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A study of the United States-Korea Treaty of 1882

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A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES-KOREA TREATY OF 1882

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History and Political Science
College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Political Science

by
Rai Won Pak
June 1957
Acknowledgment of my obligation is due to my sincere friend and distinguished scholar, Charles Lee Goode-nough, Ph. D., whose assistance in constructing this thesis has made it possible; and it is dedicated to my parents as a token of gratitude that will increase in the years to come.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The importance of the Korean position in international affairs has been dimly treated by the Western World—yet, she is a nation populated by approximately thirty millions; the thirteenth largest nation in the world, and Koreans are the most homogeneous people in the world; the nation, which is thrust down off the coast of Asia between the thirty-fifth and forty-fifth parallels and separating the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea, greatly contributed her civilization to mankind at a time when the great Roman Empire was busy conquering the world at an excessive speed.

Korea is, interestingly, the last civilized country to become known by the nations of the world. The most brilliant culture of the nation was developed during the fifth to the seventh century, A.D., when social equality existed and a "genuine democratic government system"\(^1\) practiced in the Kingdom of Sinla (57 B.C.-935 A.D.).

In 1392, the Lee Dynasty came into power and the founder of the Lee Dynasty, Lee Tai Cho, a former general of the Koryo Dynasty, became the first king of the Dynasty.

\(^1\)Referring to the Whabaik (時間) or Maripkan (麻里干) system which was a democratic system and practiced a primitive style of the parliamentary system.
The new government adopted the system of China's Ming Dynasty (1368-1643) making the King absolute in power. This absolute monarchy continued until 1864, when Tai Won Kun became regent and administered the Korean government in behalf of the King who was his young son. During the early period of this dynasty, the King Lee Tai Cho, fortified northern Korea well; especially the Yalu and Tuman rivers in order to defend the country from invasion by the northern barbarians; but on the other hand, he opened three ports in southern Korea to Japan in order to have the commerce.

There was no serious trouble between Korea and Japan until Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion. Although Hideyoshi's army succeeded on land, they met with complete failure when they were confronted with the Korean navy, commanded by the famous Korean, Admiral Soon Sin Lee. Since Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea, it is traditionally held that the Koreans henceforth hated the Japanese and that the Korean government never fully recovered. The invasion was seen as the culmination of a long period of depredation and destruction. The hatred for the Japanese by the Koreans ante-dated the Hideyoshi invasion particularly because of the devastating piratical raids.

\[2\] The term, "barbarian", Orangkae (_eta) referred to the Manchus.
Korea's relationship with China and Japan was of a different category; to China, the Koreans used words of the Sadae (사대) which means "serve the great"; but to Japan, the Koreans used the words of the Kyorin (교린) which means "neighborly relations" or "relations with a neighboring country." With China, the Koreans followed a definite ceremonial and diplomatic procedure and undoubtedly Korea was the most important free and independent tributary state of the Chinese Empire.

It is true, however, that many western writers who are dealing with the Far Eastern problem have defined Korea as a part of China or at least governed under the Chinese Empire; but this quick judgment comes from a misunderstanding of the Oriental conception of thought, and a lack of careful study of Oriental character. Dr. Alonzo L. Baker has well mentioned that "the only values of the Oriental are those of the spirit." With this connotation Dr. George M. McCune added:

The suzerain-tributary relationship between the two countries is difficult to define. It was a spiritual or cultural union rather than a political one. It was based upon precedent and circumstances and depended upon mutual good will and respect.

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There was no treaty stipulations to govern its scope or determine its character. The tributary state was absolutely autonomous.\(^4\)

Since 1611, peaceful relations were restored between Korea and Japan. Korea had not only equal status quo but acted with a superior attitude. While the Korean envoy went to Taemado (Tsushima) and dealt with the lord there, the Japanese envoy came to Pusan and dealt with the junior officer from Seoul. When Korean special envoy went to Yedo (Tokyo), the Japanese government had to give a big entertainment banquet which drained the Yedo government's purse very seriously. For this reason, the Yedo government wished to put an end to the exchange of ambassadors. Finally, at its request, in 1811, the last envoy to Japan went no further than to the island of Tsushima (辺島), where he was received by the Shogun's officers.

It is, therefore, obvious that there were two policies in Korea during the Lee Dynasty: Sadae or "Serving the Great" and Kyorin or "Friendly Relations" with Japan. In the words of King Lee Tai Cho, founder of the Lee Dynasty:

Our Kingdom should always pay reverence to the west (i.e. maintain with China the relationship respectively of suzerain and tributary nation) and should always command the trust and confidence of the East (i.e. secure the friendship of Japan).

\(^4\)George M. McCune, Korean Relations with China and Japan, Berkeley, California, 1941, p. 10.
The successful rule of our Kingdom and the safe existence of our dynasty depend entirely upon how effectively we maintain this national policy.\(^5\)

During the 500 years of the Lee Dynasty, those two were the fundamental policies until the appearance of the Tai Won Kun's isolation policy; and fundamental relationship between Korea and China was not a treaty commitment, but was a series of ceremonial obligations between a superior and inferior power in a mutual, profitable relationship.

W. W. Rockhill uses the term of "father" or "elder brother"\(^6\) in describing the relationship of the Chinese Emperor to Korea. This relationship between Korea and China became more firmly established when the Min Emperor sent strong forces to Korea against Hideyoshi's continental invasion during 1592-1598. Against this friendly relationship with China, the relationship between Korea and Japan was based upon treaty rights and obligation.

In spite of those relationships with her neighbors, Korea certainly changed her policy when Tai Won Kun became regent. This attitude of Tai Won Kun toward China, Japan, and the western countries was not the formulated plan, but was the result of a strong feeling for the need of self-preservation of Korean independence from outside powers.

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Since 1864, the relationships of Korea with outsiders have not been happy ones; therefore, they felt that the best way to keep out of trouble was not to associate with outsiders. For this reason, Korea's attitude toward the western powers has been one of caution. However, Korea's desire to hold an isolationistic policy was not practicable when the other power knocked at the door of the Korean gate.

It is true when the historians say that the Korean government was corrupted during this time; however, it is also true that other powers brought about her ruin. Had not such powers interrupted Korea's internal affairs, Korea could have taken her own measures in settling her own chaotic condition and could have participated in world affairs without having suffered through the bitter experience of the past half century of Japanese tyrannical occupation.

Until 1882, when the United States and Korea signed a treaty of amity and commerce, Korea did not have formal relations with any western powers; nevertheless, it is doubtful that any agreement or treaty with a western power could have saved Korea from Japan. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance implied British support of Japan's Far Eastern Policy. Certainly, Great Britain made no move to save Korea, but assisted Japanese imperialism which later caused the World War II. The United States, because of her policy
of neutrality, would not risk war in order to help Korea, even though she is the first nation which obtained Koreans' trust and signed a mutual assistance treaty. Thus Korea became the center of a struggle for power in the Far East which makes a knowledge of its history indispensable for an understanding of modern Far Eastern diplomacy.

This study covers not only the cause of Korea's entry into the world affairs with the United States in 1882, but also it is a study of modern power politics in the Far East, in which Korea played a significant role.
CHAPTER II

TAI WON KUN AND CHRISTIAN PERSECUTIONS

The Korean contact with western countries began since Tai Won Kun was King's regent. All the outstanding western authorities on Korean history believed that Tai Won Kun was an anti-Christian from start to end; e.g. Homer B. Hulbert, the former advisor to the late King Ko-Jong, says in his book, The Passing of Korea that one of the mistakes of Tai Won Kun's life was in supposing that he could eradicate Roman Catholicism by force; he also says that Tai Won Kun was a man of strong personality and imperious will, and however the people may have come to hate him, they always respected him. Mrs. Isabella Bishop says in her Korea and her Neighbours in regard to Tai Won Kun that he was the man who persecuted the Roman Christians so cruelly and persistently as to raise up for Korea a noble army of martyrs. She further stated "...able, rapacious, and unscrupulous, his footsteps have always been

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1 The King's position in Korea was absolute and his wishes were carried out without any interruption from outsiders except by his cabinet members who helped and assisted him. But, when Ko-Jong was on the throne, he was not old enough to take charge of the administration, so the King's father, Tai Won Kun, took the position of regent in order to help his son in 1864. His power in the administration was continued until 1875.

bloodstained." William E. Griffis says in his Corea (Korea): the Hermit Nation that Tai Won Kun was a rabid hater of Christianity, foreigners, and progress.

It is most natural for the western writers to label him as a Christian-hater or a foreign-hater if one is only aware of the facts of the cruel persecutions of the Roman Catholics. It, however, does not give a satisfactory picture of Korea at the time if we believe that he was an anti-foreigner because he persecuted the Roman Catholics. What were the causes of the Christian persecution during the Tai Won Kun administration?

Persecution of Christianity. In November of 1860, the Russo-China treaty was negotiated at Peking; two years later, a border dispute occurred at Sakhalin Island between Russia and Japan. In March of 1864, several Russians arrived at Kyong-In city in north-eastern Korea and asked the Korean government to open trade with her. The Russian demands were so offensive to the Koreans that it brought much uneasiness to Tai Won Kun’s administration.

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5 Chosen-Shi or History of Korea, was published at Seoul, Korea in 1931-1938. It is composed of 38 volumes. p. 12.

6 Ibid., p. 12.
The Korean Christians who were aware of the fact that Tai Won Kun was worrying over the border trouble with Russia, suggested that he discuss the matter with the French missionaries. Tai Won Kun knew that the Korean government alone would be unable to persuade the Russians to keep out of the Korean territory and offered to the French missionaries freedom to conduct their missionary work if they would keep the Russians out of Korea. A French Bishop Berneux who represented the missionaries, refused to accept such a bargain. In spite of it, on the other hand, the Catholic missionaries smuggled into the west coast of Whang Hae Province four additional missionaries in violation of the public law of Korea. Tai Won Kun knew this fact, yet rather than to make an issue of the smugglings, preferred to make their entry legal by having the French missionaries accept his bargain.7

From October to November in 1865, about three scores Russians came to North Korea. Tai Won Kun was now certain of Russia's determination to share in Korea's trade. At this time, the Korean Christians, Pong Joo Hong and Myon Ho Kim who represented the Roman Catholic Church, went to persuade Tai Won Kun to negotiate a treaty with Britain and France instead of with Russia. Further, Hong and Kim assured

7Ibid., p. 64.
Tai Won Kun that the treaty could be negotiated through the missionaries in Korea. The Roman Catholics made use of the only way to thwart Russia was by making an alliance with England and France.8

This plan by the Christians was something impossible for Tai Won Kun to carry out for the following reasons: first, Tai Won Kun was not in favor of making any alliances with any foreign countries. He believed that any type of close relationships with a foreign state would bring disaster to the nation; therefore, he was opposed to the idea of an alliance as a whole. Secondly, the dowager Queen Cho, who appointed King Ko-Jong and Tai Won Kun to power, was strongly anti-foreign. Thirdly, the higher officials of the Korean administration were very much anti-Christian and anti-foreign. When under such circumstances Tai Won Kun was being encouraged to negotiate a treaty with England and France, he thought the Christians were the national traitors who were advocating the ideas to sell the country down the river. At this time, Tai Won Kun was informed of the Christian persecution in China, which gave the anti-Christian party, now in full power at the court, an incentive to do likewise, but Tai Won Kun warned the court that such action would lead to entanglement with Europe.9

8Griffis, op. cit., p. 373. The question was the problem of the treaty, or an alliance, but Tai Won Kun directed against all relations with the outside world.

