibid.
MacArthur admitted that Inchon's problems were important, but were not impossible. He added that "Inchon will not fail; Inchon will succeed, and it will save 100,000 lives." The general admitted that he realized "that Inchon is a 5000 to one gamble, but I'll accept it."\textsuperscript{22}

In replies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur insisted on Inchon as the place of invasion. He stated that the "very arguments you have made as to the impracticalities involved will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise. For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt."\textsuperscript{23}

There were also charges that the Inchon plan was no secret. On September 16, 1950, the \textit{New York Tribune} stated that Inchon was one of the worst kept secrets. It was known all over Korea and Japan. The article also stated that if the North Koreans did not know it, they were the only ones who did not. Even army field commanders were using this news to bolster troop morale along the front. The local

\textsuperscript{21}Middleton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23}Spanier, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 79.
population must have known, for the build up of men and equipment was being done in their full view; it would have been impossible to hide it.  

Many times in his career the general had displayed over-confidence; now he displayed this again. He made such statements as: "We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them." The use of the first person seemed to betray a great ego. These very things, over-confidence, egotism, and dynamic speaking many times made the general convincing. Admiral C. Turner Joy stated: "After I had listened to this eloquent and passionate soliloquy, my own personal misgivings about the choice of Inchon were erased." The timing of the landing at Inchon also gives insight into the personality of MacArthur. Tides limited it to four dates—September fifteenth, October seventh, November second and third. The general chose the first date, for it would not only relieve the strain on the tired troops at Pusan, but it would let the people who would be liberated in this area harvest the October rice crop for themselves. The biggest
factor was the opposition to the plan; this made the general believe that the enemy would not think he would risk it.27

The Inchon landing turned out as MacArthur had predicted; his brilliantly conceived and skillfully executed operation caught the enemy completely by surprise. Very few operations of this brilliance have been recorded in the history of warfare. The general had gambled with disaster and it had been successful.28

The British historian David Rees describes Inchon as an operation that "could not have happened under any commander but MacArthur." "It came from his overpowering personality and his self-confidence."29

Even though Inchon seemed to be a great victory, in its ultimate results it seems ambiguous. Its very success meant that the United Nations war aims were raised from the 38th Parallel to the Yalu River.30

27Spanier, op. cit., p. 78.
28Ibid., p. 81.
30Ibid.
The controversies that surrounded MacArthur's plan for Inchon did not disappear with the victory, but were hidden in an avalanche of praise which flooded him. The question of whether the invasion was worth the risk or not still stood out. For many, this question has had no answer. Even though the general professed to see merit in the objections of his critics, he seemed to more strongly indicate that he was actually resentful and contemptuous of them. He discarded their objections as "timidity and defeatism."31

The very success at Inchon brought up another point. It left little doubt that if a difficult situation would come up again, MacArthur would prefer again to use his own judgment rather than heed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.32

By the end of September virtually all of South Korea was in Allied hands and the North Korean force was shattered. MacArthur called on the enemy to surrender on October 1, but there was no response. There was now a great deal of solid military reason for carrying the war into the north. There

31 Middleton, op. cit., p. 112.
32 Spanier, op. cit., p. 82.
was much debate on the issue, but finally, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Truman authorized MacArthur, in a series of messages in late September, to go beyond the 38th Parallel. 33

The general had asked for more men, and here again one of the same suspicions that he had had in early World War II crept up. The general felt that the reason for the lack of reinforcements was that Asia was being placed near the bottom of the list of American interests. He once again had the idea that Asia was being sacrificed to Europe. 34

All of the general's instructions regarding his planned operations in North Korea stipulated that his authority to operate was valid only if there were no signs of Chinese intervention. 35 On October 9, MacArthur received directions which changed these instructions slightly. He was now permitted to pursue the war in the north, even if Chinese involvement was encountered. The general was told that he could move north as long as he thought that the forces

33Middleton, op. cit., p. 119.
34Spanier, op. cit., p. 82.
35Middleton, op. cit., p. 130.
now under his control had any reasonable chance of success. The instructions also stated: "In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory." The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the general that as a "matter of policy" only South Korean troops should be advanced into the northeastern provinces bordering the Soviet Union and along the Manchurian border. Secretary of Defense Marshall wired MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel."38

