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A study of the congressional hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur: a thesis...

Byford Scott

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A STUDY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL MacARTHUR

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of
History and Political Science
College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Byford Scott
June 1960
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CHAPTER I

KOREA—DILEMMA AND DISASTER

A divided nation. At the end of World War II Korea was occupied by the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Thirty-eighth Parallel was arbitrarily set as the boundary between the forces of occupation. This arbitrary boundary was not intended to result in the creation of two separate governments; rather it was to prevent the Soviet forces from occupying the whole nation. Korea had been under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek declared that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This was later reaffirmed at Potsdam in 1945. At the end of World War II Russian troops were massed along the Manchurian border, while the nearest American forces were in Okinawa. Thus the military division of Korea was solely intended for the purpose of temporary occupation of the military forces.

Even before the outbreak of the Korean War that nation had become a political headache for the United States. The cost of occupation was high, and troop morale was low. Furthermore, South Korea thought the occupation had gone on long enough, even though it needed American help. All attempts to unify the nation by a United Nations supervised
election failed due to Soviet opposition. A South Korean government was formed in August 1948 with Syngman Rhee as its first President. In September 1948 the North Korean government was created. Rhee apparently felt that police state methods were needed to keep the Communists from taking over in South Korea. However, in April 1950, the State Department felt it necessary to warn Dr. Rhee that further American assistance would be withheld unless he balanced his budget, inaugurated democratic reforms, and held elections. Elections were held on May 30, 1950. Rhee's party retained only 22 of 210 seats.1 Whatever degree of dictatorial methods Rhee used in the past, dictators do not allow themselves to be beaten in elections, and South Korea had experienced the workings of the most basic of democratic institutions.

In a move extremely well calculated to create an awkward situation for the United States, the Soviet Union announced the complete withdrawal of its occupation forces from Korea effective December 25, 1948. Since Soviet troops were withdrawn only to the Manchurian border all the strategic and propaganda benefits accrued to Moscow. It was a clever move. Withdrawal of American troops to Japan was completed June 29, 1949. While the Soviets had left a well trained and equipped North Korean Army, the forces of South

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Korea had neither the training nor the equipment to match North Korea's.

Korea and Formosa are excluded from the defense perimeter of the United States. In a statement made to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson said that both Korea and Formosa were outside the defense perimeter of the United States. This did not alter the fact that both areas were still the responsibility of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a statement could have accomplished anything, and it was both unnecessary and unwise, even if it were true at the time. Combined with the recent withdrawal of United States forces, it seemed to suggest an open door for aggression in South Korea.

The significant military developments in Korea. The North Korean Communists, under the leadership of Moscow-trained Kim Il-sung, were willing to discuss unification of Korea, but they flatly refused to deal with the government of Syngman Rhee for that purpose. In short, it was clear that what they wanted was Communist unification instead of a democratic Korea.

On June 25, 1950, the forces of North Korea crossed

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2 *Time*, June 11, 1951, p. 23.
the Thirty-eighth Parallel (June 24, in the United States). Secretary of State Acheson immediately advised Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, of this action. Mr. Lie called an emergency meeting of the Security Council for Sunday, June 25. The Security Council condemned the invasion and called for an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of North Korean troops from South Korea. The vote in the Security Council was nine to zero. Yugoslavia abstained from voting, and Russia was not present. The Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council meetings since January.

President Truman ordered General MacArthur to give immediate military support to the forces of South Korea. The President did not, then or in the future, ask Congress for a declaration of war. However, the majority of Congress, Republican as well as Democrats, approved the President's action. Technically Mr. Truman acted as Commander in Chief of the armed forces in response to a request from the United Nations Security Council. This is the explanation of the reference to the Korean War as a "police action."

General MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea. The United States and South Korea furnished the bulk of the fighting forces, but several nations sent contingents of ground troops and
naval or air units to Korea. The United States could not jeopardize its occupation forces in Japan, and it was some time before effective military pressure could be brought to bear. The consequence of this situation was that during July and August, 1950 the North Korean forces pushed the South Korean and United States armies into the southeast corner of Korea, known as the Pusan beachhead.

During September and October, the United Nations forces began to counter-attack. A brilliant amphibious landing was conceived and directed by MacArthur at Inchon on the west coast of Korea. The situation involved landing at a city under incredible tidal conditions. On September 15, the tide rose to 30 feet in six hours; in the next six hours it fell to six feet.3 The landing had to be made at high tide. There were also the problems of enemy magnetic mines, shore batteries, and the possibility of Chinese entry into the war about that time. The purpose of this attack was to hit the enemy in the rear, and cut off his forward units. He did not have strength in depth. This would disrupt his supply lines and make possible the retaking of Seoul, the capital of South Korea, which was in enemy hands. The risks were great, but the results proved that it was worth the

gamble. The whole operation was a tribute to MacArthur's military ability. The Thirty-eighth Parallel was exposed to the forces of the United Nations, and a turning point in the war had been reached.

In the United Nations and in the capitals of the world there was much discussion about what to do next. There were reports that the Chinese Communists would enter the fighting if the United Nations forces crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel. The military problem was one thing; the political problem another. This is why democracies require that the military authority be subordinate to the civil authorities. In this case North Korea had invaded South Korea and had been pushed back into its own territory. Not wishing to antagonize Communist China, some members of the United Nations strongly urged that the fighting not be carried into North Korea. Great Britain was the principal advocate of this position. However, MacArthur was given permission to cross into North Korea, and on October 9, the United Nations forces invaded North Korea. Within three weeks his troops were nearing the Manchurian border.

On October 3, the State Department reported that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, had advised the Indian Ambassador at Peiping that if United Nations forces crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel China would send troops to help the North Koreans. However, this action would not be taken
if only South Koreans crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel.⁴

There was involved in this the problem of determining whether this warning was so much propaganda, or a true statement of their intentions.

President Truman decided that he wanted to have a personal talk with General MacArthur. The General had been out of the United States for fourteen years and, according to the President, "all his thoughts were wrapped up in the East."⁵ In addition the President felt that in spite of the Administration's attempt to keep MacArthur advised on the world-wide picture as seen in Washington, it had not succeeded. "I thought," said the President, "he might adjust more easily if he heard it from me directly."⁶ Finally, the Peiping threats of intervention in Korea were another reason for the President's desire to confer with MacArthur.

The meeting took place at Wake Island on October 15, local time. In his Memoirs, the President said that MacArthur had assured him that victory had been won in Korea, and that the Chinese Communists would not attack.⁷

MacArthur's biographers do not agree with the President regarding the reasons for the meeting at Wake Island or with the results which the President concluded from the

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⁵ Loc. cit.

⁶ Loc. cit.

⁷ Ibid., p. 365.

With an eye to the coming elections, it was expedient for the President to smooth over the differences... with his principal field commander. ... It was equally expedient to exploit politically the smashing victory at Inchon and directly link the Administration with this impressive success.

Frazier Hunt concluded, "Despite the outwardly friendly nature of the visit there seem to have been very few, if any tangible results." ⁹ He also noted that the two men most concerned with the developments in the Far East and with the rise or fall of General MacArthur—Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall—had remained in Washington. With all due respect to Hunt's wisdom and experience, it is hard to see how bringing Marshall and Acheson to Wake Island could have helped the relationship between Truman and MacArthur. Furthermore, there was greater need for them in Washington while the Chief Executive was out of the country.

Late in November MacArthur ordered a general advance, hoping to end the war "before Christmas." His troops were threatening the Manchurian border and the power houses along the Yalu River, when the character of the war changed.

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⁸ Willoughby, *op. cit.*; p. 382.

Chinese troops crossed the border from Manchuria and launched a major counteroffensive. A thrust by the Chinese split the United Nations forces in two. Those in the northeast were surrounded and trapped, but were finally evacuated by sea from the port of Hungnam. Although the evacuation was made possible by highly skillful operations of the United States Navy, it was a Far Eastern Dunkirk. It was not long before the remaining United Nations forces were driven back below the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and there was considerable alarm that the United Nations might be forced back to the old Pusan beachhead. There was also concern that the "limited war" might turn into World War III.

In late January and February, 1951, the United Nations forces halted the enemy advance and began a series of cautious advances. By the end of March, United Nations forces again reached the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and in some places advanced beyond it.
CHAPTER II

THE MacAR'thur CONFLICT

The events leading to the dismissal of General MacArthur. While the United States put forth most of the effort in fighting the Korean war, it was done in the name of the United Nations. One of the major considerations of the United Nations was to keep the local war from becoming a world war. England had special reasons for keeping the war limited to Korea, since any threat to China would undoubtedly result in a counter threat to the British colony, Hong Kong. Consequently the United States was not free to make the decisions and determine the measures that should be used for winning the war; the decisions were not ours alone.

The Truman Administration had written off Chiang Kai-shek as a bad risk; it felt that it was throwing good money after bad to support him. This was also the British view. MacArthur, on the other hand, seemed to believe that we ought to give him the respect due a friend. But there was more to it than that. On July 31, 1950, MacArthur suddenly flew to Formosa and spent a day and a half consulting with the Generalissimo. Neither Truman nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed beforehand of this trip. However, as the American commander in Japan and the United Nations commander in Korea, he had both the right and the duty to inspect the For-
mosa area, since he had the specific duty to defend it. On June 27, 1950, President Truman had ordered the neutralization of Formosa.\(^1\) However, it was not tactful of MacArthur to make this kind of trip without first informing Washington. Moreover, the fanfare attending his arrival gave the impression that he sympathized strongly with nationalist aims and policy, as he undoubtedly did. Chiang Kai-shek said, "The foundation for Sino-American military cooperation has been laid."\(^2\) This appeared as if the United States were about to enter into a new Chinese civil war. President Truman saw this as General MacArthur making, or at least interfering with, foreign policy. He sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo, "to brief General MacArthur on what American foreign policy was, and to ask him to improve his timing."\(^3\)

On August 10th MacArthur issued a statement in which he said, with aggressive emphasis, that his visit to Formosa was limited entirely to military matters, and that Chinese domestic affairs were altogether out of his own responsibility and province.

My visit, the General said, has been maliciously represented to the public by those who invariably, in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific . . . which tend, if indeed

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they are not designed, to promote disunity and destroy faith and confidence in the American nation and institutions and American representatives at this time of great world peril.4

On August 28, 1950, another explosion between President Truman and General MacArthur took place when a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at Chicago was released, in advance, to the press. An alert newspaperman got hold of it and called it to the attention of the White House. President Truman ordered the message withdrawn from the convention; however, it had already reached newspaper publication. It was published in the New York Times, on August 29. In this statement MacArthur said that Formosa was part of the new battle line that made the Pacific a peaceful American lake, that the western strategic frontier had shifted from an "exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines."5 This, he held, was an avenue of weakness along which we were subject to attack and had been attacked. Formosa in the hands of an enemy was to be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, strategically located, which could be maintained at a much


lower cost than its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders. "Nothing," he said, "could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia."  

President Truman, in a fireside chat, then explained to the nation and the world, "we do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves. We believe that the future of Formosa . . . should be settled peaceably . . . by international action." 7 There could be read into MacArthur's statement an implied criticism of the neutralizing of Formosa. It was apparent that MacArthur had a talent for this sort of thing. Furthermore, many people believed that because of his experience and record of achievement, his opinion was needed. President Truman's military experience was limited to that of an artillery captain in World War I. When MacArthur was Army Chief of Staff Marshall was a colonel who had never had a field command. The contrast could not be overlooked by the press and the public.

On September 12, 1950, Secretary of Defense Johnson resigned, effective September 19. General George Marshall, following a special act of Congress to make a military

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6 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3478.

officer eligible for that post, became Secretary of Defense. The Wake Island meeting of Truman and MacArthur shocked almost everyone with its brevity. The communique that was drafted and initialed by both men was described by one reporter as an act that appeared "as if both men were heads of different governments." It stated: "a very complete unanimity of view" prevailed in the discussions covering Korea, Japan, and United States policy in the Pacific.

After Inchon, military developments moved at an increased tempo. On October 20, American troops captured Pyongyang, the North Korean capital; the next day United States parachute troops landed deep inside North Korea. Then on October 28, Red Chinese elements were identified in North Korea.

On November 24, General MacArthur launched an end-the-war offensive which, on November 27, ran into an attack by four Red Chinese armies that stalled and threw back the drive. On November 28, MacArthur said, "We face an entirely new war" because of the intervention of the Red Chinese forces.

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8 Gunther, op. cit., p. 200.
9 Hearings, Part 5, pp. 3571-73.
10 Loc. cit.
These events led the New York Times reporter Arthur Krock to make the following inquiry of General MacArthur:

Answering criticism for military action beyond Thirty-eighth Parallel or Pyongyang, some officials here saying for non-attribution but for publication that every time such stop-point was suggested you replied you would not accept responsibility for security of your troops if decision was made; that this faced authorities with dilemma of taking risk replacing you with elections coming on or letting you proceed against their political and diplomatic judgment and against some high military judgments also.

In reply General MacArthur sent the following message:

Reference query contained in your radio of the twenty-ninth. There is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous gossip to which you refer. Every strategic and tactical movement made by the United Nations Command has been in complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and in compliance with the directives under which I operate, every major step having been previously reported and fully approved.

I have received no suggestions from any authoritative source that in the execution of its mission the Command should stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel or Pyongyang, or at any other line short of the international boundary. To have done so would have required revision of the resolutions of the United Nations and the directives received in implementation thereof.

It is historically inaccurate to attribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Communist armies to the strategic course of the campaign itself. The decision by the Chinese Communist leaders to wage war against the United Nations could only have been a basic one, long premeditated and carried into execution.
as direct result of the defeat of their satellite North Korean armies. Thanks for bringing this misleading anonymous gossip to my attention.

Obviously there were political implications involved in this, and the political and military considerations overlapped each other. MacArthur was in a position to hold, with good reason, that his forces were not secure unless they crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel. Carrying the war to the enemy was no new military concept, and by doing so he protected his own forces. However, this brought the Chinese Communists into the war, and the same reasoning applied to them. Beyond the Yalu River they could build up supplies of men and matériel. This was not acceptable to MacArthur. Nevertheless, our planes were not permitted to follow, even in hot pursuit across the Manchurian border.

From this point on, the record indicates that MacArthur could not accept this concept of fighting a war, at least not this war. He probably arrived at this decision sometime earlier, but we are concerned with the events that took place and the reasons for them. He went over the heads of his superiors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, and took his case to the people through the press and public statements. On December 1, 1950, in an interview with reporters of the magazine *U.S. News & World Report*, the following questions and answers were made:

Q. Are the limitations which prevent unlimited
pursuit of Chinese large forces and unlimited attack on their bases regarded by you as a handicap to effective military operations?

A. An enormous handicap without precedent in military history.

Q. Nine out of ten persons on the street here and throughout the country are asking why the atom bomb is not being used. Can anything be said as to the effectiveness of the bomb in the type of operation in which you are now engaged?

A. My comment would be inappropriate at this time.  

On the same day MacArthur also sent a message to Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press, which said, in part:

From the initiation of the North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea until the total defeat of the North Korean armies, support from the Communist Chinese from behind the privileged sanctuary of neutral boundaries was open and notorious and all-inclusive.

On December 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur of a Presidential order, issued to all cabinet members and other top government officials, requiring the clearance of speeches, press releases, and other statements concerning military policy and foreign relations. Military commanders and diplomatic representatives were directed to use extreme caution in public statements and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign

Hearings, Part 5, pp. 3532-33.

15 Ibid., pp. 3534-35.
policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States. 16

By this time the controversy was front page news all over the nation. At a press conference on January 11, 1951, President Truman denied that there was any curb on MacArthur's authority to speak freely on the Korean War. At MacArthur's headquarters the directive was interpreted as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiques, correspondence, or personal conversations with others. 17

Without the Chinese Communists in the war North Korea was defeated, but the "new war" that MacArthur spoke of found the United Nation forces driven back to the vicinity of the Thirty-eighth Parallel. In February the General had this to say about holding the battle line at this point: 18

The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force which could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piece-meal. Talk of crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel at

16 Ibid., p. 3536.


the present stage of the campaign, except by scattered patrol action incidental to the tactical situation, is purely academic.