9Ibid., p. 374.
The persecution began in December of 1865, and on February 23, of the next year, Bishop Berneux was arrested and lodged in prison.\textsuperscript{10} When the court brought him up for trial, he said that he had come to save the souls of the Koreans, that he had been in the country for ten years, and that he refused to leave the country except by force. Further, at the personal interview with the regent, Tai Won Kun, Berneux failed to address His Highness in the punctilious form of words demanded by court etiquette.\textsuperscript{11} His death warrant read as follows: "The accused, who gives his name as Chang, refuses to obey the King; he will not apostatize; he will not give the information required; he refused to return to his own country. Therefore, after the usual punishments, he will be decapitated."\textsuperscript{12}

A few days later, Petinicolas, Pourthie, Davelby, Aumaitre, and Huin were put to death along with the thousands of Korean Christians who were also being persecuted.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10}Hulbert, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 115, Ilsongrok (일성록) or King Ko-Jong's Political Diary, January 11, 1866.

\textsuperscript{11}Griffis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 374. Shows Berneux defiance and an obvious superiority complex. Other French Catholic missionaries also---consciously or unconsciously---violated Korean laws during the early stages of their missionary work, and gave themselves a very poor reputation in their work.

\textsuperscript{12}Hulbert, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 116. Berneux stayed and preached at Seoul, Kwangju, Yongin.

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 116.
French Attack Korea. When the French authorities were informed of the persecutions in Korea, they declared:

The government of His Majesty cannot permit so bloody an outrage to be unpunished. The same day on which the King of Korea (Korea) laid his hands upon my unhappy country-man was the last of his reign; he himself proclaimed its end, which I in turn, solemnly declare today. In a few days our military forces are to march to the conquest of Korea, and the Emperor, my August Sovereign, alone has now the right and the power to dispose, according to his good pleasure, of the country and the vacant throne.\[14\]

The commander of the French fleet in the Pacific, Admiral Rose, sent three boats to the Korean coast to make a preliminary survey of the situation.\[15\] Meantime, the Chinese government, who had refused to take any responsibility for the action of the Koreans, sent a message to the Korean government in regard to the French expedition to Korea.\[16\] The Korean government replied with the facts of

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\[14\] This was written to Prince Kung of China by a French deputy minister to China, M. DeBellonet, on July 13, 1866. The vigorous language which he used is perhaps the reflection of Louis Napoleon. Griffis, op. cit., p. 378.

\[15\] DeBellonet and the French authorities sent the forces to Korea without waiting to hear from his government at Paris. DeBellonet dispatched the fleet and made war on his own responsibility. Griffis, op. cit., p. 381.

\[16\] The French Counsel immediately requested the Chinese government to take certain actions in regard to the persecution in Korea. The Chinese government, however, declared that Korea was not under the Chinese rule, but she was an independent state. Therefore, the French authority had to deal with the matter directly with the Korean government. This was the first time that China ever declared officially that Korea was not a dependent of China. Takehiko Okuhira, Chosen Kaikoku Kosho Shimatsu, or The Relationship of the Korean Opening from the Beginning to the End, Tokyo, Japan, 1935, pp. 20-21.
the persecution, and simultaneously prepared to meet the French expeditionary forces.

Tai Won Kun proclaimed a national emergency and fortified the Island of Kang-Wha which is located in the mouth of the Han River. This island already was supplied with a force of some five thousand men.

By this time, the French troops had already won several victories over the Koreans. The Korean government was very confused by the situation. General Nam Sik Lee was appointed to take charge of the affairs and General Ju An Pak was appointed to take charge of the mountain castle and to defend the coast line. When French marines were assigned to attack the Korean troops at the Buddhist monastery they were confronted with an unexpected defeat by a Korean troop enveloping attack. In this battle, most of the French forces were put to death, and the remaining soldiers lost their encouragement to fight with Koreans.

After this miserable defeat, the French admiral, Rose, fired on the city of Kang-Wha, stole books and silverware, then sailed away to China.

The result of this expedition was most disgraceful to the French prestige as well as to the Europeans in the Far East. It also encouraged the Korean national isolation
policy because Tai Won Kun believed that his forces could defeat any invading foreign forces.

After the remaining French forces were withdrawn from Korean waters, the persecution of the Christians continued until about 1870. The Christian persecutions made an ugly page in Korean history and since then Tai Won Kun became known as an anti-Christian. Besides the isolation policy of Tai Won Kun, the imperialistic policy of the Napoleonic French government and the missionaries who violated the law of the sovereignty also helped to bring about the persecution of the Christians in Korea.
CHAPTER III

KOREAN ISOLATION POLICY AND OUTSIDE POWERS

General Sherman Incident. On May 12, 1866, the American schooner, Surprise was shipwrecked on the west coast of Korea.\(^1\) The Surprise was heading for Lienchu Island from Shantung. The Korean government treated those American sailors well. Yang Joon Lee, a Korean official,\(^2\) in spite of the isolation policy, led them to Peking. The following statement gives a clearer picture of the situation:

Captain McCaslin and his men with their Chinese cook, after being first well catechised by the local magistrate, and secondly by a commissioner sent from Seoul, were kindly treated and well-fed, and provided with clothing, medicines, and tobacco. By orders of Tai Won Kun, they were escorted on horseback to Eu-Ju and after being feasted there, were conducted safely to the Border Gate.....\(^3\)

Two months after the Surprise incident, the American ship General Sherman arrived at the mouth of the Tai-Dong

\(^1\)Exact place was Chooul-san in Pyongnamdo (崇儒堂), Korea.

\(^2\)Ilsungrok, or King Ko-Jong's Political Diary, May 23, 1866; Pyongan Kamyong Kerok, or The Official Record of the Military Office of Pyongan Province, May 15, 20, June 12, 13, 22, 25, 1866. Papers relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1867, pp. 14-17.

\(^3\)Griffis, op. cit., p. 391.
River on June 7, 1886. The surprised Korean local officials asked them the reasons for their arrival. The answer was that the English, the American, and the Chinese merchants were seeking to trade with Korea. They wanted Korean paper, rice, gold, ginseng, and leather in exchange for western clothes and dishes. They claimed to have no desire to harm the natives and that they would leave Pyongyang as soon as the trade ended; otherwise, they would go to the capital and make an effort to see the King. The Reverend Robert Thomas, an English protestant missionary, aboard ship, understood a little Korean language. The Korean officials stated that trade was prohibited by the national law; therefore, they should not move further up the Taidong River nor to Pyongyang City. The group of foreigners did not pay any attention to the warning, and inquired about the treasures and physical situation of the city of Pyongyang. Meantime, the group of foreigners threatened the Koreans by saying that many more ships would come later. Many local Korean

1. Beside the English, the American, and the Chinese there were those from Denmark. Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

2. Ilsongrok, or Kig Ko-Jong's political Diary, July 15, 1886; Whang-Hae Kamyung Kerok (東海英文統報), or the Official Record of Whang-Hae Prefecture, July 8, 9, 10, 1886; Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, Part I, 1867, No. 124, pp. 426-428.
residents, however, were fascinated by the big black ship and made friends among them; the Korean officials, however, prohibited any type of intercourse with the foreigners on the General Sherman, and declared they would defend the national coast line. 6

The General Sherman arrived at the city of Pyongyang and spent the night of 11th of July there. Meantime, the high officials of the city and the prefecture inquired into their arrival. The Reverend Thomas and other Chinese acted as spokesmen since they knew the language better. The foreigners further demanded to know why the Koreans had killed the seven foreigners and persecuted the Roman Catholics. In addition they claimed that their religion was the gospel of Jesus, entirely different from the Roman Catholic. Besides these threats they also mentioned that the French fleet was on its way to the capital of Korea. The Korean officials, however, refused to accept either the gospel of Jesus or the Roman Catholic, and rejected any type of trade which the foreigners proposed.

6 Hsungrok, July 11, 1866; Singjoungwon Kaesu Ilgi ( Yayın된 개성일기), or The Revised Diary of the Office of the Royal Secretaries in the Palace. July 10, 1866; Ujongbo Dunrok, or the Record of the Legislative Assembly, Seoul, 1862-1864, July 10, 1866; Pyongan Kamyongrok (평안관행록), or the Official Record of the Governor's Office of Pyongan, July 13, 1866; Chosen-shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 87.
The General Sherman anchored at Taidong River and refused to leave the city. Two Korean officers, Hyan Ik Lee and Tai Ke Shin, went to the ship and explained to them again that the local officials had no right to trade with the foreigners unless the central government approved.

The Korean government would, the official said, be willing to give all possible needed assistance to ships in distress. The English missionary Thomas and the Chinese merchant Cho Neung-Pong seemed to understand the difficult position of the local officials. But the owner of the ship and the financiers were determined to have trade and did not pay any attention to the local officials. At that time the General Sherman was tied up on the coast as a result of low tide.

The local government official, simultaneously, proclaimed that any citizen who associated with foreign ships would receive capital punishment. The Reverend Thomas, with three other companions, landed at Man-Kyong-Dae (만경대), located in the south part of Pyonyang, for observation. The mayor of the city persuaded them to return to the ship.7

On July 16, 1866, six foreigners from the General Sherman were rowing close up to the heart of the city, where

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7Pyongan Pyonyang Kerok (平安平壤啟譯), or the Official Record of the Military Office of Pyongan, July 15, 1866.
Ik Hyan Lee, the local high officer, chased them with a small boat. The six passengers of the General Sherman were not willing to take orders from Lee. On the contrary, they arrested Lee, and took him aboard where Lee remained captive for sometime. The Mayor of the city had a conference with the Reverend Thomas, and spent all night trying to bring Lee back, but the foreigners refused to release him.  

Three days later, five foreigners armed with guns and rifles again approached the shore in a small boat. They were having a difficult time rowing up the river because of the rough waters. At that time, there were many natives assembled along the bank, who were calling to the General Sherman to return their official, Ik Hyan Lee. Simultaneously, the angered people were throwing stones at the ship. The five foreigners in the small boat became frightened and rushed back to the ship. The junior military officer, Chun Kwon Pak caught this small boat and rowed to the General Sherman with two other junior officials in order to rescue their superior, Ik Hyan Lee. They rescued Lee but the two junior officials were thrown over board and drowned.  

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8 Ilsungrokt, July 22, 1866; Euyongan Kanyong Kerok, July 17, 18, 19, 1866; Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 89.

9 Ilsungrokt, July 22, 23, 25, 1866; Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 90. Chun Kwon Pak got a promotion for his brave action and Ik Hyan Lee was later released from his position because he lost the official seal.
On July 20, the General Sherman still remained on the west shore of Yang-Gak Island at Taidong River. The head or the governor of Pyongan Province, Kyu Sun Pak, ordered several high officials including the mayor of the city, to investigate the conditions of the General Sherman. The report was that the ship had no intentions of leaving the river. On top of that, the ship's crew stole rice and other foods from the local people and threatened them with gun-fire, killing seven and injuring five Koreans. Governor Pak, who was among the mass near the bank and who felt the hopelessness of persuading the foreigners that there would be no hope of opening trade, appointed two officials, Nak You Paik and Yai Ke Shin, to direct the fight against the General Sherman. The fight continued all day but the General Sherman still remained without any sign of departure.10

After three days of desperate fighting, the General Sherman caught fire and all on board died.11

10 This fight continued for three days; Nak You Paik and Yai Ke Shin ordered many gunmen and arrowmen to participate in the fight against the General Sherman which continued to fire back at the natives on the shore. Chosen-Shi, op. cit., p. 92.