On October 15, President Truman summoned MacArthur to a meeting at Wake Island to discuss the last phase of the United Nations involvement in Korea. The President asked the general what the chances of Chinese intervention would be and MacArthur gave a very optimistic answer. He estimated that the Chinese had 300,000 troops in Manchuria, and that only 58,000 to 60,000 of these could be moved across the Yalu River. These the general felt could be destroyed by his air force. Even as MacArthur was giving his optimistic reply four Chinese armies 120,000 strong

36Truman, op. cit., p. 362.
37Hearings, op. cit., pp. 1216, 1217.
38Ibid., p. 132.
were moving into positions opposite the United Nations forces. These were soon joined by 180,000 Red Chinese troops which moved to the northern border of the Yalu River.39

The real tragedy of the conference was the fact that there had been no realistic attempt to come to grips with the great issues that stood between these two men.40

Ambassador William Sebald stated:

MacArthur compared his forthcoming meeting with President Truman to his World War II journey to Pearl Harbor for a major conference with President Roosevelt.41

At Pearl Harbor MacArthur had convinced President Roosevelt to authorize a return to the Philippines which the Navy had proposed to by-pass. Now the general had prepared for another such conference.42

President Truman had called this Wake Island Conference mainly because there seemed to be a fundamental difference between the MacArthur and Washington viewpoint on the Korean War. The main disagreement was over the

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39Middleton, op. cit., p. 127.
40Ibid., p. 132.
41Sebald, op. cit., p. 217.
42Ibid.
relative importance of Europe and Asia in global strategy. This was an old disagreement; it was a hold-over from World War II. MacArthur believed that the Communists would conquer Europe through Asia if not stopped, but the administration kept on building up forces in Europe. 43

General MacArthur launched his "Home for Christmas" or November Offensive knowing that there were at least 100,000 men facing him and 40,000 guerrillas behind him. He also knew that the size of his assaulting force was inadequate for a frontal attack. The general split his army in two, taking a tremendous gamble, creating an attractive and fatal vacuum. Being confident of success, he made his military dispositions not on the assumption of massive Chinese Communist intervention, but on the enemy that existed. MacArthur stated that he was limited by the size of his force and the mission given him. This mission was to clear out all North Korea and to unify it. 44

The appearance of Red Chinese forces in the war caused concern in Korea that was not shared in Japan. When Washington, worried about reports of this, asked MacArthur

43 Ibd., p. 216.

44 Spanier, op. cit., p. 122.
for an evaluation, he warned against "hasty conclusions." Two days later the general began to sound the alarm ordering his air force to bomb six major bridges across the Yalu River. The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately countermanded the order and reminded MacArthur of a restriction not allowing Allied planes to strike within five miles of this river. The general sent back a strong protest which surprised the Joint Chiefs because it was so different from the previous messages. The Joint Chiefs then authorized MacArthur to bomb the Yalu bridges, but only from the Korean side.

General MacArthur stated that the reasons for his November defeats were the restrictions "without precedent in history," which had prevented him from bombing supply bases in Manchuria, or even the Manchurian side of the Yalu bridges, and following enemy planes over the Manchurian border. In time he would even see treason in these restrictions.

Later the general stated that his November Offensive was of a reconnaissance nature. To this General Marshall

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45 Middleton, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
46 Ibid., p. 138.
pointed out that no general launches a reconnaissance with his whole army. He holds his main force to the rear as precaution, particularly when the enemy might possibly drive a wedge between two wings of his army thereby rolling up the flank and rear of either or both.\textsuperscript{48}

General Collins stated:

\begin{quote}
I don't believe that in the initial phase it was considered as reconnaissance in force at all, because General MacArthur was bent upon destruction of the North Korean forces.\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}

In his memoirs, President Truman stated:

\begin{quote}
Now no one is blaming General MacArthur, and certainly I never did for the failure of the November Offensive . . . But I do blame General MacArthur for the manner in which he tried to excuse his failure. . . .\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

The President has stated that MacArthur misinformed him, and he has strongly implied that he would not have ordered the northward advance if his field commander had correctly estimated Peking's intentions.\textsuperscript{51} In order to evaluate this

\textsuperscript{48}Spanier, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{49}Hearings, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 1369.