From a military standpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage and sanctuary protection for his military potential against our counterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously consider conducting major operations north of that geographic line.

Judging from this statement one would think that the General felt he had two adversaries; one in Korea, and the other in Washington. This statement was obviously an attempt to use his influence in order to fight the Chinese as he thought best. He apparently saw the handwriting on the wall, and opposed, in advance, ending the war at the Thirty-eighth Parallel. However, this is not the kind of battle communiqué that gives the status of military operations as of a certain date. Even so, this statement was not to arouse as much controversy as later "communiques."

On March 7, the United Nations troops recaptured Seoul for the last time. General MacArthur then made one of his most important statements on the Korean War, in part as follows: 19

Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and matériel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of

19 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3450.
counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves.

Vital decisions have yet to be made—decisions far beyond the scope of authority vested in me as the military commander, decisions which are neither solely political nor solely military, but which must provide on the highest international levels an answer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea.

The *New York Times* said that State Department people were not exactly delighted with General MacArthur's use of the word "stalemate" and its implications of futility. They felt that the effort in Korea was exacting a price in casualties that the Chinese Government could not go on paying forever. However, MacArthur's point was that it was the Chinese, and not the United States, who could afford the price in human life.

In the United Nations most of the delegates interpreted the statement as an attempt to put pressure on the United Nations to authorize MacArthur to bomb Chinese supply bases and industries in Manchuria. The United States' representative moved quickly to end such fears and said that MacArthur's statement should be viewed as an "analysis" and not a "recommendation." "Any recommendations to the United

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Nations," he said, "would come from Washington." 21

This message also said a great deal more than the ordinary battle communique. By implication it criticized the United Nations for the "obscurities which becloud the unsolved problems raised by China's entry into the war." The "vital decisions yet to be made" clearly blamed Washington and the United Nations for the lack of a clear-cut victory in Korea. The decision had been made. The United Nations and Washington did not wait from the date of the Chinese entry into the war in October, until March, when MacArthur made this statement, without having a plan of action. However, this plan was a negative one; it was based on the idea of containment, of limiting the war to Korea, and of not taking the risk of spreading the war into China.

In the United Nations the idea of unifying Korea by military action was quietly dropped. The General Assembly resolution of October 7, which tacitly authorized the crossing of the Thirty-eighth Parallel by United Nations forces and the importance of unification of the whole country, was being pushed deeper into the background. 22

The next phase of the controversy took place during the United Nations grinding offensive that slowly pushed the

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Chinese Communists back toward the Thirty-eighth Parallel. Intelligence reports indicated that the Chinese were massing in North Korea and Manchuria for a major drive. The fourteen United Nations countries with troops in Korea were working for a statement of aims that would induce Mao Tse-tung to consider a truce proposal. On March 20, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacArthur the following message:

State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for U.N. forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

Just four days later, March 24, without consulting Washington, the General issued another in this unusual series of communiques. It is amazing in light of the March 20 message of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, he had apparently reached the limit of his patience. He noted that the Chinese "human wave tactics" had failed, and that Red China lacked the industry to fight a modern war. The com-

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23 New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951. 
Hearings, Part 5, p. 3541.
The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse . . . .

Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

This message coupled an implied threat and an offer to discuss truce terms. The New York Times said the statement, "caused dismay and anger at the U.N. and in Washington." At the President's direction the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacArthur a message which sternly called attention to the December 6, directive advising him and all other commanders to steer away from foreign and military policy statements until they had been cleared by Washington.

General Courtney Whitney, one of the men closest to MacArthur since the fall of the Philippines, later said: "The General has interpreted . . . his statement of March 24 . . . as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within

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his uncontested authority to speak."26

Then on April 5, 1951, the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, Joseph Martin, read a letter to Congress from General MacArthur. This was a reply to a letter from Congressman Martin. This exchange, and in particular MacArthur's letter, furnish the climax in the dispute over our policy in Korea.

Congressman Martin's letter, dated March 8, 1951, was as follows:27

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command.

My Dear General: In the current discussions on foreign policy and overall strategy many of us have been distressed that . . . we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command.

I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.

I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up.

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect

27 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3543; reprinted from the Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938.
you command is enormous. May success be yours in the gigantic undertaking which you direct.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

The reply of General MacArthur, March 20, 1951, read:

Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Martin: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats still fight with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am,

Faithfully yours,

Douglas MacArthur.

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28 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3543.
CHAPTER III

THE BACKGROUND OF THE HEARINGS

How General MacArthur was fired. On the afternoon of April 12, 1951 (Tokyo time), General and Mrs. MacArthur were just finishing lunch at the Embassy with a visiting United States Senator when the General's aide, Colonel Sidney Huff, telephoned for Mrs. MacArthur. A radio broadcast had just announced that the General had been relieved of all of his commands. Colonel Huff knew that Mrs. MacArthur could help more than anyone else in this very awkward situation. A little later the official message from Washington was received and delivered by the aide. It was dated April 10, 1951 (Washington time), and read as follows: 1

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message.

The message explaining the President's action read: 2

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his whole-

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1 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3546. 2 Ibid., p. 3547.
hearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

The reaction of the public. The extent of the public reaction was enormous. In New York, Mayor Impelleteri announced that the city would honor the General with the traditional ticker tape parade. From Tokyo, General MacArthur cabled his acceptance of New York's honors. He also notified the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought it "inappropriate" for him to appear as a witness while Congress was considering an invitation to him to address the Congress as a whole. He said he wanted to talk to Congress in "general terms."

A large part of the press supported MacArthur, but it cannot be assumed that this was an accurate reflection of public opinion. However, the press does influence public opinion, and the attitude of the press is an important consideration. The influential magazine *Time* said of the situation:

Seldom had a more unpopular man fired a more popular one. Douglas MacArthur was the personification of the big man . . . Harry Truman was almost a professional little man, with admirers who liked his courage and critics who despised his faults.

However, an Associated Press survey of seventy-eight leading newspapers in all parts of the country showed this division of opinion: Truman right, thirty-eight; Truman wrong, twenty-six; neutral, fourteen.

The *New York Times* reported that newspaper comment generally reflected the following major themes:

1. Civil vs. military control of policy.
2. What world policy do we have?
   (a) Europe first or,
   (b) Stop Communism in Asia now.
3. The President's Asian policy; whether or not he has been vacillating.
4. Personalities. Is Truman doing his job? Is MacArthur a 'far-seeing statesman,' or a 'dangerous egoist?'
5. Secretary of State Acheson's role and charges of 'appeasement' of the United Nations and Communist China.

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6 *Loc. cit.*
Across the nation newspaper editorials generally took a pro-MacArthur and anti-Administration view. A survey by the New York Times\textsuperscript{7} reported that the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (Independent) said, "A general in the Orient could not be allowed to determine global policies in the light of facts, contacts, and consultations not available to anybody in Japan or Korea." In New York the Daily News (Independent) said, "... the entire Korean War situation stinks to heaven," and thought it was MacArthur's duty to tell the American people all he knew about "little Harry Truman's police action." The Minneapolis Star (Independent) called the Korean War a "tragic blunder," but warned against embracing MacArthur's policies. The survey showed the Cleveland News (Republican) holding, "In the hearts of Americans at this hour General MacArthur is the real conqueror, and a President of the United States had, by his ill judgment and compromised position, emerged defeated." In Dallas the Daily Times-Herald (Independent-Democrat) agreed that MacArthur had to go, but said: "The enemies of freedom can sit complacently and smile at our confusion." The New Orleans States (Independent-Democrat) was most outspoken: "We could much better have lost the whole national Administration at Washington than this able commander, statesman, organizer, and leader."

\textsuperscript{7}\textit{Ibid.}, p. E-3.
The Pacific Coast was more sensitive to Asian developments than any other part of the country, and the public was shocked. However, there were many voices to support the President, and the press seemed more temperate than the public, though editorials expressed great fears of disastrous consequences. The Los Angeles Times (Republican) called the President's move "horribly bad judgment ... the most powerful nation in the world has listened to the mewlings of its impotent allies and has thrown in with the appeasers."

The noted New York Times political commentator, Arthur Krock, wrote: 8

It is probably too much to expect the Republicans not to try to make a quick harvest of the sudden crop of popular anger, the potential of trouble and danger for the free world is large.

Another Times writer, Hanson W. Baldwin, predicted that the change would result in smoother command and staff relationships, and that the "Bataan crowd" would be replaced by Pentagon direction. 9

Probably the person to whom the public reaction meant the most was the President. What did he expect the public reaction would be? The answer was given at the Blair House conference of April 10, which was the final meeting before MacArthur's dismissal. There was a discussion of the prob-


9 Ibid., p. E-4.
able public reaction, and the conferees anticipated there would be an uproar in Congress and that the first response from the public would be adverse. Nevertheless, President Truman observed, "If your decision is right you must go ahead with it even if you know there will be a storm of disapproval. If you are right, the American people will in time support you."\textsuperscript{10}

Public reaction was all that the President and his advisers expected it would be. Arthur Krock wrote, "The dismissal inevitably projected General MacArthur onto the national political stage from a position in the wings."\textsuperscript{11} Huge crowds turned out in Hawaii and San Francisco. An estimated 100,000 persons appeared before the San Francisco City Hall to hear the General say, "I have no political aspirations whatsoever. I do not intend to run for any political office. I hope that my name will never be used in any political way."\textsuperscript{12}

In Washington, at President Truman's directive, all government departments and agencies dismissed for the afternoon all employees whose duties could be spared. About half a million people watched the welcoming events. The turnout in New York was twice as large as that which greeted

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid.}, p. E-1. \quad \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. E-3. \\
General Eisenhower on his return from Europe.

As of April 17, the public response was running against the President insofar as Congressional mail and telegrams were criteria. Some Democratic senators, however, noted a rising approval for the President. The Democratic tactic was to speak more or less softly and hope that such a reaction would take place. ¹³

Adding to their survey of public opinion, the *New York Times* reviewed foreign press statements. In England the *Manchester Guardian*, after saying, "President Truman . . . is wholly in the right," added that, "MacArthur had at times been left to take difficult decisions with a lamentable lack of political guidance from statesmen whose task it should have been to give it." The conservative *Daily Express* took issue with the President's decision. Said the *Express*: "Is he [General Ridgway] also to be told by the fake Success lollipops that he can do anything he wants. . . to the Chinese except hurt them?" ¹⁴ Generally, though, the British people and government disagreed with MacArthur. They opposed any naval blockade of China because it would be ineffective, and they felt that using the troops of Chiang Kai-shek or bombing China would lead to an extension of the war.


Furthermore, they openly favored seating Red China in the United Nations. In the House of Commons there was cheering at the announcement of General MacArthur’s removal.\(^\text{15}\)

In Rome, Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza said the President had done "an excellent thing." The Netherlands government thought it a "wise" move. At the United Nations in New York there was polite but undisguised elation. The Indian delegation said: "It should improve the atmosphere." In Peiping a Chinese Communist paper wryly observed, "We do not see any significance in MacArthur's dismissal ... One mad devil has lost favor with the boss and is being replaced with another."\(^\text{16}\)

The reaction of Congress. Both Democrats and Republicans joined in praising General MacArthur for his statement that he did not intend to enter politics. Senator Wherry, Republican of Nebraska and Minority Leader of the Senate, said:\(^\text{17}\)

This should put a stop to all the snipers and hatchetmen who have been dragging MacArthur politically into the great decision that must be made on what our national defense policy should be.

Senator Johnson, Democrat of Colorado, said, "He can


\(^{16}\) *Loc. cit.*

\(^{17}\) *New York Times*, April 19, 1951, p. 10.
now be regarded as a patriot instead of a politician." 18

House Minority Leader Martin said that the MacArthur statement was "no news to me," then added: "General MacArthur had previously told some of his friends he was not interested in politics. He is only trying to be of genuine service to the country ... " 19

Senator Lehman, Democrat of New York, said he was "glad that General MacArthur rejected any idea of engaging in political activity." 20

Senator Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, said, "I congratulate him on his decision and I think this means he'll be even more influential." 21

Republican Senator Ferguson of Michigan said that the announcement was just what he expected and that: 22

Republicans here should not speak for General MacArthur, nor should he be spokesman for the party. Congress should get as many facts from him as possible to formulate proper policies.

Meanwhile, on April 12, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican party leader in the Senate, in a speech before the Yale Engineering Association in New York, accused the President of usurping Congressional authority when he sent American troops into Korea without first getting approval.

19 Loc. cit.  20 Loc. cit.  21 Loc. cit.
22 Loc. cit.
Furthermore, he noted that the President's position was not consistent, since the firing of MacArthur led the world to believe that we were "flirting with appeasement," while at the same time we were trying to prevent World War III by our move against Korean aggression.\(^{23}\)

Other Congressional comment was in much the same vein -- pro-MacArthur from both Republicans and Democrats. Undoubtedly some of the Democrats were waiting for a turn in the tide of public opinion. It would have been politically unwise to oppose it at this time.

For a short time Republican House Leader Martin talked about impeachment. Senator Kerr, Democrat of Oklahoma, accused the Republicans of dodging the real issue and said that if they believed the nation should follow MacArthur's policy they should submit a resolution expressing that as the sense of the Senate. Senator Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, said, "The Republican Party has become the war party."\(^{24}\) The talk of impeachment was dropped.

However, that did not mean the Republicans were going to abandon so much political ammunition. Within the party itself a change of tactics was needed to insure support of Republicans in Congress. Eastern internationalists, like


\(^{24}\) Time, April 23, 1951, p. 26.
Senator Lodge, and men like Senator Knowland who wanted decisive action in Asia, as well as such isolationists as Indiana's Capehart and Illinois' Dirksen, who frequently criticized involvement in either Europe or Korea, were all needed for effective party unity. A Presidential election was coming up in 1952, and the firing of MacArthur seemed, at this time, to accrue to the benefit of the Republicans. As a result Representative Martin announced that the Republican Party would move to have MacArthur address a joint session of Congress.

In addition to the Republican opposition in Congress the President had considerable opposition from within his own party. This came from Southern Democrats who took issue with the President's stand on civil rights and transferred this attitude into general opposition of his politics.

On April 19, 1951, General MacArthur addressed a joint meeting of Congress. In this he was free to speak over the head of the President, but he had already done that. This was probably his greatest hour. The New York Times headlined, "20 Million View General over TV." According to the Times, this was more than "witnessed the Senate crime investigation." Furthermore, "viewers saw a man who not only had strong convictions, but also displayed an intuitive stage presence and a keen awareness of his dramatic hour."25

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Interest in the address was so great that many television and radio stations changed their schedules to offer repeat broadcasts on films and recordings. However, according to the New York Times, "TV cameramen gave fine shots of Republicans applauding, but no direct, full-screen views of the Democrats just sitting quietly." The Times concluded that "both reporterial accuracy and dramatic contrast called for better judgment by the cameramen or directors."\(^26\)

The General's speech raised several questions and kept the dispute very much alive. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed with him. It followed that members of the Senate Armed Services Committee would want to hear more about that.

The demand for an investigation by Congress. Both parties agreed there should be an investigation of foreign policy. In addition to the immediate reason, brought on by the General's dismissal, there was the problem of troops for Europe—the so-called "great debate" of 1950-51. In its broader aspects, this was a logical development of the differences involved in the "Europe first" policy of Roosevelt and Churchill in World War II, with which MacArthur had disagreed.\(^27\) The final and probably the most pressing reason

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for an investigation was that intense public interest de-
manded it. These circumstances put Congress in a difficult
position. In the first place it was the duty of Congress to
investigate the situation since it involved the safety of the
nation, but a really objective analysis required that the in-
vestigators subordinate political considerations to national
security.