11 The Reverend Thomas and Neung-Pong Cho came out to the deck of the ship and asked to be rescued, but the angered Koreans shot and killed them. Rev. Thomas who is now respected by the Korean Protestants as saint, had planned to come to Korea with the French fleet which was under Rear Admiral Rose but changed to the General Sherman, because the French fleet was delayed and the General Sherman desperately needed a Korean interpreter; Rev. Thomas learned Korean at Peking. There is a St. Thomas Memorial Church near the place where he was killed.
The governor of Pyongan Province, Kyu Sun Pak, gave special rewards to those officials who fought against the General Sherman. The General Sherman incident was reported to the Chinese government through the Eijongbu or the Legislative Assembly. At the same time, the Korean government again declared the strict national isolation policy prohibiting the use of all foreign books and goods, and proclaimed that anyone who violated this statute would receive capital punishment. On the other hand, the officials or the citizens who promoted this national policy would receive special rewards. The Korean government established a special naval defense budget of thirty thousand Ryangs (Korean money), and distributed it to the local naval bases, also many mountain castles were built along the coast lines.12

The disappearance of the General Sherman caused a great disturbance to the westerners in China. The American minister to China immediately inquired of the Chinese authority and requested investigation concerning the General Sherman. Meantime, the commanding officer of the American Asiatic Fleet, Bell, sent out the Wachusett to Korea in order to investigate the General Sherman incident.

12 Ilsumro, September 3, 1866.
Captain Shufeldt of the Wachusett contacted the local officials at the west coast and sent out the documents but left without receiving any reply from the Korean government.¹³

The Chinese government gave information concerning the General Sherman's incident through reports from the Korean government, to the American authority at Peking. The reasons for this disaster according to the Korean report was that the foreigners came to Pyongyang, harmed the citizens, took away treasures and foods, and disturbed the peace of the land. The Korean government told the Chinese government that they refused to open trade with any foreigners and refused to accept any foreign religion. Korea did not have trade with the English and the French, and did not lose the peace. When the French came to Kwang-Wha Island, they burned the castle, destroyed the treasures of the state, and stole what was left of the remaining goods. The report further said, "Is that the way foreigners make trade?" and "Is that the way religion teaches?" If damage has to be paid to the foreigners, it should be arranged accordingly; but on the other hand, how can the Korean government estimate what damage the foreigners have done to the Koreans?"

¹³Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 131. Takehiko Okuhira, Chosen Kosho Shimatsu, or The Relationship of the Korean Opening from the Beginning to the End, Tokyo, Japan, 1935, p. 23.
The Kang-Wha Incident. After the General Sherman Incident, the Korean government under Tai Won Kun was still as stubborn as ever, and did not settle the incident of the General Sherman. The American General Consul in China, William H. Seward, thought that the case of the General Sherman could be utilized in opening trade with Korea. In a report to the State Department on the case, he proposed first, that the Korean envoy come to Shanghai in order to explain to the Americans the causes of the General Sherman incident and to explain to the French why the Roman Catholics had been persecuted in Korea. Mr. Seward also wanted to learn if the Korean government was considering sending Korean envoys to Europe, and if there were still survivors of the General Sherman. He wanted to inform the envoys, too, that the American warship Shenandoah was heading for Korea to investigate further the General Sherman Case.

14 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870, No. 281, No. 282.

15 Since there were rumors that some of the crew aboard the General Sherman were still alive, the American deputy minister, Williams, and the British minister, Alcock, inquired of the Chinese authority who in turn inquired of the Korean government. The Korean government reported that the rumors were caused by a Chinese, & Mun-Tae, who came on an American ship, the Wachusett under the command of Captain Shufeldt. Ilsangrok, March 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, and April 3, 8, 28, 1868. Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., pp. 167-168.
The American ships came to Jangyu in Whang-Hae Province to inquire of the Korean local government about the remaining survivors. The Korean local government insisted that there were no survivors. The American ships remained about a month and later withdrew.

The Secretary of State reported the General Sherman incident to the Congress on June 27, 1868, and advising first, the rescue of those surviving from the General Sherman; second, to find the cause for the violence and to investigate the condition of the ship; then to sue for damage and get a formal apology; third, to make a treaty to open Korean ports to the United States and other nations and to protect the foreigners' lives and their property in Korea. At the same time, Seward, however, realized that there was no chance to make a treaty with Korea without having the aid of military forces. Washington revoked his suggestion. 16 Seward's idea of opening Korea was delivered by F. F. Lov, the American

16 Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, 1925, p. 453. At this time, there was one theory that the English and the French also should participate with the Americans in opening Korea. The British minister, however, favored that either the Americans alone or that all powers together should open Korea, but the British did not favor French participation with the Americans in this matter. The British minister was afraid that the French might gain too much influence in China by so doing. See Thomas F. Wade to Earl Granville, Peking, August 20, 1871. Foreign Office 17-588, Public Record Office.
Minister to China; Minister Low, with the permission from the State Department at Washington, interviewed the Chinese authority at Peking in regard to trade with Korea; he also sent a note to the Korean government that there were two unfortunate incidents; the Surprise and General Sherman in Korea. The Korean government treated the first case to the satisfaction of the American government; but the second case was not as satisfactorily dealt with. In fact, the American government was not too sure that the Koreans even recognized the American flag. The second note stated that the American government was sending her minister and naval officer with a warship to Korea in order to investigate the situation, and to discuss the matter of future trade and the ship wrecks on the Korean coast. A third American note asserted that the American government sought a peaceful settlement, but should the Korean government refuse this offer, Korea would be inviting unfriendliness.

The Chinese government meanwhile, declared that the national policy of Korea was her own and that China had no control over Korea. This attitude of China was also reported to Korea. Minister Low was using Commodore Perry's tactics. The five American warships under the commanding officer John Rodgers arrived near Yang-Jang Island where they
anchored on May 30, 1871. The American envoy Low, immediately contacted the local officials, but had no success. Meanwhile, the central Korean government sent out a note to the Americans that the Korean government had treated all the westerners who were shipwrecked well and gave them the needed help, and also guided them to Peking; that in the future too, she would continue the hospitality. The unfortunate incident of the General Sherman had been explained several times to various groups and was being repeated again so that the Korean people would not harm any foreigners who did not harm the Koreans. The ship General Sherman, met her fate at the river in Pyongyang as a consequence of her own action. The Koreans did not initiate the incident. "If one wished to have friendly relationships one should approach with the will of the virtuous, but the foreigners lacked this art. If one opens the commercial trade, it might lead to more trouble."  

The Korean government sent out junior officials to the Colorado where Minister Low was staying and delivered

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17 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, pp. 115-121.
18 Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., pp. 234-237.
the message sent by the Korean Legislative Assembly. The Americans did not interview these junior officials because of their low rank. The commanding officer, Rodgers, ordered that the Palso and Monocacy, with four other small boats, survey the coast and the river. Meanwhile, the Korean government proclaimed a national emergency and was building forts all along the coast line. This was for coastal defense.

On June 1, 1871, the Palso and Monocacy, approached the capital, Seoul, through the Han River. The Korean forts fired upon the American vessels which returned the fire.

The American warships were violating the national law of Korea when they approached the capital. The Americans seemed to have misunderstood the geographical situation. The Han River was no longer the high seas, and it is quite a long distance from the high seas to the capital.¹⁹

The American marines, on June 10th landed under the protection of the United States naval gun fire, and occupied

¹⁹ Minister Low and others perhaps misunderstood the location of Seoul as in the case of Tokyo which is located close to the high seas. The Low groups perhaps planned the same tactics as did Commodore Perry in Japan. This, however, could not be applied in the case of Korea.
one part of the Kang-Wha Island until the 12th. The American envoy, Low, perhaps was thinking of this victory as the corner stone for the future treaty, but the local officials refused to delivery any message to the capital, Seoul, and the Americans did not have enough forces to fight through to the capital; besides, the envoy was not authorized by the American authority at Washington. Minister Low, therefore, decided to withdraw from Korea and wait for instructions from Washington. The United States fleet left on July 3rd for China. On his return, the minister reported to the Secretary of State, Fish, immediately.

The President of the United States in his annual message to Congress, in 1871, reported in regard to the Korean problem: "I leave the subject for such action as Congress may see fit to take" but Congress did not take any immediate action.

20 The casualties of this battle reached about 100; the families received special rewards; the American casualties were about 10. Ilsungrok, April 28, 1871. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, pp. 128-129, 135.

21 John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, Boston and New York, 1926, p. 316.

22 Fredrick Low to Hamilton Fish, Peking, October 2, 1871, No. 88, Foreign Relations of the United States.

The Navy Department approved of Rodger's action after receiving his report and further stated that they should be more cautious in the future in Korea. 24

The Korean government, meanwhile, blamed the United States. "She is talking peace in the mouth, but violates the law of the land, and threatens with armed forces." 25

The main expedition of the Americans to Korea encouraged Tai Won Kun to a stronger isolation policy in the Korean government. Tai Won Kun believed that the Korean defense forces actually chased the foreigners away from Korea.

Russia and Prussia. On December, 1866, the Russians arrived at the city of Kyong-Won near the Tuman River, and asked for trade; but the local government refused them. In January of the next year, five Russians returned and took Korean animals and disturbed the peace. The biggest disturbance among the many cases was caused by several groups of Russians when they crossed the Korean border and arrived at the cities of Kyong-In, In-Sag, Kyong-Won, etc.


on December 18, 1866. The local Korean military under the leadership of Ji Won Chung, head of the special military mission to the North, chased the Russians away. The central Korean government gave special awards to the injured persons and arranged special plans to prevent future disturbance on the northern border. The Russians, however, constantly crossed the border and in many cases influenced the Koreans to move out from Korea to Manchuria and Siberia. Approximately one thousand families ran away from their native land to seek richer land and a prosperous future. The local inhabitants suffered very much through the double taxation plan and the conscription to the military in order to defend the northern border. The Korean government tried to enforce the law that anyone who crossed the border would be shot to death. This law did not prevent them from escaping Korea.

In June 1869, when the Prussian minister to Japan, Van Brandt, arrived at Pusan on a Prussian merchant ship,

26 The Korean settlement in Manchuria and Siberia at the present time began from these adventurous groups of the early days. Many of them never crossed the border, but were shot by the Korean border patrolmen on the way. Those who crossed the new land made the best of their lives. The rice farm was first introduced to the lands by these Koreans.
with the aid of the Japanese, and asked for trade, the local government not only refused to receive the Prussian documents, but at the same time boycotted the Japanese settlement near Pusan as long as the black ship remained at Pusan. The isolation policy of Tai Won Kun continued to be applied with more courage and temporarily western intervention in Korea ceased.