\textsuperscript{50}Truman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 381.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., p. 383.
charge it is necessary to look at what MacArthur said at Wake Island and how much stock had been taken in his advice. MacArthur has not denied that he advised that Communist China would not enter the Korean War. The general based what he said on three points: (1) Allied air power had overwhelming strength; (2) the time was past even for Soviet intervention, and (3) these reasons eliminated a combination of Chinese ground forces supported by Russian Air Force.52

Possibly the general was not so concerned because he had been allowed permission to bomb and blockade North Korea after it attacked; therefore, he might have expected to receive permission to bomb and blockade Communist China too if she tried to intervene.53 MacArthur later stated that "the disposition of those troops . . . could not have been improved upon, had I known the Chinese were going to attack."54

The general charged espionage for the failure of his Wake Island prediction. This seems to point our that MacArthur must always be 110 per cent right. It could not be that he had made a mistake; it had to be that he was

52Ibid., pp. 383-384.
53Spanier, op. cit., p. 92.
54Hearings, op. cit., p. 19.
destroyed by enemies at home. This betrays a curious state of mind, for it seems as though he feared that his great record would be wiped out by a mistake. The general himself had often made the statement: "I have always been able to take care of the enemy in front, but have never been able to protect myself from the enemy in the rear."\(^{55}\)

The general was the figure of a sad and lonely commander, with great victories to his credit, fighting to avoid any defeat which might mar his last command. He believed that the change of policy in Korea was, rather than a military matter, a political one. He never changed from this idea.\(^{56}\)

General MacArthur's concept of the Korean War came out in an interview Ambassador William Sebald held with the general on November 14, 1950. MacArthur said that the immediate objective was to destroy the bridges across the Yalu River and thus isolate the area between the United Nations forces and the North Korean border. He went on to say that if this failed, he saw no alternative to bombing

\(^{55}\text{Spanier, op. cit., p. 94.}\)

\(^{56}\text{Middleton, op. cit., p. 155.}\)
key points in Manchuria.57

By late 1950, it was clear that there were two irreconcilable viewpoints to the war. Washington was looking for an honorable end to the conflict, while MacArthur thought we should have victory.58

On November 28, 1950, MacArthur announced that "heavy Chinese reinforcements" were in the "privileged sanctuary" of Manchuria and that now "we face an entirely new war."59

In December, MacArthur submitted a plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for bringing the war to an end. This plan encompassed four ideas any of which Washington felt could enlarge the war.60 The first called for the intensification of our economic blockade against China; the second was the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; the third called for the removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; and fourth, the removal of restrictions on the forces of

57 Sebald, op. cit., p. 203.
58 Ibid., p. 220.
59 Ibid., p. 204.
60 Middleton, op. cit., p. 159.
Nationalist China on Formosa. The general later testified:

... In my own professional opinion, Communist China, its power to wage modern war has been tremendously exaggerated; and I believe when we place pressure, the blockade pressure, and the disruptive pressure of the air, on its distribution systems, that she would be forced to yield within a reasonable period of time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur orders to hold in Korea if he could with the troops he now had and under the restrictions now in effect. The general felt that this would subject his command to severe losses and that "the issue really boils down to the question of whether or not the United States intends to evacuate Korea." He later stated that, in his opinion, he could hold on in Korea for any length of time up to the complete destruction of his own forces, if such a course was dictated by political considerations or factors.

President Truman issued a statement announcing that if

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62Hearings, op. cit., p. 58.
63Middleton, op. cit., p. 160.
64Hearings, op. cit., p. 488.
continued resistance should not prove possible with the forces under MacArthur's command, and withdrawal from Korea became necessary, that the United States "shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified."65 This was taken by MacArthur as an indication that America had decided not to win in Korea.

The general sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars arguing that what was needed was "aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership," and that "nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism" that we would alienate Asia if we defended Formosa.66 President Truman was irritated by this letter publishing the idea that the government in Washington was responsible for MacArthur's troubles for limiting the fighting to Korea. The thing that galled the President most was the general's giving public voice to his resentments.67

On March 20, MacArthur wrote a letter to a member of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin, in answer

65Middleton, op. cit., pp. 151-152.
66ibid., p. 354.
to an address Martin had made suggesting the use of Nationalist Chinese troops in Korea. This letter was a challenge to existing national policy of the United States. The last paragraph reached a climax with the statement: "There is no substitute for victory."68

President Truman felt that this letter showed that the general was not only in disagreement with the policy of the government, but was challenging this policy in open insubordination to his Commander-in-Chief.69 The President stated that "there is a right kind and wrong kind of victory, just as there are wars for the right thing and wars that are wrong from every standpoint."70

