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Hebraism and Hellenism as seen in Sartor resartus and Wilhelm Meister's apprenticeship

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HEBRAISM AND HELLENISM AS SEEN IN
SARTOR RESARTUS AND WILHELM MEISTER'S APPRENTICESHIP

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of English
College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Robert Roy Dutton
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the years the study of literary relationships has been a highly active form of research. There seems to be a perpetual interest in this field, with its matter of determining influences and comparing relationships and ideas. Certainly this is a logical interest. For on the assumption that literature is a search for truth, in what better way may we find that truth than through a study of the works of the world's writers, searching for sources of their thoughts, and sharpening those thoughts through comparison and contrast.

Thomas Carlyle and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the authors under consideration here, have often been the subjects for this method of literary criticism. Much of this work has been done with the emphasis on influences. Indeed the influence of Goethe on Carlyle is now as widely recognized as any other like literary kinship, more so than most, perhaps, as the very vocal Scotchman was never one to hide his likes and dislikes in this world of man. The aspect of influence, however, is at best of an indirect

\[1\) For example, the relationship existing between Kant and Coleridge, or that between Godwin and Shelley.\]
importance to this thesis. The interest here is centered rather in the second kind of relationship, one in which ideas are dealt with irrespective of sources or origins. In general, this study is to be a comparison of some of the ideas of Carlyle and Goethe. More specifically, the problem is to discover just how the ideas of these two men are alike and how they vary, to what extent there is variation, and to find, if any, a common basis for the thinking of both authors. This research, in turn, will lead to the primary purpose of this thesis, that is, to see into the nature of Hebraism and Hellenism through the two works, Sartor Resartus and Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship.

As described in Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy, Hebraism and Hellenism make for a penetrating insight into life and living. With the two philosophies at hand it is possible to categorize almost any mode of thought, and to reconcile differences arising within that thought. Yet systems are best presented and truly seen only when seen in action. Hence, from this study of Sartor Resartus and Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, with their two heroes,

2 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus and Heroes and Hero-Worship. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1921.)

Teufelsdrockh and Wilhelm, it is hoped that a picture may be caught of Hebraism and Hellenism in action, lending the philosophies vitality, a vitality that is always lacking when application is absent.

The Sartor Resartus of Carlyle and the Wilhelm Meister of Goethe are peculiarly fitting for this inasmuch as in each work the main character is imbued with one of the two philosophies of life. Teufelsdrockh is a Hebraist; Wilhelm is a Hellenist. Furthermore, the two works are largely autobiographical, which means that the two authors also possess the characteristics of Hebraism and Hellenism. Carlyle was born into an authoritative environment, a life based on duty and faith, which he could never forget. Goethe, on the other hand, was born into a freer existence, one which was based upon reason and liberality. Through the two autobiographical works of these men, then, the nature of Hebraism and Hellenism may be seen quite clearly.
2.

OUTLINE OF THESIS

In this thesis, we first shall consider the apprentice theme as a literary medium. Aspects such as definition, popularity, scope of appeal, and limitations will be discussed. In addition, the apprenticeships of Teufelsdrockh and Wilhelm Meister will be considered briefly as illustrations of this literary pattern.

Next, the structures of the two books will be dealt with, pointing out the differences which necessitate a certain approach to the resolution of our problem.

In the third chapter, the early years of Wilhelm and Teufelsdrockh will be discussed through a comparison of their birth, family, environment, education, and general youthful activities. With this, the trends of their further experiences are established.

In the fourth chapter there is related the continuation of the two stories as an aid in understanding references to content found throughout the remainder of the thesis.

The fifth chapter is composed of five parts, each of which deals with the ideas of these two men in relation to certain aspects of life. These parts are: Education, "The Shows of Things", The Individual in Society, The
Individual and Society, and Religion.

The sixth and last chapter is a summation of findings, with a resolution of the presented problem.
CHAPTER I

THE APPRENTICE THEME

The apprentice theme has always been a successful medium of literature. In a broad sense, the term "apprenticeship" may be interpreted to mean general growth, growth of any kind or nature. It may be thought of as merely a learning situation—of life. Narrowing the scope, however, this particular theme more often than not calls to mind a rather set framework, that of the young man finding himself and his place in the world after much and varied experience, ranging all the way from episodes of the boudoir to contemplation of the universe and its uses.

