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An inquiry into the rise of communism in China

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CHAPTER I

MICHAEL BORODIN

The Chinese Communist Party was begun through the machinations of the Comintern in 1920.[1] Versailles and its disregard for the rights of China, coupled with the declaration of Karakhan, Vice-Commisser for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, were instrumental in bringing about the Organization. This declaration promised that Russia would renounce all the advantages, privileges, and concessions extorted from China by the Tsarist regime.

Two professors at Peking University, Chen Tu-hsiu[2] and Li Ta-chao, founded a Society for the Study of Marxism. In May, 1920, Gregory Voitinsky, secretary-general of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, arrived in Shanghai for a meeting with Chen. While the Russian wanted Chinese Communism to enter the political war on all fronts, Chen counseled moderation. He agreed to sponsor a group known as the Young Socialist League. Stimulated by a contribution of $5,000.00 a month from the Comintern, this

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[1] Victor A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, p. 6.

[2] See Chapter VIII, page 150, for a biographical sketch of Chen Tu-hsiu.

movement spread to Canton, Peking, Hankow, Changsha, Tsinan, and other important cities.[3] These societies attracted numerous students and underwent various influences from people of all classes before finally crystallizing into a Communist Party.

During the last week of July, 1921, thirteen men met in a girls' private school in the French Concession of Shanghai. These men were Communists from the different sections of China bent on strengthening the Party structure. The conference lasted four days and dealt with rules and questions of organization. At this time there were not over one hundred real Bolsheviks in the whole land.[4] Outside aid was necessary to sustain the movement. This same year, 1921, the young party joined the Third International thereby setting the stage for closer cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

The All-Chinese Congress of Trade Unions met for the first time at Canton in 1922. Here was shown the increasing strength of the Communist group as the head of

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[3] Robert S. Elegant, China's Red Masters, p. 43.

[4] Robert C. North, and John H. Paasche, "Moscow and the Chinese Communists," Pacific Spectator, 3:141, Spring, 1949.

a working class movement. Later, in 1922, there arrived a mission from Russia as an indication of the growing rapport between the two countries.

Doctor Adolph A. Joffe, leader of the mission, held a series of conferences with Doctor Sun Yat-sen in January, 1923, as a result of which a declaration was published to the effect that both men

> . . . considered that neither Communist organization nor the system of Soviets can be introduced into China at present because the necessary conditions do not exist there,

and that

> . . . the most important and most pressing problem of China is to achieve her national unification and to realize her complete independence.[5]

Writing for the January, 1923, issue of the magazine Living Age, Joffe attempted to explain the policies of the U.S.S.R. in China. His explanation for such inconsistencies of word and fact as the presence of Russian troops in Outer Mongolia generalized the theme of "national interest," but did not elaborate on the specific threat of this region to his country. He stressed the financial exhaustion of the Soviet Union and cited her need

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[5] Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 7; Cf. Wellington Koo, Memoranda, presented to the Lytton Commission, p. 731.

for control of the Chinese Eastern Railway "until such time as she can build a new railroad in her own territory."[6] His appeal was sent to the Chinese intellectuals, "the true representatives of the people of China," for an understanding of Russian interests.[7]

From 1920 to 1923 Soviet agents were changed in China every few months. No one seemed to be able to find a foothold to start work. In September, 1923, Michael Borodin was sent from Moscow to China as political adviser to the Kuomintang in Canton. It is in this man and the powers which he possessed that Russia made her first concerted and partially successful effort for control of the "Middle Kingdom." All that had gone before was but a nibbling at the skin of the fruit. This was a bite to the core.

Mr. Borodin was the first Soviet agent to conceive of an effective method of working in China. He served Doctor Sun faithfully, never while the doctor lived forwarding the cause of the Communists, even apparently

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[6] On May 31, 1934, an agreement was signed by Wellington Koo and L. M. Karakhan providing for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway; Cf. "Agreements Between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. and Annexes," American Journal of International Law /XIX; sup., (April, 1925), p. 56./

[7] A. A. Joffe, "Russia's Policy in China," Living Age, 316:73-76, January 13, 1923.

opposing for a time the Communist Party of China. Counseling moderation, he gained a reputation as an unselfish adviser. His plan for the reorganization of the Kuomintang was accepted with great enthusiasm.

When Communist Party members offered to join the Kuomintang individually, they were admitted. Doctor Sun never suspected that this was the first step toward the conquest of his group; for, after the Kuomintang had been reorganized by Borodin, he alone in China understood fully the workings of the system, and he could put into key positions those who owed him allegiance. He used intimidation and force. Divide and rule was easy when he played on the sectional jealousies of the Chinese people.[8]

Michael Borodin was born in Russia and came to the United States as an illiterate boy to escape the oppression of the Tsars. For awhile he lived in New York and then moved to Boston where he became connected with a branch of the Carnegie Institute. Traveling west, Borodin settled in Chicago and opened a school to teach the English language to foreigners. He married Fanny Orluck,

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[8] George E. Sokolsky, "Borodin and His Methods," Trans-Pacific, 14:5, April 9, 1927.

an American citizen, who bore him two sons. The boys were registered under the name of Grusenberg when they attended the American School in Shanghai. Their father was one-time known as M. Berg in the midwest.[9]

There is a possibility that Borodin was an American citizen. Soviet consular authorities at Shanghai made this claim early in 1927.[10] J. B. Powell in his book, My Twenty-Five Years in China, lends credence to this report.[11] I was unable to get any information from the United States Government to verify this claim. While the question may be academic there has been some use made of it by Kremlin propagandists.

The Borodins were charming, intelligent, resourceful, and devoted people. Michael Borodin might have been one of Chicago's lawyers, but the drive to see the proletariat in power was in him, and he used his organizing ability to that end. His major interest while in the United States was in the revolutionary activities directed against the Tsarist regimes. A contemporary

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[9] J. B. Powell, "Michael Borodin, Cleverest Revolutionist in the World Today," China Weekly Review, 41:159-61, July 16, 1927.

[10] New York Times, April 6, 1927, p. 2:4.

[11] J. B. Powell, My Twenty-Five Years in China, p. 127.

recalls that the Russian students in the United States at this time were not very popular. They could find nothing right with the United States.[12] After the Russian Revolution, Borodin's Chicago school undertook to fit radicals for places of authority and service in the new government. He spent some time in Mexico, but found that country inhospitable to Communism, and so returned to the United States.

Borodin did not join the Communist Party until 1921. On his return to Russia his natural inclination was towards the Mensheviks.[13] However, the Comintern needed people versed in foreign languages, and Borodin's knowledge of English and Spanish made him a logical choice for Zinoviev's International. He was sent to England and while there served six months in prison for passport falsification. Upon his release he went back to Moscow. Sometime later he was dispatched to China.

Michael Borodin brought to Canton Moscow's proposal to repudiate old treaty rights held by Russia and to provide China with civilian and military experts to help

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[12] Katherine E. Bowden, Archivist, Valparaiso University, Indiana, in a letter to the author.

[13] David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, p. 212.

her in the building of a strong national state. He found at Canton an inactive government, a supine Kuomintang, mere rudiments of an army, and a weak Communist Party. Borodin decided the key to his position would be the Kuomintang, if it could be reorganized--preferably on the model of the Russian Communist Party as far as the relations between the Party and the government were concerned.

Comrade Borodin's first task, therefore, was organizational. The loosely-knit Kuomintang scattered throughout the country had to be welded into a powerful striking force. Borodin was the man for the job.

From the beginning he had the support and confidence of Sun Yat-sen. Sun, in attempting to impregnate the people with the idea of unity, devised the San Min Chu I. Doctor Sun, however, was a sick and tired man, dying with cancer, when Borodin began his work. The new order was to have the vigorous direction of this foreigner whose travels all over the world provided the dynamic background necessary for the following that had to be built. It is of little wonder that Sun introduced Borodin as a "genius of organization who understood why feudalism had become established during the Republican period."[14]

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[14] Nora Waln, The House of Exile, p. 204.

Having won a position of respect for himself and his work, Borodin advised the placing of discontented, western-educated orientals in the secretariat of the new Kuomintang. These men soon came into pivotal prominence in the shaping of policy. The rules set down by Borodin were adhered to in every respect. Communism took over, intent on driving foreign capitalist nations from China. As Sun Yat-sen lay on his death bed, Russian advisers pushed the young Kuomintang into demanding an investigation of Christianity. This led to the expulsion of all Christians from the Party and from all Nationalist territory.[15]

Anything with the imprimatur of Sun Yat-sen needed no other endorsement to insure the whole-hearted support of South China. So it was with the Russian advisers. They were invited by Doctor Sun, who gave them his confidence. To Borodin he gave three years of friendship. Millions of farmers and coolies, who could not understand the political issues involved, thought it sufficient recommendation for a man that he was a friend of Sun Yat-sen.[16]

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[15] Ibid., p. 216.

[16] John M. Roots, "Chinese Head and Chinese Heart," Asia, 27:96, February, 1927.

These Russians were spread throughout Nationalist Party activities. The majority were engaged in the training of young officers at the Whampoa Military Academy. Here political indoctrination was mixed with military exercise. Every member of the Academy had to be a member of the Kuomintang. It was not enough that he know how to fight. He had to know what he was fighting for, and he had to place loyalty to the Party above all else. A political representative was assigned to each company in keeping with the Russian pattern. This representative was charged with the responsibility for political orientation of the troops.

His job was made easier by the excesses of the foreigners in China's brief contact with the western world. Unequal treaties, extra-territoriality, and the impoverished conditions of the masses were propaganda enough. Here was a government ready to right these wrongs, renounce all its prior claims, send in helpers to lead the Chinese to a better life. Incidents like the killing of fifty Chinese in the Shameen Affair at Canton in 1925 by the British[17] intensified the efforts of the

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[17] Ibid., p. 92.

propagandists. Britain became the primary target of Borodin's expulsionist program.

Sun Yat-sen died in March, 1925, at Peiping. Even before his burial a fight broke out to determine who would be leader in the Kuomintang. While the members argued, the Russians seized control and evolved a party organization which made Michael Borodin party dictator. Neither the radicals nor the militarists had wide support in China in 1925. The great merchant-trading class was hostile to radicalism in politics and economics and the farmer-peasant class was apathetic, bent only on getting a living.[18] Even up to the spring of 1927 the Communists constituted no more than 5 per cent of the Kuomintang membership.[19] Influence was exerted through control of Party machinery. Borodin had been trained in the Russian system of organization, and his efforts bore successful results.

It has been said that a social and economic revolution had never occurred spontaneously in China because she had no organized capitalism of her own.[20] The Chinese

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[18] "Russia's Hand in the Chinese Puzzle," Literary Digest, 84:18, March 14, 1925.

[19] New York Times, April 10, 1927, Section 9, p. 1.

[20] "Contrasting Views of China," Living Age, 332:776, May 1, 1927.

claim their revolution began with the Taiping Rebellion, and that the Boxer outbreak and the overthrow of the Monarchy were only phases of one continuing movement. However, not until 1924, when the Kuomintang adopted a constitution that specifically contemplated revolution and reconstruction, did the force become conscious and organized. The nationalistic and basic anti-foreign feelings of the people were channeled through the fertile ground of Communist propaganda. This propaganda was not of the flag waving, poster pasting, slogan spouting variety. Perhaps the most important kind was that typified in the story by Ambassador Kharakhan:

> Propaganda, of course I do propaganda. Last summer when student delegations flooded Peking, I received them all, fed them just such tea and cakes as I am offering you, and talked to them. That was propaganda, especially when those same students went to your American Legation and were received by a third assistant under-secretary who was obviously in a hurry to get away from them so he could play golf. It was propaganda last week when we lowered our Embassy flag to half-mast on the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, while no other legation remembered to honor the first President of China.[21]

George E. Sokolsky described Russia as "the Cain among nations" in April, 1927.[22] Every hand was against

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[21] Lewis S. Gannett, "Bolshevism in China," Nation, 123:171, August 25, 1926.

[22] Sokolsky, loc. cit.

her and her hand was against everyone. China, also, felt the ostracism of the West and it was only natural that she acted with friendliness towards the one power that treated her as an equal. The Soviet Union knew what she must do to win Chinese friendship for she had been on the "outside" since the revolution of 1917 and the Treaty of Brest Litovsk.

A session of the enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International, held in Moscow in November and December of 1926, devoted much of its attention to the Chinese situation. It adopted a set of theses which were really directives to the Chinese Communist Party:

> 1. Reorganize with radicals in control so as to insure continued effort along lines of non-capitalist development.
> 2. Seize control of the whole Nationalist movement by entering the Canton Government.
> 3. Once entrenched in the government concentrate on the peasantry.
> 4. Identify national liberation with the agrarian revolution.[23]

Despite the protestations of Russian officialdom disclaiming Borodin, there is ample evidence he carried on the Communist Party program.

Some anti-Bolshevik journalists agree that Soviet propaganda in China is exaggerated in the press. A writer

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[23] New York Times, April 10, 1927, Section 9, p. 1.

to a Russian monthly published in Paris declares that China is immune to Bolshevik teachings by virtue of her culture, traditions, and regligious views. Another Soviet writer, V. Vilenski Siberiakov, remarked:

> We are not over-optimistic and do not expect an immediate Socialist revolution in China. When the Chinese revolution took place, the Chinese bourgeosie were still too weak to take power in their hands. But this bourgeosie know that the morrow will be their day . . . . The historical process will inevitably bring the Chinese bourgeosie to rule . . . .[24]

Nevertheless, the Communist faction of the Kuomintang came close to achieving its aim in the early years of the struggle for power. Except for Chiang Kai-shek and the seacoast merchants they might not have had to wait for the morrow.

The primary factor in the Nationalist surge was its army. From his office in the Asia Hotel at Canton, Michael Borodin advised the establishment of a military school at Whampoa with Chiang Kai-shek as principal. Up to thirty Russians were assigned as advisers to this school. In March, 1927, military graduates of Whampoa numbered five thousand and formed the nucleus of the Kwantung Army.[25]

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[24] "Soviet Russia's Hold On China," Literary Digest, 85:20, May 16, 1924.

[25] K. Furoso, "Borodin's Work," Trans-Pacific, March 19, 1927, p. 5.

According to Borodin this revolutionary army was the means for bringing China under one rule. Certainly this new army owed its creation largely to skilled Russian instruction and to arms and equipment supplied from Russia.[26] Eye-witness accounts testify to the element of idealism which pervaded this force.[27] The Nationalists fought for a cause; other troops were chiefly mercenary. Over the entrance of the Whampoa Military Academy a motto in gilt characters proclaimed--"He who seeks power or riches need not enter here." Those who did enter believed in this motto and acted as though they did. A report coming out of Canton in 1926 spoke of the inability to keep men hospitalized for any length of time. "We are needed," they would say, and limp off in the direction of the fighting.[28]

If idealism existed in the ranks, dissension was evident on the part of the leaders of the movement. Chiang had not been impressed by his Moscow visit, and took a road that opposed the policies of Borodin. A year after Sun's death he led an unsuccessful attempt to oust the Russian.

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26 "Why Canton Embraced Soviet Russia," Literary Digest, 92:17, February 19, 1927.

27 Roots, op. cit., p. 159.

28 Loc. cit.

Warrants were issued for the arrest of all Communist leaders, but Borodin's prompt seizure of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang resulted instead in the expulsion of 124 conservatives. A resolution was passed giving greater freedom to the army that was so strongly influenced by the Russians. Making an uneasy truce with Chiang the Central Executive Committee then went on record with a statement saying it could not work with the government at Peking, and that the only government with which it could work was that of the Soviet Union.[29]

Borodin's influence reached its peak in the period immediately following the death of Sun Yat-sen. Using such incidents as the Shanghai riot[30] he stirred the people to express their anti-foreignism in violence. Great Britain was the focal point of infection according to this Russian adviser, and he directed his cleverest efforts towards destroying her power. Since Great Britain was the major

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29 Yokantoff, op. cit., p. 72; Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, p. 444; Cf. Waln op. cit., p. 218. This author states that Chiang attempted a coup d'etat three days after Sun's death.

30 Shanghai Municipal Police fired on a Chinese mob, May 31, 1927. Moscow trained Li Li-san had spurred school boys to agitate against Japan which resulted in the destruction of the Nagai Wata Kaisha Mill. Waln, op. cit., p. 218.

power in China at that time and had made numerous mistakes in its relation with the Chinese people, his task was made easier. British journalists recognized the internal force of Chinese xenophobia but accused the Bolsheviks of fanning the revolutionary flames.[31] British political leaders were more specific in their accusations and more inclined to stress the Russian influence. In a speech before the House of Commons on May 24, 1927, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin cited instances of Russian activity in espionage designed for world conquest. Concerning the role of Borodin in China he says:

> On February 1, last [1927] Mr. Rosengolz, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in this country, informed his government that it was essential to give a short explanation to the press that Mr. Borodin was not a Soviet representative and was not in the service of the Soviet Government, but a private citizen in the service of the Chinese Government.
>
> On February 3, Mr. Rosengolz published a statement in the Daily Telegraph to the effect that Mr. Borodin is a private individual who is not and never has been in the service of the Soviet Government . . .
>
> On February 11, Sir Robert Hodgson, the British Charge d'Affaires at Moscow, made inquiries of Mr. Litvinoff [Acting Foreign Minister of the Soviet Government] to which Mr. Litvinoff replied that . . . Borodin was a Russian Communist . . . and that as far as the allegation that Mr. Borodin was a representative of the Soviet Government it was without

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31 "Red Russia's Hand in China," Literary Digest, 86:17, July 25, 1925, quoting from the London New Statesman and the Daily Telegraph.

foundation and the Soviet Government has no kind of connection with or responsibility for him.

Mr. Baldwin continues,

> Yet there is in the possession of His Majesty's Government a telegram dated November 12 last year, from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet representatives in China in the following terms:
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> 1. Until a Soviet representative is appointed in Peking Comrade Borodin is to take his orders direct from Moscow.
> 2. The Far Eastern Bureau is to be informed that all of its decisions and measures regarding questions of general policy must be agreed on with Michael Borodin.
> 3. Comrade Borodin's appointment as the official Soviet representative in China is considered inadvisable.[32]

The United States came in for a lesser share of abuse; a share relative to her power in China. Borodin opined that the United States was "rapidly becoming as imperialistic as Great Britain."[33] However, he noted the changed attitude of the masses towards foreigners and listed three possible reasons for this:

> 1. American and British warships in Chinese waters.
> 2. A need for [normalcy] in order to get foreign loans.
> 3. Unions now had better control of the workers.[34]

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[32] New York Times, May 25, 1927, p. 4:3.

[33] Ibid., March 11, 1927, p. 1:2.

[34] Ibid., p. 5.

One cogent reason perhaps purposefully ignored by Borodin was his insecurity at this time and his need for stability in government. Borodin's rise had been meteoric; his fall threatened to be the same. In July, 1926, he was announced openly as the chief adviser of the Canton Government. Mr. Norman, American adviser to Sun, went home. Within one month the people of China began to feel that the Russians were not sincere concerning Chinese purposes, but only using China as a tool in the machinery of World Revolution.[35] Chiang Kai-shek and the West had long harbored such views. The pattern set by the Spartacist Movement in Germany, Bela Kun in Hungary, Cook in Britain, and the assistance given to Kemal Pasha in Turkey were too familiar to mistake in the Orient. Nevertheless, whatever the feelings of the people, it seemed that having accepted Russian assistance to further their aims, they must also accept the Russian system of control.

Communism spread from the original centers of Shanghai and Canton into the whole country. Organization on a regional level remained very loose. Quarrels among

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[35] Waln, op. cit., p. 239.

groups were commonplace, and there was no set policy to follow. The most influential group of all were the extremists of the South under Chiang Yi-mien. Here was the center of most revolutionary activity. As L. S. Gannett wrote in 1926:

> Red Canton, they call it in Shanghai; and in Hong-kong they talk of the Cantonese as Bolsheviki. You hear mysterious stories of their Russian advisers, their Russian trained army, their Russian ammunition--and the nearer you come to Canton the more hair-raising the stories. People see visions of four hundred million Chinese linking arms with a hundred and fifty million Russians to fight the Western World.[36]

Ideally the Communist Party strives to gain about 3 per cent of the total population in any country. By 1927 the Communist Party in China had a good start towards attaining this goal. Just before the break with the Kuomintang the Communists had sixty thousand adult members and a junior enrollment over thirty-five thousand. Under the influence of the Party were 3,800,000 trade-union workers and 9,720,000 members of the peasant unions.[37]

Militaristically the main source of opposition to Borodin came from Chiang Kai-shek and his Whampoa officered troops. Chiang, having compromised with the radicals in

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36 L. S. Gannett, "In Red Canton," Asia, 26:488, June, 1926.

