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A study of the Hawaiian statehood movement

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A STUDY OF THE HAWAIIAN STATEHOOD MOVEMENT 2

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of History

College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Leslie Gay Knoles

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CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN HAWAII

A study of the development of the issues in the Hawaiian statehood controversy reveals the paradoxical fact that, while Americans were promoting the mutual interest of Hawaii and the United States, they were also developing a social, economic, and political atmosphere that has resulted in forces inimical to the consummation of a logical realization of Hawaii's integration as a state. A knowledge of how Hawaii became linked to the United States, and of the institutions developed in the islands prior to annexation in 1898 is essential to an understanding of the contemporary problem.

When the first Americans visited the islands in 1789, the native population numbered approximately three hundred thousand Polynesians who were ruled by local chieftans.

It was at this time that a Boston trading ship, Columbia, commanded by Captain Robert Gray, dropped anchor after the first leg of a fur trading venture from Oregon to the Orient. The Americans were pleased by the climate of the islands and the charming qualities of the natives. Of primary economic interest was the discovery of the abundant growth of sandalwood. This fragrant wood was known to be in

demand in China for use in ornamental carving and, because of its medicinal qualities, for use in incense. Happily for the traders, the addition of the wood to their fur cargo made possible a more profitable trade with the Orient. It was then possible for American traders to pick up furs in the Pacific Northwest, proceed to Hawaii for sandalwood, thence to the Orient.

Six years after the Columbia's first visit, the local chiefs were subjugated, and the islands were united by King Kamehameha, who was the progenitor of a dynasty that would last for nearly a century. Kamehameha's prestige was sufficient to establish Hawaii, in the eyes of interested foreign powers, as a sovereign state worthy of respect. It is possible that this monarch unknowingly was the instrument which prevented Britain, or another power, from establishing a protectorate over the islands which would have precluded American annexation.

By 1819, the year of Kamehameha's death, the fur-sandalwood trade was at its height. In addition, sperm whale hunters from all over the world were establishing Honolulu as an important port of call. By 1820, it was estimated that some two thousand American sailors were visiting the islands annually.¹

¹Harold Whitman Bradley, The American Frontier In Hawaii, The Pioneers 1789--1843, pp. 1-120.

Because of the beauty of the islands and of the native women, Hawaii soon became known as the "sailor's paradise." The implications of this description need not be enlarged upon except perhaps to explain the next group of Americans who became established in Hawaii--the missionaries. Hiram Bingham and a band of seven Congregationalists, their wives and children, arrived in Hawaii for the purpose of educating the natives, teaching the scriptures, and converting the people to Christianity. Their arrival was opportune since it was at a time when the old Polynesian taboos, under which the people had lived for centuries, were beginning to break down and were needing replacement by some other faith.²

Bingham and his flock first began their task by a campaign to teach the natives how to read and write. Their success was phenomenal after they had convinced the royalty that they could and should learn to read and write. It was not long until all ages and ranks were competing in reading and writing tests. The job of conversion was difficult for awhile because the Hawaiians had difficulty following the strict New England rules of Christianity. There was, for example, no such word as "sin" in the Hawaiian language, and

²Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom 1778--1854, Foundation and Transformation, pp. 100-116.

when the missionaries undertook to explain sin to the people, there was some consternation on the part of the many sailors in Hawaii.³

The missionaries began the important establishment of an American society on an outpost more than two thousand miles from the mainland. By 1835, prior to compulsory education in America, Governor Hoapili of the island of Maui enacted a law requiring all children over the age of four to go to school. In 1840, a national system of common schools, supported by the government, and patterned after the New England schools was established.⁴ Ten years later the schools were of sufficient worth to gold rushing Americans that many California secondary school children were educated in Hawaii, primarily at Oahu College (now Punahou High School), rather than on the Eastern seaboard; which would have necessitated much more difficult travel conditions.⁵

The religious and educational accomplishments were only a part of the contribution of the missionaries. It has

³Thomas Blake Clark, Hawaii the 49th State, pp. 65-75.

⁴Honolulu Advertiser, October 8, 1935.

⁵United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, Hawaiian Statehood, p. 12.

been said of them that "they came to do 'good'; their descendents stayed to do 'well.'"⁶ The character of American society made possible frequent changes of occupation, and so the missionaries, as well as the sailors, soon began to acquire a major share in the business activities of the islands. Bishop, Brewer, Castle, and Cook are the family names of missionaries, for example, that are still prominent in Hawaii's business life. Several other factors conditioned a closer relationship between the two nations, among which were the expansion of the United States to the Pacific Coast and the rush of population to California; international developments in Asia, particularly the opening of Japan; trade with the California miners; expansion of American commerce in the Pacific; the depletion of the Hawaiian race as a labor force; and the economic development of sugar as a basic industry.⁷

The development of sugar had more to do, perhaps, with strengthening Hawaii's bonds with the United States than any other factor. Although the land area was small, and not ideally suited to the growing of sugar, it was found that the combination of climate, irrigation,

⁶Tully C. Knoles, Observation circa, 1928.

⁷Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 324.

scientific fertilization, pest control, and other advanced techniques would sustain sugar as a basic industry. One of the advanced techniques, not related to agriculture per se, was political. In searching for a favorable market, the sugar planters were able to negotiate a reciprocal free trade agreement in 1875. In order to make the treaty agreeable to the United States, they were able to persuade King Kalakaua to pledge not to lease nor to alienate any land to other foreign powers.⁸ A renewal of the treaty in 1887 ceded Pearl Harbor to the United States as a permanent naval base.

The immediate result of the treaty was that it gave impetus to the establishment of a sugar plantation boom. Nearly ninety plantations were functioning, but each was faced with the management problems of finance, shipping, marketing, purchasing of equipment, and the labor supply. These problems gave rise to the formation of "factoring" companies which assumed these management problems in return for 2½ per cent of the plantation's gross income. These companies were responsible for stabilizing the sugar industry. However, many of the arguments against both Hawaii's annexation, as well as statehood, stem from their

⁸Stephen B. Jones and Klaus Mehnert, "Hawaii and the Pacific," Geographical Review, 30:358-75.

methods.

The native population had steadily declined so that by 1853 there were only seventy thousand Hawaiians left in the islands. The diseases of the white man had taken their toll, and the easy Polynesian background did not lend itself to the hard "stoop" labor demanded on the plantations. The factors, therefore, decided to look to the Orient for cheap contract labor. As early as 1852, the Hawaiian Agricultural Society had imported some two hundred Chinese laborers as an experiment to determine if they could replace the diminishing Hawaiian population. The coolies were under a five-year contract, by the terms of which they were supplied with passage, housing, medical aid, food, clothing, and three dollars a month.⁹ The Chinese became a part of the Hawaiian society, and about thirty thousand entered the islands in a twenty-year period.¹⁰ Some concern for the increasing numbers of Chinese caused the factor to look to Japan for a new source of supply. Japan had followed, for a great many years, a policy of retaining all her citizens in her islands. By 1886, however, the Emperor authorized the Japanese

⁹Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 387.

¹⁰William Atherton Du Puy, Hawaii and Its Race Problem, p. 102.

Immigration [sic] Company to send to Hawaii great numbers of laborers. The reasons for this change in policy are located in a previous treaty consummated between King Kalakaua and the Emperor in 1873 which, it was claimed, granted to "all Japanese forever the rights of the most favored nation."

Japanese statesmen also located another treaty between Hawaii and Spain, which had been signed by the King. It was meant to enable traders to use the ports, and it provided that they should "enjoy the same rights and privileges which are granted to the natives." This was the implement by which the Japanese were able to establish the policy of dual citizenship, which the Hawaiians were unable to repudiate. Great numbers of Japanese poured into Hawaii following the first arrival of two thousand who arrived in 1886.¹¹

Immigrants from Portugal joined, between 1878 and 1883, the three hundred or so men who had jumped the trading and whaling vessels between 1830 and 1878. Their assimilation was considerably different from that of the other laborers, since families came together, and the

¹¹Marion Mills Miller (ed.), Great Debates in American History, pp. 178-81.

Portuguese were considered to be Caucasian stock. Generally, the Portuguese were accorded the privilege of becoming gang bosses and foremen on the plantations.¹² Inevitably, the Oriental contract labor system, although it solved many of the sugar planters' problems, caused many other problems which have been thoroughly aired in the statehood issue, just as they were during annexation debate in Congress.

The background of the development of annexationist views was not limited to Hawaii alone. Owing to the proximity of California and Hawaii during the gold rush, there was an annexationist move in 1852, when Congressman McCorkle asserted that:

. . . it is essential to our Pacific interests that we should have possession of the Sandwich Island, and upon this point the people of California will speak with one voice. In the annexation of the Sandwich Islands, it makes them a part of ourselves--not "entangling alliances" are formed. . . .¹²

In 1854, President Franklin Pierce authorized negotiations with King Kamehameha III in regard to annexation as well as statehood. Article II of the resulting proposed treaty read:

¹¹Clark, op. cit., pp. 100-103.

¹²Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 409.

The Hawaiian Kingdom shall be incorporated into the American Union as a state, enjoying the same degree of sovereignty as other states, and admitted as soon as it can be done in consistency with the principles and requirements of the Federal Constitution, to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a state, as aforesaid, on a perfect equality with other states of the Union.¹³

This proposed treaty is the first recorded official negotiation between the two countries. It was not consummated partially because of Kamehameha's death and the fact that Great Britain exerted some pressure on Pierce to withdraw negotiations.

President Andrew Johnson, in his annual message to the Fortieth Congress on December 18, 1868, described the favorable aspects of a reciprocity treaty by saying that,

. . . it would be a guaranty of the goodwill and forbearance of all nations until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission to the Union.¹⁴

Pressure from Hawaii for annexation came largely from American entrepreneurs who steadily made their influence known in the kingdom. As early as 1840, Hawaii's King Kamehameha III had changed the character of the Polynesian dynasty from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy with a constitution patterned along American democratic ideals.

¹³United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaiian Statehood, pp. 6-7.

¹⁴Ibid.

The King had surrounded himself with missionary advisers who had guided him toward the enactment of the liberal constitution which granted universal suffrage and extended the right of property ownership to the common man.¹⁵

When Kamehameha III died, his successor, Kamehameha IV had no predilection for America, much preferring the British institutions. In 1864, his successor, Kamehameha V abrogated the liberal constitution of 1840, and drew up a new one which restored some of his autocratic privileges and limited suffrage to property owners. His death, in 1872, ended the Kamehameha dynasty, and gave rise to the growth of American control of the government.

Since Kamehameha V died childless, without appointing a successor, William C. Lunalilo and David Kalakaua ran in elections to determine the next king. Lunalilo was the victor; however, he died within a year, also failing to appoint a successor. A special session of the legislature was called to determine a successor, and it was at this point that American influence in Hawaii's political life was to manifest itself. Queen Emma, Kamehameha IV's widow, apparently was the people's choice; but David

¹⁵Kuykendall, op. cit., pp. 194-220.

Kalaka'ua was selected to oppose her. Since the election was to be performed by the legislature rather than a popular vote, the Americans saw to it that the legislators were wined and dined sufficiently to secure a favorable vote. The county was thirty-nine to six in favor of Kalaka'ua. As if to remind the new king of the source of his sovereignty, it is reported that Samuel G. Wilder collected the ballots and shaped them into a crown which he later presented to Kalaka'ua.¹⁶

The new king was the first reigning monarch to set foot on the United States, when he was sent by the Hawaiian sugar interests to petition for the reciprocal trade treaty in 1875. Kalaka'ua was known as Hawaii's "Merry King," and his knowledge of fiscal affairs was limited to how much he could spend. Since he was almost always in debt despite an estimated income of \$400,000.00 a year, the king began alienating his benefactors, the American businessmen. Rather than listening to these men who put him in office and could have saved him, he became influenced by fraudulent schemers.

The indiscretion which finally began the downfall of the kingdom occurred in 1887 when the king allowed

¹⁶Clark, op. cit., p. 80.

himself to become involved in a fantastic sale of an opium license in which he sold the license to one, but took the money of both of the bidders for the license. At this point, Sanford B. Dole headed a committee which demanded that the king sign a new constitution which restricted him from appointing nobles, and provided that the king could no longer act without the approval of his cabinet.

The king's sister, Liliuokalani, the next in line of succession, was extremely dissatisfied with the actions of her brother, and determined that when she became queen she would restore her rightful prerogatives. In 1891, Liliuokalani was serving as Acting Regent while her brother was visiting in San Francisco. Kalakaua died during his visit, and Liliuokalani thus became Queen without further formalities. Her determination to win back what she considered to be her rightful prerogatives proved to be her undoing.

In January, 1893, taking advantage of the fact that most of the opposing members of the legislature were absent, she arranged to have the cabinet removed and a new one immediately appointed. With a new cabinet, she commenced the drafting of a new constitution which would have restored some of the powers of the monarchy.

Dole and a "committee of safety" issued on January 16, 1893, a proclamation which declared the actions of the

queen illegal, and on the next day during a mass meeting confiscated the Iloani palace and proclaimed a provisional government which would exist "until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon."¹⁷

Dole, as head of the provisional government, demanded that the queen surrender the palace. American military force prevented a counter revolution with the assistance of the United States Minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, who allowed United States troops from the cruiser Boston to land in Honolulu.¹⁸ Less than thirty days later, President Harrison transmitted to Congress a treaty of annexation which had been brought to Washington by Commissioners Lorin A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, and Joseph Marsden on behalf of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. In his message, Harrison seemed to condone much of the action in the following statement:

I do not deem it necessary to discuss at any length the conditions which have resulted in this decisive action. It has been the policy of the administration not only to respect but to encourage the continuance of an independent government in the Hawaiian Islands so long as it afforded suitable guarantees for the protection of life and property and maintained a stability and strength that gave adequate security against the

¹⁷Clark, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

¹⁸Miller, op. cit., p. 170.

domination of any other power. . . . The overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this government, but had in its origin what seems to have been a reactionary and revolutionary policy on the part of Queen Liliuokalani, which put in serious peril not only the large and preponderating interests of the United States in the islands, but all foreign interests, and, indeed, the decent administration of all civil affairs in the islands. . . . The restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable, if not impossible, and unless actively supported by the United States would be accompanied by serious disaster and the disorganization of all business interests. The influence of the United States must be increased and not diminished.