One can readily understand the popularity of the apprentice theme with authors, as the number of possible ingredients is infinite. Almost any aspect of life is welcome within the generous limitations of structure and content. As one writer states,

There is plenty of time along the way for discussions on all sorts of subjects—repentance, criticism, beauty versus wit, the best of all possible worlds, the relative miseries of the married and the celibate, the proper way to present Hamlet. Then too, if experience is the thing, it must include all sorts of people and ways of living...

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1 Susanne Howe, Wilhelm Meister and His English Kinsmen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930) p. 3.
But no matter what the subject, growth of man is the thing, and each man grows in his own way; each man is always "becoming." And here is another boundless reservoir for the literary aspirant. Indeed what may his hero become? Why—anything! He may join the political ranks and become a great leader. He may choose the army for a career, and, after much hesitancy and confusion, become a famous soldier. He may but travel, and become the wiser for his experience. He may become—anything. Miss Howe concludes that

... the fascination ... consists in the fact that, by their very nature, they show life and philosophies of life as something moving, changing, dynamic. 2

In general, then, the success of this medium lies in the scope of its appeal. It says to the reader, "Come and see into the life of a fellow human, for you too are human, and you too must live." 3

And Teufelsdröckh lived, and Wilhelm lived. They lived with all of the blundering, doubt, and confusion that a man could wish to experience. They lived with a seeking intensity which led to many blind alleys, deep living pains, to a very darkness visible before achieving final freedom. Certainly their story gives to us "life

2 Ibid., p. 11.
3 Loc. cit.
and philosophies of life as something moving, changing, and dynamic!" It is our work, now, to see into the lives of these two men, and hence of their authors, to see into the experiences of Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm, to see into the paths chosen by each, and to point out the differences and likenesses in the reasoning of these two pathfinders. In short, it is our work to discover and compare the ingredients of the success of these two seekers in gaining the upper-hand on life.
CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURES OF THE WORKS

There are, to be sure, many points of similarity between Sartor Resartus and Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship; structure of content, however, is certainly not one of them.

Sartor Resartus is presented to us in three books, each something of an entity. Briefly, this is the plan:

Book I is chiefly concerned with an attack on mechanistic science, the content being drawn largely from earlier review articles written by Carlyle. Here also we are introduced to the fictional philosopher, Teufelsdröckh, along with some of his philosophical concepts of "cloth-symbols."

Book II is a romanticized autobiography of the author, ostensibly a biography of our philosopher. Book III brings forth Carlyle's recently developed social doctrines, having to do with much of the make-up of society. Here, the Established Church, other forms of worship, religion in general, science of the day, and the many classes of society receive an ample share of condemnation as only Carlyle can condemn. Although this arrangement seems co-

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centric to the point of nonsense, there are unifying elements, the aspects of which will be dealt with in a later part of this thesis.

*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, on the other hand, is presented in a more familiar pattern. The content of its eight books is in a logical and sequential form, such as that found in almost any novel. That is, the progress in life of an individual from the time of his birth is recorded sequentially.

The difference in structure, then, makes it necessary to make comparisons in terms of ideas, excluding likenesses of narrative. This hampers us little as the primary concern is not with likenesses of narrative, chronologically speaking, but with comparisons of experiences and ideas, regardless of order of occurrence. One notable exception, however, exists at the very beginning of our study, inasmuch as the early years of both youths have so much in common that comparison of narrative is desirable.
CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNINGS

All apprentice themes, it has been said, are concerned with "becoming." Hence on the part of the authors there is a consistent use of "the child is father to the man" beginning. And no exceptions to this design are the apprenticeships of Carlyle's Teufelsdröckh and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, the earliest days of each being replete with the shape of things to come. Indeed the pattern of the life of Teufelsdröckh is formed so early that we feel as if destiny had prepared for his entrance into this world since the beginning of time. Wyrd must have seen and pronounced long, long before Teufelsdröckh was ever in the womb—or how else account for his Arthurian-like origin, a stranger out of the night and out of nowhere, bearing the mystical infant, and then mysteriously disappearing forever? Shades of Havelock! And the story of Teufelsdröckh's life continues to unravel itself, always in such a manner as to expose more of him, more of his past, present, and probable future. The home into which he was cast was kindly, but susterely puritanical, one in which--

I was forbid much: wishes in any measure bold I had to renounce; everywhere a strait bond of Obedience inflexibly held me down. Thus Freewill often came in painful collision with
Necessity; so that my tears flowed, and at seasons the Child itself might taste that root of bitterness, wherewith the whole fruitage of our life is mingled and tempered. ¹

And giving even greater insight into the later man, Teufelsdromk reflects,

Obedience is our universal duty and destiny; wherein whose will not bend must break; too early and too thoroughly we cannot be trained to know that Would, in this world of ours, is as mere zero to Should, and for most part, as the smallest of fractions even to Shall. Hereby was laid for me the basis of worldly Discretion, nay, of Morality itself. ²

As the young Diogenes was a precocious and sensitive child, intellectual purgatory, of a type usually reserved for the young man, was begun early. Even in his eighth year of light—

... a dark ring of care, as yet no thicker than a thread... ³

had made its Wordsworthian appearance.