27 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, China, No. 21.
CHAPTER IV

ENCOURAGEMENTS OF OPEN DOOR POLICY

The non-intercourse of Korea with westerners now became a settled principle; a principle of which the whole world has heard. To Koreans the idea of a treaty or trade with western countries was hardly understood. The Korean point of view to a treaty was pointedly expressed:

Our respective dispositions are mutually dissimilar; our guiding principles are not alike.... If you are going to want us to give away land and people, then let me ask how can 3000 li (Korean mile) of river, hill, city, and country be lightly thrown away? If you will desire us to agree to negotiate and carry out friendly relations, then let me ask how can 4000 years' ceremonies, music, literature, and all things, be, without sufficient reason, broken up and cast away? It does not consist with right, it cannot be spoken of. 1

Western powers attempted to open Korea even after the Kang-Wha Incident in 1871, but all were in vain. For several years the Americans made no further overtures toward isolated Korea. But in 1878 the American navy and Congress both again became interested.

In 1878, the United States Senator Aaron A. Sargent of California introduced a resolution which requested the

1 Egbert S. Oliver, Opening the Hermit Kingdom, Korean Survey, August-September, 1936, p. 4.
President to "appoint a commissioner to represent this country in an effort to arrange, by peaceful means.... a treaty of peace and commerce between the United States and Kingdom of Corea (Korea)."

At the same time the senator justified the action of the Korean government in respect to the General Sherman, and condemned the attacks upon the forts by the Navy in 1871. There was no formal action taken on the resolution, but the following year, Commodore R. W. Shufeldt was sent to the China Sea with instruction to make, if possible, a treaty with Korea.

Commodore Shufeldt visited Pusan in 1880, like many others did in the previous years and experienced the same refusal that other foreign officers had. After this failure, Shufeldt went to Peking and stayed at the American legation.

By this time China's Viceroy, Le Hung Chang, who was alarmed by the Korea-Japanese treaty of 1876 in which Japan recognized the Korean independence, set to work to check the Japanese activities in Korea. Li encouraged Korea to enter into treaty relations with western powers.

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and simultaneously urged the western powers to open trade with Korea. Li wrote a letter to a high officer of the Korean government:

......you may say that the simplest way to avoid trouble would be to shut yourself in and be at peace. Alas, as far as the East is concerned, this is impossible. There is no human agency capable of putting a stop to the expansionist movement of Japan: had not your government been compelled to inaugurate the new era by making a treaty of commerce with them? As matters stand, therefore, is not our best course to neutralize one position by another? You should seize every opportunity to establish treaty relations with western nations of which you should make use to check Japan.

The Korean government was forced to realize that it was impossible not to make treaties and friendships with western countries. Commodore Shufeldt learned about this Korean feeling through Chinese authority and left for Korea accompanied by three Chinese naval vessels.

Prior to this, the Secretary of State instructed John A. Bingham, the United States Minister to Japan, to ask for the aid of Japan to contact the Kingdom of Korea. Before Commodore Shufeldt arrived in Pusan, he received a

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5Ibid., p. 159.
6Takehiko Okuhira, The Relationship of the Korean Opening from the Beginning to the End, Tokyo, 1935, p. 68.
letter of introduction addressed to the Japanese Consul at Pusan from the Japanese Foreign Minister, Inouye. Shufeldt contacted the local officer at Pusan, and the head of Tong-Rai City, through the aid of the Japanese Consul. The Korean government, however, refused to deliver Shufeldt's message to the King and asked Shufeldt to leave Korea immediately. Commodore Shufeldt withdrew to Tokyo and sent a message to the Korean Foreign Minister, Ja Sing Yun, on May 29, 1880, but no reply was received.  

Soon after Shufeldt's arrival in Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Inouye sent a message to the Korean government saying that the Korean government would no longer be able to continue the isolation policy and that it would be much wiser to open trade with other western nations. He also introduced Commodore Shufeldt and explained what happened at Pusan. 

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7Ibid., p. 69.

8Inouye explained what happened at Pusan between Shufeldt and the Korean official and brought his attention to the changing international situation and that isolation was impossible today. Not only had Japan followed this step, but so had China....that the United States envoy was anxious to hear from the Korean government. Inouye requested that the Korean government should answer within sixty days. Zenrin Shimatsu, or the Good Neighbor Policy from Beginning to the End, Tokyo, 1935, Vol. V, p. 5.
On August 11, 1881, the Korean government sent an envoy, Hong Jip Kim, to Tokyo and explained to the Japanese Foreign Office that the Korean government had no desire to open trade with the United States or any other foreign countries. The Korean envoy also pointed out that improper words were used in Shufeldt's letter.\(^9\)

The Japanese Foreign Minister, on the other hand, encouraged the Korean envoy to open the country and manufacture ammunition to defend the nation, and to select talented young men in the military and the cultural fields in order to train personnel.\(^10\)

The Korean envoy, Hong Jip Kim, followed Incuye's advice. While the Korean envoy was staying in Tokyo, the Chinese minister to Japan, Ho I-Chang and the councilor, Wang came to see Kim often. Kim received a letter from them stating that there was no other problem more critical than that of preventing Russian aggression in the Far East. Korea should be friendly to China, negotiate with Japan and

\(^9\)Shufeldt used words in his letter Tai Korgo (대한국) or "the Great Korea," and Shei-Ran (제간) or "Honorable Look." The first term refers to victory or the superior country, and the second is in reference to the highest respect. The term had only been used in referring to China and her emperor. Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 432.

\(^10\)Ibid., p. 533.
associate with the United States in order to build a strong country. The letter further stated that China would help Korea in case of war with a foreign country, but since Japan was not able to help Korea in any case, therefore it would be to Korea's advantage to maintain a closer relationship with China rather than Japan. The United States was a country of courtesy and did not intend to invade foreign lands or to tell lies to people and interfere with other nation's political affairs. The United States, so far, had helped small nations. The Chinese officials advised Kim that the Korean government had to make a treaty with the United States.

The Korean government, meanwhile, sent an envoy, You Won Lee, to Tientsien, China, with selected groups of people who were to be trained in the manufacture of ammunitions. While Lee was in Tientsien, he was advised by Li Hung Chang that Korea should open her trade with the United States. Lee agreed with Li Hung Chang and reminded him that the Korean government would ask for advice from China in matters connected with foreign nations in the future.

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11 Ibid., p. 538, Since the United States was a favorite nation to China, they distinguished the United States from western nations; the Chinese believed that the United States had no other intentions than "to have trade."

12 Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., pp. 527-528.
The Japanese Foreign Minister, Inouye, on the other hand, told Hong Jip Kim that the trouble between Russia and China would affect Japan as well as Korea and that the desires of the Americans, the British and the French to open trade in Korea were not so much for the trade itself, but because they feared Russian domination in Korea.\footnote{Takehiko Okuhira, *The Relationship of the Korean Opening from the Beginning to the End*, Tokyo, 1935, p. 72. The Russian soldiers were constantly violating the Korean law by crossing the borders. Many incidents were reviewed in this study. Twenty-one Russian warships appeared in the Japan Sea in July, 1880.}

Thus both the Chinese and the Japanese governments encouraged the Korean government to make a treaty with the United States. Not only the Chinese government, but also the Japanese government was afraid of the Russian aggressiveness in the Far East.

Hong Jip Kim returned from Tokyo to Korea, and reported to the King personally. The King asked him which way the Russians would enter China in case Russia attacked China. Kim replied that the Chinese Minister was worried over the Russian problem and that he was willing to co-operate with the Korean government. He hoped that the Korean government would be prepared to meet the national emergency although China would be willing to help Korea. The King, who was
personally worried about the international situation, was anxious to find out all the details in regard to the situation. The problem being the unsettled condition, but this was the beginning of the understanding of the world situation.
CHAPTER V

OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS

From this time on, the Korean government began to think seriously of opening Korea to the foreign countries. Because of this reason, Hong Jip Kim was appointed as one of the Korean delegates to negotiate a treaty with the United States. The King, however, was fearful of his people who disliked the foreigners. It was quite clear that in the Korean situation, the King, several progressive-minded ministers, and the high officials were in favor of a treaty, but there were still strong anti-foreign groups in the cabinet. Besides this, the Koreans were afraid of a Russian invasion in case of a Russo-Chinese war, but the fear was unnecessary at this time since the Russo-Chinese treaty was signed on February 24, 1880, at St. Petersburg.

China's Viceroy, Li Hung Chang, delivered the Korean government's decision to open trade with the United States to Commodore Shufeldt who was then staying at Nagasaki, Japan, and asked him to come to Tientsien. Meanwhile, Li Hung Chang contacted the Korean officials who were at Tientsien at that time. He suggested that the Korean

1 Okuhira, op. cit., p. 76.
An official should make an inquiry of the Korean government's plenipotential minister in regard to a treaty with the United States. He also reminded the Korean official of the importance of a treaty with the United States. The Korean official went back to Seoul where he delivered Li's message to the King. The Korean government, by this time, abandoned its traditional isolation policy, and looked for the opportunity to make a treaty with the foreign countries.

Soon after Commodore Shufeldt heard from Li Hung Chang, he left Nagasaki immediately and arrived at Tientsien on August 25, 1880. The following day, Shufeldt had the conference with Li Hung Chang which lasted for three hours. In the conference, Commodore Shufeldt asked for help from China in order to succeed in making the treaty between the United

2 Chosen-Shi, op. cit., p. 603. The Korean officials, Yun Choong An, the head of the Machine and the EngineConstruction Department, and Cho You Lee, went to Tientsien in order to inspect the work of the Korean technical students in the city.

3 Ibid., p. 604. The King and government officials were looking for the proper opportunity since Hong Jip Kim's report from Tokyo on the Russian problem.

4 Okuhira, op. cit., p. 76. While Commodore Shufeldt was staying at Nagasaki, the Chinese Consul made a report to Li Hung Chang about Shufeldt and his mission. Li Hung Chang, who disliked the Japanese recognition of the Korean independence in the 1876 treaty, did not wish to see another Korean treaty through the Japanese government. Li now had an opportunity to work out some sort of treaty between Korea and the United States.
States and Korea. Further he mentioned that Korea seemed to be a poor country; therefore there would not be much trade between the two nations, but her strategic position would help the Americans in case of a shipwreck. Shufeldt also discussed the significant strategic military position of the Korean peninsula in relation to China, Japan, and Russia. 5

After a satisfactory conference with Li Hung Chang, Commodore Shufeldt left China and arrived at San Francisco on November 8, 1880, and immediately left for Washington, D. C. Shufeldt made a detailed report to the State and Navy Departments on his trip and requested to return to China to finish the treaty between Korea and the United States. 6

The expectations and attitudes of the United States were probably most nearly officially stated by the instructions which the Secretary of State, James G. Blain, wrote to Shufeldt:

While no political or commercial interest renders such a treaty urgent, it is desirable that the ports of a country so near Japan and China should be opened to our trade and to the convenience of such vessels of our Navy as may be

5 Shufeldt to Thompson, August 30, 1880, Crisis of the Macedonians, II, pp. 466-470, The Navy Department.

in those waters, and it is hoped that the advantages resulting from the growing and friendly relations between those great empires and the United States will have attracted the attention and awakened the interest of the Korean government.... If the Government of Korea (or Corea) is willing to open its ports to our commerce as China and Japan have done, we will with pleasure establish such friendly relations, but we do not propose to use force or to entreat such action.\(^7\)

The secretaries of the State and Navy departments instructed Commodore Shufeldt to return to China and Shufeldt went back to China on July 1, 1881.\(^8\)

The Korean government appointed her envoy, Yun Sik Kim, and interpreter, Won Kyun Pyun, to China. Kim carried a secret letter which was delivered to Li Hung Chang. The secret message from the Korean King stated that the King had heard about strong and rich United States, who love peace, and wished to negotiate a treaty with her through the office of Li Hung Chang.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Egbert S. Oliver, Opening the Hermit Kingdom, Korean Survey, August-September, 1956, p. 6.