Only two courses are now open--one the establishment of a protectorate by the United States, and the other annexation full and complete. I think the latter course, which has been adopted in the treaty, will be highly promotive of the best interests of the Hawaiian people; and is the only one that will adequately secure the interests of the United States. . . . Prompt action on this treaty is very desirable. . . .¹⁹

This message was transmitted on February 15, 1893, but while Senate action was still pending, Harrison's successor, Grover Cleveland, was inaugurated, and his attitude was just the reverse. A Special Agent, James A. Blount, was sent to the islands for the purpose of investigating the circumstances of the revolution, and his report caused Cleveland to send a message to the Senate which stated his views on the subject:

¹⁹Message of President Harrison transmitting Treaty of Annexation, February 13, 1893, in Henry Steele Commager (ed.), Documents of American History, pp. 152-53.

. . . Surely under our constitution and laws the enlargement of our limits is a manifestation of the highest attribute of sovereignty, . . . and should be clear and free from suspicion. Additional importance attached to this particular treaty of annexation because it contemplated a departure from unbroken American tradition in providing for the addition to our territory of islands of the sea more than 2,000 miles from our nearest coast.²⁰

Cleveland went on to say that he did not feel that the Provisional Government had the sanction of either "suffrage or popular revolution." He inferred, also, that there was a tremendous amount of haste between the time Hawaiians had considered the provisional government and the time when the commissioners arrived in Washington to negotiate the treaty--a period covering only thirty-two days. These considerations would probably have been enough reasons for withdrawing the treaty. However, Cleveland's prime reason was the fact that Queen Liliuokalani, even though she had signed the treaty, sent along with it a protest that she had yielded to the superior force of the United States whose minister supported the provisional government.

Cleveland inferred that Harrison had been misled by saying that the revolt had in no way been "promoted by this government," and that the facts proved that the Provisional Government had not been established due to the honest desires

²⁰Ibid.

of the people, nor could it have existed without the force of the United States to support it.

Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for consideration.²¹

The Provisional Government, on being informed of Cleveland's action, took steps to consolidate its power, and July 4, 1894, after a constitutional convention, proclaimed the Republic of Hawaii, with Sanford B. Dole as President.

Annexationist fervor still refused to die following its rebuke by Cleveland, and on September 9, 1897, following McKinley's inauguration, an annexation treaty was ratified by the Hawaiian Senate which stated:

The Republic of Hawaii and the United States of America, in view of the natural dependence of the Hawaiian Islands upon the United States, of their geographical proximity thereto, of the preponderant share acquired by the United States and its citizens in the industry and trade of said islands, and of the expressed desire of the Government of the Republic of Hawaii that those islands should be incorporated into the United States as an integral part thereof, and under its sovereignty, have determined to accomplish by treaty an object so important to their mutual and permanent welfare.²²

²¹Cleveland's Withdrawal of Treaty for Annexation of Hawaii, December 18, 1893, Ibid., pp. 153-54.

²²Ibid., pp. 186-87.

McKinley had earlier proclaimed that he favored annexation when he wrote in 1896, "We need Hawaii just as much and a great deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny."²³ The United States Senate did not, however, ratify the treaty at this time. Commodore George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, focused interest in the islands in order to provide the navy with a way station between the United States and the Orient. On May 4, 1898, a joint resolution to annex Hawaii was introduced in the House by Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, and the subject, having been reported favorably, came up for discussion on June 11, and continued until July 6, 1898. Representative Robert R. Hitt, Illinois, reported the resolution along with the majority report.

The arguments of pro annexationists are substantially the same as proponents of statehood. Hitt inferred in his report that it had long been under consideration both in Hawaii and in the United States that, whether by cession or annexation, Hawaii's acquisition had been the "natural result of events and causes long operating and now concluding with mutual and cordial consent." He also pointed out

²³United States Congress, Report 109, Hawaiian Statehood, op. cit., p. 7.

that the islands should not be considered as of no consequence to the United States; that their position in the Pacific in relation to the West Coast and the Orient was such that their acquisition would be of prime importance in a world diminishing in size due to steam power and in which naval competition was growing increasingly keen.

Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet merely served to support the contention that Hawaii as a neutral power only served to embarrass the United States since, because of military exigencies, the navy was forced to use the islands as a coaling station. Thus, the United States was demanding strict neutrality by other nations, while disregarding neutrality itself.

One of the greatest fears, of course, was that because of Hawaii's weakness, other powers such as Germany, France, or Britain might influence her sufficiently to secure the islands as part of their empires. Japan also had to be considered. By 1898 there were some twenty-four thousand Japanese in the islands, and as their numbers increased, the United States had reason to fear the consequences were she to leave the islands to their own devices. Japan, it will be recalled, had made rather stringent demands on the Hawaiian government in regard to the citizenship rights of the Japanese laborers. The theory that the Japanese inherently possessed the rights of dual

citizenship would have made it possible for a large Japanese population to vote for a change in administration or allegiance. As a matter of fact, annexation, it was felt, would not only settle the question of the citizenship rights of the Japanese, but would also make it possible for the United States to place restriction on further immigration.

Those who argued against the annexation expressed the belief that the defense of the West Coast was not threatened in the first place. Furthermore, the acquisition of Hawaii might only lead to accusations by other powers that, though we disavowed any aggression on our part, we were certainly demonstrating a type of colonialism as well as a repudiation of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine were annexation to become a fact. The war with Spain was presumably being fought to maintain the integrity of the doctrine as well as to free subjugated peoples. A return to slavery was inferred owing to the character of, not only the native population, but also the Oriental contract laborers and the system of peonage under which they worked.

A serious doubt existed, particularly among the Democratic elements, as to whether the United States had an honest right to deal with the Republic of Hawaii due to the circumstances under which it assumed its authority. Since many in Congress still took Cleveland's view that the

Republic was merely a coup d'etat on the part of a few powerful business interests, and not a demonstration of the wishes of the people, it was felt that annexation would certainly set a dangerous precedent, one which would be virtually the first step toward the building of an empire among alien lands and peoples.

Proponents argued that the United States had, for all practical purposes, exercised dominion over the islands to such an extent that, even if the annexation movement failed, the bonds were so strong that the United States would certainly not permit a free choice on the part of the Hawaiians to become married to one of the other powers. The feeling was that annexation would insure that the islands would not fall to Japan, either by conquest or by vote of the rapidly growing Japanese population. Since the American flag was already privileged to fly at Pearl Harbor under the terms of the renewed reciprocal free trade agreement, the argument that the United States should not go out of its own boundaries was felt to be extremely weak.

It was pointed out that, in the westward expansion on our own continent, the native population had very little voice in determining their own destinies; therefore, why should the United States at this time oppose a movement which had been proposed by Americans who were responsible for the advancement of western culture in the "barbaric

islands"? Since the government had held out the "gift" of the islands, proponents felt that annexation would literally be an "extension of the domain of peace on the habitable globe." Military conquest of territory in the Far East and in the West Indies was being considered; however, Hawaii's was a conquest by friendship, freely offered and received.

The joint resolution was passed in the House by a vote of 209 to ninety-one, and in the Senate, on July 6, 1898, by a vote of forty-two to twenty-one. The Newlands resolution became law on July 8, 1898, and the Republic of Hawaii became formally annexed as a territory of the United States on August 12, 1898.²⁴

²⁴Miller, op. cit., p. 244.

CHAPTER II

THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

The Newlands Resolution was not only the instrument by which Hawaii became a part of the United States, but it also contained the interim provisions for the government of the territory until such time as Congress could further implement the new association. The government of the Republic of Hawaii ceded absolutely all rights of sovereignty, as well as the ownership of all public, government, crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, and military equipment.

Since Hawaii already had a standing government, the Resolution provided for the government of the islands by stating that,

. . . all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government . . . shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct.

The existing treaties between Hawaii and other foreign powers were abrogated; municipal laws of the islands, not inconsistent with the Resolution or the Constitution were permitted to remain in force pending action of Congress. Customs, laws, and relations between Hawaii, the United States, and other countries remained unchanged, and the public debt of Hawaii was assumed by the United States.

Further immigration from China was prohibited, as well as the immigration of Chinese from Hawaii to the Mainland.

Finally, the President was required to appoint five commissioners whose duty was to recommend legislation to the Congress.¹

By 1900, the Organic Act for the government of Hawaii was passed. This Act has been in effect Hawaii's Constitution for the past fifty-six years, and has provided for the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the government. The President appoints, with the approval of the Senate, the governor and the secretary of the territory. The secretary's duties are similar to those of the lieutenant-governor of a state. Each of these officials is appointed to a four-year term and must be a resident of Hawaii. The territorial legislature consists of a bicameral system composed of fifteen senators and thirty representatives elected for four and two year terms, respectively. Non-voting representation in Congress was established and the people were allowed to elect a delegate to Congress every two years. Hawaii's judicial branch consists of a two-judge federal district court, whose jurisdiction is the same as other district courts of the

¹Henry Steele Commager (ed.), Documents of American History, pp. 186-87.

United States. Under the act, Hawaii has also been permitted to establish a territorial supreme court and four circuit courts. There have also been numerous lower courts established by the territorial legislature, with Congressional approval.

The Organic Act gave to Hawaii an organization more like a state than had been previously been given to any like area. The limitations in the organization, however, are evident. The executive branch is not elected, but holds office by Presidential appointment; the legislature is popularly elected, but since the constitution places the legislative authority for the territories in Congress, its power is only at the will of the Congress; its courts are "legislative" courts created by Congress in exercising its power over the territories, as distinguished from the courts in the states which are constituted under Article III of the Constitution. United States' citizenship was extended to all persons who were citizens of Hawaii as of August 12, 1898, with the exception of certain Chinese who came under the Exclusion Acts of 1894 and before.²

²United States Code (Annotated), Title 48, Section 491.

One further accomplishment of the Organic Act was to establish Hawaii as an "incorporated" territory. An incorporated territory is an outgrowth of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, designed by the Continental Congress to meet the needs of the local government of the territories, and to provide for an interim government until such time as the territories could qualify for statehood. Traditionally, the incorporated territory becomes a rudimentary or inchoate state. Its specific incorporation into the Union implies the express applicability of the Constitution, and the application of federal laws to the territory. The states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin were territories under this concept as were twenty-three other states. Hawaii and Alaska are the only two remaining incorporated territories, and proponents of statehood claim that "incorporation" infers an inherent right to statehood, because of the precedent set by the Northwest Ordinance.³

The procedure followed by previous incorporated territories in order to become states has simply been that the people petition Congress. If Congress gives its

³Marcos E. Kinevan, "Alaska and Hawaii: From Territoriality to Statehood," California Law Review, 38:273-292.

approval, it passes an enabling act which sets forth the conditions by which statehood may be achieved. The people of the territory must then frame, ratify, and present a constitution to the President. If the President approves the constitution, elections of state officials are held, and the territory is deemed a state. When statehood has been granted, the territory receives the same powers as the other states, and the action is irrevocable.⁴

Proponents of Hawaiian statehood have pointed out that the admission of any territory of the United States to the Union has been based on the doctrine that the strength and prosperity of the nation depended upon full political equality for every incorporated area, the people of which have met the following three tests:

1. That the territory had attained a sufficiently large population to support statehood in the time in which it was admitted;

2. That that population was imbued with, and wholeheartedly in support of, democracy and the American form of government; and

3. That the people of the territory desired statehood.

Proponents of statehood, and the recommendations contained in numerous Congressional Committee reports claim that Hawaii has met all the requirements.⁵

⁴"Statehood Under the United States Constitution," Congressional Digest, 26:259-61.

⁵Hawaii Statehood Commission, Hawaii Showcase for Americanism, p. 1.

CHAPTER III

HAWAII'S CASE FOR STATEHOOD

Hawaii, in recent years, has been submitting progressively stronger evidence that she has met the tests for statehood. Evidence to support the size of her population and its economic stability; the loyalty of her citizens to democracy and the American way of life; and the desire of her people for statehood has developed to such an extent that successive Congressional committees since 1946 have reported that Hawaii has "unequivocally met the qualifications as a state."

Hawaii's population of nearly a half million people is more than that of any other incorporated territory, except Oklahoma at the time it was admitted to statehood. Its population today is greater than that of any of the following states: Nevada, Wyoming, Delaware, Vermont, Idaho, and Montana. Furthermore, it is within fifty thousand or so people of four additional states. The following table represents the growth in size as well as citizenship responsibilities in the first half-century of Hawaii as an incorporated territory.

The ability of a population to "sustain statehood at the time of admission" infers economic system and stability. Hawaiian proponents point out that in the fiscal

TABLE I

HAWAII'S GROWTH IN SIZE AND CITIZENSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES
1900-1950*

	1900	1950	Per cent Change
Population	154,001	499,794	224
Citizens	63,221	433,324	585
Aliens	90,780	66,445	-26
Registered Voters	11,216	141,319	1160

* Hawaii Statehood Commission, Hawaii, Showcase for Americanism, p. 26.

year of 1953, her citizens paid nearly \$136,000,000.00 in federal taxes, exceeding the payments of anyone of the nine states of Nevada, New Hampshire, Montana, Vermont, Idaho, South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, and New Mexico.¹

Hawaii's industrial wealth depends upon the success of her agricultural economy. In 1953, Hawaii's twenty-eight independent sugar plantations produced 1,099,000 tons of raw sugar on 220,000 acres, with a crop value of \$148,000,000.00. Her pineapple canneries produced 29,000,000 cases of fruit and juice. This production was realized from fourteen pineapple plantations totaling 73,000 acres and a crop value of \$100,000,000.00. Coffee, fruits, nuts, vegetables, and fishing contributed another \$29,000,000.00 to Hawaii's economy.²

The tourist industry has been rapidly assuming the proportions of a "basic industry" owing to the increase of mainland visitors. In 1953, some 78,000 tourists visited the islands, and bolstered the economy by an estimated \$43,000,000.00.