With his school years this "ring of care" takes on added density, a density which foreshadows the blackness of the Everlasting No. For here he was quite alone within a hostile world. Friendless was he. This stricken deer


² Ibid., p. 75

³ Ibid., p. 74.
had yet to even find the herd, much less leave it. His schoolmates were--

. . . mostly rude boys, and obeyed the impulse of rude Nature, which bids the deer herd fall upon any stricken hart. . . .

His professors were--

. . . hide bound pedants, without knowledge of man's nature or of boys, -- knowing syntax enough; and of the human soul thus much; that it had a faculty called Memory, and could be acted on through the muscular integument by appliance of birch rods. 5

Yet a rough, dark ore was unearthed during this pedagogical period. All was not negative. For Teufelsdröckh, one of "the hungry young who looked up to their Spiritual Nurses; and for food, were bidden eat the eastwind", fashioned for himself at this time a vague ground-plan, the blueprint of which was drawn from a chaotic library at his disposal. Receiving nothing but "vain jargon" from the Education Machine, he took to much reading and thinking.

Thus from poverty does the strong educat nobler wealth; thus in the destitution of the wild desert, does our young Ishmael acquire for himself the highest of all possessions, that of Self-help. 6

4 Ibid., p. 79.
5 Ibid., p. 80.
6 Ibid., p. 87.
Hence, during these years, even as "fever paroxysms of doubt" were growing in the direction of the Everlasting No, the seeds of the Everlasting Yea were as firmly taking hold.

Quite unlike the history of Teufelsdröckh, the early years of Wilhelm are given in very little detail. Of his actual birth nothing is said; here, merely, is Wilhelm, son of a successful businessman. Of his formal education only the information that he was instructed for a short time in commercial activities is volunteered. This is not to say, however, that Wilhelm's childhood was neither significant nor prophetic. Quite to the contrary, for one notable exception to this vagueness does exist. This exception has to do with Wilhelm's relation of his youthful obsession with puppets, and, consequently, with the theatrical world.

Through this story we learn that Wilhelm's childhood was in every way normal. Owing to the fact, perhaps, that his family was financially sound, his early life reminds us somewhat of the role taken by our modern youth. That is, it was not necessary that he go to work at an early age in order to help support the family, certainly a desirable situation not known by the majority of boys in those days. His father, and his mother to a lesser extent, seems to have been one of those who worry this much over
their sons, that the boy was not to be understood, inasmuch as he showed little interest in the commercial activities upon which the family depended for its livelihood. For the most part, he was allowed to grow as he would. His friendships were many, and worries, aside from when he could play with his puppets next, were quite few.

Yet it is through these puppets, and the theatrical inclination, that his future is indicated. There is, to be sure, a superficial awareness of life here, a grasping for light, although certainly not with the intensity shown by Teufelsdröckh. Dark rings of care are completely unknown, and there is all the happiness that goes with childhood.

Hence this interest in drama points the way, and we know that Wilhelm is to pursue a theatrical career. But we also know that life is not known through this "mirror of life", the theater; it is known only through experience, trial and error. So Wilhelm, like Teufelsdröckh, has begun his search for placement in the world. There is much traveling to be done.

We thus see these two "mankins" set out upon two paths of life, paths separated by opposite environments and heredities. The roads, stony though they be, showing many detours, always lead ahead, even as no stroke on the canvas is lost. For along the way milestones are reached,
each adding to the stature of the pilgrims, each adding to the uniqueness of the paths. One such, and early, is of love.

Lonely Teufelsdröckh, after leaving school and turning from his short imagined bent toward law, resolves to become a solitary rover. Almost immediately, however, "a certain Calypso-Island", in the person of the fair Blumine, detains him.

