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Collective security in the Pacific with particular reference to SEATO

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SEATO

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History and Political Science
College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Political Science

by
Emanuel Valdez Berbano
June 1956

Dedicated to President Robert E. Burns, counselor
and friend, with the highest regard and deep appreciation;
and to my mother and father, in token of gratitude that
will grow through the years.

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CHAPTER I

"THE WHY AND HOW OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY"¹

Few terms are more popular today than "collective security," and few are used with such diverse meanings. The following statements by high-ranking American officials are typical:

The path of collective security is our only sure defense against the dangers that threaten us.
(President Harry S. Truman; address of May 7, 1951.)

. . . the principle of collective security . . . is the only principle that we think can carry us to peace.
(Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall; testimony to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, May 12, 1951.)

(The concept of collective security is) the most important single concept affecting international life.
(Under Secretary of State James E. Webb; address in Montreal, May 31, 1951.)

The core of our program this year is again collective security. We are concentrating on collective security because it is the greatest need of the world today . . . it is the responsible and realistic road to world peace. (John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs; address in New York, October 21, 1951.)

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson used the term no fewer than fourteen times in his address at the opening meeting of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the

¹From the book by Joseph Hurst Ball, Collective Security: the Why and How (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943).

United Nations on September 20, 1950. And, of course, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had as the main purpose in negotiating the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty "to establish a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."

(Statement made by Secretary of State Dulles before the opening session of the Conference at Manila on September 6, 1954.)

I. DEFINITION

To assess the true significance and possibilities of collective security in international affairs, the question must first be answered: What does "collective security" mean?

The concept appears to be simple and self-explanatory. It has been defined by Georg Schwarzenberger as "machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order."² It clearly implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace. In a sense Ernest A. Gross, United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations, stated a truism when

²Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), p. 494.

he declared: "There is no alternative to collective action for the achievement of security. The opposite of collective security is complete insecurity."³

But not all collective action is collective security. For in reality, the concept is a complex and elusive one. The very few ventures in collective action have been limited by the vague and general nature of the commitments, and by the unwillingness of the states concerned to take adequate vigorous action. Collective security is clearly incompatible with neutrality and with a balance of power policy, as Quincy Wright explains.⁴ The decisive tests would seem to be: First, whether the system is strong enough. Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared to carry it on to a definitive conclusion. The second test appears to be whether the states associated in it abide by their obligations to the fullest extent necessary in crisis situations. As Professor Friedmann explains:

A successful system of collective security does not necessarily presuppose a complete abandonment of national independence or individuality. It does, however, require the submission of the individual

³ Address at the University of Virginia, July 13, 1951; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXV (July 30, 1951), 183.

⁴ Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), II, p. 781.

national will to collective decisions . . . and in order to be effective it requires the international control of military forces and vital weapons, which is certainly not possible without a severe restriction of national sovereignty.⁵

Third, such a system must be far more than an alliance. It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith. It must not be directed against any specific power or combination of powers. Last, but not least, the arrangement must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Also, especially so far as collective security in Southeast Asia is concerned, it must embody these principles given by Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs: (1) it must contain no taint of colonialism and must not be designed to prop up regimes, colonial or national, that have little or no popular support; (2) since military aggression of the continental sort is not likely to be the main future danger so much as Communist infiltration for exploitation of forces within a state, no mere military agreement will be satisfactory; and (3) the solution cannot be a purely Western one but should be broadly based on the Asian's participation either actively or through their cooperation and advice.⁶

⁵W. Friedmann, An Introduction to World Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 57.

⁶Raymond Daniel, dispatch from Ottawa dated May 28, 1954; in the New York Times, May 29, 1954.

II. PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The student of collective security will probably say that it is a statement of perfection to argue that the price of the failure to provide collective security after World War I was World War II. It was too high a price; hence, during the second global conflict within a single generation careful preparation was made for a postwar order which would establish a genuine peace and for an organization which would preserve that peace.

At first glance it seems that the foundations were well laid. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for collective action are more extensive and apparently more far-reaching than those of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations system has been buttressed by regional arrangements and agreements, some of which, notably those existing in Western Europe, the Atlantic Community, and the Western Hemisphere, establish strong regional security systems which are presumably consistent with, and supplementary to, the United Nations system.

Article I of the Charter calls for "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Chapter VII of the

Charter points out in great detail what these "effective collective measures" may be. If the Security Council finds that an act of aggression or other threat to the peace has occurred, and if the parties concerned do not comply with such measures as the Council shall deem necessary, the United Nations may call upon the member states to take any of a number of non-military and, if necessary, military measures against the offending state or states.

Article 43 provides that

All members of the United Nations . . . undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call or in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 45 stipulates that "Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action."

Article 47 provides for a Military Staff Committee

. . . to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmaments.

Article 49 states that "The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council."

The famous Article 51 specifically recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations," but it also plainly stated that

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right . . . shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council . . . to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VII of the Charter thus clearly envisions collective action of a far-reaching nature, and the Members of the United Nations, by adhering to the Charter, accepted a commitment to abide by and give full support to the decisions of the Security Council.

III. THE VIEW OF WESTERN POWERS

Until the Korean crisis of 1950, the potentialities of the United Nations for collective action against aggression were untested. But because of the very nature of the organization it was obvious from the beginning that it could not become an effective instrument of collective security without radical revision of the Charter. Although he supported and voted for the United Nations Charter, even Senator Robert A. Taft, for instance, confesses that he was "never satisfied." While at the same time expressing his belief in international law as a basis for enduring

peace, he contended that the veto power in the Security Council of the United Nations "completely dispels the idea that any system of universal law is being established, for surely nothing can be law if five of the largest nations can automatically exempt themselves from its application."⁷

Because of the constant use of the veto by the Soviet Union the United States and other major powers of the Western world are placing first emphasis on regional security programs and arrangements. They are relying more upon heavy expenditures and elaborate plans for national defense and for regional measures for "individual or collective self-defense," to use the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, than they are upon the more general safeguards provided for in the Charter. In the field of security they seem to attach more significance to individual and regional than to collective security in its true and broader meaning.⁸

IV. LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Perhaps this situation has developed because of the

⁷Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (New York: Doubleday Company, 1951), pp. 39-40.

⁸Carlos P. Romulo, "The United Nations is Dying," Collier's, LXIV (July 23, 1954), 30-2.

very nature and limitations of international law.⁹

Whereas international law represents a positive attempt to build an international legal order, in the absence of which peace and sanity in the international community are in constant jeopardy, international law "will never play a really effective part in international relations," as J.

L. Brierly, an English authority declares, "until it can annex to its own sphere some of the matters which at present lie within the 'domestic jurisdiction' of the several states."¹⁰ Professor Dickenson, another friendly critic describes it this way:

. . . as regards its institutions and procedures of adjustment the law of nations has been a jungle law imperfectly ameliorated by a fragmentary and hesitant progress in the direction of legal order.¹¹

While it is true that rules of procedure called international law have grown considerably during the past few hundred years, the modern world still is composed primarily of a group of politically independent, self-governing states each of which claims every sovereign right.

⁹Salo Engel, "On the Status of International Legislation," The American Journal of International Law, XLIV (October, 1950), 739.

¹⁰J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 75-6.

¹¹Edwin D. Dickenson, Law and Peace (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 76.

Consequently, the resort to international law has been purely voluntary. When national honor, security, or other vital interests are at stake, nations have placed their particular interests above the restraints of international law. Force, therefore, is the ultimate means of pursuing national policy and cannot be left out of account in any kind of international relations.

V. THE NEED FOR ALLIANCES

In the absence of other means of providing for security in a badly divided world, regional arrangements for collective defense and for other purposes have become useful and even essential. The Charter of the United Nations, as pointed out, not only does not place impediments in the way of the formation of regional alliances, but under Article 51 it actually makes provision for the forming of regional groupings. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, popularly known as SEATO, or the Manila Pact, is one of several regional arrangements set up since the United Nations was created.

There are some who hold that regional security pacts add to international tensions, and may even hasten the catastrophe they are designed to prevent. It does not follow, however, that failure to take such steps may increase the prospects of peace. In fact, failure to

provide regional security may add to the dangers and, in addition, may gravely jeopardize the security or even the national existence of the states which are so foolhardy as to trust altogether to the devices of peaceful settlement in a world where even the faintest sign of morality and decency are cast aside by nations who are not scrupulous as to the methods by which their materialistic ends are attained. The signatories to SEATO regard their organization a necessity. In the face of present dangers in Southeast Asia they see no alternative.

CHAPTER II

ASIAN EXPERIENCE WITH REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

While the SEATO system of regional collective security in Asia is the most recent, it has had several predecessors. Five of these will be discussed briefly.

I. "GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE"

Japan appealed to the idea of regionalism when Nippon's leaders attempted to disguise their program of conquest in East Asia by declaring their objective was the creation of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Begun cautiously fifty-five years ago when Korea and Formosa were detached from China, the process of turning this fantastic scheme into reality proceeded systematically and with increasing ruthlessness until it engulfed most of China and southeastern Asia--an empire which, at its crest,

. . . sprawled over 3,000,000 square miles, controlled more than half a billion people, and contained the world's best sources of natural rubber and tin, as well as rich reserves of antimony, tungsten, chrome, iron ore, coal, petroleum, vegetable oil, and hemp.¹

¹"Liquidating Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere," Business Week, No. 1177 (August 18, 1945), 18.

The program of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had been proclaimed in 1938 when "Japan's fascists" had succeeded in capturing control of the government.² But it was not until July 1940, that the Tojo Cabinet formulated the construction of a "New Order" in East Asia as basic in Japan's foreign policy. The "New Order" was to comprise an area centered around Japan, China and Manchuko and to include the mandated islands, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The sphere was created to be an economically self-sufficient area under Japanese political hegemony.³ Professor Francis C. Jones of Harvard University explains Japan's "New Order" in this manner:

The general Japanese concept of Greater East Asia was one in which Japan herself stood forth as the leader in all walks of life--military, political, economic, and cultural. Around her were to be grouped the Satellite States, varying in degree of political subordination to Tokyo, but all in common looking to Japan as the superior country, whose ways they should endeavour to imitate and with whom they should all faithfully cooperate. For the Japanese the successful establishment of Greater East Asia meant not only the attainment of the long-desired goal of economic self-sufficiency,

²Leland D. Baldwin, Recent American History (New York: American Book Company, 1954), p. 321.

³William H. Elsabee, Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Nationalist Movements, 1940-1945 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 16.

but also of something else which would satisfy a psychological craving--the recognition of Japan's ethical and cultural superiority, the acceptance of Japan at her own valuation as the 'light of Asia.' Indeed, whether consciously or not, the Japanese aspired to play the part which the Chinese had once played in the great days of the Celestial Empire, when the Son of Heaven in Peking "swayed the wide world," and when China was regarded by her neighbours as the exemplar and fountainhead of civilized life.⁴

Without attempting to determine the influences of Japanese occupation policies of the countries of Southeast Asia or the contribution of those policies to later developments, suffice it to say that their thinly veiled policy for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a complete failure. This fact is now part of contemporary history. Japan failed because of the cruelty meted out to the native population when total collaboration was not forthcoming, and because of the privation due to the economic dislocation which accompanied the war. In the former, there were many instances where the Japanese received considerably support from nationalist parties and succeeded in attracting the cooperation, sometimes nominal, but often active, of nationalist leaders who spurned (and were spurned by) the previous colonial regimes. However, there never developed a real unity of interests between

⁴Francis C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 332.

the two parties; there was no overwhelming despair on the part of the Asians at Japan's defeat, no feeling that they must have Japan's support to stand on their feet. In analyzing the Japanese failure to capture the loyalty of the various nationalist movements in Southeast Asia,

William H. Elsbree wrote:

The idea of linking forces with the national movements was a sound one. It was by no means original with the Japanese but the circumstances under which they launched their effort gave them a unique opportunity. They fumbled it, and one basic cause was their own faulty conception of the nationalist movements in Asia. The view came dangerously close to being one according to which the "native blokes" were given a few trappings of authority rather as playthings to keep them amused while the Japanese devoted themselves to essential matters. The idea of Japanese superiority was implicit in their actions during the occupation. The notion of guidance was always that of leading a little child by the hand, there was no inkling of relationship in which mutual problems would be discussed on equal terms . . . (After all) the process by which one nation transmits to another the fruits of its own experience is an exceedingly complex one, particularly if some respects must be paid to elements of the old society of the recipient. . . . The Japanese violated most of the rudimentary principles of such a relationship. They saw what a useful instrument nationalism could be in their plans for a Co-Prosperity Sphere, but they failed to draw all the necessary consequences from this realization.⁵

Briefly then, because the Japanese failed to identify the interests of the peoples of Southeast Asia, an attempt to unify a geographic portion of Asia under the guise of a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" has failed.

⁵Elsbree, op. cit., p. 164.

II. ASIAN RELATIONS CONFERENCE. 1947

At the end of World War II, as the winds of political and social change began to blow over Asia the leaders of many Asiatic countries have frequently voiced the community of interests of all Asian peoples. This is a development of revolutionary implications since "Asia represents potentially the mastery of the world in manpower and resources."⁶ Of this event, P. C. Spender, Australia's Minister for External Relations, observed, "In all, more than one billion people have been caught up in political and economic transformation in Asia," moreover, "everywhere the dynamic growth of new political and economic policies, and new institutions, will continue under the impulse of the nationalist idea and the demand for economic and social reform."⁷

Perhaps the most concrete evidence of this tendency was the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in the spring of 1947. Delegates from twenty-eight Asian countries and other political entities, such as some of the

⁶Robert Payne, The Revolt of Asia (New York: John Day, 1947), p. 290.

⁷P. C. Spender, "Partnership with Asia," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (January, 1951), 205.

Republics of the U.S.S.R., attended this historic conference. "When the history of our present times is written," declared the Prime Minister of India in his address of welcome at the opening session, "this event may well stand out as a landmark which divides the past of Asia from the future." The Indian leader thus expressed the meaning of the new era for Asia:

A change is coming over the scene now and Asia is again finding herself. We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes her rightful place with the other continents In this crisis in world history Asia will necessarily play a vital role. The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs.⁸

While giving due credit to the West for its contributions to human progress, Nehru also pointed to the apparent inability of the Western world to prevent recurrent wars. Delegate after delegate followed the Indian Prime Minister to the rostrum to voice the identity of interests of the countries of Asia and to emphasize the importance of close collaboration among them. After more than a week of round table discussions, the Conference voted to establish an Asian Relations Organization, to be composed of a General Council and non-governmental national units in each of the

⁸"Asian Relations," A Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April, 1947 (New Delhi, India, 1948), p. 19.

participating countries. Nehru was later chosen President of the new Council.

The Organization, which has nominally been in existence since 1947, is hardly more than a skeleton. It is a far cry from such elaborate regional arrangements as the Organization of American States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. True though this evaluation might be, the importance of it all is to be found in the role played by the Asian Relations Conference itself, participated by no less than twenty-eight Asian states, as the first real experience for the newly-freed countries of Asia to confer, commune, and advise on problems common to them.

III. ASIAN CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA. 1949

Another conference in New Delhi, held in January, 1949, also had broad implications for future Asian unity, although it was convened to consider the Indonesian question. Delegates from nineteen countries, mostly from South and Southeast Asia but including also Australia, New Zealand, and Ethiopia, called for the withdrawal of Dutch troops from the areas under the control of the Indonesian Republic and for a transfer of sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950. At the same time the delegates were careful to emphasize that they were not seeking to align the East against the West. They decided not to establish a

permanent organization, but agreed to consult more frequently and to cooperate more closely in the future.⁹

A resolution adopted unanimously by the nineteen states represented at the Conference recommended that the participating nations explore the possibilities for regional arrangements within their areas, and that they establish appropriate machinery to carry out such an investigation. Since Australia, New Zealand, China, and the States of the Arab League, as well as the countries of South and Southeast Asia, were represented at this conference, the meaning of "regional arrangements within their areas" was none too clear. Prime Minister Nehru revealed some of the difficulties in the way of regional associations when, in a speech to the Indian Parliament on March 8, 1949, he said:

We haven't yet decided as to what region that cooperation should relate to. India is interested in several regions of Asia and whether all of these should be grouped together or dealt with separately is still to be considered.¹⁰

At that time Nehru laid down "two conditions for any kind of regional grouping in which India would participate:"

⁹"Delhi Conference of Asiatic Countries," Nation, CLVII (January 29, 1949), 113.

¹⁰Quoted in the New York Times, March 9, 1949.

(1) it must be wholly within the scope and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations; and (2) it must be largely confined to consultation and cooperation with "no binding covenant in it." Obviously, a regional association which fulfilled the second of these conditions is doomed to failure.

Whereas it is significant that India took the initiative in calling the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and the Conference on Indonesia of 1949, both of which were held in New Delhi, and, that Nehru and other Indian leaders took a prominent part in these conferences and obviously attached great importance to them, it is more significant to note that although India aspires to leadership in South and Southeast Asia and regards herself as a champion of Asian causes, she does not look with favor upon proposals to establish a permanent organization of Asian states. Nehru has flatly refused to join or support the proposal for a Pacific Pact.

IV. THE COLOMBO PLAN

The program for the economic development of South and Southeast Asia initiated by the governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, known as the Colombo Plan, is described in a White Paper published by the seven Commonwealth Governments

concerned. The Plan has been much written about and its history is now known quite well. It poses bluntly the question of how far the Western peoples are ready to divert their resources to a vast region of Asia. Started in 1950 as a bold new venture of the British Commonwealth to promote the economic advance of Commonwealth countries in Asia, its scope has since widened and the area of its operation includes most of South Asia. To its original members--Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and British Borneo--other countries have been added. The United States became a full member in 1951, and Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines have also joined, the last three only in 1954.¹¹

The Colombo Conference. January, 1950. The Conference itself, held at Colombo, Ceylon, January 9-14, 1950, was unique in several respects. In the first place it was the first conference of all the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers convened for the expressed purpose of reviewing "the international situation, including the broad economic aspects" of the region. Second,

¹¹Robert Murphy, "The Defense of Asia," Department of State Bulletin, XXXI (November 29, 1954), 801.

. . . it was the first occasion on which representatives from the new Asian Dominions of India, Pakistan and Ceylon were admitted to the inner councils of the Commonwealth and given an opportunity to express their views on Far Eastern problems.¹²

Third, the choice of meeting place was significant. Held in the capital city of the youngest of the independent, self-governing Dominions, it was the first Commonwealth conference ever convened in Asia.

The main theme of the Colombo Conference was probably expressed by D. S. Senanayake, then Prime Minister of Ceylon, in his keynote address to the opening session. The fundamental problem of Asia, he said, was economic, not political. It was therefore necessary that positive steps be taken to attack Asian poverty and improve the standard of living.¹³

To be sure, several strategic and economic issues threatened any likelihood of agreement on joint action at the initial phases of the conference. The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was one of many controversies among members of the Commonwealth. The sharp differences in outlook on such issues as the recognition of

¹²John R. E. Carr-Gregg, "The Colombo Plan," International Conciliation, No. 490 (January, 1951), 16.

¹³London Times, January 10, 1950.

the Mao Tse-tung regime in China or the Bao Dai government in Indochina showed how remote were the possibilities of a more or less unified Commonwealth foreign policy.