Since Hawaii is located at the crossroads of the Pacific, she has developed excellent air and ocean shipping

¹Hawaii Statehood Commission, Hawaii, Showcase for Americanism, p. 14.

²Russell H. Fifield, "Statehood for Hawaii," Current History, 29:172, 344.

facilities. The Honolulu airport was the eighteenth busiest in the world during 1953. Some 1,100 surface ships called at Honolulu harbor during the fiscal year 1952-1953. Overseas incoming freight total 2,500,00 tons; outgoing freight totaled nearly 1,000,000 tons.³

Additionally, Hawaiians support their local governments through county and territorial taxes. In the fiscal year 1950, territorial taxes amounted to nearly \$77,000,000.00; county taxes were approximately \$4,500,000.00. The total tax burden, therefore, amounts to \$216,466,638.00, including federal taxes.

Per-capital expenditures by the territory and counties as compared with local and state mainland averages, are demonstrated in the figure in the Appendix.

Federal expenditures in the islands are primarily for defense activities, and they amounted to \$237,000,000.00 in 1954.

In 1954, the labor force in the islands averaged nearly 184,000, with seasonal highs expected during the spring and summer months.⁴

³Hawaii Statehood Commission, op. cit., p. 15.

⁴Fifield, loc. cit.

The school system in Hawaii is one of the best organized and efficient of any in the nation. There are 319 institutions through the twelfth grade, with a total of 127,000 students, 106,000 of whom attend the public schools.

The University of Hawaii, with a student body of nearly 5,000, is one of the nation's land-grant colleges, and it has a higher enrollment in proportion to the population than does any similar institution.

Public and higher education are recognized as the territorial responsibility, and in the 1953-1954 budget, the legislature appropriated \$33,000,000.00, more than a third of the Territory's budget for the biennium.

The Territory's health and welfare responsibilities are much the same as those of Mainland states.⁵

The center of island culture is, of course, located in the city of Honolulu. The visitor to this city will find the establishment of literature and the fine arts equal to, if not surpassing Mainland cities of comparable size. In fact, most tourists in Honolulu find it difficult to believe that they are in a city that is technically, at least, not a full-fledged city of the United States. The

⁵Hawaii Statehood Commission, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

business district is very similar to that of Long Beach, California, for example. A four-lane, divided highway leads from the downtown district to the Waikiki Beach playground, where luxury hotels, shops, and restaurants tempt every a Mainland tourist. Superb treasures of the Hawaiian and Polynesian arts are contained in the Queen Emma and Bishop Museums. The Royal Hawaiian Band has been supported by the city since 1870, and the Honolulu Symphony Orchestra, since 1902. The Honolulu Community Theater, as well as the University of Hawaii Theater Guild, provide Honoluluans with a varied repertoire of plays. Libraries, churches of all faiths, twelve commercial radio stations, seven major newspapers, and two television stations which provide locally produced as well as Mainland shows, complete the picture of this American community.

What surprises the new visitor more is, of course, the fact that the skins of these Americans are multi-colored as compared to those of the Long Beach variety. It is perhaps in the field of race relations that proponents of statehood feel their greatest pride. The fact that Americans have so effectively dominated island culture makes it almost impossible to distinguish between races, except by the color of the skin.⁶

⁶Leslie G. Knoles, personal observation, 1944, 1945, and 1953.

Racial groups in Hawaii represent eleven ethnic backgrounds: Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, Portuguese, Spanish, Puerto Rican, Haole or other Caucasian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, and Negro. In 1930, only 43 per cent of the population were native to the islands, but by 1940, 79 per cent were native, and in 1950 the ratio had increased to nearly 84 per cent.⁷

Perhaps it is the mere fact that so many racial groups are represented on such a small area, and that they arrived at Hawaii at relatively the same time, that no one group was cited by the residents as undesirable. The Hawaiian native, not ever having experienced subjugation by an outside power, developed no feelings of racial superiority or inferiority, and their mingling with all the races freely set the pattern for later racial harmony.⁸ Possibly the best picture of Hawaiian racial achievement, is found in the following description:

The face of Hawaii today is represented in the Society pages of the Honolulu Star Bulletin by formal portraits of Nisei, Anglo-Saxon, and Filipino brides published side by side. It is typified by the chromium-plated drive-in where slangy Japanese-American car hops rush double-rich chocomalts to your car or the business

⁷United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Alaska and Hawaiian Statehood, Report No. 88, p. 19.

⁸William C. Smith, "Minority Groups in Hawaii," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 223:36-44.

office where brown-skinned hula maidens practice the sinuous intricacies of shorthand. It is the brown-skinned kids in jeans and Hopalong Cassidy shirts sitting in a classroom and reciting about our "Pilgrim forefathers."⁹

Statehood proponents further declare that Hawaiians have qualified for statehood under the second test: that they are imbued with, and wholeheartedly in support of democracy and the American form of government. Hawaiians feel that their impressive war records during World War II and the Korean conflict are sufficient to prove to the world that they support democracy. A comment made by an American Army private after the Italian campaign was: "The first dead American I saw during the war in Italy was a Japanese from Hawaii."¹⁰ The One Hundredth Infantry Battalion, and the Four Hundred Forty-Second Regimental Combat Team, comprised mostly of Hawaiian-Americans of Japanese descent, were described by General Mark Clark as the "most decorated units in the entire military history of the United States." Maysayuki Matsumaga had this to say about his service with the One Hundredth Infantry Battalion:

I can honestly and sincerely say this: while fighting for the same ideals as any other American was fighting for, at the same time, every man in the One Hundredth

⁹Leonard Slater, Newsweek, 36:22, November 27, 1950.

¹⁰Sheldon C. Eller, observation circa, 1944.

and the Four Hundred and Forty-Second was in addition fighting to prove to the world that despite his racial ancestry he was as loyal an American as any, as loyal as any, and deserved the right to be called an American. That was the driving force behind our men which led them to achieve such an enviable record in American military history . . .¹¹

In the Korean conflict, substantial numbers of Hawaiians served in the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions. The percentage of Hawaii's battle casualties was reported to have been three times those of the rest of the country. It has also been pointed out that there were no "turncoats" reported from the youth of Hawaii.¹²

Proponents cite the fact that Hawaii has been a functioning democracy for fifty-six years. Both the Democrats and the Republicans are as well organized and potent as they are in many states, and there are no racial groups preponderant in either party. For example, the 1953 Territorial Legislature consisted of twenty-seven Republicans, and nineteen Democrats. Fifteen of the legislators were Japanese, of whom nine were Republican and six Democrats. Of those remaining, three were Chinese and the rest were assorted Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, and Caucasian.¹³

¹¹United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee, 81st Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 49, S. 155, S. 1782, pp. 246-50.

¹²Hawaii Statehood Commission, loc. cit.

¹³Members of the Territorial Legislature, 27th Session.

The final pre-requisite for statehood involves the desires of the people of the territory. The Hawaiian Legislature has, on eighteen different occasions since 1903, petitioned Congress for admission to the Union. In 1940, at the suggestion of the report of the Congressional Investigation of 1937, a plebiscite was held which resulted in a two to one vote for statehood. In 1950, the Hawaiian State Constitution was approved by a vote of better than three to one.¹⁴ Gallup Polls have shown a steady favorable opinion for statehood both in Hawaii and on the Mainland, today's estimate showing nearly 78 per cent in favor.¹⁵

Samuel Wilder King, Hawaii's Governor, summed up the viewpoints of the proponents of statehood when he stated:

Hawaii should be granted statehood . . . as a demonstration to the world that the United States is keeping faith with the ideals on which our nation was founded. Hawaii has met the requirements for statehood in all respects and her people are prepared to meet the responsibilities of statehood.

Statehood will bring to a climax a long and vigorous campaign by the people of Hawaii for self-government. It will be a deserving reward to this community for its patriotism and loyalty. . . . I am confident that the

¹⁴Hawaii Statehood Commission, op. cit., pp. 3,4.

¹⁵George Gallup, Director American Public Opinion, Tables on Hawaii Statehood, 1955. Cited in 1955 Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives.

people of Hawaii will carry forward the high standards that have marked the conduct of their government affairs and will discharge their responsibilities under statehood in an exemplary manner.¹⁶

Despite the fact that the qualifications for statehood, based on precedent by which other states have been admitted, seem to have been met, Hawaii's case has never yet achieved the strength to pass through both Houses of Congress in the same session. Statehood bills were passed by the House in 1947, 1950, and 1953; the combined Hawaii-Alaska bill was passed by the Senate in 1954. These are, however, the only floor votes that have been taken on the measure. The only consolation that Hawaiians might gain from this is the fact that since both Houses have acted favorably on occasion they may possibly be both convinced at some date in the future.

¹⁶Hawaii Statehood Commission, op. cit., p. 32.

CHAPTER IV

HAWAII AS A STATE

For all practical purposes, the benefits that would accrue to Hawaii from the achievement of statehood, or to the nation, would be small. A great deal of the appeal for statehood is, however, manifested in the psychological or emotional phases of the question which cannot be defined in terms of practicality.

If Hawaii were to become a state, life for the average citizen would change very little. The nature of the Organic Act makes nearly all federal laws applicable to the Territory. Therefore, there would be no noticeable difference in any of the tax laws, Social Security, Selective Service, relief pay, unemployment compensation, minimum wage, and other features of the government that are already so similar to those of a state.

For the individual citizen, however, statehood would remove the stigma of "second class citizenship" that now exists in the minds of many Hawaiians. He would be able to vote for President and Vice-President of the United States, and for the governor of Hawaii, and other state officials. He could be represented in Congress by two elected Senators, and, presumably, by two elected

Representatives.¹ The lack of representation on a voting basis has given rise to the rebirth of a slogan dear to the hearts of all Americans: "Taxation without representation is tyranny!"²

If Hawaii were admitted, Congressional sufferance over her Legislature would be removed; her courts would be established on a "constitutional," rather than a "legislative," authority; local elections and appointments rather than federal appointments to the courts would be the rule. Statehood would insure an equal share in the federal per-capita grants for education, health, highways, and other public improvements.

Hawaiians would also be granted the right to vote for Constitutional Amendments, and her delegates would no longer need to wade through much of the proposed legislation in order to insure that the Territory can qualify for laws as desirable to her as to the states.³

The advantages to Hawaii's economy would be in the Constitutional right of free exchange of goods between the states. There have been times when Hawaii's trade has been

¹United States News and World Report, 34:36-7.

²Farrant L. Turner, Secretary of Hawaii, letter to members of the National Association of Secretaries of State, September 11, 1953.

³Marcos E. Kinevan, "Alaska and Hawaii: From Territoriality to Statehood," California Law Review, 38:283-91.

subject to Congressional restraint just as if she had been a foreign country. The most notable example of this restraint is the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act of 1934. This act placed Hawaii's sugar industry on a quota, and it also provided that the only sugar to be refined in Hawaii was that for domestic use. This resulted in the construction of a \$25,000,000.00 refinery near Richmond, California, which hires 1,500 Californians to refine Hawaii's sugar. These people could be added to Hawaii's payroll were this restriction removed by statehood.⁴

As far as the United States in general is concerned, there seems to be very little practical advantage in granting statehood. Most of the benefits would appear to be psychological or emotional, and in terms of "moral responsibility" and obligation. The feeling is that prompt admission would enhance America's reputation as a nation which keeps its promises and meets the obligations it has toward all its citizens. There is a belief, held by many proponents, that a "promise" of statehood was inherent in annexation. Former Governor Oren E. Long, as well as the late Governor Joseph F. Farrington refer to a promise held out by Senator John Morgan of Alabama, in 1899, the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, when

⁴United States News and World Report, loc. cit.

he told Hawaiians that "the road to statehood would not be long." Both of the governors point out that, regardless of Johnson's position at the time of his statement in Hawaii, the citizens had always felt that he was an official emissary of the United States Government, whose word was worth believing.⁵

America's position in today's world, as it relates to the Asian countries, is cited as another benefit to the nation were statehood granted. Not only would there be a new state in the Pacific basin, but the claim is that admission would create goodwill among the countries of that basin if the stigma of "colonization" or the denial of "self determination" were removed. Furthermore, it is claimed that men who really had knowledge of the Pacific and its peoples would be sent to Washington as voting members of Congress.

Finally, it is argued that Hawaiians would pay the cost of government, including the salaries of administrative officials and the Legislature, and they would thus relieve the Federal Government of this expense.⁶

⁵Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Congress, Senate, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee, 83rd Congress 2d session on S. 49, S. 51, and H. R. 3575, January, 1954, pp. 26, 264.

⁶Hawaii Statehood Commission, Hawaii, Showcase for Americanism, p. 29.

The majority report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs substantiates these arguments in its 1951 report on statehood:

It is a paradox that the United States should still permit so vital a part of itself to remain in the inferior status of a Territory when that part fulfills each and every one of the historic qualifications of statehood, and is eager to assume the burdens and responsibilities of full equality, as well as enjoy its privileges. The United States has been striving with all its might to promote the principle of self-determination and self-government among the peoples of the earth. Yet it is denying to a commonwealth within its own borders the right of self-government in the full measure to which that community is entitled.

Statehood would resolve that paradox . . .⁷

⁷United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Calendar No. 296, Report No. 314 together with Minority views to accompany S. 49, 82nd Congress 1st Session, p. 3.