Heaven, what a volcanic earthquake-bringing, all-consuming fire were probably kindled!—have we not here the components of driest Gunpowder, ready, on occasion of the smallest spark, to blaze up?\(^7\)

Yet the blaze was short, although the ashes remained. For even as some account for our Earth's origin, Teufelsdröckh was the victim of a fiery hit-and-run, and left to whirl in Chaos. And what then?

Thick curtains of Night rushed over his soul, as rose the immeasurable Crash of Doom; and through the ruins as of a shivered Universe was he falling, falling, towards the Abyss.\(^8\)

And with this launching, the Everlasting No looms more menacing.

Looking far down on the other path, we see Wilhelm engaged in the same pursuit, that of love, with Marianna,

\(^7\) Carlyle, op. cit., p. 103.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 112.
an actress and dancer. And, unfortunately, Wilhelm fares no better. After many hours of happiness, he too suffers the sorrows of a lost romance. Of greatest sadness to Wilhelm is the later revelation that his own rashness brought about this parting. But no matter—it is done; and Wilhelm, like Teufelsdröckh, turns to travel in self-defense. Yet it is well to note the effect that this affair d'amour has on Wilhelm. To be sure, for a while, he was stricken to the core. For—

In a temper so new, so entire, so full of love, there was much to tear asunder, to desolate, to kill; and even the healing force of youth gave nourishment and violence to the power of sorrow. The stroke had extended to the roots of his whole existence.9

Enjoying the perogative of youth, however, it was not long until Wilhelm—

... bitterly reproached himself, that, after so great a loss, he could yet enjoy one painless, restful, indifferent moment. He despised his own heart, and longed for the balm of tears and lamentation.10

And we know that Wilhelm will love again. In fact the many love affairs which follow serve to mark stages in his development. Not so with Teufelsdröckh. He shall

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10 Ibid., pp. 75, 76.
never be snared again. His biographer comments,

... and perhaps there is now no key extant that will open it [his heart]; for a Teufelsdröckh, as we remarked, will not love a second time. 11

Furthermore, instead of merely and naturally growing out of this bereavement as Wilhelm does, Teufelsdröckh dismisses the episode through stoical reflection. From his biographer again,

He quietly lifts his Pilgerstab (Pilgrim-staff), "old business being soon wound up;" and begins a perambulation and circumambulation of the terraqueous globe!------Singular Diogenes! No sooner has that heart-rending occurrence fairly taken place, than he affects to regard it as a thing natural, of which there is nothing more to be said. 12

At this point we must pause, for the differing structures of the two works make it impossible to continue the comparison through the narratives. But the lines are drawn, and the paths and travelers are more distinct. On the one hand, there is Teufelsdröckh, child of Duty and Obedience, meeting this, his first crisis, in a true Hebraistic manner. On the other hand is the child of freedom, Wilhelm, whose nature refuses the dark depths of

11 Carlyle, op. cit., p. 113.

12 Loc. cit.
Teufelsdröckh. Here, the core is built of trial and error, and one event is not a whole, but only a unit of many units yet to come, only a paragraph in the text of life.
CHAPTER IV
THE STORIES CONTINUED

With the exception of Teufelsdröckh's and Wilhelm's earlier years, these two works hold almost nothing in common as far as structure of content is concerned. As such is the case, let us briefly take each story individually and complete it in order that we may obtain a better understanding of the following parts of the paper.

The remainder of Teufelsdröckh's story may be summed up in little space, for that which is left is given to us in four short chapters. Three of these have to do with his famous spiritual conversion. "The Everlasting No", the first of these, contains pages filled with the darkest depths of bewilderment and doubt to be found in the entire nineteenth century. With much fear and without hope, Teufelsdröckh is truly dwelling in the City of Dreadful Night. It is a tale of continuous and intense searching for light, ending in a complete negation. Out of this despair, the "Centre of Indifference", described in the second of these three chapters, is reached by Teufelsdröckh. Here a Byronic defiance comes into being, a defiance that grows into the positivity of the third chapter, "The Everlasting Yea." Facing his fear, our philosopher finally
comes to terms with himself.

Despicable biped! What is the sum-total of the worst that lies before thee? Death? Well, Death; and say the pangs of Tophet too, and all that the Devil and Man may, will or can do against thee! Hast thou not a heart; canst thou not suffer whatsoever it be; and, as a Child of Freedom, though outcast, trample Tophet itself under thy feet, while it consumes thee? Let it come, then; I will meet it and defy it!¹

Calm and serene, Teufelsdröckh reflects upon his spiritual accomplishment.