But probably the most constructive result to come out of the Colombo meeting was the Spender Resolution, named after its sponsor, Percy C. Spender, Australia's Minister for External Affairs, at the latter stages of the conference. In general, the Spender Resolution recommended that the Commonwealth governments consider a project of economic coordination whereby each contributing member would provide material help to the countries of Southeast Asia, and proposed that a Commonwealth Consultative Committee be set up to work out practical measures for the development of the region.

It has been alleged that credit for taking the initiative was due "almost entirely to the Australian Department of External Affairs at Canberra, where tentative plans had been formulated several months before the conference opened."¹⁴ However, one of the very first proposals to renovate the economic structure of the region came from Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Indian diplomat. Before becoming

¹⁴Carr-Gregg, op. cit., p. 17.

ambassador to Communist China, Panikkar had been ambassador to Nationalist China. After the fall of Nanking to the Communists, the foreign ambassadors found their functions suspended since the new regime did not recognize them. They had enforced leisure. Panikkar occupied his time by writing a memorandum upon the need to regenerate South Asia economically if the whole region was not to go the way of China. In his memoirs he wrote:

The memorandum was forwarded by the Commonwealth Ambassadors to their Governments as a joint proposal. A copy was also sent informally to Malcolm Macdonald, the British Commissioner General in Singapore, to enable him to discuss it at an important conference of the heads of British missions which was due to meet in Singapore. I was told later that the proposals in the memo formed the basis of discussions which led to the Colombo Plan.¹⁵

The full significance of the Spender Resolution may be judged by virtue of three of its own provisions. First, by acknowledging that the most constructive way to establish political stability in Southeast Asia was through raising the region's living standards, it avoided the delicate question of a joint military pact in Asia. Second, not only were the three Asian Dominions extremely reluctant to commit themselves to any defense agreement at Colombo, they were also understandably suspicious of economic aid which

¹⁵Quoted in Guy Wint, "South Asia: Unity or Disunity," International Conciliation, No. 496 (November, 1954), 177.

might involve political strings or conditions. But the virtue of the new plan was that it did not envisage simply two sides of a contract, consisting of those who would give and of those who would receive. It wisely recognized the danger of such a relationship, which sometimes gives the recipient countries a sense of humiliation and the aiding countries a feeling that they are being exploited. Quite the contrary, the Australian proposal introduced the principle of mutual aid. The aim was rather to spread the financial burden among all the interested countries.

Finally, because the resources needed for the development of the region were likely to be considerably more than the Commonwealth itself could provide, the Spender Resolution pointed out that it would be necessary to seek the cooperation of other advanced industrial countries outside the Commonwealth. This paved the way for possible United States participation.¹⁶ There was nothing exclusive in the proposed plan. It contemplated from the outset that the non-Commonwealth countries of Southeast Asia should also be invited to join in whatever project could be devised for joint action in the area.

¹⁶London Times, January 6, 1950.

Viewed in the context of the entire Conference then, the Spender Resolution stands out as an act of statesmanship that is rare in contemporary history. And as for the Colombo meeting itself, an editorial comment of the New York Times reviewing the Conference at that time was reassuring. "The New Commonwealth," it said, "is an international organization that really works, because every member wants it to work and because they all have common interests and ideals in spite of disputes on specific issues."¹⁷

The Colombo deliberations themselves were highly significant for two main reasons: First, it recognized that "Asia is at the moment the main focus of interest and an area of special urgency." Accordingly, the Colombo Plan was evolved for pooling the resources of member nations in a project of mutual aid in which each would give according to its ability. Secondly, to support this aid project, it established a standing consultative mechanism, the Plan's "Consultative Committee representing the Commonwealth Governments." This piece of international machinery, once dubbed "the pivotal body in the entire venture,"

¹⁷New York Times, January 9, 1950.

. . . is a gathering of representatives, sometimes ministers, sometimes officials, of the governments taking part in the Plan. It meets at irregular intervals, whenever the need for consultation is felt, and it surveys the progress in the area as a whole, discusses the relations of one plan with another, and debates questions of economic and political nature which may be of interest to some or all the countries. It is a very useful ad hoc body.¹⁸

The Sydney Conference. May, 1950. The Australian Government agreed to convene the first meeting of the Consultative Committee in Australia when the recommendations adopted at Colombo were accepted by the governments concerned.

Accordingly, after the acceptances were received, the Committee met in Sydney on May 15, 1950. That the conference should be held in Australia was appropriate. As we have seen, it was the Spender Resolution at Colombo which launched the idea for joint action in the region. The Australian Government had "special reasons for wishing to preserve peace and stability among the countries of this area." In the first place, Australia's long-term industrial expansion is closely linked with the future prosperity of Southeast Asia. Her natural markets are those close to home,

¹⁸Wint, op. cit., pp. 178-79.

and as Percy Spender told the Australian House of Representatives, "no nation can escape its geography."¹⁹

Moreover, since World War II, Australia has emerged as the most advanced industrial country in that part of the world, and her commercial relations with Asian countries have grown considerably. The second reason concerns Australia's far-reaching strategic interests in the area. During World War II the country was in mortal peril after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Since Southeast Asia is the "frontier" of Australia's Southwest Pacific zone, Spender stressed that "above all, it is in our interest to foster commercial and other contacts" with neighboring Asian countries and help maintain "stable democratic governments in power. . ."²⁰

The deliberations of the Sydney conference fell into three parts: short-term aid; long-term aid; and technical assistance.

At the Sydney meeting, as at Colombo, it was agreed that the problems of the Commonwealth countries in Southeast Asia could not be considered apart from those of other countries in the area. However, it was felt that progress

¹⁹"Current Notes on International Affairs," Department of External Affairs Publications, No. 2 (Canberra, February, 1950), 160.

²⁰Ibid.

could be made more swiftly if the initial steps were taken by those countries which had a common bond and common interests. At the same time it was decided to investigate immediately the possibility of wider collaboration, and the committee therefore recommended that

A formal approach should be made to Governments of non-Commonwealth countries in south and southeast Asia informing them of the Committee's deliberations and of the course of action now contemplated. These Governments should be informed that their full association in the enterprise would be welcomed by the Commonwealth Governments.²¹

There was no time at Sydney to work out the details of such project and proposals were remitted to a standing committee which met in Colombo in July, 1950. This meeting was attended by representatives of all Commonwealth governments who participated in the Sydney conference. Its purpose was to plan practical measures to carry out a program for the training of Asian technicians in more advanced countries, the sending of technical advisers to Asia and the equipment or endowment of Asian scientific and technical institutions.²²

²¹Quoted in the London Times, May 20, 1950.

²²"Current Notes on International Affairs," Department of External Affairs Publications, No. 7 (July, 1950), 485.

The London Conference. September, 1950. On September 6, 1950, a team of experts from different Commonwealth countries met in London to study the individual statements submitted by the South Asian governments and correlate them into a single six-year program of development. From this comprehensive data the Ministers of the Consultative Committee would determine how much of the development work could be financed by the Asian countries from their internal resources; how much from the major Commonwealth countries; and how much from countries outside the Commonwealth or from interested international agencies.

The final programs were framed in the light of two sets of considerations. The first involved the human and material potentialities and the second, the availability of financial resources. The other determining factors were, first and foremost, the available domestic resources, then the sterling balances and contributions from the more highly developed Commonwealth countries, and finally, probable external finance from private, governmental, and intergovernmental sources. In this connection, two highly significant statements were made, one by the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Eugene Black, before the London Conference began; and the other by the then United States Secretary of State, Dean G. Acheson, after the close of the conference.

Eugene Black was reported as saying on September 8 in Paris that the bank was "vitally interested" in the Commonwealth program.²³

Secretary Acheson pledged full United States cooperation when he spoke at a Washington news conference on October 11, 1950. The former Secretary of State was reported as saying that the United States was in "complete sympathy" with the proposal for a six-year program.²⁴ He added that the Commonwealth nations and his Government had the same objective in Southeast Asia and expressed the hope that it would be possible to dove-tail the efforts of both.²⁵

Clearly then, there were two documents on which the London meeting had to base its decisions. One deals with technical assistance; the other with economic development. Both are interdependent. For any major development in the region was likely to require a very considerable amount of technical aid and therefore the cooperative employment of technical abilities would have to play an indispensable part in the over-all program. The formulation of a

²³Manchester Guardian, September 9, 1950.

²⁴New York Times, October 12, 1950.

²⁵A similar statement was made by George C. McGhee; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXIII (October 30, 1950), 698-701.

regional economic policy for Southeast Asia was, therefore, achieved.

In the last analysis, the Colombo Plan created a real link among the different countries of South Asia and between them and the Western countries which can provide capital or loans void of any political conditions. This would allay any fear that Western economic aid was a means of reviving Western imperialism. Yet it meant also the renunciation of any possibility of using the plan for imposing a political unity among the Asian governments. By bringing Western experts to Asia, by exchanging experts among the different countries taking part in the plan, by sending Asians abroad for training, it created a supply of technicians with a cosmopolitan outlook who in turn will influence public opinion on particular questions in their respective communities.

Too much cannot be expected of the Colombo Plan, and the consequences in promoting a lasting unity within the region can be exaggerated. However, in the opinion of Guy Wint:

The significant achievement of the Colombo Plan has been to strengthen the countries of the region individually. Here, of course, it has had an effect upon the stability of the whole area. For the economic collapse of any single country, or revolution in any of them due to economic causes, would have deeply disturbing consequences throughout the region. The degree of

success of the Plan . . . may decide whether or not South Asia is to go Communist. The perception of this has led Communists everywhere to attack the Plan bitterly.²⁶

V. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS

Especially from the viewpoint of the less-developed countries of Asia, overshadowing the political and security activities of the United Nations, in scope, achievement, and perhaps in ultimate significance, are its operations in economic and social fields. As stated in Article I of the Charter, the third major purpose of the United Nations is the achievement of

. . . international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The United Nations is thus concerned not only with the maintenance of peace but also with promoting the conditions under which genuine peace will be possible. As C. Hart Schaaf wrote:

Virtually all regional activity of the international agencies bears directly or indirectly upon the problem of planning for the economic development of the region of Southeast Asia. Indeed, in their conferences and in the studies of their Secretariats, this is the heart

²⁶Wint, op. cit., p. 180.

and marrow of their work--to arrange for the exchange of views, to assemble information, to prepare analyses, the central objective of which is to facilitate the planning for the economic development of the region.²⁷

Accordingly then, with "unprecedented unanimity," the fifty-nine members of the United Nations approved, on November 16, 1949, an "expanded programme of technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries" through the United Nations and the specialized agencies. This action by the General Assembly was heralded by its President, Carlos P. Romulo, as "one of the most constructive acts of international statesmanship ever undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations."²⁸

The objective of this program was modest and realistic. In a report prepared by the Secretary-General on technical assistance to under-developed countries it said: "The basic aim of outside technical assistance to under-developed countries must be to help themselves, and to diminish their dependence on external aid."²⁹

There are three advantages of a program of technical

²⁷C. Har Schaef, "Economic Cooperation in Asia," International Conciliation, No. 489 (April, 1950), 224.

²⁸Quoted in "Technical Assistance for Economic Development: Programme of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies," International Conciliation, No. 489 (January, 1950), 3.

²⁹United Nations Document E/1327 dated May, 1949.

assistance developed under international auspices. First, such a program allays the fears of under-developed countries that attempts will be made to dominate them. There will exist, therefore, a receptive atmosphere essential to accomplishment. A second reason is succinctly expressed in the preamble to the Economic and Social Council Resolution on Economic Development of Under-developed Countries:

A sound international programme of this character must combine and make use of the experience of many nations with different social patterns and cultural traditions and at different stages of development, so as to facilitate progress in the less advanced countries and to help solve their technical and economic problems.³⁰

A third reason why an international program may be more effective lies in the nature of many of the problems in which international action is essential.

Epidemics and insect pests, such as locusts, do not respect national frontiers. Their control must be organized on an international basis. Some other problems are regional in character, transcending national lines as, for example, the technical control and use of rivers flowing through more than one country and the efficient organization of certain transportation systems.

In other fields international standardization and uniformity are important, as for example, in the facilities and regulations of international air transport and in the collection and classification of certain types of statistics.³¹

³⁰"Technical Assistance for Economic Development," loc. cit.

³¹Ibid.

ECAFE. A more determined effort to treat the South Asia area as a unit was made by ECAFE--the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East--set up by ECOSOC's Working Group for Asia and the Far East meeting at Lake Success in February, 1947, to parallel similar bodies for Europe (ECE) and Latin America (ECLA).

ECAFE, like the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan, is interested in all plans for economic development in the area. The nature of ECAFE must, however, be understood. It is not an executive body. Its primary function is to give counsel, to conduct research, and to suggest policies to governments, but not to take action. It cannot itself execute what it may recommend.

It is a more formal body than the Consultative Committee. It possesses a permanent secretariat, elaborate and fairly costly, which ensures continuity of activity and interest. Because of the nature of its very function ECAFE has caused the problems of the region to be considered as a whole. In 1949, for example, ECAFE, under its Executive Secretary, one P. S. Lokonathan, made a survey of the factors and problems underlying post-war economic development of the region. The Survey, a book of over five hundred pages published on June 27, 1949, which gives a full analysis of the situation in 1949, was produced in collaboration among the ECAFE Secretariat at Bangkok, the

Secretariat at Lake Success, and the specialized agencies. Governments in the region supplied published material and some appointed correspondents to co-ordinate information. The ECAFE Secretariat visited most countries of the region to collect data and consult with government officers. Of the ECAFE survey, the July issue of the United Nations Bulletin the following year carried an article which had as its thesis and title: "Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East Faces Realities of Regional Situation."³²

It would be foolish to under-rate the influence of ECAFE. It creates a climate of opinion, and governments in their own actions have been increasingly influenced by it. It fosters a sense of regional unity. ECAFE has been called the "economic parliament of Asia."

TAB. Though ECAFE is not an executive organ, the United Nations does possess in the Technical Assistance Board an executive arm. This too has been active in South Asia. Its efforts had been very much like those of the Colombo Plan. The individual governments have been aided. The number of technicians in the area has been increased.

³²"Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East Faces Realities of Regional Situation," United Nations Bulletin, IX (July, 1950), 9-10.

Ideas have been popularized. New concepts have been introduced. And the Board has helped in creating a new climate of opinion in which all the countries of the region urgently desire to employ up-to-date knowledge in the solution of their problems. To the extent that the countries have been encouraged to believe that the way to progress lies in their working together, and to the extent that the strengthening of their economies has reduced discord among them, the work of the Board has been a unifying factor.

To be sure, the underlying difficulties of economic cooperation are legion. But many of the difficulties confronting economic cooperation themselves contain mitigating or balancing factors. Outstanding grounds for optimism are: (1) that problems confronting the region are quite similar from country to country. Since similar problems usually require similar solutions, the countries of the region will increasingly turn to one another in the evolution of concerted efforts toward economic development. (2) Of even greater significance than the poverty of Asia is the fact that the people of Asia are becoming aware of it. Everywhere there is an awakening to the possibility of improvement. If regional economic efforts to date have uniformly been directed toward the problems of economic development and raising the standards of living, it is not

unreasonable to suppose that governments and people will wish to increase and accelerate these cooperative efforts. (3) The economies of the region are complementary with one another, and complementary trade is likely to increase as industrialization proceeds. Post-war Japan, India, and the countries of the Western Pacific could be outstanding examples. (4) The rise of nationalism had advantages as well as disadvantages. Among the advantages is the probable improvement of government efficiency, notably in those offices dealing with international and regional affairs. (5) Last but not least, the United Nations and its specialized agencies have been increasing their emphasis on economic problems in Asia, their regional organs promoting regional meetings and conferences, and their Secretariats serving the countries of the area. The result is that countries of the region whose direct relations are marred by distrust and suspicion are meeting at regional conferences and discuss to their mutual advantage, common problems upon which they would not otherwise consult.

The United Nations and the specialized agencies-- ECAFE, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the Bank), International Refugee Organization (IRO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the

World Health Organization (WHO), International Labor Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (the Fund), International Civil Aviation Organization (CAO), international training centers provided under UNESCO--in their regional organs and efforts, are a powerful force for economic cooperation.

VI. "POINT FOUR" UNDER THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

Since emancipation in South Asia came at a time when economic conditions in most of the countries of the area were worsening rather than improving, there was bound to be disillusionment about the new political institutions which would tend to make Communism appear attractive to some. After the victory of the Communists in China the danger was clear to everybody. "Among the most significant and menacing results for the free Asian countries," declared Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, "is the fact that the fall of China has provided the Communist movement throughout Asia, for the first time, with a firm Asian base."³³ All of South Asia, because of the desperate poverty of much of the region, seemed at that time to be

³³Murphy, op. cit., p. 799.

exposed to the Communist advance. The Western powers, therefore, in their own interest, developed plans to increase their assistance to the new governments of the South Asia region and to help them in the reform of their economic system. Besides their participation in the Colombo Plan and the United Nations agencies, Western governments have given considerable aid on a bilateral basis; other nations outside the area have also sought to participate in its economic development.

In his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949, President Truman outlined four courses of American foreign policy. The first course is the continued unfaltering support of the United Nations and its related agencies. The second course is the continuing of programs for world economic recovery. The third is the strengthening of freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression "by providing military advice and equipment to those nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security." The fourth course of action is found in the portion of the President's Inaugural Address which reads:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and our industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas . . . we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital

investment in areas needing development. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

Apparently the chief reason for announcement of what has since been known as the Point Four Program was that the writer of the address--whoever he has--seized upon the idea as the answer to a search for some dramatic highlight. Certainly, it soon became clear that, as James Reston once said, "the speech preceded the policy."³⁴ But President Truman's call for a "bold new program" of aid to under-developed areas aroused great interest and enthusiasm throughout the non-Communist world. Said Secretary of State Acheson in the course of House hearings on Point Four Legislation before the Foreign Affairs Committee:

. . . the President's challenging proposal for helping the masses of people of the world to improve their living conditions has aroused great interest, great enthusiasm, and great hope throughout the world. There already is evidence that many people in many countries have been quick to grasp its implications and its potentialities.³⁵

³⁴New York Times, May 26, 1950.

³⁵"Point Four Legislation," Department of State Bulletin, XXI (October 10, 1949), 552.

In a speech in New York in May, 1950, George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs in the State Department, was in effect explaining Point Four when he told his audience:

There was obviously both selfishness and altruism in Mr. Truman's proposal. It was selfish because . . . the peace of the world and the security of the United States depends upon the well-being of the under-developed nations.

On the other hand, this plan was altruistic because the United States was not seeking any political favors. It was asking no privileges for American business greater than those accorded to businessmen from any other country. And the United States was willing to contribute more than its proportionate share in this program.³⁶

The idea embodied in the Point Four Program was by no means new. The United States had for years been engaged in a variety of programs of this sort. But the significance of Point Four is, as John R. Steelman, one of the President's Assistants, said:

. . . major emphasis is to be placed upon this type of activity. What have been the scattered activities of business and government are to be brought together and made a major part of our foreign policies. It is important to attack the problem as a whole and to understand that technical assistance and overseas development will have constantly increasing importance for years to come.³⁷

³⁶Address of George V. Allen, on "Where Do We Stand on Point Four?" Department of State Bulletin, XX (July 4, 1949), 865.

³⁷"Goals and Practical Problems of the Point Four Program," Department of State Bulletin, XXI (June 12, 1949), 761.