37 Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 74, quoting from Foreign Policy Association Report, April 20, 1933, by T. A. Bisson and from those figures given by Dr. W. Koo in his Memoranda.

May, 1926, pursued his campaign in the North. The idea of a Northern Expedition had been conceived by Sun Yat-sen back in 1921 when he was elected President by a special Parliament. Nothing was done in the succeeding years because Chen Chung-ming's revolt held up the schedule. Sun, himself, had to leave Canton, and the expedition was suspended until Chen was defeated in 1924 and 1925. Early in 1926 the campaign against the North began in earnest. Soldiers joined the war as crusaders to fight the rabble recruited by Wu Pei-fu and other war-lords.[38] By November of the same year, Swatow, two hundred miles to the east of Canton, had fallen. In a speech before the Swatow Chamber of Commerce on November 16, Chiang reaffirmed his anti-Communist stand thereby crystallizing again his struggle with Borodin.

When the year 1926 began the Communists were as strong as ever in the Kuomintang. At the Central Executive Committee Congress, January 1 through January 20, a strong tie with Russia was urged. Still Borodin felt he needed to make plans for a base of operations in case things came to a showdown at Canton. With this in mind he visited General Feng Yuhsiang in Mongolia. During his absence

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38 H. H. Chang, Chiang Kai-shek, pp. 161-2.

Chiang took control of the Government and ousted the Communists. Hastily Borodin returned and forced Chiang to relinquish his hold.

As the Generalissimo's influence increased Borodin's had to diminish. The fantastic ease with which the troops of Chiang marched to conquest after conquest amazed the world and unified the Chinese behind him. In August, 1926, Changsha was captured and Wu Pei-fu retreated from Wuchang. By September Chiang was master of the Yangtze Valley around Hankow and immediately directed his attention to Kiangsi Province to the southeast. The capital of that province, Nuchang, was captured on the nineteenth. Kiukiang, to the north, followed suit soon after.[39] The tuchun, Sun Chuan-fang, master of Chekiang and Kiangsu, was liquidated in early 1927. By the middle of February Hangchow was taken and in March Soochow, Nanking, and Shanghai went to the Nationalists.

The soldiers of Chiang were different from the troops of the war-lords. Their training at Whampoa had made them unique in the annals of Chinese legions. Considering themselves as liberators and servants of the

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[39] Ibid., p. 166.

people, their behavior towards the conquered populace was friendly and above reproach. A typical reaction of skeptical foreign correspondents was voiced by H. O. Chapman in his The Chinese Revolution 1926-27:

> It was found that Nationalist soldiers never looted . . . . The villagers and townspeople rubbed their eyes in amazement; the propaganda was true after all that these men were one with the common people. The people reciprocated this attitude with open cordiality, and it was not uncommon to see, a few hours after the occupation of a town or village, the soldiers fraternizing in a most friendly way with the shop-keepers and families on the street front.[40]

The real groundwork for capitulation was laid long before the troops arrived. First, conditions were right for a change. Second, the Communists knew how to capitalize on evidences of discontent. A well organized underground operated in each primary city selected on the itinerary of Chiang. As soon as the Nationalists were ready for the assault the banners and slogans were unfurled to demoralize the defending troops. Mob demonstrations and parades were staged to welcome the Generalissimo.

After the capture of the Wuhan area, Chiang Kai-shek asked that the government be moved there that he might be able to continue his fight from a base close to the center of the activity. Borodin saw his power slipping from him

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40 Ibid., p. 171.

and either he or his leftist followers determined to take a stand. Securing control of Hankow the Communists took possession of the masses and used them to further the cause of revolution. A general strike was called for November 27, 1926, which struck terror into the hearts of the merchants and bankers. Attacks on foreigners were concentrated on the British, and in January, 1927, the British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were entered. Mr. Owen O'Malley was dispatched from Peking to Hankow by the British Government and immediately entered into negotiations with Eugene Chen, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Hankow Government. By agreements reached on February 19 and March 2, the administration of the disputed concessions were handed over to the Hankow authorities. This news was favorably received by the populace and strengthened the Communist position.

Shortly thereafter a series of grave clashes with foreigners occurred culminating in the "Nanking Incident" of March 24, 1927.[41] Pressure outside China mounted against the tactics of the Communists. The whole Kuomintang Party had to shoulder responsibility for the actions of its extremists.

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41 Yakhontoff, loc. cit.

While Borodin was busy consolidating his position in the Yangtze area and attempting to establish a "Red" regime in China, Chiang was going on with his military campaigns down the river. But, no matter how far he went the Communist influence was there with him and often before him. For the capture of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces Chiang had to rely on Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi. Marching along with these two men were Cheng Chien and his soldiers. Cheng had pronounced Communist sympathies and rushed into Nanking on March 24, looting and plundering the city in the name of the Nationalist Army. If this was an organized plot to cause serious international complications for Chiang Kai-shek and thereby enhance the standing of Borodin, it backfired. Chiang assumed full responsibility for what had happened in Nanking and on April 18, 1927, formed a new government in that city with the support of the Shanghai bankers and the blessings of the Powers.

This Government was destined to eclipse the rise of Hankow and was for twenty years to rule China. It condemned Communism and the methods employed by the Russian advisers in getting control of the people. Borodin faced a virtually impossible task. On April 6 the Peking police, under instruction from Chang Tso-lin, raided the Soviet Embassy and confiscated property purported to show

that Borodin had complete control of the Kuomintang at Hankow and was using this organization to further the aims of the U.S.S.R. According to one writer this evidence proved "beyond all question the complicity of the Soviet Government in the anti-foreign agitation and its continuous interference in China's Civil War."[42] The publication of these documents was a serious blow to the plans of the Russians. Many of the Kuomintang members deserted their standard.

As if this were not enough, an Indian Communist, Manabendra Nath Roy, head of the Far Eastern Section of the Comintern, revealed in a casual conversation that the Third International had a new program for China. This included:

1. Peasant confiscation of land in Hunan and Hupeh.
2. Elimination of the left wing of the Kuomintang.
3. The Communist Party of China was to replace the Kuomintang.
4. A court was to be created to punish anti-communists.
5. An army of 70,000 was to be raised in Hunan and Hupeh.[43]

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[42] Chang, op. cit., pp. 178-9, quoted from China Year Book, 1928, p. 793.

[43] Loc. cit.

News of these indiscreet statements hastened Borodin's downfall. On July 13 the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto declaring that it had withdrawn its representatives from the National Government.[44] On the same day the Kuomintang members in Hankow met and outlawed Communism and the Communist Party.[45] Borodin's policies were repudiated. All that remained was to get rid of the man.

In April, 1927, Chiang had instituted a purge of Communists from his government. A message had been sent to Moscow denouncing Borodin. He was accused of using his advisership to create dissension among the membership of the Kuomintang. A New York Times dispatch carried the news of his detention in Hankow, closely watched by troops and laborites.[46]

Nevertheless, political expediency had to be served as evidenced by the following item out of Hankow:

> Soviet sympathizers are assured, however, that on no account will the Chinese people cause the late President's /Sun Yat-sen's/ policy of allying with the Soviet to be affected by M. Borodin alone.[47]

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[44] Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 75.

[45] Chang, loc. cit.

[46] New York Times, April 21, 1927, p. 1:1.

[47] Loc. cit.

In retrospect it is easy to find reasons for Chinese antipathy towards Communism. Joffe, Borodin, and others in 1923-24, made much of the fact that China was not ready to accept Communism. In 1927 she was still not ready for acceptance and was able to blunt its aggressiveness by force of arms and a dislike of foreigners, even the Russian variety.

By the end of July pressure had built up around Borodin and he decided to leave Hankow. This decision may have been made for him although accounts as to what actually did happen are not clear, varying from author to author.[48] The consensus seems to be that he was forced out. This view is substantiated further by Borodin's own attitude towards leaving his post. On July 14 he asserted that he did not expect to depart and did not desire to quit. At the same time he emphasized that he was only an employee of Hankow and so must abide by the Government's decision.[49]

For all the political maneuvering, the slogans, the strikes, and the ideals, an army won for Borodin, and an army was his downfall. Generals Chiang and Feng

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[48] Chang, loc. cit.; Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 76; Vinacke, op. cit., p. 447; McNair and Lach, Far Eastern International Relations, p. 306.

[49] New York Times, July 14, 1927, p. 4:3.

Yu-hsiang met at Suchow on June 19 and 20 and agreed on plans for dealing with the Communists in the National Revolution. These plans were publicized in a telegram sent by General Feng to Chiang Kai-shek:

> 1. Borodin, who has already resigned, should return to his own country immediately.
> 2. Those members of the Central Executive Committee who wish to go abroad for a rest should be allowed to do so. The others may join the Nanking Government, if they desire.[50]

Replying to this alliance Borodin said:

> If the Chinese leaders who have been my friends and fellow workers for four long years believe that the moment has come when they can continue their fight without my help, then I shall submit, for I have played my part and given my advice. I have no intention of fighting for Communism in China--the time is not yet ripe.
>
> I came to China to fight for an idea. The dream of accomplishing world revolution by freeing the people of the East brought me here. But China itself, with its age-old history, its countless millions, its vast social problems, its infinite capacities, astounded and overwhelmed me, and my thoughts of world revolution gradually sank into the background. The revolution and the fight for freedom in China became an end in itself and no longer a means to an end. My task was to grasp the situation, to start the great wheel moving, and as time passed it has carried me along with it. I myself have become only a cog in the great machine.[51]

Numerous reports of Borodin's imminent departure filtered out to the Western World. As early as May 21

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[50] New York Times, June 24, 1927, p. 1:3.

[51] A. K. Nielsen, "Borodin's Swan Song," Living Age, December 1, 1927, p. 999.

there were two, one that he had already fled through Kuikiang to Nanchang, and the other that his airplane was moored off the Hamburg-American landing.[52]

On July 12 Madame Borodin was released from prison in Peking where she had been held since February after being taken from the steamer Famiat Lenina.[53] Papers taken from her and translated by Chang Tso-lin supposedly led to the raid on the offices of the Russian Commercial Agencies and the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Actually, Borodin left Hankow on July 28th. It was announced he would return to Russia by way of Chenchow, in the Province of Honan, then to the Province of Shensi and on through Mongolia.[54]

He reached Vernindinsk Station on the Trans-Siberian Railway on October 1, 1927. It had taken him over a month for the arduous journey from Hankow, skirting and finally crossing the Gobi Desert.[55] A week later he arrived at Moscow and the curtain came down on a career of intrigue that had made Michael Borodin the foremost power in Chinese

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[52] New York Times, May 21, 1927, p. 7:2.

[53] New York Times, July 14, 1927, p. 4:3; Waln, op. cit., p. 271.

[54] New York Times, July 29, 1927, p. 2:3.

[55] New York Times, October 2, 1927, p. 4:1.

politics. In 1928 he was seen in Moscow "unhonored and without employment, a virtual prisoner in the Soviet capital."[56] Later he became editor of a small English paper, the Moscow Daily News.

Whatever else may be said of Borodin, he must be given credit for the initial successes of the Revolutionary Army. His was the brain that launched the idea, that organized the propaganda, that devised the tactics, and that started the revolutionary movement. He, more than any other, was the man who made the Chinese bury their private intrigues and special interests so far as was humanly possible and fight together for an idea. Without Borodin the Army would never have gone beyond Canton. For all the idealism of his words the practical welding of this force was his greatest achievement.

Prominent in the Common Room of the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow hangs a crimson banner with a quotation in Chinese and Russian:

> Very soon will come the day when the U.S.S.R. will be able to greet in a powerful and free China a friend and ally; and both these allies, in the great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed people of the world, will go forward hand in hand.[57]

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[56] Chang, op. cit., p. 180.

[57] Roots, op. cit., p. 91.

1927 was not to be the time. Borodin had failed to bring about the ultimate victory. The conservatives in the Kuomintang took the reins of government and set out to unify China.

CHAPTER II

KIANGSI INTERLUDE

1927-1934



MAP 1

COMMUNIST PRESSURE POINTS
1927-1934

After the expulsion of Borodin, the serious split in the Kuomintang became evident. All hope of cooperation between the communist and conservative factions was given up, if indeed there had been anything but a false hope from the start.

On August 1, 1927, the Twentieth Army, under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, with the help of Chu Teh[1] led an uprising in Nanchang and the beginning of what was to be the Red Army was organized.[2] A detachment of these troops set up the first Soviet Republic of China at Hailofong and participated in the abortive Canton coup d'etat of December 11. While this Canton Commune lasted only three days, Party members believe it had a profound effect on Communism in China.[3] It gave the Reds a "sounding board" for the proclamation of a policy that promised much to the peasant and working classes. These promises spurred the agrarian revolution. The drive to obtain land gave impetus to the movement. Abstract doctrines were neither heeded nor understood.

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[1] See Chapter VIII, p. 158, for a biographical sketch of Chu Teh.

[2] Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 149.

[3] V. A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, p. 81.

Early in 1927 Mao Tse-tung[4] had traveled from Shanghai to Hunan to inspect the farmers' associations. He spent thirty-two days in this Province and there laid the seeds for the continuing struggle against the Kuomintang. Communism has made most headway in those regions which have the highest proportion of farm tenancy as distinct from farm ownership.[5] Mao realized this from the start. As Secretary of the Kuomintang Peasant Committee, he had gathered enough material on land ownership in China to convince him the peasants were ready to revolt. Poor peasants, numbering 65 per cent of the population, owned 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the cultivable land; another 15 per cent was owned by the "middle peasantry"; the remaining 70 per cent was owned by absentee landlords, rich peasants, and money-owners.[6] The burden of taxation fell heaviest on those who tilled the soil. Exhorbitant demands were made on the peasant's meager holdings. The long-suffering masses needed only a leader to take matters into their own hands.

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[4] See Chapter VIII, p. 156, for a biographical sketch of Mao Tse-tung.

[5] Joseph Barnes and F. W. Field, Behind the Far Eastern Conflict, p. 26.

[6] Robert Payne, Mao Tse-tung, p. 89.



GRAPH 1

LAND OWNERSHIP IN CHINA
1927

Getting the revolt underway was one thing, sustaining it quite another. Chiang Kai-shek, determined to protect his rear from dissident peasants as he began his march to the north, laid plans for military action. The Communists themselves offered a disunited front. They could agree on no detailed procedure to follow. There were those who favored agitation by the proletariat instead of revolt by the peasants. As a result the whole movement was doomed to failure.

Recruits for the peasant-worker army were drawn from the peasantry, Nationalist deserters, and the Hanyang miners.[7] This latter group according to one description were:

> . . . a race [set] apart. Pock-marked, fearless, revolutionaries by instinct, nearly all of them deaf because underground explosions of dynamite had shattered their eardrums. . . . They thirsted for war against the Kuomintang, or against any authority whatsoever.[8]

Such were the spearheads of the new army.

By September an attack was readied upon Changsha but the offensive, which came to be known as the Autumn Crop Uprising, failed. Mao was captured by some "min-tuan" and

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[7] Snow, loc. cit.

[8] Payne, op. cit., p. 100.

almost executed. He escaped at the last moment into a field after unsuccessfully attempting to bribe his captors. Remnants of this peasant army retreated to Chingkanshan for the winter of 1927-28.

Chingkanshan is a broad pine-clad mountain on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. It is densely wooded, with immense spurs and cliffs, and in the winter is covered by fog. One thousand men, the nucleus of the Communist Army, took over the numerous Buddhist temples on the mountain, came to terms with the local bandit chieftains, and set about expanding their influence.

Other Chinese Communist armies were being formed. The Soviets were spreading also. From Kiangsi, Hunan, and Kwantung to Fukien, Hupeh, and Kwangsi they expanded westward to Szechwan and Kweichow. But, it was the army of Mao, living in the temples above the cliffs of Chingkanshan, which was the main strength of the Communist Party.

It was cold on Chingkanshan in the winter of 1927. Food and clothing were scarce. Men starved and froze. Small local forces constantly attacked the Communists despite efforts to reach an agreement. With only two hundred rifles and a short supply of ammunition, the chance for defense of their position depended on the untenability of its approaches.

This Army had taken heavy losses in its battles with the Kuomintang and could not afford to take any more. Time was needed to regroup and to replenish dwindling reserves. Villagers had to be enlisted for future campaigns.

Meetings were held at which the peasants were urged to redistribute the land. Rice was planted in the mountains against the day when the Army would be forced to hold out in this stronghold with their own food. It was during this winter that Mao introduced the first and most famous of the guerrilla slogans credited to him:

> When the enemy advances, we retreat.
> When he escapes, we harass.
> When he retreats, we pursue.
> When he is tired, we attack.[9]

Great store was placed in this and other slogans. Their roots were deep in Chinese history and the people responded to them.

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek continued his campaign against the North. After his marriage to Soong Mei-ling he returned to Nanking from Shanghai to resume control of the government post he had relinquished in August, 1927. Chiang recognized three problems whose solutions were of paramount importance to the unification of China under the

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[9] Ibid., p. 104.

Kuomintang:

1. The carrying of the Nationalist campaign into Peking.

2. The control of Communism.

3. The strengthening of the Nanking Government, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.

Chiang's insistence on the primacy of the Northern Expedition gave Mao the time he needed to consolidate his position. The control of Communism was thereby made more difficult.

China has always needed capital. While Chiang was in his monastery retreat during his brief retirement, he reiterated his belief that China's destiny was along republican lines after the manner of the United States.[10] In order for her to reject socialism, money was needed for investment in private enterprise. Since there was little money for investment in China, funds had to come from outside.

Socialism was the easy way. No foreign support was needed for its fulfillment. High up in the mountains of Chingkanshan the Communists started their program of socialization. In Nanking the Kuomintang sought loans.

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[10] H. H. Chang, Chiang Kai-shek, p. 184.

The difference came in that this had to be a third consideration for Chiang while Mao was able to make collectivization his primary target.

On April 10, 1928, the Northern Expedition was resumed with added vigor. Everywhere along the route of march the same slogans made famous by Borodin were in evidence. "Down with the Militarists," "Down with the Imperialists," "Abolish the Unequal Treaties," could be seen. But they were not quite the same as when they were displayed in Hankow. War against imperialism never meant in Kuomintang ideology war against everything foreign.[11] The principles laid down in the San Min Chu I were still followed but the approach differed from that taken by the radical elements of the Party.

Before the end of April, San Chuan-fang was defeated in Shangtung and by June, Yen Hsi-shan's troops hoisted the Nationalist flag over the imperial city of Peking. Wu Pei-fu was in hiding in Szechuan and Chang Tso-lin had met death in an explosion outside Mukden. There was in all of China the force of Chiang Kai-shek and one thousand men on an obscure mountain peak down south.

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[11] Ibid., p. 196.

Mao Tse-tung remained on Chingkanshan throughout 1928. In May of that year Chu Teh met Mao for the first time. Chu had fought in the rebellion against Yuan Shih-kai and had traveled in Europe. He was one of the first Chinese Communists in Germany. Together these two, Mao and Chu, planned a six-county Soviet linking the Hunan-Kiangsi-Kwantung border districts.

The formation of a Soviet followed an established pattern in most instances. Land was taken from the rich and given to the poor. Peasants were encouraged to rise in revolt. A small body of trained "Red" soldiers formed the nucleus of the movement. Elections were usually held on an occupational basis. Selections of candidates were made by the Communist Party. Both sexes over sixteen years of age were given the right to vote and allowed to run for office. "Only those who belonged to the exploiter class were disenfranchised. . ."[12] Deputies came from the poor peasants, workers, soldiers, students, and tradesmen.

If the proposed six-county Soviet failed, an alternate plan called for a withdrawal to the uplands of Kiangsi. Both leaders fought against the idea of an

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[12] Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 89.

immediate march on Changsha to meet the Nationalist armies in open combat, and the other plan that called for a retreat south of the Kwantung border.