The hot Harmattan wind had raged itself out; its howl went silent within me; and the long-deafened soul could now hear.—The first preliminary moral Act, Annihilation of Self (Selbst-todtung), had been happily accomplished; and my mind's eyes were now unsealed, and its hands ungagged.

With one more short chapter, entitled "Pause," the biographer lets Teufelsdröckh fade off into the mist. Perhaps he goes away to join the sect of St. Simonians, or, as is the biographer's choice, the great philosopher becomes an inhabitant of London.

Now let us see what has happened to Wilhelm. In a self-inflicted dejected mood, the ex-lover turns to the routine of commercial activities. And, with business as


² Ibid., pp. 140, 41.
his object, he soon sets out upon a journey. Before long, however, he meets several actors and actresses and his old love for the stage is manifested. Wilhelm and his new-found friends form a theatrical company, with Wilhelm paying the expenses. The troupe is not long on the road when it is invited by a count to give performances at his large country estate. At the manor Wilhelm becomes acquainted with the works of Shakespeare, and his ideas about the drama are transformed to a great degree. When the players, after the fulfillment of their engagement, are leaving the estate, they are attacked by bandits. Wilhelm is saved by "the Amazon", an attractive woman who makes a deep impression on him. But she appears and then disappears so quickly that Wilhelm is not sure whether she was real or only the figment of his feverish mind.

He later forms a connection with a regular theater, and, when acting the part of Hamlet, is so startled by Hamlet's father's ghost, an apparition that seems quite real to Wilhelm, that he produces a powerful effect upon his audience by the truth of his representation. Wilhelm has not, however, the capacity of becoming a great player, the reason being that no matter what part he assumes, it is always his own personality that he represents. He does not possess the faculty of giving living form to the
thoughts and feelings of a type of mind different from his own. One of the actresses of the company, Aurelia, appeals to Wilhelm through her deep melancholy, which is owing to the fact that she has been deserted by Lothario, a lover of high station, whom she is unable to forget. Before her death she gives a letter to Wilhelm, asking him to place it in Lothario's hands.

In fulfillment of this mission, Wilhelm leaves the stage; and by Lothario, who has many great qualities, he is introduced to a circle widely different from anything he has yet seen. He finds that there is a secret society by which, unknown to himself, he has been closely watched and in some measure guided. This society, of which Lothario is one of the leading members, has been formed for the cultivation of all that is highest and noblest in humanity; and Meister, his "Lehrjahre" over, is admitted into it with much pomp and ceremony, and with no little mystery.

It is here that he learns the truth about his first love, Marianne, who was not unfaithful after all, and at the same time he finds out that she is now dead. He then wins the affections of a woman who appeals rather to his intellect than to his feeling; but he is afterwards brought into contact with "the Amazon", who had passed
before him so strangely and beneficially, and the tale ends with the description of the somewhat complicated circumstances which lead to their betrothal.
CHAPTER V

THE COMPONENTS OF LIFE

1. Education

With this background, let us see how Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm looked upon life and its components. In terms of man and his relationship to this world and man, let us see just what came out of the apprenticeship of each. And let us first of all speak of education.

In the times of our biographers, education was a watchword, and much is made of the subject in both books. Furthermore, inasmuch as apprenticeship is the basis for the stories, aspects of growth and learning are constantly under consideration. This chapter, then, is to deal with education in relation to the development of Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm. First, the general pattern of their modes of progress will be discussed. Second, more specific information concerning their conclusions about learning will be given. And lastly, some time will be devoted to the effects of progress and learning on Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm.

One of the outstanding elements common to both books is the lengths to which the authors go in delineat-
ing Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm as products of their individual learning and background. Both men grew according to the patterns of their past. Experience is the thing; it pervades both works. For these two, experience is education, and education comes through experience. Certainly learning does not come to the heroes through the schools, for it was seen that formal education, "wisdom bundled and delivered," is detested by Teufelsdröckh, and is barely mentioned as a factor in Wilhelm's apprenticeship. Here, there is no easy path to knowledge. Teufelsdröckh stumbles for many years in his early seekings. He is in chains, only to be freed after he runs the whole gamut of experience, from a complete negative to a complete positive. There is no shortcut; learning is made up of time-consuming detours. Wilhelm fares no better. He spends years of his life on these detours, searching in barren fields for the life of things. Experience, then, or the actual living of life, is the all-essential to the growth and learning of both men.