Of less vital importance, but not to be overlooked,
was the manner in which the General was dismissed. A Con-
gressional investigation was not needed to prove it had been
bungled, but an explanation of it was in order. To many Re-
publicans it was typical of the way everything in Washington
was being handled, and it contained all the elements of a
political bombshell.

Arrangements for the Hearings themselves had inter-
esting and important political overtones. The Democrats
wanted closed hearings and wanted to use the standing com-
mittees on Military Affairs and Foreign Relations. Time
magazine said that the Democrats were anxious "to keep Gen-
eral MacArthur's thundering rhetoric out of the earshot of
microphones and his dramatic profile off the screen of
twelve million television sets."28 Commenting on Time's

28 Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Young, 1951), p. 178.
observation, Rovere and Schlesinger said that while *Time* was no doubt correct, "... the case did not rest entirely on the audio-visual delights of General MacArthur; it also rested on the same logic which holds that jewels should be kept in a safe."\(^{29}\) After five votes a compromise was reached in which the Democrats yielded on procedure to the extent that the Hearings could be attended by all members of the Senate, with questioning limited to committee members; there would be no broadcasting or televising, but an effort would be made to give the press whatever parts of the testimony the Defense Department could, in good conscience, release.\(^{30}\)
CHAPTER IV

FACTS ABOUT THE HEARINGS

The Committee—How it was constituted. Sitting jointly, the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations brought together most of the principal leaders of both parties under the chairmanship of Senator Richard Russell, Democrat of Georgia. Representing the Armed Services Committee were: Senators Byrd, Democrat of Virginia; Hunt, Democrat of Wyoming; Johnson, Democrat of Texas and Majority Leader in the Senate; Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee; Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi; Long, Democrat of Louisiana; Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire; Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts; Morse, Republican of Oregon; Knowland, Republican of California; Cain, Republican of Washington; and Flanders, Republican of Vermont. Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations were: Senators Connally, Democrat of Texas and committee chairman; George, Democrat of Georgia; Green, Democrat of Rhode Island; McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut; Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas; Sparkman, Democrat of Alabama; Gillette, Democrat of Iowa; Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin; Smith, Republican of New Jersey; Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa; Lodge, Republican of Massachusetts; Tobey, Republican of New Hampshire; and Brewster, Republican of Maine. This resulted in fourteen
Democrats and twelve Republicans.\textsuperscript{1}

The extent to which politics entered into the committee's line of questioning is a matter of some speculation, but it was, nevertheless, a factor that must be studied and evaluated. While the committee had a Democratic majority, seven of them were Southern Dixiecrats.\textsuperscript{2} On the other hand, Republican Senator Morse frequently split with his own party to support the Administration viewpoint.

These two committees brought together two of the most important Congressional groups. Under their wing was control of the defense budget, about two-thirds of all federal expenditures, and the increasingly difficult problems of foreign affairs. The importance attributed to the work of these committees is indicated by the seniority of members assigned to them. Senator George was elected to the Senate in 1922; Senator Russell was elected in 1932; Senator Byrd was elected in 1933. Senator Knowland was being groomed to take over the Senatorial leadership of the Republican Party. The Senator most conspicuous for his absence from these committees was Robert A. Taft, who preferred to devote himself to leading the Republican Party in Congress and to

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Hearings}, Part 1, p. ii.

\textsuperscript{2} Senators: Russell, Georgia; Byrd, Virginia; Johnson, Texas; Stennis, Mississippi; Long, Louisiana; George, Georgia; Sparkman, Alabama.
domestic affairs. Senator Sparkman was to be the Democratic Vice-Presidential choice in 1952. Senator Morse was widely known as a liberal Republican. He had gained a considerable reputation on the West Coast as an arbitrator of labor disputes. In 1943, Senator Fulbright introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives which called for "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace." \(^3\) Subsequently, Senator Fulbright became Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A similar resolution was introduced in the Senate in 1943 by Senator Tom Connally; the combination of these became known as the Connally-Fulbright resolution. \(^4\)

**How the Hearings were conducted.** Because the testimony concerned national security it was necessary that the Hearings be closed to the public. While neither the press nor the public was admitted, arrangements were made to give the press whatever testimony the Defense Department cleared. Of course, Defense Department censorship was not what the correspondents felt would result in the full coverage they wanted. According to Rovere and Schlesinger, most corre-


\(^4\) Loc. cit.
spondents thought the system would be "unbearably clumsy," but it turned out to be "... the most thorough and accurate coverage there has been of any Congressional hearing within memory."5

A subcommittee on Censorship was made up of Senators McMahon and Knowland with Admiral Arthur Davis representing the Defense Department. The censored transcripts were sent to the Senate Office Building press room ordinarily within an hour after the testimony had been given. Whenever the stenotypist in the hearing room had a few hundred words, his ribbon was taken to the mimeograph room, where the text was cut on a stencil. The stencil was then given to Admiral Davis with the advice of Adrian Fisher of the State Department. Any material that would endanger national security was cut out with a razor blade. The mutilated stencil was put on an electric duplicating machine which, sheet by sheet, fed duplicates practically into the hands of the correspondents, who had arranged to purchase them. The fee was twelve and a half cents a sheet, and for a time there was a brisk second-hand market at three cents a sheet. All told, there were 8,000 sheets.6

Chairman Russell had some difficulty keeping the bal-

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5 Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 179.
6 Ibid., p. 181.
ance that would protect national security and at the same time keep the American people well informed. He stated at the beginning of the Hearings that the transcript should be full and complete, and later he said, "The American people are entitled to every single piece of information that can be safely spread on the public record." However, he also noted that two press reports quoted unidentified Senators on evidence submitted to the committee which did not appear in the released transcript. At one point Senator Russell criticized General Marshall for having "put the classification to practically all of your statements." It turned out, however, that only 3.8% of Marshall's testimony was deleted, either by himself or the censors. This compared to 1.4% of MacArthur's testimony.

When the Hearings had been going on for three weeks the New York Times observed:

Our friends and adversaries all over the world have been able to listen to an exposition of our military and diplomatic strategy such as has never been put on record before by any other nation in history.

Commencing May 3, 1951, the Hearings lasted for seven weeks, ending June 27, 1951. Over two million words of

7 Hearings, Part 1, p. 682.
8 Ibid., p. 335.  9 Ibid., p. 678.
10 Cited in Rovere and Schlesinger, op.cit., p. 181.
testimony were taken from thirteen witnesses. In an endeavor to make the Hearings non-partisan, the members of the joint committee decided that no views or conclusions would be stated as that of the majority or minority, but that the committee members could file their own views and conclusions with the Chairman. Such views were printed in the appendix.

The most controversial matter relating to procedure that arose after the Hearings were underway occurred when witnesses declined to answer on the grounds that the questions disturbed the confidential position of an adviser to the President. MacArthur was asked what transpired during the private talk at Wake Island; he declined to answer and was not challenged. General Marshall also declined to answer confidential questions about the President and himself and was not challenged. Bradley was questioned about a conference between the President, General Marshall, General Bradley, Secretary Acheson, and Mr. Harriman concerning the dismissal of MacArthur, and he declined to answer for the same reason. In this case, however, there were several strong objections from Republicans Wiley and Hickenlooper. Arguments in favor of Bradley's stand were: (1) it involved

11 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3567.
12 Ibid., p. 3559.
a confidential relationship like lawyer-client and doctor-patient, and (2) the separation of powers of the government. The principal argument against Bradley's position was that this was public business. Chairman Russell ruled that Bradley was not required to testify to this point, and Senator Wiley appealed the ruling to a vote of the Committee. The ruling of the Chairman was sustained by a vote of eighteen to eight. Senators voting to uphold the ruling were: George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Smith, Lodge, Connally, Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, and Flanders. Senators voting against the ruling were: Fulbright, Gillette, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Brewster, Bridges, Knowland, and Cain. Senator Russell ruled that as Chairman he should not vote on his own ruling.13

The witnesses who appeared before the Committee.

General MacArthur was, of course, the principal witness. His military career was long and distinguished, though like his father before him he quarreled with civilian authorities. As military governor of the Philippines, Major General Arthur MacArthur disagreed with Governor General William Howard Taft concerning the degree of civil government that should be granted the Philippines. Arthur MacArthur was in command of

13 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 870-73.
the American forces during the Philippine revolt and did not agree with Judge Taft that the Philippine people were ready for civil government. Since politics were involved in this situation, part of Taft's job was to get the revolt off of the front pages of the newspapers as quickly as possible.14

Douglas MacArthur's military career was outstanding from the day he entered West Point. He graduated in 1903, the top man of his class. In World War I he was chief of staff of the Forty-second (Rainbow) Division; then as commander of the Eighty-fourth Infantry Brigade fought in the Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne defensives, and in the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. In 1918 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, and in 1919 was appointed Superintendent of West Point. From 1922-25 he was in command of the United States forces stationed in the Philippines. This was followed by assignment as chief of the general staff, 1930-35. In the period of Japanese expansion President Franklin Roosevelt (1935) appointed MacArthur head of the American military commission to the Philippines. The purpose of the commission was to establish an extensive training and defense plan for the Philippine Army.

Although he had retired from duty in 1939, he returned to duty in July 1941 to command the United States armed

14 Hunt, op. cit., pp. 27-29.
forces in the Far East. After the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, he led the American resistance in the Philippines until March 1942, when President Roosevelt ordered him to Australia to take command of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. From here and New Guinea he directed the campaign that ultimately led to the liberation of the Philippines. In December 1944, he was promoted to general of the army—five star general—the army's highest rank. With this rank goes full pay for life, since he is considered to be on permanent call. After the surrender of Japan, MacArthur was named Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) occupation forces. He was seventy years old when he became the United Nations Commander in Korea.

When he ordered the dismissal of MacArthur, President Truman was well aware that he was dealing with a popular hero and an explosive political situation. Consequently he did not act until he felt there was no other alternative. Even so, he did not have an easy time of it. This was partly because the Korean War was an unpopular war at home, and partly because of the inept way the General was dismissed; but probably the chief difficulty lay in the character and personality of Douglas MacArthur. In addition to his soldierly qualities, he has been an eloquent and effective public

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15 Willoughby, op. cit., p. 300.
speaker. In 1950, John Gunther wrote: 16

A five star general can pretty well make his own rules, and nobody has ever excelled MacArthur in his capacity to tear the guts out of a directive, but by and large he is scrupulously careful to maintain military proprieties.

Politics were not the only extraneous factors that were involved in the Hearings; so too were the personalities of the individuals concerned with these times and events. The careers of Generals Marshall and MacArthur had crossed and rivaled each other for many years. At the time that MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander in the Orient each was a five star general. Each had served under the other, but at the crucial hour Marshall was Secretary of Defense. Marshall came to the Army from Virginia Military Institute; he was commissioned in 1902. In World War I, when MacArthur led the Rainbow Division to famous victories, Marshall was an organizer, administrator, and planner of battles. He became aide-de-camp to General Pershing. At the end of the war each held the rank of colonel, but postwar reshuffling of rank brought Marshall down to a captaincy while MacArthur became a brigadier general.

During the years that MacArthur was Superintendent at West Point, Commander at Manila, Commanding Officer of the Fourth Corps Area, and finally Chief of Staff and a full gen-

16 Gunther, op. cit., p. 15.
eral, Marshall continued service with Pershing. There were assignments in China and long tours in the Army's schools as a student or instructor. Marshall knew that he would have to have some field assignments to attain any real advancement. In 1932 and 1933 he was given duty with troops, but the assignment was interrupted with orders to the Illinois National Guard as inspector and instructor. Marshall was bitterly disappointed. He took the unusual step of requesting the Chief of Staff to assign him field duty, but he was ordered to carry out the original assignment to the National Guard. MacArthur was Chief of Staff at the time. From this time on there was bad feeling between them, but it cannot be said to have influenced their military decisions.

After MacArthur's tour as Chief of Staff ended in 1935, Marshall rose rapidly. In 1939 he became Chief of Staff and a four star general, just in time to plan and carry out America's great rearmament drive. When World War II started for the United States, Marshall was in command at the Pentagon, and MacArthur was at Manila. The two Generals disagreed on strategy for the prosecution of the war. Since there was not enough equipment for a full-scale war in both Europe and the Pacific, there had to be a division. Europe was given first call, and the Pacific had to wait. MacArthur

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made no secret of his impatience.

After the war Marshall retired from the Army, but, like MacArthur, when he was needed by the government he continued to serve. President Truman sent him to China to try to bring about a truce in the Chinese civil war. The truce did not materialize, and in a year Marshall came to doubt the value of Chiang, his men, and his administrators.

After his return from China Marshall became Secretary of State for two years. He stressed the Europe-first policy with the Marshall Plan, shut off aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and pigeonholed the Wedemeyer Report that urged continued help to Chiang. MacArthur's views were passed over. 18

After the invasion of South Korea, Marshall was again called from retirement to become Secretary of Defense. Thus the quiet and unassuming Marshall had kept pace with the brilliant and dramatic MacArthur throughout their long careers. The personal characteristics that made the differences between them were reflected in the methods that they used and in the objectives they advocated.

One of the most controversial figures of President Truman's cabinet was Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Rightly or wrongly he was a constant target of the opposition. In defense of his Secretary of State, President Truman had this

18 Ibid., p. 33.
History, I am sure, will list Dean Acheson among the truly great Secretaries of State our nation has had. Most of the criticism came from members of the Senate sometimes called the "China First" bloc.

These men kept repeating the completely baseless charge that, somehow, Acheson had brought about the Communist victory in China, and they now charged that it was Acheson who was depriving General MacArthur of the means of gaining victory.

Graduated from Groton, Yale University, and Harvard Law School, Acheson was given an education that very few people could obtain. Consequently, it was not surprising to find that the U.S. News and World Report found this background had set him apart from many in Congress with whom he had to deal. This, however, did not impair his standing with the President. It is interesting because the backgrounds of Truman and Acheson were so different.

In his dealings with other people, Acheson unfortunately had a flair and a weakness for withering phrases when the questions revealed a lack of knowledge or slowness to understand his viewpoint. At one point in the Hearings Senator Flanders said that Mr. Acheson "was using his 'papa knows best' style to a bad advantage." No doubt some of this was politics, and would have happened to anyone who was

20 U.S. News & World Report, June 15, 1951, p. 34.
21 Loc. cit.
Secretary of State at the time. Since the end of World War II the State Department had increased greatly in importance. It could not move without getting strong reactions, both favorable and unfavorable. In the postwar period Nationalist China fell to the Communists. Many people in the United States were very critical of the roles played by both Acheson and Marshall. Marshall was sent to China when Ambassador Hurley resigned, with instructions to try to bring about a coalition government in which Chiang Kai-shek would permit Communists in both the government and the army of Nationalist China. The result was that the Republicans were able to mark him as the symbol of United States difficulties in the Far East. Five years previously China was in friendly hands, then it fell into the hands of a shooting enemy. Besides these knotty problems, Senator McCarthy's charges of communists in the State Department created additional trouble.22

Relations between MacArthur and Acheson had been strained since 1945. MacArthur had announced that within six months after the occupation of Japan started, a reduction of forces from the original estimate of 500,000 to 200,000 could be made. At a press conference Acheson countered with, "... the occupation forces are instruments of policy and

22 Ibid., p. 32.
not determinants of policy . . . and whatever it takes to carry this out will be used . . . ."23

During World War II, Franklin Roosevelt was in many respects his own Secretary of State, but after his death that office again became the real source of American foreign policy, subject to Presidential approval. Acheson became Under Secretary in 1945 for Secretary of State James Byrnes. The opponents of the Truman Administration, Republican and Democrat, were able to link Acheson with a group of ultra-liberals then working in the State Department. According to Frazier Hunt, it was he who assigned John Carter Vincent as head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department. Acheson also made John Stewart Service head of the State Department Information Service. In addition, the fact that Alger Hiss and Owen Lattimore were State Department men was condemned.24

The truth was that the Republican campaign against Acheson, fairly or not, marked him as the symbol of the difficulties of the United States in the Far East. He had befriended Hiss, but so had John Foster Dulles and Felix Frankfurter. Acheson became something of a political albatross to the Democrats. As a matter of fact many Republicans con-

24 Ibid., pp. 415-16.
sidered him a political asset to their cause. However, on the stand Acheson was to be coldly logical, calm, and unemotional. He had a lawyer’s skilled command of himself, and was exceedingly careful not to be clever, apparently realizing that a debater’s victory often costs more support than it wins.