> "Our main tasks," according to Mao, ". . . were two: to divide the land and to establish Soviets. We wanted to arm the masses to hasten these processes."[13]

However, numerous disagreements were still evident within the Communist Party. These differences were often aired, but no procedures were adopted that could lead to any concrete action. During July and August, 1928, the Communist Party held its Sixth Congress in a suburb of Moscow. The following resolutions were received in China that Autumn:

> At the present time the Party must everywhere propagate among the masses the idea of soviets, the idea of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass uprising. It must emphasize in its agitation the necessity for overthrowing the ruling bloc, and the mobilization of the masses for revolutionary demonstrations. . . . It must consistently and undeviatingly follow the line of seizure of state power, organization of soviets as organs of insurrection, expropriation of the landlords and big property owners, and the expulsion of the foreign imperialist. . . . The future growth of the revolution will place before the Party as an immediate practical task the preparation for, and the carrying through of, armed insurrection as the sole path for the completion of the bourgeoisie democratic revolution, and to overthrow the power of the Kuomintang.[14]

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[13] Snow, op. cit., p. 152.

[14] Payne, op. cit., p. 107.

It is a matter for conjecture as to what Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung felt about these resolutions. Delegates at a meeting thousands of miles away from the scene spoke of organizing the proletariat. However, the proletariat were in the very centers of Kuomintang influence. Mao knew his only hope lay with the peasants. For the time being, at least, the cities were beyond his reach.

After the failure of the Canton Uprising, P'eng Pai had led part of his troops to Hailofong and there formed a Soviet. However, this army was soon destroyed and its men scattered. Some of them traveled to Chingkanshan where they became members of the Second Red Army. In the Spring of 1928 the Third Red Army was organized by the partisans around Kian.

The Fourth Red Army was formed by combining the forces of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung. Chu was made commander and Mao took the office of Political Commissar. More troops arrived in the winter of 1928 after mutinies in Ho Chien's army. Out of these emerged the Fifth Red Army.

Soviets were established in Chekiang and Kiangsu in the Northeast and in Anhwei and Honan in the North. Eventually Kirin Province in Manchuria was also penetrated.

Nationalist troops made at least two concerted efforts to stop this growth by assault on Chingkanshan.

Unsuccessful in both, a blockade was set up which made conditions on the mountain very bad. Larger and larger contingents were thrown against the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek. Still the opposition mounted. The "Red" movement proceeded at a pace unrelated to the numbers actually engaged in communist proselytism.

As supplies became critically short on the mountain top, a plan for breaking through the blockade was advanced. Mao's original one thousand men had been supplemented by Chu's two thousand. Another eight thousand armed peasants from southern Hunan had joined the group.[15] Squash became a staple of diet and the slogan, "Down with capitalism and eat squash," was echoed among the troops. As conditions worsened defections to the Kuomintang increased. So, to relieve this untenable situation, the Fourth Army took out on a campaign across southern Kiangsi leaving Peng Teh-hwei in command of the mountain.

The men who came down from Chingkanshan could hardly be called a coherent, organized group. Ragged, dirty, lice-covered, still wearing summer cottons, they faced snow-blanketed terrain. Less than half of them had rifles.

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[15] Ibid., p. 108.

They hoped to capture some from the enemy.

Fortunately for the Communists, this section of China was eager for change. A succession of corrupt governors had left the Province poverty stricken. Numerous secret societies existed for the overthrow of the Kuomintang. Even with the aid of these peasants there was not enough food for the four thousand marchers. Quite often the men lived on roots. Hundreds died from starvation and exposure.

As the Communists moved through Kiangsi many engagements were fought with government troops. At Tapoteh half the "Reds" were killed. This fight was later described by Chu Teh as a "mutual bloodletting unworthy of the name battle."[16] By the end of February the Red Army had reached Tunghu and Hsingkuo where they joined forces with the local Communists and organized Soviets. Here the troops were divided to establish Soviets in Yunting, Shangheng, and Lung Yeh.

Within the Communist Party the two opposing factions continued their struggle for supremacy. Li Li-san[17] led a group that asked for an immediate attack upon the cities.

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16 Ibid., p. 110.

17 See Chapter VIII, p. 166, for a biographical sketch of Li Li-san.

His opposition favored a policy of consolidation in the remote villages of Kiangsi. Through the whole movement was woven a dislike for discipline tempered by idealism. For a year and a half the "Reds" wandered about Kiangsi sometimes without purpose except possibly to attract followers to the banner.

In an effort to reconcile these differences, two conferences were held in December, 1929, and February, 1930, to discuss the program of revolt. The former, the Ninth Party Conference of the Fourth Red Army, was held in West Fukien and paved the way for the establishment of Communist power in Kiangsi. The latter, a local Party Conference, was called in South Kiangsi to formalize the policy of land redistribution and quicken the formation of Soviets. At this Conference it was decided to unify the local units organized by the Red Army under the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. By May, 1930, Soviet territory in western Fukien comprised eight districts and in Kiangsi an even larger area. The Chinese Red Workers and Peasants Army had grown to one hundred thousand men.[18]

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18 "Chinese Soviet Congress Called for May 30th," China Weekly Review, 52;502, May 24, 1930.

Four months after Mao left Chingkanshan Peng Teh-huei was forced to evacuate. In July Peng attacked Changsha and captured that city from Ho Chien. The communists held it for ten days and then were forced south where they joined forces once more with Mao and Chu Teh. It was decided that Peng's Third Army should operate along the Kiangsi-Hunan border while the Fourth moved into Fukien.

In June, 1930, these two forces were again combined into the First Front Army and moved against Changsha for the second time. This action was undertaken with reluctance by Mao Tse-tung. At Kutien, in December, he had warned against this campaign and the whole Li Li-san line.[19] However, his field commanders despaired of continual roving through rugged mountains taking small villages and so were able to overrule his opinions. Further, a raid on "Red" Headquarters in Shanghai revealed orders from the Third International to the Chinese Communists "to take Changsha at all costs."[20] How much influence this might have had on the decision to launch the attack is debatable. There is a good chance it had very little.

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[19] Payne, op. cit., p. 112.

[20] New York Times, September 12, 1930, p. 10:2.

When this second attempt to take Changsha failed, the policies advocated by Li Li-san were temporarily abandoned. This failure may have saved the "Red" Army from total destruction for had it succeeded a suicidal attack was planned on the Wuhan stronghold.[21] Li was sent to Moscow for further study and 25 per cent of his followers were eliminated.[22]

Nanking determined to stamp out the Communist surge in Kiangsi. At least five separate campaigns were undertaken by the Nationalists to bring this area under control.[23] Over nine hundred thousand troops were mobilized against the Soviet districts. The necessity for this number is described by H. H. Chang in telling of his visit to the region:

> We passed through villages recaptured from the Communists, but soldiers were still stationed there, ever on the lookout for guerrillas. The government troops under Chiang Kai-shek were always in pursuit of the Communists always during the day and sometimes during the night. They had to cross valleys and mountains, but as they penetrated farther into the territory they could find no trace of them.[24]

The First Campaign opened with seven Kuomintang

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[21] Snow, op. cit., p. 161.

[22] Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 127.

[23] Some writers list eight drives. Cf. Snow, op. cit., p. 165, footnote 1.

[24] Chang, op. cit., p. 216.

columns numbering one hundred thousand men driving down from the north in December, 1930, along the Yungfeng-Kian road.



MAP 2

FIRST ANNIHILATION CAMPAIGN[25]

Skirting Futien the "Reds" marched out of Kian and took Tunghu in a short battle. Here they waited. Finding Kian abandoned the commander of the Nationalists, Lu Ti-Ping, stationed troops there and entered the mountains in pursuit of the Communists. The cold, thin air was

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25 Payne, op. cit., p. 115.

disagreeable to troops unused to mountain fighting. Sporadic skirmishing took place. Some of the advancing columns lost their way. The whole expedition was a fiasco.

At Tunghu a trap was sprung on the Eighteenth Division. The entire Fiftieth Division was destroyed as it wandered in the east around Tungshao. Altogether sixteen thousand enemy troops had been accounted for in the successful Communist plan with negligible losses to themselves.[26] A major engagement was fought near Ningtu resulting in another "Red" victory. By the end of February the fighting was over.

In May Nationalist Forces opened the Second Campaign to destroy the Communists. Action was confined to approximately the same area as the earlier battles. Near Tunghu the Kuomintang Fifth Army was decimated and the equipment of two divisions captured. Chu Teh, while outnumbered on the whole front, managed to bring his consolidated forces to the weakest points of the Nationalist line and there have superiority for the time necessary to win. Intelligence and sometimes active support was supplied by the friendly natives making the Kuomintang task more difficult.

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[26] Ibid., p. 116.

A Third Campaign was launched by the Kuomintang in July, 1931. Three hundred thousand "White" troops opposed the Communists, but only the highly respected Nineteenth Route Army was able to achieve a Nationalist victory. All other Nationalist forces met defeat. Seventeen of the original thirty-three divisions were lost. Over thirty-five thousand deserters joined the Communist ranks. With each succeeding invasion the "Red" strength increased.

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria and Chiang Kai-shek turned his attention to the north.

Granted this respite, Communist leaders began anew their political infiltration. On December 11, 1931, the First Soviet Congress met and drew up a Constitution. Mao Tse-tung was elected President of the All China Soviet Republic--a pretentious label for so limited an organization. Faith in the friendship of Russia was reaffirmed and an effort was made to right some of China's injustices in the field of labor.[27]

During this same period the "Red" Army was reinforced by twenty thousand deserters from the Twenty-eighth Route

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[27] Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 128; Chapter X for a detailed report of procedure.

Army of the Kuomintang. Teng Ch'ing-tan and Tsao Fu-shen led the uprising at Ningtu which brought these new recruits to the Communists. Thus strengthened, and with Chiang kept busy by the Japanese, the Communists began offensives of their own. Changchow, in Fukien, was captured and held for six weeks; sufficient time to organize an underground. Other battles were fought at Hsiang, Lo An, Li Chuan, Chien Ning, T'an Ning, and Kanchow. Direction of the Army was left to Chu Teh as Mao devoted more and more of his time to political considerations. Chu's campaigns met with mixed success. However, his initial wins heightened the determination of the Kuomintang to push another major force against the Communists as quickly as possible.

So it was that the Fifth Annihilation Campaign began in April, 1933. The Kuomintang marched south in three columns. Only one column returned north. Thirteen thousand Nationalist soldiers surrendered in one battle.[28] Although this was a complete rout of Chiang's troops the "Reds" seemed to have lost the spark that had made their earlier efforts tactical masterpieces. They had failed to solve the problems of the border regions and idealism was wearing thin after six years of struggle.

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[28] Snow, op. cit., p. 165.

Nanking began its fifth and last campaign of the period immediately on the heels of the reverses of the fourth. Four hundred thousand troops were thrown into the fray and in one year, by October, 1934, the "Red" Army was immobilized. Seventy thousand Communists, all that remained of a once potent guerrilla band, were forced to flee Kiangsi.[29]

While the Fifth Campaign was in progress, the Second National Soviet Congress was held at Juichin. On January 22, 1934, eight hundred delegates met and heard Mao Tse-tung speak in glowing terms of Communist victories while admitting economic difficulties. For all their victories it was soon evident that the Communist Army needed assistance on the field. The scorched earth policy of Chiang completely demoralized the peasants without whose active support the "Reds" were just another small army against a large foe. There could be no way to salvage the defeat short of complete rebuilding.

Economic difficulties presented a different problem. Military forces could one day be regrouped, a lost hill taken in a fight, but a lost ideal may never again reach the high plane of its previous existence. There is often

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[29] Chang, op. cit., p. 219.

some deficiency when people try to reestablish a set of principles. If suspicion supplants enthusiasm, a minority's ideal cannot afford the change.

> The Soviets have not progressed as far as they should have done. New tactics are necessary. A struggle must be waged against bureaucracy and the habit of dictation among Soviet functionaries; persuasion must replace dictation in everything that includes the masses,[30]

admitted Mao.

Mao could have added that new fields were better suited to the task.

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[30] Payne, op. cit., p. 134.

CHAPTER III

ON TO SHENSI

1934-1937



MAP 3

ROUTE OF THE LONG MARCH[1]

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* Adapted from E. Snow, Red Star Over China.

At the end of the Fifth Nationalist Campaign, Communist strength had been cut in half. Lacking supplies, harassed on all sides, one hundred thousand of them started a journey of six thousand miles that was later to be called the Long March.[1] Not knowing exactly where they were going, the "Red" troops intended to break out of Kuomintang encirclement and join up with the other Soviets in Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Anhui, and Shensi. Thousands of peasants joined in the flight. Machinery was placed on mules only to be discarded as the march lengthened out.

On October 16, 1934, from a point near Yutu in southern Kiangsi the order to start was given. Courageous rear-guard action held up the Nationalists long enough to allow the main body time for escape. Many were the tales to spring from this epic of human endurance. Not until 1937 were the last of these guerrillas cleared from the provinces.

Suffering and untold hardships greeted the weary, battle-scarred veterans of the Red Army. Death met them at every turn in the road and rained down on them from the planes of Chiang Kai-shek. Thousands perished but other

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[1] For a complete discussion of the Long March Cf. Payne, Mao Tse-tung, Chapter 6; Snow, Red Star Over China, Chapter 5.

thousands took their places. Still they marched by day and by night, fighting, dying, deserting, growing, sickening; a barefoot, ragged, vermin-ridden mob, blindly following a cause that promised a better way of life than any they had ever known.

Tales of heroism were recounted daily. The most critical incident of the Long March was the crossing of the Tatu River. As the "Reds" emerged from the forests, they captured the river town of An Jen Ch'ang and attempted a crossing in three ferryboats. Now the Tatu does not look impressive on a map, but it is a swift river and wider at floodtime in May then the Yangtze. So the attempt had to be abandoned and another crossing had to be found.

About 140 miles west of An Jen Ch'ang, amidst high gorges where the river is narrow and deep, there is an iron-chain suspension bridge called the Liu Ting Chiao. It was towards that bridge an advanced force drove, stopping only briefly to eat and rest. In these periods political attaches unceasingly lectured on the reasons behind this one action.

The Liu Ting Chiao was centuries old. Sixteen heavy chains were stretched across the river. Thick boards lashed over the chains made the road of the bridge. As the "Reds" came up they found half the boards had been removed

and a Nationalist machine gun planted at the north approach. Thirty suicide volunteers destroyed the machine gun and secured the bridge before "White" reinforcements could be brought up. Here was an army with a purpose. No paid mercenaries these men who raced over bare cables into a hail of bullets; they thought they were trying to find a better China.

Onward pushed the Communist troops, recruiting as they went. Up from Kiangsi and Fukien through Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechuan, Kansu, and into Shensi marched the horde.

The Great Snow Mountain shows an elevation of 16,300 feet on some Chinese maps. To the footsore "Reds" it seemed much higher. Kiangsi's mountains were foothills compared to these--a mere two thousand feet. It is hard to breathe at sixteen thousand feet and a man tires easily. About forty thousand survived the trip over the mountains and joined with the Fourth Front Red Army at Ta-wei in north-western Szechuan for a much needed rest.[2]

In August, 1935, the Communists pushed out for Shensi. It was a month of rain and fog. Towards the

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[2] Payne, op. cit., p. 151.

grasslands and into the soft, damp swamps moved the "Reds." Hostile natives,[3] disease, poisonous mud that raised livid welts on the flesh, long plains of black and yellow grass, and the deathly cold nights made this the most tortuous part of the Long March. In October Pao An was reached, and the ordeal was over.

Here in Shensi there was time to consolidate resources, build up the army, establish village governments, and spread their influence over all of Northern China. Less than twenty thousand Communists had arrived at Pao An. It seemed improbable that this group could one day be a formidable foe for Nanking.

Meanwhile, jealousy spread through the leadership of the Kungchantang, the Chinese Communist Party. Chang Kuo-t'ao, sometimes vice-chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet and later chairman of the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei Soviets, disagreed with Mao Tse-tung on the disposition of the Red Army. Preferring to remain in Szechuan, he was finally persuaded to lead his troops into Kansu and Shensi by Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai. A year later, at Pao An Chang, he continued

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3 One incident reported in the New York Times, September 1, 1935, p. 12:7, tells of six hundred "Reds" stripped and chased by Lolo tribesmen near Menningshun.

his opposition to Mao and in 1938 fled to Hankow. The defection of Li Li-san in 1931 was of a more temporary nature. Li had disappeared into the Soviet Union but returned to China at the close of World War II as General Lin Piao's political adviser and vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor.

In 1934 and 1935 the Shensi Soviet expanded considerably. A training school was established for the Communist Party in this period of political indoctrination. The "Reds" opened a bank, issued stamps, and printed money. Land was confiscated and redistributed. All surtaxes were abolished. Co-operatives were opened. Primary schools were started. By the middle of 1935 the Soviets controlled twenty-two counties in Shensi and Kansu.[4] It was into this setting that the survivors of the Long March came.

Shensi is a farming province. Cattle, sheep, and goats graze on the high, loess hills. It is usually peaceful in this part of China. Modern living is practically unknown. Peasants till the poor soil as their ancestors have done for the past thousand years. Marxists could not have picked a more incongruous locale for the

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[4] Snow, op. cit., p. 202.

beginning of a Communist state. Surrounding cities were under the banner of the Kuomintang.

Faced with a peasant society the "Reds" wisely adopted a peasant program of land and taxes. However, the Chinese Communists regarded land distribution as merely a preliminary step in the establishment of a mass base for inroads into industry. The First All-China Soviet Congress in 1931 left no doubt as to the ultimate aim of Communism in China--a complete Socialist State of the Marx-Leninist conception.[5] As with Stalin and Trotsky, so with Mao Tse-tung and Li Li-san, it never was a question of what to do, but how and when to do it.

Because the Soviets had to fight from the beginning, an army was of primary importance. The potency of any "Red" fighting force depended on the support of the people. Cut off from any outside aid with Russia having her own problems magnified by a world in depression and an inadequate Five Year Plan, these Communists were left to their own resources in a practically resourceless land. Remoteness from Nanking, the Japanese menace, and the inadequate peasant program of the Kuomintang helped give the "Reds" a chance for success.

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[5] Ibid., p. 212.

Representative government of the Communist variety was established wherever the regime was stabilized. Patterned after the Russian system it gave every indication of democracy to the casual observer. Suffrage was universal but not equal. An attempt was made to balance peasant influence by classifying the rural population into categories: great landlords, middle and small landlords, rich peasants, poor peasants, tenant peasants, rural workers, handicraft workers, lumpen proletariat, and professional workers. In the election of the Soviets the tenant peasants, rural workers, handicraft workers, et cetera, were given a greater representation than were other divisions.

Central Soviet
Provincial Soviet
County Soviets
District Soviets
Village Soviets

GRAPH 2*

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN COMMUNIST RURAL AREAS

* Ibid., p. 213.

In each area the Communist Party controlled the choice of candidates.

At this stage the extension of the Party was more important to the revolution than was the governmental organization. Membership drives were undertaken in the towns and villages. Young Communists were organized as Young Vanguards and Children's Brigades. Women were banded into Communist Leagues, anti-Japanese societies, nursing schools, weaving schools, and tilling brigades. Adult farmers were organized into the Poor People's Society and into anti-Japanese societies. An ancient secret order, the Elder Brother Society, was given a place in the social scheme of reconstruction. Peasant Guards and Partisan brigands took assigned positions in the new order. Committees were set up under each of the district Soviets embracing all phases of activity in the Communist areas. It mattered little to the peasant tilling his small plot of land that he was being fit to a social pattern that could not permit individual political liberty and survive. Here was a system that promised economic betterment and an opportunity to belong. Small wonder that it found in him a willing worker and an ardent supporter.

Redistribution of the land was of great importance in the initiation of Communist policy. By "Red"

definition "any farmer who rented out his land and collected most of his income from it, and not from his own labor, was a landlord."[6] In Shensi the problem was simpler than it had been in the South. Big estates were often owned by former officials, tax collectors, and absentee landlords. Confiscation was easy.

Co-operatives were established that went beyond production and distribution. Animals and machines were pooled in a common effort. Labor societies were organized to plant and harvest large areas quickly. Even the army was used for this work at least one day each week. The Communists were taking a step towards the kolkozes of the Russian farm areas.