CHAPTER V

A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF HAWAIIAN STATEHOOD

Although the power to admit new states into the union rests solely with Congress under Article IV of the Constitution, the terms of that Article do not clearly define the steps by which states must be admitted. Twenty-nine of the states were granted statehood after a prior status of an incorporated territory. The military governor of California issued a call for a convention to frame a civil government. The convention wrote a constitution and asked the military governor to submit it to the federal government. The measure passed Congress on September 7, 1850.¹ Texas was admitted by a joint resolution of the United States Congress which was accepted by a convention in Texas which was called to write a constitution for that state-to-be. The legislation for the admission of Texas was completed on October 13, 1845.² Kentucky and West Virginia were created from the State of Virginia; Maine was originally a part of Massachusetts; and Vermont petitioned for statehood and was accepted in perhaps the briefest

¹James A. B. Scherer, Thirty-First Star, pp. 147-209.

²George P. Garrison, Texas A Contest of Civilization, pp. 255-59.

procedure of all.³

The Territorial Legislature of Hawaii started petitioning for statehood on March 6, 1903, and has periodically petitioned on at least seventeen occasions since that time. Delegates and members of Congress have also introduced statehood bills, so that Congress has had to decide on the issue thirty-eight times. In 1935, the first of a series of Congressional committee hearings on the subject were conducted, and eleven separate hearings have been held since. Testimony and materials have been collected from 779 witnesses during 121 days of hearings. The total committee membership was 260, thirty-nine of whom visited the islands. Six hundred twenty-four of the witnesses favored admission, while only seventy-eight were opposed. The pages of printed hearings number 4,724, and the committee reports swell this to about 5,500 pages.

The hearings have covered some sixty different topics relative to statehood including Hawaii's boundaries and coastal waters, the system of land tenure, economic

³United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii-Alaska Statehood, Hearings before the Committee, 84th Congress, 1st session on H.R. 2535, H.R. 236 and related Bills, January and February 1955, Exhibit XIV, pp. 485-99.

system, management of fundamental industry, the racial problem, racial bloc voting, partisan politics, dilution of representation, and scores of other topics.⁴ In 1951, the majority report of the Congressional investigation held that: "The record of testimony and information built up around the question of statehood for Hawaii is more complete than was the case for any other state prior to admission."⁵

It appears, however, that regardless of the majority conclusions of many of the hearings, as well as the successful passage of statehood bills in one House of Congress on four occasions, that the issue still hangs inconclusively suspended. An editorial impression, in 1935, provides what has proved to be the best thumb-nail sketch of the legislative history when describing the actions of the Delegate to Congress at that time:

Samuel Wilder King follows precedent! He sponsors in Congress a statehood resolution, being merely a repetition of other statehood gestures. In due course of time, Congress will place it on the shelf until the next session. The proposals are like Congressional clocking. They mark the sessions of the national legislative assembly regularly and without fail.⁶

⁴United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Alaska-Hawaii Statehood, Elective Governor and Commonwealth Status, Hearings before the Committee on S. 49, S. 399, S. 402, February 1955, p. 175.

⁵United States Congress, Senate, Report 314, op. cit., p. 17.

⁶Editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser, January 9, 1935.

It was conjectured that King was really only doing what tradition dictated, and that it would be a long time before King's constituents would foster any popular sentiment for statehood. The consensus in Hawaii was that there was no considerable movement favoring the issue, and that even if all the sentiment of the Hawaiian people were behind statehood, this fact would not be enough to sway Congress or the American people to favorable action.⁷

Delegate King also recognized that a favorable decision by Congress would probably not be forthcoming immediately; notwithstanding, his continued urging that Congress recognize Hawaii's desirability as a state finally began to be noticed. On August 23, 1935, the subcommittee of the House Committee on the Territories voted to hold hearings in Hawaii during the fall of 1935, on H. R. 3034, a bill, "To Enable the People of Hawaii to Form a Constitution and a State Government."⁸

The first forum on statehood was called to order at Honolulu's Iolani Palace on October 7, 1935. These hearings were significant in that they established the specifications by which Hawaii would have to prove her fitness for statehood. One of the significant patterns set at this hearing,

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., June 2, 1935.

(and to be followed in every subsequent hearing) was that very few opponents of statehood appeared to voice their objection, even though it was inferred that there were many who objected to statehood. Out of 105 witnesses heard, only fifteen were opposed, and they did not generally match the standing in the community of the proponents who testified. The proponents of statehood established the fact that they were well organized and quite vocal. The opponents, on the other hand, were not only unorganized, but they were not apt to state their opinions in public. It was implied during these hearings that opponents had never before considered the situation serious enough to warrant their attention nor to seek the leadership they lacked at the hearings. The fifteen witnesses who did appear in opposition, however, were vocal about some elements of statehood which today can still be considered as obstacles to its conclusion.

The hearings were completed on October 18, 1935, and the subcommittee filed its report which complimented the Territory on being, ". . . a modern unit of the American commonwealth, with a political, social, and economic structure of the highest type." Three members of the five-man committee felt, however, that a considerable amount of study would be necessary before such a bill could be

reported favorably.⁹

A joint committee of the House and Senate was appointed to return to the islands by the next Congress. Accordingly, a twenty-five-man committee conducted hearings, commencing on October 6, 1937. These hearings were held throughout the major islands, and committee members visited various of the industrial, social, educational, and military establishments. The findings were, however, more conclusive than those held in 1935. Although more opponents appeared to testify in opposition at this hearing than had been the case in any of the other hearings, the character of opposition had still not changed appreciably. Of the sixty-six witnesses heard, only nineteen were in opposition.¹⁰

In spite of the preponderance of testimony in favor of statehood, it was evident throughout the hearings that opponents felt that more opposition evidence would have been forthcoming except that many of Hawaii's citizens were still unwilling to oppose statehood openly. Senator Guy Gillette described the dilemma with which he and the rest of the committee were faced by the following statement:

⁹United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 3034, October 7-18, 1935, p. 329.

¹⁰Honolulu Advertiser, October 5-24, 1937.

Congress is not going to grant statehood to Hawaii if the Hawaiian people don't want it. I have been assured by probably twelve or fourteen people since I came here that in event of a plebiscite, seventy-five per cent of the people would declare themselves for statehood. I have also been assured by probably twenty others that if a plebiscite were held, ninety per cent would be opposed to statehood. . . .¹¹

The committee report did recommend that a plebiscite be held to determine whether or not the people really did favor statehood. The report went on to say that "due to the unsettled state of international affairs, further study should be made."

The plebiscite was held in 1940, and resulted in a two-to-one vote for statehood. The bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 caused Hawaii to hold her plans in abeyance until the conclusion of World War II.¹²

The third series of hearings conducted in Hawaii commenced on January 7, 1946 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Territories. This hearing was conducted in much the same manner as the 1937 hearing. The committee traveled through the five major islands. Of the 107 witnesses heard, ninety-one favored, and sixteen opposed statehood.

¹¹United States Congress, House of Representatives and Senate, Joint Committee, 75th Congress 2d Session, pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, October 6-22, 1937, p. 49.

¹²Hawaii Statehood Commission, Hawaii, Showcase for Americanism, p. 2.

The recommendations contained in the committee report provided Hawaii with its first unanimously favorable report on the issue. The findings held that:

1. The people of the Territory of Hawaii have demonstrated beyond question not only their loyalty and patriotism, but also their desire to assume the responsibilities of statehood.
2. The policy of the United States Government is one of self-determination: that peoples be allowed to choose freely their form of political status.
3. Hawaii's location in the Pacific plays so large a part in our country's international position in this area.
4. The Congress of the United States has, through a series of acts and committee reports, indicated to the people of the Territory of Hawaii that they would be admitted when qualified.
5. The Territory of Hawaii now meets the necessary requirements for statehood.¹³

Unfortunately for Hawaii's proponents, House Resolution 236 was merely an authorization to study statehood, and the recommendation contained in the report was never acted upon by the whole committee.

In March, 1947, the House Committee on Public Lands met in Washington to consider H. R. 49 and ten other identical bills for Hawaiian statehood. Thirty-five witnesses were heard, all of whom favored admission. This committee

¹³United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, Hawaii Statehood, Report of the subcommittee, 79th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 1-11.

also unanimously recommended statehood, and since it was a whole committee, the issue finally arrived on the House floor for debate.¹⁴

The one surprising outcome of this debate was that there were very few who opposed the issue, except on the basis that the Japanese in the islands still should not be trusted with full citizenship, regardless of what their war record might have been. As an example, Representative Prince H. Preston, Jr. of Georgia, had the following to say in regard to the Japanese Americans:

It makes citizens with equal rights with you and me of 180,000 Japanese people who reside in Hawaii. It gives those people the same rights as you and I have, we, the descendants of those who created, fought, and maintained this country. Who are those people? They are the descendants of the recently deposed Emperor of Japan. . . .

Mr. Preston's argument was that once Congressmen of Japanese descent were elected to Congress, they would certainly speak for Japan, and not the United States of America.¹⁵

¹⁴United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Public Lands, Hawaii Statehood, Report of the Committee, No. 194 on H. R. 49, 80th Congress, 1st session, p. 40.

¹⁵Congressional Record, 93:7937.

Another argument was presented by a representative from the large state, Frederic Rene Condert, Jr., New York, that implied the willingness to ". . . give them more self-determination, but not two Senators' worth."¹⁶ The old anti-annexationist argument was also resurrected, which held that islands more than two thousand miles from the mainland would only pave the way for other non-contiguous areas to ask for statehood.

Debate closed on June 12, 1947, and the House of Representatives passed the bill by vote of 196 to 133; however, Congress adjourned before the Senate could take action.

An analysis of the "no" vote brings to light what may be the real issue as far as opposition in Congress is concerned; that of the 133 "no" votes, seventy-five of them were from the members representing the south.¹⁷ Although the racial issue is not argued in much of the testimony, or Congressional debate, there is an indication that the motivation behind the majority of those voting "no" might have been just that.

The other "no" votes can be found scattered among the larger states, primarily Pennsylvania and New York.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., 7936.

¹⁷Ibid., 7939.

¹⁸Ibid.

The motive for these votes might possibly have been that voiced by Representative Conderit in objecting to Hawaii's receiving two Senators, thereby diluting the representation of the larger states.

The year 1948 would undoubtedly have been the year Hawaii could have expected her best chances for admission, had it not been for the fact that there was a growing belief that Communism had infiltrated Hawaii's labor force. The chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Senator Guy Cordon conducted hearings in the islands for sixteen days during January 1948. Two hundred thirty-one witnesses were heard; 215 favored statehood, and sixteen were in opposition.

The purpose of Cordon's investigation was to study the judicial system, the degree to which the racial melting pot worked, the economic stability, the extent of Communism, and racial bloc voting. His report held that

1. The courts of the Territory are functioning satisfactorily.
2. Democracy has creditably proved itself in Hawaii.
3. The financial condition of the Territory appears sound.
4. Though the extent of Communist success in Hawaii is not definitely known, the total number of Communists being fewer than one hundred, ample protection against the infiltration of Communist doctrines in the formation of a State constitution exist, since approval must be given both by the electorate of Hawaii and by the President of the United States.

5. Election records for forty-eight years do not support the contention of bloc voting, and there is little chance that the pattern of political behavior will undergo any drastic changes under State government.¹⁹

Senator Cordon recommended that the bill (H. R. 49) be favorably reported to the Senate for immediate action; however, the subcommittee decided to hold further hearings in Washington in order to determine the extent of national interest on the question.²⁰

Accordingly, the subcommittee met on April 15, 1948, and heard eight more witnesses, none of whom were in opposition. Upon further study, the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, determined that it would take no action on the favorable report of the subcommittee. Instead, it authorized the chairman, Senator Hugh Butler, to organize a trip to Hawaii for committee members who might like to look into the Communist question.

Senator Butler was the only one who found that he could go to the islands, so he hired a staff investigator to precede him and make an on-the-spot study of Communist activities. Senator Butler arrived in Hawaii after the

¹⁹Congress of the United States, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Report of the Subcommittee to accompany H. R. 49, 80th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 1-18.

²⁰Ibid.

study had proceeded for nearly two and one-half months. Commencing on November 1, 1948, Butler held confidential interviews with seventy-seven witnesses whose remarks were made a part of the record, and personally talked to over a hundred more whose testimony was not recorded. As a result of his study, Senator Butler became one of the staunchest opponents of immediate statehood. His report, submitted on June 10, 1949, recommended:

1. That statehood for Hawaii be deferred indefinitely, until Communism in the Territory may be brought under effective control;

2. That the Territorial government of Hawaii be encouraged to take positive steps within the scope of its authority to suppress unlawful communistic activities;

3. That the executive branch of the Federal Government, through the Department of Justice, take immediate steps to prosecute lawless communism in the Territory, and to protect from force and violence those who honestly seek to support and strengthen orderly constitutional government;

4. That Congress take cognizance of the very serious economic problems which confront Hawaii as a result of the activities of the Communist-dominated ILWU and immediately enact remedial legislation.²¹

Senator Butler's findings were such that most of the subsequent hearings and debate have been concerned with the

²¹Report submitted by Senator Butler relative to H. R. 49, p. 15.

Communist issue primarily, and it would seem that other issues may have been clouded by this consideration.

Since the 1949 hearings conducted by the subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions of the House Public Lands Committee were held prior to Butler's report, it heard only five witnesses, none of whom voiced opposition. On March 10, 1949, the whole committee recommended that statehood be granted, recognizing:

. . . the extent of Communist influence and activity in the Territory had been the objective of intense inquiry, but . . . that the people of the Territory are alert to the problem and would be better able to cope with it as a State than as a Territory. . . .²²

On March 7, 1950, the House of Representatives voted again to admit Hawaii, by a count of 262 to 110.²³

The Senate Interior Committee held another hearing on the question in May, 1950 at which time sixty more witnesses were heard, none in opposition. Although the Committee met in executive sessions for a period of two weeks, Congress again adjourned before action was taken on the question.²⁴

²²United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Public Lands, Hawaii Statehood, Report No. 254, on H. R. 49, 81st Congress, 2d session, 27 pp.