The principal military advisers of the President were, of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their function was twofold: they advised the President on military matters, and each was administrator of his respective branch of the armed forces. They were necessarily concerned with the balance of forces needed to protect us and our friends from Soviet aggression. The disposition of our forces became the subject of much Congressional controversy in 1951. The question was not so much what to do, but how to do it. There was and is an area here where military and foreign policy overlap, and this was the crux of the MacArthur controversy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were made up of General Omar Bradley, Chairman; General J. Lawton Collins, Army; General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force; and Admiral Forrest Sherman, Navy. General Bradley enjoyed a very considerable reputation. During World War II, he was in the African and Sicily campaigns; in 1944 he led the United States First Army in-

vasion of Normandy; and in 1944, was placed in command of the newly created Twelfth Army Corps, in which position his skillful planning hastened the defeat of Germany. From 1945-48 he was head of the Veterans Administration. In 1948, he replaced General Eisenhower as Army Chief of Staff and in 1949, became the Chairman of the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senator Russell described him as a man of "great humanity and great humility; the GI's general." In his testimony, Secretary Marshall noted that Bradley had commanded, in the field, the largest force of ground troops in history, his experience was very extensive, he was level-headed, and a man of great honesty of purpose.

Admiral Sherman, the Navy's representative to the Joint Chiefs, was well known as a brilliant strategist, and the one who had perhaps the most complete knowledge of world affairs and geopolitics. He had been Admiral Nimitz's Deputy Chief of Staff in the Pacific campaign of World War II, and had been in command of the Mediterranean Fleet. The result was a first-hand knowledge of both the European and Pacific theaters of military operations.

In World War II General Collins was in the fighting at Guadalcanal and in Europe. His forces seized Cherbourg in the first large capture from the Germans after the African invasion.

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26 Hearings, Part 2, p. 727. 27 Ibid., p. 501.
campaign. According to General Marshall, "he conducted a classic battle, which received almost no publicity in this country, in destroying large portions of the two armies remaining of the Germans at Mainz ... " \(^{28}\)

Marshall felt that the combined experience of this group was such that he doubted if the Government would ever again be able to match it at one time in the Chiefs of Staff. \(^{29}\)

The committee decided to go beyond those who were directly concerned with MacArthur's dismissal and to investigate the whole military situation in the Far East. Only in this way, they felt, could they understand MacArthur's position. General Albert Wedemeyer's knowledge and experience were called upon for this purpose. During the earlier years of World War II, he served as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Section of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff. In 1943 he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Southeast Asia Command. In 1944 he was sent to China to assume command of the United States Forces in the China theater. There he also served as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He was author of the famous Wedemeyer Report on China.

In March 1949, Louis Johnson succeeded James Forrestal

as Secretary of Defense. He held the rank of Colonel and was a past National Commander of the American Legion from 1932-33. During the Roosevelt Administration Johnson was Assistant Secretary of War and served as Roosevelt's special representative to the Far East. In the latter position, he held senior diplomatic authority in that part of the world.30 He served as Secretary of Defense until September 1950, when he was succeeded by General Marshall.

As the Hearings proceeded, the length of the investigation became the subject of increasing concern to the Committee. The function of a Congressional investigation is, of course, to gather the information that will enable Congress to pass legislation, and to check upon the functioning of the Executive branch of the government. A subcommittee was appointed to consider the number of additional witnesses that should be called to testify. Thirty-four names were formally suggested, and a much larger number was mentioned informally. By the eighteenth of June there was considerable need for ending the Hearings as soon as practicable, since twenty-six Senators had taken time out from the work of the Senate as a whole, and it had suffered as a result of this loss of time. Furthermore, the work of other committees was diverted in order to proceed as rapidly as possible with the MacArthur

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30 Hearings, Part 4, p. 2570.
controversy and our far-eastern policies. The main consideration in selecting witnesses was that the Committee should become well informed and hear from both sides of the issue, while at the same time preventing the testimony from becoming repetitive in character. Averell Harriman was contacted and said that he would be glad to testify, but that he would not have anything to add to what had been covered by previous witnesses; as a result he was not called. Finally, the subcommittee tried to balance the number of witnesses presenting views that were in conflict with the Administration and vice versa, but at the same time limiting the list of those to testify to persons "who had some direct relation with the events and policies under investigation."  

By the time the subcommittee looked into the matter of the witnesses to be called, the pro-administration witnesses who had given testimony were: General Marshall, Secretary Acheson, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg, and General Collins; the witnesses who generally opposed the Administration were: Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer, and former Defense Secretary Louis Johnson. At this point the subcommittee recommended that the full committee invite and hear: Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Vice Admiral Oscar Badger, Major General David Barr, and

Patrick J. Hurley, Major General, Honorary Reserve, United States Army. Three of these witnesses were thought not to be friendly to the Administration. They were: General O'Donnell, Admiral Badger, and Patrick Hurley. O'Donnell was invited to testify at the specific request of Senator Knowland.33

General O'Donnell was introduced to the committee as "one of our top Air Force commanders." In World War II he led the first squadron of B-17 Flying Fortresses across the western Pacific. When World War II was two days old he earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for an attack on a Japanese cruiser and destroyer escort under unusually hazardous conditions. Later he commanded the Seventy-third Bomb Wing (B-29), and led it on the first Superfortress attack made on Tokyo. From July 1950 to January 1951, he was in command of the Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command.34

When he appeared before the committee, Admiral Badger was the United States Navy Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier. He had been on duty in the Far East over three years, and for another three years had gone there every six or seven weeks on various assignments. He testified that, at the end of the war, he had charge of the demobilization and closing up of Pacific bases, and went to China fre-

33 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2720-25. 34 Ibid., p. 3061.
quently in connection with the shipping and disposition of surplus material that was left on the islands of the Pacific. Exclusive of the MacArthur area of command, he was the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Far East in the western Pacific.35

General David G. Barr had considerable experience in the area of the committee's interest. He was Chief of the Army Advisory Commission in Nanking from January 1948 until he assumed command of the Seventh Infantry Division in Japan in May 1949. He led this Division at the Inchon landings in Korea. He held several of the country's highest decorations, including the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.36 His assignments with the Army Advisory Commission were during the time that General Marshall was endeavoring to arrange a coalition government of the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. General Wedemeyer was opposed to this plan and was to describe General Barr to Defense Secretary Forrestal as a "polite and a loyal, good officer, but most entirely lacking in force."37

General Patrick Hurley of New Mexico devoted his life to the service of his country. From 1912-17 he was the United States attorney for the Choctaw Indian Nation. Dur-

37 Forrestal Diaries, op. cit., p. 383.
ing World War I he fought in France as a colonel in the Army. In 1929 he was Undersecretary, and from 1929-33 he was Secretary of War in the Hoover Administration. As Secretary of War, he obtained the appointment of General MacArthur as Chief of Staff over the objection of General Pershing.\(^\text{38}\)

In introducing General Hurley to the committee, Senator Russell observed that he had played a key role in the events which were under study by the committee; that he had served as Ambassador to China from November 30, 1944 to November 27, 1945, and that these were some of the most significant months involved in the committee’s investigation.\(^\text{39}\)

General Hurley was first sent to China in 1944 as President Roosevelt’s personal representative to help calm the bitter antagonism that existed between Chiang Kai-shek and "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. This personal feud had an important bearing on the course of events in China and was an important factor in the ultimate fate of Chiang Kai-shek. In the war against Japan, Stilwell insisted upon using all the forces of China, including the Communists. After years of fighting the Japanese, the Nationalists were weakened to the point where resistance to Mao Tse-tung’s armies was not

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strong enough to command effective control of the government of all China. The United States government had furnished Chiang Kai-shek a great deal of military aid in both equipment and military personnel. However, much of the equipment was lost in the black market of China. Stilwell's main theater of action was Burma, but the United States wanted him placed in field command of all Chinese forces. A long history of foreign domination did not endear Chiang Kai-shek or any other Chinese to this idea, but Stilwell was an impossible pill for Chiang to swallow. The result for Hurley was that he personally became well acquainted with the political situation in China. He was in the middle of the struggle for control of China that took place between the Japanese, the Communists, the British, French and Dutch colonial interests, and the Nationalist forces of Chiang.

What the Committee hoped to accomplish. The relief of General MacArthur and the Congressional Hearings that followed dramatized some of the aspects of the question of the role of the military in making government policy on the highest level.

One of these problems concerned the most effective and economical operation of the Defense Department. The increasing importance of the military establishment in the formulation and execution of national policy had become an
important political and social problem. For the United States this was essentially a new problem, and the traditional American values and institutions in the field of civil-military relationships faced new challenges. In this situation some Congressmen expressed fears of the development of a Prussian-type general staff in this country. The unification of the armed forces is one illustration that was held up as an example. On the one hand, there were those Congressmen who were alarmed at the inefficiency and lack of agreement among the top military command; and on the other hand, there were those who felt that the nation was being indoctrinated with some form of creeping militarism. The fact that, since World War II, the budget for national defense was about two-thirds of the total national budget seemed to confirm this notion. That the United States had acquired a new role in world affairs was not accepted or not understood in the minds of these people.

Certainly part of the reason for the Hearings was the examination of the role of the military in making and executing foreign policy. It is obvious that foreign policy is, to a degree, contingent upon the military power necessary to back up international commitments and to protect our national status. This is not to say that military factors are the only elements involved in making foreign policy. For Congress, however, the task would seem to have been clear-cut:
a definite investigation of the military problems involved in the Far East, and what conditions must prevail to maintain the principle of civilian supremacy in our newly acquired role of leadership and responsibility in the world.

The traditional role of the military in the United States is subordinate to the civil authorities, the President and Congress. The President is, of course, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, but a declaration of war must be approved by Congress. The civilian attitude toward the military has been one of suspicion, distrust, and sometimes positive dislike. The history of many nations is but a cataloguing of tyrannical governments established by the use of military power. Many Americans, mistakenly or not, view the actual attitudes and values of military men as inimical to freedom and democracy. In view of this it seems inconsistent for Americans to have elected military heroes President six times. However, in such men many governments have hoped to find national security.

The machinery of the executive branch of the government did not provide the means through which advice of high ranking officers could be directly available to the President unless he requested it. However, in this investigation, the

committee decided to hear not only from the Secretary of Defense, but also from the top ranking military officers directly.

Senator Russell opened the Hearings by stating that the committee would "attempt to obtain facts which are necessary to permit Congress to make correct decisions in the problems of war and peace in the Far East and throughout the world."\textsuperscript{41} He agreed with General MacArthur in his speech to Congress, that the issues were beyond the realm of partisan considerations.\textsuperscript{42} This established a very general objective for the committee, but so general that the problem of defining just what the real issues were became the subject of considerable controversy.

The problem of limiting the issues was to pursue the committee all during the Hearings. Senator Wiley, very early in the investigation, said, "To me we can clear away a lot of maze and fog if we know just what the issues are."\textsuperscript{43} However, Senator Russell countered with the observation, "The Chair does not want to prescribe the limitations of this hearing."\textsuperscript{44} He then suggested that a subcommittee could be appointed to define the issues. However, no limitations were established except to set time limits for the

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., Part 1, p. 1.  \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., Part 1, p. 2.  
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., Part 1, p. 35.  \textsuperscript{44} Ibid., Part 1, p. 36.
questioning of witnesses. Senator Wiley said that he wanted to know why MacArthur was fired and so did the public.

Since there was no legislation before the committee, it was almost inevitable that the questions would become involved with policy that was not related to the removal of MacArthur. Examples of this were: the China lobby, steps taken to prevent the loss of Iran to Soviet Russia after World War II, atom bomb development in 1945, Communists in the State Department, and the China situation. It is obvious that much of this had political implications. Furthermore, the Korean War did not bring the kind of response from the nation that followed Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Other points of issue for the committee were: (1) whether MacArthur had exceeded his authority; (2) who was right and who was wrong with respect to the prosecution of the war, and (3) the reasons for the awkward manner of the dismissal of the General.

In order to place the investigation above partisan politics, the committee decided that no views or conclusions would be set forth as that of the majority or minority, but that members would be permitted to file their views and conclusions with the Chairman, and that they would be printed in the appendix. It seems that the magnitude of the issues was such that the committee should have taken a stand and submitted a report of the whole committee. It would seem
that the public would be entitled to this much, especially since very few people would ever go into the situation to the extent that was done by the committee. Furthermore, as a result, some of the legislators were able to go uncommitted on one of the most important and controversial issues of the day.
CHAPTER V

THE CASE FOR MacARTHUR

The testimony of General MacArthur. The General's speech to the Congress had been an impressive prologue to the Hearings. It had left, however, some questions that needed further clarification from MacArthur, and there was the Administration point of view to be heard. This chapter deals with the witnesses at the Hearings who were friendly to the General. MacArthur was the first witness to appear before the committee.

Just as there were witnesses friendly to each side of the case, there were those on the committee whose questions were designed to favor the General and those whose questions favored the Administration. However, the questions, the demeanor, and the attitude of the members of the committee were respectful and generally friendly, even when they took the side of the Administration. However, to have been otherwise would have been politically unwise at that time. Yet much, and perhaps all, of the respect shown MacArthur was because of his service to the nation.

Following World War II efforts were made to bring about greater efficiency in the armed forces through unification of certain military functions. One of the first points brought out by MacArthur was an observation that there
was, in Korea, "very complete" cooperation between all branches of the service.¹

The testimony then developed the Soviet choices of action in Korea. MacArthur indicated that he thought that Soviet military decisions were made on a global basis rather than by the incidents occurring in Korea; that their planning was based on broader considerations than one geographic area. Their plans, he felt, were flexible, and the high command represented a high degree of military efficiency.

Then proceeding to matters more directly concerned with the dispute between MacArthur and the Truman Administration, he was asked how many ground troops were needed to accomplish the mission in Korea. To this the General replied that he had constantly asked for more troops than he was given, but that he was unable to say how many troops were required because he was not permitted to prevent the enemy build-up of men and supplies in Manchuria. "If this restriction were removed," he said, "I do not believe it would take a very great additional component of ground troops to wind this thing up."²

The question of the timing of MacArthur's recommendation to carry on air operations over Manchuria and to blockade the coast of China was raised. He said that this

¹ Hearings, Part 1, pp. 4-5. ² Ibid., p. 10.
was not done until after the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war.³ The air operations he had in mind consisted of continuing in hot pursuit after enemy planes engaged in combat over Korea, and of bombing the supply bases which gave the enemy privileged sanctuary. He also had asked that use be made of the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. In discussions with General Collins, MacArthur had pointed out the need to lift the restrictions on air operations against Chinese bases in Manchuria and the use of Nationalist forces.⁴

In his speech to Congress MacArthur said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed with him concerning his proposal to blockade China, to remove the restrictions on air reconnaissance over Manchuria, and to make use of the Nationalist forces on Formosa against the Chinese Communists. He cited a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated January 12, 1951 to support his statement.⁵

Senator Wiley asked MacArthur if he had ever advocated the invasion of the Chinese mainland by United States ground forces. The General answered: "Senator you know that is ridiculous. No man in his proper senses would advocate throwing our troops in on the Chinese mainland."⁶

³ Ibid., p. 12. ⁴ Ibid., p. 13. ⁵ Ibid., p. 29.
Senator Wiley asked: you have indicated in your public addresses that there has been a failure to take certain needed political decisions in the Korean matter. Can you tell us what...those decisions might well have been.

The General answered as follows: I would have served—as soon as it became apparent that Red China was throwing the full might of its military force against our troops in Korea, I would have served warning on her that if she did not within a reasonable time discuss a cease-fire order, that the entire force of the United Nations would be utilized to bring to an end the predatory attack of her forces on ours.