Politically, economically, and educationally, at first glance, the Shensi Soviets seemed to presage a new and better era for the Chinese peasant. Ethically, the West and most Western observers took a dim view of the moral aspects of Communist control. There can be no denying the material failure to promote the economic well-being of the people under the old regime, but none can praise the "spiritual" rejuvenation of the new. It is in this that the Soviets failed. Their economic success

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6 Ibid., p. 216.

enhances the chance for failure. If the Chinese, or any people, ever reach the point where physical necessities are easily obtainable then Communism of the Russian variety will disappear. In Shensi, as elsewhere, Communism flourished on poverty and had to expand to include more poverty or die.

Two tasks faced the Soviets in the Northwest: to feed and equip the Red Army, and to bring immediate relief to the peasantry. Private capitalism, State capitalism, and Socialism existed side by side in the Soviets. The State owned and exploited heavy industry but allowed some competition from private enterprise, under restrictions, in the transaction of land and its products.[7] A third competition was permitted in the co-operatives where members competed against private and state capitalism. Socialism was the aim of these co-operatives and their functions were listed to attain these ends:

1. To combat the exploitation of the masses by the merchants.
2. To combat the enemy's blockade.
3. To develop the national economy of the Soviet districts.
4. To raise the economic political level of the masses.

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[7] Mao Tse-tung took his lesson from the failure of the Russian experiment in 1918-1921 when all capital was abolished in the U.S.S.R.

5. To prepare the conditions for socialist construction.[8]

Consumption, sales, production, and credit co-operatives were organized on all political levels. Shares were priced so that even the lowest peasant could afford to participate in the endeavor and there were no restrictions placed on the number of members. However, a member had only one vote regardless of the number of shares he possessed. Prizes were offered for efficiency in management; managers being elected by the co-operatives with the assistance of the central bureau. The government invested and shared in these enterprises.

Trade was a problem for the Northwest area. An agrarian economy yielded bulky raw materials that were difficult to transport across the marshy flats and up the rocky hillsides that passed for roads. Manufactured articles were needed. These had to come from Kuomintang areas for the most part. Soviet currency was not accepted outside the Communist Zone and a way had to be found to get enough Nationalist currency to pay for imports.

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[8] Snow, op. cit., p. 222, quoted from Outline of Co-operative Development, Department of National Economy, November, 1935, Wayapao, Shensi, p. 4.

To complicate the situation further, exports had to be sold on a depressed market like smuggled goods. The need for money was acute.

Lin Pai-chu, veteran of the Long March and Communist Commissar of Finance, explained his three-fold program of fund raising thusly: a direct tax levied on the people, voluntary contributions, and confiscation. This last method provided the biggest and fastest source of revenue, but also had the shortest life. For all of Lin's efforts, the unfavorable balance continued. No adequate solution short of legitimate access to machine industrialization could solve the dilemma. That the "Reds" managed to survive under such an economic burden attests to the tenacity of the movement and to the impoverished conditions under which the people had lived prior to its coming.

Illiteracy in the Northwest was set at about 95 per cent in 1935. Soviet education attempted to cover all phases of human activity. However, greatest emphasis was placed on military education with schools organized for the infantry, cavalry, radiomen, medical men, and engineers. Teachers were scarce, instruction crude, socialist propaganda plentiful. Those who learned to read could not doubt as to who had taught them or their part in the great struggle. Each peasant knew the Red Army as the

Poor Man's Army, the Red Flag as the Poor Man's Flag. These were among his first lessons to be repeated over and over again. Education in Shensi served the Communists well. Rudimentary but effective, a fully developed system might have been detrimental to the cause in the long view.

Superstition played a vital part in the health habits of this region. Water was considered harmful, and a man bathed but twice in his life--once at birth and again at marriage. To combat such practices schools were set up under Hsu Teh-li.[9] However, these schools were more often used for political indoctrination than the teaching of health as such. Children learned their first characters in the form of revolutionary slogans and then worked forward into stories of conflict between the "Reds" and the Kuomintang, landlords and peasants, capitalists, and workers.

Let us now leave Shensi briefly and survey the happenings in other parts of China. The Japanese threat was being felt all through Asia and the Nationalist Government pressed to relieve the situation. Japan had gone into Manchuria in 1931 and gave every evidence of

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[9] See Chapter VIII, p. 154, for a biographical sketch of Hsu Teh-li.

staying there. Despite this foreign aggression tuchuns continued their jealous grasp of portions of China. A National Military Council composed of Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Chang Hsue-liang with Chiang Kai-shek as chairman was short-lived. Civil wars broke out in Shantung, Szechuan, and Kweichow in 1932 to add to the difficulties in the attempt to unify China. In November of 1933 a group of Chinese generals led by Ch'en Ming-ch'u declared the independence of Fukien and established a government at Foochow. Nanking sent land, sea, and air forces against the city and retook it by January. In other southeastern provinces, such as Kwangtung and Kwangsi, the Nationalists had only nominal control without effective authority.

In the late Spring of 1936, as the Japanese renewed their pressure on the north, these southern armies took the field demanding that Chiang join them in an attack against the invaders. For awhile it appeared a clash would be inevitable, as the Generalissimo made it evident he would resist any attempt by these troops to move north. However, the southern revolt collapsed without any serious fighting, the result being the extension of Nationalist authority to the Canton regions. Thus, we may see the widespread defections in a land that needed unity above

all else. A government at Nanking being pulled apart by internal troubles, warlords playing politics for power, revolt in the South, and the Japanese in Manchuria added up to a bargaining point for the Communist Party. In 1936, at Sian, the capital of Shansi, the crises came to a head.

To Sian in 1935 had come the Young Marshall, General Chang Hsueh-liang, and approximately one hundred thirty thousand troops to blockade the Red Army in the Northwest. These Manchurians, having been forcibly removed from their homeland by the Japanese, continually agitated for action in that direction rather than against the Communists. Consequently, the threatened punitive expedition never seemed to get underway. General Chang even established friendly relations with Chou En-lai,[10] laison official for the Kungchantung.

Recognizing the inherent danger in this state of affairs, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian on December 4, in order to hasten the proposed offensive. Instead of accomplishing this, the Generalissimo was imprisoned and held for fourteen days by Chang Hsueh-liang. First reports

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[10] See Chapter VIII, page 161, for a biographical sketch of Chou En-lai.

of ransom demands were said to include five points:

1. A grant of $30,000,000 to Chang's army.
2. A new and better garrison area.
3. Equipment and supplies equal to those supplied to government armies.
4. A stronger front against Japan.
5. Officers of Chang's army to get executive posts in the proposed new anti-Japanese army for national salvation.[11]

However, these specifications may have been hastily drawn for later reports modified and broadened the demands to contain:

1. A cessation of hostilities in the Civil War.
2. A re-organization of the Nanking Government to include all parties.
3. Release of patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai.
4. Release of all political prisoners.
5. Guarantee of the right of assembly.
6. Assurance of the right of the people to carry out patriotic movements.
7. Faithful execution of the will of Sun Yat-sen.
8. A conference for national salvation.[12]

Chiang would make no definite commitments. Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, and W. H. Donald arrived in Sian on December 22, to effect his release. Surprisingly enough, Chou En-lai helped in bringing this about.[13] The Communists were aware of the Generalissimo's ability to unify

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[11] New York Times, December 21, 1936, p. 1:6.

[12] Chang, op. cit., p. 249; New York Times, January 22, 1937, p. 10:2.

[13] H. H. McNair and D. F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, quoting Betram, First Act in China, the Story of the Sian Meeting, p. 133, and Bisson, Japan in China, p. 78; Snow, op. cit., p. 415; Chang, op. cit., p. 260.

the country against Japan. They also feared making a martyr of a person they would someday need to discredit before the Chinese people.

On December 25, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was freed. In the spring of the following year, Chou En-lai was named as Communist representative at Nanking bringing in an era of closer co-operation between the "Reds" and the "Whites."

Meanwhile the Soviet Government moved from Pao An to Yenan, a site chosen for its historical significance. This city had seen the downfall of the last purely Chinese dynasty, the Mings. Perhaps Mao Tse-tung wished to begin a new kind of dynasty here. In any event, Yenan assumes an important niche in the rise of Communism in China, a springboard for all that follows.

The years 1934 to 1937 were ones of consolidation for the forces of Communism in China. Mao Tse-tung's plan for a Communist regime, built on land reform and political indoctrination, showed results. Support afforded the Communist Army by the people of the area accentuated its effectiveness. Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the defection of Chang Hsueh-liang, revolts in the south, friction within the Kuomintang, and the remoteness of Shensi prevented Chiang Kai-shek from bringing adequate pressure to bear on this region. Left alone, the

Communists built a hard core of resistance to Nationalist control.

CHAPTER IV

NANKING AND YENAN

1937-1945

Early in the morning of July 7, 1937, on the Marco Polo Bridge, the whine of bullets marked the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in earnest. With this overt act against the territory of China proper, the Nanking authorities had no choice but to find a solution to the Communist problem. Four promises which had been agreed upon earlier were published by the Kuomintang on July 15, 1937. These included:

> 1. The Chinese Communist Party shall struggle for the realization of the three principles of the people.
> 2. They will abandon the policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang regime, give up the communist movement, and discard the policy of confiscating land by force.
> 3. They will dissolve the present Soviet organization, and by carrying into practice the principles of democracy, they will help to bring about the political unity of the whole nation.
> 4. They will disband the Red Army.[1]

Ten weeks after the beginning of the war the Communists announced their version of these promises:

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[1] China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 67.

1. The Communists propose to abandon the agrarian revolution they have practiced in the past.
2. They propose not to overthrow the Kuomintang by force.
3. They promise to reorganize the Soviet Government in the border region as a democratic, local government.
4. They agree to reorganize the Red Army as a national revolutionary army.[2]

The discrepancies in these interpretations may be laid to a judicious effort on both sides to "save face." In actual practice the Communist version was the one followed.

The "Reds" did not offer much in the way of real compromise for all the imposing wording of their concessions. With a full scale invasion of the mainland by a major power underway, there was little opportunity to continue a program of agrarian reform. Secondly, Russia recognized Japan as her first enemy in Asia. Some of this fear was transmitted to the Chinese Communist leaders during their Moscow stay. It could be of no benefit to overthrow the Kuomintang and then fall prey to Japan. The third agreement was never fulfilled despite a great display of elections and balloting. The fourth saw the Red Army become officially the Eighth Route Army with a New

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[2] Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, p. 114.

Fourth Army organized out of the scattered guerrilla forces in Central China. Outside pressure had brought an uneasy truce to the struggling factions within China.

From 1934 to 1937 both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung had refurbished the morale of their respective troops by representing their immediate enemy to be Japanese imperialism. The Generalissimo's "anti-bandit" campaign was a preparation for the fight against Japan. Every pillbox built was a defense line against the coming attack from the Island Empire. So, also, every step taken towards the west by the "Reds" was training for the struggle with Japan.

Even after the attack on Lukouchiao there was no slackening of pressure on either side. Not until January, 1938, following the Japanese victory at Nanking did an actual "modus operandi" become effective, and then only on a limited scale.

The formation of the People's Political Council was symbolic of Chinese unity during the early period of the war. It first met on July 6, 1931. Of its two hundred members, seven were Communists. This group had three main powers: (1) to consider government policies and actions; (2) to submit proposals to the government; and (3) to question high government officials and receive reports from

them.[3] In the beginning the People's Political Council served as a sounding board for national opinion, but even this perfunctory use was curtailed as disunity spread.

The New Fourth Army was permitted to engage in guerrilla activity on the north and south banks of the Yangtze River. Recruits from the provinces flocked to the colors of Yeh Ting, its commander. Political prisoners, peasants, students, and factory workers jointed the surge.

Mao Tse-tung formulated a theory which saw the war divided into three periods: (1) Japanese offensive, Chinese retreat to gain time; (2) Japanese offensive blunted against the foothills of Western China; and (3) Japan's internal and international contradictions reach a breaking point, followed by large-scale Chinese counter-offensives and victory.[4] These tactics were adopted by the Nationalist Forces in their retreat to the west.

In 1939 Generalissimo Chiang set up a guerrilla school with some ideas borrowed from the Communist Military Academy at Yenan. Shortly before this Chiang had made a declaration at Nanyo which showed a change in the

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[3] Lawrence Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics, p. 50.

[4] Edgar Snow, The Battle For Asia, p. 178.

emphasis of the Government on the conduct of the war. He said:

> The people are more important than the army. Guerrilla warfare is more important than positional warfare. The political education of the soldiers is more important than military education. Propaganda is more important than bullets.[5]

General Yeh Chien-ying, "Red" tactician, was sometime adviser in the new school. Outwardly at least, the Kuomintang and Kunchantung seemed to be moving in the direction of complete harmony. It looked as though the "Whites" were turning "pink." Military necessity left little choice. A capitalist system without capital is an impossibility. A non-industrial nation attempting to fight a war on an industrial basis is likewise impossible. For all of this, the basic differences between Communist and Nationalist remained irreconcilable. China presented much less than a united front against the invaders.

Throughout 1938 the picture of amicable relations was often vigorously portrayed.[6] By 1939 this thin veneer of friendship had worn smooth. As enemy pressure slackened, the Kuomintang turned to the task of regaining

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[5] Ibid., p. 183. Chiang's shift in tactics noted in New York Times, December 15, 1938, p. 14:3.

[6] New York Times, May 1, 1938, p. 3:5; May 1, 1938, p. 37:1; June 12, 1938, p. 30:1; October 7, 1938, p. 16:1; November 9, 1938, p. 21:5.

control relinquished to other factions in the government. Chou En-lai, Communist vice-chairman of the Political Department of the National Military Council, was deprived of all real power. Bookshops were raided and literature on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies was confiscated.[7] Communication between Chungking and Yenan was gradually cut off. Arms supply to Communist-led troops was stopped altogether. A blockade of the Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia areas was initiated by Kuomintang forces.[8]

North China has always remained a nation apart from the south. If there had been unity in 1938, there had been no surrender of sovereignty. After Sian the Communists were left in control of an area the size of England. With the union of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party a special administration was set up for the territory. Yenan became the capital of the new provisional government as it had been the capital of the Soviet Republic. It remained the center of Communist Party activities as well as headquarters for the Eighth Route Army.

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[7] New York Times, November 16, 1939, p. 8:4.

[8] Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China, p. 124.

This city suffered repeated bombardment by the Japanese during the war. In spite of the destruction, conditions were better than had been enjoyed by the Communists at Pao An.[9] Industry, trade, and agriculture expanded slowly. Public health progressed to the point where plague which was edemic to the region had not been felt for two years.

Economically the Communist controlled areas were faced with a two-way blockade, from Japan and from the Kuomintang. In order to overcome the difficulty of supply it was necessary to establish self-sufficiency in the regions of occupancy. This program was launched in 1940 by ten thousand soldiers of the One Hundred Twentieth Division of the Eighth RouteArmy under General Wang Chen. These troops turned farmers enlisted the aid of the peasants to produce 4,500,000 pounds of millet, 450,000 pounds of pork, and 1,000,000 pounds of potatoes and pumpkins by 1943.[10] Not only did soldiers farm on a large scale, but also maintained their own smithies, spinning and weaving factories, tailor shops, oil pressing mills, and food preserving plants.

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[9] Snow, op. cit., p. 266.

[10] Epstein, op. cit., p. 262.

In the Shansi-Hunan-Hopei Area soldiers reclaimed large stretches of land in the barren Taihang Mountains. The Army in Shantung supplied its needs to the value of $56,156,000.00 or about $1,000.00 for each regular soldier. In Central Hopei each man was obliged to cultivate one sixth of an acre annually.[11] Japanese attacks often coincided with the planting and harvesting seasons. They hoped to force the Chinese troops into requisitioning food from the people and thereby to destroy the relationship of peasant to soldier without which guerrilla warfare is impossible. Labor Exchange Groups foiled these attempts by reducing planting and harvesting operations from six to two weeks. What had formerly been done by the individual peasant on his own farm now was done by the whole village. Necessity forced community co-operation.

Agriculture has been the foremost industry in China from time immemorial. The search for more arable land has occupied the efforts of sage and politician, conquered and conqueror, landlord and peasant for centuries. China is the land of flood and drought. Her many rivers furnish enough water for crops when irrigation projects are developed.

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11 Ibid., p. 279.

One of the serious effects of the Japanese invasion was the deterioration of the system of irrigation. Punitive expeditions often found it advantageous to demolish dikes. Rebuilding was difficult with the lack of mechanical equipment and decreased manpower. However, in the Peiyao region of the Shansi-Honan-Hopei Section over eight hundred thousand acres of new land was cultivated in 1940-1941. On the Central Hopei plain 197 major dike breaches were mended, one hundred ninety miles of new embankments built, and fifty miles of river deepened.[12]

1939-1941 were years of trial for the fronts behind Japanese lines. With the regular front inactive, Japan could concentrate on flushing the guerrillas. At the beginning of the resistance there had been unity in China. Now there was no hope of getting supplies from the unoccupied areas controlled by the Kuomintang. Consequently, the guerrillas had to extend their operations, to capture more arms, and to keep the enemy so busy in so many places that he could not concentrate against any one.

First the Japanese tried conventional methods of positional war. Attacking on a wide front, they would take some place from the Communists. After finding that

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[12] Ibid., p. 286.

all they had gained was land, the Imperial Army next organized commando groups of about one thousand men to carry out quick, deep raids into Chinese territory designed to annihilate directing centers and separate detachments. The first such strokes were delivered in the spring and autumn of 1939, in the southeast Wutai Mountain Area. Lieutenant General Abe, the highest Japanese commander on the mainland, had devised the tactics and died trying to make them successful.

A series of forts were constructed to "strangle" the roving Chinese troops. These were also unsuccessful. The guerrillas never let the Japanese get their balance. They kept the initiative by constant attack, always maintaining superiority in the areas of activity. The militia was particularly effective in sniping and mine-laying. Whereas, formerly, the Japanese entered villages at will in small numbers, they now did so only when a campaign extended through the territory.

Friction between the Communists and Nationalists mounted. Down south, the New Fourth Army, which had achieved some measure of fame for its anti-Japanese resistance in the lower Yangtze Valley, found itself in serious difficulty.

In contrast to the stony mountains and dry plains

of the Eighth Route Army bases north of the Yellow River, the New Fourth operated in the rich, green, humid valley of the Yangtze among flooded rice fields terraced along gentle slopes. Inter-party strife began in 1938 in this sector. After the defection of former Premier, Wang Ching-wei, to the Japanese, it was difficult to tell foe from friend.

Three types of national forces had held the lower Yangtze at that time. The New Fourth numbered ten thousand men, the "Loyal and Victorious" Army of Kuomintang Secret Service Chief Tai Li numbered eighty thousand men, Central Army troops numbered about fifty thousand in the area. It was not until the Japanese stopped their general offensive that the differences in the Chinese camp came to the forefront. The New Fourth continued its program of limited offensive against the Imperial troops. Kuomintang leaders wished to take the time to consolidate and rest.

Late in 1940 Ho Ying-chin, War Minister and Chief of Staff to the Central Government, ordered the New Fourth to leave its bases behind the enemy lines and to move several hundred miles to the north bank of the Yellow River, there to join with the Eighth Route. The "Reds" refused to obey. In January, 1941, Government units under

General Shangkuan Yun-hsiang attacked the New Fourth and destroyed its organizational arm. Although its headquarters were gone, only one fourth of its efficiency was impaired. Like all forces engaged in guerrilla activities, it was divided into tactically autonomous detachments, each holding its own pocket of resistance and dependent on headquarters only for general guidance, not for supplies and day to day direction.

The Kuomintang version of this affair was one of disciplinary action against an insubordinate unit. The Kungchantung saw in it a renewal of Civil War. The New York Times saw other possibilities:

> It is not accident or coincidence that the most recent flareup between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists has occurred while Japan's special Ambassador is negotiating with Premier and Foreign Minister Vyachesloff M. Molotoff in Moscow on a possible agreement following on Japan's formal adherence to the German-Italian alliance.[13]

> The quarrel [between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang] turns upon two demands. The Eighth Route Army asked to be transferred from its present field of operation in the impoverished northwestern provinces to the richer and more populous Yangtze Valley, now largely under Japanese control, arguing that they could fight there more effectively. The Fourth Route Army demanded an immediate national convention with a view to broadening the basis of government . . . .