²³Congressional Record, 96:2947.

²⁴United States Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee on H. R. 49, S. 156 and S. 1782, 81st Congress, 2d session, May 1950.

Three more hearings were conducted in 1953. The Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Possessions of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs heard nineteen witnesses, one of whom was opposed to statehood. These hearings considered five statehood bills: H. R. 21, 49, 205, 1745, and 2981.²⁵ On March 10, 1953, the House passed a different bill, H. R. 3575 granting statehood, by a vote of 274 to 138.²⁶

The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs had, meantime commenced its hearings on two of its own bills for statehood, S. 49 and S. 51. The committee heard three witnesses for statehood. The Committee re-convened on June 29, 1953 to consider S. 49 and S. 51, as well as H. R. 3575, since the latter bill had been passed by the House. Twenty-seven witnesses appeared, nine of whom opposed statehood.²⁷

In 1954, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee of the Senate continued its hearings on the three bills,

²⁵United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the subcommittee on H.R. 21, 49, 205, 1745 and 2981, 83d Congress, 1st session, 209 pp.

²⁶Congressional Record, 99:1869-1900, Hawaii Statehood debate and vote, March 10, 1953.

²⁷United States Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee on S. 49, and S. 51, and H.R. 3575, 83d Congress, 1st and 2d sessions June 29-July 11, 1953, and January, 1954.

reporting two measures to the full Senate for debate on March 4, 1954. One of the bills would have granted statehood to Hawaii; the other would have done the same for Alaska. It was during this debate that a motion was made to combine the two bills, so that on April 1, 1954, H. R. 3575 was approved by the Senate by a vote of fifty-seven to twenty-eight; however, the language of S. 49 was substituted, and thereby Hawaiian-Alaskan statehood became the issue.²⁸

The House failed to take action on this substitute bill, and it was at this time that Hawaii lost its greatest friend for statehood, her delegate, Joseph R. Farrington. The following description of his last day of life, and the disappointment of proponents portrays much of the nature of the Hawaiian statehood movement:

In the last session of Congress, Hawaii was in a position to obtain statehood due to the fact that the Bill passed both the House and the Senate, but those who were opposed to Hawaii would not allow a conference to be held. Joseph R. Farrington, the Delegate from Hawaii (who was one of the finest members of Congress that I have ever met), really lost his life in his effort to obtain statehood for his beloved Hawaii. He went to see Mr. Rayburn and begged of him to permit a conference to be held and pointed out that this Bill had received

²⁸Thomas H. Kuchel, Senator, California, letter to Leslie G. Knoles on Statehood, February 6, 1956.

the approbation of both branches of Congress. He was so frustrated that he went back to his office, and later, . . . he was found dead by his secretary. . . .²⁹

In 1955, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings on nine different bills, two of which were on granting statehood to both Hawaii and Alaska. Fifteen witnesses were heard, one was in opposition. On February 15, 1955, the committee voted nineteen to six to report favorably on H. R. 2535; however, it was recommitted to the Committee on May 10, 1955.³⁰

The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings in February, 1955 on three bills, S. 49 granting statehood to both Hawaii and Alaska, and S. 399 and S. 402 providing for the election of governors and other officials in both Territories, and on proposals for commonwealth status.

These latter two bills and the commonwealth proposals were opposition attempts to grant more self-government, remove the stigma of "taxation without representation," but still deny statehood to either of the Territories.³¹

²⁹Letter from a Congressman to Leslie G. Knoles, April 1, 1954, name withheld by request.

³⁰United States Congress, House of Representatives, Hawaii-Alaska Statehood. Hearings before the Committee on H. R. 2535 and nine other bills, 84th Congress 1st session, January 25, 28, and 31, February 2-16, 1955.

³¹1955 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

The purpose of the concluding chapters of this study is to define the major obstacles to Hawaii's realization of statehood, and to attempt to draw conclusions on the future progress of the movement based on the evidence provided over the past twenty-one years of the controversy.

CHAPTER VI

NON-CONTIGUITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO STATEHOOD

When New Mexico and Arizona were admitted to the Union, the assimilation of the last remaining contiguous incorporated territories led many to believe that the westward expansion had been terminated and that the limits of the United States had been established for all time. In spite of this belief, the two remaining incorporated non-contiguous territories, Hawaii and Alaska, have been submitting evidence to provide that they, too, should be admitted as states.

In Hawaii's case, the claim has been based on the premise that the union of states is political, not geographical. The expansion of the nation covered three thousand miles of land which in turn led to the development of numerous sectional interests; however, the union was held inviolate. Two thousand miles of water separate the western outpost of the American society, but it is claimed that those same political bonds serve to unite the citizens of Hawaii with the mainland.¹

¹Honolulu Advertiser, October 7, 1935.

Despite the evidence that Hawaiians submit to demonstrate their preparedness for statehood and its responsibility, Hawaii's non-contiguity, added to the various other issues in the controversy, has provided opponents with their strongest weapons to negate Hawaii's plea.

Although annexation was accomplished over the opposition of those who claimed that the United States was establishing a dangerous precedent by placing non-contiguous territory under its domain, Congress has been cautious in denying established precedent insofar as the admission of new states is concerned. Non-contiguity, per se, does not pose too much of a problem today as compared to the relatively greater distances, in terms of time, during the opening of this century. It does provide, however, a point of reference from which other objections take strength.

For example, opponents have claimed that the Hawaiian is apt to view events from a provincial, or local point of view rather than from national insight. In his minority report of the 1950 Congressional investigation, Senator Hugh Butler stated:

In every previous case, residents of a new state have been able, easily and cheaply, to cross state boundaries and mingle with the people of the two other states. In most cases, in fact, the new state has been peopled by the other states. They have been born and bred in American traditions and American customs. Their

Americanism has been native to them, and it has been continually renewed and revived by day to day contact with their neighbors across state lines.²

It is implied that the cost of the trip from the islands limited travel to the mainland to the upper income groups, and that the average Hawaiian citizen's contact with mainlanders came from rubbing elbows with tourists in Hawaii seeking relaxation.

Senator George Smathers supported this argument in 1954 when he said:

. . . I . . . know from travelling around a little bit that the average man on the street in Hawaii is probably like the average man on the street in Puerto Rico. He has not had very much of an opportunity to do travelling outside of his own country, and for that reason he knows very little about the United States and the United States Government and the United States People.³

Another objection, based entirely on precedent, proposes that there has been no dispute over the frontiers of the United States since the Louisiana Purchase and the Oregon settlement. Furthermore it is pointed out that

²United States Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee on H. R. 49, S. 156 and S. 1782, 81st Congress, 2d session, May 1950, pp. 47-59.

³United States Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee on S. 49, and S. 51, and H. R. 3575, 83rd Congress, 1st and 2d sessions, June 29-July 11, 1953, and January 1954, p. 85.

history has established that fluid and expanding frontiers have been an invitation to trouble.

Tyre Taylor, General Counsel for the Southern States Industrial Council states:

. . . history records not a single instance of a nation or an empire going beyond its natural frontiers to admit a State as a part of itself that has not been followed by the disintegration of that state or empire. Rome, of course, is the classic example. Its decline started when its Senate took in the Senator from Scythia, the Senator from Mesopotamia, the Senator from Spain, the Senator from Gaul, and the Senator from England.

France is of course the modern example. The French National Assembly numbers 622 deputies. Of these, 30 come from Algeria, 10 from what they call the Overseas Department of Guadeloupe-Martinique, Reunion, and French Guiana; and 38 come from the Associated Territories and the Cameroons.

In the French Senate, out of 315, 115, or more than a third come from the far flung areas of the French Union.⁴

The physical separation from the mainland, and the nature of Hawaii's economy prevented a preponderant Anglo-Saxon population; furthermore, what Anglo-Saxons there were had imported so many contract laborers from the Orient that racial homogeneity with the mainland was out of the question.

As a matter of fact, Hawaii's non-contiguity provided the means by which a fascinating institution arose and

⁴Ibid., pp. 554-57.

dominated island life for nearly eighty years. It will be recalled that factoring companies were organized during the rise of the sugar industry and were largely responsible for putting stability into the plantations. As time went on, five of the factors took on such stature that they were nicknamed the "Big Five." They are Castle and Cooke, Ltd.; Alexander and Baldwin, Ltd.; C. Brewer and Company, Ltd.; Theodore H. Davies and Company, Ltd. and American Factors, Ltd.⁵ "Closely bound by inheritance, intermarriage and interlocked directorates . . . they sit separately but they act together."⁶ As the sugar industry expanded, and pineapple also took on more importance in the economy, the Big Five bought into both industries, so that by 1943, all but three of the sugar and seven of the pineapple plantations were consolidated under their control.

Since Hawaii was two thousand miles from the mainland, and the Big Five controlled the two major exports, it was an easy matter for them to secure control over shipping, Hawaii's economic life or death. The Matson Navigation Company which was partially owned by the group, monopolized all shipping between Hawaii and the mainland up until World

⁵Marcos E. Kinevan, "Alaska and Hawaii: From Territoriality to Statehood," California Law Review, 38:273-79.

⁶Stanley High, "Feudal Hawaii: Paradise Limited," Readers Digest, 42:19-23.

War II. As a matter of fact, Matson still is the prime seaborne carrier even today.

Nearly all of Hawaii's agricultural land was devoted to the production of sugar and pineapples, and it followed that truck crops for domestic consumption were kept at a minimum since more food production meant less revenue for the factors, less high-paying cargoes to the mainland, and less cargo in return.

The Big Five's dominion extended into nearly every phase of Hawaiian life: banks and trust companies, wholesale and retail food and mercantile stores, press, radio, theaters, lumber and building materials, public utilities, and politics.⁷

A great deal of the early objection to statehood was voiced against the Big Five. One of the witnesses in the 1935 Congressional hearings, James Askam, said:

I'm here to speak against statehood, for the simple reason that if we have statehood, we put ourselves more in the power of the five people who control the islands. You have to do what they say or get out. They once told me to get out, but I didn't; I'm going to stay here until I die.⁸

⁷Ibid.

⁸Honolulu Advertiser, October 8, 1935.

Throughout nearly all the hearings, it was implied that the major reason why more of the opposition did not testify was because of the fear that speaking against the issue would be tantamount to economic suicide.

The paternalistic system exercised by the Big Five in providing for wages, schools, hospitalization, and housing, naturally tended to cause them to control the political scene. The early hearings, for example, found labor conspicuous by its absence.⁹

By 1943, however, inroads had been made into the power of the Big Five, and honest attempts to enlighten the management picture were conducted. The employer groups hired James Blaisdell, a former War Manpower Commissioner from California, to assist them in revamping their personnel relations, and steady gains have been made since that time.¹⁰

To the credit of the Big Five, they and their ancestors are largely responsible for the development of Hawaii politically, economically, and socially to such an extent that the islands are in a position even to be considered as a state. It has been their dominance over the

⁹Ibid., October 10, 1953.

¹⁰Thomas Blake, Hawaii the 49th State, pp. 166-69.

life of Hawaii that has caused opponents of statehood to question whether a society so constituted would be fitting statehood material. While it is true that monopolies have existed throughout American history, their control has not been so absolute due to the fact that the very life-lines of the United States have not been dependent upon any one group of monopolists.

The breaking of precedent is, of course, one of the basic reasons why non-contiguity is such a powerful argument. It is felt that if Hawaii and Alaska were admitted, then the door would be opened for other non-contiguous areas to seek admittance. Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Samoa might feel that they were entitled to it. Henry Cabot Lodge stated:

We know that there is already a movement on foot to submit an application on the part of the British Crown colony of Newfoundland. . . . In the Italian election which passed on the question of retaining the monarchy, there were, to my recollection, several thousand people who voted in favor of having Italy join the United States as a state. All these people, and no doubt many others, will be encouraged if they learn that the Hawaiian Islands have been given statehood.¹¹

It is impossible to speak of non-contiguity without convolving the labor force of the islands, Hawaii's polygot population, and her political situation, since these issues are so broad, they are treated in succeeding chapters.

¹¹Edward Latham, Statehood for Hawaii and Alaska, The Reference Shelf, pp. 66-8.

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNISM IN HAWAII

The Communist movement in Hawaii, and the alleged control the party exerts over the islands' labor movement, has emerged as one of the major obstacles to the granting of immediate statehood. Although Communism exists, in varying degrees, in the United States, Hawaii's non-contiguity, basic industries, racial background, and industrial management history pose a serious threat if a successful movement in the Hawaiian islands were realized.

There is little doubt that the existence of a Communist plot is difficult to prove; however, the recent history of the labor movement in Hawaii leads to a belief that Communism's precepts have been followed despite attempts to discredit or disclaim such an accusation.

According to the testimony, given by an avowed ex-Communist, Paul Crouch, a Communist movement was begun as early as 1925 in Hawaii. He claims, furthermore, to have been instrumental in applying for the original membership in the Third International, as well as directing the policies and plans for the movement starting in the spring of 1928. Crouch testified that the plans had been originated in Moscow and called for organization within the various racial groups in Hawaii, particularly the Japanese. The plans,

until the year 1935, called for independence rather than statehood, so that Hawaii could become a part of the Communist International, rather than an adjunct of the Communist Party of the United States. An alleged Comintern agent, James S. Allen, reported Crouch, informed Moscow that there was little response to an independence movement. This resulted in the party's going on record for statehood in 1935 even though it did not actively promote it. The party then became a part of the Communist Party of the United States.

Up until 1936, the party was loosely organized, generally limited to various racial groups, most prominent of which was the Hawaiian Proletariat Soviet, with some twenty-five hundred Japanese members. In 1936, Crouch states, the present organization of the Communist Party in Hawaii was formulated, and it became the most exclusive society or group in the islands. Its underground nature was described in this manner:

Membership has been by invitation only and it has been limited to the people that the leadership felt could be implicitly trusted. This is shown by the fact that from 1936 to 1946, the Communist Party became a powerful force in Hawaii and the community at large was completely ignorant of its existence. The Communist Party could have and I believe today could go out, if it wanted to open up its books, and sign up 500. I know that at that time (1936) it could have signed up four or five hundred people, but it didn't need to.