President Truman began to draft a message stating that he was willing to negotiate with the Communists. At the same time, MacArthur began to draft his own message which concluded with the proposal:

\[\ldots\] I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the Commander in Chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the

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68Truman, op. cit., p. 446.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
United Nations in Korea . . . might be accomplished without further bloodshed.71

Though MacArthur called this a "routine" message, it brought out many problems. President Truman said that it was "cross-purpose" to the one that he was preparing, and added: "It would have confused the world if my carefully prepared statement had been made."72

In Washington this was taken as open defiance. The President thought that the end had been reached as he stated:

... I could no longer tolerate his insubordination. MacArthur had actually threatened the enemy with an ultimatum intimating that the full preponderance of Allied power might be brought to bear against Red China. . . .73

This announcement was read by President Truman on April 11, 1950:

... with deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties

71 Ibid., p. 175.

72 Truman, op. cit., p. 440.

73 Ibid., p. 442.
I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of commands. General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established.\footnote{Ibid., p. 449.}

This announcement stunned the American people. Many protested to the government in defense of the general. He returned home to a tumultuous welcome which reached its climax with his speech before a joint session of Congress and the Senate Hearings which followed.\footnote{Spanier, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 211-212.}

General MacArthur answered the charge of insubordination as follows:

Senator I have been a soldier for 52 years, I have in that time, to the best of my ability, carried out every order that was ever given me. No more subordinate soldier has ever worn the American uniform. I would repudiate any concept that I wouldn't carry out any order that was given me. If you mean to say that the orders I have carried out I was in agreement with, that is a different matter.\footnote{Hearings, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27.}

On the question of why the general was relieved, General Omar Bradley testified that he didn't "agree that General MacArthur was relieved because he disagreed on
policy," but because "he carried it to the people and not through the channels to the Commander-in-Chief."\textsuperscript{77}

To the question that the general was right in what he planned to do, General Bradley has stated that "to have extended the fighting to the mainland of Asia would have been the wrong war, at the wrong time and in the wrong place."\textsuperscript{78}

In his testimony, General Marshall reminded the committee of the fact that the policies of the United States weren't the only ones involved. There were also the policies of the United Nations and General MacArthur was the United Nations commander.\textsuperscript{79} On the question of General MacArthur's carrying out of orders Marshall answered:

\begin{quote}
He did not violate the policy by military action, but he took issue with the policy before the world... And created a situation where apparently we had two views speaking for this country because he was the Supreme Commander of those troops of those nations involved.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

The general had actually been dismissed for three

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 1073.

\textsuperscript{78}Truman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 446.

\textsuperscript{79}Hearings, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 414.

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., p. 416.
reasons. First, was the fact that he had failed to get clearance for his statements as he had been directed to do by the President; second, because he challenged the place of the President as the nation's spokesman on foreign policy; and third, that he did not agree with the national policy of trying to limit the conflict to Korea. 81

Ambassador William Sebald, who knew MacArthur quite well, summed up the Korean situation as follows:

MacArthur handled his various command responsibilities and the innumerable challenges of the situation in a characteristic way long familiar to Washington. With his sense of history, experience, seniority, reputation, and temperament, he did not easily compromise when his judgment or his decisions were questioned. Although he knew when to conform to specific superior authority, he did not hesitate to advance his views vigorously. He was never reluctant to interpret his authority, broadly or to make decisions and act quickly—arguing the matter later. Many in Washington remembered these same qualities from World War II and resented them even more in the semi-peace of the postwar era. 82

81 Ibid.

82 Sebald, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

General MacArthur's campaigns have brought him much praise. Thomas R. Phillips has stated that the "campaign in the Pacific from Australia through the Philippines to Japan was a marvel of ingenuity." General Bernard Montgomery stated that his campaign proved MacArthur to be "the best soldier the United States produced during World War II," and added that "he fought a wonderful campaign in the Pacific."1

Despite these and many other congratulatory statements, the general always seemed to be surrounded with controversy and friction. There seems to be several reasons for this and they all, in some way, point to certain aspects of the general's personal qualities.