Within this experience, however, a vital counterpart is to be found. This is the matter of guidance. Although throughout Wilhelm's apprenticeship there seems to be a complete lack of guidance, with Chance and Fate dictating all, it is revealed at last that he was ever under the watchful eyes of a group instrumental in helping
him to find himself. It was they who saw that Wilhelm, in
spite of his errors and detours, slowly progressed in the
right direction. Later, Wilhelm becomes a member of this
group. The point to remember here, however, is that
 guidance for Wilhelm comes from without himself. Others
are directly responsible. In the case of Teufelsdröckh,
guidance, for the most part, comes from an entirely dif-
ferent source. With him it is an internal phenomenon, and
much less owing to any outside influence. To be sure he
did do a great deal of reading. But Teufelsdröckh had to
live and experience things himself, and it was through him-
self only that he progressed. It has already been mention-
ed that he, in contrast to Wilhelm, lived alone in this
world. His guidance emerges from this solitude; is an
inner-light sort of thing. It is mystical and highly
romantic—romantic in the sense that the emphasis is on
individualism.

As Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm proceed along their
paths of life within the general patterns suggested above,
the two growth-producing elements, experience and guidance
within that experience, take on added meaning. Hence fur-
ther distinction becomes possible. Teufelsdröckh says, in
the chapter entitled "Getting Under Way,"

... hence have we, with wise foresight, In-
dentures and Apprenticeships for our irrational
young; whereby, in due season, the vague univer-
sality of a Man shall find himself ready-moulded into a specific Craftsman; and so thenceforth work, with much or little waste of Capability as it may be; yet not with the worst waste, that of time.1

There is shown a general basis for agreement when a stranger, one of Wilhelm's life-guardians it is discovered later, points out to the youth that neither Fate nor Chance is to be trusted.

Fate, . . . , is an excellent but most expensive school-master. In all cases, I would rather trust to the reason of a human tutor. Fate, for whose wisdom I entertain all imaginable reverence, often finds in Chance, by which it works, an instrument not over manageable. At least the latter very seldom seems to execute precisely and accurately what the former had determined.2

There is clearly a common thought within the two passages, with controlled experience as a basis. But when Wilhelm is being accepted into the mysterious group, he is further advised that,

To guard from error is not the instructor's duty, but to lead the erring pupil; nay, to let him quaff his error in deep, satiating draughts, this is the instructor's wisdom. He who tasted his error, will long dwell with it, will take delight in it as in a singular felicity; while

---


he who drains it to the dregs will, if he be not crazy, find it out. 3

With these three passages in mind, a distinction in ideas becomes clear. Teufelsdrockh shows an intense hatred toward the waste of time and ability. Teaching must be strict, completely authoritative, in order to produce without delay the "ready-moulded" individual. By implication, the individual must "give himself" completely to his apprenticeship, without question and with great faith. With Wilhelm a more liberal note is sounded. There is to be guidance, but guidance of a more tolerant nature. Here there is no fear of error or of loss of time. In fact error is welcomed as a valuable medium to ultimate success, a kind of a "no stroke on the canvas is lost" idea. Evidently Mr. Runes misses this point when he states,

Goethe's Wilhelm Meister is ultimately an argument against capricious desiring. Wilhelm begins in youthful exuberance. He is fickle, unsteady and theatrical [?]. He plays Hamlet well because he himself is Hamlet in his vacillations and dreamings. . . . Similar experiences urge upon Wilhelm the wisdom of giving up his catholic interests in favor of one particular activity. . . . It represents the development from vagrant individualism to practical social-mindedness. 4

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3 Ibid., p. 433.

There can be no argument with the last sentence of this statement, as the development from individualism to socialism, if one may safely use the word today, is surely the story of Wilhelm Meister. But it is the point of view of this writer that Mr. Runes' first observation that the book is an argument against capricious desiring, is in error. Capricious desiring is necessary in that it forms the basis upon which Wilhelm is able to become selective, and hence to acquire this social-mindedness. Without this basis, this experience, selection would have been impossible. Along with controlled experience, then, the necessity and desirability of error are found in Wilhelm's story.

But there is also an addition to be made within Carlyle's idea of learning. This element is pain rather than error. The life of Teufelsdröckh is filled with this pain, the pain of transition and growth. Furthermore, this pain, like error, is seen as desirable and necessary, for out of it is forged a better man. Indeed every step of progress made by Teufelsdrockh was preceded by pain. One has to recall only the three steps of his spiritual conversion.