It was approximately six weeks before President Truman's Address that the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1948, had adopted two resolutions on the same general subject of technical assistance to less developed countries. The first called on ECOSOC to give "further and urgent consideration" to the whole problem; the second of these measures provided for "an expanded program of technical assistance" by the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The Act for International Development (Title II of the Economic Assistance Act of 1950) was the first legislative step to implement the Point Four Program. Despite the fact that the United States was by that time spending some four hundred million dollars a year on various forms of assistance to under-developed areas,³⁸ the Act for International Development was "a significant milestone in the evolution of American world policy."³⁹ For the first time, technical assistance had become a major policy for the United States government. The Act declared the purpose was to

³⁸Address of Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., on "Point Four Program After Korea," made in Baltimore, Maryland, January 23, 1951; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXIV (February 5, 1951), 225.

³⁹Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1951), p. 96.

. . . aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity and expanding purchasing power.

It authorized participation in both bilateral and multi-lateral "technical cooperation" programs, and directed the President to set up machinery for administration and coordination, including an advisory board with representatives of private industry.

In November, 1950, Gordon Gray, who had been asked by President Truman "to study the whole complex of our foreign relations," reported that aid to under-developed areas was "more important than ever to the security and well-being of free countries," and that while the United States had "formulated some promising economic measures with respect to these areas," they "have not been pressed with the vigor that the situation requires, and they have not yet been fused into a sufficiently effective program."⁴⁰

President Truman next asked the International Development Advisory Board, a group of twelve outstanding private

⁴⁰Gordon Gray, Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 5, 9.

citizens headed by Nelson Rockefeller, to consider Gray's proposals "as its first task." In March, 1951, the Board issued a significant report which was as bold in its conception as the Gray Report and which spelled out its recommendations in much greater detail. The Rockefeller Board was careful to emphasize that the program of aid to under-developed areas was an essential contribution to the promotion of more stable economic conditions in the world.⁴¹

Congress shared in varying degrees the apprehensions of Senator Taft that it would become a kind of global WPA program and "a permanent policy of giving our money away."⁴² The Executive continued to tailor its requests for Point Four to the dimensions which Congress would tolerate. Both within and without the Government there was strong feeling that the United States should raise its sights in this area of its foreign policy, both because American national interests would best be served by a truly bold program of aid.⁴³

⁴¹"Partners in Progress," Report of the President's International Development Advisory Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 63.

⁴²New York Times, June 8, 1950.

⁴³James P. Warburg, Point Four: Our Chance to Achieve Peace Without Fear (Washington, D.C.: Author's Publication, 1949), p. 98.

In a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Point Four Legislation, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson testified as follows:

We are spending billions for military defense--as we must. We are spending other billions for economic reconstruction in Europe and vital points in the Far East--as we must. We are organizing joint defense through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Military Assistance Program. We are organizing joint action to remove trade barriers through tariff and reciprocal trade agreements and through the International Trade Organization. We are attempting to remove the causes of international friction and misunderstanding by playing an active role in the United Nations.

All these things we do are, in the last analysis, measure of national security . . .

The legislation that is before you, this "Act for International Development" has the same broad purpose. In a very real sense, it is a security measure. And as a security measure, it is an essential arm of our foreign policy. . .⁴⁴

President Truman, for his part, also declared in an address before the annual convention of the American Newspaper Guild in Washington, D. C., on June 28, 1950:

. . . we must not be misled into thinking that our only task is to create defenses against aggression. Our whole purpose in creating a strong defense is to

⁴⁴ Statement of Dean G. Acheson on "Aid to Underdeveloped Areas as Measure of National Security," before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Point Four legislation, March 30, 1950; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXII (April 10, 1950), 563.

permit us to carry on the great constructive tasks of peace. Behind the shield of a strong defense, we must continue to work to bring about better living conditions in the free nations. . . . In a world dark with apprehension, the Point Four idea offers new hope.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Address of President Harry S. Truman on "Point Four: An Investment in Peace"; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXII (July 17, 1950), 93, 95.

CHAPTER III

THE ASIAN BACKGROUND OF SEATO

"Asia is conscious of herself, and the Asiatic Century has begun." With these words Robert Payne, an American journalist and teacher, closes his book on the Revolt of Asia, an event which he describes in his opening sentence as "the greatest single event in human history."¹ Writes Lin Yutang in a book titled, Between Tears and Laughter, "The emergence of Asia--and I think of Russia as half-Asiatic--is the one greatest single fact of this war," a phenomenon which he describes as "simply the end of the era of emperialism. Nothing is going to stop it."²

However much one may question these and other similar interpretations, the fact is, as Owen Lattimore emphasized in The Situation in Asia, that the greatest of the continents is now "out of control."³ Another Asian observer, "It appears to me," declared Prime Minister Kotelawala of Ceylon in 1955 before the World Affairs Council

¹Robert Payne, The Revolt of Asia (New York: John Day, 1947), p. 1.

²Lin Yutang, Between Tears and Laughter (New York: John Day Company, 1943), p. 20.

³Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), pp. 3-13.

of Northern California, "that the social revolution in Asia has not still been fully grasped by the majority of people, particularly, may I submit, in this part of the world. . ."⁴

Asia is assuming a new and more significant role in world politics. James A. Michener describes the voice of Asia

as

. . . one of the most significant voices in the world today. On what happens in Asia may depend what happens a few years from now to people in France and South Africa and the United States.⁵

The "revolt of Asia" may prove to be the most significant event of the twentieth century. For events and forces which are absorbing the attention of the Western world today, when compared in retrospect, may appear to have had only passing importance. Arnold J. Toynbree, British historian and cautious prophet, in his monumental volume ventures the prediction that even the challenge of Communism

. . . may come to seem a small affair when the probably far more potent civilizations of India and China respond in their turn to our Western challenge.

⁴Address of Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, before the World Affairs Council of Northern California; printed in The Council Spotlight, (January, 1955), p. 4.

⁵James A. Michener, The Voice of Asia (New York: Bantam Books, 1951), p. 1.

In the long run they seem likely to produce much deeper effects on our Western life than Russia can ever hope to produce with her Communism.⁶

After indicating in a brief and sketchy manner the shifting scene in Asia, we shall next consider the Asian background of SEATO starting with "The New Regionalism."

I. THE NEW REGIONALISM

There are both centrifugal and centripetal forces to Asian regionalism. Of the centripetal forces--those that tend to facilitate cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia--particular note should be given to the peculiarly supra-national, almost non-national, character of nationalist movements in these countries, the imperative of common action to obtain necessary outside assistance, something approaching a common standard of living, the absence of a single dominant power, and the rapid march of totalitarianism.

Pacific Union. Perhaps the clearest example of regionalism in the Pacific area in the post-war was the proposed Pacific Union. Users of the term "Pacific Union," like its better-known European counterpart, "Western Union,"

⁶Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 221.

frequently mean a Pacific Pact, similar to the North Atlantic Pact. One of the most ambitious schemes was advanced by S. R. Chou during the period of wartime unity. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Chou proposed that after the war a "Pacific Association of Nations" be formed, whose membership would include "China, Soviet Russia, India, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Japan and Thailand."⁷ The organs of the new Association would be a General Conference, a Pacific Council, a Pacific Court, an International Military Staff, and a Permanent Secretariat. Dr. Chou's proposals were elaborated in his book, Winning the Peace in the Pacific, which is one of the most comprehensive treatments of the possibilities of regionalism in the Pacific area and in Asia generally.⁸ H. E. Abend holds the thesis that "our destiny in Asia is in a Pacific Charter."⁹

Supporters of such proposals are prompted by the

⁷S. R. Chou, "A Pacific Association of Nations," Foreign Affairs, XXI (October, 1942), 71-86.

⁸S. R. Chou, Winning the Peace in the Pacific (New York: Macmillan Company, 1944).

⁹H. E. Abend, Pacific Charter: Our Destiny in Asia (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1943).

desire to present a more united front to the growing menace of Communism in Asia, to establish a common defense plan and organization, and to associate the United States in such an undertaking. This idea is suggested in remarks which President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines addressed to the United States Senate on August 9, 1949:

. . . today the most urgent problem that confronts the Philippines and the other free countries of Asia is the problem of security. . . . No one who realizes the extent of the menace to which Asia is exposed . . . can well afford to rest at ease now that the North Atlantic Pact is in full force and effect. Asia with its vast population . . . and with its incalculable resources, cannot and out not to be lost to communism by default.¹⁰

Two other outstanding advocates of Pacific Union, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, have for obvious reasons emphasized the importance of "organizing the Pacific peoples in their fight against communism," to use Rhee's words. Official spokesmen of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Japan have also favored some kind of a Pacific defense pact. In July, 1950, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, in a voluminous report on the military assistance program, unanimously endorsed proposals for a mutual defense

¹⁰Congressional Record--Senate, August 9, 1949, p. 11032.

pact for the Pacific area, patterned after the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the United States would participate.¹¹ In January, 1952, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, after a tour of the Far East, publicly advocated "an agreement now with as many of the Pacific nations and our other allies as will join for the mutual defense of the far Pacific."¹²

Southeast Asia Union. The most specific and geographically the most limited proposal for Pacific Union is for a Southeast Asia Union to promote the common political, economic, and cultural interests of the states of that area. In 1948, K. Santhanam wrote on "A Regional Authority for South-East Asia," which suggested an outline of a regional organization for Southeast Asia.¹³ Presumably such a union would attempt to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia to better their conditions of life and to prepare themselves for greater freedom and greater responsibilities, thereby, it is hoped, bolstering the region alike against

¹¹New York Times, July 12, 1950.

¹²Thomas E. Dewey, Journey to the Far Pacific (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1952), p. 166.

¹³In K. M. Panikkar, et al., Regionalism and Security (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 25.

both the menace of persistent colonialism and the threat of mounting Communist pressures.

Probably, the chief sponsor of a Southeast Asia Union was President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines, who was also the key mover in most other projects relating to Pacific Union. He lost no opportunity to promote this idea. He entrusted Carlos P. Romulo with the task of visiting the other countries of Southeast Asia to attempt to gain support for the proposed union. In the same address he made to the United States Senate on August 9, 1949, Quirino stated his belief that

. . . the free countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific must themselves start the movement for closer cooperation in furtherance of their common interests in the political, economic, and cultural fields;

but he is also stressed the need for outside encouragement and aid, specifically endorsing President Truman's Point Four program and the United Nation's program of technical assistance to under-developed countries, and expressing the hope that when a Pacific Union was organized, "the United States and the other democracies should desire to offer such help as should lie in their power to give." President Quirino also invited countries of South Asia interested in forming such a union to a conference at Baguio City to take the necessary first steps.

Baguio Conference. May, 1950. The results of the Baguio Conference held in the Philippines in late May, 1950, were limited. Delegates from seven scattered countries--Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand--agreed on a series of resolutions for regional cooperation in economic, social, and cultural programs, and exchanged views informally in closed sessions on matters of mutual interest; but largely on the insistence of India and Indonesia, the Conference avoided public declarations or commitments of a political nature altogether.¹⁴ Thus the Baguio Conference tends to confirm Werner Levi's assertion that the aim of the states in this area "has been to demonstrate the degree of Asian solidarity rather than to point up the many difficulties still confronting the establishment of an Asian Union."¹⁵ For political reasons no official representatives from Indo-China, China, or Korea were invited to the Conference. Burma accepted the invitation to attend, but because of changes in the government did not send a delegation. The Conference failed to accept a Philippine proposal for a permanent organization; instead, it merely decided that

¹⁴"Sitting it out; Baguio Conference," Commonweal, LI (June 16, 1950), 237.

¹⁵Werner Levi, "Union in Asia?" Far Eastern Survey, XIX (August 16, 1950), 148.

Carlos P. Romulo, the President of the Conference and then Foreign Minister of the Philippines, should explore the possibilities of action of this sort.

President Quirino stated in a press interview that the feeling of the delegates, representing a part of the world which was directly menaced by Communism, was that "by getting together and cooperating in mutually improving economic and social conditions we contribute to solution of the Communist problems of each nation."¹⁶ In his latest book, Crusade in Asia, Romulo wrote that the meeting closed with the adoption of this principle:

That in the consideration of the special problems of Southeast Asia the point of view of the peoples of this area be prominently kept in mind, by any conferences dealing with such problems, so that better understanding and cordial relations may subsist between the countries in the region and other countries of the world.¹⁷

In summing up the results of the Baguio Conference, a friendly American correspondent wrote:

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Conference was its manifestations of regional solidarity and its vaunting of purely Asiatic views and interests.

¹⁶Quoted in the New York Times, May 28, 1950.

¹⁷Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia (New York: John Day Company, 1955), Chapter VIII.

Delegates all emphasize that the free informal closed session exchanges of opinion on many matters decisively promoted mutual understanding and future cooperation.¹⁸

II. NEW FOUNDATIONS OF PACIFIC SECURITY

World War II ended with the complete elimination of a great power alliance--the Third Reich, Italy, and Japan--and the serious weakening of components of another, notably France and Great Britain. World leadership thus largely devolved upon the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Without attempting the discussion of the change in Soviet post-war policies, suffice it to state that the very nature of Soviet policies and strategy, when consistently pursued, was largely responsible for bringing on the "cold war." Consequently, forms of cooperation in the international community of necessity began to take shape in agreements and pacts of regional nature.

Probably more than any other, the man most instrumental in laying down the new foundations of security in Southeast Asia is the present Secretary of State--John Foster Dulles. These efforts took him four years and his

¹⁸Tillman Durdin, dispatch from Manila, dated May 31, 1950; in the New York Times, June 1, 1950.

missions "involved crossing the Pacific twelve times."¹⁹

Concerning his efforts, Secretary Dulles has said:

The position of the United States toward collective security in Southeast Asia has been known basically for quite a long while. In fact, it really goes back to the time when I went out to the Far East in January, 1951, on a mission to try to create a collective security pact in that area. That effort failed at that time in the sense that we were not able to put together a collective security arrangement of any large proportions and we ended with a series of separate pacts, one with Japan, one with Australia and New Zealand, and another with the Philippines.²⁰

On March 20, 1952, the Senate of the United States approved the adherence of the United States Government to four treaties, namely: the Treaty of Peace with Japan; Security Treaty between the United States and Japan; Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines; and the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. These four treaties provide the new foundations for security throughout an important sector of the free world community. "They constitute," in the words of President Eisenhower, "an

¹⁹Address of John Foster Dulles on "Security in the Pacific," before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California, June 11, 1954; printed in the Department of State Publications No. 20 (Washington, D.C.: June, 1954), p. 1.

²⁰Radio and television address to the nation of John Foster Dulles on "The Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter"; printed in the Department of State Bulletin, XXX (April 26, 1954), 863.

important link in the collective security of the free nations of Southeast Asia and the Pacific."²¹ They also, in the words of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

. . . constitute an important contribution toward clarifying the position of the United States in the Pacific. They are logical and desirable steps in liquidating the old war and strengthening the fabric of peace in the Far East against the danger of a new war.²²

The four closely related Pacific treaties are better understood if they are viewed as one multilateral peace settlement and three supporting mutual defense pacts. The main purpose of the Japanese Peace Treaty was, as the same Senate Committee report stated:

. . . the termination of the war in the Far East and the restoration of Japan to the status of an independent sovereign nation. The treaty contains provisions for such matters as security and territorial arrangements, trade and commerce, reparations and property rights. . . Accompanying the peace treaty are three collateral pacts which provide collective security arrangements for the Pacific . . . These three pacts constitute an integral part of the peace settlement in the Far East.

Measured against the need for collective security throughout the vast areas of non-Communist Asia, the security measures which accompanied the Japanese peace

²¹Letter of transmittal of President Eisenhower to the United States Senate on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Protocol to SEACDT: in the Department of State Bulletin, XXXI (November 29, 1954), 819.

²²Quoted in "Background," Department of State Publications, No. 4556 (Washington, D.C.: April, 1952), 2.

treaty are far from perfect. As Secretary Dulles himself stated,

. . . these treaties also recognize, and were cited, that they were only a beginning--only initial steps toward the development of a more comprehensive system of security in the Pacific area.²³

And Senator Walter F. George of Georgia, Chairman of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee, voiced the same sentiment when he declared in congressional debates over the whole question of collective security in the Pacific, that these treaty arrangements "were not regarded as definitive solutions of the Pacific defense problem." And added, "They expressly contemplated the development of a more comprehensive collective security system when circumstances made that feasible."²⁴ However, these treaty arrangements greatly widened the area of united action for defense in the Pacific and gave rise to the hope that "they will open the way for a new era in the Pacific," to use former Secretary of State Acheson's words.

The story of what these necessities are, and how these arrangements meet them, is revealed in the evolution of the four treaties and a study of the new relationships which will result from them.

²³Ibid., p. 3.

²⁴Congressional Record--Senate, February 1, 1955, p. 893.

Pacific Security and Japan.

Japan occupies a strategic position in the Far East; it has a large, energetic, and skilled population; it is the only industrial nation in the Far East; and it lies athwart the American defense line in the Pacific. . . . A free, prosperous, and democratic Japan could exert an important stabilizing influence in the Far East.

So stated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the main body of the Senate.²⁵ "Russia Will Lose Power as Germany and Japan Gain," is the theme of an address made by Senator George in April, 1955, in which he foresees that on Japan's comeback, "there will commence again the age-old struggle with China for control of the wealth of Manchuria"; then will come the day "when our Russian friends will go back to their ancient borders and boundaries and when again there will be re-established a power group in the Far East that will give some stability to that area."²⁶ In the eyes of a geopolitician, "Japan now constitutes the last link in the chain to be drawn around the China and Siberian coasts in America's own defense."²⁷ Stalin himself has said that with

²⁵Quoted in "Background," loc. cit.

²⁶Address of Senator Walter F. George on "Russia Will Lose Power as Germany and Japan Gain," to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D. C.; in the United States News and World Report, XLIII (May 6, 1955), 78.

²⁷John E. Kleffer, Realities of World Power (New York: David MacKay Company, 1952), p. 316.

Japan the Soviet Union would be invincible.

The return of Japan to the world community as a free and sovereign nation was an event which was long awaited. As early as 1943, while the war was still in progress, the United States Government had begun to plan for the occupation of Japan.²⁸ Even then the aim of the United States was the rebuilding of a peaceful Japan which could assume its full responsibilities as a member of the community of nations. The occupation plans were developed to facilitate this aim.²⁹

Two years after the Japanese surrender the occupation mission had been largely accomplished. In March, 1947, General MacArthur announced that it was time for a peace treaty to be concluded.³⁰ In the same year the United States had proposed a conference to discuss the preparation of a peace settlement with Japan but the proposal failed because of Soviet non-cooperation.³¹

By September, 1950, the position of the United States in regard to the proposed treaty had been satisfactorily established. John Foster Dulles, then consultant to the

²⁸M. E. Cameron, et al., China, Japan and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 607.

²⁹Ibid., p. 633.

³⁰Ibid., p. 630.

³¹Ibid., pp. 631-32.

Secretary of State, was placed in charge of the project of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan.