\(^8\) In spite of many trained diplomats, Shufeldt was appointed to negotiate one of the most difficult treaties in the Far Eastern History. The fact indicated his talent as a diplomat as well as a naval officer. The Secretary of State instructed the United States Minister to China not only to have an immediate interest in regard to the treaty between Korea and the United States, that it was necessary also to have an intimate knowledge of the general political conditions in the East. Therefore, Commander Shufeldt should make reports to the State Department as soon as he received all the available news from Tientsien on the way to Peking. He was to report to the American Legation at the same time. If there were any further news, that too was to be reported immediately, China Instructions, Vol. 3, No. 94, Confidential.

\(^9\) Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 604.
Li Hung Chang informed Shufeldt in Tientsien that the Korean envoy was ready to negotiate a treaty. Meanwhile, the American government appointed Shufeldt as the United States plenipotentiary Minister to negotiate a treaty with the Kingdom of Korea. The Secretary of State sent a long instructive letter to Shufeldt. The letter said that the American government would feel very dissatisfied if a situation should arise again where the Koreans should misjudge American friendship toward Korea. An attempt for negotiations would not even be started, unless there were assurances for complete success according to the letter. The Secretary further instructed that the process of the treaty should follow the United States-Japanese Treaty of 1857, and that it would be wise to bring out the shipwreck as the first and the main purpose of the treaty.

Commodore Shufeldt reported to the State Department that the Korean envoys, Yun Sik Kim and Tong In Lee, were in the city of Tientsien in order to discuss the treaty.

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11 The Secretary, Blaine, had knowledge of the general situation. He admitted that he was not sure whether the president's personal letter to the King would help the situation or not. He also was not sure which port would be the most desirable and the one most likely to be opened. He mentioned the port of Pusan as one possibility. As Blaine stated, the whole problem had to depend on Shufeldt, Ibid.

12 By this time, the Secretary's message was on the way to Shufeldt, but he did not receive it until after he had asked for an appointment as the American Plenipotentiary Minister who would negotiate the treaty. The telegram was sent to Washington by the American deputy minister, Holcombe, Okuhira, op. cit., p. 90.
On January 17, 1882, the new Secretary of State, F. T. Frelinghuysen, sent the following wire to Shufeldt: "Congratulations to Shufeldt on the prospect of successful negotiation." Shufeldt immediately set to work on the treaty by visiting the deputy minister, Holcombe, who mastered the Chinese language, as the latter was to participate in the treaty conference.

Frelinghuysen also sent instructions to Shufeldt stating that the main purpose of the treaty should be for the protection of American lives in case of a shipwreck on the Korean coast. He also added that it would be well not to try to gain too much at first. The treaty should be simple and on a small scale, as otherwise the treaty might not be made at all. The treaty could be gradually extended as the need arose. In general, his instruction was similar to the previous message from Blaine, See Frelinghuysen to Shufeldt, Washington, D.C., Foreign Relations of the United States, January 6, 1882, China Instructions, Vol. 3.
CHAPTER VI

THE TREATY CONFERENCE

The conference on the treaty was held at Peking on March 25, 1882. The strange feature of the conference was that there were no Korean delegates present although the treaty was with Korea.\(^1\) This strange feature can be explained: the draft of the treaty was presented by Li Hung Chang and the previous negotiations were carried forward under Li's supervision and advice.

The main problem at the conference was the first article of Li's draft, which stated: "Chosen (or Korea) being a dependent state of the Chinese Empire.......":

This first phrase of the first article was not included when the Korean draft, added the phrase later. According to the first article, it said:

Chosen (or Korea) being a dependent state of the Chinese Empire, has nevertheless hitherto

\(^1\) Yun Sik Kim, the Korean envoy, secretly informed Li Hung Chang, that he could represent Korea. Kim was mainly concerned with the opposite group of Koreans at home. Shufeldt might have felt the strange air at the conference. Shufeldt who was to negotiate according to the international law, had to know a little more concerning the background of what was going on between China and Korea. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Shufeldt to Frelinghuysen, March 30, 1882.
exercised her own sovereignty in all matters of internal administration and foreign relations. After the conclusion of this treaty, the King of Chosen and the President of the United States shall treat with each other upon terms of perfect equality, and the subjects and citizens of the two nations shall maintain perpetual relations of friendship. If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other shall render assistance and protection, or shall act mediator in order to preserve a perfect peace.

Shufeldt, after careful study of Li's draft, objected to the inclusion, "dependent state." Shufeldt's argument over this point was: "If Korea is in possession of sovereign rights in respect to her foreign and domestic relations, the United States should treat with her independently of any suzerainty to China." 3

Li Hung Chang refused to continue further discussions if Shufeldt rejected the "dependent state" clause. Li further stated that his government would not send the warships and envoys to Korea with the American envoys. Shufeldt calmly presented the prepared letter to Li, and said that the

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2Egbert S. Oliver, Opening the Hermit Kingdom, Korean Survey, August-September, 1956, p. 6.

3Shufeldt to Frelinghuysen, Tientsien, April 10, 1882, No. 5, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Shufeldt sent his own draft and Li's draft to Frelinghuysen. The United States draft was compiled with the help of deputy minister, Holcombe, at Peking. Li's draft was supposed to be from the government of Korea and modified by Li Hung Chang.
United States had a right to deal with Korea if she was exercising her own sovereignty in all matters of internal administration and foreign relations. The United States government did not wish to accept any statement which referred to the relationship between Korea and China in the treaty. Li Hung Chang explained that even if they avoided the "dependent state" phrase, the Korean King would add it on later. Thus the first conference ended without solving the problem of the "dependent state" phrase.

While the conference was proceeding, an unexpected problem arose. Li Hung Chang was informed by his friend in the United States that Shufeldt had written on the China situation and had stated that only power could be appreciated in China. Li instantly suspected Shufeldt's action, and questioned Shufeldt in regard to the article.

Shufeldt's article was originally written to the United States Senator Sargent of California, from Tientsien, on January 1, 1882. This letter appeared in the newspapers in San Francisco as an open letter, which was reprinted in

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1. Ibid., Li Hung Chang was speaking for himself, not for the King or his envoys when he used the phrase "dependent state." See Li Wan Chang, Chinsuo, or Story of Li Hung Chang (生平述事), Tientsien, 1932, Vol. 1, The United States-Korean Treaty.

2. Okuhira, op. cit., p. 10.
the North China Daily News, on May 9, 1882. Shufeldt's letter said: "Six months residence in this city (Tientsien), the political center of the Chinese government, and an intimacy rather exceptional with the ruling element, has convinced me that deceit and untruthfulness pervade all intercourse with foreigners, across this barrier, either sympathy or gratitude is utterly idle. The only appeal or argument appreciated is that of force."

Holcombe, the deputy minister, stated to Frelinghuysen that it was fortunate that the letter was published after Commander Shufeldt left for Korea for, it might have prevented

6North China Daily News, May 9, 1882; the points Robert W. Shufeldt had endeavored to make in this letter were:

1. That China has no real aggressive military or naval strength.
2. That there is and can be no affinity between the people of the United States and China.
3. That the government of the United States, as the government of Europe, should insist upon its rights in China, conceding no more than is granted and trusting no more than it is trusted.
4. That although the two nations are so situated as to invite trade, there never can be any intimate political or commercial relations between them, except upon the basis of such as the United States may demand.

The main reason Shufeldt addressed it to Senator Sargent was that he remembered "you were the earnest opponent of unlimited Chinese immigrations into the United States both as Senator and citizen of your state."
the success of Shufeldt's mission to China if the Chinese government had known of it beforehand.\(^7\)

Meanwhile, the "dependent state" phrase was still the main problem. Both Shufeldt and Li Hung Chang did not compromise or give in but held on to their original ideas. Meanwhile, Holcombe went to visit the Chinese foreign office at Peking, and explained the fact that the United States government would not give in to the "dependent state" problem; therefore, in order to make a successful treaty, the Chinese government must compromise in this matter. Holcombe suggested to the foreign officer to advise Li Hung Chang to compromise on the problem of the "dependent state" phrase. On April 19, 1882, the draft was finally completed except for the "dependent state" phrase in the first article.\(^8\)

\(^7\)Holcombe to Frelinghuysen; Peking, May 22, 1882; No. 103, confidential, Foreign Relations of the United States.

\(^8\)Tongmoon Kwanji (通文錄), or Record of the Office of the Interpreter, The Lee Dynasty, Seoul, 1883, Vol. 12. Holcombe was the Interpreter for Shufeldt and also advised him on the main issues. After he found out that the Chinese government would give in on the matter of "dependent state," he advised Shufeldt to oppose stubbornly his suggestions; Shufeldt certainly did as he was told by Holcombe. Holcombe's diplomatic talent, therefore, was a great contribution to the treaty.

Li, however, suggested to Shufeldt that if the State Department agreed to restore the phrase, it should be included. Li also suggested that the addressing words "Tai Chosun Kunju (大朝鮮君主)" or "The real Master of the Great Korea" should be changed to "Kookju (國主)" or "The Master of Country." Shufeldt agreed to change it.
The Korean envoy, Yun Sik Kim, though in Tientsien all during the time of the conference between Shufeldt and Li Hung Chang, never attended the conference. Li conferred with Kim from time to time whenever necessary. As soon as the draft was completed Shufeldt was ready to leave for Korea in order to complete the treaty. Li Hung Chang sent two Chinese officials in order to prepare to welcome the American envoy. Li also wrote a letter to Hung In Kun, the brother of Tai Won Kun, that Korea should negotiate a treaty with the United States, and gave all the details about the conference between Shufeldt and himself. 9

9 Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 608.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY

When the Korean government was informed that the American envoys would arrive at Chemulpo (or Incheon) in order to conclude the treaty which Shufeldt and Li Hung Chang had previously discussed, the Government of Korea appointed Hyon Shin as the chief envoy, Hong Jip Kim as the vice-envoy and Sang Woo Sou as the secretariat.

The United States Plenipotentiary Minister Shufeldt arrived at Chemulpo, Korea, by the United States warship, Swatara, with three Chinese warships on May 12, 1882. The Korean envoys, Shin and Kim, went to meet Shufeldt and the other Chinese officials. Shufeldt returned to visit the Korean envoys the next day. The friendly visit of the

1Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 610. Hyon Shin was the chief envoy who negotiated the treaty of 1876 with Japan; Hon Jip Kim was the good will missioner to Japan and made the reports on the Russian aggressiveness in the Northern Korea. Both were advocating the opening of the country to the foreign countries.