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[13] New York Times, January 19, 1941, p. 3:8.

> As to the Yangtze, a Chinese victory which would leave Communist forces in possession of the country's richest provinces would scarcely be palatable to the government unless it were first assured that those forces put loyalty to China above adherence to Moscow.[14]

Whether of primary national or international significance the discord in China was evident.

Industrial production in Communist sections was naturally centered in supplying the army. Each of the nineteen Red areas had at least one base arsenal employing from two hundred to one thousand workers.[15] The making of small arms was their first job. With an extremely mobile force there is little need for unwieldy field pieces. Then, too, operating so close to the invading army, it was necessary to move on an instant's notice. Easily dismantled and easily transported machinery was the order of the day.

Raw materials for arms production came from the war itself. Japanese rails were torn up steel and Japanese communication lines for copper. Captured "scrap" accounted for almost all of the metals used.

Textiles were produced largely by the women in the villages. Conservation came as a matter of course.

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[14] Ibid., January 22, 1941, p. 20:2.

[15] Epstein, op. cit., p. 287.

Uniform factories were maintained by the army. Old uniforms had to be turned in for salvage before new ones were issued. The cloth was torn into strips and used for padding in shoes or plaited into rope for sandals. To save metal uniform buttons were made of wood. Glazed earthenware took the place of enameled metal insignia.

The Communists printed their own currency throughout the war. Initially, the flooding of "Red" controlled areas with money printed by the Japanese gave impetus to the printing. Then, in keeping with the ideal of a self-contained economy, the practice was continued. As in most agrarian societies and particularly those that are socialized, there is little need for coin. Barter serves as well. In the eyes of the state it serves better, for control is easier. To bribe an individual with a bushel of grain is congruous. To pay the state with a bushel of grain is natural. Taxes in kind had been extracted from the Chinese people for years.

With a government constantly alerted to move, however, it was necessary to have the people accept a currency that could be minted by that government. In this way a base could be built for economic salvation in the event of military disaster.

Trade in China was carried on among its geographical subdivisions regardless of political affiliations. Hostile terrain, lack of communications, and the will of a determined people made it virtually impossible for Japan to close off its sections. Trade was slow and often hazardous but always active. The Kuomintang blockade was even less effective. Although Nanking protested against the "Red" practice of coining money, there was nothing she could do about it. And without these issues the Communist economy would have been seriously restricted, if it did not collapse.

Education of the masses was stressed whenever possible in Communist areas. Hsu Teh-li[16] laid the foundation for an educational system in Shensi. Before his arrival there had been one hundred twenty schools scattered throughout the province. By the end of 1939 there were 773 primary schools, seventy-eight model primary schools, sixteen higher primary schools, seven hundred character-study groups, 208 elementary schools, four middle schools, three colleges, an art academy, a technical training academy, and an Industrial Co-operative

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16 See Chapter VIII, p. 154, for a biographical sketch of Hsu Teh-li.

Vocational Training School for Boys.[17] These schools, of course, devoted much of their time to political indoctrination on Marxism and the Communist interpretation of the San Min Chu-I.

Of singular importance was the Nu Tzu Ta Hseuh, the Women's University, near Tushih. In 1939 there were four hundred girls enrolled in such diverse subjects as spinning, the care of infants, and English and Russian grammar. Here, also, the central theme was Marxism. The higher the school, the more intense the indoctrination. All activities were channeled towards control by the state.

When Japan attacked in 1937 there had been little thought in China of a fight to the end. Kuomintang leaders hoped for six months of resistance and a subsequent moderation of Tokyo's demands. Not until 1938 was the Chinese Minister withdrawn. From time to time "peace feelers" were sent from the Axis. These were rejected when it became evident that peace could mean nothing but submission to Nippon.[18] Some Kuomintang leaders favored peace at any price. A movement was instituted within the Party to bring Chiang Kai-shek to terms. The Communists

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[17] Snow, op. cit., p. 273.

[18] Rosinger, op. cit., p. 30.

violently opposed this action. They urged a continuance of the war until the Japanese were driven from the mainland.

Since China was considerably weaker than Japan both economically and politically, it had to develop methods of warfare that would permit the most effective use of its resources. No better example could be found of a numerically inferior, ill-equipped force prolonging a struggle than the Communist Campaigns of 1930-1934 in the Kiangsi hills.

China for the first time in its long history was temporarily united in a common cause. What had been accomplished by the Communists in one province could be achieved on a national scale by the combined weight of the Kuomintang and Kungchantang. Support from foreign powers grew as the war progressed. More and more enemy troops had to be delivered to other areas, making it extremely precarious for Japan to launch attacks into the interior. The policy of trading space for time was successful against the Japanese.

However, the continuing struggle against the Communists was further weakened by this stratagem. If the defense of industrial regions was untenable militarily, their defense was necessary politically. To give up the idea of fighting for positions meant the government would

abandon its industrialized coast. This would prostrate a faction within the government where support had come from the industrial, merchant class. Moreover, to engage in guerrilla warfare, the people would have to be mobilized behind the Japanese lines. This could best be accomplished by offering them an improved way of life. The peasants could hardly be expected to support the war effort without an amelioration of their economic and political position. In this also we find the Kuomingtang being forced to reduce the power of a class which had supported it, the landlords.

The Eighth Route Army carried much of the burden for successful guerrilla warfare. This group was sent to Shansi in 1937 where it found a demoralized people in leveled villages. This populace was quickly organized into an effective force for harassment of the Japanese Army in occupation and for raids on Japanese supply lines.

Emphasis fell on the cultivation of peasant support. Land was re-distributed, rents and interest rates reduced, and the payment of debts cancelled or extended. Such actions helped cement the friendship of the people who succeeded in keeping large numbers of enemy troops in the north thereby blunting Japan's drive for conquest of all China.

However, all was not well with Nationalist and Communist. As early as the spring of 1938, the government had refused the necessary official registration to all non-Kuomintang Youth Organizations. Later that same year a military clash occurred in north Honan between the Eighth Route Army and Nationalist troops. The next year battles were reported between Communist and Central forces in Kansu Province.[19]

At the Southeast Shansi mountain base internal friction threatened to leave the area easy prey for the Japanese. The political history of this base involved two provincial administrations and overlapped that of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Suizan regions. Difficulties with Yen Hsi-shan,[20] tuchun of Shansi, led to small scale civil war in the former province which was finally quelled by elements of the Shansi New Army. The Eighth Route assumed jurisdiction over the latter area.

In South Hopei Governor Lu Chung-lin, who had been sent in by the Central Government, dispersed the local administrators and brought back old-line officials. He

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[19] New York Times, November 16, 1939, p. 8:4.

[20] For a brief resume of this man's activities from 1912-1946 Cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 167-68.

disarmed the Militia and entered into an agreement with Governors Yen of Shansi and Shen Hung-lieh of Shantung, for inter-provincial defense. The Eighth Route Army struck at this coalition and in 1940 set up the Shansi-Honan-Hopei Government.

From its northern base, this Army finished out the war against Japan. Because of a shortage of supply, it engaged primarily in guerrilla activities. Occupied cities were generally avoided. For the most part the Communists were content to harass and let the Japanese come to them. Reports filtered out to the western world of battles won and lost. Verification was difficult and often impossible.

Conditions worsened between Kuomintang and Kunchangtung. Early in 1941 Chungking accused Communist troops in North China of refusing to go to the aid of Nationalists trapped by Japanese forces in the Chungtiao Mountains.[21] The Communists, in turn, accused the Kuomintang of withholding supplies and not fighting the invaders.

After the collapse of Allied positions in Southeast Asia, Japan moved more troops into North China. The Eighth

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[21] New York Times, May 22, 1941, p. 6:5.

Route was driven out of Central Hopei altogether. Its central headquarters in the Shansi Mountains was surrounded, and the Chief-of-staff, Tso Chuan, was killed.

A new method of extermination was tried by the Imperial Army. Forces were concentrated in single villages for a three-month period during which time every inhabitant was questioned. This was doomed to failure as the Eighth Route once again forced the Japanese to deploy by attacks on their weakest positions.

As the American forces approached the Philippines and the United States Fourteenth Air Force swept the Chinese skies clear of enemy planes, Japan changed her strategy and launched an attack against the Chinese regular front. In early 1944 the whole Province of Honan fell when Tang En-po's Central Armies disintegrated. Next came the capitulation of Changsha and a move into Hanyang to meet columns coming north from Kwantung. This gave the Imperial Army possession of the entire Canton-Hankow railway and cut China in two. In the South the Japanese moved with astonishing rapidity. Whole fronts collapsed as the Chinese armies reeled back, often without resistance.[22]

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[22] Epstein, op. cit., p. 325.

Chungking was a mass of confusion. Rumors plagued the city. Officials worried. People waited for the invading islanders.

Meanwhile, the Communist forces in the North began a series of coordinated attacks from all bases behind enemy lines. Because of the scarcity of materials for anything but guerrilla action, these attacks avoided the big cities and major Japanese centers. Three objectives prompted this offensive: (1) to relieve the pressure along the regular front; (2) to destroy the net of blockhouses built in North and Central China; and (3) to extend Chinese areas along the coast so as to provide facilities for Allied landings. Some measure of success was attained in all three, but it remained for those Allied troops' island-hopping in the Pacific to play the major role in their eventual fulfillment.

Throughout this campaign the Communists expanded considerably. In March, 1944, the regulars totaled four hundred seventy thousand. By late fall this number almost doubled to eight hundred thousand.[23] Opinions differed

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[23] Ibid., p. 331.

sharply on their relative worth to the war effort.

A military review for a Tokyo daily wrote:

> Our major enemy's now the Communist forces. Seventy per cent of our engagements in North China are fought against them. Chungking Army has lost the will to combat.[24]

However, when General Okumura, Japanese Commander-in-Chief in China made his report to the Allies after V J Day, he estimated that the Japanese had lost less than fifty thousand men to the guerrillas.[25] So obscure are the records and so confused was the front it is virtually impossible to tell where the true figures lie. Another source credits the Communists with ninety-two thousand battles in seven years of war and inflicting one million one hundred thousand casualties on the enemy.[26] Still another author says, "for every Japanese they claim to have killed, they have killed at least five Chinese. . ."[27]

On the political front things were no better. In May of 1944, Lin Chu-an, chairman of the Communist led Shensi-Kansa-Ninghsia border region, arrived at Sian for a

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[24] Epstein, loc. cit.

[25] Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, p. 210.

[26] Harrison Forman, Report from Red China, p. 125.

[27] Lin Yutang, The Vigil of the Nation, p. 125.

conference with Central Government officials to plan for closer cooperation between the two groups. Later that month another Communist, Lin Tso-han, went to Chungking for a series of conferences with Chiang Kai-shek. These talks centered on (1) the degree of autonomy for Communist-dominated area; (2) the degree of participation by Communists in the Central Government; and (3) the extent of cooperation in the Japanese war.[28] Very little agreement was reached in these conferences. If anything they served to focus the attention of all concerned on the basic differences between Kunchangtung and Kuomingtang.

It may be significant that one month after the start of these conferences the ban on foreign correspondents traveling in Communist sections was lifted by Chungking. News sent back to the outside world was for the most part complimentary.[29] Correspondents praised the economy, educational program, and military forces at Yenan. Describing the opening meeting of the Communist-led Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Administration, these newspapermen list eight of the twenty-two members in

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[28] New York Times, May 5, 1944, p. 11:1; May 18, 1944, p. 10:6.

[29] New York Times, June 4, 1944, p. 23:2; June 10, 1944, p. 14:3; July 1, 1944, p. 6:4; August 6, 1944, p. 19:2; August 20, 1944, p. 23:1.

attendance as Communists. Others were landlords, minor gentry, teachers, a doctor, a soldier, a shop clerk, a tenant-farmer, and a poor peasant.

People's councils in the villages numbered fourteen at that time. Great emphasis is laid on the fact that of the 9,967 village councillors, 5,549 are poor peasants, 3,435 are middle peasants, 690 are rich peasants, 502 are hired laborers, 394 are workers, and the rest are laborers, gentry, and merchants. The Communists number 2,477, or 24 per cent.[30]

While Chinese Communists initially were drawn from all classes, there is no doubt that the class struggle was the foundation of party success. Those of the gentry had to submit to the will of the Party leaders. The 24 per cent did the ruling. Party policy, if flexible in this stage, was nonetheless established by a small group. Implementation could come on the local level but little else.

Warlordism has plagued China since the overthrow of the Manchus. Chiang Kai-shek was never able to completely unify the country. Certain sections continued to exercise

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[30] New York Times, August 6, 1944, p. 19:2.

varying degrees of autonomy right through the Japanese invasion. In Shansi the military governor, Yen Hsi-shan, fought a "gentlemanly" war with the Communists. If the "Reds" caught a Shansi soldier or official they trained him for a month and then sent him back. Yen trained his Communist captives for only a week. He believed his principles were stronger.[31] Such ludicrous examples of local resistance to Communism aided its growth in China.

In September, 1944, the series of conferences between Lin Tso-han and Chiang Kai-shek, begun in May, finally broke down. No progress was made in the settlement of basic issues.[32]

Early in February, 1945, Chou En-lai started discussions with the Central Government at Chungking. Foreign pressure, notably that of the United States, had been instrumental in bringing this about. American Ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley, assisted in the negotiations. Still no solutions to the problems could be effected. Wong Shih-chieh, Information Minister, gave the Nationalist

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[31] New York Times, June 5, 1944, p. 9:1.

[32] New York Times, September 16, 1944, p. 4:2, for a discussion of the differences in Communist-Nationalist talks.

version of its concessions as follows:

> 1. A readiness to recognize the Chinese Communist Party as a lawful political party.
> 2. Inclusion of a high ranking Communist official in the National military council.
> 3. Inclusion of Communist representatives in the executive Yuan.
> 4. Establishment of a committee of three, including equal status on it for Communists, to reorganize and supply the Communist Army.[33]

Chou disagreed with this report saying that Wong's concessions were contingent upon great Communist concessions. Communist troops had to be surrendered before legal recognition would be given to the Party. He further alleged that membership in the National Military Council and Executive Yuan were meaningless since neither body had any power.[34] So ended another attempt to reconcile divergent views. Neither side was willing to concede on issues vital to their ideologies. No compromise could be lasting.

As the World War II drew to a close the struggle between Communists and Nationalists worsened. On August 12, 1945, Chiang sent a message to Communist armies to hold positions and await further orders.[35] Chu Teh refused to

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[33] New York Times, February 15, 1945, p. 11:1.

[34] New York Times, February 16, 1945, p. 5:1.

[35] New York Times, August 15, 1945, p. 6:1.

obey. Instead he called on General Yasuji Okanura, Commander of the Japanese expeditionary forces in China, to surrender to his troops. Chinese Communist troops occupied Wanping ten miles southeast of Peiping.[36] Reports filtered in of Communist fighting in Shansi.[37]

Mao Tse-tung was invited to Chungking for a final attempt at settlement of differences in the late summer of 1945. But, even as these talks were in progress, Yenan reported new Communist army offensives in the Nanking area.[38] Rumors of the Eighth Army receiving supplies from Manchuria circulated freely in Nationalist quarters.[39] Little hope could be held for successful negotiations in this atmosphere.

So it continued down to the close of World War II. Puppet forces swung over from Japan to Chungking enabling the Central Government to control many cities. The First Army occupied Canton and the Sixth Army occupied Shanghai. Communist-Nationalist skirmishes raged in eleven Provinces.

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[36] New York Times, August 18, 1945, p. 2:1.

[37] New York Times, August 21, 1945, p. 1:7.

[38] New York Times, August 29, 1945, p. 1:5.

[39] New York Times, October 5, 1945, p. 3:4.

Artillery and mortars thundered along the coastal end of China's Great Wall where Communists blocked the path of thousands of Nationalist troops into industrially rich Manchura.[40]

Whatever bonds of unity had been forged by the Japanese invasion, collapsed with the surrender. As the Kungchantung gained in strength and popularity, the Kuomintang lost support. The fight for China, started in 1920 and interrupted briefly in 1937, was on again without pretense.

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40 New York Times, November 11, 1945, p. 1:6.

CHAPTER V

CIVIL WAR CONTINUES

1946-1951

"Within forty-eight hours of victory [over the Japanese] civil war was raging across China."[1] For twenty years the Red Army had flourished on the stony soil of China's political front. From the first force of three thousand men organized by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in 1928, they had grown to six million strong at the time the Nationalists were driven from the mainland. By 1946 there were approximately one million two hundred thousand in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Another indeterminate number operated in the Northeast, the Joint Democratic Armies, while about one million five hundred thousand irregulars followed the Communist flag. Opposed to these Chiang Kai-shek could muster four million men in the armies of the Kuomintang and one million irregulars.

As World War II drew to a close, Chu Teh ordered an offensive by the Chinese Red Armies to join the Russians coming down from the north. Chungking attempted to

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[1] T. White and A. Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, p. 279.

countermand this order by instructing the Eighth Route and the New Fourth to remain at their posts. Other units were to press the attacks against the Japanese. Yenan disregarded these instructions, and the race for China was underway.

In August, 1945, Japan capitulated to the Allied Forces including a Soviet Union in the struggle for only a week, but a Soviet Union whose proximity to China in general and Manchuria in particular made her a potent factor in the control of this strategic area. Forty years before her armies had left the Northern Provinces. At Portsmouth her dreams of an Eastern Empire had been thwarted. Some wondered if this time she was back to stay.

However, the U.S.S.R. had other plans for this region that did not include prolonged military occupation. Her first objective was to immobilize Manchurian industry and then, her second, to establish a government "friendly" to the Soviet Union. The old Tsarist method of encompassment was revived with a new and vital force for implementation, the Chinese Communist Army.

In September, 1945, the Chinese Government at Nanking had dispatched a note to Russia and the United

States claiming all Japanese property in Manchuria.[2] The attitude of the Communist Party, if one of unadulterated Nationalism, should have been in harmony with this pronouncement. Communist leaders had long recognized the need for Chinese industrialization. Nevertheless, Li Li-san, the leader of the industrial faction of the Kungchantang, newly arrived from Moscow, declared in a speech at Harbin:

> I feel that the movement of machinery [by Soviet Forces from Manchuria to Russia] is not an important problem at all. Of course the Soviet Union moved some machinery but not a large amount compared with its war losses.[3]

As early as August, 1945, negotiations were started between Yenan and Chungking in an effort to avoid the coming struggle. Mao Tse-tung flew to the Nationalist capital for a series of talks, but nothing came of them. There was too wide a gulf to resolve with words. Chiang favored a centralized government with power to appointed provincial and district magistrates. Mao wanted a

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[2] New York Times, March 15, 1946, quoted in Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 245.

[3] Ibid., quoting the Daily Worker, New York, July 26, 1946. The American Reparations Commission set the total damage to Manchurian Industry at over $2,000,000,000; United States Department of State Bulletin, 1946, p. 1154. Russia set the value of removed equipment at $97,000,000; Investiya, January 29, 1947; quoted from Dallin, p. 244.

decentralized organization with semi-autonomy for the village. Neither understood nor appreciated democracy. Both probably felt they had the interest of the Chinese people at heart and that they alone held the key to future prosperity.

On October 11, the Communists returned to Yenan, all hopes for a truce dissipated.

In January, 1946, General George C. Marshall of the United States, was proposed as intermediary in the Nationalist-Communist dispute. This placed him in the embarrassing position of trying to be impartial while his nation supplied one of the parties in the contest. American equipment and training had bolstered the Nationalist hold on the cities. To Nanking had gone the American trained Sixth Army of Chiang. Into Shanghai went the Ninety-Fourth. A third army had been flown to Peking from Hankow.

Government proposals for peace suggested that the People's Political Council elect five impartial observers to form a military inspection team to look into all areas of conflict. The Communists asked for an immediate cessation of hostilities with impartial inspection.[4] On

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[4] New York Times, January 1, 1946, p. 1:6.