The negotiations that followed are not within the scope of this paper. But what is of interest will be the attitude of the countries in the Pacific area--the fact that it was natural for them to have reservations about Japanese self-defense privileges. The Philippines recalled vividly the three long years of brutal occupation. Australia and New Zealand had no desire to risk again the anxious moments of 1942 when their very existence as independent nations was in grave peril. When the Dulles Mission visited these countries in early 1951, the concern over a possible rebirth of a militaristic Japan was forcefully expressed to the Mission.³² It was at this time that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand put forward the suggestions which led to their security treaty with the United States. They suggested to the Dulles Mission that an arrangement be made between themselves and the United States whereby each of the three nations would agree to act to meet any common danger in the Pacific. "The ANZUS agreement of September, 1951," wrote W. Macmahon Ball, Professor of Politics at the University of Melbourne, and

³²Ibid., pp. 635-36.

author of Nationalism and Communism in East Asia,

was then presented as a safeguard against the risks inherent in the peace treaty with Japan, which put no restrictions on her armament. But before long it was represented as a safeguard against Communist expansion.³³

It was the feeling of these nations, expressed at that time, that their capacity to continue to accept commitments for the preservation of peace anywhere in the world would necessarily be conditioned by the existence of firm security arrangements in the Pacific. The new relationships in the Pacific community afforded by the emergence of a Japan desirous of assuming a responsible security role in the area presented several opportunities for arrangements which would mutually benefit all nations interested in the maintenance of that security. By way of summation, it could be concluded that the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed by Japan and forty-eight other nations at San Francisco, and the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, are at the heart of the existing arrangements for the security of the Pacific.

³³W. Macmahon Ball, "An Australian View of South-east Asian Security," Far Eastern Survey, XXIII (November, 1954), 165.

Pacific Security and the Philippines. "In the Philippines," said President Truman in his statement of April 18, 1951, on Pacific security,

. . . the United States is accorded certain military operating rights and facilities pursuant to an agreement with the Government of the Philippines, and the whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.³⁴

This is the principle which was incorporated in the new mutual defense treaty between the two Governments. In a sense, it can be said that the treaty merely formalizes a relationship that has been in existence for some time. After the Spanish-American War of 1898 the United States established military bases in the Philippines and, under the terms of the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947, continues to maintain them. This concept was given formal expression on August 30, 1951, with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries.³⁵ It stipulates that,

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it

³⁴Statement of President Truman on "Security in the Pacific"; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXIV (April 18, 1951), 765.

³⁵The text of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, XXV (September 27, 1951), 464-65.

would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. (Article IV).

Article V declares that,

. . . an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

In addition to giving formal expression to the historical and military realities of Philippine-American relations, the treaty also provides for close collaboration at policy-making levels by stipulating that the Foreign Ministers of both countries will consult together

. . . regarding the implementation of the treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. (Article III).

On May 25, 1954, Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay and Charles E. Wilson, United States Secretary of Defense, agreed on the creation of a joint Philippine-United States council to implement the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. After a secret meeting in Malacanang Palace, a press statement was issued which stated, "To effectively carry out the mutual defense treaty, which developments in the international situation, especially in the Far East call for," it was agreed that a council composed of representatives of the United States and the Philippines be

established. "This group will serve as a continuing body in charge of the over-all implementation of the above-mentioned pact," the statement added.³⁶ This consultation was in accordance with Article III of the pact which called for such measures whenever "in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific."

Again, on September 4, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles declared that "if the Philippines were attacked, the United States would act immediately." He made the pledge in a statement at the opening of United States-Philippine mutual defense talks in Manila. "I wish to state in most emphatic terms that the United States will honor fully its commitments under the mutual defense treaty." He added that the United States intended to maintain and use its air and naval bases in the islands and "these provide concrete evidence of the United States' ability and intention to take counter-measures." The Secretary pointed out that President Eisenhower had ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from invasion by the Communists.

³⁶New York Times, May 26, 1954.

"In the case of the Philippines, no specific orders are required," he said, "Our forces would automatically react."³⁷

Pacific Security: Australia and New Zealand. The people of Australia and New Zealand share with Americans their language and their basic institutions. They fought side by side during the world wars. Relations among their nations have always been amicable. There could be little doubt in any quarter that aggression against either of them would seriously involved the United States.

It was, therefore, deemed useful to put the world on notice of this relationship by formalizing it. Accordingly, the mutual defense security pact signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS),³⁸ contains the recognition of each party that armed attack in the Pacific area on the territories, armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties would be dangerous to the peace and security of all. Each party pledges itself to take action in accordance with its constitutional processes in the event of such attack.

³⁷New York Times, September 4, 1954.

³⁸The text of this treaty is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, XXV (July 23, 1951), 148-49.

In addition, the parties are to establish a council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers, to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty. This council is to be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

The treaty provides that,

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council . . . is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Associations, Associations of States, or other authorities in the Pacific area in a position to further the purposes of this treaty and to contribute to the security of that area.

Later, in May, 1954, Richard G. Casey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in announcing Australia's readiness to join in establishing a system of defense in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, (and after Australia's Chiefs of Staff also had made an assessment of the military problems involved), said that bearing in mind the manpower, resources, and territorial ambitions of Red China, it was doubtful that an individual Southeast Asian country could resist Communist infiltration and aggression solely on its own resources. In the modern world no country anywhere can depend for its security on its own unaided efforts, he said. This means the independence and liberty of the Southeast Asian countries will need to be supported and helped by

other free countries in position to do so, he added.³⁹

These bilateral and trilateral treaties of mutual defense, born out of a post-war policy to rebuild and rearm Japan, were "designed to serve as a point of departure toward the development of a more comprehensive system of security in the Pacific area." John Foster Dulles, the chief architect of these treaties, has said:

The four treaties do not, of course, mark the outer boundaries of our concern in Asia and the Pacific. The United States has a deep interest in the peace, security and welfare of many Asian nations which are not parties to the security treaties. Indeed, each of the treaties indicates the expectation of the parties that there will be further developments.

The steps for peace and security now proposed are only a beginning. There will be a continuing need for the United States, in cooperation with other free nations, to sustain an ever-mounting initiative in Asia and to develop ever-growing fellowship with the peoples of Asia who would be free. It is, however, necessary to consolidate our present position before we move on, and that consolidation involves entering into these treaties.⁴⁰

³⁹Quoted in the New York Times, May 17, 1954.

⁴⁰Quoted in "Background," loc. cit.

CHAPTER IV

STEPS TOWARD THE FORMATION OF SEATO

The seige and fall of Dienbienphu caused a terrific reaction against Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. From that moment the steps leading to the negotiations on SEATO came in fairly rapid succession.

I. INDOCHINA

Thomas Barman, the B.B.C. diplomatic correspondent has stated in an article in The Listener:

The immediate cause to the discussions in Manila arose as a result of the continued expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia and especially in Indochina . . . a threat which Secretary of State Dulles said, extended to the vital interests of the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.¹

Carlos P. Romulo in a November, 1954, article conceded that, "Indochina gave Communism its greatest diplomatic victory since the Bolshevik revolution."²

However much one may question the validity of these statements, it remains that the stakes in Indochina are big--if the Communists win. Briefly, (1) once in command

¹Thomas Barman, "The Background to the Discussions in Manila," The Listener, LII (September 9, 1954), 380.

²Carlos P. Romulo, "Three Years to Save Asia," This Week Magazine, (November 7, 1954), p. 7.

of Indochina, Communists would have a strategic base for expansion west, south, and east. (2) Communist westward drive would subdue Thailand and Burma, bringing external Communist expansion to the side door of India and Pakistan. (3) Southward drive would annex Malaya and Indonesia. (4) Eastward drive would be aimed at the Philippines, tied in with a push northward from Indonesia, and (5) Japan, surrounded, might fall.³ Added to these is the psychological effect of it all to the people in that section of the globe where "saving face" is a very important factor in the cold war. It is because of the big prize involved that the United States has picked Indochina as the place to stop the Communists in Southeast Asia.

What has been set forth here is the so-called "domino theory." President Eisenhower subscribed to the "falling domino" principle on at least two occasions in 1954. In fact, he gave that name to the theory at his news conference of April 7, 1954, when he outlined his concept of the strategic value of Indochina. First, he said, there is the strategic value of the country in terms of its materials; then, the problem of so many additional

³"Stakes in Indochina," United States News and World Report, XXXVII (July 30, 1954), 21.

human beings coming under a dictatorship; and, finally, the effects of the "falling domino" principle. He said that as the last domino in a line falls inevitably from the toppling of the first, the loss of Indochina would lead to the loss of Burma, of Thailand, and Indonesia; it would turn the so-called island defenses' chain of Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, and to the southward it would move in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.⁴

Again, at the Governor's Conference in Seattle on August 4, 1954, the President said that "several things would happen right away" if Indochina were lost. "The peninsula, the last little bit of land hanging out there (southern Thailand and Malaya), would be scarcely defensible," the President warned. And he added that "Burma would be in no position for defense and that India would be outflanked."⁵

Approximately a year before, in his "Peace in the World" address on April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower said that "aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the world free community to be met by united

⁴ "President Explains Value of Indochina," United States News and World Report, XXXVI (April 16, 1954), 21.

⁵ Quoted in the New York Times, May 12, 1954.

action."⁶ Then, on March 29, 1954, after the siege of Dienbienphu had begun, Secretary of State Dulles, in a major foreign policy speech approved in advance by the President for delivery to the Overseas Press Club of America, renewed President Eisenhower's proposal for "united action." In what was probably the key paragraph of that speech, delivered in measured tones and thrice punctuated by applause, Dulles declared:

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might have serious risks, but these risks are far less than would face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today.⁷

In other portions of the speech, Dulles cited "that such a tragic event as the fall of Dienbienphu will harden, and not weaken our purpose to stay united." He also declared that

Today the United States and other countries immediately concerned are giving careful considerations to the establishment of a collective defense. Conversations are taking place among them. . . . This common defense may involve serious commitments by us all. But free peoples will never remain free if they are not willing, if need be, to fight for their vital interests.

⁶Address by President Eisenhower on "Peace in the World," Vital Speeches, XIX (May 1, 1953), 420.

⁷Quoted in the New York Times, March 30, 1954.

Furthermore, vital interests can not longer be protected merely by local defense. The key to successful defense and the key to deterring attack is association with others for mutual defense. That is what the United States seeks in Southeast Asia.

II. VIEWS OF PRESENT EISENHOWER AFTER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINA

On July 20, 1954, it was announced from Geneva that a cease-fire in Indochina had been agreed between the representatives of the French and the Communist Vietminh forces in terms that left Cambodia and Laos as independent states, and with Vietnam split into two. The agreement had concluded the Geneva meeting on Korea and Indochina that convened April 26, 1954.

Even while the negotiations in Geneva were still in progress President Eisenhower issued a written statement on the Indochina situation. He said, in part:

The United States believes in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through collective action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle, has entered into regional security agreements with other nations.

The Indochina phase of the Conference is in process of being organized and the issues have not yet been clarified. Meanwhile, plans are proceeding for the realization of a Southeast Asia security arrangement. This was publicly suggested by Secretary Dulles in his address of March 29. Of course, our principal allies were advised in advance.

This proposal of the Secretary of State was not a new one; it was merely a reaffirmation of the principles

that have consistently guided our post-war foreign policy . . . and a reminder to interested Asian friends that the United States was prepared to join with others in the application of these principles to the threatened area.⁸

When Prime Minister Churchill came to confer with President Eisenhower in June concerning Western strategy in the cold war, a joint statement was issued. Part II of that statement reads:

We discussed Southeast Asia and, in particular, examined the situation which would arise from the conclusion of an agreement on Indochina. We also considered the situation which would follow from failure to reach such an agreement.

We will press forward with plans for collective defense to meet either eventuality.⁹

Actually, as early as May, 1954, President Eisenhower "has made the establishment of a South Asian security system a major immediate goal of his foreign policy."¹⁰

Immediately after the cease-fire agreements have been announced from Geneva, the President gave another statement to the press on the Indochina situation. On this occasion he said:

⁸"What Eisenhower Said About Indochina in April," United States News and World Report, XXXVII (July 30, 1954), 21.

⁹"Statement of Eisenhower and Churchill on Western Strategy on the 'Cold War,'" printed in the United States News and World Report, XXXVII (July 9, 1954), 57-8.

¹⁰Neal Stanford in the Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 1954.

The United States has not been a belligerent in this war. The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested people . . .

The United States is actively pursuing discussion with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area.¹¹

The views of Secretary Dulles concerning the Indochina truce were contained in a statement issued by him on July 23. In that statement he said, in part:

After nearly eight years of war the forces of the French Union had lost control of nearly one-half of Vietnam, their hold on the balance was precarious, and the French people did not desire to prolong the war.

These basic facts inevitably dominated the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference and led to settlement which, as President Eisenhower said, contain many features which we do not like . . .

We merely noted them, and said that, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, we would not seek by force to overthrow their settlement . . .

The important thing from now on is not to mourn the past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the loss in Northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of Communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. In this effort all of the free nations concerned should profit by the lessons of the past.

¹¹"What Eisenhower Says About Indochina Now," United States News and World Report, XXXVII (July 30, 1954), 21.

One lesson is that resistance to Communism needs popular support . . . the people should feel that they are defending their own national institutions. . . . Prime Minister Mendes-France said yesterday that instructions had been given to the French representatives in Vietnam to complete by July 30 precise projects for the transfer of authority, which will give reality to the independence which France had promised. . . . The evolution from colonialism to national independence is thus about to be completed in Indochina, and the free governments of this area should from now on be able to enlist the loyalty of their people to maintain their independence as against Communist colonialism.

A second lesson which should be learned is that arrangements for collective defense need to be made in advance of aggression, not after it is under way. The United States for over a year advocated united action in the area, but this proved not to be practical under the conditions which existed. We believe, however, that now it will be practical to bring about collective arrangements to promote the security of the free peoples of Southeast Asia. Prompt steps will be taken in this direction. In this connection we should bear in mind that the problem is not merely one of deterring open armed aggression, but of preventing Communist subversion which, taking advantage of economic dislocations and social injustice, might weaken and finally overthrow the non-Communist governments.

If the free nations which have a stake in this area will now work together to avail of present opportunities in the light of past experience, then the loss of the present may lead to a gain for the future.¹²

Thus, Indochina and all that it signified brought about an "agonizing reappraisal," to use diplomatic parlance recently made popular, of the power position in Asia. On

¹²"What All Sides Say About Indochina Truce," United States News and World Report, XXXVII (July 30, 1954), 21.

the one hand, Communists, once more, are taking over new territories and are maneuvering into a position to get more territory, more people, more of everything. On the other hand, the United States and its allies are making one more effort to rally non-Communists in defense of what is left in Southeast Asia.

III. BEGINNING OF CONVERSATIONS ON THE TREATY

Actual conversations on the formulation of a collective defense treaty in the Pacific area began even before the Geneva Conference was ever projected. At that time the Communist advance in Indochina was still unchecked, and the United States Government wanted the proposed security treaty to come into effect at once so that it could be invoked against the forces of Ho Chi-minh in Indochina. As the New York Times put it:

Secretary of State Dulles wanted the Allies to "negotiate from strength" at the Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina. It was his idea that the Western Allies should agree before the conference started on the kind of "united action" they would take to protect Southeast Asia if the Geneva conference failed.¹³

At the same time, President Eisenhower again stated in a news conference that the Secretary had his "unqualified

¹³New York Times, May 6, 1954.

support" in the Administration's efforts to create a security arrangement for Southeast Asia.¹⁴

To rally the strength of collective security, Secretary Dulles throughout the second week of April consulted with diplomatic representatives of friendly governments in both Europe and Asia.¹⁵ The purpose when, before going to London and Paris, he had his talks with a number of Ambassadors was twofold: to get some common declaration from the governments directly concerned with the Communist threat to Southeast Asia that would express their solidarity in terms which the Chinese Communists could not mistake; and to impress those governments with the sense of urgency about the Peiping-mounted Vietminh military action in Indochina that they did not yet seem to share with the United States at that time. It appeared obvious to Dulles that the fury of the Vietminh assault on Dienbienphu was a maneuver to strengthen the position of Communist China vis-a-vis France at the coming Geneva conference: it was equally obvious that a strong counter maneuver should be made by the non-Communist nations before

¹⁴James Reston in the New York Times, May 6, 1954.

¹⁵Walter H. Waggoner in the New York Times, April 10, 1954.

the conference met. This should take the form of some united declaration with which nations in the Far and Western Pacific would be associated.

In his Washington talks with the Ambassadors, Mr. Dulles did not issue an ultimatum. "His accent was on a show of unity in a form which would be politically possible for all the signatories."¹⁶ When the reports of these conversations by the Ambassadors reached the end of the long relay from the Secretary to the Foreign Office spokesman in London and Paris, the "ultimatum" idea had become the prevailing interpretation of British thinking. Though acceptable to the British later, it was exposed to the withering process of an official "leak" to assure its rejection in advance of formal proposal. And since such a declaration at any time was impossible of survival in French politics, a similar leak was made in Paris for the same purpose.¹⁷

These developments confirmed the growing belief of Dulles that the general idea could not be worked out by relay but must be discussed at first hand. And since Big Three unity is by far the most important factor in the

¹⁶Arthur Krock in the New York Times, April 18, 1954.

¹⁷Neal Stanford in the Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 1954.

international tug-of-war, there was necessity of working out a common attitude before they faced the Communist powers at Geneva. So Dulles flew to London and Paris in mid-April to explain to the foreign ministers and their most influential advisers in person what he had in mind--one thing being that he had no intention, as charged abroad, to try to "torpedo" the Geneva conference in advance.¹⁸

In a statement read to newsmen outside the West Wing of the White House, Dulles described such a united front as "obviously desirable." This left little or no room for questioning the administration's decision to proceed as speedily as possible with "united action" in the threatened area. Before Dulles could leave Washington by plane this message was already in the hands of the officials he was to meet in London and Paris. In his statement the Secretary again called attention, as he and President Eisenhower have done at frequent intervals, to the threat of Communist aggression to the "entire area" of Southeast Asia. Recalling the unity achieved by the three Western powers at the July "summit" conference in Berlin which gave birth to the

¹⁸Chicago Daily Tribune, September 1, 1954.

agreement for the Geneva meeting with the Communists on Korea and Indochina, Dulles declared:

Now the three of us need to join our strength and add to it the strength of others in order to create the conditions needed to assure that the conference will not lead to a loss of freedom in Southeast Asia, but will preserve that freedom in peace and justice.

His trip to London and Paris, he said, is "a mission of peace through strength."¹⁹

At the conclusion of their meetings in London on April 13, Secretary of State Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden issued this joint statement:

We have had a full exchange of views with reference to Southeast Asia. We deplore the fact that on the eve of the Geneva conference the Communist forces in Indochina are increasingly developing their activities into a large-scale war against the forces of the French Union. They seek to overthrow the lawful and friendly government of Vietnam, which we recognize, and they have invaded Laos and Cambodia.

We realize that these activities not only threaten those now directly involved, but also endanger the peace and security of the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, where our two nations and other friendly Allied nations have vital interests.

Accordingly we are ready to take part with the other countries primarily concerned in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations Organization to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

¹⁹Quoted in the New York Times, April 10, 1954.

. . . We believe that the prospect of establishing a unity of defensive purpose throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific will contribute to an honorable peace in Indochina.

Likewise, on April 14, Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault of France issued a joint communique in Paris; excerpts from the text follow:

For nearly two centuries it has been the practice for representatives of our two nations to meet together to discuss the grave issues which from time to time have confronted us.

In pursuance of this custom, which we hope to continue for the benefit of ourselves and others, we have had an exchange of views on Indochina and Southeast Asia.

. . . We deplore the fact that on the eve of the Geneva conference this aggression has reached a new climax in Vietnam, particularly at Dienbienphu, and has been renewed in Laos and extended to Cambodia.

The independence of the three Associated States within the French Union, which new agreements are to complete, is at stake in these battles. We recognize that the prolongation of the war in Indochina . . . also threatens the entire area of Southeast Asia and of the Western Pacific. In close association with other interested nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, a collective defense to assure the peace, security and freedom of this area.