Those people were in front organizations. They were doing the work of the party and there was no need to risk exposing the apparatus of the party by recruiting risky elements.¹

Since the consistent policy of world Communism was to establish "beachheads" on the docks of the world, the party allegedly decided to concentrate on that segment of Hawaiian society. That there existed a fertile field in this area is attested to by Jack Kawano, an American Japanese who, until recently, was one of Hawaii's top labor leaders, and who admitted to thirteen years' experience as a Communist Party official. Kawano came to Honolulu in 1932 from the island of Hawaii to seek employment on the docks. He recalls the conditions of the early thirties as follows:

In those days, the gang foreman runs everything on the docks, and if he does not like you, you do not work. And to be one of the guys he likes, you are supposed to give him things--part of your wages, groceries, even auto tires. Guys like me, with not even rice at home, we can't give him nothings. And so we think we should be organized. But the AFL unions won't take guys of Oriental descent, so we make up our own union, an independent outfit called the Honolulu Longshoremen's Association. And when I am not working on a sugar gang, loading a ship, I work for this union, without pay, as an organizer. I figure that if by having a union more work is spread around, then I will have more work too. It is not then I am so much a union man; I am just hungry.²

¹United States Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearing before the Committee on S. 49, and S. 51, and H. R. 3575, 83rd Congress, 1st and 2d sessions, June 29-July 11, 1953, and January, 1954, pp. 283-322.

²Richard English, "We Almost Lost Hawaii to the Reds," The Saturday Evening Post, 224:31.

By the summer of 1937, Kawano had been blackballed by employers for being a labor agitator, and he was invited to a meeting in the room of William Bailey, who, according to Kawano informed him that he was a Communist. Bailey signed up Kawano, and several others in what was known as the "Traveler's Club." The first meetings of this group, Kawano says, were held in the offices of the paper, Voice of Labor, whose editor was the labor leader, Jack Hall.

Kawano noted that there were white collar people present at this meeting; some were professional people representing downtown groups in Honolulu, others were professors at the University of Hawaii. Kawano says that he became the leader of the downtown cell, and shortly, the union which he represented was taken into Harry Bridge's International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union in 1938.

Kawano states that he was sent to the California Labor School where he was taught ". . . Marxism, analyzing and preparing propaganda, how to agitate on Union matters, and a history both of the American labor movement and of the Communist Part. . . ."

Kawano then was teamed up with Jack Hall and Robert McElrath in spreading propaganda on the waterfront. They were able to gain sufficient membership for the ILWU to enable it to become the dock workers bargaining agent in 1941. Kawano then became the president and business agent of the

Longshoremen's Local 137 which had about two-thirds of the ILWU's membership of fifteen hundred, some twenty of these, according to Kawano, were Communists.

When Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese, instructions came from the California state committee ordering the party to disband. By this time, Russia was an ally of the United States, and it was felt that since Hawaii was such an important defense post and the military so anti-Communist that it would upset the order of things should the party continue to operate.

Kawano, and several others, continued as organizers even though the party had ceased to function. Kawano was barred from the waterfront by the military authorities, so he spent his time organizing the sugar workers who were disgruntled because they had been frozen to their jobs, making it impossible for them to compete with the mainlanders for the higher priced jobs in the government installations. The AFL continued to ignore the plantation hands of Oriental ancestry, so it was not too difficult for Kawano to sign up some 14,000 of them. These workers were promptly taken into the ILWU by Harry Bridges.

It was at this time that Jack Hall was appointed by Bridges as the regional director of the ILWU, and that Kawano and McElrath went out and signed the Pineapple Workers into the union, thus completing the unionization of Hawaii's

basic industries under one control. The ILWU, which boasted some 1,500 members in 1941 had swelled its ranks to 29,000 by 1946. Kawano said that in recognition of this achievement, both he and Jack Hall were elected to the executive board of the party.

The first test of strength occurred soon after Hall and Kawano's appointment to the executive board. The ILWU called a strike of the sugar plantations' irrigation workers, the announced purpose of which was to raise their hourly wage. The strike lasted for seventy-nine days and cost, through loss of wages and crops, an estimated \$27,875,000.00. Kawano described the strike in terms that inferred a reason much different from that of the strike's announced purpose when he said:

. . . all the strategy of that sugar strike was decided at Communist executive meetings. We keep the peoples stirred up, organize all the propaganda. From the communist position, it was a good thing to have the strike then; it would give the peoples in the sugar industry good training for the future. . .³

It was about this time that the executive board determined that the party should expand its scope into the political field. Jack Hall had, in fact wangled an appointment as a police commissioner from Governor Ingram M. Stainback in 1945, and the leadership determined that the

³Ibid., p. 50.

labor vote could command a control over the politics of Hawaii. The Communist groups began by taking over precinct jobs. Under the direction of the Political Action Committee of the CIO, eighteen ILWU members were elected to the Territorial House of Representatives. This experience in politics, though highly successful at the polls, did not result in strengthening labor's legislative position; therefore, more drastic action was planned.⁴

By mid 1947, the local executive board was convinced that the only chance the party had for success was to infiltrate and control one of the existing parties, since it was impossible for them to operate in the open due to Territorial statutes. The Democratic party was selected as the one which would be easiest to control, and plans were laid by Jack Hall, Jack Kawano, Harry Iehua Komoku, an alleged Communist and an ILWU leader, and Wilfred Oka, an ILWU member who had worked himself up to the position of Secretary to the Oahu Democratic county committee.

A reorganization of the Democratic Party had been planned, and when it was announced on March 9, 1948 that all Democratic precinct clubs on Oahu would become inactive as of midnight, March 31, the ILWU group was ready for the

⁴ibid.

elections on the following day. A clean sweep of the elections was accomplished so that in the May 2, 1948 Territorial Democratic convention, it was alleged by Senator Butler that forty-one Communist Party members were delegates or alternates.⁵

The fact that the Communist groups could get so far is not so astonishing when it is realized that it was not until the spring of 1947 that Governor Ingram M. Stainback was made aware, for the first time, that a real menace existed in the islands. It will also be remembered that Jack Hall had been appointed as police commissioner, by Stainback, in 1945.

General John E. Hull, commanding General of the ground forces in Hawaii in 1947, called on Stainback and warned him of the importance of keeping Communists out of the Government. He also acquainted the governor with the fact that the Hawaiian Communist Party was a part of Cell Number 13, located in San Francisco. Of all this, Stainback said, "I had never heard any of this, and Communists mean no more to me than the men from Mars." The general provided him with a list of alleged Communists,

⁵United States Congress, Senate, Report relative to investigation in Hawaii with reference to H.R. 49, Senate Committee print, 80th Congress, 2d session, submitted by Senator Hugh Butler, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, pp. 6-8.

and the governor noted that Jack Hall was placed at the head of the whole organization.⁶

Subsequent to the discovery that there was an apparent Communist Coup being planned, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs authorized its chairman, Senator Hugh N. Butler to make an investigation with regard to H. R. 49 (80th Congress) granting statehood to the territory. The Senator employed a staff of investigators who made an on-the-spot study of Communist activities in the Territory for two and one-half months prior to Senator Butler's arrival on October 30, 1948. Starting November 1, 1948, the Senator held confidential interviews with seventy-seven witnesses whose remarks were made a part of the record, and personally talked to over a hundred more whose testimony was not recorded.

As a result of these interviews, Senator Butler made the following conclusions in his report:

Since V-J day, in September, 1945, the Hawaiian Islands have become one of the central operations bases and a strategic clearing house for the Communist campaign against the United States of America. By the well-known infiltration tactics of world communism, a relative handful of Moscow adherents in the islands, operating chiefly through the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, has persistently sabotaged the economic life of the Territory. This

⁶Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., pp. 519-31.

premeditated campaign of sabotage, through strikes, slowdowns, arbitrary work stoppages, and violent racial agitation, is inspired, managed, directed, and financed largely through the International headquarters of the ILWU in San Francisco.

Harry Bridges, president of the ILWU, is the unseen dictator of the Territory of Hawaii. He operates through John Wayne Hall, (Jack Hall) regional director of the ILWU in Honolulu, who is an identified Communist.

Both the ILWU and Harry Bridges, personally, are publicly identified in the records of the House Committee on Un-American Activities as long time Communist operatives.

This report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities details the recent history of communism in the Hawaiian Islands, and the methods by which it has penetrated every aspect of life in the Territory --business, labor, transportation, agriculture, education, publishing, radio entertainment, and in lesser degree, even the religious life of the community.

In regard to Hawaii's statehood, he concludes:

1. That statehood for Hawaii be deferred indefinitely, until communism in the territory may be brought under effective control;
2. That the Territorial government of Hawaii be encouraged to take positive steps within the scope of its authority to suppress unlawful communistic activities;
3. That the executive branch of the Federal Government, through the Department of Justice, take immediate steps to prosecute lawless communism in the Territory, and to protect from force and violence from those who honestly seek to support and strengthen orderly constitutional government.⁷

⁷Report submitted by Senator Butler relative to S. 49, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

Butler, at this time professed strong opposition to statehood, stating that ". . . neither Congress nor the American people should risk a permanent league with communism within the structure of the Federal Union."⁸

The ILWU, however, soon proposed another test of its power. Negotiations had been going on for a considerable period of time between the shippers and the union over wages and hours. Following the close of the Territorial Legislature, on May 1, 1949 the worst strike in Hawaii's history commenced. Governor Stainback called in both sides and attempted to bring them together, however, negotiations ended in a stalemate. Significantly Harry Bridges, the head of the ILWU was present at this meeting.

Stainback then travelled to Washington in an attempt to get the Federal government to do something about the situation, but he was informed that, as Governor, he could handle the situation from the islands. Accordingly, on his return, Stainback called a special session of the legislature and reviewed the situation on the eighty-seventh day of the walkout. Of particular concern was the fact that during the period of the strike no seaborne commerce entered the

⁸Ibid.

Territory, save for food, medicines, and other critical supplies brought in on surplus spaces by Naval and Military Sea Transportation Service vessels. He pointed out that the economic effect of such a strike was particularly damaging since there had been no export of Hawaii's basic commodities, and that the harvest of both sugar and pineapples might necessarily shut down due to a lack of storage space.

Governor Stainback submitted that:

Stevedoring operations on island communities 2,000 miles away from the nearest mainland port are a public utility in every sense of the world. The free and uninterrupted flow of commerce from the mainland and world ports is vital to the people of Hawaii. Public ownership of public operation is not new in American democracy. The welfare of the people of Hawaii demands that their government now take steps not only to end this strangulation of our economy, but to protect them from future threats of continued management difficulties in our dock operations.⁹

The operation of the docks was assumed by the Territorial government with only occasional flashes of violence; however, it will be recalled that ILWU forces on the West Coast cooperated with the Hawaiian Union by refusing to unload pineapples and other products that were shipped from Hawaii during this phase of the strike.

⁹Congressional Hearings, op. cit., p. 545.

Finally, on October 24, 1949, after 127 crippling days, the strike was settled. The stevedores were awarded the twenty-one cent an hour wage that they had been offered during early negotiations, and Hawaii counted its losses. It was estimated that the people, labor, and management lost \$40,000,000.00 during the six-month period. If it is true that all strikes on the islands were Communist inspired as has been implied particularly during wildcat strikes that have occurred every time Harry Bridges has been arrested or tried, then losses because of party activity have amounted to over \$100,000,000.00.¹⁰

These events, as well as the unfavorable publicity Hawaii received from Senator Butler's reports, at least generated a great deal of anti-Communist activity in the islands.

In 1950, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was invited by the territorial legislature to investigate the progress of Communism in the islands. The report of the committee held that:

The evidence shows that as of 1951, the people of Hawaii have successfully cast Communist influence out of all phases of their political, social, cultural, and educational activities. The only sphere in which

¹⁰English, op. cit., p. 54.

Communism plays a part of any significance in the ILWU . . . which has headquarters in San Francisco. The people of Hawaii have shown that they are alert to the menace of Communism in that union, and, while the problem is not theirs alone, they are leading the way in completely nullifying its influence.¹¹

As a result of the waterfront strike, and Senator Butler's report in 1949, the Hawaii Residents' Association was established, whose main objective was to carry on educational program, and to disseminate information about the Communist threat. It publishes a semi-monthly newspaper, distributes free information to schools and libraries, and provides a speaker's bureau and radio time for the express purpose of fighting Communism in Hawaii. Approximately four thousand members of the organization contributed to its 1955 budget of \$60,000.00.¹²

The interest in Communist activities resulted in a dramatic trial of seven alleged Hawaiian Communists for violation of the Smith Act. The trial lasted for a period of eight months, and in June 1953, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty" against all seven defendants. Six were sentenced to five years in prison with fines of \$5,000.00 each, while one received a three-year sentence, and a fine of \$2,000.00.

¹¹Hawaii Statehood Commission, Hawaii, Showcase for Americanism, p. 5.

¹²Ibid., p. 6.

The seven identified and convicted Communists, still at large pending appeal, are:

Jack W. Hall, Regional Director of the ILWU

Koji Ariyoshhi

Jack Kimoto

Charles K. Fujimoto, Chairman, Communist Party of Hawaii, ILWU employee

Eileen Fujimoto, Employee of the ILWU

Dwight Freeman, Alleged Communist Party Organizer

John E. Reinecke, Former public school teacher, and writer for the Honolulu Record, alleged Communist newspaper.¹³

The results of these citizen-sponsored activities have most notably been manifested in the winning-over to unqualified support of statehood, one of its previous enemies, Senator Hugh Butler. During the Senate debate of the question in 1954, Butler said:

I yield to no other member of this body in opposition to Communism. Furthermore, I lay credit to having first exposed the Communist danger in Hawaii. Today I am convinced that the people of Hawaii have the Communist problem under control . . . Hawaii has had to pass more rigid tests for admission than any of the existing states. In simple justice, we ought not to deny statehood any longer.¹⁴

¹³"Communism in Hawaii," A summary of the 1955 Report of the Territorial Commissioner on subversive activities, pp. 28-29.