January 10 the Political Consultative Council met and promised internal reform. An immediate cease-fire order was issued.[5] Nevertheless, reports continued to come in on Communist-Nationalist clashes.[6] Agreement was made increasingly difficult as both sides fought to have the biggest voice in the adoption of the New Constitution.[7]

On January 31 Chiang Kai-shek pledged full liberty to all parties.[8] The Communists won the right to carry on free, nation-wide, political activity and a strong minority in the National Coalition Government. More important, the Communist Armies were to remain in control of their territories.[9] Making the promise was easier than making the implementation necessary to carrying it into completion. Working against the success of this plan were: (1) the opposing philosophies of the two factions, (2) the two armies in the field, (3) the methods employed by both Parties to control territory, (4) the restlessness of the people, and (5) the Russians in Manchuria.

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[5] New York Times, January 11, 1946, p. 1:3.

[6] New York Times, January 17, 1946, p. 16:3.

[7] New York Times, January 31, 1946, p. 3:2.

[8] New York Times, February 1, 1946, p. 1:4.

[9] New York Times, February 2, 1946, p. 3:5.

As the Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria, Nationalists and Communists rushed to fill the vacuum. Because of its proximity and its occupation by forces politically affable to the Chinese "Reds," this Northern Province presented overwhelming advantages to the latter. Disregarding American advice to consolidate his positions in the South, Chiang entered the unequal contest.

Communist offensives were undertaken in Shantung, Shansi, and Hopei. Within a few weeks all traffic north of the Yellow River was disrupted and the "Reds" gained control of two thirds of Shansi. Their drive to the capital, Taiywan, was repulsed by the former warlord and now governor, Yen Hsi-shan.[10] However, the capture of the railway center, Kalgan, and a large store of Japanese equipment more than compensated for this loss. Its possession gave the Communists a secure route for moving troops north and effectively cut the Nationalist line to Manchuria.

Blocked by the Chinese Red Army from bringing in large contingents of Central troops, the Generalissimo

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[10] General Yen Hsi-shan had been returned to the governorship of Shansi with the help of forty thousand Japanese troops under General Sumita, former Japanese Commander in Shansi. New York Times, February 13, 1946, p. 10:6.

unwisely turned to traitor generals who were completely out of sympathy with the people. Manchurians had lived under these same men during the Japanese occupation. Changing flags could not change the memory of unjust acts.

Supposedly acting upon the request of the Central Government, Moscow said the Russians' withdrawal from Manchuria would be postponed and intimated its last troops would not leave until the Americans left. Anti-Russian parades were held in Hankow, Peiping, and other Chinese cities. Russian troops were rushed to reinforce the garrisons at Port Arthur and Dairen.[11] Meanwhile, continued Soviet stripping of Manchurian industry proceeded at an increased pace. Some estimated the removal of machinery at 50 per cent of the total.[12]

In the South, Communist leadership was less effective, Communist propaganda less virile, and Communist force less potent. Large cities were securely held by the Kuomintang. A projected coup in Shanghai failed to materialize. The Fourth Army marched north to Mukden. The "Reds" had decided to concentrate their strength in the

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[11] New York Times, February 27, 1946, p. 16:2.

[12] New York Times, March 17, 1946, Section IV, p. 5:7.

northeast.

Communist General Lin Piao seized Szepinkai on March 16, 1946, four days after the Russians left the city.[13] The Kremlin announced that Russian evacuation of the whole province was completed on May 3.[14] Seventeen days later Central troops recaptured Szepinkai and pushed to within twenty miles of Changchun.[15] A concerted Kuomintang offensive was launched in the summer of 1946. By March, 1947, Nationalists were in Yenan. Throughout these two years it seemed that Chiang was winning the war. He took one hundred sixty cities. The taking of cities, however, proved to be a weak point in the campaign. As General Chen Yi of the East China Communist Armies declared:

> By orthodox military strategy we should deploy our best troops to defend our capital and consider how long we can hold it. We are not doing this at all. We are considering how many of Chiang's troops we can annihilate in their sorties, how long before his casualties will force his withdrawal and how to diminish his armies still further in their retreat. We would never make the mistake that Chiang made in 1937 when he used up all his best troops to defend Shanghai and Nanking. When these were taken his armies were crushed.[16]

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[13] New York Times, May 15, 1946, p. 12:3.

[14] New York Times, May 22, 1946, p. 10:3.

[15] New York Times, May 23, 1946, p. 2:6.

[16] Anna L.Strong, The Chinese Conquer China, pp. 202-3.

For each city captured the Generalissimo's striking force was reduced by just so many men as were needed for garrison duty. The ability of the "Reds" to disperse and regroup in another area hundreds of miles away used the countryside to best advantage. Once again the people had to play the important role of supplying cover for the guerrilla troops.

If at first the Communists gave ground, exchanging land for men, they were aided by the defeatist attitude of Chiang's soldiers. Whole units surrendered without a fight. Many did not even bother to destroy their equipment. The Twenty-sixth Division, carrying all the implements of modern war, went over to the enemy. Kuomintang morale reached a new low.

In spite of this, the Nationalists pushed forward over the land by sheer weight of numbers. Heavy fighting was reported in Shantung in the fall of 1947. Kuomintang victories were announced daily with some reference to Communist drives. The world awaited the news of "Red" capitulation.

Let us leave for awhile the military story of the Civil War and look at the political developments in 1946-1947. With the failure of American mediation efforts, Kuomintang and Kungchantang settled into a battle of words. Chou En-lai directed a strong protest against the

decisions made by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang which closed its session in Chungking on March 17, 1946. He charged that the Nationalist Government had failed to live up to its promises of popular rights and liberties, with violations of the cease-fire agreement, and with pursuing plans to circumvent the compact for reduction and reorganization of the armies.[17] Differences of opinion on the general theme of the Constitution were given an airing. The Kuomintang favored a strong central government, whereas the Communist Party advocated greater provincial authority.[18]

On January 11, an agreement had been reached calling for five Government armies and one Communist army to be stationed in Manchuria.[19] The Communists held out for a revision of this agreement, but events in the field rendered this unnecessary.

Following Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria, Russian newspapers accused the United States of pushing China back into the status of a semi-colonial country. Simultaneous attacks by Moscow and Yenan on American policy in China

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17 New York Times, March 19, 1946, p. 14:3.

18 New York Times, March 30, 1946, p. 8:2.

19 New York Times, June 11, 1946, p. 15:2.

were promoted. If, as Lord Iverchapel, former British Ambassador to China, maintained, the Chinese Communists were not affiliated with Russia but were simply agrarian reformers,[20] their paths ran parallel courses.

In July a repressive campaign was undertaken by the Kuomintang in its large cities. Book stores and magazine stands were searched in Shanghai. One book store was stripped of all books with titles that bore such words as "democracy," "people," and "emancipation."[21] These tactics did more harm than good to the Nationalist cause.

The Kungchantang were extremely touchy on the subject of American aid to the Central Government. Considerable anti-American feeling was mustered in areas under "Red" control. On October 6, two hundred armed Chinese attacked the Marines at Tangku in an attempt to get arms and ammunition. Our military differed on the policy to follow in dealing with the whole Chinese question. There were those who felt we should stop assisting the corrupt Nationalists while others accused the scheming

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[20] New York Times, June 23, 1946, p. 5:1.

[21] New York Times, July 23, 1946, p. 4:6.

Communists of sabotaging unity.[22]

General Marshall said:

> The Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work towards establishing a Communistic form of government in China, though first working through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type.[23]

There were some indications of this when Marshall made his statement, but correspondent Michael Keon proved the better prophet in maintaining that the Chinese Communists were heading towards a dictatorship of the Russian type.[24]

Students have played a vital role in Chinese politics since the overthrow of the Manchus. In 1915 they revolted against the Twenty-one Demands of the Japanese Government. 1919 saw their protest against Versailles and shortly thereafter the beginnings of Communist agitation. Rioting broke out in student compounds over the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Now, in 1947, there were student demonstrations against the Central Government. These protests voiced the pleas of nine tenths of the Chinese people.[25] The Communist Party

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[22] New York Times, October 11, 1946, p. 10:4,5.

[23] New York Times, January 8, 1947, p. 3:2.

[24] New York Times, October 19, 1947, p. 15:1.

[25] New York Times, July 2, 1947, p. 20:4.

was ready to capitalize on the situation by espousing the student cause as their own. However, the people were instinctively anti-Communist and could have been won over to a truly reformed National Government.[26]

For the first time a new note entered negotiations. The Shensi Red Radio asked for a coalition government with a provision for the punishment of war criminals. This was generally thought to apply to Chiang Kai-shek.[27]

Internal friction hastened the downfall of the Kuomintang. Constant bickering, inept leadership, graft, and the vacillating policy towards needed socio-economic reforms caused the people to turn elsewhere for relief.

Chiang took over the premiership from T. V. Soong in March. Tightening the reins of government only brought more discontent. General elections called in November were a political farce. There was no secrecy in balloting. The results were a foregone conclusion.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party continued to grow. At the end of 1947 estimates placed membership at two

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[26] John L. Stuart, "Observations on North China and Manchuria," United States Relations with China, 30:254, August, 1949.

[27] New York Times, July 15, 1947, p. 10:4.

million people.[28]

In 1947-1948 the "Red" Army began its victory drive. Gathering momentum with each victory, the Communist wave rolled down from the north. Kaifeng, capital of Honan, fell on June 22, 1948. Tsinan, a city of eight hundred thousand, capital of Shantung, fell in eight days to the army of Su Yu. Eight hundred miles north, Changchun capitulated after a long seige by Lin Piao. On November 2, Mukden, the industrial center of Manchuria was occupied.

Thus, Chinese Communist territory increased from one ninth of China in 1946 to one fourth of China in 1948. The population controlled by the "Reds" went from one hundred thirty million to two hundred million.[29]

A thousand miles to the south the East China People's Army which had taken Tsinan, moved to Hsuchow, gateway to Nanking. Further inland Liu Pocheng swept towards Hankow while Peng Teh-hwai advanced on Sian.

Military success followed into 1949 with cities falling into Communist hands almost at will. Lin Piao drove against Peiping and Tientsin. Marching six hundred

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[28] New York Times, November 30, 1947, p. 40:4.

[29] New York Times, December 19, 1948, Section IV, p. 4:3.



MAP 4

COMMUNIST EXPANSION IN CHINA
1946-1948*

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* New York Times, December 19, 1948, Section IV, p. 4:3.

miles in twenty days, his forces took Tientsin on January 15, in a twenty-seven hour assault. Demoralized Nationalist troops surrendered in large groups or fell back to the south. Peiping was occupied without firing a shot.

On January 14, 1949, Mao Tse-tung called for an eight-point program amounting to unconditional surrender for Chiang Kai-shek.[30] This was in response to a proposal by the Generalissimo[31] and included:

1. Punishing the war criminals.
2. Abrogating the Constitution of 1946.
3. Abolishing the Kuomintang "legitimacy of traditional institutions."
4. Reorganizing the armies.
5. Confiscating bureaucratic capital.
6. Reforming the agrarian system.
7. Abrogating the treaties of national betrayal.
8. Convoking a Political Consultative Conference without the participation of reactionary elements and establishing a democratic coalition government.

Seven days later Chiang resigned and turned the Government over to Li Tsung-jen to attempt peace

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30 McNair and Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, p. 653.

31 New York Times, January 1, 1949, p. 4:3. Chiang's proposals called for upholding the Constitution, maintaining Democracy, maintaining the entity of the Armed Forces, and maintaining a minimum living standard.

negotiations with the Communists. The "Reds" proposed separate settlements for sixteen Nationalist areas: Sian, Nanking, Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanchang, Changsha, Foochow, Chengtu, Formosa, Canton, Kunming, Hainan, Taiyuan, Lauchow, Kweisui, and Urumchi. Peiping was to be used as the model for an interim government.

Military fortunes did not wait for political considerations. In April a twenty-four point peace draft was submitted to the Li Government. Its four fundamental demands were:

1. Uncontested crossing of the Yangtze.
2. Reorganization of all branches of the Nationalist Army.
3. Eventual Communist occupation of all China.
4. Abolishment of the Nanking Government after the formulation of a coalition by a political consultative conference.[32]

Almost before the ink was dry, Nanking was in "Red" hands. Shanghai fell the next month, and by autumn the Nationalists had been driven into southwestern China and Formosa. Chungking capitulated in December. Effective Kuomintang resistance on the mainland came to a halt.

On September 18, 1949, eighteen years to the day of the "Mukden Incident," the Chinese Communists announced

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[32] New York Times, April 19, 1949, p. 3:1, 2.

their plan of government for China. In Peiping a Political Consultative Conference was convened to establish an interim regime until the convocation of an All-China People's Congress. Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman of the Central Committee, Politbureau, Military Council, and Secretariat. Madame Sun Yat-sen, Chang Lan, and Li Chi-sen were elected Vice-chairmen. Chou En-lai was designated Foreign Secretary and Jen Pe-shih named Finance Minister. Liu Shao-chi[33] was Party Leader in the Secretariat. Chu Teh retained command of the armies. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" was proclaimed.

If 1949 saw the advent of the first Marxist State in the Orient, the ensuing three years saw the probability of its ultimate collapse. China was a nation economically destitute when the Communists came to power. Plagued by twelve years of constant war, her people needed a return to peace. "Red" methods promised this could not come for a long while.

As the Communist Armies approached Nationalist centers, inflation ran rampant. Baskets were used to carry the deflated Kuomintang currency. Prices rose at

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33 See Chapter VIII, p. 167, for a biographical sketch of Liu Shao-chi.

astonishing rates. In an effort to control the economy the "Reds" set up twelve companies. These six, the Central Foodstuffs Company, the Central Cotton and Cloth Company, the Central General Merchandise Company, the Central Salt Company, the Central Coal and Building Company, and the Central Native Products Company, controlled domestic affairs. Foreign trade was entrusted to six others: the Central Hog Bristles Company, the Central Native Products Export Company, the Central Fats and Oil Company, the Central Tea Company, and the Central Mineral Products Company.

These trusts handled the bulk of the purchase and distribution of food and other essential goods, placed processing orders, and collected finished goods from private factories on a contract basis. They also allocated raw materials and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Trade and local government trade bureaus, fixed market prices and determined margins of profit. Some room was left for private enterprise but under governmental prescribed regulations. Human nature probably gave this scheme some serious jolts at its conception. Surely, Mao was flaunting history when he made such an abrupt change.

An expanding network of cooperatives was established to provide a link between state companies and organized

groups of small prviate farmers and handicraftsmen. Consumer cooperatives were set up in factories, schools, government offices, and army units. More than twenty million persons were enrolled in thirty-four thousand rural and three thousand urban organizations.[34]

Throughout April and May, 1950, reports of business being strangled in China reached the outside world.[35] In June, Mao urged Chinese businessmen not to fear Communism. He stated that those who helped the cause would not be forgotten.[36] They were not forgotten. Their reward was to come one year later when all Chinese industrial cooperatives were absorbed by the Government-sponsored All-China Federation of Cooperatives.[37]

Land distribution has long been the curse of the East. Reform under the Communists took the direct method of confiscation from the rich and loan to the poor with the state holding title. Initially successful, this program had to be eased somewhat to prevent the spread of

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34 New York Times, October 8, 1950, p. 17:1.

35 New York Times, April 16, 1950, p. 44:3; May 24, 1950, p. 19:3.

36 New York Times, June 25, 1950, p. 22:1.

37 New York Times, March 6, 1951, p. 4:3.

resistance. The Basic Agrarian Reform Law of June 28, 1950, caused further upheavals. At this time land had been distributed to eighty thousand peasants in five hundred counties.[38]

That all is not well with the Communist plan is evidenced by disorders on the Continent. Guerrilla bands operate in Kweichow, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Szechwan, Hunan, Hupeh, Tsinghai, Shensi, and Ninghsia.[39] Further proof lies in the thousands killed by the Communists for political offenses.[40] Extortion practiced on Chinese abroad[41]

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[38] New York Times, June 11, 1951, p. 3:1.

[39] New York Times, January 1, 1951, p. 3:1.

[40] Nationalists claimed 210,000 executed in three Provinces in January, 1951. New York Times, March 9, 1951, p. 3:1. Three hundred shot in Swatow, Ibid., February 15, 1951, p. 4:8. Fifteen executed in Canton, Ibid., February 6, 1951, p. 5:1. One hundred twenty-two killed in Shanghai and Canton, Ibid., April 3, 1951, p. 3:6. Two hundred eighty-four shot in Shanghai, Ibid., June 21, 1951, p. 3:5. Fifty-five executed in Nanking, Ibid., June 25, 1951, p. 5:6. One hundred fifty-four executed in Shanghai, Ibid., July 4, 1951, p. 5:1. Two hundred seventy-seven shot in Peiping, Ibid., July 20, 1951, p. 2:1. Forty killed, 2,748 imprisoned in Shanghai, Ibid., August 24, 1951, p. 2:7. Two hundred thirty-seven executed in Peiping, Ibid., August 30, 1951, p. 3:7; 28,332 "counter-revolutionaries" executed by the Communists in Kwantung over a ten-month period ending September 3, 1951, Ibid., September 20, 1951, p. 4:5. Forty-three shot in Canton, Ibid., September 3, 1951, p. 2:4. The Chinese Daily News reports more than one million political prisoners in Kwantung, Ibid., October 10, 1951, p. 2:6. Forty-two executed in Chungking, Ibid., November 3, 1951, p. 3:7.

[41] New York Times, November 14, 1951, p. 1:7.

indicates the poverty of a Government faced with a full-scale war in Korea, a herculean task of reconstruction at home, and few friends in the world. Intra-party strife has added to the burden.

At a convention of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Peiping, June, 1950, an intensive self-criticism and criticism was held. Only four leaders were judged to be without blemish: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi,[42] Lin Piao,[43] and Jao Shu-shu.[44] Plans were laid to purify the Party and to complete the unification of China. Purges were instituted leading to more disorder. Communist Party membership was stated to be four million five hundred thousand at this time. Mao warned the "Reds" to slow their recruiting lest more undesirables filter in.

Some relaxation of political absolutism was offered as inducement to the middle class to back the Communist program. Recruitment of non-Communist left-wing parties was

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[42] Head of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Held by some to be Mao's successor.

[43] Commander of the Fourth Field Army.

[44] Secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee.

allowed on a limited basis. The six parties chosen[45] were, of course, required to uphold the policies of the People's Political Consultative Conference. No dissension would be tolerated.

Propaganda techniques, eminently successful in the whole rise of the Communist Party in China, were polished and used at frequent intervals. One such, the complaint meeting, showed careful planning in the following four steps:

> 1. Extensive preparation with working out in advance of main problems.
> 2. Concentration on concrete, personal experiences.
> 3. Use of slogans to stir the audience.
> 4. Cooperative participation by neighboring schools.[46]

"Spontaneous" meetings were then called at which an exchange of ideas was encouraged. Artificial creation of mass hysteria became a potent weapon. Organizers were told to search for evidence of atrocities, cultural aggressions, exploitations, and calamities that might be linked to the pattern of the day. Cases were so arranged that

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[45] Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang; China Democratic League; China Democratic Association for National Reconstruction; China Peasants and Workers Democratic Party; China Association for Promoting Democracy; Chuisan Society.

[46] New York Times, January 1, 1951, p. 3:1.

psychological methods of persuasion could be rehearsed on cue.[47] Always a good show, these demonstrations gave to the peasants a feeling of having a voice in the Government. Actually, they served to minimize resistance by directing energies along channels outlined by the Party.

There is no end to the Civil War in sight in the spring of 1953. Chiang Kai-shek is entrenched on Formosa. "Red" China is engaged in a major conflict with United Nations Forces in Korea, a war that is sapping her already weak resources. Many necessary civilian projects are left undone. There is dissatisfaction at home but little hope of evaluating its true strength until some later date. Eye-witness accounts vary. As Derk Bodde, Professor of Chinese, University of Pennsylvania, writes:

> After spending a recent year in China under both the Kuomintang and the Communists, I have no hesitation in saying that the bulk of the people there . . . definitely preferred Mao Tse-tung, Communism and all, to Chiang Kai-shek.[48]

In reply to Doctor Bodde, John A. Bottorff, says:

> I have lived in Peiping under the Kuomintang several years before Dr. Bodde arrived, and lived under the Communists several years after he left, . . . I have no hesitation in saying that the bulk of the people there

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[47] New York Times, August 7, 1951, p. 3:1.

[48] New York Times, August 11, 1950, p. 18:6.