These two words, error and pain, are important for purposes of distinction and comparison. Certainly the words connote different things. Yet to what extent are
they different? There are many who would say that essentially they are one and the same, that error is pain and pain is error. One may be cause and the other effect, but they are so closely related that they might be considered but pieces of a whole. That is, to the degree to which there is error, to that degree there is pain; to the degree to which there is pain, to that degree there is error. This seems to be sound when but one individual is being dealt with, but another consideration must be kept in mind when comparison between individuals is being made. This added element is background, heredity and environment, for the extent of suffering of both Wilhelm and Teufelsdröckh was in direct proportion to the nature of their individual temperaments, as determined by their heredity and environment. Inasmuch as the pasts of our heroes have been discussed, let us compare the reception of each to growth, with its pain and error.

It has been said that man may best be deciphered not by his actions, but by his reactions; hence a distinction may be possible through this comparison. To begin with, just a brief glance back at the love affairs shows us the trend. Teufelsdröckh has to experience things but once, and he learns. But what a lesson this is! There is deep pain and suffering in each barrier he surmounts, so deep, we suppose, that the single experience is enough to
last a lifetime. This is certainly not the case with Wilhelm, who "gets with life" more easily. On the road of detours he enjoys himself. There is a feeling of frustration at times, but existence is never unbearable, as it is at times for Teufelsdröckh. Teufelsdröckh cannot live with error. That part of life is completely black and soul-less, and is to be cast out once and for all. As Howe says, "Teufelsdröckh was not willing to sift his experience," taking the good and leaving the useless. Life was either good or bad, black or white. Wilhelm, on the other hand, grew and learned in a less harrowing manner. Events and experience had many more shades, shades of both the good and bad; the crystal, with its many facets, was but to be adjusted.

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It was said, more than once, that Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm spent years in blundering and in doubt, in pain and in error. It was also said that this confusion was vital to ultimate self-fulfillment, that it contained the basis for growth and learning. Inasmuch as this error and pain are necessary, let us see in this chapter just what contributes to such a negative element, under what conditions it flourishes, and what must be done in order to dispel it.

To begin with, Teufelsdröckh makes quite clear his philosophy of existence as he distinguishes between the real and unreal. He says,

All visible things are emblems; what thou seest is not there on its own account; strictly taken, is not there at all; Matter exists only spiritually, and to represent some Idea, and body it forth. Hence Clothes, as despicable as we think them, are so unspeakably significant. Clothes, from the King's mantle downwards, are emblematic, not of want only, but of a manifold cunning victory over Want. On the other hand, all Emblematic things are properly Clothes, thought-woven or hand-woven: must not the Imagination weave Garments, visible Bodies, wherein the else invisible creations and inspirations of our Reason are, like spirits, revealed, and first become all-powerful; ... the rather if, as we often see, the Hand to aid her, and (by wool Clothes or otherwise) reveal such even to the outward eye?

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Here is the heart of *Sartor Resartus*. And it is rung through with that portion of the Platonic idea having to do with the visible and the invisible. This theme of values ranges through all of Carlyle's works, for above all, Carlyle was ever fighting what he thought to be a distorted sense of values on the part of his age. But Teufelsdröckh is not yet through with these shows. He continues,

But deepest of all illusory Appearances, for hiding Wonder, as for many other ends, are your two grand fundamental world-enveloping Appearances, Space and Time. . . . In vain, while here on Earth, saih you endeavor to strip them off; you can, at best, but rend them asunder for moments, and look through.2

Such was Teufelsdröckh's tragedy. He was, until the Everlasting Yea, concerned deeply with Victory over Want, with the Visible. He was crying out for light when he should have been crying for faith to take the place of light, for faith is the nearest thing we have to light in a world that is divinely dark. Wherein then lay his triumph? How was this sight into the necessity of faith attained? Why, by burning out the self element. As he lay in the Centre of Indifference, he says of himself,

. . . cast, doubtless by benignant upper Influence, into a healing sleep, the heavy

dreams rolled gradually away, and I awoke to a new Heaven and a new Earth. The first preliminary moral Act, Annihilation of Self (Selbst-todung), had been happily accomplished; and my mind's eyes were now unsealed, and its hands ungrieved. 3

Almost Eastern is this in its implication, with the mystical high-lighted. And certainly it has a measure of the Wordsworthian idea of contamination in it. 4 This is the personalism of Teufelsdröckh, appealing to the individual and his place in being. It is romantic.