¹⁴1954 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., pp. 313-20.

Proponents of statehood in Hawaii have not denied the existence or the seriousness of the Communist threat, but believe that Hawaii would better be able to cope with the situation as a state, and that the further exclusion of Hawaii would weaken those who are fighting Communism in the Territory. They point out that their state constitution provides for apportionment of its legislature in such a manner that the balance of power would be vested in the Honolulu district, where ILWU influence is negligible, negating the influence in the ILWU strongholds in the counties of Hawaii, Maui, and Kanai.¹⁵

The most recent interest in ILWU policies occurred early in February, 1956, when the contract between the ILWU and the sugar and pineapple companies expired. Jack Hall announced stop work meetings were to be held on February 8 and 9 "to give a complete report to the membership on sugar plantations and take a vote on the companies position." Hall did not mention a strike, but union sources assumed he meant one would be taken since late in January the pineapple workers turned in a 90 per cent vote to strike if necessary to back up their contract demands.¹⁶

¹⁵Hawaii Statehood Commission, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁶Associated Press Dispatch in the Modesto Bee, February 7, 1956, p. 2.

Some confusion existed as to what might happen when Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell said in San Francisco that he thought that the ILWU was "possibly" dominated by Communists in the islands. Harry Bridges threatened stop work meetings of the ILWU in West Coast ports in protest to the Secretary's comments; however, negotiations were completed in Hawaii, and the new contract signed in February.¹⁷

Suffice to say, statehood proponents were able to breathe easier, because even though the ILWU has gone on record as favoring statehood, one more strike like the 1949 affair might easily have convinced Congress that the ILWU's motives were more than economic.

Some observers feel that the Communist issue is merely a talking point around which southern Democrats may hide their true motives.

¹⁷Ibid., February 13, 1956, p. 6.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RACIAL ISSUE

Prior to World War II, the most vocal objection to statehood was manifested in the distrust of the large Japanese population of the islands. Most of the opposition testimony centered around this question during the 1935 and 1937 Congressional hearings.

During the 1935 hearings it was pointed out that the alien oriental does not recognize American standards of living, and if statehood were accomplished, it would draw in a land already reverting to an oriental standard of living.¹ Furthermore, there was some distrust expressed because of the Japanese language schools and the dual citizenship factor which held that every child born of Japanese parents held allegiance to the emperor.²

In 1937, even greater emphasis was placed on opposition to the issue due to the racial question. Charles Hart, a witness, voiced his opposition most loudly when he said:

¹Honolulu Advertiser, October 8, 1935.

²United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearing on H. R. 3034, October 7-18, 1935, p. 246.

"I think I express the views of ninety-five per cent of the people. Anybody who comes in asking for statehood with conditions the way they are with the Asiatics is a traitor."³

The citizens of Japanese descent were, at that time, placed in a most peculiar situation. A spokesman, Shigeo Yoshida stated,

There may be such a thing as dual citizenship, but there is no such thing as dual allegiance . . . many of us have not expatriated, and do not feel it necessary. To expatriate ourselves is admitting we have owed allegiance to Japan.⁴

It was further pointed out that there was great opposition to the dual citizenship continuing, and that the United States would not countenance it in admitting a new state, even though the practice existed in the western states.⁵

The Japanese language schools came in for a great deal of criticism since it was difficult for Americans to understand why other Americans needed to learn how to speak a foreign tongue. It was pointed out, however, that the language schools were not sponsored or controlled by the government, that attendance was based solely on the wishes

³United States Congress, House of Representatives and Senate, Joint Committee, 75th Congress 2d session, pursuant to senate concurrent Resolution 18, op. cit., p. 12.

⁴Honolulu Advertiser, October 19, 1937.

⁵Editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser, October 23, 1937.

of the parents. Many of the earlier immigrants had absolutely no knowledge of either the written or spoken English language, and they viewed the language school as an expedient means of maintaining their family ties. Since all of their children were required by law to attend schools where only English was taught, the means of family communication was falling apart. Dr. Arthur L. Dean, Vice President of Alexander and Baldwin, who had studied the schools stated that there was no apparent attempt to inculcate loyalty to Japan even though the children were trained in the cultural and social customs of their ancestors.⁶

The possibility that racial bloc voting existed was also touched upon throughout many of the Congressional investigations. This argument, however, never seemed to stand the test of voting experience, as it was pointed out again and again that there were Japanese-American Republicans who fought just as bitterly over political issues with Japanese-American Democrats as their Anglo-Saxon counterparts did. A Japanese-American witness for statehood said:

⁶1935 Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives, op. cit., p. 81.

In Hawaii, as on the mainland, Japanese-Americans are active in both political parties. In Hawaii they enjoy positions of influence in both parties; they have been elected and appointed to local and Territorial offices. In the last election, and prior thereto, it was not uncommon to find Japanese-Americans vying with each other as representatives of the Republican and Democratic parties for the same post, or to find a Japanese-American representing a predominately non-Japanese district, or to find a non-Japanese representing an overwhelmingly Japanese area.⁷

Another argument on the basis of race, is one of population growth. Based on Hawaiian Board of Health estimates for 1953 the races considered to be non-caucasian outnumber the caucasian (and Hawaiian) by 306,733 to 162,106. Of the non-caucasian figure, 189,219 are Japanese; 62,936 Filipinos; 32,139 Chinese; and Koreans, Puerto Ricans, and others number 22,439.

According to the estimate of one witness:

. . . the Japanese increase was . . . 1.98 per cent annually. At that rate, 190,000 ^{/sic/} Japanese will double again in 36 years, to about 380,000. Roughly, the other oriental groups combined about equal the Japanese group.

If the total economy, based on the 309,000 tillable acres, can support only 300,000 to 400,000 people, and if these oriental groups alone. . . shall total some 700,000, what chance is there of any Haole (white) group surviving. . .? Survivorship, when overcrowding occurs, invariably goes to those who multiply most rapidly and are willing to live cheaply.⁸

⁷1954 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., pp. 253-58.

⁸Ibid., pp. 479-500.

Unfortunately for Hawaii's chances, the attitude of southern Congressmen toward the integration proceedings in the United States seem to preclude their change of attitude toward an area that is already integrated. A Congressional delegation from Hawaii, it is believed, would undoubtedly reinforce civil rights proponents.⁹

It would seem that until there is no single line of racial predominance that Hawaii's race problem will remain as one of the major obstacles to her admission as a state.

⁹Nation, 174:145, February 16, 1952.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICS AND STATEHOOD

During most of the twenty-one years of the statehood controversy, the basic political assumption was that Hawaii was predominately Republican.

The most recent developments in Hawaii are, however, that the Republican predominance is ending and that a new era in island politics is rapidly approaching. The first manifestation of this phenomenon occurred on November 2, 1954, when the Democratic party won a decisive victory on the basis of a coherent policy of reform. As a result of the victory, Democrats controlled twenty-two of the thirty seats in the House and nine of the fifteen seats in the Senate.¹

Honolulu's Fourth House District has for years elected six Republican haoles to the House, and were scheduled to repeat the process in 1954. The Democrats selected five Americans of Japanese Ancestry (AJA), lawyers, and a woman of Hawaiian Ancestry to oppose the Republican candidates. "Not being experienced politicians, the Democrats

¹Phillip Woodyatt, "When Coconuts Dropped on the G.O.P.," The Reporter, 13:9, 28.

plugged away on their platform in the refreshing belief that the people would vote on the issues if they were given a chance."

Early in the campaign, the Republicans displayed apathy toward the campaign, but as election day approached, they began to campaign vigorously, focusing their attention on the ILHU's alleged connection with Communism and the Democratic Party.

When the election was over, however, the Democrats had won five out of the six seats at stake.²

This trend away from the Republican party can also be found in a review of the plurality of votes for Delegate, traditionally a Republican's position. The drop in plurality is recorded as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Republican Plurality</u>
1948	52,000
1950	31,000
1952	9,000
1954	890 ³

Based on the preceding figures, and the 1954 Legislative election returns, it appears highly possible that

²Ibid., p. 30.

³United States Congress, House of Representatives, Hawaii-Alaska Statehood. Hearings before the Committee on H. R. 2535 and nine other bills, 84th Congress, 1st session, January 25, 28, and 31, February 2-16, 1955, p. 301.

the fourth Democratic Delegate since 1900 may be elected in 1956. If Hawaii were admitted as a state, there is an excellent possibility that Hawaii would elect two Democratic Senators. Since the Democratic party also gained control in Alaska during 1953, she too would probably elect two Democrats.

The national platforms of both parties in 1952 were unanimously committed to statehood for Hawaii, although the Republicans were opposed to immediate statehood for Alaska.⁴

This development places the Republican party and its President in a dilemma. In 1952, the Republicans were charged with the attempt to gain political advantage in supporting Hawaiian statehood and negating that of Alaska. In 1956, with the political picture reversed, Presidential approval of statehood for both territories would undoubtedly give the Senate four new Democrats. If the President were to veto statehood, he could then well be accused of defeating a measure in popular favor.⁵

On the other hand, current developments within the Democratic party with regard to racial segregation, would

⁴Ibid., p. 300.

⁵Ibid.

seem to make the acceptance of Hawaii as a state incongruous with the Southern Democratic attitude on integration.

The spokesman for the large states, Representative John R. Pillion, New York, objects to admission, because "statehood basically shifts Senatorial and Presidential Representation from the 48 states to Hawaii and Alaska." His point is that they would be represented by four Senators out of a total of one hundred; in the electoral college, they would be represented by seven votes out of five hundred thirty-five.⁶

The admission of Hawaii and Alaska under the present constitutional provision will entitle their residents (628,437) combined to 4 seats in the United States Senate. The average representation would be 1 Senator for each 157,000 inhabitants. The people of the United States having a population of 152,572,000 represented by 96 Senators today enjoy the average representation of one Senator for each 1,589,000 persons. Thus Hawaii and Alaska would become entitled to representation in the United States Senate 10 times greater than the average representation of the people of the United States. Each voter will have approximately 33 times the power of vote of the people of California in the United States Senate, 27 times the power of the vote of the people of Pennsylvania, and 47 times the power of the vote of the people of New York.⁷

⁶ An exemplification of the power of the deciding vote was afforded in the Democratic convention of 1900, when Prince David K. Kawananakao, a delegate from Hawaii, cast the determining ballot in favor of reaffirming the Free Silver Plank of 1896. Cited in Miller, Great American Debates, p. 218.

⁷ 1955 Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives, op. cit., p. 311.

Pillion states that in a presidential election, the two new states would be entitled to one electoral vote for each 89,776, inhabitants whereas the people of the forty-eight states are entitled to one electoral vote for each 287,300, thus giving the combined vote of Hawaii and Alaska a combined strength of three and two-tenths greater than the average voter in the United States.

Furthermore, Pillion calls attention to the fact that if Hawaii and Alaska were admitted, Hawaii would be entitled to two seats in the House, and Alaska to one. That would cause a temporary increase in the membership of the House from 435 to 438 until the 1960 reapportionment at which time the membership would revert to 435.

The United States Census Bureau reports that the following 10 states show a population loss between April 1, 1950 and July 1, 1952: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, West Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. In all probability these states, after the 1960 reapportionment, will bear the loss of the three seats which would be granted to Hawaii and Alaska in addition to any other loss they may suffer by reason of population apportionment.⁸

Because of the political implications were Hawaii to be admitted under the present constitutional requirements, Pillion has attempted to provide an alternate method which would considerably relieve the situation. In House Joint

⁸Ibid., p. 318.

Resolution 208, introduced by the Congressman, it is proposed to limit the representation in the Senate for newly admitted states. By its provisions

. . . any state hereafter admitted, upon attaining a population one-half the average population represented by each Senator (1950 Census--794,646), would become entitled to 1 United States Senator. Upon attaining a population $1\frac{1}{2}$ of the average population represented by each Senator (1950 Census: 2,383, 938), it would become entitled to 2 United States Senators.⁹

At first glance, it would appear that Pillion's proposal was a complete denial of the principle of equal representation in the Senate. However, he points out that since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment which provides for the election of Senators by the direct vote of the people rather than by State Legislatures, Senators no longer represent States ". . . as such in their political and corporate capacities. Under the Seventeenth Amendment, Senators represent the electorate as individuals."

Since no new states have been admitted since the passage of the amendment, Pillion maintains that his new method of apportioning Senatorial representation is necessary, stating that:

⁹1955 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., p. 162.

. . . the reason for equality of Senatorial representation for states no longer exists, there is no compelling need for the constitutional provision which would allot equal Senatorial representation to newly admitted states . . . there is no precedent for the admission of States under the altered conditions of Senatorial representation . . .¹⁰

There are three other proposals to increase Hawaii's self-government, all of which appear to be attempts to defer her statehood indefinitely. One, of course, is to admit Hawaii into the Union by making her a County of one of the West Coast States. This idea is unacceptable to Hawaii, and would probably be unacceptable to any of the States.¹¹ Another proposal concerns the possibility that Hawaii could elect her own Governor and other state officials, judge, and enact a constitution. Under the terms of S. 402, a bill to provide for the election of the Governor and secretary of the Territory of Hawaii, appointment of judges by the Governor, and the formation of a constitutional government, Hawaii would have been able to elect her governor at the general election of 1955. The Governor would:

. . . hold office for a term of four years, and would be the commander-in-chief of the militia . . . grant pardons and reprieves, . . . shall be removed from office on impeachment. The house of representatives of the Territory shall have the sole power of impeachment . . . (with) the concurrence of two thirds of the members . . .