In other words, I would have supplied her with an ultimatum that she would either come and talk terms of cease fire within a reasonable period of time or her actions in Korea would be regarded as a declaration of war against the nations engaged there and that those nations would take such steps as they felt necessary to bring the thing to a conclusion.

MacArthur believed that the way to bring the War to a conclusion without abject appeasement was only by the application of superior force. He said that there were three choices of action: To pursue to victory; to surrender to the enemy; or, he said, "what I think is the worst...to go on indefinitely...in that stalemate; because what we are doing is sacrificing thousands of men while we are doing it..."9

When he was questioned regarding the conversations between President Truman and himself at Wake Island, MacArthur declined to answer on the grounds that they were of a con-

7 Hearings, Part 1, p. 29. 8 Ibid., p. 12.
9 Ibid., p. 67.
fidential nature. However, in his Memoirs President Truman said that MacArthur had told him that he thought there was very little chance the Chinese would come into the war. This point was confirmed by MacArthur's biographer, Frazier Hunt.

The Administration's policy in Korea, MacArthur alleged, was no policy at all. "There is," he said, "no policy--there is nothing, I tell you, no plan or anything." This did not go unchallenged by the Administration witnesses, and will be taken up in the next chapter. MacArthur's attitude was an interesting and rather effective method of discrediting a viewpoint with which he disagreed. It should be said, however, that in this instance MacArthur's approach was positive, while the Administration's was negative. Probably the most important strategic concept of the United Nations and of the Administration in Washington was to limit the conflict to Korea, and it was felt that MacArthur's strategy might broaden the area of warfare; that it could even result in World War III.

On the subject of the Martin letter Senator Green asked if the two letters made public were the whole of the correspondence between them. MacArthur answered, rather

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11 Hunt, op. cit., p. 475. 12 Hearings, p. 68.
vaguely, that he felt any member of Congress was entitled, within security provisions, to any information that he requested.\footnote{13}

Senator Kefauver asked MacArthur if he had received information from the State Department, on the same day he wrote the letter to Congressman Martin, requiring further statements by him be coordinated in accordance with the directive of December 6, 1950. The General said that he had not.

Next Senator Kefauver asked: "But you did not feel that the letter to Congressman Martin would have required coordinating his letter as required by the order of March 20?"\footnote{14}

MacArthur's reply was: "Not in the slightest."\footnote{15}

In the Martin letter the General had in effect taken his case to the people by going to one of their elected representatives. The fact that he dealt directly with the President's political opposition was bound to arouse the wrath of the President even though the Congressman had initiated the correspondence.

Everyone seemed to agree that a subordinate should make his views known to his superiors when he disagrees with them, but probably most people would hold that it

\footnote{13}Ibid., p. 46. \footnote{14}Ibid., p. 113 \footnote{15}Loc. cit.
should stop there, especially in the armed forces. Senator Kefauver asked the General if he thought it proper for a brigadier or major general under him to take issue with his general concept as the theater commander by writing a letter to a member of Congress when he knew it would be used in the debate about the way his campaign was being conducted. MacArthur replied that he wouldn't have the slightest objection, just so he did it in a courteous, polite way following the normal code of a gentleman's conduct. Under the circumstances it would have been inconsistent for the General to say anything else, but military officers certainly are discouraged from the use of political influence.

Regarding the circumstances surrounding his dismissal, MacArthur testified that the first word he had received was from his wife, who was advised by one of his aides who had heard it on a radio broadcast. The aide told Mrs. MacArthur because he felt that she could handle the situation better than anyone else. About thirty minutes later the official communication had been received. The order relieved the General of his command upon its receipt, replacing him with General Ridgeway, who was 350 miles away on the Korean front. Ordinarily the relief of a command is done in such a way that the new commander will be briefed on the current status of

16 Ibid., p. 114.
the operations. MacArthur testified that unquestionably this summary method of turning over great responsibilities jeopardized the interests of the United States. 17

Whether the relief of MacArthur upon receipt of orders actually did jeopardize the interests of the United States is a matter of some speculation, but it certainly could have. If it did not it speaks well for the state of MacArthur's military organization.

Senator Knowland called the attention of the committee and General MacArthur to an editorial in the New York Times of May 5, 1951 which appeared under the heading, "The Basic Disagreement": 18

General MacArthur advances the thesis that once war has broken out the balance of control must be put in the hands of the military; and that no political considerations should handicap the latter in winning such a war; while the Administration holds that in peace or war, the civil government remains supreme.

This statement seemed to imply that the General did not agree with the democratic principle of the civilian control of the military in war as well as in peace. MacArthur called the interpretation of the Times "completely slanted." "At no time," he said, "in our system of government is there any question of the civil administration being in complete control." 19 He said that what he meant to convey was that there should be no non-professional interference in the

handling of troops in a campaign. He also said that whoever wrote that article was completely biased or should have his head examined. 20

The testimony of General Wedemeyer. Because of very extensive military experience in the Far East, Wedemeyer's views were desired by the committee. He had relieved General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell when that officer was unable to get along with Chiang Kai-shek. He was in China during the Marshall mission and saw the fall of the Nationalists to the Chinese Reds. According to Time magazine, he was a "classic specimen of what the Army calls a Brain, an officer who is on speaking terms with history, economics and geopolitics, as well as with smaller military subjects." 21 During most of his career he had been a staff officer; eventually he became one of the most important in the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of planning, from October 1948 to August 1949. Consequently he was unusually well informed on the many ramifications involved in the Korean situation.

For several years the famous Wedemeyer Report was classified top secret by the Defense Department, after the General refused to withdraw certain statements considered embarrassing by the State Department. One of these items

20 Hearings, Part 1, p. 289.

21 Time, June 25, 1951, pp. 18-19.
recommended the establishment of a guardianship in Manchuria and a trusteeship in Korea. One of the objections concerned the establishment of a guardianship of five powers in Manchuria. This included the Soviet Union, but it was intended to keep Russia from taking over in that area. The trusteeship for Korea was to be under the United Nations. This was in 1947, at which time General Marshall was Secretary of State.\(^2^2\)

The testimony of General Wedemeyer brought out that he was opposed to the idea of trying to form a coalition government of the Communists and Nationalists in China, and that he had informed General Marshall of the difficulties involved in that plan when Marshall arrived on his China mission in 1945. Wedemeyer did not have the difficulties with Chiang Kai-shek that Stilwell had; he felt that Chiang was our one hope in China and that he should be supported.

For a region that was not directly involved in the Korean fighting, Formosa had come in for a great deal of attention. Of course, both Korea and Formosa were related to the China problem, and the committee wanted to know more about the strategic importance of each region to the United States. Concerning Formosa, Wedemeyer said that while it was not vital it was a most important bastion against the

\(^{22}\) Hearings, Part 3, pp. 2326-27.
advance of Communism, and it enabled us more effectively to neutralize offensive action from bases on the mainland. If necessary, Wedemeyer favored putting our ground forces on Formosa to defend it.23

When the forces of North Korea had invaded South Korea and President Truman had ordered MacArthur to resist, MacArthur had advised that it would be necessary to make use of ground troops to repel the North Koreans. Aware that most military men agreed with MacArthur, Wedemeyer happened to think differently. With humility he said to the committee, "I could be so wrong."24 This did not mean that he was opposed to the defense of South Korea, but that he would have used air and sea forces only against North Korea. Observing that there were many powder kegs around the periphery of Soviet Russia he said, "We should not allow them to be fused at Russia's convenience and loss of manpower to their third team."25

On October 7, 1950, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution stating that the essential objective of the United Nations in Korea was the establishment of a unified and democratic government of Korea and recommended that all appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability

25 Ibid., pp. 2307-08.
throughout Korea. This indicated that the Thirty-eighth Parallel was eliminated as the boundary between North and South Korea.

General MacArthur had stated that he did not know what the policy was in Korea. He had further objected to the restrictions imposed upon him in the United Nations' effort to limit the war to Korea. Wedemeyer agreed with MacArthur that no restrictions at all should be imposed on the theater commander once a mission like this one had been declared. Any restrictions, he felt, required a change in the mission. The result was that Wedemeyer believed that MacArthur ought to have been authorized to bomb enemy supply bases and lines of communications and to use whatever combat-ready Nationalist forces were available on Formosa. General Wedemeyer pointed out that theater commanders do become involved in making policy when no clear-cut instructions are issued. He had exactly that experience in China when he had found it necessary to order his forces to fire on Red Chinese who attacked American troops. "A theater commander," he said, "is compelled to take action in his theater that actually generates foreign policy in the absence of direction from home." However, it should be pointed out that the Communists were

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28 Ibid., Part 3, p. 2347.
not then the government of China, and that our forces were in China at the pleasure of the Nationalist government.

Senator Morse did not agree that MacArthur had not been informed concerning what the policy was; he said, "Speaking for myself, I would say ... there is no evidence ... that he was not fully advised at all times as to what the policy of the Government was." 29

General Wedemeyer replied that MacArthur had been criticized for moving across the Thirty-eighth Parallel and then against the Chinese forces, but that, "he had to do those things." 30 Wedemeyer also indicated that he personally doubted that there had been a clear-cut policy enunciated to MacArthur.

Senator Fulbright asked General Wedemeyer what he believed the policy in Korea should be. To answer this the General said that he would have to step out of the realm of an Army officer, because "what an Army officer needs is direction as to what you civilians want to accomplish. ... If you tell me what you want to accomplish, I could help you determine what the military action should be. ..." 31 His answer to the Senator's question was that: We should get the ground forces out of Korea and use air and naval units;

31 Ibid., p. 2362.
that Formosa and not Korea was strategically important to us; we should break off relations with Soviet Russia, and take the strategic initiative away from them.  

This led to a discussion of a possible truce providing for a cease-fire at the Thirty-eighth Parallel. Since we went in there in the first place to create a united, free Korea, Wedemeyer felt that such a truce would be a psychological defeat for us, but that it was better than going on using up our manpower in a military stalemate against what he called the third team of the Soviet Union.  

One of the most controversial aspects of MacArthur's general attitude had been his recommendation that "We go alone" in case our allies in the United Nations did not go along with us regarding such things as the blockade of the China coast. While General Wedemeyer strongly favored a United Nations effort, he also felt that in case the other members of the United Nations would not support us we should go alone. He did not think that the bombing of bases in Manchuria or the naval blockade of China was an act of war, since the initial aggression had already occurred on the part of the Chinese Communists.  

One of the specific points where MacArthur was con-

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32 Ibid., pp. 2362-63.  
33 Ibid., pp. 2360-61.  
34 Ibid., p. 2536.
sidered by the Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have gotten out of line involved the March 20 message of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he had been informed that the State Department was "planning a Presidential announce-
ment" concerning conditions of settlement in Korea. The message indicated that time would be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that might develop. 35

Senator Cain pointed out that MacArthur was not told that the President was going to take any action with respect to either a cease-fire or negotiations with foreign govern-
ments. Wedemeyer concurred in this and also with the point that while MacArthur could not have known the nature of these negotiations, as Supreme Commander in the Far East he should have been advised that they had been undertaken. 36

The Martin letter was the climax of the MacArthur con-
troversy. Senator Bridges asked Wedemeyer if he would have answered such a letter from Congressman Martin. The answer was affirmative— but that he would have asked that the reply be kept confidential, and he would have advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended that they contact Congressman Martin and clarify the confused situation. 37 He said that

he would not object to an officer of his command writing frankly to any Senator or Congressman and was confident that it went on all the time. 38

The relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to field commanders was the object of some searching questioning by Senator Sparkman. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the top military advisers to the nation, and then asked, "In case of a disagreement between a field commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom should we as members of Congress and to whom should the American people look for guidance?"

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, without question, sir, Wedemeyer replied. They are your senior military advisers, and I have explicit confidence in their integrity and in their loyalty . . . . I do not always agree with their judgment as an individual but I would never question it if I were a member of Congress. 39

Regarding the appropriateness of the dismissal, General Wedemeyer testified that when the President loses confidence in or feels that he has a commander in a remote area who is not carrying out his orders, it is incumbent upon him to relieve the commander. However, in this case the manner in which it was done made most Americans unhappy. In this case Senator Morse agreed with General Wedemeyer. 40

The testimony of former Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson. Mr. Johnson said that he did not have any prepared statement for the committee, but that he would not violate the confidences of the President obtained while he was a member of the cabinet. He also noted that he had not talked publicly or privately about his departure from the Defense Department, about the Defense Department, the removal of MacArthur, or any allied subject.41

Senator Bridges asked the former Defense Secretary to explain what were the reasons for going into Korea, and what were the objectives—as determined by the conference that took place on June 24, 1950.

Johnson's explanation was a realistic appraisal of the official stand of the United States:

The fairest statement I can make as to the general approach was that if you let this one happen, others would happen in more rapid order. . . . The impression was abroad . . . that we were not going to do anything about it.42

Besides the fact that the aggression of North Korea would damage American prestige, it was a clear violation of the United Nations Charter.

Johnson said that before the fighting began the State Department had spoken for our government on Korea. The recommendation to defend South Korea came from the Secretary

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41 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2570. 42 Ibid., p. 2585.
of State, and it was concurred in by the Secretary of Defense. Johnson said that the possibility of Chinese or Russian intervention was considered a calculated risk.43

Senator Bridges wanted to know whether, at that time,44 the objective was just to drive the Korean Communists back beyond the Thirty-eighth Parallel, or whether it was the United Nations objective stated later—a democratic free Korea, or if there were some other objective. Johnson said that no conclusion had been stated on any of these points, including whether we stopped at the Thirty-eighth Parallel, the Yalu River, or any other location.45

One of the chief points of interest turned on whether MacArthur had followed the instructions he received from Washington. Apparently the President did not think that he had. Senator Wiley asked: "During the time you were Secretary did MacArthur follow directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense implicitly and faithfully?"

Mr. Johnson: "Yes sir."46

Johnson went on to say that he thought that MacArthur had done one of the outstanding jobs in Japan that was ever

43 Ibid., Part 4, pp. 2584-85.

44 June 26, 1950 conference of the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

45 Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2585-86.

46 Ibid., p. 2591.
done by any American anywhere, and that he was one of the
greatest, if not the greatest, general of our generation.

Regarding MacArthur's recommendations concerning the
steps to be taken in the Korean fighting, Johnson was in
agreement with some, but not all of them. He approved of
the intensification of the economic blockade of China, and
of the naval blockade of China, but not of the Russian con-
trolled ports. He would have followed the advice of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on air reconnaissance over the coastal
areas of China and Manchuria, and he would not have removed
the restrictions on the Nationalist forces on Formosa.47

Johnson testified that the ever increasing burden of
the cost of national defense had become a major issue for
the Truman Administration. In 1949 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had asked for a thirty billion dollar budget. This
amount was cut to about twenty-three billion dollars by
Defense Secretary Forrestal.48 The 1950 budget called for
still more reductions. Johnson said that he, the Defense
Chiefs, and General Eisenhower were called to a budget meet-
ing and were advised that the President had approved a
thirteen billion dollar defense budget. He said that it
was the first time those present had ever heard of it, and

that he "was sick about it." The figure had been worked out by the President's Economic Adviser, Edwin Nourse, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Frank Pace. This amount was designed to get the fat out of the Defense establishment and trim it down to muscle. Regarding his own convictions concerning this budget, Johnson said, "If there was peace this was entirely too much; if there was war it was entirely too little." Senator Long noted that we were criticized for spending too much right up until the Korean War, and then we were criticized for not spending enough.

Johnson agreed with MacArthur regarding the contribution of our United Nations allies. "Despite my hope in and support of the United Nations," he said, "I am heartsick and remain indignant that so many have done so little in sharing the sacrifices. ..." However, he did not propose, or suggest that we "go it alone."

The handling of MacArthur's dismissal had distressed Johnson as it did almost everyone—probably including the President. He said that he would have asked that it be handled in some other way, like sending Harriman or going himself, had he still been Secretary of Defense. The subject of dismissal had been brought up by the President

49 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2598.  50 Loc. cit.