We recognize that our basic objective at the Geneva conference will be to seek the re-establishment of a peace in Indochina which will safeguard the freedom of its people and the independence of the Associated States. We are convinced that the possibility of obtaining this objective depends upon our solidarity.

The United States delegation considered these a concrete advance toward the organization of a defensive community in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the prospect of

defensive unity in the troubled area was regarded by the United States as a contribution toward an "honorable" peace settlement in Indochina because it presented to the Communist bloc a "strong alternative" to the failure of negotiations at Geneva. In a statement issued in New York, April 15, upon his return from Europe, Secretary Dulles himself said:

I returned well satisfied with the results of my trip. . . . That understanding has been greatly enhanced by the talks which I have had in London with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden, and the talks I have had in Paris with Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault. Our common purposes were expressed in joint statements which we issued on Tuesday in London and yesterday in Paris.²⁰

However, there was difficulty in reconciling the official United States interpretation with Eden's description in the House of Commons. For example, after the Foreign Secretary had read the statement he was reported as having told the left-wing Laborite leader, Aneurin Bevan, that Bevan would be "completely inaccurate" in calling the agreement "a definite commitment to take certain action in certain circumstances." To the accompaniment of Opposition cheers Bevan asked Foreign Secretary Eden if he was aware

²⁰Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1954.

that the agreement "will be universally regarded as a surrender to American pressure" and might "jeopardize all hopes of negotiating with the Communist bloc and settlement in Korea and Indochina." Eden's retort, it was reported, was that he knew Dulles would be criticized "in the same terms as Mr. Bevan has used about me."²¹

The United States attitude was that the concept of Asian collective defense had been accepted in principle by the British. Hence, it was argued a working party could be set up immediately in Washington to discuss details for a more or less permanent organization of the nations of Southeast Asia. This working party, it was said, could start its proceedings during the Geneva conference, apparently on the theory that this would remind the Communist bloc nations of the consequences of a failure to negotiate honestly.

The United Kingdom did not share that view.²² The British considered that the organization of a defensive system must and should be a thorough and detailed business. Eden's approach in Commons was that the two Western powers

²¹Benjamin Welles, dispatch from London dated April 14, 1954; in the New York Times, April 15, 1954.

²²Joseph C. Harsch in the Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1954.

"must await the reactions of the other interested countries before determining what steps we take next." Moreover, Eden told the House that Britain's main objective was "most emphatically" to obtain what a Labor questioner called a peace "honorable to all parties" at the conference which was to open April 26, 1954.²³ Furthermore, as a B.B.C. diplomatic correspondent contended:

The United Kingdom Government did not want to enter into any new arrangements until the results of the Geneva conference were known. It was argued in London that you could not draw a security line unless you first knew where the security line in Indochina was going to be.²⁴

The Times of London voiced a general view when it said:

So long as there is ground for hoping that the Geneva conference may produce some results, it would seem both premature and imprudent to make a public declaration based on the expectation that it will fail.²⁵

This was the British line of reasoning. Because of such an attitude, President Eisenhower, in his news conference of May 19, 1954, hinted at an Asian alliance without Britain. Asked whether such a pact could be

²³New York Times, April 14, 1954.

²⁴Barman, op. cit., p. 380.

²⁵Quoted by Anne O'Hare McCormick; in the New York Times, April 10, 1954.

effective without Britain's support, the President was reported to have replied in effect: (1) It must be remembered that Australia and New Zealand were the members of the British Commonwealth that were directly involved. (2) With the participations of the proper Asiatic nations--and this participation he described as the first indispensable --it might be possible to create an alliance that, while not so broad as one might like, nevertheless, could be workable.²⁶ The big factor, however, was that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand shared the British viewpoint. In the past, Australian sources have indicated that their government regarded a Pacific alliance as urgent. As a matter of fact, Australia's Foreign Minister, Richard G. Casey, was one of the very first to conceive of a "new plan to defend Southeast Asia."²⁷ But once the Geneva conference began, Australia agreed with Britain that little could be done until the talks on an Indochina settlement were completed.²⁸ Similarly, T. Clifton Webb of New Zealand served notice on May 20 that his country's government

²⁶William S. White, in the New York Times, May 20, 1954.

²⁷Richard G. Casey, "New Plan to Defend Southeast Asia," United States News and World Report, XXXVII (July 16, 1954), 50.

²⁸Walter H. Waggoner, in the New York Times, May 21, 1954.

could not join a Southeast Asia alliance unless Britain was a member.²⁹

The cause of the difference in approaches between the United States and Great Britain was well explained by President Eisenhower himself in a news conference on May 5, 1954. Reading from a formal statement the President said:

It was Mr. Dulles' timing, not his objective, that the British opposed. They agreed a Southeast Asia pact should have the support of as many Asian nations as possible. They insisted it would take time to get the consent of these nations and such an agreement scarcely could be negotiated by Congress.

Besides, London argued, the Western powers should not announce in advance what they were going to do militarily if it failed. The result of this was that Secretary Dulles did not get his united action policy ahead of Geneva and was not able to negotiate from strength there . . .

What is now clearly developing is a kind of compromise. Britain did not want to negotiate a Southeast Asia pact until after the Geneva conference and we wanted to announce at least the beginning of one before the start of that conference. Instead, the pact actually is being negotiated, or at least discussed during the Conference.

The fact that such an organization is in process of formation could have an important bearing upon what happens at Geneva during the Indochina phase of the Conference.²⁹

Developments on the other camp were not all sunny and bright, either. Differences in the political approach

²⁹Quoted in the New York Times, May 6, 1954.

between the Soviet and Chinese delegations to the conference were described as "deeper than those now separating" the United States, Britain and France over policy in Indochina and Korea. Stated a dispatch from London in the New York Times:

A number of hints were dropped by Soviet officials that Foreign Minister Molotov and his advisors were trying to restrain the Chinese delegation from imprudent action at the conference table and elsewhere.

The British acknowledged the possibility that these hints were circulated as part of a Communist effort to discourage Western firmness with threats of resulting aggression elsewhere in Asia.

Our informant believed that the Chinese, encouraged no doubt by the recent display of Western disunity over air intervention in Indochina, now considered that by maintaining military pressure Communist forces could win the entire country.

Continued the dispatch,

The Russians, on the other hand, are said to take the Western intention of establishing a system of collective defense in Southeast Asia much more serious than their Asian allies. But they are pictured as believing that if the fighting, but not the political infiltration of Indochina is ended now plans for the reestablishment of a defense system will not get very far and, at the same time, a war that might become a starting point for a world conflict would be eliminated.³⁰

The developing plans for the security of Southeast Asia were beginning to emphasize the need not only for

³⁰Drew Middleton, dispatch from London dated May 7, 1954; in the New York Times, May 8, 1954.

military safeguards but in terms of economic development as well. "With allied and friendly nations consulting on preparations for a prospective Southeast Asian conference," wrote Walter H. Waggoner of the New York Times from Washington, D. C., "a three-point regional defense program is taking shape here." These points are: First, the creation of an alliance of the Western powers and the free nations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific that would respond in unison to military aggression. Second, the strengthening of internal security forces to minimize the possibility of subversion or infiltration of free governments in the threatened area. Thirdly, reflecting the need for a long-range program for combating Communism, would be the encouragement of economic development and stability to eliminate the conditions on which Communism and other subversive movements feed.³¹ As will be noted shortly these points actually became the basis for the main provisions of the Treaty.

IV. FORMULATION OF THE TREATY DRAFT

Although the essence of the SEATO Pact was indicated to the public almost from the preparation of the first

³¹New York Times, August 1, 1954.

tentative draft, no actual text was released in advance of the approval of the first draft by the governments of the original prospective member states. By way of explanation, the general public was given to understand that negotiations on the treaty were conducted in official secrecy because, apparently, the wishes and interests of the proposed partners to the treaty needed to be understood and fully considered prior to such commitment as would be involved in the release of even a tentative draft. Also, there appeared to have been a feeling that the less known by unfriendly powers of the proposed treaty content and the problems of negotiation the more effective the result might be.

On September 2, 1954, an advance working party that included all the eight countries through their technical experts met in Manila in consultations on draft proposals. Nobody was going to the conference "cold" or unprepared to cope with the basic suggestions. As a matter of fact, the proposed treaty has already reached its second or third draft as the results of studies in Washington concerning a possible Southeast Asian defense treaty and the State Department's exchanges of opinion with the other countries concerned.

In the working papers exchanged between Washington and London the agreed objective was to obtain a pact stating

the commitments of the participants, rather than to set up an organization comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty.³² The diplomats foresaw the main problem at the conference would be to define the commitments to be required of each participant. One possible extreme would be a commitment along the lines of the Brussels treaty of March, 1948, which required Britain, France, and the Benelux to go to war automatically if anyone of them was attacked. The United States Constitution would not permit such a commitment. The North Atlantic Treaty contains a slightly less precise commitment. It says an attack on one country shall be considered an attack on all, and each shall then take "such measures as it deems necessary, including the use of force to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic area." The ANZUS treaty among the United States, Australia and New Zealand is vague in that it requires each country to "act to meet the Communist danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

The United States draft was accepted as the basis for the discussions at the first meeting of experts attending the preliminary sessions.³³ The three main sections upon

³²New York Times, August 13, 1954.

³³Tillman Durdin, dispatch from Manila dated September 1, 1954; in the New York Times, September 23, 1954.

which the experts had to attempt to reach the widest possible measure of agreement on details before the top level representatives took over were: military commitment, mutual aid against subversion, and mutual economic aid.³⁴

V. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIRCULAR

On August 15, 1954, it was announced that a conference of the United States and seven other nations on the formulation of a Southeast Asian collective security treaty will begin in Manila September 6. The other countries to be represented were Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Announcement of the conference was made simultaneously in the capitals of the participating countries.

The United States State Department issued a circular that said briefly:

The Government of the United States has agreed with other like-minded governments that the situation in Southeast Asia calls for the establishment of a collective security arrangement, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to strengthen the fabric of peace in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

³⁴Dana Adams Schmidt in the New York Times, August 22, 1954.

Accordingly, the Government of the Philippines having offered facilities in Baguio, [later changed to Manila] the foreign ministers of the governments concerned have agreed to meet there on September 6 to consider measures to further their common objectives in the area. This meeting follows consultations between the United States Government and other Governments over the past four months.

Thus, the long and tedious diplomacy which had been going on continuously since Secretary of State Dulles first broached the call for "united action" in a speech on March 29, 1954, finally took on new dimensions.

VI. THE MANILA CONFERENCE OF 1954

There was no question that the foremost desire of the delegates assembled at Manila was to achieve positive results and to preserve the largest measure of unity possible. But this did not mean that the Conference was all sweetness and light. There were debates,--plenty of them.

One of the most controversial issues of the Conference centered on the nature of the military commitment. A number of delegates, in particular the Philippines and Thailand,³⁵ advocated the conclusion of a pact providing for automatic military action against pact members who were victims of aggression. Such a provision is contained in

³⁵Ford Wilkins in the New York Times, August 28, 1954.

the North Atlantic Treaty. In this regard, Herman Phleger, United States State Department advisor, explained the inability of the United States Government to sign a commitment for automatic action at the meeting of technical experts working on the draft. He showed conference delegates that congressional sentiment had hardened against further commitments of the NATO-type. He explained that the State Department wrote the draft treaty that was used as a working document with congressional views in mind.³⁶ The draft provides for action against aggressors only in accordance with the "constitutional processes" of each pact signatory.

Meanwhile, the question of whether the proposed treaty be protective specifically only against Communist aggression had appeared as another conference issue. The article in the United States draft dealing with sanctions against armed attack mentions actions only against Communist aggression. Most other delegations favored a more general definition of aggression. Romulo, in a public address in Manila, August 30, wanted to condemn aggressive imperialism and colonialism along with

³⁶ Benjamin Wells, dispatch from Manila dated September 2, 1954; in the New York Times, September 3, 1954.

Communism.³⁷ Advocates of a broader description of aggression, including the British Commonwealth officials, felt such a terminology would be more palatable to Indian and other neutralist Asian opinion. The British, in particular, had in mind the problem of maintaining as much Commonwealth solidarity with India as possible. Both the British and the Pakistani delegations took strong stand on this question; the British contention being that to name only Communist aggression would be unduly provocative to Red China, to which government the British owe diplomatic recognition. The United States, on the other hand, was

. . . reluctant to have the description of aggression so general that it would call for United States action in quarrels between non-Communist Asian nations, for example, India and Pakistan, (the latter a signatory), over Kashmir.³⁸

In this connection, Muhammed Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister and head of his delegation, upon the conclusion of the Conference said that Pakistan would help her neighbor India if India were threatened by any kind of danger, including a Communist attack. But he added that such support would depend on whether India would permit

³⁷Quoted in the New York Times, August 31, 1954.

³⁸"Southeast Asia; Cloud of Difficulties," Times, LXIII, (September 13, 1954), 32.

Pakistan to help her.³⁹

Another controversy centered around the question of whether the treaty should mention protection of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam from Red aggression as its aim. Prince Wan of Thailand supported the United States in urging that the three States be included in the area to be protected, taking issue with British Commonwealth and Philippine delegates who wanted no specific mention of protection for the Indochina territories. The Pakistan delegate spoke strongly against making the Southeast Asia pact a purely anti-Communist one and against including specific guarantees of Cambodia, Laos, and free Vietnam. The reason for this stand by Pakistan as well as a similar stand by the Philippines "seemingly lies in a reluctance to guarantee areas that are still regarded as colonial French-dominated rather than in any lack of anti-Communist determination."⁴⁰ Only the United States and Thailand stood for specifically including these three states in the treaty area.

³⁹Walter Simmons, dispatch from Manila dated September 8, 1954; in the Chicago Daily Tribune, September 9, 1954.

⁴⁰Tillman Durdin, dispatch from Manila dated September 7, 1954; in the New York Times, September 7, 1954.

Controversy over consideration of the article dealing with economic measures developed toward the final stages of the Conference. The Asian representatives sought to get the Western powers committed to specific programs, whereas the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand--the nations that would be providing the economic assistance under the pact--held out for permissive and general arrangements. It was understood that Britain did not want to see the Colombo Plan, which operates within most of the Southeast Asian countries, superseded or incorporated into the economic machinery of the Southeast Asia pact. In a dispatch from Manila gleaned in the Chicago Daily Tribune, Walter Simmons reports:

Pakistan delegates said Britain had expressed concern over Pakistan's participation in the Manila Conference warning them that India might succeed in getting Pakistan kicked out of the eleven-nation Colombo bloc if she signed any defense commitment at Manila . . .

The report continued,

British concern over the Colombo bloc was explained by the desire to prevent India from completely dominating the group. . . . With Pakistan out, the British felt that India would wield complete control over the weaker nations.⁴¹

⁴¹Walter Simmons, dispatch from Manila dated September 7, 1954; in the Chicago Daily Tribune, September 8, 1954.

The Asian delegates to the conference took the view that the pact should bring to them special economic aid that would not go to nations outside the pact. The fact is that mutual economic assistance provides the United States with an opportunity to exert its influence in the realm in which Americans particularly excel.

The last important problem involved in completing the pact that bound the signers to resist aggression in the prescribed area was reported settled in a closed conference session on the morning of September 8. What follows is the account given at the last day of the conference by Tillman Durdin who was covering the Manila Conference for the New York Times. He said:

The morning session was not terminated until 1:15 P.M., more than four hours after it had began. A round of clapping was heard from the closed conference hall before delegates emerged smiling and remarked: "It's all over."

It is understood that purely technical details of drafting took a great deal of time after basic agreement had been reached on outstanding questions. All other major obstacles to the conclusion of the treaty were resolved at two intensive, three hour closed sessions of the treaty conference delegates yesterday morning and afternoon. (September 7). Difficulties were reported to have developed on a number of points. But compromises were reached and most details were settled for a pact that will not differ greatly from the treaty proposals the United States submitted as a working draft to experts of the eight powers who assembled to produce a composite document here last week.⁴²

⁴²Tillman Durdin, dispatch from Manila dated September 8, 1954; in the New York Times, September 8, 1954.

To wrap up the Conference successfully, it became necessary that compromises be made. The United States compromised on the insistence that the pact be exclusively an anti-Communist one. It was agreed to state that as far as the United States was concerned the pact applied only to Communist aggression. In return, John Foster Dulles conceded the omission of the word "Communism" in reference to aggression in the operative article of the treaty. Advocacy of a NATO-type clause deeming an attack on one an assault on all, especially by delegates of the Philippines and Thailand, was dropped after Secretary Dulles assertedly had maintained that a proposed clause in the Southeast Asia treaty providing for action against aggression according to constitutional processes was not weaker than the Atlantic pact provisions. In deciding that the area of the treaty would be "the general area of Southeast Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian members of the pact and the Southwest Pacific," but "not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north," the United States and Britain actually compromised since this line excludes both Hong Kong and Formosa. Thailand and the United States, advocates of having the operative article of the treaty specifically state that Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam be protected, agreed to a French proposal that mention of the three States

be made in a protocol, which is included as a part of the treaty document. It was deemed inadvisable to include any specific mention of Vietnam in the operative article of the Southeast Asia treaty in view of the cease-fire agreements prohibiting either of the two Vietnams from entering into any kind of military pact until elections are held in 1956. Also, it left the programs and instrumentalities for economic assistance mainly discretionary.

The eight signatories to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, as the pact became officially designated, as listed in the official directory of the Proceedings of the conference, are as follows:

Australia:	Richard G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs.
France:	Guy La Chambre, Minister of State.
New Zealand:	T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs.
Pakistan:	Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
Philippines:	Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Thailand:	Prince Wan Waithayakon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:	Marquess of Reading, Minister of State, Foreign Office.
United States:	John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State; U. S. Senators H. Alexander Smith (Rep. N.J.), and Michael J. Mansfield (Dem. Mont.)

CHAPTER V

PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

The treaty text spells out in broad terms the extent to which the United States finds it expedient to undertake, under its Constitution, to define its obligations and those of other participating nations in the interest of their common security. It is a brief and simple document and, as has been pointed out in a White Paper issued by the Department of State, its powerful impact on world affairs derives from these three factors: the stature and strength of the states supporting the arrangement; the precarious security situation in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to which it is designed to bring collective defense against open armed aggression as well as defense against subversion; and the improvement of economic and social conditions through cooperative programs for the advancement of the peoples of the area.¹

I. MAIN PROVISIONS

The preamble of the treaty reaffirms clearly the continuing faith of the signatory members in the purposes

¹"Answers and Questions on the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter," Department of State Publication Q. & A. No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: February, 1955), 1, 2.

and principles of the United Nations Charter which embody their desire to live in peace and amity with all peoples and governments; desires to promote stability and well-being in the treaty area, strengthen peace and uphold democratic principles; promote economic development; declares that the signers stand united against aggression and that the members will coordinate their efforts for collective defense; recognition that all nations in Southeast Asia are entitled to self determination.

Since the Charter of the United Nations set forth in detail the machinery and the procedures available for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, there was no need to outline new machinery or procedures in the treaty. However, the signatories did assume certain definite obligations. They are as follows:

Article I calls for settling international disputes by peaceful means under the United Nations Charter.

Article II says member nations by self-help and mutual aid will maintain a capacity "to resist armed attack and to prevent and overcome subversive activity directed from without."

Article III proposes cooperation among members "to promote economic stability and social well being."