One point is touched upon by Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan in their book *MacArthur, Man of Action*. They state:

> Let future biographers of MacArthur note

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one important factor when writing of the general; the worst thing that can happen to an army man is to be promoted over the heads of senior officers, for this was precisely what happened to MacArthur. 3

The general's rapid promotion, which caused him to become successively the youngest officer to command West Point, then on to become the youngest Major General on active duty, and finally, when he was 50 years old, the youngest man ever to be appointed to the office of Chief of Staff of the Army, may have been the source of some jealousy or resentment on the part of those "jumped by MacArthur." 4

One example came out during the siege of Bataan when rumors of a Washington sell-out reached the fighting men. Some thought that this was happening because it was common knowledge that General Marshall and General MacArthur were not on good terms due to the spectacular rise of MacArthur, after World War I, to four star general and Chief of Staff while Marshall, only a year younger, continued in the rank


of lieutenant general. 5

The friction which developed between MacArthur and the Navy had predated World War II. The differences which existed between Admiral Thomas C. Hart and the general, for example, were passed on to subordinates and, therefore, existed in the two commands in the Pacific. Friction became worse between the branches of the services after the disasters of Pearl Harbor and Clark Field. There were misconceptions about the defense of the Philippines on the part of all branches. The preparations for defense were not completed, and therefore, misconceptions were shared by the Navy, Army, and Air Force, who had all underestimated the Japanese strength. 6

On Corregidor the Marines developed a suspicion that they were not well-liked by the high command. They were not mentioned in communiques, and two days before MacArthur left for Australia, unit citations were ordered for all except the Marines. During this time the general had left many details to his Chief of Staff, General Sutherland, who let it be known that this was no oversight for "the Marines had


gotten their share of the glory in World War I, and they weren't going to get any in this one!"7

There had also been some friction between General MacArthur and President Roosevelt. Each of these men had great respect for the other, but in 1933, the two were in dispute. MacArthur was Chief of Staff and President Roosevelt had ordered a cut in the Army budget. The young officer argued that this would greatly weaken the Army and lower their morale at a bad time. In fact, MacArthur stated:

"Mr. President, if you pursue this policy which will lead inevitably to the destruction of the American Army, I have no choice but to oppose you publicly. I shall ask for my immediate relief as Chief of Staff and for retirement from the Army and I shall take this fight straight to the people."8

President Roosevelt dropped the proposed budget cuts.9

A major source of much of the controversy surrounding General MacArthur's leadership has been pointed to several times throughout this paper. This has had to do with the

7Ibid., p. 74.
8Ibid., p. 213.
9Ibid.
old staff the general kept around him, and who many times did things in his name for which he received the blame.

General Kenney stated:

MacArthur's loyalty to those who are loyal to him and work for him is a wonderful trait. It marks the leader whose men trust him and follow him. In MacArthur's case it will even tolerate a degree of inefficiency. He cannot hurt a loyal friend. I believe that is why he kept some people around, in spite of the fact that they were largely responsible for the bad press that he had during World War II. ¹⁰

General Kenney went on to say that he looked upon those who worked for him as "companions in arms," and that he would go to almost any extreme to look after and support them if difficulties arose. ¹¹ In past history this same type of loyalty eventually got General Ulysses S. Grant into serious difficulties. MacArthur stated of his staff that it "was unsurpassed in excellence" and that "no commander was ever better served." ¹²

General Kenney has stated that the confusion and indecision prior to the Clark Field attack did "not sound

¹¹Ibid., p. 64.
as though MacArthur had anything to do with the handling of the Air Force at that time." He went on to say that the Air Force contact with MacArthur's Headquarters was General Sutherland, "who received recommendations for the use of the Air Force and who often rendered decisions in the name of General MacArthur."13

The general had an extreme sense of destiny. *Time* Magazine stated:

MacArthur envisioned himself as a child of destiny. He conceived and fought monumental battles with huge armies like Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon. He viewed his times and his own acts as decisive in history. His triumphs and his failures often thrust him into whirlwinds of international controversy. 14

In 1940, in the Philippines, MacArthur told newsmen that "it was destiny that brought me here!"15 This idea of destiny carried over to his staff as was shown when General Courtney Whitney mentioned that though it seemed that MacArthur's final performance for posterity would be his service in Japan, now at 70 the Korean War was "Mars last

13Kenney, *op. cit.* p. 83.