. . . definitely preferred the Nationalists, Chiang Kai-shek and all, to the Communists.[49]

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[49] New York Times, August 21, 1950, p. 18:6, in a letter to the editor.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE RISE OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

To assume Soviet assistance to Chinese Communism on a scale large enough to bring about control of the "Middle Kingdom" by the "Reds" would be inconsistent with the facts; to deny Russian interest in and approval of any means for establishing a Marxist government in China would be folly. Russia has coveted parts of China for over three hundred years. In 1580 Yermak, a Cossack brigand, took possession of Siberia. Expansion under the Tsars continued until 1689 when the Manchus forced withdrawal from the regions of the Amur by the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Here matters rested in an uneasy truce until 1858. In that year Muraviev, Governor-General of Siberia, signed the Treaty of Aigun which fixed the Russo-Chinese boundary at the Amur River as far as the Ussuri. An additional agreement with the Chinese Government secured the territory east of the Ussuri River in 1860. Vladivostok, now in the Russian fold, furnished a good port, but not the ice-free one she desired on the Pacific.

By the terms of the Treaty of Shiminoseki ending the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, China was to cede the Liaotung Peninsula with its excellent harbors of Port Arthur

and Dalny to Japan. Russia, France, and Germany protested this provision and it was never carried to completion. In May, 1896, a secret agreement was concluded at Moscow giving Russia the right to extend the Trans-sib railroad across Manchuria and setting up a Russo-Chinese Bank for construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Then, Russia occupied Port Arthur and demanded a lease on the Kwantung area of the Liaotung Promontory. This was granted for a twenty-five year period. Up to 1904 Russia spent her time in the economic penetration of Manchuria and the building of a powerful naval base at Port Arthur. All this was negated by the Treaty of Portsmouth at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.

The Soviet Revolution and the establishment of the U.S.S.R. seemed for a time to promote a new Russian policy for the Far East. On May 31, 1924, she renounced all the "unequal" treaties of the Tsars. Now there was to begin a campaign of ideological penetration fostered by existing political and economic conditions which were a continuing phase of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Sponsored by the Third International, Communist advisers were attached to the Chinese Government at Canton from 1924-1927.[1] After

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[1] See Chapter I, page 7.

1927 the Soviet Union gave little but moral support to the Kungchantang while training some of her future leaders in Moscow.

When the Japanese invaded Manchuria, Russia was gravely concerned for the safety of her frontier. Threatened also was the Russian interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway which was finally sold to the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1935.[2] Realizing the impotence of the Nanking authorities to handle affairs in the northern provinces, the U.S.S.R. sought to pacify Japanese aggressive moves by refraining from any action which might bring about full-scale war. Being expediently friendly to Japan in Manchuria left little time for assistance to Chinese Communism in a direct manner. Russia needed her materials too badly at home to share them with a group of "Reds" at Yenan. However, she did aid the Kungchantang indirectly by her actions in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang[3] which forced still another diversion on the already weighty program of the Nationalists. It must have seemed to Chiang Kai-shek that the unified Chinese nation was being

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[2] H. L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, pp. 27-30, for a brief history of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

[3] Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union, Chapters XIV and XVI, for the story of Soviet influence in these two Provinces. New York Times, February 9, 1936, p. 34:1, states that Sinkiang is virtually under Russian control.

further removed from the ideal of the 1911 Revolution. Sun Yat-sen's "Nationalism" had to struggle against the designs of two nations whose policies were ostensibly instituted for self-protection.

Of paramount importance to Japan's scheme of Empire was containment of Russia. With inimical ideological concepts, it was inevitable that conflict should begin. The growth of Communism in Northwest China added to Japan's fears. In November, 1935, General Hayao Tada, Commander of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin, declared:

> Should the 'Reds' in Shensi become as strong as they were in Kiangsi they would definitely menace peace in North China, as it is virtually certain they would attempt to control other provinces. However, more important is prevention of the 'Reds' from linking up with Soviet Outer Mongolia and receiving aid from Soviet Russia.[4]

This fear of joint action by the Communists of Russia and China prompted violent reactions on military and political levels which otherwise might have had less serious consequences. Numerous warnings against the spread of Communism issued from Tokyo. However, these threats were directed against the more immediate danger to Japanese expansion.[5] The U.S.S.R., plagued by internal

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[4] New York Times, November 2, 1935, p. 5:1.

[5] New York Times, March 17, 1936, p. 15:1; March 4, 1936, p. 16:2.

difficulties,[6] was in no position to move effectively on a military front in 1936-1938. Chinese Communists could depend on little help from the Soviet Union.

Russia had an intense interest in the "Sian Affair." She realized a unified China could modify Japan's demands and make her own frontier more secure. On the other hand, the attitude of the southerners over the abduction of Chiang convinced Moscow that he was the logical man to bring on unification. Stalin assumed the Japanese threat to warrant first consideration. He saw in the failure of the revolt an indication of the direction Chinese politics were heading, a trend that would lead to closer co-operation with the Central Government and an avoidance of any close tie with the Communist movement.

Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia felt the pressure of Russian imperialism. In 1939 the U.S.S.R. admitted that she considered the frontiers of Mongolia as actually Russian frontiers.[7] Air bases were established in both Provinces,

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[6] The Communist Party Purge Trials began in January, 1937. In 1936-1937 many Sovkhozes were abolished as failures and Kolkhozes (collective farms) were expanded. The Second Five Year Plan was falling short of expectations in its production of consumer goods and there was the possibility of abortion as had happened with the First Plan.

[7] New York Times, November 16, 1939, p. 8:2.

some reaching as much as two thousand miles into Chinese territory.[8] A report circulated that there were three hundred thousand men inside Sinkiang,[9] presumably led and supplied by the Russians.

The linkup of political machinery in Sinkiang and Moscow was shown by the fact that purges of "deviationists" in Russia were accompanied by similar cleanups in the Province. Trotskyist hunts in the Soviet capital brought "Left Opposition" searches in Tihua. When Henry G. Yagoda was shot in Moscow, the head of the Bureau of Public Safety in Sinkiang, Yagoda's man, was likewise executed. How far this region had come from Chinese control is best illustrated by the traveler who sought to go there, asked the Chungking Government for a visa, and was told:

> . . . that a visa can be granted only if the applicant can obtain a permit from the Soviet Embassy for travel through Russia.[10]

Nominally, Sinkiang was under the rule of an old-style tuchun, Sheng Shih-tsai. In keeping with the

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8 New York Times, December 2, 1939, p. 6:2.

9 New York Times, October 3, 1939, p. 1:4.

10 New York Times, January 2, 1940, p. 10:2.

policies of his office, General Sheng's allegiance varied with the political tides. First espousing a Russian alliance for development of natural resources, he reversed himself in April, 1942, and declared his complete loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek. Two years later he was replaced by Wu Chung-hsin, chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. A closer sooperation was again fostered by the Soviet Union. Mineral resources, particularly tungsten, were exported to the U.S.S.R.

After the Japanese occupation of Manchuria numerous border clashes took place between Russian and Japanese troops. Each seemed to be testing the strength of the other with neither willing to risk war. These hostilities were brought to a halt by an uneasy truce in 1939. Nevertheless, whatever supplies were shipped into China by Russia during World War II came dangerously close to contested areas.

On August 26, 1945, an Alliance and Friendship Pact between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Republic was signed. Supposedly good for thirty years, Article V bound the contracting parties "to work together in close and friendly cooperation after the conclusion of peace."[11] Its

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[11] New York Times, August 27, 1945, p. 4:2.

principal provisions included:

1. The Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway become joint property of China and the U.S.S.R.
2. Port Arthur to be used as a naval base for both parties.
3. Dairen to be a free port with a Soviet citizen as harbor master.
4. The U.S.S.R. to guarantee to restore Nationalist leadership in Manchuria.
5. Sinkiang to be considered an integral part of China.
6. Outer Mongolia to be free after the War, if a plebescite so directs.[12]

As Russian sympathy for Chinese Communism was more openly manifest, this treaty became increasingly worthless. All through the Kuomintang-Kungchantang post-war struggle, Russia postponed implementation of her obligations. Final abrogation came in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid with "Red" China on February 14, 1950. Its four main parts called for:

1. Mutual assistance in case of aggression.
2. The return of Port Arthur, Dairen, and the South Manchurian Railway to China by the end of 1952.
3. A credit of $300,000,000 extended to China by Russia.
4. The return of Manchurian industries.[13]

Possibly the single most potent factor in the control of future Chinese action by the Russians has been the extent of the education given to the Chinese in Moscow.

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[12] New York Times, loc. cit.

[13] New York Times, February 16, 1950, p. 21:1.

Thousands of students leave each month for intensive training in Marxism under the Communist leaders in the Soviet capital.

Li Li-san left China to receive further training after disagreeing with Mao Tse-tung on policy in 1931, and did not return until the closing days of World War II. His immediate resumption of power could leave little doubt as to the efficacy of his stay with the Marxist hierachy. In more recent times Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung have made pilgrimages. Chou made his trip in September, 1939, ten years and three months before Mao could be persuaded to take the journey. This latter visit resulted in the Treaty mentioned above.

What Russia received for the concessions she made in the Treaty of 1950 have not been publicized. The New York Times listed Moscow as demanding seven ports: Chingwangtao, Haichow, Chefoo, Weihaiwei, Tsingtao, Dairen, and Port Arthur in preliminary negotiations. She also was reported as asking for increased shipments of foodstuffs from Manchuria, a labor force of one half million men to be available for use in Russia, and concessions by Peiping to Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Tibet.[14]

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[14] New York Times, January 29, 1950, p. 1:8.

Soviet advisers have now infiltrated all fields of Chinese endeavor. Two Russian companies were given the right to exploit oil and nonferrous metal resources in Sinkiang.[15] An order to abolish the use of English in business was posted.[16] In Shanghai a health program was launched using Russian equipment.[17] Stalin's pictures often took precedence over Mao's at public demonstrations.[18] For awhile, at least, the unity seemed complete.

Moscow had followed two distinct lines in her relations with Nationalist China from 1937 to 1949. One had to do with Yenan, and through Yenan, with Chungking; the other had to do with Chungking directly. One was Communist policy, the other a policy of a state towards another state.[19] Strict interpretation of the 1945 Treaty had led to usurpation of power by the Communists in Manchuria. Withdrawal of Russian troops at a time when events made Nationalist occupation of this region impossible,

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15 New York Times, March 31, 1950, p. 10:5.

16 New York Times, April 16, 1950, p. 44:3.

17 New York Times, May 24, 1950, p. 19:3.

18 New York Times, August 27, 1950, p. 5:1.

19 S. Okazaki, "Moscow, Yenan, Chungking," Pacific Affairs, 14:107-18, March, 1941.

materially aided the "Red" cause. The stripping of Manchurian industry helped in a negative way since the Chinese Communists could not have used it anyway, at least, not for some time. Russian abandonment of arms in positions where the Kungchantang could easily sequester them further helped the "Reds."

Attacks in Russian newspapers on Nationalist policies heightened the rupture between the two groups. An article in the War and Working Class for June 19, 1944, implied the necessity for Chiang to unite his forces with those of Mao.[20] Izvestia criticized Chiang in his prosecution of the war against the Japanese.[21] Red Star added its voice to the effort.[22] Pravda charged that Chinese corruption in Government led to the defeat of Kuomintang troops.[23] These could hardly be the utterances of a state ready to enter a treaty of alliance with another state in good faith, especially when that state is a dictatorship in absolute control of the press.

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[20] New York Times, June 20, 1944, p. 10:4.

[21] New York Times, December 3, 1944, p. 36:2; December 4, 1944, p. 14:6; June 4, 1945, p. 2:6.

[22] New York Times, March 14, 1945, p. 10:3.

[23] New York Times, February 19, 1945, p. 4:4.

If the U.S.S.R. played a comparatively minor role in Chinese internal activities between 1945 and 1950, her role as "Big Brother"[24] to the Chinese Communists has been more than adequately fulfilled in foreign affairs. On every major political issue Mao Tse-tung and Joseph Stalin presented a united front to the world. Mao has denounced the Atlantic Pact,[25] circulated the Stockholm Peace Petition, and vowed to follow the Soviet international policy.[26]

In January, 1948, Mao urged the formation of an Asian Cominform in order to better the articulation with world Communism.[27] The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in July, adopted a resolution supporting Russia's stand on the defection of Marshall Tito, even though seven months previous Mao had said he planned doing some of the same things. Said Mao:

> The objects that the new democratic revolution are to eliminate, are only feudalism and monopoly

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[24] This name is used in a Chinese Communist Handbook published by the Hopeh-Hunan-Shantung District Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, New York Times, January 14, 1948, p. 11:5.

[25] New York Times, April 5, 1949, p. 28:3.

[26] New York Times, December 17, 1949, p. 1:1.

[27] New York Times, January 2, 1948, p. 11:2.

> capitalism . . . . Because of the backwardness of China's economy it will still be necessary to permit the existence for a long period of the capitalist economy represented by the broad petty bourgeosie and the middle bourgeosie, even after the nationwide victory of the Revolution.[28]

This incongruous reversal is explainable only on the assumption of increased Russian influence.

Soviet Russia has taken up the case for seating "Red" China at the United Nations. The United States has been her major adversary. British recognition of the Peiping Government on January 6, 1950, one month after recognition of the Peiping Government by India and Burma, seemed for a time to make her position stronger. However, the war in Korea has changed all that.

Meanwhile, the Nationalists wait on Formosa. United Nation bombers raid along the Manchurian border. The Kremlin uses the Chinese whenever and wherever it can to further its aims for world control.

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28 New York Times, July 12, 1948, p. 10:1, quoting from a speech made by Mao Tse-tung to the Central Executive Committee in December, 1947.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The Chinese Communist Party cannot raise the living standard in China without substantially jeopardizing its hold on the people. A monolithic state exists because economic considerations overshadow political usurpation of power. When men are fed and properly clothed in the industrial society that theoretically is the base of Communism, they turn to some other governmental form.

Communism in China has an emotional side that led its believers into the long fight for survival. Communists fought for a cause. They believed in the right of their way and they still believe in it. However, as Dallin points out in his Soviet Russia and the Far East, devotion to a cause is not enough to make that cause just or make it succeed.[1] Japanese kamikaze fliers willingly sacrificed their lives; Hitler's S. S. legions fought long and well; medieval witch hunts aroused sincere religious fanataciam. In each case these were a dedicated minority. Others were swayed to the banner for a limited time.

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[1] David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 226.

So it has been in China. A hard, closely-knit core has ruled since 1927. Followers have multiplied as economic conditions worsened.

When the North Koreans crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, they started a flame in Asia that has consumed much of the resources of an impoverished continent. China's entry has prolonged that engagement and led to her alignment against the United Nations. This could be a fatal step to a young government.

However, history shows people uniting for foreign war. This may be happening in China, even in the face of continuing reports of increased guerrilla activity. Without the Korean War there might be even more unrest.

The Chinese leaders have forfeited their chance for the rapid amelioration of a long-suffering people. Korea is a major war to the industrial United States. What must it be to agrarian China? Even with the help of Russia she cannot hope to keep the peace at home in any sustained campaign. Time is needed to consolidate agriculture, build industry, and stimulate commerce.

According to T. Z. Koo, four factors have been favorable to the growth of Communism in China.

1. A disintegration of the rural economic system. The trend of farm workers to the cities.

2. Warlord rule impoverished the land.
3. Chinese intellectual life has long been familiar with communal organization and the equalization of property, particularly land.
4. Pressure from Japan and the uncertain international situation.[2]

To these we would add the ineptness of the Kuomintang in keeping in touch with the people and their needs and the program of international Communism for indoctrination in Marxism.

Chinese "Red" leaders are not agrarian reformers in the sense of our 1930 editorials. They are Marxist. No denial of this basic fact has ever come from Peiping. On the contrary, every word, every action bears evidence to its truth. As Edgar Snow put it:

> My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals who build up hopes that the Communists of China are different and only reformers and have abandoned revolutionary methods to achieve their program are doomed to ultimate disillusionment. . . . Their religion remains international socialism and if conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they believe necessary in order to stay on the locomotive of history.[3]

From 1920 to the present the thread of international Communism has wound through the deliberations of the Kungchantang. If, in some points, certain leaders seem to

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[2] T. Z. Koo, "Communism Bound to Fail in China," China Weekly Review, 65:495, August 19, 1933.

[3] Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia, p. 290.

have deserted the fold, it has been a temporary expedient brought on by some economic, political, or military factor without effect on the ultimate goal. Disagreement between Mao Tse-tung and Li Li-san has never concerned the aim of Communism, only the means of achieving that aim. Communist ideology has always been the motivating cause. While Li wanted to use the workingmen in the cities to advance Marxism, Mao wanted to use the farmers. Land reform was a good stimulant because it was so badly needed. Mao was the man to use this wedge because he understood the farmer's problems. So far his program has been successful.

However, there are certain things which are unfavorable to Chinese Communism that we need to consider. The social and ethical code of her people has been one of the strongest opposing forces. Virtues of filial piety, respect for old age, obedience, tolerance, and mutual benevolence between man and man will be hard to circumvent. Twenty centuries of teachings by the sages cannot be eclipsed in twenty years.

Some argument may be advanced for the socializing implications of Communism through Confucius. In the Analects we read:

> Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said: 'The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in the ruler.' Tsze-kung said, 'If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be forgone first?' 'The military equipment,' said the Master. Tsze-kung again asked, 'If it cannot be helped and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be forgone?' The Master replied, 'Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state.'[4]

The duty of the government to supply food is the essential point. This phase of Mao's program of land redistribution has historical significance, albeit remote. Confucius preferred to let even this go to keep the confidence of the people.

No Communist state dares disband its military. A military government cannot keep the confidence of the people. If its food supply does not match its promises, the Communist state will soon lose the confidence of the people. This remains an unresolved dilemma.

The will of the Chinese people has never had a forum for expression in its long existence. Drives towards nationalism manifest in the politics of Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europe have been notably absent in

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[4] William D. Gould, G. B. Arbaugh, and R. F. Moore, Oriental Philosophies, p. 125.

Chinese history. With the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911, some semblance of national stirrings was evidenced, but the local tone and reversal to warlordism in the next decade negated its continuity. Even Sun Yat-sen, the eclectic idealist, friend of the common man, attempting by benevolent propaganda in his San Min Chu I to evolve a dictum of the good life without recourse to the practicalities of large sections of his homeland, met with failure in the confusion of its implementation.

Democracy was poorly imitated under the Kuomintang; it has no chance under Communism. Elections do take place in "Red" China and results would seem to indicate that non-Communists outnumber Communists in elected bodies.[5] However, parliamentary controversy continues to concern adaptation to local conditions of basic principles laid down by Party Headquarters, rather than those principles themselves; the methods of carrying out, rather than decisions for or against fundamental lines of policy; and, finally, matters concerning the ability, efficiency, and honesty of personnel, the evaluation of popular attitudes, the assessment of results, and future potentialities of

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5 "The Chinese Communists and Their Programme," World Today, 5:71, February, 1949.

action. The impetus continues to come from the top. A chain of command extends through the Communist Party into the organizations of elected officials at every level. Irregardless of his political label, every officer follows the dictates of the Kungchantang or he no longer is an official.

In closing, let us consider the Communist aims as published in the Red Flag Daily News in 1930.

1. Expulsion of foreigners.
2. Elimination of militarists.
3. Establishment of government run by laborers, peasants, and soldiers from the ranks.
4. Confiscation of all banks.
5. Abolition of all unequal treaties.
6. Cancellation of all loans.
7. Union with the 'world proletariat' and Soviet Russia.
8. Adoption of an eight hour day.
9. Labor insurance and unemployment compensation.
10. Confiscation of all factories who refuse to obey Communist rule.
11. Nationalization of land and churches.
12. Abolition of the land tax.[6]

Very few of these aims have been carried to completion. The Russians seem to have more power than any other foreign group ever had. Communist militarists have been substituted for the warlords. Government by "laborers, peasants, and soldiers from the ranks" is a paper government without sovereignty. Old treaties have been abrogated,

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[6] New York Times, September 28, 1930, Section III, p. 4:3.

but new ones have been entered into with Russia that threaten to be even more reprehensible. Loans have been negotiated with the Soviet Union. The Korean War has postponed almost all social legislation. Land deeds are placed in the repositories of villages and controlled by the Communists. Taxes have probably increased, if not through impositions, certainly through "loans" to the regime.