Article IV agrees that each party will meet the "common danger" of armed attack in the treaty area or

against any member "in accordance with its constitutional processes"; in case of aggression members will "consult immediately in order to agree to measures which should be taken for common defense"; aid will be sent to an attacked nation only on request.

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is not unique among treaties of alliance. It provides that any armed attack and all measures taken in consequence shall be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations and that such acts shall be brought to an end when the Security Council has taken steps to restore and maintain international peace and security. (By virtue of Article VI). Moreover, it does not affect in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations nor does it conflict with other existing treaties.

II. FURTHER PROVISIONS

Geographically speaking, the Treaty designates as "the treaty area" the "general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties," and "the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude." (Article VIII) At the time of treaty signing the states agreeing to become members of the pact were

those eight countries already listed above. The treaty text provides also that the member parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other "State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Area" to become a member of the pact. (Article VII)

With respect to organization, the treaty provides, under Article V, for the establishment of a Council on which each of the parties will be represented and directs that this shall be so constituted as to be able to meet promptly at any time to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty.

Other details of organization and procedure are not specified in the treaty; they are to be worked out on the basis of practical experience. It is evident that a considerable degree of flexibility in the application of the treaty was intended by those who drafted it and this will make it all the more adaptable to unforeseeable situations which may arise.

The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. (Article IX, Section 3.)

Article X states the treaty is to endure without time limit, with any party able to withdraw by giving one year's notice.

Article XI says that English is the official language of the treaty.

III. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES

There is considerable evidence of a remarkable degree of "likemindedness" among the members of the several governments respecting both the content of the treaty and the form it should take under the United Nations Charter.² Since there was no doubt in any quarter that without the full willingness of the United States to be a party to the pact its promotion would be useless, the principal and probably the extremely significant question which arose during discussions of the treat draft pertained to whether the United States could under its Constitution take action involving the use of armed force in an emergency. (Though Secretary Dulles did make clear on several occasions in the past "that one of the conditions which we have always stood on is that there must be congressional sanction to any such

²Robert Trumbull, dispatch from Manila dated September 9, 1954; in the New York Times, September 9, 1954.

action.")³

United States military commitment defined. The answer to this question was found in a formula which the Secretary of State presented, first to the delegates at the Manila Conference and again to the first Council meeting under the treaty which was held at Bangkok, February 23-25, 1955. Of the first instance, he said:

We considered at Manila how to implement the treaty. One possibility was to create a joint military force. However, I explained that the United States' responsibilities were so vast and so far-flung that we believed that we would serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves.

This viewpoint was accepted. Thus, the treaty will not require us to make material changes in our military plans. These plans already call for our maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. The deterrent power we thus create can protect many, as effectively as it protects one.⁴

At the Bangkok meeting of the Council, Mr. Dulles undertook to give a more detailed analysis of the situation:

³John Foster Dulles, "United States Policy on Participation in Collective Defense," Department of State Bulletin, XXX (June 7, 1954), 863.

⁴Reprinted in the Congressional Record--Senate, November 9, 1954, p. 14755.

. . . for military purposes, the Chinese Communist front should be regarded as an entirety because if the Chinese Communists engage in open armed aggression this would probably mean that they have decided on general war in Asia. They would then have to take into account the mutual defense treaties of the United States with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China, and the forces maintained under them. Thus general war would confront the Chinese Communists with tasks at the South, center and North, tasks which would strain their inadequate means of transportation.

The United States in particular has sea and air forces now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers.

Our Treaty Council, after appraising the military factors, concluded that the available military power offered solid hope of deterring open armed aggression against the treaty area.

In order to bring our power to a concerted pitch, our military advisers at Bangkok started their work together. It is expected that another military meeting will be held at Manila next month (April, 1955). In this way information will be exchanged about the forces which could be made available, and strategies can be agreed upon. Also out of these meetings may come plans for combined military exercises.⁵

The Pacific Charter. The Pacific Charter is another significant feature of SEATO. It has been described by the State Department White Paper as the "declaration of principles and intent on the part of the nations who negotiated the Manila Pact. It constitutes the cornerstone upon which

⁵Address broadcast of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on "The Way of the Aggressor Has Been Made Harder," on March 6, 1955; in the United States News and World Report, XXXVIII (March 16, 1955), 69-70.

the Pact was developed." President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines proposed the Pacific Charter as a means of making it clear that the nations at the Manila Conference are dedicated to seeking the welfare of the Asian people and will not promote colonialism. It will probably be both relevant and interesting to note at this point the editorial comments of Life magazine on this particular subject. It reads:

Moreover, a declaration of the rights of all Asian nations to freedom and self-determination was watered down by colony-conscious Britain. It was the Asian members of MANPAC (for Manila Pact), led by the Philippines' far-sighted President Ramon Magsaysay--vigorously supported by Dulles--who drove through a separate Pacific Charter asserting these aims, which all the powers signed. This Charter may prove more powerful than the treaty in taking the onus of colonialism from the West's desire to save freedom. Fittingly enough it came from the freely elected leader of a former colony which America voluntarily set on its own.⁶

Dulles explained the importance of the Pacific Charter in these words:

In my opening address to the Conference, I emphasized that one of the most effective weapons of communism was to pretend that the Western powers were seeking to impose colonialism on the Asian peoples. I said we must make it abundantly clear that we intend to invigorate independence. "Only then can the West and the East work together in true fellowship."

⁶Editorial, "A Treaty's Meaning for Asia," Life, XXXVII (September 20, 1954), 36.

This Manila Conference faced up to that issue. It was the first Conference where representative nations of Asia and of the West sat down together to work out a program of mutual security. The result was the Pacific Charter, which, in ringing terms, dedicates all the signatories to uphold the principles of self-determination, self-government, and independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

Whenever there arises in Asia a power that wants to conquer others, it adopts the motto: "Asia for the Asians." The Japanese, when they were dominated by the war lords, used that slogan. Today, the Soviet and Chinese Communists have adopted it. They want to prevent the free countries of Asia from getting the help they need to preserve their independence.

The Pacific Charter, on which the East and the West did meet may well prove to be the most momentous product of the Conference.⁷

In the eyes of other Asian countries then, the Pacific Charter stands as a powerful refutation of Communist appraisals of Western motives.

IV. UNITED STATES APPROVAL AND RATIFICATION

In a colorful ceremony on September 8, 1954, the Secretary-General of the Conference announced that, in accordance with the decision of the Conference, "the Plenipotentiary Representative or Representatives of each State

⁷Address of Secretary Dulles delivered to the nation over radio and television on September 15, 1954, on the "Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter," in the Department of State Bulletin, XXXI (September 27, 1954), 432-33.

ascend the rostrum to sign the three documents." Shortly afterward a certified copy of the signed document was placed in the hands of President Eisenhower for transmission "with a view to receiving the advice and consent" of the Senate of the United States to ratification. Other copies were being transmitted at the same time to the other signatory states to be submitted to their respective ratification procedures. According to treaty terms, the pact was to be officially in existence "as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines." Thereupon the alliance was to be ready to function.

It appeared that those who drafted the treaty text had considerable confidence that, once signed by the foreign ministers of the participating states, it would be ratified without amendment by the governments involved. SEATO was ratified, to use Secretary Dulles' words, "promptly and with virtual unanimity." It was submitted by a Republican President to a Democratic-controlled body, along with a similar treaty with Nationalist China and a request for congressional authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the Formosa area. All treaties were ratified and the congressional authority granted despite that political division.

The treaty, with the exception of one vote cast against it by Senator William Langer, a congenital dissident, was reported by the Committee to the Senate body for favorable action on January 24, 1955.⁸ The report recapitulated essentially all of the arguments advanced in favor of the alliance. After much careful deliberation, the Senate, by a vote of 82 to one approved the resolution of ratification on February 1, 1955.⁹ Then in a press release on the 25th, the State Department stated that "The Treaty entered into force February 19, 1955, following the deposit of the instrumentalities of ratification with the government of the Republic of the Philippines."¹⁰

Of the speed with which SEATO was ratified by the Congress, Dulles said:

These events demonstrate a capacity for action which is certainly needed in the world today. Too often representative processes lead to such partisanship and such consequent delays that hostile forces are encouraged to believe that the democracies are inherently ineffective. The Government of the United States has shown the contrary. Partisanship was wholly subordinated to the national good, so that action of great importance could be taken with deliberations, but with decisiveness.

⁸Congressional Record--Senate, January 24, 1955, p. 514.

⁹Congressional Record--Senate, February 1, 1955, pp. 891-92.

¹⁰"Results of Meeting of Council of Southeast Asian Pact," Department of State Bulletin, XXXVII (March 7, 1955), 371.

For this the nation can be grateful to the leadership and to the general membership of both parties in the Congress. And I know that they would want me to pay special tribute to Walter F. George, who, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, carried the heaviest aggregate burden of responsibility.¹¹

¹¹"Dulles Sees Risk in Retreats," United States News and World Report, XXXVIII (February 25, 1955), 91.

CHAPTER VI

LIMITS OF THE DEFENSE AREA

The three Western Powers, the countries of the Western Pacific, and their Pacific allies--these nations form the core of any feasible plan for collective security in Southeast Asia. Their interest in a political pact designed to give safety in the long run from unwarranted external attack needs no spelling out. Undoubtedly they believe in a Southeast Asia pact as the most practical means of achieving a measure of collective security in the face of intensified Communist activities in that part of the world, and of making headway toward the objectives outlined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Beginning in mid-April when Dulles left London and Paris to confer on the establishment of a security arrangement in the Pacific area, there was a good deal of discussion and speculation as to the logical extent and limits of membership in the alliance. While it is true that an enlarged group of states might represent greater weight and prestige, the more numerous the component parts the greater would be the likelihood of internal disagreement and weakened common purpose.

I. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL RULE

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty as signed on September 8, 1954, applied--at least potentially --to the whole of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. For one reason or another, however, not all of the states eligible for inclusion from geographical points of view have been or are likely to be embraced by the treaty.

India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia. Apart from Pakistan the remaining four of the so-called Colombo powers --India, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia--have indicated varying degrees of unwillingness to join the anti-Communist bloc in Asia. India has consistently opposed the Southeast Asia defense plan, or any other collective security pact for that matter. Indonesia, which usually aligns herself with Indian policy, has taken virtually the same line. Burma and Ceylon have been "less" opposed to the idea of a Southeast Asian defense organization but neither has shown a desire to join it outright. This coolness on the part of four of the five Colombo powers (so-called because their Prime Ministers met at Colombo in late April, 1954 to concert a joint policy between the Communist and the anti-Communist forces in Asia), has come as a disappointment to the Western Governments, especially Britain.

From the start of the Geneva Conference on April 26, 1954, Anthony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, has followed a consistent policy with regard to creating a stable Southeast Asia. This policy has had three main facets: (1) to help stop the "hot war" in Indochina; (2) to associate the Colombo powers, and other friendly nations, with an Indochinese armistice; and (3) to persuade them to join Britain and the United States in an effective defense alliance to halt further Communist aggression.¹ The first two elements of this policy have already been realized. An Armistice has been attained in Indochina. On August 10, the five Colombo powers, led by Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, formally associated themselves with the armistice agreement and expressed their hope that no parties to the pact would breach it. The third part of the British aim, however, has not been achieved, though Britain has never entertained high hopes that India --and the smaller Asian powers around her--would join a proposed Southeast treaty organization. At the same time British statesmen have maintained that there could be no successful system of collective defense in Southeast Asia

¹Benjamin Welles, dispatch from London dated August 6, 1954; in the New York Times, August 7, 1954.

unless the countries of the area themselves took part in it whole-heartedly and effectively. British policy makers "still regard India and Burma as the two most important links in the chain of Communist containment that must be forged in Southeast Asia,"² and British policy will probably continue to attempt to attract these two powers gradually into the collective security fold.

However, "Nehru has consistently argued that collective security pacts tend to nullify peace efforts by promoting 'tension'"³ and considers the new Southeast Asia pact "most unfortunate."⁴ The fact is that the Indians have gone much further. They have been working on influential Britons to take a more independent attitude toward the United States in Asian affairs. The influential Times of India said editorially on April 15, 1954, that Britain's acquiescence in the Washington program "is dangerously near a spineless appeasement of an importunate ally."⁵ A predominant measure of Indian newspaper opinion

²London dispatch dated August 14, 1954; in the New York Times, August 15, 1954.

³New York Times, April 16, 1954.

⁴Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1954.

⁵Quoted in the New York Times, April 16, 1954.

saw the proposed Southeast Asian alliance as "a new attempt by the Western powers to re-impose foreign domination" in countries newly free or struggling to be free of colonial rule.⁶

In a speech before the lower Chamber of Parliament on August 15, 1954, Nehru declared that the forthcoming talks in the Philippines were "likely to reverse the trend of conciliation released by the Indochina settlement."

Collective security can come only by

. . . resolving world tensions and developing a pattern of collective peace. . . . We are apprehensive, therefore, that the proposed Southeast Asian collective organization, will in the present do more harm than any good that it may hope to do in the future.

He added that his recent talks with Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist Premier and Foreign Minister, had brought about "greater understanding" between the two countries; that the Chinese leader's visit to India appeared to have helped him to understand non-Chinese Asia and to appreciate the "evolving Southeast Asia pattern of collective peace."⁷

The visit referred to occurred on June 26 at which time India's Nehru and Red China's ^hChou exchanged toasts. On

⁶Quoted in the New York Times, April 16, 1954.

⁷Dispatch from New Delhi, dated August 25, 1954; in the New York Times, August 26, 1954.

that occasion Nehru said:

Our great leader Mahatma Gandhi led us by peaceful methods through travail and many bitter experiences to freedom. China's cause was differently fashioned. Both our countries placed the good of the common man before them and are aiming in their different ways to raise the millions who suffered so much in the past. . . .

Destiny beckons our countries and I hope neither of them will be found wanting at this great moment in history. I hope our two countries will stand for peace and will live amicably together and cooperate in the cause of peace and human advancement as they have done through the past 2,000 years of human history.⁸

The other point well noted in Nehru's speech in the lower Chamber was the particular emphasis that the Indian leader laid on the joint declaration he had issued with Chou which accepted the principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference. He expressed the hope that the five principles "contained the nucleus of the pattern of collective peace, the only alternative to war preparedness and the only substantial approach to real security." The five principles are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

⁸Textual excerpts from Prime Minister Nehru's remarks made in exchange with Premier Chou En-lai at New Delhi, India; June 26, 1954; in the New York Times, June 27, 1954.

In his speech in the upper Chamber of Parliament the following day, August 16, Nehru went further in sharply criticizing the United States and European powers over their approach to Asian problems. He said their "out-of-place and out-of-date" policies ignore Asia. He recalled that although the Geneva conference on Indochina took into account the realities of the situation in Asia, nevertheless it was a conference on Asian problems held in Europe and "chiefly dominated by Europeans and Americans." He expressed the hope that Western powers would not pursue such a policy in the future. In a statement similar to the one he made in the lower house a day before, the Prime Minister spoke of the imperative necessity to accept the principle of "peaceful co-existence," claiming that if co-existence among nations was not possible the only alternative was world "co-destruction." Here was Nehru's grievance: India, he said, had great respect for the United States and other nations in Europe but that "all the honor and respect in the world for them does not make the slightest difference to our decision that we must have a say in our destiny and in Asia's destiny" Fully realizing that Asian problems were of the deepest interest to the United States and Europe, "what I would venture to submit as completely out-of-place and out-of-date today is for

problems to be considered by certain European or American powers, forgetting or ignoring Asia, especially when those problems are Asian," Nehru said.⁹

We see then how in his speeches Nehru explained at great length India's opposition to the formation of any kind of collective defense organization in Asia, viewing the meeting in the Philippines for this purpose as "unfortunate." While acknowledging that the countries who attended the meeting were aiming at peace and security, he felt that the Geneva settlement had brought a sense of relief in Asia and throughout the world. On the other hand, he contends that the approach adopted in the Philippines conference would revive fears and suspicions giving rise to insecurity; whether we agree or not, this was Nehru's viewpoint.

Burma has consistently remained "wary" throughout the whole negotiation period on the Southeast Asian pact. In an interview, U Nu, Prime Minister, was quoted as saying that his country would not join SEATO because "we do not stop at non-involvement; we do our utmost to shun any activity which is likely to create misunderstanding in any

⁹Dispatch from New Delhi dated August 26, 1954; in the New York Times, August 27, 1954.

quarter."¹⁰ The Economist, a London-published magazine, has regarded Burma "a particularly vital test case" in the task of the diplomats of the SEATO powers to convince their neighbors that whatever China's aims, collective security is really more likely to lead to peace than a field wide open to piecemeal aggressions.¹¹

Ceylon's official attitude and intentions toward SEATO were expressed on May 6, 1954 by Ceylon's Commerce Minister, R. G. Senanayake, when he said his country would invite an atomic "Pearl Harbor" if she offered herself as a military base. He also contended that the United States was trying to promote a Southeast Asian defense pact "irrespective of the ultimate decisions at the Geneva conference," of the neutralist conclusions of the recent five-nation Asian Premier's conference, and "even the consensus of Commonwealth opinion." Senanayake made his statement to The Times of Ceylon. "If we would offer Ceylon as a military base for one side or the other," he asked, "would we not be inviting attack? If such an attack came it would probably be delivered with atom and hydrogen bombs."¹²

¹⁰Dispatch from Rangoon, Burma dated May 21, 1954; in the New York Times, May 22, 1954.

¹¹"Recruit for SEATO," The Economist, CLXXIII (October 2, 1954), 20.

¹²Quoted in the New York Times, May 17, 1954.

As far back as 1948, the idea of a Southeast Asian alliance was canvassed, but Ceylon strongly resisted attempts to get her into any power bloc.¹³ Both Ceylon and Burma follow Nehru's lead whether that lead be valid or not.

Indonesian Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo's Government, which derives its principal support from a Nationalist-Communist coalition in Parliament, is officially on record against the treaty as a threat to Southeast Asian stability. Only one group in Indonesia backs the Manila pact--Hizbullah, an Islamic organization of former guerillas who played an important role in 1945 in the Indonesian struggle for independence against Dutch colonial rule. In a formal statement issued by its Central Executive Council, it hailed the defensive character of the pact and termed it a peaceful factor in the generally serious situation facing Southeast Asia. Hizbullah further condemned what it termed an unrealistic approach to power politics through disguising the facts and assuming peace appeals. In recent months, the Indonesian Government has indirectly hinted that it would be interested in some form of non-aggression pact with Communist China.¹⁴

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴New York Times, October 17, 1954.

Pakistan. Pakistan was the only nation of the so-called Colombo powers to attend the Manila Conference and come out of that meeting a party to SEATO.

The importance of this young Moslem nation in overall strategic considerations will continue to be highlighted by two relevant facts. These are Pakistan's geographical position and her implied alliance with the West in seizing upon United States military aid in defiance of her bigger "neutralist" neighbor, India. A further factor to be considered in assessing Pakistan's position is Karachi's forthright attacks on suspected Communist subversives, particularly in the country's eastern area. (Incidentally, Pakistan's behavior toward the Communists is not much different from past actions of the Indian Government when they were deemed to constitute a threat to security. Thousands were jailed.

On account of Pakistan's geographical position, her membership in SEATO would place a pro-Western enclave inside neutralist India in Pakistan's Province of East Bengal, and, as Robert Trumbull writing from the Manila Conference, stated:

. . . provides a prospective strategic bridge between the two theaters of Western defense against Communism. These theaters are Southeast Asia and the Middle East. This is how Pakistani delegates view their country's role in the drama unfolding here.