2Tongmoon Kwanji, op. cit.; according to the Diary of the Swatara, it said that the Korean envoys, Hyon Shin, Hong Jip Kim, and the interpreters came to visit Commander Shufeldt at the Swatara. This first official visit of the Koreans lasted about an hour. The American envoy also promised to visit the Korean envoys. It was a friendly visit, and the good-will of the Koreans was expressed by their gifts which included rice, eggs, chickens, pigs and other food stuffs. See Shufeldt to Frelinghuysen, Shanghai, April 28, 1883, No. 7, Foreign Relations of the United States.
American envoys to the Korean banquet helped in creating the hospitable atmosphere. Shufeldt made a good impression on the Koreans. ³

On May 17, two Chinese officials, Ma and Ting, visited Shin and Kim, and the Korean envoys suggested to the Chinese officials that there should be a statement in regard to the rice export as in the case of the 1876 treaty, a treaty between Korea and Japan.⁴ On the same afternoon, the Chinese official, Ma, went to confer with Shufeldt in regard to rice export. On May 18 and 19, Ma and five other Chinese officials went to Seoul in order to investigate the market condition. On May 20, Shufeldt landed at Inchon with Captain Cooper of the Swatara, and other naval officials to visit Shin and Kim formally. As soon as the ceremony ended, Shufeldt and the Korean envoys inspected each others certificates. Shufeldt gave to the envoy the personal message of the President of

³Mikuk Tongsang Silgi, or The Real Record of the American Trade, (美國貿易實錄), Seoul. At the Korean banquet, Shufeldt remarked that in speaking of a country, one must know their food because it tells about the land and the customs. These Korean foods were so tasty and the best he ever had. Why should they be worried about the iron ship! The Korean envoy, Shin, when he visited the Swatara, mentioned the wonderful ship they had.

⁴The rice export was the main concern of the envoys since it was the topic of the day discussed by the ministers as well as the Korean people. The people were afraid that the export of rice would bring starvation to the nation.
the United States to the King of Korea. They agreed upon
the contents of the treaty, and decided on May 22, for the
date of signing. On May 21, they prepared the documents
which included three copies in English and three in Chinese. 5

On May 22, 1882, nine-thirty in the morning, Shufeldt,
with fifteen assistants and twenty sailors, landed at Inchon,
where the Korean envoys were waiting for them. After the
brief greetings, the Korean plenipotentiary, Hyon Shin, and
the vice-envoy, Hong Jip Kim, signed on the six copies of the
treaty, after which the American plenipotentiary minister,
Robert W. Shufeldt, signed. 6

After the ceremony was over, the American warship
fired a twenty-one gun salute in respect to the King of
Korea: a banquet followed at the Chinese warship, which was
attended by the Korean and American dignitaries. 7

Article I of the treaty was significant in the Korean
relations with the United States. It reads:

5Hansung Sinbo (南山新聞), or the Seoul Daily News,
No. 5, "the American Treaty". The Chinese officials, Na and
Ting, also arrived, but they did not attend when the actual
signatures were exchanged. In fact, they retired from the
room as a matter of courtesy. Hanabusa, the Japanese Minis-
ter to Seoul, too arrived at Inchon; when the American envoy
entered the Korean water, Hanabusa paid a visit to Commodore
Shufeldt, but like the Chinese, did not attend the ceremony.

7Okuhira, op. cit., p. 130.
If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government the other will exert their good offices on being informed of the case, to bring an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.\(^8\)

The two countries were to be opened for residence to the citizens and subjects of each other to pursue their calling and avocation.

Another significant point of the treaty was that it acknowledged the independence of Korea and the treaty was negotiated as an independent state. This meant a direct loss in China's prestige over Korea.\(^9\)

A new phrase, not in the original draft which was agreed upon between Shufeldt and Li Hung Chang, in Article VIII of the treaty read:

But it is to be understood that the exportation of rice and breadstuffs of every description is prohibited from the open port of Inchon (or Che-mulpo).\(^10\)

The phrase was suggested by the Korean who had insisted upon the same thing in the treaty conference of 1876, a treaty conference between Korea and Japan, and accepted by Shufeldt.


\(^10\)The Chinese text is as follows:

惟兹已開仁川港各色米穀概行禁止。
On May 23, 1882, the Chinese officials, Ma and Ting, gave to Shufeldt the Korean King's reply to the President of the United States. The letter, dated May 21, 1882, or April 5, according to the Chinese calendar, read:

Having heard that the administration of your government was just and upright, we have long desired to establish friendly relationships with you, but to our deep regret have had no opportunity to do so.

and it continues:

Having now received the envoy whom you have sent to us for the purpose of negotiating a treaty, we have appointed Shin of the Board of Foreign Affairs as our minister, and Chin, also of the Board, as his assistant to discuss the business with him. They will be able to sign the treaty at an early day, which can be carried back and presented to you by Commodore Shufeldt.

We beg that it be ratified quickly and envoy sent hither to exchange the ratifications in order to enable our two governments and peoples to mutually enjoy the benefits of the cordial friendship which shall flow from it, which is our sincere desire.

With compliments and salutations.

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11 This is the original translation of the American deputy minister, Mr. Holcombe. The Korean officer, Jung Jun Lee, delivered the two letters of the Korean King to Ma and Ting on May 22, 1882. One letter used the name of the King, which was more personal; the other one used only the name of the country, which merely read "The King of Korea." Ma delivered the later one to Shufeldt. The original copy in Chinese is as follows:
After receiving this letter, Commodore Shufeldt replied that there have been thirty years of trade between the people of the East and West. The general life of the people is the same although they are a different race. He continued that the principle of trade is to contribute to the intellectual and the cultural development of the people as well as for the nation to gain wealth and strength. Shufeldt indicated that the purpose of his mission is also to strengthen the good will relation between the two nations, and he assured them that there is no other reason than this peaceful will in his mission.  

On May 24, 1882, Commodore Shufeldt and his group left Inchon for Shanghai. The Koreans were very much impressed by the Americans, so the Koreans invited them again in 1886. When Shufeldt met Li Hung Chang at Tientsien, Li showed the letter which was of an entirely different nature than the letter which Shufeldt had already received from the Korean envoy. This letter, too, was addressed to the President of the United States, but dated May 15th, seven days before the treaty had been signed. The King’s letter was delivered to Shufeldt two days after the treaty signature; therefore,

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12 Admiral Shufeldt, Korean Repository, Vol. I (1892), p. 62. Shufeldt once said, "the feat of bringing the last of the exclusive countries within the pale of western civilization."
it seemed at that time that Li Hung Chang tried to impress upon the United States that Korea is a tributary state to China, because of the Korean King’s personal recognition of the Korean political status quo, and since Li was unable to insert "dependent state" in the treaty. Commodore Shufeldt, however, paid little attention to this letter, for he was mainly concerned with the treaty.13

The letter, which Commodore Shufeldt received from Li Hung Chang and which was officially recognized by the Korean King, mentioned as follows:

His Majesty, the King of Chosen, herewith makes a communication. Chosen has been from ancient times a state tributary to China. Yet, hitherto full sovereignty has been exercised by the Kings of Chosen in all matter of internal administration and foreign relations. Chosen and the United States, in establishing now by mutual consent a treaty, are dealing with each other upon a basis of equality. The King of Chosen distinctly pledges his own sovereign powers for the complete enforcement in good faith of all the stipulations of the treaty in accordance with international law. As regards the various duties which develop upon us, a tributary state to China, the United States has no concern whatever. Having appointed

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"\[13\]Li Hung Chang was aware of the fact that Korea’s loyalty to the relationship between Korea and China could no longer be preserved, for it involved more than just two nations. Li, therefore, tried to obtain by legal evidence, which in the western eyes embraces international law, to indicate Korea’s subordination to China. Li was familiar with the Japanese-Korea treaty of 1876, in which Korean independence is mentioned."
envoys to negotiate a treaty it appears to be my duty, in addition thereto, to make this preliminary declaration. To the President of the United States, May 15th, 1882.14

Commodore Shufeldt, commenting on this letter, said that the letter concerned the tributary status to China, and was written before the signing of the treaty.15 Shufeldt further commented that this mistake happened because of the fact that they lacked a good interpreter.16 He said

14 The original text in Chinese is as follows:

大朝鮮國臣民，照會事，照會為中國臣民而内設交涉向來，均由大朝鮮國君主自由為。大美國國紙此密旨相待大朝鮮國明白詳細內含，親手授自主書即照韓國臣民為中國臣民一切作為許各節，均照大美國遵照章程條約議定之條外，照應大照會須遵照議在照會大美國臣民德大朝鮮國臣民臣民臣民

15 Shufeldt to Frelinghuysen, the U.S. Naval Hospital, Mare Island, California, August 23, 1882, Foreign Relations of the United States.

16 M. F. Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1945, pp. 147-149. "Shufeldt knew that some of the misunderstanding in the treaty process H. H. Dubs underestimated the language capacity of the American negotiation of Shufeldt and Holcombe. Professor Dubs comment: "Both Shufeldt and Holcombe really paraphrased this letter (King's letter) instead of translating it exactly, thus securing a more readable translation and gives an impression that is misleading. In my translation I have tried to be literal and to give the impression the letter would make upon an educated Korean of that date." Shufeldt and Holcombe did not translate the King's letter, or other
that there was no significant meaning to the whole matter except for the fact that it was breaking the promise between Shufeldt and Li Hung Chang. Another conflicting matter after the treaty was that concerning the appointment of a Korean minister to the United States. Li Hung Chang did not wish to see a Korean minister apply in all important diplomatic matters to the Chinese Minister and who would give the final approval. Secretary of State, Bayard, who was informed of this matter, instructed the American Minister in Peking to protest the Chinese action, and gave notice to both governments that "as the United States have no priority with the interrelations of China and Corea (or Korea), we shall treat both as separate governments customarily represented here by their respective and independent agents." 18

documents, word for word; it would be impossible to maintain the original meaning by this method. Two translations of Shufeldt and Holcombe give sufficient idea of the King’s letter although they used legal terminology non-existent in the Far Eastern language at that time. A careful study reveals that Shufeldt understood the general political situation in China and Korea, and handled the situation very wisely. Mr. Nelson further stated in his book that Korea’s dependence upon China is in fact the main theme: the assertion of her equality with the United States is in no way a declaration of her independence from China. This statement also does not justify the position of Commodore Shufeldt at that time."

18 George R. J. Palk, Protestant Missions in Korea, Pyongyang, Korea, 1929, pp. 59-60.
The Korean Minister at Washington, D. C., was received later without Chinese intervention, and there was no further question on the subject, although China did interfere with Korean internal affairs until the Sino-Japanese War.

After the treaty was made, Shufeldt sent a report to Washington, stayed in Nagasaki for a few weeks while waiting for an appointment as the American Asia Fleet Commander; an appointment which he never received. Returning to the United States on July 29, he stayed in California. The American public and even the Washington officials, including President Arthur, did not pay much attention to what Commodore Shufeldt achieved. In spite of his successful service, Commodore Shufeldt was practically unknown as compared to Commodore Perry, who opened Japan.