The "Red" victory has been fraught with negatives, substitutions, and militarism. China deserves better.

CHAPTER VIII

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF SOME CHINESE RED LEADERS[1]

I. CHEN TU-HSIU

Chen Tu-hsiu was born in 1879 to a family of moderate means in Anhwei Province. Chen revolted against the classical pattern of the Chinese educational system at an early age and turned his energy to reform. Seeing how the West had enforced its will on China, he determined to master the technical knowledge of the Occident. At the age of twenty-one he went to Tokyo to enroll in the Higher Normal School in preparation for his life work as a teacher.

In 1907 he left Japan for France where he formed a strong attachment for the French people. He returned to China in 1910 convinced that only radical changes could save his country. In succession he became a high school principal, secretary to the governor of Anhwei Province, and, finally, commissioner of education in the provincial government.

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[1] These sketches are taken from Robert S. Elegant, China's Red Masters; Britannica Book of the Year, W. Yust, editor; Collier's Encyclopedia, C. Barry, editor; "The Ten Men Who Rule China," United Nations World, 4:6-8, January, 1950.

Yuan Shih-kai's rise to power led to a "Second Revolution" by Sun Yat-sen in 1913. Although not of the Kuomintang, Chen supported this movement, and upon its failure was forced to flee the country. When Yuan's power faded in the summer of 1915, Chen returned to China, settling in the French Concession of Shanghai. Here he started a newspaper, New Youth, which promised a thorough overhauling of morality, education, and economics. Insisting on a return to "plain language," for the next five years he led a campaign against the literary abuses of classicism.

Chen was made dean of the College of Letters at Peking University where his librarian was Li Ta-chao, later to become co-founder with Chen of the Chinese Communist Party. These two men started the Weekly Critic as a political organ in an effort to preserve the cultural emphasis of the New Youth, and in so doing made the College of Letters a "hotbed" of revolution.

When Germany's former interests in Shantung were turned over to Japan at Versailles, riots broke out in Peking. Students from the University stormed through the streets and into a party given by leaders of the pro-Japanese faction. Held responsible for these disorders, several professors, including Chen, were forced to resign.

He was then imprisoned for eighty-three days.

Chen's conversion to Communism came in the spring of 1920 at a meeting with Gregory Voitinsky, Secretary-General of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. As a result of this conference, the Chinese Socialist Youth Group was organized. With $5,000.00 a month coming from the Comintern, other branches were founded in principal Chinese cities.

Pressure from the Russian "advisers" resulted in the calling of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China on July 1, 1921, in the French Concession of Shanghai. Chen was in Canton at this time and did not attend the gathering. Nevertheless, he was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee--a group charged with establishing perfect laison with the Communist International.

Always the teacher, Chen accepted the position of dean at the College of Letters at Shanghai University. The Party undertook to transform the University into a training school for revolutionists. Chen assembled a faculty competent for this job. Included was Ch'u Chiu-pai, Chen's successor in the Party, who had just returned from Moscow.

Chen's influence in the Communist Party waned almost before the organization got started. His leadership of the New Literature Movement and the May Fourth Movement were to

be his greatest achievements. Others were destined to lead the Party he fathered to power.

Throughout the period of Communist-Kuomintang alliance from 1923-1927, Chen disagreed with prominent members of the left-wing. He and Borodin could not agree on their assessment of the Kuomintang. He and Mao Tse-tung disagreed on the place of the peasant and the proletariat in the revolution.

Following the coup of Chiang Kai-shek, Chen resigned from his Party offices and retired to Shanghai. Drifting further and further away from Stalin orthodoxy, he was formerly expelled from the Chinese Communist Party in November, 1928. From that time until his death in 1943, Chen remained violently anti-Russian. Arrested in 1932 on the charge that his activities constituted a threat to the Chinese Republic, he openly re-affirmed his faith in Communism. Sentenced to fifteen years in prison, he was released in 1937 by a general amnesty granted political prisoners at the beginning of the Japanese War.

Chen Tu-hsiu used his four years in prison doing research on philology and spent his later years writing a treatise on the characters engraved on bones used by the ancient Chinese in divination. His last work was entitled, On the Meaning and Classification of Characters.

II. HSU TEH-LI

Hsu Teh-li, elder statesman of the Kungchantang, teacher of Mao tse-tung, received his early training in the Classical tradition. A native of Changsha, he taught for many years in that Hunan city.

When the change to westernization first came about, Hsu enrolled in a six-month Short-Course Teacher Training School at Ning-hsiang. He was exposed to pleas for the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen but did not burst into revolutionary ardor. Hsu preferred teaching.

Returning to Changsha on completion of his teacher-training course, Hsu started a school for young men. Here revolutionary concepts were given a place with conventional training in ideographs and composition. Subtlety, anti-monarchial ideas were incorporated into the presentation of all subjects.

Not satisfied with his Normal School Work, Hsu successively taught at a girls' school in Changsha, studied primary education in Japan, during which time he met Sun Yat-sen and joined the T'ung-meng Hui, and established a project to educate laborers in night courses.

After the 1911 Revolution, he gained prestige in the educational field as director of the Changsha First Normal School. He even survived the counter-revolution of

Yuan Shih-kai in 1913. However, within five years his unorthodox methods and radical agitation caused his removal from his post and subsequent slight to Shanghai. From this city he embarked for Paris and Berlin to join in the groups that were to be so vital to the Chinese Communist Party in the future.

Hsu Teh-li remained in Europe for three years. On his return to China he joined the Kuomintang and became co-leader of the Executive Committee of the Changsha Branch. Identified with the extreme left-wing, Hsu often disagreed with Chiang Kai-shek. When the Red Flag was raised at Nanchang, he cast his lot with General Ho Lung and fled to Hong Kong.

At the age of fifty-one, Hsu was ordered to Moscow for further study. He attended Sun Yat-sen University, the training center for revolutionary leaders of the Far East. Shortly thereafter he was assigned as commissioner of education for the Soviet Areas in China, one of the civil affairs posts which controlled domestic activities during the war.

Hsu Teh-li has not risen as high as some of his friends in the Party heirarchy, but his influence has been profound. Always the pedagogue, his students carry on his training, talk about his work, and revere his word.

III. MAO TSE-TUNG

Mao Tse-tung was born in 1893 to a family of farmers in the Changsha valley. His father had prospered over the years, advancing to a point financially where he could assure his sons an education. Determined that Tse-tung would amount to something, the elder Mao made the boy study far into the night; however, revolting against this training, the youth showed the complete disregard for money often associated with those who have not had to earn it.

Mao attended private school from the age of eight to thirteen. His liking for the old popular novels sorely tried the patience of his teachers. He is reported to have given up his reading of these novels when he saw that it was always the great man, the prince, who was dominant. Next, he turned to the revolutionary journals of Sun Yat-sen and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

In July, 1921, Mao Tse-tung formally joined the Chinese Communist Party. After coming to Shanghai to participate in the establishment of the Party and report on the peasants of Hunan Province, he returned to Changsha as chief of the Hunan Committee of the Communist Party. Since Hunan is predominantly agricultural, Mao organized peasant unions in direct contradiction to the Comintern's edict for cooperation with the Kuomintang. Moreover, the

International insisted that the firm base of any Bolshevik revolution must be the urban proletariat. The cities were the center of power. Mao saw it differently.

Late in 1923, Mao was accused of deviationism, severely reprimanded, and fell from the Party's good graces. With a promise to mend his ways, he attended the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in the winter of 1924 and later served on the Executive Committees of the Shanghai Bureaus of both the Communists and the Nationalists.

He was appointed head of the Party's Hunan Peasant Bureau in 1926 and immediately returned to his old unorthodox fixation. In a report entitled, On the Peasant Movement in Hunan, he wrote that "all revolutionary parties . . . will be put to the test by these [peasant] masses."[2] Rejected by the 1927 Fifth Congress of the Communist Party, this report effected a split that cut Mao off from the Party until 1931. After organizing the abortive Autumn Crop Uprising in Hunan in 1927, he fled into the countryside hunted by the Kuomintang and in disfavor with what remained of the Communist Party.

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[2] Elegant, op. cit., p. 240.

Mao was captured by a company of militia but escaped by bribing his captor. Joining a band of fugitives on the Kiangsi border, he quickly rose to leadership of the group. These two battalions became the core of the force Mao led to Chingkangshan in southern Kiangsi and later became the cadre of the Red Army. While Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung built their defensive strength in the Kiangsi Area, the Kungchantang was annihilated as an effectively working force. Li Li-san still pressed for control of the cities but military reverses discredited his ambitions.

In 1931 the Party transferred its Headquarters to the Kiangsi Soviet. During a halt in the Long March, four years later, Mao was elected its chief. Today he is chairman of all ruling bodies of the Communist Party. There is no one to challenge his position.

IV. CHU TEH

Chu Teh came of a well-to-do family in northern Szechwan. His early life was devoted to preparation for an official position through the time-honored study of the Classics. When, in 1906, the Court abolished the examination system, Chu determined on acquiring Western knowledge.

Finding his taste ran to physical rather than the intellectual, he enrolled at Yunnan Military Institute

where he made a good record. Upon graduation in 1911 he jointed the Yunnan Army of Ts'ai, soon to be tuchun of that Province, and to reward Chu for his services by appointment as commander of his alma mater, the Yunnan Military Institute.

From here on Chu's fortunes prospered, until, in 1921, he was named Commissioner of Police for Yunnan. This post gave him affluence in the community, and Chu Teh, in true warlord style, maintained a splendid establishment complete with retainers, concubines, and motorcars. His success was short-lived, however, for his enemy, the deposed military governor, T'ang Chi-yao, retook the Province by military force and Chu was forced to flee to Chungking. Finding it politically inexpedient to work for the rulers in this area, he traveled to Canton and Shanghai. In these cities, outside the pall of interior smugness, he embraced the cause of Sun Yat-sen and idealism of two young men, Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek.

Chu went to Germany in 1924. While there he was introduced to Communism. He joined the Party in 1925 and returned to China at the beginning of the following year. Sent to Chungking, he accepted the offer of command of a division by General Yang Shen that had been made him on his previous visit. Keeping his Party affiliations secret,

Chu wasted no time in indoctrinating these troops toward Marxist ideology.

When the Northern Expedition started he joined forces with Chu P'ei-te, his former chief and classmate at Yunnan Military Institute. At Nanchang on August 1, he revealed himself as a "Red" by rejecting Chu P'ei-te's order to suppress the rebellion.

After the failure of the Swatow Commune, Chu Teh began his work of building a Communist Army in China. Retiring to the Canton-Hunan border with less than one thousand impoverished men, he joined the army of Fan Shih-sheng, accepting the post of regimental commander.

By close cooperation with the dissatisfied peasants of the area, Chu extended the region under his control. In May, 1928, he attached his forces to those of Mao Tse-tung on Chingkanshan and took over the military leadership of both groups. Three years later, on October 7, 1931, at the First Congress of Soviet Representatives in Jui-chin, Chu Teh was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the New Fourth Army. Intermittent guerrilla campaigns were waged against Nationalist forces with some measure of success.

After the Japanese invasion of July, 1937, and the subsequent alliance of Communists and Nationalists, Chu Teh was named commander of the Eighth Route Army.

Throughout World War II Chu stuck to his policy of harassment without engaging the Japanese in large-scale battle. This unwillingness to engage the enemy in decisive combat widened the breach developing between Chungking and Yenan.

At the War's end Chu refused to obey Chiang's order to surrender Japanese troops to the Kuomintang. Instead Lin Piao was instructed to advance on Manchuria and unify pro-Communist forces there. The drive that was to take the whole mainland away from the Nationalists was underway.

Today Chu Teh is first vice-president of the Central Government Committee. The Korean War has enhanced the power of the military. Rule by generals is still the accepted practice.

Chu's prestige has not diminished. He remains Chinese Communism's first soldier.

V. CHOU EN-LAI

Most of Chou's young life was spent in Manchuria. As a son of an official, his early study was with the Classics. Realizing the need for Westernization, he forsook Confucius and entered Nankai University. Here Chou agitated against the government and organized the "Awaken Club" to further this movement.

In 1920 he went to France, participating in the meeting which finally founded the Paris Branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Winning recognition in the ranks of international Communism, Chou was rewarded on his return to China by appointment as secretary of Canton Branch of the Party.

This was the year for establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy and Chou En-lai found a place on its faculty in the all-important Political Training Department. From this position he was able to spread Marxism throughout the officer corps. However, the virus did not spread easily or well, and Chou was soon assigned to organize terrorists in Shanghai under the direction of Chen Tu-hsiu.

After the abortive uprising of March and April, 1927, he fled to Nanchang. Within the next few months his banner flew in a number of minor proletarian revolts, all doomed to failure.

Chou went to Moscow as a member of the Chinese delegation to the Comintern in 1928. The following year he was again in China, this time as chairman of the Organization Bureau and supporter of Li Li-san. When Li's policies were abandoned, he was transferred to the Military Affairs Bureau, a post that was to become as important as his previous one. Strangely enough, the purge of the

"Trotsky" faction did not seriously affect Chou's career.

At Juichin, in 1931, Chou entered the service of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, the new masters of the Chinese Communists. He became chairman of the new Politburo and after the Long March took on the functions of a foreign minister for the rebels at Yenan.

As foreign minister, he entered into negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek at Sian during the Generalissimo's captivity by Chang Hsueh-liang. Here he concluded an agreement for joint participation in the war against Japan. Shortly thereafter, he was sent to Nanking as Communist representative to the "United Front."

Throughout the war, first in Nanking and later in Chungking, Chou worked for the coalition government as a wedge towards getting eventual "Red" control. Failing in this, military victory in 1949 gave him the top administrative post in the Chinese Communist Government--Premier of the State Administrative Council. In his capacity as Foreign Minister, he helped bring about the "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" between China and the Soviet Union.

Now Chou En-lai concerns himself with getting "Red" China a seat on the United Nations. So far his efforts in this regard have been frustrated. Basically Chou lacks understanding of the West and its motives. Blinded by

Russian propaganda, he pursues a foreign policy that alienates the whole world.

Yet, Chou has done many an about-face in his long public life. If someone else should start, Chou En-lai might follow.

VI. LIN PIAO

Lin Piao is one of the few graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy in the ranks of the Communists. Born in 1908, his family operated a small textile mill in Huangan. Revolutionary ideas came early in Lin's life. He migrated to the industrial city of Wuchang and joined the "Social Welfare Club," a group immersed in Westernization. It was an easy step to membership in the Communist Youth League.

After graduation from Whampoa, Lin was commissioned in the Citizens' Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang. He abandoned his Nationalist career in August, 1927, when he led his troops to join the "Red" insurgents at Nanchang. With Chu Teh he marched to Chingkangshan.

Lin commanded the First Army Group on the Long March. On arrival at Yenan, he was appointed Director of the Red Academy, and in 1937 was given command of the One Hundred Fifteenth Division. During World War II Lin's reputation grew as a master tactician. Plans of battle for the Eighth

Route Army are credited to him.

At the Japanese surrender in 1945, Lin Piao received the job of securing Manchuria to the Communists and establishing in that Province a formidable base for operations southward. Pushing out, his troops were instrumental in bringing the offensive against Chiang to a successful conclusion. When the Nationalists were driven from the mainland, Lin undertook the capture of Hainan in 1950.

One measure of Lin Piao's prominence in Communist China may be gained by recounting the number of posts he holds in the Peiping Government. He is Commander of the Fourth Field Army, Chairman of the Central China Administrative Area, Commander of the Central China Military Area, Secretary of the regional Communist Party Bureau, and Chairman of the Financial and Economic Bureau for Central China.

Yet, the story of Lin Piao has been caught up in the maelstrom of world events. His Fourth Field Army has suffered enormous casualties in Korea. Rigid control of communications has probably caused little tarnishing of Lin's reputation. As long as he follows the Party's dictates this will remain so.

VII. LI LI-SAN

The firebrand of Chinese Communism, the advocate of quick victory through the proletariat, Li Li-san first came into effective control of the Party after Chen Tu-hsiu's removal in August, 1927. His policies carried through two attacks on Changsha in opposition to the wishes of Mao Tse-tung. For failure he was stripped of his Party offices and exiled to Moscow in 1931.

During the years the Chinese Communist Party struggled in rural areas, Li remained in Russia. Not until the Soviet Army invaded Manchuria did he return to his homeland. Here, in 1945, Li's political life in the Communist regime began again. The Party had a firm peasant base and could now use his knowledge in the cities it was soon to conquer. Appointed political adviser to Lin Piao, he followed that General to victory in the ensuing campaigns against the Nationalists.

Held in abeyance by his Kremlin masters, Li is now afforded the opportunity to do the work he most wants to do --organize the workers in the cities. As vice-president of the General Federation of Labor, his task is becoming increasingly important to the "Red" Government. Even Mao Tse-tung appears to be swinging towards that idea.

Relations between Mao and Li are cordial as of the moment. At a recent Congress of the Asian trade unions, Li praised Mao's leadership and humbly confessed his own transgressions. In spite of this display of humility, Li still looks toward Moscow too often for many Chinese. The analogy between him and Eastern European Communists who were shipped back from the U.S.S.R. is striking.

While Mao and Li are striding together at this moment, neither's life would indicate that either could change basic behavior patterns. Ostensibly, Li has assumed the role of passive follower. He will do so until the Kremlin decrees otherwise. Li Li-san may be the Trojan Horse in the Chinese Communist Camp.

VIII. LIU SHAO-CHI

Born in Hunan, Liu Shao-chi began his studies in preparation for a teaching career in that Province. Entering the Changsha First Normal School, he was a classmate of Mao Tse-tung and came under the radical influence of Hsu Teh-li. Upon graduation, Liu went to Shanghai filled with revolutionary zeal and there joined the Socialist Youth Group of Chen Tu-hsiu.

Liu Shao-chi's early efforts on behalf of the Party concerned themselves with the labor movement. His first

assignment was to the coal mines of Kiangsi. So successful was his agitation for reform that he was transferred to the Headquarters of the Labor Secretariat. Thrown into the web of intra-Party strife, this group produced large, militant unions. The All-China Labor Federation was organized with Liu as vice-president.

When Chiang cleaned the Communists out of the Kuomintang in 1927, Liu probably went to Moscow as so many of the other "Reds" did. However, his work from 1928 to 1931 is not recorded. In the latter year he turns up again as an organizer of underground unions in Changhai. By 1932 we find him installed as Chairman of the All-China Labor Federation in its new center at Juichin, the Kiangsi "Red" capital.

In this capacity Liu organized laborers into three categories: (1) peasant unions, (2) unions of sales clerks and handicraft workers, and (3) unions of coolies and transportation workers. These organizations were created to "assist positively in the creation of the Red Army." Leadership within the unions was constantly juggled to keep this aim paramount. Improvement in working conditions was not an end in itself, but purely a means of moving the workers into a position to help in gaining the Communist rise to power.

After the Long March, Liu once again dropped from sight. Presumably on his second visit to Moscow, there was little need for his peculiar brand of agitation in agricultural Shensi.

With the union of Kuomintang and Kungchantang in 1937, we find him on the scene, this time engaged in rallying the Shanghai workers to the cause of anti-Japanese aggression. Forced underground, he worked consistently for the Communist Party's eventual seizure of control.

The Red-Nationalist split in 1941 brought Liu back to Communist areas. He was elevated to the Secretariat of the Central Committee two years later, that body that conducts the everyday business of the Party. In 1944 he was given a seat in the Political Bureau. Liu had arrived.

Liu Shao-chi's sponsorship of a revised Party Constitution at Yenan in June, 1945, marks his most notorious achievement to date. Credited as among the principal designers of this document which establishes the supremacy of Party machinery over that of the State, he pleads for a centralism of power in the Central Committee. While the Party Congress may choose the Central Committee, this same Central Committee may postpone indefinitely the meetings of a Party Congress, thus negating its power.

On foreign policy Liu has been a vigorous advocate of the Kremlin line. He denounced Tito in 1948 and makes the United States and imperialism synonomous. His proposed philosophy separates Soviet Nationalism from that of the West. Sometimes the actions of Moscow leave him hard-put for explanations. Nevertheless, so long as China walks with Russia, Liu Shao-chi will remain a potent force in Chinese political life.

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