¹⁰Ibid., p. 163.

¹¹1954 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

The governor shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii appoint the chief justice and justices of the supreme court, the judges of the circuit courts.

The salaries of the Territorial officials would be paid by the Territory, and determined by the legislature.

Finally, in order to recognize the principle of government by consent, the bill provides that Hawaii may, ". . . organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption."¹²

This proposal seems to have some merit growing out of the results of the 1954 Territorial elections. President Eisenhower's appointee to the Governorship is Samuel Wilder King, and it is noteworthy that he opposed and vetoed nearly every item of legislation passed by the Territorial Legislature in its 1955 session.¹³ Since the legislature does not convene until 1957, it would seem that the citizens could elect a Democratic governor if they had that privilege.

The bill does not, however, provide for a change in status as a Territory. Presumably the name would remain the same, and the status of the Congressional representation would remain unchanged.

¹²1955 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., p. 60.

¹³Woodyatt, op. cit., p. 30.

A proposed substitute bill was submitted to the Senate Committee on Internal and Insular Affairs on February 28, 1955, by Senator A. S. Mike Monroney, Oklahoma, Senator J. William Fulbright, Arkansas, and Senator George Smathers, Florida. This substitute would change Hawaii's status from that of a Territory to that of a Commonwealth. The bill reads in part:

Whereas the principle of self-government is the cornerstone of democracy; and

Whereas our Government exercises sovereignty over the territories of Hawaii and Alaska wherein the principles above stated are not now given their fullest expression; and

Whereas it is the desire of Congress to remedy this condition and establish a policy for the future of overseas or non-contiguous areas consistent with our ideals and principles as to the maximum degree of self-government and as to principles of taxation . . .

Be it enacted, etc., that this act is enacted in the nature of a compact so that the people of the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska may organize governments pursuant to constitutions of their own adoption.

Such governments . . . as hereinafter specified shall be called Commonwealths of the United States of America.

The bill provides for a local referendum on the subject in order to determine the peoples' wishes in the matter.¹⁴ It is interesting to note that one of the

¹⁴1955 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., pp. 112-17.

complaints of opponents to statehood have, in recent testimony, maintained that, if given the opportunity to choose between state and commonwealth, a great majority would favor the latter. They point out that the 1940 plebiscite and the 1950 vote on the State Constitution gave them no other opportunity for choice.¹⁵ In recent years, since Puerto Rico was granted commonwealth status, there has been considerable interest in Hawaii in that form of government. It is suspected that one of the prime factors in this interest is that citizens of the Puerto Rican Commonwealth are relieved of federal income and other taxes. This would, in effect, remove the stigma of "taxation without representation" without breaking precedent.

Considerable opposition to the commonwealth status was voiced by the present Hawaiian Delegate, Mrs. Joseph R. Farrington, on the basis that the Puerto Rican Commonwealth was just another step toward independence. She stated:

In Hawaii, we . . . are Americans. We believe that the Republic of the United States is the greatest government conceived by man, and therefore we want to share in all the responsibilities as well as the privileges of government. We do not want to get out of paying our taxes. . . .¹⁶

¹⁵1954 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., p. 449.

¹⁶1955 Congressional Hearings, Senate, op. cit., p. 141.

Furthermore, Delegate Farrington submitted that Puerto Rico's tax structure was formulated long before she became a commonwealth, and that it was not the change in status that exempted her from taxes.

Legally, doubt is expressed that Congress may change the taxation laws as they apply to an "incorporated" territory. Delegate Farrington cites the case of *Downes vs. Bidwell*, 1901, 182 US 244, which held:

(that the) Constitution applies in its entirety to "incorporated" territories; and as consequence in legislating with reference to such territories, Congress is restrained by the requirement in Article I, section 8, clause 1, that "duties and imposts, and excise" be levied uniformly throughout the United States. To be able to evade that requirement . . . , Congress would have to possess the Constitutional competence to dis-incorporate that territory . . .

She concludes that incorporation, like statehood, is irrevocable once attained, therefore, the applicability of tax laws would still apply.¹⁷

An interesting development in the islands has been the change in attitude of Hawaii's former governor, Ingram M. Stainback, who was vehement in his arguments for statehood. Stainback, for example, now says:

Hawaii's government is in the red and the Territory is faced with increasing unemployment. If Hawaii would forget its seemingly futile agitation for Statehood and

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 142-43.

accept commonwealth status, we might be put on the path of prosperity very quickly . . . we would have from \$135,000,000 to \$185,000,000 a year that now goes into Federal taxes.

I need not describe in detail what could be done with three or four times our present revenues in the way of improving our schools, hospitals, public buildings, our roads, our parks and recreation centers.¹⁸

This attitude, on Stainback's part, is a far cry from his remarks before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in 1950 when he said:

The time for statehood is now . . . a territorial government is a transitory one, tolerably for a reasonable period but should be endured no longer than is necessary to show that the people of the territory are loyal citizens of the United States and capable of self-government.¹⁹

Opponents of commonwealth status make the following conclusions in regard to their opposition to commonwealth:

1. Commonwealth status will not provide Federal tax relief.
2. Puerto Rico's tax position had no direct relation to its Commonwealth status.
3. There is a serious legal question as to whether Congress has the power under the constitution to exempt us from the uniformity clause of the Constitution . . .
4. The traditional move from territory to state is reasonably clear and direct, the path to Commonwealth is poorly lighted and blocked by constitutional questions.
...

¹⁸Harold S. Roberts, Is Commonwealth the Answer for Hawaii? p. 2.

¹⁹Ibid.

5. The commonwealth proposal does not provide representation in the legislative councils of the nation and would leave us in an "inferior" position to the citizens of other states. The proposal also leaves open the question of the ultimate disposition of Hawaii --with the possibility of negotiating us out of our incorporated territorial status.

6. The people of Hawaii in the recent election (in the 1955 election one Delegate favored Commonwealth, the other, statehood) have not indicated any great support for the commonwealth candidates and the arguments thus far presented by its proponents.²⁰

With all of the proposals, and counter proposals concerning Hawaii's politics, representation, and status, there appears to be little question that the entire political picture is so complicated that the obstacles in this field seem insurmountable. Furthermore, there seems to be a growing lack of interest in statehood in Hawaii which may well be a matter of discouragement after trying for statehood so long. Another reason for indifference is that mainland opposition has been predominately from the Democratic party, possibly on the grounds of race prejudice; the Republicans in Hawaii may now say that they are not so sure about statehood because of the Democratic victory. Statehood in the near future may be much less probable than it appeared in 1935.²¹

²⁰Ibid., p. 6.

²¹Woodyatt, op. cit., p. 31.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

The negation of the Hawaiian statehood movement is a demonstration of how an issue that has not been recognized as a major national problem may be allowed to stalemate. Tests of time, popular opinion, statute, and precedent have seemingly lacked sufficient political impetus or moral impact to bring about favorable action.

It is difficult to conceive how statehood proponents can maintain confidence in ultimate statehood, when they reflect upon the legislative and political developments over the past twenty-one years.

One remarkable phenomenon is that there is little or no organized opposition on the mainland or Hawaii. "The opposition which exists," according to Jan Jabulka, Executive Director of the Hawaiian Statehood Commission, "is mainly Congressional, and it stems principally from the Democrats in the deep South who oppose us solely on racial grounds."

To date some thirty-two national organizations including veteran, trade, labor, religious, civic, fraternal, and professional bodies are on record as supporting admission. The two major political parties carry statehood planks in their platforms, and the newspapers of the nation

are almost unanimous in their endorsement.

Jabulka writes that:

Only one . . . organization, and it is not a national but a regional organization, has apprized Congress of its opposition. It is the sectional Southern States Industrial Council whose opposition was enlisted by Senator Smathers when he led the Senate Interior Committee fight against us in 1954.¹

The Hawaii Statehood Commission, together with Delegates Joseph R. Farrington, and his successor, Mrs. Joseph R. Farrington, must be credited with keeping the statehood issue alive. The Commission was created by the Territorial Legislature in 1947 and is supported by the taxpayers of Hawaii. In 1953, a budget of \$150,000.00 was voted by the legislature to be used toward promoting statehood. The Commission issues booklets, leaflets, and folders covering nearly every phase of the subject. Since 1947, it has maintained an office in Washington, D.C., and recently published a Statehood newsletter in the Capital.²

The statehood movement has been a paradoxical history of Americans trying to convince other Americans that they were suitable to become full-fledged members of the

¹Jan Jabulka, Executive Director of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, letter on statehood to Leslie G. Knoles, August 17, 1955.

²United States Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hawaii Statehood, Hearings before the Committee on S. 49, and S. 51, and H. R. 3575, 83rd Congress, 1st and 2d sessions, June 29-July 11, 1953 and January, 1954, pp. 140-42.

Union. The lack of success in this undertaking has been primarily attributed to four interlocking obstacles: non-contiguity, racism, Communism, and politics. In reviewing these obstacles and their ramifications on the question, it is difficult to predict how the course of statehood will run. It is a certainty, based on all the evidence, that Hawaiian statehood is as much a stalemate as it was at the start of the hearings in 1935.

The issues have never remained clearly defined throughout the legislative history. Prior to World War II, the American-Japanese problem was the weightiest consideration. During and immediately following World War II, the Japanese-Americans' performance of loyalty and patriotism largely removed them from consideration as a risk.

Communism was never an issue until 1948, and since that time, it has assumed a status in the testimony which has far outdistanced other obstacles. Despite the protestations that Communism is not a problem restricted to Hawaii alone, it would seem that an uncommon amount of attention has been given over to the study of Hawaii's ILWU and its alleged Communist leadership. Because of the lack of recent debate on the racial issue by the southern Democrats, it is possible to infer that they have rallied around the Communist issue, and based their arguments on that obstacle.

Representative Leroy Johnson implied this when he

wrote:

The Communist issue . . . was raised frequently, primarily by Southern members of the House. I am not impugning their motives because they had what they consider entirely valid reasons for being against statehood in Hawaii.³

Personalities in the issue have occasionally been aligned on one side, and in a few short years have been unequivocally on the other side. From 1948 to 1953, Senator Hugh N. Butler led the opposition on the Communist issue. In 1953, Butler changed over, and was until his death in 1954, a strong proponent because of what he felt the Hawaiians had done to combat Communism. Ingram M. Stainback, on the other hand, was stamping for "statehood now" in 1950, and today opposes statehood in favor of the commonwealth proposal.

The political question has loomed as the most insurmountable problem, particularly in view of Hawaii's switch from the Republican to the Democratic party in 1954. Since most of the mainland opposition comes from the Democrats, another paradox exists. The arguments submitted to demonstrate the illusion of representation that would occur should Hawaii be admitted, have brought to light many of the partisan political angles that had previously not been thoroughly aired.

³Leroy Johnson, Representative, letter to Leslie G. Knoles.

The counter-proposals of "more self-government" without change of status, as well as the commonwealth status, have emerged as an attempt further to confuse an attempt to predict a logical conclusion.

When it was decided to join consideration of Alaska and Hawaii, many felt that Hawaii's chances for admission were greatly minimized. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel wrote: "I opposed this because I felt that a joinder would reduce the chances to admit either territory."⁴

Delegate Elizabeth P. Farrington agreed when she stated: "I feel that if Hawaii is considered on its merits and not joined with Alaska we will be successful in our fight to win statehood."⁵

On the same general topic, Representative Johnson said: "I believe you have put your finger on the reason for denying statehood to Hawaii, namely, those who favor Alaskan statehood are strongly opposed to Hawaiian statehood. . . ." ⁶

⁴Thomas H. Kuchel, Senator, California, letter to Leslie G. Knoles on Statehood, February 6, 1956.

⁵Elizabeth P. Farrington, Delegate from Hawaii, letter to Leslie G. Knoles on Statehood, May 16, 1955.

⁶Leroy Johnson, loc. cit.

The future of statehood legislation is highly problematical. In President Eisenhower's State of the Union address, delivered January 5, 1956, President Eisenhower reiterated his ideas on the issue, stating:

The stature of our leadership in the free world has increased through the past 3 years because we have made more progress than ever before in a similar period to assure our citizens equality in justice, in opportunity, and in civil rights. . . . We must strive to have every person judged and measured by what is rather than by his color, race, or religion. . . .

One particular challenge confronts us. In the Hawaiian Islands, East meets West. To the islands, Asia and Europe and the Western Hemisphere, all the continents, have contributed their peoples and their cultures to display a unique example of a community that is a successful laboratory in human brotherhood.

Statehood, supported by the repeatedly expressed desire of the islands' people and by our traditions, would be a shining example of the American way to the entire earth. Consequently, I urgently request this Congress to grant statehood for Hawaii. . . .

It was the Hawaii Statehood Commission's understanding that in the second session of the 84th Congress, which convened in January, 1956, that separate bills would again be introduced and the legislative process would start all over again.⁸

⁷Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, The State of the Union, Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on the State of the Union, Document No. 241, 84th Congress 2d session, January 5, 1956, p. 15.

⁸Jabulka, loc. cit.

It is difficult to look upon statehood detachedly, and without emotion because of the fact that many mainlanders are bound by unbreakable ties to the land of Aolha. Hawaii's sacrifices during World War II are not easily forgotten. Her spirit in the face of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor set an example for Americans everywhere, and will stand as one of the standards by which Americans are judged.

Emotionally, therefore, many feel that statehood is long overdue; practically, it appears that the fight has hardly begun.

As of March 29, 1956, there is apparently no immediate action contemplated.⁹

⁹Merritt D. McCarl, personal inquiries of various California Representatives, interview with Leslie G. Knoles, April 1, 1956.

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APPENDIX





FIGURE 1
PATTERN OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PER CAPITA, STATE AVERAGE AND HAWAII
FISCAL 1951*

*Government in Hawaii, A Handbook of Financial Statistics, 1953, III Tax Study Committee (Honolulu: Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, 1953) Chart 10, p. 30.