The friendly disposition of the Korean government towards the United States was evinced soon after the treaty in a number of ways. Besides the exchange of diplomatic courtesies; American Christian missionaries were allowed to work in Korea in spite of the fact that the guarantee of the missionary to work was lacking in the treaty of 1882.19

The President of the United States appointed Lucius H. Foote as the first American minister to Korea. Foote arrived on February 27th, 1883, at Seoul where he exchanged

19 Ibid., p. 60.
certificates with the Korean Minister, Min Yong Mok. By request of the United States the Korean government offered the rights of transportation of American exports and imports in Korean ports.20

20 Foote to Frelinghuysen, September 4, 1884, Seoul; Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
CHAPTER VIII

INFLUENCE OF THE TREATY

As soon as the news of the United States-Korea treaty spread in the diplomatic circle in Peking, the western diplomats were surprised and anxious to follow the pattern of the United States. Sir Thomas Wads, the British Minister to China, contacted London immediately, and visited Li Hung Chang for help in negotiating a treaty with Korea. Li Hung Chang instructed Chang Shu-Shen that the Chinese government would not help Sir Thomas Wade if the British government wanted the same type of treaty as the United States-Korea treaty. Sir Thomas Wade agreed to Li's suggestion and received a copy of the Chinese text of the United States-Korea treaty and also a letter of introduction to Ma, who remained at Seoul as Chinese agent.¹

The British Plenipotentiary, General George Willes, the Commander of the British China Fleet, arrived on May 27, 1882, at Inchon. General Willes contacted the Korean officials Hyon Shin and Hong Jip Kim through the Chinese official, Ma. The problem in the discussion was again the "dependent state" phrase which Ma insisted upon to General

¹Chosen-Shi, or History of Korea, op. cit., p. 613.
Willes. Willes replied that he was not authorized to insert the phrase and that he was only to follow the Shufeldt Treaty.  

On May 30, the Korean Plenipotentiary, Nyong Ha Cho, the vice envoy, Hong Jip Kim; with the Chinese official, Ma; went to see the British Plenipotentiary, Willes, at the Virginia; the British warship. The British envoy said that the Shufeldt Treaty was too general and that he wanted more detail in the treaty. The British envoy was unable to convince either the Chinese or the Korean envosy. The British envoy also suggested the Island of Kaumun for their warship, but this was rejected by the Koreans.

The treaty was signed between Korea and Great Britain four days later. According to the treaty, at first three Korean ports, Pusan, Wonsan, and Inchon (or Chemulpo), were opened; secondly, warships were not to enter any Korean port; thirdly, the British would survey the Korean coast. Simultaneously, the Korean King was to declare Korea a tributary state to China, which would be similar to the contents in the letter to the President of the United States.

3 Ibid., p. 614.
The British government, however, did not ratify the treaty because it seemed that the Korean government asked a high tariff. According to the United States-Korea treaty, the tariff rate ran from 10 per cent to 30 per cent. The British-China treaty, however, was as low as 5 per cent except on tea, silk and opium. The British were not willing to pay such a high tariff. The Korean government also refused absolutely to import any amount of opium. Whether the British had plans to export opium to Korea or not, was not clear, but the American Minister to Seoul, Foote, observed the probability of the British plan. According to the British point of view, the nature of the treaty was too progressive compared with the British treaties with China, Japan and others. The British government perhaps thought that the British-Korea treaty might cause other future treaties to be made along the lines of a similar progressive nature, which would be in conflict with the traditional British conservative policy.\(^4\)

Meanwhile, on June 5, 1882, the French warship arrived at Inchon. The French Consul, Dillion, at Tientsien, was the French Plenipotentiary. Dillion already began to negotiate a treaty with Korea through the Chinese official,

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and was as successful as the American and the British. As the American deputy-minister, Holcombe, predicted, the French were not able to convince either the Korean official or the United States since the French did not have much trade in the Far East, but desired to spread the Roman Catholic missions.  

At that time, the French were not on good terms with the Chinese government, because in spite of China's protest, the French troops were in Indo-China; this situation did not help France to make a treaty with Korea. Besides, the anti-Christian movement was still strong in Korea. The French mission failed in Korea, and Dillon returned to Peking where he reported to Boree, the French Minister to Peking.  

On June 20, 1882, the German Plenipotentiary Minister, M. Von Brandt, the German Minister to China, arrived at Inchon by the Stosch, a German warship. Von Brandt had special encouragement from Commodore Shufeldt before he left China. He also contacted the Chinese Foreign Office. Three days later the Chinese officials, Ma and Ting, again arrived at Inchon.

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5 Holcombe to Frelinghuysen, May 29, 1882, No. 117; Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.

6 Okuhira, op. cit., p. 149.

7 Chosen-Shi, op. cit., p. 617.
The Korean government appointed Nyong Ha Cho, Chief-envoy, Hong Jip Kim vice-envoy and Jo You Lee and Jun Yong Cho the sub-officials. On June 30, they signed the treaty which was exactly the same as the previous treaties with the United States and Great Britain.

At the ceremonial banquet, which was held at the Stosch, the German Minister said, "All the Asiatic countries have had diplomatic relations; now at last Korea joined. More than ten years ago, a French ship entered the Han River, located from Seoul to Inchon, where she lost more than half of her soldiers. The English ship arrived at Southern Korea and requested Korea to open trade, but received no reply. Later American ships came three times in the same attempt but all failed. But now during these few weeks, three treaties have been made. All of which could not have been achieved without the help of the Chinese."9

After Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister to Japan, was transferred to Peking, he arranged with the Chinese government for a new treaty with Korea. Sir Parkes arrived at Inchon on October 26, 1883, and negotiated with the Korean government. At the same time the German Plenipotentiary

8 Ilsungrok, May 7, 10, 1883.
9 Ibid., May 11, 1883.
Zappe, the German Consul General at Yokohama, Japan, went to Seoul for the same purpose. Both of them succeeded in negotiating new treaties with Korea. At this time, the tariff rate was 5 per cent to 20 per cent. Britain's main export was cotton, which had a tariff rate of 7.5 per cent. Sir Parkes was appointed as the British Minister to Korea later.10

The new German-Korea treaty was similar to the new British-Korea treaty. Following these British and German treaties with Korea, other European countries too came to Korea to make treaties. The Korean government signed a treaty with Belgium on June 26, 1884, and with Austria-Hungary on June 23, 1892.

The Korean government negotiated a treaty with Russia on June 25, 1884, but since there were border troubles between Korea and Russia, it was very difficult to convince the Korean government to make a good-will treaty with Russia. As soon as the Korean government was informed about the Russian treaty through the Chinese government, the Korean government replied that there was only a narrow border at the Tuman River, a border river between Korea and Russia, and there was not much to trade near the border. There

10 Okuhira, op. cit., p. 158.
would be trouble if there was trade on the border. At first, the representative from both countries should go to the border and set the border signs, and the government should punish anyone who violates the border laws. Thus the Korean government refused to make a treaty with Russia. The Korean government, however, realized that Korea could not stop the western power which deeply penetrated into the Far East with modernized civilization. Korea finally opened her door to the Russians.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Lee Dynasty, Korea's last dynasty, based upon an Asiatic mode of production in the agricultural slavery system, was a feudal society. There were several reasons which delayed the transformation in Korea from the feudalistic system to the capitalistic system. The Asiatic agricultural slavery system of production and the Asiatic land system prevented the development and the industrialization of the country. Because there was no such group as the European medieval handicraftmen in Korea, the isolated families and the tribes-people of the villagers had a close tie-up with the feudalistic domestic handicraft which provided them the necessary semi-primitive articles; but there was no real source for the accumulation of capital for the merchants and the small manufactures. These are the main reasons which prevented the natural transformation of the feudalistic system to the capitalistic system in the Lee Dynasty. Under this feudalistic condition, the political struggle continued between Tai Won Kun's group and Queen Min's group during the period of middle nineteenth century.
Under Tai Won Kun, father of King Ko-Jong, administration, Korea followed the national isolation policy in her relation with the western powers until 1882, when the United States and Korea signed a treaty. Although he contributed a great deal to domestic reformation, it was a great mistake when he insisted upon his national isolation policy. Both the reformation of the domestic affairs and the national isolation policy of Tai Won Kun were merely to preserve his own power in the government. The anti-western policy of Tai Won Kun indicated clearly the Korean conservatives' desperate effort to save themselves in a changing Korea and in a changing world. The Queen Min group, on the other hand, followed exactly the opposite policy in both domestic and foreign affairs. Both the opening of Korea to the western powers and the corrupt administration of Tai Won Kun brought power to the Queen Min group. Korea was to be opened sooner or later; however, while Tai Won Kun was stubbornly fighting against history, Queen Min, wife of the King Ko-Jong and Tai Won Kun's daughter in law, used intelligently the opportunity to achieve her own influence in the government.

The opening of Korea was not through Korean leader's own will, but through the development of the Far Eastern politics with the western powers. The feudalistic society
of Korea was threatened by a new power, her neighbors, China and Japan, which were newly equipped with the western thought of politics and were transforming from their long traditional feudal society to new progressive society. Although the western powers had much opportunity, if they were aggressive, to open Korea earlier before China and Japan opened Korea, they were not aggressive enough to open Korea. It is true that the French had tried, but France did not have sufficient force to hold every place that she wanted to conquer; besides, she was more interested in the French Indochina. The United States, too, had the opportunity to open Korea earlier than 1882, but she refused to follow any aggressive policy toward other countries; e.g., the Secretary of States, George F. Seward, refused William H. Seward's request for military forces in order to make with the Koreans a similar treaty to the American-Japanese treaty. ¹

By this time, under influence of the western powers, the Japanese landlords and merchants invested their capital in industry in order to have competition with the western powers. The imperialistic Japanese "Zaibatsu Groups," Japanese wealthy capitalists, were building industries and

seeking control of the Korean market in the process of the natural accumulation of the manufacture-goods. The western powers, on the other hand, seeking colonies on a world-wide scale, were not willing to make it easy for Japan to have a free hand in Korea. China did not want to lose her share in Korea. She set promptly to work checking Japan. In the meantime, the Korean government tried to be more friendly to the Chinese authorities and concentrated more on a centralized and an absolutist government which oppressed the people more and more.

China encouraged Korea to enter into treaty relations with the western powers. Commodore Shufeldt learned of this fact and started working on a treaty between the United States and Korea. The government of Japan, too, encouraged the Korean government to make a treaty with the United States. The main reason for these encouragements was that China and Japan wished to bring the western powers into Korea in order to check the Russian activities in the Far East. Count Inouye, Minister of the Foreign Office in Japan, told Hong Jip Kim, Korean envoy to Japan, that the desire of the western powers—America, Great Britain, and France wished to open trade in Korea—was not so much for the trade itself, but in fear of Czarist Russian domination over Korea.2

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2Okuhira, op. cit., p. 67.
While Shufeldt and Li Hung Chang were discussing the United States treaty at Peking, Li Hung Chang was trying to convince Shufeldt of Korea's dependent state. Even though Li Hung Chang was insisting upon the "dependent state" as the major problem, Li could not afford to break the negotiation, since he knew that only the western powers were able to stop the aggressive activities of Japan and Russia in Korea.

The treaty of 1882 acknowledged the independent state of Korea, and the treaty was negotiated by Korea as an independent state. The treaty of 1882 meant a direct loss in China's prestige in Korea. The Korean independence, however, was not guaranteed by any power; no power wanted to see any other power monopolize Korea.