51 Ibid., p. 2705.  52 Ibid., p. 2712.
when MacArthur sent his message to the Veterans of Foreign wars.\textsuperscript{53} He said that since he did not have all the facts concerning the basis for the dismissal, his personal opinion could only muddy up the water, and he declined to comment on it. However, he did say that if the President had lost confidence in MacArthur a change was in order.\textsuperscript{54}

The successful landing at Inchon took place on September 15, 1950. Just four days later Secretary of Defense Johnson resigned. Senator Knowland thought this was odd timing; a resignation could not be tied to such a successful military operation, and he asked Johnson what the circumstances were. The Secretary said that he had actually been forced to resign two days before Inchon, but that his resignation was effective on the nineteenth. He went on to say that he did not know why he was ousted from the Defense establishment, but that it hurt him. He felt that he and MacArthur had carried the burden of the responsibility for Inchon, while General Collins had gone to Korea to try to argue MacArthur out of it.\textsuperscript{55} Whatever the reasons were, it seems to have been handled ineptly. Johnson was succeeded by General George Marshall. What the President's reason for this action were is not indicated in the Truman Memoirs,

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., Part 4, pp. 2586-87. \textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 2604. \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pp. 2617-18.
but his well known admiration for Marshall may well have been the explanation.

An additional factor which possibly contributed to Johnson's requested resignation was his doubt about the State Department attitude toward Formosa and Chiang Kai-shek. He said that our government "recognized" the Nationalist government, but did not "support" it. The State Department motion to protect Formosa with the Seventh Fleet was a great surprise and relief to him. This feeling went back to December 1949, when the State Department opposed, on political grounds, sending a military mission to Formosa. The President, disregarding military considerations, sided with the State Department on political grounds. It therefore seems probable that the President had at least two obvious reasons for replacing Johnson: the first was that he felt that General Marshall was better qualified for the cabinet post; and second, he could not have this type of fundamental disagreement in his cabinet. Neither could he afford to make his reasons public.

The testimony of Patrick Hurley. One of a few people to know first hand why China had changed from friend to foe, Hurley was in a position to furnish testimony that was in conflict with the Administration viewpoint. He told the

56 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2596. 57 Ibid., p. 2578.
committee that military plans had to be kept secret, but that the policies that cause the commitment of a nation to war should not be kept from the people affected by the commitment. He also felt that the administration of our foreign policy was not in keeping with the policy announced to the American people by the Administration.

Hurley said that the change in our foreign policy began at Yalta in 1945. There we abandoned the principles of the Atlantic Charter for a policy based on concessions to communism and imperialism, and on fear of Russia rather than confidence in America. "Confidence in America," he said, "is a better basis for a foreign policy than fear of Russia." 58

As the American Ambassador to the Republic of China from November 1944 to November 1945 Hurley had been under the wartime directive of President Roosevelt to work toward the unification of the forces of Nationalist and Communist China against Japan. However, he had ordered the withholding of American lend-lease supplies from the communists unless and until they recognized the sovereignty of and placed themselves under the Republic of China. 59 That recognition had not been forthcoming. Meanwhile the government of China was under attack from both within and without.

58 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2829. 59 Ibid., p. 2839.
It was this situation in which the United States had become increasingly involved because of the war against Japan. In 1942 General Joseph Stilwell was chief of staff of the Allied armies in the China theater. Because a great deal of aid was given to China, the United States wanted some voice in the planning of military operations in the China theater. However, a conflict of personalities made for an unworkable situation between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. In addition, the record of foreign domination in China was a source of ill-will and suspicion. Stilwell felt that Chiang had no intention of establishing a democratic regime and that he was milking the United States. Relations between them became so strained that General Wedemeyer was sent to relieve Stilwell in October 1944.

While he said that he did not agree with the "Europe first" policy of World War II, it was the President's decision, and Hurley made it his decision. Nevertheless, Hurley believed that we should not abandon Chiang Kai-shek. He found him to be honest, an able and educated soldier, who was both a Christian and anti-Communist. Senator Smith wanted to know why, in view of these favorable qualities, we had backed away from supporting him. Hurley blamed State Department personnel who were pro-Communist in their
sympathy. In contrast, Wedemeyer had felt that the real trouble lay in the conflict of ideologies, which could not be made to work together. Hurley said his job had been to bring the two Chinas together in a united effort against Japan, and he believed that it could have been done, but for disloyal elements in the State Department. Hurley believed that John Patton Davies, Robert Service, and others in the State Department wanted the United States to go over to Communist China. Hurley wanted the defense of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Wedemeyer, on the other hand, had felt that they would never get together, and that one or the other would have to control China.

The testimony of Vice Admiral Oscar Badger. While he was generally friendly to the MacArthur viewpoint, Admiral Badger's testimony revealed some differences that were significant. He felt that our major strategic objective was to create conditions that would keep Russia from starting World War III. MacArthur undoubtedly agreed with this, but so did General Bradley. Their differences were in how to implement the grand strategy.

In a speech to the National War College on March 14, 1951 Admiral Badger said that we should initiate political,

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economic, humanitarian, and military objectives which, in case of war with Soviet Russia, would permit us to be engaged under the most favorable terms. 64

On the use of Nationalist troops on Formosa he testified that he was not familiar with their capability and that their use—primarily for guerrilla fighting on the mainland of China—ought to be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 65 He said that he understood MacArthur's recommendation to be for raids rather than a full-scale invasion of China, but that these would have to be very well planned and timed. 66 As to the use of Formosa as a naval base he felt it was too small and its facilities were too restricted. However, he also felt that Formosa was extremely important as a source of influence upon the thinking of the Chinese on the mainland.

One of the things that MacArthur had resented the most was the sanctuary allowed the Chinese over the Korean border. To this point Admiral Badger testified that he was opposed to the recognition of Chinese sanctuary, but that his opposition applied to the Chinese who committed the act, and not the one who was supporting it, Russia. Hot pursuit


65 Ibid., p. 2806. 66 Ibid., p. 2780.
of enemy planes should be made until they are destroyed. He would go along with the prohibition of bombing Manchurian bases, because we could win the war in Korea; however, a plane attacking was another thing. 67

Hot pursuit had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs and the State Department, but it had been rejected in the United Nations. 68 The Admiral declined to comment on the advisability of unilateral action on this subject on the grounds that he did not feel qualified to answer. On the other hand, he did say that even if we wanted to bomb Chinese cities and our allies disapproved he would not agree that we should go it alone. 69

The testimony of Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., United States Air Force. In his questioning of General O'Donnell, Senator Knowland listed the restrictions imposed upon the Air Force. They are summarized as follows:

Instructions to CINCPE [Commander in Chief Far East] by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, 1950 that provided for employment of United States naval and air forces against North Korea below the Thirty-eighth Parallel only.

Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCPE on October 21, 1950 that because of political implications, the State Department wanted a special report to the Security Council by CINCUNC [Commander in Chief United Nations Command] to the effect that U.N. forces would not inter-

67 Ibid., Part 4, pp. 2798–2800.
68 Ibid., pp. 2800–01. 69 Ibid., p. 2770.
fere with the operations of the Suiho hydroelectric power plant near Sinuiju.

November 6, 1950 Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCFE to postpone all bombing missions on targets within five miles of the Manchurian border until further orders. This order stopped a planned attack on the Yalu River bridge at Sinuiju, and the communication and supply centers there.70

MacArthur had protested the order to postpone the bombing missions in the Yalu River area, and requested that his protest be brought to the attention of the President.

Owing to General O'Donnell's position and experience in Korea Senator Knowland wanted his views on the effects of these restrictions. The General testified that the United Nations decision to restrict us to the areas south of the Yalu put us under wraps and made us work against inordinate difficulties. 71

O'Donnell said that the Air Force was designed to do a devastating type of job, but that the tactical bombing missions it was doing was something else, and that it was not in keeping with the training and mission of the Air Force. 72 The sanctuary allowed the Red Chinese meant that their planes could attack our bombers on a hit and run basis from Manchuria. It also meant that as our planes approached the sanctuary they were subjected to anti-aircraft fire, but they could do nothing about it except try to evade the fire.

70 Ibid., Part 4, p. 3091. 71 Loc. cit.
72 Loc. cit.
He further indicated the belief that the Strategic Air Command was not designed to fight a limited war.

The committee questioned O'Donnell on the wisdom of bombing Manchurian bases. From a purely military viewpoint he was probably better qualified to answer this than anyone who appeared before the committee. Prefacing his remarks with the observation that he spoke beyond his position as a bomber commander, he said that, in November, "he thought we ought to punish those people and let them know that they can't come in as an aggressor and get away with it."73

O'Donnell's concern for what happens as a result of the exercise of military responsibility is an interesting contrast with the military men who become involved in political decisions, and the politicians who become involved in military decisions.

He believed that at a very small cost in casualties we could have hit them hard and perhaps even stopped them in November 1950. At that time their antiaircraft fire was not good and they had very little good fighter cover. However, the situation soon changed to such an extent that the problem had to be reevaluated. This turned on whether we could bomb Manchuria and still retain "our Sunday punch for Russia in case they get out of bounds."74 This evaluation and

decision should be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A primary consideration, O'Donnell felt, was that the Strategic Air Command functioned as a deterrent against Soviet Russia, and our offensive potential could be weakened by a major Air Force involvement in China. In short, we had lost the advantage we held when China first entered the Korean War, and we had made a military mistake in not using the advantage when we had it.

Asked about Formosa as a base of operations he said that we could get along without it, since we have bases at Guam and Okinawa, but that he certainly would not like to see it in unfriendly hands.

Summary. General MacArthur's testimony indicated that he believed that the Soviet strategy was made on a global basis rather than on the conditions prevailing in Korea. While he recommended the bombing of enemy supply bases in Manchuria, the "hot pursuit" of enemy planes, the use of Nationalist forces, and a blockade of the coast of China, he was strongly opposed to the landing of troops on the Chinese mainland. He felt the Administration in Washington lacked a policy or a plan for the prosecution of the war.

Regarding the Martin letter General MacArthur testi-
fied that he felt that any member of Congress was entitled, within security provisions, to any information he requested. He told the committee that he agreed completely with the constitutional principle of civilian supremacy of the armed forces, but that there should be no non-professional interference in the handling of troops in a campaign.

Other MacArthur witnesses agreed with the General in varying degrees. General Wedemeyer would have used sea and air power only to defend South Korea. General O'Donnell testified that in November 1950 we could have stopped the Chinese if we had hit them hard in Manchuria, but that the advantage we held at that time was not maintained. Since the Strategic Air Command functioned as a major deterrent against Soviet Russia, O'Donnell felt that it should be up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine whether a major Air Force involvement in China should be undertaken. General Wedemeyer agreed with MacArthur that no restrictions should be imposed on a theater commander once a mission had been undertaken. He concurred in the bombing of enemy supply bases in Manchuria and the use of combat-ready Nationalist troops. He also agreed that we should "go it alone" if that were necessary, but he preferred a United Nations' effort. Admiral Badger, though he generally supported MacArthur's views, was opposed to any unilateral action on our part. He opposed the recognition of the Chinese mili-
tary sanctuary, but would not bomb Manchurian bases. He also favored hot pursuit of enemy planes until they were destroyed.

Former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified that MacArthur had followed instructions implicitly and faithfully, but that if the President had lost confidence in him a change was in order.
CHAPTER VI

THE CASE AGAINST MacARTHUR

The testimony of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. As a witness Secretary Acheson was careful not to be clever; his testimony was logical and calm, but he could not match the drama of MacArthur, and he did not try. The fact is that because of this, the country seemed to care less about what he had to say.¹

The questioning of the Secretary covered a very wide range of subjects, many of which had no direct bearing on the relief of MacArthur. In addition, there was much that was simply repetitious and, it would seem, unnecessary. It is possible that his examiners wanted to see if they could catch him in a contradiction, but if so they were unsuccessful. Senator Wiley was perhaps his most unfriendly examiner. It should be understood that leading questions are an acceptable form of examination before a Congressional committee. Acheson agreed with Senator Wiley that MacArthur had done a very fine job in Japan, and that our allies agreed with our policy.²

Certainly one of the weakest points for Acheson con-

¹ U.S. News & World Report, June 15, 1951, p. 34.
cerned his speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, in which he said, by implication, that Korea was outside the United States Pacific defense perimeter. It was felt that his speech opened the door to South Korea for invasion by North Korea. His explanation of this was that the United States had troops stationed at certain points which formed a defense perimeter, and that the other areas would first have to defend themselves, then the guarantees of the United Nations would take effect. Acheson testified that the United Nations had never proved a weak reed before, and that it wouldn't in the future. It cannot be denied that some observers might indeed question this.

MacArthur had claimed that he did not know what the policy was in Korea; that actually there was no policy. Senator Bridges referred to the President's statement of November 16, 1950, in which he said, "It is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and that a unified, independent democratic government be established throughout Korea."

Acheson. In the period shortly after the Inchon landings until the intervention of the Chinese Communists, it looked as though both of these objectives could be attained. That is, that as the forces of the North Koreans who had been attacking South Korea were rounded up, destroyed, or surrendered that then the country could be put together and . . . , both

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3 Ibid., Part 3, p. 1741. 4 Ibid., p. 1735.
objectives would have been realized. . . .

There was a distinction made by the Secretary of State regarding the method to be used for the unification of Korea. He testified that since 1947 the United Nations, and since 1943 or 1944 the United States, had stood for a unified and democratic Korea; that was still our purpose and the purpose of the United Nations. However, he did not understand this to be a war aim. The military objective was to stop the attack on South Korea, restore peace, and provide measures to prevent renewal of aggression. Thus the Secretary of State was saying that the military objective was to restore South Korea to the boundaries and conditions that existed before the invasion of North Korea. If so, what then were MacArthur's troops doing up near the Yalu River when Communist China intervened? To Senator Cain this looked like an attempt to unify Korea by force. To MacArthur, crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel was a tactical necessity compelled by the Inchon developments. A halt would have surrendered the military advantage to the Communists and left the United Nations' forces exposed to a counterattack at the enemy's convenience. Acheson's explanation was, "You have not restored peace and security if there are people on the other side coming over and fighting you. You have to try and

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5 Hearings, Part 3, p. 1735.
stop that condition of fighting and war that is going on."

The peculiar thing is that Acheson's justification of crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel would seem to justify MacArthur's demand to carry the war to China by bombing and blockade.

Whatever justification and logic MacArthur could bring to bear for bombing the Manchurian bases of Red China, the fundamental point was that the Administration wanted to limit the war to Korea. Acheson pointed out that no one could accurately forecast Soviet reactions, but that some known factors had a bearing on the question and should be taken into account. First was the known Soviet assistance to North Korea and Communist China. "We know," said Acheson, "understandings must have accompanied this aid." 7

Second was the fact that a treaty existed between the Soviets and Communist China. Even if a treaty did not exist, China was the most important satellite of the Soviet Union, and her self-interest and prestige in the Far East made it difficult to see how Russia could ignore a direct attack on China itself. 8

Third, we could not expect our collective-security system to survive if we took action that other members of the

6 Ibid., Part 3, p. 1732 7 Ibid., p. 1719.
8 Loc. cit.
system disapproved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended the application of the doctrine of "hot pursuit" of enemy planes over the Yalu River. It was turned down as a result of checking with our allies through their embassies instead of taking it up in the Security Council because of the presence of Soviet Russia. This subject had highly secret classification at the time. Here the diplomatic considerations outweighed the military tactics.

General MacArthur had been very critical of the trade that was carried on between some of our allies and China, especially by Great Britain. He had proposed a naval blockade to bring this trade to a halt. Questioned about our trade with China, Acheson stated that in June 1950 we had placed an embargo on strategic materials, and had obtained the cooperation of the major oil companies on withholding shipments of oil from the Middle East and Latin America. In December 1950, we placed a complete embargo on all shipments from the United States and froze all Communist Chinese funds in the United States. 9 The Secretary of State felt that an economic blockade was to be preferred to a naval blockade. 10 In addition to the fact that this involved military action directed against the mainland of China, it was also compli-

cated by the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen.