15Ibid.
gift to an old warrior."16

It is possible that false impressions about General MacArthur's attitude might have been due to American correspondents using the dateline "General MacArthur's Headquarters" over stories written in all parts of Australia on subjects ranging from "strategic pipedreams" to "jittery criticisms" of the conduct of the Pacific War.17 This sort of thing continued throughout the general's career. The press was always watching what was done by someone in his position, especially one with the temperament and personality of MacArthur. He complained, with clear justification, that reporters tended to tell the story of the war with its emphasis on casualties and the trauma of combat itself which distorted the overall picture.18

Many times the general would fly into a rage over press criticism and this only made matters worse. During the Japanese Occupation, Ambassador William Sebald stated


18Middleton, op. cit., p. 93.
that he sometimes tried to tell MacArthur that routine reports were the normal procedure, but the general instead ordered Sebald to "have the State Department stop this criticism of the Occupation and SCAP." The general just did not seem to realize that the press is free in the United States.

The myth of MacArthur had grown during his lifetime and one of his most dominating characteristics contributed to it. This was his great ego. It was this ego that gave the general many useful as well as negative traits. This was demonstrated in an entry in the diary of Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal:

MacArthur never once referred to "the Americans," or "the Japanese," or to "our forces" or "their forces." Always it was "the enemy and I" or "he and I," so much that it left listeners with the impression of a tremendous ego.

The general's useful traits impressed many people. During World War II newsman Clark Lee stated:


20Gunther, op. cit., p. 23.

There was MacArthur, a soldier and a man of culture, whom some hated because he was both prophet and poet and a master of the English language; who could tell you the details of every great battle in history; whose decisive brain and great military knowledge should have been occupied in planning great battles. . . . 22

General Wedemeyer stated:

Whenever one of MacArthur's reports came into the War Plans Division, I was impressed with the sound strategic concept behind his proposals. How often I wished that he could be in a position of authority in our government to help the planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 23

MacArthur was disliked by many, respected by many, and others greatly loved and were inspired by him. General Carlos Romulo stated that the general "accomplished what he did in the Philippines because he knows how to select and inspire men." 24

The extraordinary career of General MacArthur raises a great deal of historical speculation on the problems of civil-military relationships. He was a political general


surrounded by controversy throughout his career. President Roosevelt had known this and it became evident in the differences between Harry Truman and MacArthur in the post-war era. In Korea, MacArthur had outlined a program which was completely unacceptable to his superiors and used his prestige to enforce it.

In looking at the personal qualities of MacArthur, it is possible that inconsistencies were to be expected, for he had many times in World War II, for example, announced victory while his troops faced the stiffest part of the battle. In Korea there was no excuse for the statements he began to make to certain people after the failure of his November Offensive. Within four days he was able to find four different ways to publish his views which made it quite plain that he or his staff were not to blame. There was also no excuse for the way the general made public his opposition to the administration's policy in Korea. If there was to be criticism, there were other ways to carry

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26Ibid., p. 67.

27Truman, op. cit., p. 282.
Many things have had to be considered and placed together in order to get a picture of General MacArthur as a military leader. Here we have a man who is driven by a tremendous ego which will not allow him to ever be wrong. He always had to be right. This led the general into verbal arguments with what he believed to be powerful enemies who opposed him. Many times these very arguments only made matters worse and led the general deeper into more controversy.

The general had a great sense of loyalty to old friends. He kept around him a group of old friends who shielded him from critics and items which might upset him. The general in turn protected them. Many times these old friends made decisions in the general's name for which he received the blame.

Another problem was the fact that MacArthur, during World War II and thereafter, served under men he once had under his command. Many times old rivalries entered the picture.

The general's whole career brings up the problem of civil versus military authority. He opposed President
Truman's European policy just as he had President Roosevelt's policy. The reason for MacArthur's lack of concern for Europe is clear from a statement he made during World War II. In this statement he said:

Europe is a dying system. It is worn out and run down and will become an economic and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia... The hands touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history for the next ten thousand years.28

MacArthur continued his wartime opposition to the Europe-first strategy after the war. He maintained that this strategy was inspired by Russian Communists.29 The general argued from a military standpoint, yet MacArthur himself at one time had stated:

... No single departmental head, no matter what his particular function or title, could or should be responsible for the formulation of... decisions.30

Thus the general had agreed with President Truman that wars were too serious a situation to be left in the hands of the generals.