Japan had a chance to conquer Korea later only by proving herself a power in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, when she was able to stop the Russian Empire, which had caused the other western powers much worry in Far Eastern power politics. When Japan was monopolizing Korea, the United States, because of her policy of neutrality, would not risk war in order to help Korea; thus Korea became a victim of power politics in the Far East.
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KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES
May 22, 1882

The United States of America and the Kingdom of Chosen, being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of amity and friendship between their respective peoples, have to this end appointed, that is to say: SHUFELDT, Commodore, U.S. Navy, as his Commissioner Plenipotentiary; and His Majesty the King of Chosen, SHIN CHEN, President of the Royal Cabinet, CHIN HONG-CHI, Member of the Royal Cabinet, as his Commissioners Plenipotentiary; who, have reciprocally examined their respective full powers, which have been found to be due form, have agreed upon the several following Articles:

ARTICLE I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.

If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.
ARTICLE II

After the conclusion of this treaty of amity and commerce, the high contracting Powers may each appoint diplomatic representatives to reside at the Court of the other, and may each appoint consular representatives at the port of the other which are open to foreign commerce, at their own convenience.

These officials shall have relations with the corresponding local authorities of equal rank upon a basis of mutual equality.

The diplomatic and consular representatives of the two Governments shall receive mutually all the privileges, rights, and immunities, without discrimination, which are accorded to the same classes of representatives from the most favoured nation.

Consuls shall exercise their functions only receipt of an exequatur from the Government to which they are accredited. Consular authorities be bona fide officials. No merchants shall be permitted to exercise the duties of the office, nor shall consular officers be allowed to engage in trade. At ports to which no consular representatives have been appointed, the consuls of other Powers may be invited to act, provided that no merchant shall be allowed to assume consular functions, or the local authorities.
If consular representatives of the United States in Chosen conduct their business in an improper manner, their exequatur may be revoked, subject to the approval, previously obtained, of the diplomatic representative of the United States.

ARTICLE III

Whenever the United States Vessels, either because of stress of weather or by want of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the nearest open port in Chosen, they may enter any port or harbour either to take refuge therein or to get supplies of wood, coal, and other necessaries, or to make repairs; the expenses incurred thereby being defrayed by the ship's master. In such event, the officers and people of the locality shall display their sympathy by rendering full assistance, and their liberality by furnishing the necessaries required.

If the United States vessel carries on a clandestine trade at a port not open to foreign commerce, such vessel, with her cargo, shall be seized and confiscated.

If the United States vessel be wrecked on the coast of Chosen, the local authorities, on being informed of the occurrence, shall immediately render assistance to the crew, provide for their present necessities, and take the measures
necessary for the salvage of the ship and the preservation of her cargo. They shall also bring the matter to the knowledge of the nearest consular representative of the United States, in order that steps may be taken to send the crew home and to save the ship and cargo. The necessary expenses shall be defrayed either by the ship's master or by the United States.

ARTICLE IV

All citizens of the United States of America in Chosen, peaceably attending to their own affairs, shall receive and enjoy for themselves and everything appreciating to them the protection of the local authorities of the Government of Chosen, who shall defend them from all insult and injury of any sort. If their dwellings of property are threatened or attacked by mobs, incendiaries, or other violent or lawless persons, the local officers, on requisition of the consul shall immediately dispatch a military force to disperse the rioters, apprehend the guilty individuals, and punish them with the utmost rigour of the law.

Subjects of Chosen, guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of the United States, shall be punished by the authorities of Chosen according to the laws of Chosen; and citizens of the United States, either on shore or in any
merchant vessel, who may insult, trouble, or wound the persons, or injure the property of the people of Chosen, shall be arrested and punished only by the Consul or other public functionary of the United States thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United States.

When controversies arise in the Kingdom of Chosen, between citizens of the United States and subject of His Majesty, which need to be examined and decided by the public officers of the two nations, it is agreed between the two Governments of the United States and Chosen that such cases shall be tried by the proper official of the nationality of the defendant, according to the laws of that nation.

The properly authorized official of the plaintiff's nationality shall be freely permitted to attend the trial, and shall be treated with the courtesy due to his position. He shall be granted all proper facilities for watching the proceedings in the interest of justice. If he so desires, he shall have the right to present, to examine, and to cross-examine witnesses. If he is dissatisfied with the proceedings, he shall be permitted to protest against them in detail.

It is, however, mutually agreed and understood between the high contracting Powers, that whenever the King of Chosen shall have so far modified and reformed the statutes and judicial procedure of his Kingdom that, in the justice in
the United States, the right of ex-territorial jurisdiction over the United States citizens in Chosen shall be abandoned, and thereafter the United States citizens, when within the limits of the Kingdom of Chosen, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the native authorities.

ARTICLE V

Merchants and merchant vessels of Chosen visiting the United States for purposes of traffic shall pay duties and tonnage dues and all fees according to the customs regulations of the United States, but no higher or other rates of duties and tonnage dues shall be exacted of them than are levied upon citizens of the United States or upon citizens or subjects of the most favoured nations.

Merchants and merchant vessels of the United States visiting Chosen for purposes of traffic shall pay duties upon all merchandise imported and exported. The authority to levy duties is of right vested in the Government of Chosen. The tariff of duties upon exports and imports, together with the customs regulations for the prevention of smuggling and other irregularities, will be fixed by the authorities of Chosen, and communicated to the proper officials of the United States, to be by the latter notified to their citizens and duly observed.
It is, however, agreed in the first instance, as a general measure, that the tariff upon such imports as are articles of daily use shall not exceed an ad-valorem duty of ten percentum; that the tariff upon such imports as are luxuries, as, for instance, foreign wines, foreign tobacco, clocks and watches, shall not exceed an ad valorem duty of thirty percentum; and that native produce exported shall pay a duty not to exceed five percentum and valorem. And it is further agreed that the duty upon foreign imports shall be paid once for all at the port of entry, and that no other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any sort shall be levied upon such imports either in the interior of Chosen or at the ports.

The United States merchant vessels entering the ports of Chosen shall pay tonnage dues at the rate of five mace per ton, payable once in three months on each vessel, according to the Chinese calendar.

ARTICLE VI

Subjects of Chosen who may visit the United States shall be permitted to reside and rent premises, purchase land, or to construct residences or warehouses, in all parts of the country. They shall be freely permitted to pursue their
various callings and avocations, and to traffic in all merchandise, raw and manufactured, that is not declared contraband by law.

Citizens of the United States who may resort to the ports of Chosen, which are open to foreign commerce, shall be permitted to reside at such open ports within the limits of the concessions, and to lease buildings or land or to construct residences or warehouses therein. They shall be freely permitted to pursue their various callings and avocations within the limits of the ports, and to traffic in all merchandise, raw and manufactured, that is not declared contraband by law.

No coercion or intimidation in the acquisition of land or building shall be permitted, and the land rent as fixed by the authorities of Chosen shall be paid. It is expressly agreed that land so acquired in the open ports of Chosen still remains an integral part of the Kingdom, and that all rights of jurisdiction over persons and property within such areas remain vested in the authorities of Chosen, except in so far as rights have been expressly relinquished by this treaty.

American citizens are not permitted either to transport foreign imports to the interior for sale or to proceed thither to purchase native produce. Nor are they permitted to transport native produce from one open port to another open port.
Violations of this rule will subject such merchandise to confiscation, and the merchant offending will be handed over to the consular authorities to be dealt with.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the United States and of Chosen mutually agree and undertake that subjects of Chosen shall not be permitted to import opium into any of the ports of the United States, and citizens of the United States shall not be permitted to import opium into any of the open ports of Chosen, to transport it from one open port to another open port, or to traffic in it in Chosen. This absolute prohibition, which extends to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either power, to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either Power and employed by other persons for the transportation of opium, shall be enforced by appropriate legislation on the part of the United States and of Chosen, and offenders against it shall be severely punished.

ARTICLE VIII

Whenever the Government of Chosen shall have reason to apprehend a scarcity of food within the limits of the Kingdom, His Majesty may, by decree, temporarily prohibit the export of all foodstuffs, and such decree shall be binding on all
citizens of the United States in Chosen, upon due notice having been given them by the authorities of Chosen through the proper officers of the United States; but it is to be understood that the exportation of rice and breadstuffs and of every description is prohibited from the open port of Ynchen.

Chosen having of old prohibited the exportation of red ginseng, if citizens of the United States clandestinely purchase it for export, it shall be confiscated, and the offenders punished.

ARTICLE IX

The purchase of cannon, small arms, swords, gunpowder, shot, and all munitions of war is permitted only to officials of the Government of Chosen, and they may be imported by citizens of the United States only under a written permit from the authorities of Chosen. If these articles are clandestinely imported, they shall be confiscated, and the offending party shall be punished.

ARTICLE X

The officers and people of either nation residing in the other shall have the right to employ natives for all kinds of lawful work.
Should, however, subjects of Chosen, guilty of violation of laws of the Kingdom, or against whom any action has been brought, conceal themselves in the residences or warehouses of the United States citizens or on board United States merchant vessels, the Consular authorities of the United States, on being notified of the fact by the local authorities, will either permit the latter to dispatch constables to make the arrests or the persons will be arrested by the Consular authorities and handed over to the local constables.

Officials or citizens of the United States shall not harbour such persons.

ARTICLE XI

Students of either nationality who may proceed to the country of the other, in order to study the language, literature, laws, or art, shall be given all possible protection and assistance, in evidence of cordial goodwill.

ARTICLE XII

This being the first treaty negotiated by Chosen, and hence being general and incomplete in its provisions, shall, in the first instance, be put into operation in all things
stipulated herein. As to stipulations not contained herein, after an interval of five years, when the officers and people of the two Powers shall have become more familiar with each other's language, a further negotiation of commercial provisions and regulations in detail, in conformity with international law and without unequal discriminations on either part, shall be had.

ARTICLE XIII

This treaty and future official correspondence between the two contracting Governments shall be made, on the part of Chosen, in the Chinese language.

The United States shall either use the Chinese language, or if English be used, it shall be accompanied with a Chinese version, in order to avoid misunderstanding.

ARTICLE XIV

The high contracting Powers hereby agree that should at any time the King of Chosen grant to any nation, or to the merchants or citizens of any nation, any right, privilege, or favour, connected either with navigation, commerce, political or other intercourse, which is not conferred by this treaty, such right, privilege, and favour shall freely inure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers,
merchants, and citizens; provided always, that whenever such right, privilege, or favour is accompanied by any condition or equivalent concession granted by the other nation interested, the United States, its officers and people, shall only be entitled to the benefit of such right, privilege, or favour upon complying with the conditions or concessions connected therewith.

In faith whereof, the respective Commissioner's Plenipotentiary have signed and sealed the foregoing at Yin-chuen, in English and Chinese, being three originals of each text, of even tenor and date, the ratifications of which shall be exchanged at Yin-chuen within one year from the date of its execution, and immediately thereafter this treaty shall be in all its provisions publicly proclaimed and made known by both Governments in their respective countries, in order that it may be obeyed by their citizens and subjects respectively.

Chosen, May and 22nd, A.D. 1882.

(L.S.) (Signed) R. W. Shufeldt.  Commodore, USN, Envoy of the U.S. to Chosen

(L.S.) (Signed) Shin Chen.  In Chinese

(L.S.) (Signed) Chin Hong-Chi.  In Chinese.