Senator Saltonstall asked Acheson if the State Department had any part in making the decision that Chinese Nationalist troops should not be used in Korea.

Acheson. "Yes sir, we recommended against it."11 The reasons given were, first, that it would weaken the defense of Formosa, and second, that it was complicated by the other nations fighting in Korea who did not recognize the Nationalist Government.

President Truman's explanation of MacArthur's dismissal had been that he could not give whole hearted support of United States and United Nations policies. Senator Wiley wanted to know about this failure to carry out any policies. Secretary Acheson said that these policies had to do with limiting the hostilities to Korea and not taking steps which might extend them into Manchuria or China, or possibly beyond that.12

Senator Wiley also called attention to a press conference in which the President denied that there was any curb on MacArthur's authority "to speak freely on the Korean War."

Acheson said that this was not an accurate statement of what had happened at the press conference. The subject had been whether or not authority had been taken away from

MacArthur, by the December 6 directive, to issue communiques on the real military situation in Korea.\textsuperscript{13}

However, no such curb on MacArthur was intended. Acheson disagreed with General Whitney's interpretation of the December 6 order that held it as applying solely to formal public statements, and not to communiques, correspondence, or personal conversations with others. Neither did he agree with MacArthur that the March 24 ultimatum or the Martin letter dealt with the military situation and was within his uncontested authority to speak.\textsuperscript{14} The March 24 statement contained an implied threat; at the same time the Secretary of State had been directed by the President to carry on conversations with our allies concerning their views as to possible terms of an armistice or a settlement of the Korean War. Acheson testified that MacArthur was notified of these negotiations on March 20. He said that MacArthur's ultimatum greatly embarrassed the President and created the impression that the United States was speaking with two voices, one the President and the other General MacArthur.\textsuperscript{15}

It may be argued that writing to a Congressman was not any different than appearing before a Congressional

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 1863-64. \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 1830-31. \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 1790-92.
committee conducting hearings. However, where the contact with the Congressman showed the agent of our policy in Korea to be out of sympathy with that policy such an argument was unsatisfactory.\(^{16}\) The Martin letter was, according to the Secretary, not in keeping with the December 6 directive of the President, but while it justified his dismissal, Acheson did not agree that for a man of MacArthur's stature it should be put on the basis of disciplinary action. It was a matter of having policy agreement between Washington and the Korean commander.

**The testimony of Secretary of Defense George Marshall.** Whatever their personal differences may have been, General Marshall found it very distressing to appear before the committee in almost direct opposition to a great many of the views and actions of General MacArthur. He said that he had tremendous respect for MacArthur's military capabilities and military performances, as well as his administration of Japan.\(^{17}\)

Marshall saw Korea as another phase in the long, slow struggle against Communism. Citing the struggle in Greece and the Berlin blockade, he said, "We can win again."\(^{18}\) As to the American advance beyond the Thirty-eighth Parallel—

he said that the United Nations' authority for this was permissive rather than mandatory. The United Nations forces were never given the task of unifying all of Korea by military action. The unification of Korea was a political, rather than a military objective.\textsuperscript{19}

Obviously Marshall's thinking was global in its scope, and it centered around the containment of communism. He said that there was no quick and decisive solution to the struggle, other than resorting to another world war. Admittedly this policy was costly, but it was not comparable to an atomic war. "We have," he said, "spurned appeasement. We have brought to bear whatever has been necessary, in money and manpower, to curb the aggressor. . . ."\textsuperscript{20}

Korea was the latest challenge in this world-wide struggle.

The way to win in Korea was to keep destroying the Chinese armies there. Already four of their army groups had been destroyed, some thirty-four divisions. It was important because this was China's trained manpower.

The much debated point made by MacArthur that the Joint Chiefs agreed with his plan for an economic boycott of China, bombing bases in Manchuria, applying a naval blockade to the China coast, and the use of the Nationalist troops was denied by Marshall. He said that these were

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Hearings}, Part 1, p. 362. \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 366.
tentative objectives which were dependent upon conditions in Korea for implementation. If it became necessary to evacuate Korea altogether, they were possible courses of action. Since that was unnecessary, both the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Council felt that it was inadvisable to put them into effect.21

Ordinarily a field commander is free to try to arrange armistice terms with an enemy commander. In this case, however, MacArthur had been notified that the President was at work in this area. The General's ultimatum to the Chinese Commander, Marshall testified, "made it necessary for the President to abandon the effort, thus losing whatever chance there may have been at that time to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict."22 The President then directed the Secretary of Defense to call General MacArthur's attention to the Presidential order of December 6.23

Both Senator Taft and Senator Knowland strongly urged the use of the forces offered by Chiang Kai-shek in Korea. Testimony of both MacArthur and Marshall brought out the fact that originally MacArthur recommended against the acceptance of this offer because of their ineffectiveness and lack of logistic support. However, as our position worsened,

21 Ibid., pp. 329-337. 22 Ibid., pp. 333-334. 23 Ibid., p. 344.
MacArthur strongly advised the use of the Chinese Nationalist troops.24

General Marshall said that the Joint Chiefs were convinced that these forces would not be effective in Korea. Furthermore, their departure from Formosa would leave that island exposed to Communist attack.25

As with the testimony of the Secretary of State, General Marshall confirmed that the most basic difference had to do with the extension of the conflict beyond Korea.

General MacArthur... would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk of involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe.26

Of course, it is not in the nature of things for a military commander to agree with all of the orders he receives throughout his career. Marshall pointed out that Eisenhower did not have things all his way in the European theater during World War II, and that he sometimes had disagreed with President Roosevelt. "It is," he said, "at times commendable that a theater commander should become so wrapped

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26 Ibid., p. 325.
up in his own aims . . . that some of the directives . . . are not those he would have written for himself."27

What brought about the necessity for MacArthur's removal was his public disagreement with both the foreign and military policies of the United States. It should be made clear that MacArthur did not violate any military policy. His suggestions for the bombing of Rashin and the utilizing of Chinese Nationalist forces were turned down and he did not act contrary to the orders. Thus it was possible for MacArthur to say that he had always carried out his orders. This was no doubt true insofar as it concerned military operations. However, in the area of his public statements, MacArthur did a remarkable job of cloaking them with his "uncontested authority to speak." Secretary Marshall said, "he took issue with the policy before the world."28

Following the Chinese intervention, MacArthur had made several public statements and press releases. On December 1, he had advised Arthur Krock of the New York Times that he had received no suggestions from any authoritative source that he should stop short of the Thirty-eighth Parallel, or a line short of the international boundary, and that the strategic course of the campaign was not responsible for the attack of the Chinese Communists.

27 Hearings, Part 1, p. 325. 28 Ibid., p. 416.
Also on December 1 MacArthur had informed the U.S. News & World Report that the limits imposed on his Command constituted an enormous handicap without precedent in military history.

On the same day, December 1, he had sent a message to the president of the United Press in which he stated his command was faced with an entirely new war. Finally he had criticized the limitations imposed upon retaliation against the Chinese Communists.29

The directive of December 6 had grown out of these statements, but it was put in general terms in order to avoid making it specifically personal to MacArthur.30 This was the first specific directive he was given on public statements, and it simply required clearance on all statements concerning defense and foreign policy.

The Martin letter, like the March 24 release, should have been cleared in accordance with this order, but of course it would not have been released. The letter was brought to the attention of the President on April 5. A meeting was called, attended by the President's special assistant, Averell Harriman, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following day the President requested Marshall

to obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs. General Bradley gave those views to the President. General Marshall testified that all of the Joint Chiefs and all of the people who met with the President to consider the situation concurred in the relief of MacArthur. 31

The handling of the dismissal was one of the things that rankled the Congress most. That the Supreme Commander should hear about his relief on a news broadcast was inexcusable, and the Defense Department would have to answer for it. Marshall's explanation was that Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, then in Korea, was to deliver the message to General MacArthur at his residence, the Embassy. However, the day before MacArthur's dismissal was to take place there were indications that the action had become known publicly. The President then decided to speed up the transmission of the official notification to MacArthur by approximately twenty hours. The public release was planned to coincide with the arrival of the message in Tokyo in midafternoon. However, Secretary Pace did not receive his instructions due to a breakdown in a power unit in Pusan.32

Concerning the news leak Senator Russell commented,

I think that it is one of the most startling instances I have ever heard of, that a matter of this tremendous importance should have become public before it was intended that it should. 33

31 Ibid., p. 345. 32 Loc. cit. 33 Ibid., p. 346.
The testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, was in a better position than anyone in the nation to know whether that group agreed with MacArthur. Bradley pointed out that the message of January 12, upon which MacArthur based his argument, was a result of the condition in Korea. On January 10, 1950, MacArthur indicated doubt about our ability to stay in Korea. Bradley testified that the message of the 12th was a study of what to do in case it were necessary to evacuate Korea. "To us it was clear that it was a study. Maybe it wasn't . . . to General MacArthur; but . . . it was a study and never handled as a proposed directive."34

The foregoing testimony suggests that the Joint Chiefs were thinking along the same lines as MacArthur, but that MacArthur wanted these measures against China invoked immediately, while the Joint Chiefs were thinking in terms of a worsening military situation only.

General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were concerned with the military reasons for MacArthur's relief, and the committee concentrated on this area. Bradley testified that in his public statements MacArthur had indicated he was not in agreement with the decision to try to limit the con-

34 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 738, 1120.
flict to Korea. It followed that this would make it difficult for MacArthur to carry out the Joint Chiefs' directives. In other words, they needed a commander more responsive to control from Washington.

The Presidential directive of December 6 had required MacArthur to clear policy statements before making them. However, he had taken independent action when he proposed to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander, and when he had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew the President was considering negotiations along that line. This action by General MacArthur, Bradley testified, jeopardized civilian control over military authorities. 35

The committee wanted the Joint Chiefs to explain their differences with MacArthur concerning how to win the war in Korea. The course of action described as a "limited war" was explained by Bradley as an effort to avoid engaging too much of our power in an area that was not the critical strategic prize.

Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world . . . this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. 36

To support this charge Bradley said that he doubted

the efficacy of winning the Korean War through application of air power and blockade. War against China, he thought, would require sending ground troops to the Chinese mainland.37

Senator Bridges asked, "Do you think it is fair to ask American troops to go into battle when the enemy has a complete sanctuary across the river?"

General Bradley. "I don't admit they have a sanctuary actually. ... They are not bombing our ports and supply installations, ... so that in a way, we have a sanctuary, too."38

The policy of a limited war had led some critics to charge us with appeasement. Bradley pointed out that a blockade of China, to be successful, would have to include the British port of Hong Kong and the Russian port of Dairen. Forsaking Korea to aggression would have been appeasement, but refusing to enlarge the conflict to the point where our global capabilities are diminished, is not appeasement but a militarily sound course of action in the circumstances.39

The increasing influence of the military on the nation in the twentieth century was examined by the committee. Were the nation's military leaders to be taken into the councils

of the nation, or muzzled by the cloak of civilian control of the military? The following exchange on this subject took place between Senator Bridges and General Bradley.

Senator Bridges. If it reaches the time in this country where you think the political decision is affecting what you believe to be basically right militarily, what would you do?

General Bradley. Well, if after several instances in which the best military advice we could give was turned down for other reasons, I would decide that my advice was no longer of any help, why I would quit. . . . Let them get some other military adviser whose advice apparently would be better or at least more acceptable.

Senator Bridges. Would you speak out, tell the American public?

General Bradley. No sir. . . .

Senator Bridges. Where does the loyalty to your country come in?

General Bradley. I am loyal to my country, but I am also loyal to the Constitution, and you have certain elected officials under the Constitution, and I wouldn't profess that my judgment was better than the President of the United States or the administration.

Senator Bridges. Would it not be on a military subject?

General Bradley. Yes.

Senator Bridges. Should you not speak out?

General Bradley. I would; yes, to the constituted authorities; yes.

Senator Bridges. But you would stop there?

General Bradley. Yes. 40

40 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 752-53.
Concerning the handling of the dismissal, Bradley testified that he was not sure that the much discussed news leak really existed. There had been a great deal of speculation in the newspapers about it. The fact that "certain people" had made frequent trips to the White House gave substance to this speculation. Consequently, Bradley thought, it might be that people were jumping to conclusions as to what might happen. 41

The Joint Chiefs did not request the removal of MacArthur, but they were requested to give their opinions on removal, from a military point of view. They unanimously agreed that from a purely military point of view he should be relieved. 42 The handling of the dismissal and the timing of the release were directed by the President. The method of relief was not included in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Quite aside from the Hearings themselves, but an outgrowth of them, General Bradley became involved in an interesting constitutional problem during his testimony. He was questioned about the conference of April 6, 1951, between President Truman, Generals Marshall and Bradley, Secretary Acheson, and Presidential Adviser Harriman, regarding the dismissal of MacArthur. Bradley refused to divulge the

nature of the conference on the ground that he was in the position of a confidential adviser to the President. General MacArthur had done the same thing concerning the Wake Island conference; Marshall declined to answer questions for the same reason and was not challenged. Chairman Russell ruled that Bradley was not required to testify to the question. Senator Wiley appealed the ruling to a vote of the committee. The ruling of the chairman was sustained, by a vote of eighteen to eight.\textsuperscript{43}

The principal arguments for Bradley's position were the separation of powers and the confidential relationship similar to that of a lawyer-client, or doctor-patient. The chief argument against this position was that it was public business. Senator Wiley's reaction was that the Hearings were "not only a whitewash but a washout."\textsuperscript{44}

Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, followed General Bradley as a witness. He was asked early in the questioning what he would do in case there were a conflict between duty and what he believed to be in the best interest of the country. He replied that he would feel compelled to resign and speak out.\textsuperscript{45}

The differences between MacArthur and Collins on strat-\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}, Part 1, pp. 870-72. \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 912. \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, Part 2, p. 1194.
egy were interesting. It appears that MacArthur's strategy prevailed in Korea itself, but not without some misgivings on the part of Collins. He refused to criticize the troop deployment in Korea, but he did not approve the sending of American troops all the way to the Yalu River. He said that only Korean troops should have been sent into this area in order to prevent China from saying that they were threatened by the presence of American troops on the Manchurian border. MacArthur said that it was a matter of military necessity and that he could not stop short of the Yalu. Collins testified that MacArthur could have stopped on the high ground short of the Yalu, but that in fairness to MacArthur it should be noted that Red China invaded Korea before MacArthur's forces reached the high ground. The point is that MacArthur took exception to this suggestion of the Joint Chiefs which, Collins added, was not an order. It was not feasible to order troop deployment from 7,000 miles away, but it was appropriate to state the policy within which to operate. The military necessity to which MacArthur referred had reference to weaknesses of the South Korean troops. This estimate proved to be correct in the fighting against Communist China.46

In general, Collins held about the same views as

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46 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 1216-17.
Bradley with respect to limiting the war to Korea. A naval blockade would have to include the port of Dairen and possibly even Vladivostok. He said that he had been in Dairen and that it is wholly modern and efficient as a port. To make such a blockade effective would be one of those borderline things that might result in large-scale war. Furthermore, if we got into a large-scale war we would need allies, and any unilateral action would preclude just that.

The Joint Chiefs' study of January 12 that had caused so much controversy was made a point of questioning by Senator Russell, who wanted to know if General Collins had discussed it with General MacArthur on his January 1951 trip to Japan. Collins replied that he had told General MacArthur that the items listed in that communication were representative of the views of the Joint Chiefs of various courses of action that might be taken if it were imperative to take them. This trip, and the study of January 12, were the result of the desperate situation in Korea. MacArthur had indicated that we might be forced out of Korea, but since this did not happen, the measures posed in the study were not in order.