Douglas MacArthur had faults and at times made tactical errors, but his place in history is firmly intrenched.
Several of the sources used in this paper were written by men who were close to General MacArthur. These men had a chance to not only know the general, but to observe his actions as well. One of these was newsmen Clark Lee who writes of his observations of the general. Though the material in his books Douglas MacArthur and They Call it Pacific may not be completely objective, it is far from being completely in favor of MacArthur. Much of his material is of an eye-witness nature which discloses valuable military facts. William J. Sebald and Richard Brines, in their book With MacArthur in Japan, have written a history of MacArthur and the occupation of Japan. Mr. Sebald, as ambassador, was in a position to observe MacArthur well. This book is a first hand account of this period. Though Mr. Sebald sometimes shows a little too much personal involvement, he does not side completely with the general. The book contains stinging criticism of the general and has mixed emotions about his programs.

Several of the secondary sources used in this paper furnish good critical material on MacArthur. Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in their book The General
and the President, give an impartial account of this controversial subject. Though they find much to censure about the general, they also find much to praise. This book has facts to back up the statements made and is a critical study which attempts to make sense out of legend. John W. Spanier, in his book *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, writes a critical account of this incident and points out many of the general's shortcomings.

The sources by General Carlos P. Romulo are mainly of human interest material. Even though a great deal of the material in these books show sentimentality and hero worship, Romulo does not try to gloss over shortcomings of the general. These books furnish important information even though Romulo's close connection with MacArthur shows through.

John Toland's book *But Not in Shame* is an accurate account of the early stages of the Pacific War. The author tends to point up the human element, and is written much like a novel. This source provides good descriptive material though it generalizes a little too much.

A few of the sources have a MacArthur bias. Frazier Hunt, in his book *MacArthur and the War Against Japan*, describes campaigns well, but leaves out too many important
facts to be a definitive history of MacArthur. There is too much flattery used throughout the book. Francis Trevelyan Miller's book, *Douglas MacArthur, Fighter for Freedom*, also leaves out important facts and shows too much hero-worship and praise. It is a good source if used for general descriptions only. General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, in their book *MacArthur--1941-1951*, give an account of MacArthur's activities during these years which is slanted heavily toward the general. Many unpleasant facts are left out and many times the facts used are distorted. Since the book seems to be biased, it needs to be carefully weighed.

Many of the sources used in this paper are general histories of World War II and the Korean War. They are mainly used for general descriptions. David Rees, the English historian and author of *Korea: The Limited War*, gives an accurate and interesting account of military operations in Korea. He also gives a clear and objective account of American command troubles in the Far East. He points up problems existing between Washington and the American field commander. Walter Karig and Manson Coyle used official sources in their book *Battle Report: The War*
in Korea. Because this was written while the war was in progress, it contains some inaccuracies. This material supplemented the day to day reports given the newspapers. Frank O. Hough's book, *The Island War*, furnishes excellent general descriptive material of the events of World War II. Though this source is mainly based on the part the Marines played in the war, it is fair in its treatment of all branches of the services. This book draws on essential Japanese and American documents and seems to be quite factual. Robert Leckie's work, *Strong Men Armed*, furnishes a clear, unbiased history of the Korean War. Leckie was a combat reporter and a former marine. He draws from his own knowledge as well as other material for this blunt, but fair, account. M. Hanlon Cannon's book, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* and Louis Morton's *The Fall of the Philippines* are both based on official government sources and are published by the Department of the Army. These sources contain excellent descriptions and facts which are very ably presented by these authors.

General Douglas MacArthur's own *Reminiscences* are told as the general wanted them remembered. Many truths are omitted. Sometimes descriptions go beyond the military conception of strategy. The complete story is
not told, but the general gives credit where credit is due. This source is mainly used in this paper when direct quotations from MacArthur are needed. This book is written in cavalier fashion and there is a great correlation between the way MacArthur tells the story and the way it is told by Generals Whitney and Willoughby.

A few of the sources used are commentaries and opinions from leading historians which are based on selected documentary material. Hanson W. Baldwin, the Military Editor of the *New York Times*, in his work *Great Mistakes of the War*, gives a documented personal statement of conclusions from selected facts. Samuel Eliot Morison's work *Strategy and Compromise* also states important conclusions. The reasoning behind these conclusions is sound and sometimes controversial.

There are also sources used which are from collections of private papers or memoirs of important Washington officials and leaders. President Harry S. Truman's *Memoirs* give important facts which are necessary in discussing the war situation and General MacArthur. Truman's book tries to discredit critics and usually tells one side of the story. Nevertheless, important facts needed in this paper are
derived from this critical source. The Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman, give important facts concerning the President's relationship with General MacArthur which are extremely informative.
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