Pakistan's western wing adjoins the Middle East. The eastern province, which is separated from its west by about 1,000 miles of Indian territory but yet contains more than half the nation's population has a common border with Burma and therefore, can be encompassed tactically in the Southeast Asian area.¹⁵

Normally one would not expect New Delhi to be dismayed by the presence of a friendly military bulwark along the only two likely invasion routes into India. But India and Pakistan are not friendly and there appears to be little prospect that their differences, particularly over the possession of Kashmir, will be settled soon. This brings us to factor number 2--Pakistan's increasing alignment with the West.

Since Secretary Dulles' Middle Eastern and Indian journey in 1953 there have been major shifts in American attitudes. Washington has decided to risk a cooling of friendship with Asia's largest non-Communist power, India, in order to cement closer ties with Pakistan. Pakistan has entered into agreements with both the United States and Turkey. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States the latter will provide military equipment and training for the Pakistani Armed Forces. It is expressly stated, however, that the agreement does not

¹⁵Robert Trumbull in a dispatch from Manila dated September 1, 1954; in the New York Times, September 2, 1954.

establish a military alliance between the two countries nor does it involve any obligation on the part of Pakistan to provide military bases for the use of the United States. Both countries agree to "take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension."¹⁶ The agreement with Turkey is even more general but it does imply a Western orientation. In it the two countries agree to study methods of achieving closer collaboration in political, economic, and cultural spheres, including means of strengthening peace and security in the Middle East.

More recently Pakistan has signed up with the Baghdad Pact along with Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. This development has caused the most vehement reactions in India. India fears that Pakistan, emboldened by its new alliances, may take a stiffer line anent Kashmir. India also regards it as an act of treachery to Asia for Pakistan to align itself with one of the great power blocs. She thinks that Pakistan has brought nearer to Southeast Asia the war danger which is India's alleged policy to try to avert. Because of these events the gap between India and

¹⁶"Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan," Department of State Bulletin, XXX (May 31, 1954), 850-51.

Pakistan has been widened.

There are signs that Pakistan and Ceylon, both of which have a quarrel with India, may try to cooperate more closely. As recently as April, 1955, at the conference of Afro-Asian countries at Bandung, it was reported that Nehru's most interesting difference of opinion was with Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon over the latter's severe condemnation of Communist imperialism as well as European colonialism.¹⁷ Another straw in the wind was the recognition of both Laos and Cambodia by Burma and Ceylon. Neither Burma nor Ceylon would go to Manila, but their de jure recognition of the two states as viewed as a clear warning to Red China: "Hands Off." Indonesia, a Moslem country, though at present following the Indian lead, may be attracted by the force of Islam to switch its allegiance. And if Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia joint with Pakistan, India may be dissuaded from her insistent neutrality in the face of its geographical vulnerability to the threat of Communist advances west from Indochina.

¹⁷Norman Cousins, "Report from Bandung," The Saturday Review, XXXVIII (May 21, 1955), 8.

Formosa, Korea and Japan. At the end of the London and Paris conversations, Dulles obtained agreement on the paragraph in the communiques about a future military security establishment in Southeast Asia. While the Secretary has had a good press in the United States, the prevailing opinion being that the agreement in London and Paris marked an important step forward toward a unified non-Communist front and toward collective security measures in Southeast Asia, this evaluation has not been unanimous. Among American politicians of both parties critical estimates were voiced. Senator William F. Knowland, then the majority leader, objected to the omission of Nationalist China and South Korea, which he said, have one million men under arms. The argument that these are already and absolutely committed against Communist China was met by charges that a surrender to British Far East policy was the explanation for not including them.¹⁸ Both countries have bilateral mutual defense treaties with the United States Government. Also, the participation of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces was unlikely because Britain recognizes Communist China. Incidentally, this recognition does not give Red China a free hand on Formosa, not even on Formosa's chain

¹⁸New York Times, April 15, 1954.

of stepping-stone island defenses in Quemoy and Matsu. For on December 2, 1954, Britain revealed that "she had formally warned Red China against attacks on the Nationalist-held islands off Formosa," while at the same time urging "moderation" on the part of all concerned.¹⁹ A

military contribution of South Korea is also unlikely considering South Korea's own military problems and the unpopularity of the Syngman Rhee regime in some other Asian countries, particularly Seoul's attitude toward Tokyo, and vice versa.²⁰ In seeming anticipation of what was to come, Seoul had said that South Korea would not become a party to the Southeast Asia defense treaty even if invited because of opposition to Britain and France as members. The South Korean spokesman accused the two nations of participating in collective opposition to Communism for selfish reasons alone and not for the betterment of the Asian people. Also, he said South Korea opposed the possibility of Japan's participation.²¹

¹⁹ Stockton Record, December 2, 1954.

²⁰ William J. Jordan, dispatch from Seoul dated April 12, 1954; in the New York Times, April 14, 1954.

²¹ Quoted in the New York Times, September 16, 1954.

Japan, on her part, kept very close watch on the Manila Conference. But her interest was with a closer economic tie-up with Southeast Asia rather than joining any pact that would entail a military commitment abroad.²² The reason is that the area involved in the alliance and the adjacent nations long have been held up to Japan as the best source of raw material and the best nearby market for Japan which must export and import in order to live.

Even before the Manila talks opened, the powerful Foreign Policy Committee of the Government's Liberal Party under Premier Shigeru Yoshida had expressed the hope that Japan might join in the "economic phases" of whatever agreement the Manila meeting might produce. Dulles' statement sounded to the Japanese as though it was a plan to bolster Asian nations against Communism by aid calculated to improve their economic status.²³ If such were the case, much of the needed aid in the form of manufactured goods for the industrial plant of the Southeast Asian nations might be expected to be purchased in Japan. This form of special procurement would offset the drop in the purchase

²²Lindsay Parrott, dispatch from Tokyo dated August 25, 1954; in the New York Times, August 26, 1954.

²³Lindsay Parrott, dispatch from Tokyo dated September 6, 1954; in the New York Times, September 7, 1954.

of military supplies by the United States in Japan since the end of the Korean war. At the time of this writing the Japanese government under Premier Hatoyama is engaged in trade negotiations with Red China and Soviet Russia.

Since a free Japan is mandatory for United States security, there is not the slightest doubt that the United States will stand by Japan in case of attack. This concept was given formal expression in the mutual defense treaty between the two countries made in 1952.

II. THAILAND, LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND SOUTH VIETNAM

The closeness of the Indochina war to the borders of Thailand has made her one of the most enthusiastic and certainly the most concerned country of Southeast Asia insofar as the Manila Conference was concerned. In his opening speech to the conference, Prince Wan, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Thailand, went to great length to illustrate the Thai way of life" which is characterized by a traditional conception of peace as including freedom and justice . . ." With the Philippines, Thailand was equally determined in her "desire to see a commitment which in substance, is as near as possible to that of

NATO."²⁴ Against the opposition of all the other delegations Thailand and the United States favored including Cambodia and Laos and free Vietnam in the treaty area. To be sure, the desire of the United States to protect these three Associated States from further Communist advance by incorporating them in a collective defense arrangement was the immediate cause for calling the Manila Conference. In expressing his desire for their inclusion in the treaty area, Prince Wan said, "They deserve to be protected on their own merits and, as a representative of Thailand, I should say, as neighbours to my country."²⁵ In the end, a special compromise arrangement was arrived by which the parties unanimously signed a Protocol to the SEACDT designating Laos, Cambodia, and Free Vietnam for purposes of Articles IV and III of the Treaty.

III. AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE PHILIPPINES

It was noted earlier that bilateral treaties among Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United

²⁴Opening remarks of Prince Wan Waithayakon to the Manila Conference of 1954; in the Proceedings: The Signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty; the Protocol to the SEACDT; and the Pacific Charter (Issued by the Committee on Publicity, Conference Secretariat of the Manila Conference of 1954, Manila, Philippines), p. 25.

²⁵Ibid., p. 37.

States formed the new foundations of Pacific security. Furthermore, the proximity of Communist China and Indochina makes it a matter of grave and immediate concern to these Pacific nations to associate themselves in a wider network of defense arrangement for Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific so that united, not bilateral, action may be effected to meet external attack. Their decision to be included among the original members of SEATO supplements the series of bilateral treaties with the United States.

IV. BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES

At the time Secretary Dulles negotiated the Anzus Treaty the United States refused to invite either Britain or France to become parties to it because this would have included both Malaya and Indochina, which were already faced with Communist insurrections. It seems that United States' strategy at that time was to avoid commitments, with the exception of obligations under the United Nations Charter, on the mainland of Asia that might involve United States' ground troops.

The situation has since rapidly changed. Britain and France are now full partners in SEATO. (British participation in the Southeast Asia defense talks was done at a risk, one that may involve a permanent split with the Asian Commonwealth countries.) This is inevitable in view

of their stakes in the area. Also, let us never forget that the most important factor in the "cold war" is Big Three unity. This is the reason why the United States stands by Britain in the Middle East today. This is the reason why the United States stands by France in Morocco and Tunisia. Without attempting to argue the ethics or even the advisability of such recent moves, we can only state for our purposes at the moment that the task of the SEATO powers is to convince their neighbors that whatever China's aims, collective security is really more likely to lead to peace than a field wide open to piece meal aggressions. Ten men can overcome a thousand if the thousand say that each will defend himself individually, for in that case, the ten do not face a thousand; they face only one. One at a time.

Now that the problems facing the nations of Southeast Asia are also the problems of the Western powers, and now that the physical distance between America and the South Pacific shores, measured in time, is no longer of great consequence, it need not occasion great surprise that that foreign policy is adjusting itself to reality. The basic theme of that policy is clear. It accepts the fact that, in the words of a political scientist: "Communist aggression in Europe and in Southeast Asia is inseparably linked and

that defense against Communism, if it is to be effective, must be successful in both area."²⁶

²⁶Joseph S. Rousek, "Southeast Asia and the United States," Current History, XXIV (August, 1952), 66.

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD THE TREATY

Our discussion will be incomplete if it did not take into account the views of the Soviet camp regarding collective security arrangements in the Pacific.

As negotiations progressed toward agreement on the character of the Southeast Asia alliance and the form of the treaty, the world was left in little doubt as to the reaction of the Soviet Union and its ally in Red China. The Communist attitude was shown during the Manila Conference by vicious propaganda attacks, and even more significantly, by Red China's intensified bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in the hope of intimidating the members of the conference and perhaps preventing some from signing the security pact. Practically simultaneously, the U. S. S. R. convened seven other Communist nations of Eastern Europe to form an East European military alliance. In short, except probably for Yugoslavia, "communist states have generally disapproved of regional groupings within the United Nations, mainly on the grounds that they have far-reaching aggressive purposes," to quote a United Nations Review article.¹

¹"Reactions to 'SEATO,'" United Nations Review, I (November, 1954), 22.

I. THE SOVIET VIEW OF SEATO

From the time the pact gave promise of materializing, Soviet spokesmen attacked it as merely a tool devised by the imperialist ruling circles to preserve "colonialism." A statement made by V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, at the Geneva Conference on May 11, 1954, aimed principally at the emerging Southeast Asian collective defense treaty, contained exceedingly bitter denunciations. The statement, directed to the Asian countries, declared in part:

At present plans are promoted for a new military bloc against the peoples of Southeast Asia. This happens to be the main preoccupation at the present of the ruling circles of some powers, headed by the United States. . . . The main purpose of such military plans is to preserve and perpetuate by every possible means colonial regimes, to curb nations that strive for national liberty and independence. These plans are the expression of the aggressive aspirations of the ruling circles of certain states, but they are in contradiction with the interests of peace and with the cause of the national liberation of oppressed nations. . . . Plans of such a nature are motivated by a desire to defend in Southeast Asia outworn privileges of non-Asian states, with which the peoples of Asia do not want to reconcile themselves.

Molotov told the Far Eastern Conference that many in the "imperialist" camp were

. . . displeased with the fact that the peoples of Asia have at last stood up to defend decisively their

rights and interests. But it is time to understand that no policy based on a position of strength can turn back the wheel of history.²

Having attacked the "aggressive" nature of SEATO in its formative period of development, the Soviet Union proceeded to pay tribute to the completed Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The Soviet Union officially denounced the pact on September 14 as being directed against security in Asia and against the freedom and national independence of the Asian peoples. This lengthy castigation of the new agreement and its initiators, especially the United States, was delivered in a statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Excerpts of the statement follow:

As is known, for several months on the initiative and under the pressure of the U.S.A. and under the pretext of defending the countries of Southeast Asia against communism, intensive military preparations have been made for the forming of a new aggressive military bloc in that area . . . it was prepared, and carried out, by Western powers behind the backs of Asian countries, and the main role was played by the U.S.A., although the frontiers of the U.S.A. are several thousand kilometers away from Southeast Asia.

This fact alone shows sufficiently clearly in whose interests the new groups are being set up. . . . The new military grouping, in actual fact, represents a bloc of colonial powers based on imperialists' objectives to maintain their economic and political positions

²Excerpts from Geneva address by V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, at the Geneva Conference on May 11, 1954; in the New York Times, May 12, 1954.

in Asia, where the situation has radically changed, particularly in view of the historic victory of the great Chinese people . . .

The Southeast Asian countries should thus be the suppliers of strategic raw materials for the United States' war industry and its partners in the Atlantic bloc. They are to occupy, in the future as well, the place of raw materials appendages to the economy of the great colonial powers. Here, precisely, lies the sense of the economic measures which are being presented as one of the tasks of the participants in the treaty.

In actual fact, the treaty signed in Manila, just as agreements on the creation of other closed aggressive military groupings of the NATO type are blatantly in contradiction to the United Nations objectives and principles. . . . It is not the first time that, in the creation of military groups of states, attempts were made to justify them by referring to the interests of defense and to assisting the economic progress of the people of the countries which were being drawn into such groupings. It was thus when the Atlantic bloc was being created. It was thus when plans for the formation of the new collapsed E. D. C. were being elaborated. The same is being repeated in the present case.³

The statement concluded with a warning that the initiating states were taking upon themselves "the entire responsibility for actions which are in gross contradiction to the tasks of strengthening peace."

³ Excerpts from the text of a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on the Manila defense treaty as broadcast September 14, 1954 by the Moscow radio; in the New York Times, September 15, 1954.

II. RED CHINA'S DENUNCIATION OF SEATO

Necessarily, Communist China's attitude follows Russia's, only seemingly bolder. On September 3, Peiping radio denounced a published draft of the Southeast Asian defense treaty. The broadcast called it a "preparation for war" and said the United States draft document was tantamount to "an aggressive alliance hostile to the peoples of China and various Asian countries."⁴ On September 8, the official New China News Agency attacked the new Southeast Asia pact as "a warlike device contrived by the United States to get Asians fighting Asians." It termed the treaty, "a military bloc opposed to the Asian peoples." The agency further said Secretary of State Dulles "openly listed the aggressive objectives of the United States in organizing the Southeast Asia bloc."⁵ Similar attacks were subsequently reiterated along with warnings that Britain's support of the United States has impaired London's relations with Peiping and threats to "liberate" Formosa.

⁴Quoted in the New York Times, September 4, 1954.

⁵Quoted in the New York Times, September 9, 1954.

III. REFUTATION OF CHARGES

These denunciations came with poor grace from the state that had been obstructing much of the work of the Security Council of the United Nations by an uninhibited use of the veto, that had refused to cooperate in solving the problems of the control on atomic armaments, that had sponsored the rape of China, and that had been instrumental in creating a group of Communist dictatorships in neighboring states. As a propaganda line, however, it may have been useful to attempt to put the Western powers on the defensive by accusing them repeatedly of imperialistic designs and acts at a time when Communist authority was being pushed to its extreme limits in every direction.

It appeared to have little effect on the line of Russian argument that charges of "imperialism" and "war-mongering" were refuted repeatedly and on indisputably solid grounds by spokesmen of the United States and by representatives of other treaty nations. At every step in the development of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty the negotiators had emphasized the fact that it is not directed against any state but only against aggression. Before leaving London, the Marquess of Reading, who acted for Anthony Eden at the Manila Conference, said: "There is absolutely no reason at all for anyone to be alarmed or

suspicious about the aims of the conference unless they are designing to be aggressive."⁶ His statement was a considered, deliberate rebuttal to the broadcast of the Peiping radio on the same date. The members of the alliance were quick to stand in defense of SEATO. At the opening of the Manila Conference, Reading said:

Our objects are purely defensive. We threaten no one. We seek not provocation but protection. We desire only to live in peace with our neighbours, and to see them live in peace with one another.

In welcoming the delegates to the conference President Magsaysay has briefly but emphatically said: "We are met today for no aggressive purpose." Richard G. Casey of Australia declared: "This Treaty is not directed against any nation. It is quite simply directed against aggression." In refuting the official Soviet protest, John Foster Dulles put it this way:

The Soviet Foreign Office has just issued a lengthy statement denouncing the Manila Pact. It particularly complains of Article IV, which provides for united resistance to armed attack and political subversion. The Soviet statement says that the Chinese Communists also do not like the pact.

⁶Benjamin Welles, dispatch from London dated September 3, 1954; in the New York Times, September 4, 1954.

The Manila Pact is directed against no government, against no nation, and against no people. It is directed only against aggression. The fact that the Communists find that objectionable is tragically revealing of their ambitions.⁷

It was in an international atmosphere of this kind that the representatives of the United States and the Chinese Communists met in Geneva in April, 1955, to consider the "easing of world tensions" especially over the Formosa area. Probably no high hopes of real accomplishment were entertained in advance by the participants since no grounds for optimism existed, and today the situation remains tense without any sign of relief in the future. In such circumstances SEATO inevitably will grow in meaning.

⁷John Foster Dulles, "The Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter," Department of State Bulletin, XXXI (September 27, 1954), 433.

CHAPTER VIII

IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY

Section 1 of Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty provides that,

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

This spells the general military commitment. Article III states:

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

This is the famous economic and technical aid provision.

Article II of the Treaty states that,

. . . in order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

This is a particularly euphemistic way of indicating the real intentions of the Western powers of going into the

Treaty as "equals" with the nations in the area. And perhaps, the whole Treaty depends substantially on this article.

I. THE TREATY COUNCIL MEETING AT BANGKOK

The first Council meeting under the Treaty was held at Bangkok, February 23, to February 25, 1955, to determine what could be done to implement the various provisions of the treaty. There was also need to work out more detailed and precise understandings on how the terms of the treaty will apply to particular situations. As one editorial puts it: "The Bangkok meeting put the SEATO pact organization on its feet. It is on its feet and headed in the right direction."¹ Through it there will be military staff consultations and exchanges of opinion and intelligence. A headquarters (Bangkok), a permanent staff including a joint military staff group and anti-subversion experts, a program, and a common approach--these were the solid achievements of the Bangkok conference.²

The three main purposes of the Manila Pact have been mentioned earlier: defense against open and armed aggression;

¹"The Bangkok Meeting," Commonweal, LXII (March 25, 1955), 646.