It had been charged that the surrender ultimatum of

48 Ibid., pp. 1189, 1210-11.
MacArthur to the Chinese commander, backed by threats of carrying the war to the China mainland, embarrassed the President in his effort to negotiate a settlement. Senator Wiley asked if such a demand were unusual for a commander in the field. General Collins stated that it was not, and that twice before MacArthur had made such demands on the enemy, but in each case with the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.49

Regarding the handling of the dismissal, Senator Smith criticized the sending of the message which ordered MacArthur's relief, and held that one of the Joint Chiefs should have gone to Japan to advise him of their thinking. Smith felt that MacArthur should have had the opportunity to see his troops, and that if the friction had been explored and could not be resolved, MacArthur should have been given a chance to withdraw.50 General Collins regretted that the dismissal was not handled in the way that it was planned, that is, without any breakdown or news leaks. He did not believe it had any adverse effects on the Army in Korea, because General Ridgway was immediately available. "However it was done . . . ," Collins said, "it would have been a shock to General MacArthur."51

49 Hearings, Part 2, p. 1196.
50 Ibid., pp. 1272, 1319. 51 Ibid., p. 1220.
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, was the next witness before the committee. He believed that as sea power dominated the world before the twentieth century, it would now be dominated by the nation that controlled the air space. 52

By this time the questions of the committee seemed, generally, to run along two lines. The first concerned whether all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered MacArthur to be wrong in speaking his mind on Korea, and the other concerned the strategic concepts in each of their respective areas.

General Vandenberg agreed with Senator Morse that if a military leader disagrees with the Commander in Chief, he has an undoubted right to carry the case to the American people, as a citizen, but he should resign before he speaks out contrary to national policy. 53 However, the Air Force Chief himself had publicly disagreed with Air Force budget cuts on two different occasions. 54

The apparent agreement among the Joint Chiefs on MacArthur and on the Korean strategy seemed open to question. Senator Bridges asked Vandenberg if he had ever disagreed with other members of the Joint Chiefs on questions of

52 Ibid., Part 2, p. 1382. 53 Ibid., p. 1404.
54 Ibid., p. 1385.
strategy. General Vandenberg replied that he and the rest of the Joint Chiefs had agreed quite generally, but that three individuals, representing three services, were going to have differences of opinion, and they had to be expressed very vigorously, if they were to be of any value to the Government.\textsuperscript{55} The fact is, of course, that these differences had to be resolved without public debate.

The strategy of the Korean War, which lay within the realm of air power, was a major point of the MacArthur thesis. Vandenberg said that he was opposed to bombing missions north of the Yalu River, because a major involvement of air power in Manchuria and China would prevent us from being able to operate at full power in any other area. The forty-odd-group Air Force of the United States was a "shoestring Air Force," yet it kept the balance of power in our favor.\textsuperscript{56} In the matter of hot pursuit Vandenberg felt that it would have been of morale value to our Air Force, but would not have been decisive.\textsuperscript{57}

Senator Smith asked the General if he thought MacArthur had misrepresented the Joint Chiefs by his reference to the January 12 "study" of possible alternative courses to be taken if we were driven out of Korea. Vandenberg said

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Hearings}, Part 2, p. 1384.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1378-79. \textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1388.
that he did not believe that MacArthur had misrepresented the Joint Chiefs, but that he did believe MacArthur must have misunderstood their intentions.58

Regarding the justification of MacArthur's dismissal, Vandenberg said that he would not get into any of the legal ramifications of intent because it had nothing to do with his recommendations. Instead he put it on the ground that MacArthur did not see eye to eye on policy; that a field commander had to be given considerable latitude, and in the use of that latitude, there was danger if he felt strongly opposed to the policy.59

The last of the Joint Chiefs to appear was Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. The committee's chief interest in Admiral Sherman concerned the proposed blockade of China. The Admiral cited a few pertinent examples of China's foreign trade. From January to April 1951, over 450 American built trucks arrived in China. A considerable quantity of strategic materials went to China through Hong Kong. Also, India was an important reshipment region for this sort of thing.60 The weaknesses in the economic blockade could be reduced, and actually its effectiveness was improving at that time. He favored a United

58 Ibid., pp. 1396-97. 59 Ibid., p. 1391.
60 Ibid., p. 1515.
Nations blockade, but not a unilateral one.  

To understand the problems of a blockade, it is necessary to consider the legal ramifications from the viewpoint of international law. Admiral Sherman reviewed these briefly. First, it is a belligerent right, and therefore implies a state of war. Second, it must be limited to the ports and coast belonging to or occupied by an enemy. Third, it must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. Fourth, it must be applied equally to the ships of all nations. Finally, to be binding, it must be effective.

The result of all these factors was that a blockade of China was vulnerable because of the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen. The former was not a neutral port, but that did not change the fact that a great deal of merchandise went through it to China. Furthermore, a blockade would make China more dependent upon Russia for war materials. However, the Mukden-Tientsin Railroad carried most of the supplies from Russia, and it was long, inadequate, and vulnerable to easy bombing, sabotage, and naval raiding parties.

On the Joint Chiefs’ study of January 12, Sherman said that it was conditional in nature; courses of action to be taken if events in Korea went against us.  

63 *Loc. cit.*  
admitted that the Joint Chiefs were terribly worried about the possibility of being driven out of Korea. This worry was the reason for the study; most of the items indicated had been put into effect. It seemed to follow that there was good reason for MacArthur to believe that the whole plan would be put into effect, but all of the Joint Chiefs testified as to its conditional character.

On the subject of MacArthur's relief, Senator Johnson asked if he had recommended it. The Admiral replied, "I did not recommend it, sir; I was asked for my military opinion and I gave it." This was to the effect that MacArthur should be relieved.65

Senator Bridges questioned Admiral Sherman concerning our objective in Korea; whether we were fighting for the original United Nations' objective of clearing the Reds out of Korea, or perhaps whether the Admiral had not been told what the objective really was. The Senator seems to have used the same label for the North Koreans as for the Chinese Communists. This may have been all right insofar as they were both cut out of the same cloth, but it made a difference when it came to our objective. Admiral Sherman said that he believed the objective was to defeat the Chinese Communist Army within Korea and north of the Thirty-eighth

65 Ibid., p. 1530.
Parallel. It is rather amazing to find that a person as highly placed as Admiral Sherman should not have the same understanding of the objective in Korea as the Secretary of Defense. General Marshall testified that the military objective was to repel the invasion of South Korea. Secretary of State Acheson testified similarly with respect to our objective. Sherman did agree with Marshall and Acheson that the strategy of punishing the Red Chinese in Korea offered the best chance of achieving success. However, should that policy suffer reverses, he felt then the strategy would have to be changed.

Summary. The key witnesses against MacArthur were members of the Truman Administration. Acheson and Marshall were the principal critics of MacArthur's stand. Secretary Acheson testified that MacArthur had done a fine job in Japan and our allies agreed with our policy there. Acheson replied to the alleged lack of policy by making a distinction between our policy and our war aims. Our policy in Korea looked to a unified, independent democratic government, but our war aim was to stop the attack on South Korea. Regarding the proposal that the United States take unilateral action if our allies did not support us, he said that our collective-security system could not survive if we took action other

66 Ibid., Part 2, p. 1528.
members of the system disapproved. He opposed the use of Nationalist troops on the grounds that it would weaken the defense of Formosa, and was complicated by other nations fighting in Korea that did not recognize the Nationalist Government. Finally Acheson denied that MacArthur was not allowed to issue battle communiques on the real military situation in Korea. However, he felt that the General's release of March 20 concerning truce negotiations gave the impression that the United States was speaking with two voices.

Secretary of Defense George Marshall had a military point of view and at the same time a global picture of the situation. He believed that the Nationalist forces would not be effective in Korea. He testified that MacArthur's removal was necessitated by his public disagreement with the foreign and defense policies of the United States. He made it clear that MacArthur had not violated any military policy, but he had made public his disagreement with it to such a degree that it interfered with the carrying out of that policy. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall testified, concurred in the relief of General MacArthur. General Bradley's testimony was probably the most damaging to MacArthur. The principal point brought out by Bradley was that MacArthur's strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
He pointed out that we also had sanctuary since the Chinese did not bomb our ports and supply bases. He felt that a blockade would involve the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen, and therefore would not be tenable. Furthermore, MacArthur was not in agreement with the decision to limit the conflict to Korea, and his actions, Bradley said, jeopardized the civilian control of the military authorities.

Both Generals Bradley and Collins agreed that they would have to resign and speak out in case they were involved in a conflict in which duty and the best interest of the country could not be reconciled.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Political factors. The immediate problem of the committee was the dismissal of General MacArthur. Just as important was the underlying problem, the expanded role of the military in national affairs. Given the new international responsibilities of the United States, how could necessary military contributions be made without permitting a state of creeping militarism? The committee had to examine the controversy in the light of the constitutional principle of civilian supremacy, and determine where a breakdown had occurred, for that was the real basis of MacArthur's dismissal.

In order to keep the Hearings on as near a non-partisan basis as possible, the committee decided that it would not publish any conclusion of its findings, but would permit the committee members to state their own conclusions in the Appendix. While it seems strange that the committee could not rise above partisanship on such an issue, perhaps it was the most realistic thing to do. After all, MacArthur certainly had moved on to the political stage. The point is that the immediate situation was fraught with political overtones, but the underlying problem should have been free from partisan debate.

Since there was no limitation of issues or purpose,
some Senators were inclined to use the investigation for political objectives. Senator Wiley said, "You have got some advocates instead of investigators."\(^1\) However, the Senator was as sharply critical of the Administration, and as pro-MacArthur, as anyone on the committee. Apparently it was politically expedient to side-step a conclusion at this time. Another time, when the temper of the nation was cooler, a conclusion probably would have been reached.

One of the most important outcomes of the whole investigation was the education of the public on our foreign and military policies. This can largely be attributed to the extensive coverage given by the press. However, the attitude of the press was generally pro-MacArthur. The Korean War was unpopular, and the Administration was blamed for it. The great concern of the press could not fail to influence the members of the committee to be diligent.

*Time* magazine reported that there was a case to be made against the Administration, but that the Republicans failed woefully to make it.\(^2\) This was because they were divided among themselves on Far Eastern policy. Furthermore, many on the committee were favorably impressed by Secretary of State Acheson's grasp of the situation; this

\(^1\) *Hearings*, Part 2, p. 915.

\(^2\) *Time*, "The One That Got Away," June 18, 1951, pp. 22-23.
included Senator Wiley, who complimented the Secretary on his knowledge of the complicated affairs of state. In spite of the failure of the Republicans to make their case, the dismissal of MacArthur was a factor in the Republican victory in 1952. A resurgence of isolationism occurred, and the General, as a national hero, was a political asset. His program of building a Far Eastern policy around Chiang Kai-shek and United States air and sea power fitted neo-isolationist patterns of thought very well.

The military implications. On the military side, the policy of a limited war failed to capture the imagination of the American people, but it did prevent a general war in the Far East. In reality MacArthur's strategy was not so difficult a choice as that of the Joint Chiefs; he was backed by centuries of tradition. However, he was not backed by tradition when he decided to go over the head of the President and take his case to the people of the nation. The idea that MacArthur was unaware his line of action was improper does not do justice to his intelligence. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that he would have tolerated anything of a similar nature from one of his generals who disagreed with his strategy or tactics. Therefore one can only conclude that he believed that he must make himself a martyr to patriotism. Of course he did not doubt the loyalty of the President, the Joint Chiefs, or the Secretary of State,
but he did believe that they had been misinformed by people whose loyalty to American was questionable.

The Hearings seemed to point to generals lending themselves to political exploitation by both parties. Walter Lippmann wrote that such a thing would lead to an intolerable schism within the armed forces. The result would be generals of the Democratic Party and generals of the Republican Party.³

The investigation posed a threat to the confidential relationship between the President and his chief military advisers. The integrity of this relationship is vital to the security of the Nation. Fortunately it was upheld, and it is to be hoped that this precedent will stand. It is to be subjected to more tests because of the increasing influence of the military establishment.

When it comes down to who was right and who was wrong in Korea there is no black and white answer. General MacArthur was wrong when he did not cooperate with the intent of the policy set down by Washington. He was inclined to say that there was no policy when it went contrary to his own ideas. However, Washington was not crystal clear about its objectives, and the fact that Admiral Sherman did not understand them to be exactly what Acheson and Marshall un-

derstood them to be makes the point. It is quite possible that MacArthur could not accept the policy created in Washington. After all, his forces were nearly driven off the Korean peninsula, and he was bound to have some plans about what should be done under these circumstances.

However, no one will ever know what the outcome of MacArthur's strategy would have been. It was bold and it was dangerous, but so was Inchon. The President and his advisers reluctantly went along with Inchon, but not with the rest of MacArthur's recommendations, which they felt would spread the war. It was the President's move, not MacArthur's, and rightly or wrongly it was he who had to answer to the electorate, not MacArthur. Yet if MacArthur felt so strongly, it was his duty to speak out; but as a civilian, not as a general, and especially not as a theater commander in wartime. It would have been necessary for him to resign from the Army; however, he would have made a stronger case had he done so. His activities not only weakened his argument, they increased the distrust of the military.

Because of General MacArthur's many military successes, particularly Inchon, he had good reason to have faith in his own theories and strategy. However, when he began to make plans which called for carrying the war to China, he enlarged upon the functions of a field commander. In this situation he did not have as much information avail-
able as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If he had been willing to limit his polemics to the Joint Chiefs, it seems probable that he would have achieved some degree of success for his strategy. Instead he found himself in a situation in which the sails were too big for the ship, and it foundered in the storm.

If the nation is to try to limit warfare, it is obvious that it must have military commanders who are in agreement with that principle. Modern communications have modified the degree of latitude necessary to give a field commander. There is no doubt that field maneuvers cannot be dictated from Washington, so the degree of latitude allowed the commander is not fixed or absolute. This makes it all the more important that no conflict exists between these two areas. The fact that MacArthur erred in his handling of his differences with the President, but nevertheless retained the admiration of so much of the nation, speaks out eloquently for him. Few people in our nation's history have been so wrong and so respected at the same time. However, it was just this respect and admiration that made the dispute possible. From anyone else it would never have been allowed to reach such large proportions.
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APPENDIX

Chronology of important events.

1. December 25, 1948--the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its forces from North Korea.
2. June 29, 1949--the United States completed withdrawal of its occupation forces.
3. June 5, 1950--North Korea proposed negotiations for an all-Korean assembly but refused to deal with the government of Syngman Rhee.
6. August 28, 1950--MacArthur in a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars opposed appeasement and defeatism which would lead to abandonment of Formosa.
7. September 5, 1950--At its farthest advance North Korea held most of the Korean peninsula except for the Pusan beachhead.
9. October 9, 1950--MacArthur ordered United Nations forces across the Thirty-eight Parallel. Within three weeks his forces were approaching the Manchurian border at several points.
10. October 15, 1950--Wake Island meeting.
11. October 20, 1950--American troops captured Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.
12. October 28, 1950--Red Chinese Army elements were identified in North Korea.


16. December 1, 1950—MacArthur announced that orders forbidding him to attack Red Chinese north of the border put United Nations forces under "an enormous handicap without precedent in military history."

17. December 6, 1950—Joint Chiefs advised MacArthur of a Presidential order requiring clearance of speeches and press releases with the Department of Defense or State, whichever was appropriate.

18. March 7, 1951—United Nations forces recaptured Seoul. MacArthur reported that the battle line would remain a theoretical military stalemate as long as there was "a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action and no major additions to United Nations strength in Korea."


20. March 20, 1951—MacArthur was advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United Nations was prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea, and that the Thirty-eighth Parallel had no military significance. MacArthur's recommendations on military procedures were invited.


22. March 24, 1951—A Joint Chiefs' message to MacArthur advised that the President had directed his attention be called to the Presidential order of December 6, 1950; also advised that any further statements must be coordinated as provided in that order.
23. The State Department subsequently announced that the political issues which General MacArthur had stated were beyond his responsibility as a field commander; that they were being dealt with in the United Nations and by intergovernmental consultations.

24. April 11, 1951--General MacArthur was relieved of his command by the order of President Truman.