²"Meeting at Bangkok," Newsweek, XLV (March 7, 1955), 39.

defense against subversion; and the improvement of economic and social conditions. In this connection, "We have taken decisions," said Secretary Dulles in his closing statement at Bangkok February 25, "which will make the Council an effective working body within the three areas dealt with by the pact."³

On March 8, 1955, Secretary Dulles went on the air to report to the American people the achievements of the Council meeting under SEATO.⁴ On this occasion the Secretary said:

For the military defense, we shall rely largely upon mobile Allied power which can strike an aggressor wherever the occasion may demand. . . . The United States in particular has sea and air forces now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers.

Our Treaty Council, after appraising the military factors, concluded that the available military power offered solid hope of deterring open armed aggression against the treaty area.

In order to bring our power to a concerted pitch, our military advisers at Bangkok started their work together. . . . In this way information will be exchanged about the forces which could be made available, and strategies can be agreed upon.

³"Statement of Secretary Dulles at the Close of the Meeting," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (Marh 7, 1955), 374.

⁴Address report of Secretary Dulles March 8, 1955 on the results of the Treaty Council meeting held at Bangkok, Thailand, February 23-25, 1955; in "The Way of the Aggressor Has Been Made Harder," United States News and World Report, XXXVIII (March 18, 1955), 69-71.

Next on the agenda is the problem of subversion which is perhaps the greatest danger to the area. Said Secretary Dulles on this subject in his broadcast report:

This danger will, I think, be diminished as it is better understood that the Treaty nations have the power and the will, to strike down an open armed aggressor.

To illustrate this connection between direct and indirect aggression I may mention the situation in Laos. In two of its provinces there are disloyal elements, supported by the Chinese and Vietminh Communists. The Laos Government is seeking to re-establish control over its own territory. But it is worried less, if it suppresses the Communists within, it will be struck by the Communists from without. I hope that that worry is now allayed by their better understanding of the protective nature of the Manila Pact.

In other countries also, active subversion is being promoted from without. To deal with this is in each case primarily the responsibility of the governments concerned. However, often the nations can help each other by exchanging information, for example, about the movements and activities of international Communist agitators. Also, those who have dealt successfully with this problem can give advice which will help others of lesser experience. The Philippine delegation did this at Bangkok. They told how their Government had dealt decisively with Communist-inspired revolt of the so-called Huks.

It was agreed there would be meetings of experts to facilitate exchanges of views about these problems of subversion.

The Council meeting also dealt with the third treaty task, that of improving economic and social conditions. This problem divides itself into two parts. First is general improvement of economic conditions in the area. This calls for capital developments, industrialization,

better roads, more irrigation works, and improved port facilities, greater trade among the countries of South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. Again quoting Secretary Dulles:

This problem of economic improvement goes beyond the immediate Treaty area. The Treaty area is not and never can be a self-contained economic unit. The great bulk of its trade is with outside areas. There is need for programs to develop broadly the economic possibilities of all the free Asian countries. The Treaty nations will study their problems from this viewpoint.

At the Bangkok Conference, I took occasion to re-emphasize President Eisenhower's desire that atomic energy should be used to benefit . . . enrich the life of the great masses of humanity. . . . I described our programs for education in this field, and I extended a special invitation to the Manila Pact nations to send representatives to the United States so that they could begin to study the good uses to which atomic energy may be put.

The second phase of the economic problem is the problem of "meeting the cost of more effective security forces."

The Manila Pact's Asian members were anxious for some sort of United States troop commitments, if only token, to discourage aggression. Secretary Dulles argued that Southeast Asia's defense was linked to that of Korea, Japan, and Formosa. United States forces, therefore, must remain highly mobile. But just in case anybody thought this was an admission of weakness, Dulles declared that United States power in the Pacific is greater now than at the height of

the second world war. His figures--four hundred warships, five divisions, and thirty squadrons of fighters and bombers--were not too startling but he meant, of course, including atomic weapons.⁵ (Britain has approximately fifty thousand ground troops in the Far East--thirty thousand of them in Southeast Asia--plus about three hundred combat aircraft and a Far Eastern fleet based around a carrier and two cruisers.⁶ France has been withdrawing the bulk of her expeditionary corps from Indochina.) The request for an American commitment was soon dropped but there is need of modest national forces which are well equipped and loyal, which can support the authority of the government throughout its territory and fight initial defensive actions if there be attack from without. United States News and World Report quotes an unidentified American planner in Asia who explains United States strategy as follows:

What we're aiming at is to make our allies strong enough to resist infiltration and to hold initially against outside aggression. That will give us time to deploy our air and naval forces to stop or discourage the aggression by putting the enemy under attack at many points--and with nuclear weapons.

⁵"Southeast Asia: A Beginning at Bangkok," Newsweek, XLV (March 7, 1955), 39.

⁶Benjamin Welles in the New York Times, September 3, 1954.

⁷"Maneuvers in Asia," United States News and World Report, XLVI (February 24, 1956), 77.

But even these limited forces involve an economic burden which some of the countries cannot carry without help. So, to use Secretary Dulles' words, "the strong will help the weak by providing some military equipment and financial support." Thus, there will be "special recognition of those countries which assume military obligations with us." Then it is up for the United States Congress to vote.

Summarizing the work of the Council, a Communique was issued at Bangkok on February 25 at the close of the deliberations. It reads:

This meeting has provided the members of the Council with an opportunity for bringing about closer ties among their own governments in achieving their common objectives and purposes under the Treaty. They believe that the Manila Treaty is already exerting a positive influence for the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and that the solidarity of the member nations, shown at the present meeting, will serve as an increasingly powerful deterrent against aggression. The Council recognized the continuing dangers to peace and security in the Treaty area and agreed that these threats make it imperative that the member governments take steps to strengthen the common defense.

On the "Peace and Security of the Area," the Communique stated:

Although they represent diverse nations and peoples, the members of the Council were unanimous in the belief that this meeting has enabled them to understand and appreciate the problems facing the governments of the countries covered by the Treaty in the common effort to ensure peace and security under the Treaty. The progress achieved at this first Council meeting provides solid

hope for closer cooperation among the member governments for the good of the region as a whole. The members of the Council are united in their conviction that the common efforts of their governments are contributing positively to the peace and security of the area, both for the member governments and for other free nations in the region.

Finally, the Communique expressed the hope that "free nations will associate themselves in the near future with the work to be undertaken under the Treaty."⁸

II. "OPERATION FIRM LINK"

"Operation Firm Link," the first joint military maneuvers by the Allies of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization produced several long-range effects: (1) The Communists have called SEATO a "paper tiger,"⁹ a phrase echoed even among members of the alliance who supported a stronger military commitment. After the allied war games the "paper tiger" has at least sprouted baby teeth and shown a few claws. (2) The military exercises demonstrated to the Thais that a SEATO force can reach their country in a hurry, thereby assuring them that they will not have to fight alone if real war comes. It may serve to offset growing drift

⁸Excerpts from the text of a communique issued at Bangkok, Thailand, on February 25 at the close of the meeting of the Council of the SEACDT; in the Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (March 7, 1955), 371.

⁹"Creaky Tiger," Time, LXVIII (February 20, 1956), 32.

toward "neutralism" in Thailand or her neighbors.¹⁰

(3) The maneuvers also gave Asians a preview of the modern weapons the United States has available to defend its allies in the Pacific. (4) Finally, the show was counted on to underline the basic value of regional defense pacts. It is now generally accepted that the United Nations cannot again act against open aggression, as in Korea, or against an internal take-over by the Communists anywhere in Asia. Russia's veto can block action in the Security Council. The "neutrals," the Arab bloc and the Soviet bloc nations can prevent a decision in the General Assembly. But Admiral Felix B. Stump, United States Pacific Fleet Commander, recently told the SEATO Allies that the United States will act immediately "to prevent aggression in the area."¹¹

III. SEATO NEEDS A STRONG MILITARY ALLIANCE

Nevertheless, SEATO does not yet carry a big stick. What follows is the latest size-up of the situation by the United States News and World Report in its February 24, 1956, issue.

¹⁰"Pointed Maneuvers," Newsweek, XLVI (February 27, 1956), 48.

¹¹Quoted in "Allied Maneuvers in Asia," op. cit., p. 76.

Bases are few and widely scattered in the area. The United States Navy is still building its big new base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. It has only three air bases in the Philippines capable of handling jets. The British will soon have light jet bases at Singapore. Australia is expanding its facilities. Thailand has only one jet airfield. Also, trained manpower is short. The two largest anti-Communist armies of Asia, Formosa, and South Korea, are not a part of SEATO. More than a year ago, when the United States first proposed that SEATO be broadened to include Formosa, Japan, and Korea, all the allies except the United States and the Philippines cold-shouldered the idea of fighting if the Reds attacked Formosa. So with Formosa and Korea thus on the sidelines, here is what is left of SEATO's ground forces: The Republic of the Philippines has an army of forty thousand men in two divisions; two other training divisions are in process. Thailand has an army of some ninety thousand men "but is of uncertain value." The British have about fifty thousand men in Malaya, and the Malaysians themselves have a ten thousand-man Army. The French now have fewer than twenty-five thousand soldiers in Vietnam, where they had one hundred fifty thousand about a year ago. Australia has a force of twenty-three thousand, and New Zealand, twenty-nine thousand.

Pakistan's one hundred eighty thousand ground troops are, for the most part, pinned down along the borders with India and Afghanistan. Even the United States is short of ground troops in Asia. It has two divisions in Korea and one in Japan, but all are under strength. There is an Army division stationed in Hawaii. The Third Marine Division has units in Japan, Okinawa, and Hawaii.

"SEATO's sea-power, mostly American, is far superior to anything the communists have in Southeast Asia." Also, among the SEATO partners, the United States has the only air power of any consequence in that part of the world. Guam is back in business as the strategic Air Force's main Pacific base. Most of the United States' tactical aircraft are in Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa. The Air Force has sufficient mobility to shift its power at will wherever bases are available. The other nations, however, have little to contribute.

CHAPTER IX

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Nations that possess free and democratic institutions and desire to live at peace are placed at some disadvantage in the world where exist totalitarian states whose leaders, concerned with their own power and prestige, are not too scrupulous as to the methods by which their goals are attained. Too frequently in this twentieth century world, the offensive is held by those who would least hesitate to employ it in the use of force for materialistic reasons. The formulation of defensive pacts by states apprehensive of aggression does not alone compensate for the disadvantage. A superior will by free peoples to preserve their freedom and a willingness to make any sacrifices in that cause must help balance the scale of relative advantage. "Thus the struggle goes on," to quote the words used by Secretary Dulles in a major address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, February 16, 1955.

Thus the struggle goes on. We dare not relax because the moment of relaxation is the moment of peril. Treaty declarations must be backed by a purpose that is ever sustained, by an intelligence that is ever alert,

and by power which is ever ready and able to punish aggressors so that aggression will not pay.¹

Whenever nations that possess free and democratic institutions and desiring to live at peace lack these qualities, then that desire to live in peace is in jeopardy.

I. THE MILITARY FIELD

To the free world, SEATO represents another collective security pact, another regional arrangement, another deterrent to aggression. There is a Pacific Charter that voices certain noble sentiments: self-determination, independence, freedom. For the first time free nations of the East and free nations of the West voluntarily join a multilateral military pact. It is an advance over the previous bilateral deals designed to bring security to the Pacific area--though no all-in Pacific pact as yet. It is a collective defense arrangement with teeth, even if the teeth do not operate automatically. It gave the free world the diplomatic offensive, something which counts a lot in psychological warfare, especially in Asia. SEATO was unquestionably a victory for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and a badly needed victory at a time when

¹"Dulles Seeks Risk in Retreats," United States News and World Report, XXXVIII (February 28, 1955).

his "liberation" and "massive retaliation" policies had reached a dead end. SEATO was also a victory for the West, which was also badly in need of a victory. For the loss of North Vietnam and the defeat of EDC in the French Assembly, coming in rapid succession, had brought Western prestige to a new low throughout the free world.

Here then are the major values of SEATO:

It throws the free world's protective mantle over Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The Communists are now formally warned that aggression there may bring about collective retaliation. It skips the thorny issues of defense for Formosa, South Korea, and Japan. These are actually provided for elsewhere in unilateral and bilateral arrangements between the United States and these countries. To have dragged them into the Manila talks would have dragged out, if not effectively disrupted, the talks. It gives the Philippines the substance of American military support without the latter guaranteeing military assistance. Actually the Philippines have this guarantee verbally from President Eisenhower and formally in the United States-Philippines treaty, so they do not need it in SEATO. SEATO also makes it clear that to the United States "Communism" is the enemy to be opposed, fought, defeated throughout Southeast Asia; that Washington's obligations are confined

to Communist-inspired or Communist-led aggressions, and hope that the United States will not be committed to support French or British colonialism in Southeast Asia.

SEATO assures the United States Congress of a voice in any fighting that is to be done in the Pacific. Without that provision SEATO's chances of getting congressional

approval were nil, in the first place. SEATO is an open-end agreement--that is, other nations are free (in fact, invited) to join. While there is little chance of getting India or Indonesia to sign any such collective security arrangement, it might be possible to interest Ceylon and/or Burma. SEATO does not guarantee Southeast Asia's freedom and security; but it enhances its chance for peaceful existence and independent living.

Through NATO, the United States has automatic commitments reaching across Europe to Greece and Turkey and the borders of Iran. Through SEATO it now has another set of commitments reaching across the Philippines; Australia, New Zealand, on to the continent of Asia into Thailand and nearly meeting the NATO commitments via Pakistan.

Because the world is a globe, if one starts from any given point and proceeds far enough in any one direction, he will end up just where he started. For example, the United States started with the problem of its own defense, drifted east to Western Europe, the Balkans, the North Sea,

the landbridge to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the China road, and now she is back considering her defenses in the Far East.

Basically, the defense against any attack launched from the East against the West Coast of the United States depends upon the holding of the Pacific portion of Mackinder's "Outer Crescent." Therefore, to defend California, Oregon, and Washington, the United States has to have island defense outposts thousands of miles from the West Coast of the United States.

The land areas of this Pacific region can roughly be divided into two tiers: an inner and outer tier of defenses. The inner tier consists, as we observe a globe, of Australia, New Caledonia, Indonesia, the Solomons, the Caroline Islands, the Marianas, the Philippines, Formosa, the Bonins, Japan, the Kuriles, and the Aleutian Islands. In the outer tier we can place New Zealand, Samoa, the Society Islands, Ellice and Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands, Wake, Hawaii, Midway, and, again, the eastern end of the Aleutians.

When a geopolitician looks at the Crescent he sees it in two different lights, if he is an American. The first is the role of far-flung outposts of defense against invasion from the east.

Any engagements fought in the outer tier would be purely naval engagements until they reached the coastal waters of the United States; where land-based aircraft and artillery may take part. Engagements fought in the inner tier would be combined land, sea, and air fights from the very start. Our problem is a two-fold one; first, to contain the fight within the inner tier and secondly, to hold the line of islands which make up the inner tier. So long as this can be done, the west coast of America and Canada is safe from attack.²

Opposed to this is the enemy's mission, or in this case, Russia's and China's mission.

Obviously, she must do three things; first, destroy our control of the inner tier; secondly, force the fight into the area of the outer tier; and thirdly, invade our west coast. Inasmuch as this whole plan must stem from communist control or potential control of the inner tier, it is this area that is most important to us at present.³

These are two pictures. There is no need to re-emphasize the importance of a wall of island states ten thousand miles across the Pacific; to appreciate the significance of the Crescent; to really understand why it has to be held; why it is being prepared for your defense. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at one time tried to define America's "defense perimeter" in Asia and lived to regret it. His successor successfully avoided defining it while the Indochinese war was going on, but he has now by treaty put

²John E. Kieffer, Realities of World Power. New York: David MacKay Company, 1962, p. 304.

³Ibid.

that perimeter on the continent of Asia around the borders of Thailand and Pakistan. Thus the southern end of the United States defense perimeter has been shifted some twelve hundred miles westward. In other words, Red China is now completely ringed to the south and southeast by a defensive alliance of free nations who have a right to expect United States military assistance in the event of an attack. The one gap in the ring is Burma, and even there an attack would undoubtedly meet with resistance and evoke a call for help.

Of course, Secretary Dulles has an "out," since the United States does not have to do anything in Southeast Asia until Congress acts in the case of any aggression. But America's prestige is at stake in SEATO, and while the Congress could repudiate Dulles and President Eisenhower or any future administration, it would not only confuse, but dismay, United States allies in Southeast Asia. It would certainly end any influence Washington may have with the free peoples of Asia.

II. THE POLITICAL FIELD

Most of what will be said in the political field would merely be a reiteration of what has been stated previously.

1. Let it be nailed down once and for all that the colonial era in Asia is dead. Americans have recognized it.

And in their hearts, so have the British, the French, the Dutch, and Portuguese. However, they are still trying to hold on to a few remnants of their "empires." As long as they do, the teeming millions of Asia--non-Communist Asians--will keep worrying more about colonialism than Communism.

To hold that the main conflict confronting the entire world today is the conflict between Democracy and Communism is a cliché that must be cleared. Insofar as the United States is concerned it may be the main conflict. But for Asia, Africa, the Arab world, the main problem is, aside from mere subsistence, the problem of colonialism. To many Asians, Communism is something abstract, unknown. Colonialism is known and hated. Given the choice many Asians will take Communism. The big job is to prove to them that the choice is not between colonialism and Communism but between freedom and a new kind of imperialism--Communist imperialism.

The French, for example, must stop talking about getting out of Indochina and get out. Only the sight of French ships pulling out of Saigon will convince the Vietnamese that South Vietnam is independent. True, the withdrawal of the French may cause administrative chaos, but it is a risk that has to be taken. The same goes for

the other vestiges of colonialism which give the Communists such good talking points.

In the wordings of the Pacific Charter all the signatories dedicate themselves to upholding the principle of self-determination, self-government, and independence; and it is an historic document that pledges the colonial powers to give freedom to non-self-governing peoples. As such, it must be followed to the letter.

2. This is vital politically. To millions of hungry, illiterate Asians, talk of the menace of Communism is meaningless. Western propaganda should not be geared exclusively to the idea of a Communist menace. But the menace of old-fashioned Chinese imperialism is something they do understand. Fear of an expanding China has been ingrained in every Southeast Asian country for centuries. It is a deeply emotional thing, and something the West seems to have forgotten.

3. Also on the political front, while fighting the admission of Red China to the United Nations, the free world must be realistic enough to get plans ready against the possibility that Peiping may be voted in within a few years. Red China's admission would be bitter tea. But to pull out of the United Nations if it happens would be leaving the organization to the Communists and for the United

States to cut its own throat. One solution if Peiping gets in is to continue to recognize Formosa as an independent, sovereign state, with its own seat in the United Nations.

III. THE ECONOMIC FIELD

The reason much has been said on the economic field in the early pages of this paper is that what is done here may well tell the story for Southeast Asia. A hungry man listens to anybody who promises to fill his belly. It is as simple as that: though America is tired by now of rolling out billions. But if the fall of Southeast Asia will undermine American security, then the United States treasury may have to keep taking a beating. This also, is one of the responsibilities that goes with the privilege of free world leadership. Southeast Asia's hideously depressed areas present the greatest challenge to free economies. That challenge can be turned into an asset by making the region an economic show-window, just as an independent Philippines has become a political show-window.

Times move slowly in Asia, and a beginning is difficult to achieve. But nothing can be gained unless it is started, and it has been started. SEATO is an evolutionary step in the free world's revolutionary march toward

unity and security. At the speed at which security arrangements are evolving, SEATO could change more in the next five years than NATO has in the last five. History will show that it can act as an effective safeguard that we can again more freely on the earth walk like men secure in rights that are dearer than life.

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