Not only does Carlyle express profound concern with distorted values; we find much the same idea in Goethe's Wilhelm, except that it is of a calmer and quieter nature, more befitting his less turbulent and abrupt personality. The concern with the "shows of things" is brought out in Wilhelm's statement,

Men who put a great value on gardens, buildings, clothes, ornaments, or any other sort of property, grow less social and pleasant; they lose sight of their brethren, whom very few can succeed in collecting about them and entertaining. 5

3 Ibid., pp. 140, 141.

4 Wordsworth's Ode on Intimations of Immortality, in which is expounded the idea that man becomes tainted as he grows. The idea is found throughout Wordsworth's works.

Stricken as Wilhelm was with the theatrical disease, he had lost sight of his brothers. He was far from the practical social-mindedness of which Runes speaks. In his stage career, it is true, he was trying to find life, to see into the life of things, but he was looking in the wrong place for it. He was looking upon the Baconian shadows, which are but the shadows of truth and life. The harmony of true knowledge was being distorted by the stage. After a sincere compliment on his ability to see into the nature of dramatic poetry, the tragic figure of Ophelia points out this failing to him. She says,

For in truth, from without, you receive not much; I have scarcely seen a person that so little knew, so totally misknew, the people he lived with, as you do. Allow me to say it: in hearing you expound the mysteries of Shakespeare, one would think you had just descended from a synod of the gods, and had listened there while they were taking counsel how to form men; in seeing you transact with your fellows, I could imagine you to be the first large-born child of the Creation, standing aghast, and gazing with strange wonderment and edifying good nature at the lions and apes and sheep and elephants, and true-heartedly addressing them as your equals, simply because they were there, and in motion like yourself.

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7 Goethe, op. cit., pp. 232, 233.
In education much has been made over the nature of transition in learning. Here, Ophelia's remarks would certainly compare favorably with the modern thought on this subject. For while Wilhelm's experience with the stage has taught him much about drama and poetry, its images and its meaning, it has taught him little about the thing it is supposed to mirror---life itself. He has mistaken the Unreal for the Real. He has mistaken the means for the end, and, until he finally "drank the dregs" of this error and attained a social outlook, he was to be lost in the "shows of things."

Throughout the book, Goethe ever reminds the reader that Wilhelm is on the wrong road, for at frequent intervals there are warnings given to Meister that the stage is not what he thinks it is---that the stage is the essence of life, not life itself. For example, the mysterious, spirit-like figure of Mignon pleads with Wilhelm to abandon the theater. "Dearest father! stay thou from the boards thyself," she cries. Even more indicative of this pressure are the words found on the veil of the ghostly apparition who took the part of Hamlet's father in the group's rendering of the play:

FOR THE FIRST AND LAST TIME! FLEE, YOUTH! FLEE!6

6 Ibid., p. 159.

9 Ibid., p. 294.
Later, of course, Wilhelm learns his mistake. He learns of it, furthermore, through the same method as does Teufelsdröckh, that based on the forgetting of self. As J. G. Robertson states,

Wilhelm learns the great lesson of the "holy earnestness" of life; and the wisdom of that self-limitation based on renunciation which Goethe never ceased to preach.10

Yet herein seems to lie the difference between the resolutions of the two characters. Wilhelm's renunciation is but based on renunciation. It isn't as complete as Teufelsdröckh's. It is essentially a renunciation of self to the group, to society and its welfare, and hence to a happy fulfillment of himself. Teufelsdröckh's renunciation is wholly a renunciation, a renunciation to faith alone rather than to any part of his society. It goes deeper than the self-limitation of Wilhelm, the self-limitation of which Robertson speaks in the immediately preceding quotation. It is self-annihilation. The difference between these two approaches to self-realization, then, is one of degree rather than kind.

5. The Individual in Society

One of the greatest problems of the human race centers about the identification of the individual with the group. Just how does man attain his fulfillment within his society? Inasmuch as both Carlyle and Goethe in their works of apprenticeship were primarily dealing with the pursuits of an individual, *Wilhelm Meister* and *Sartor Resartus* have much to say on this topic.

It was established in the two preceding chapters that man's first steps toward self-realization lay in the path of controlled experience from whence came a renunciation of self. With this, man is free to act, and to act wisely, unhampered by false and misleading lights, the "shows of things." This action, however, leads us to another problem. Just how is man to act? And where and when is he to act?

There seems to be a primary agreement between the two authors on the first obligation laid upon the individual. This is to bring order out of chaos, to establish order, be it ever so small, where there was but worthless existence. Let Taufelsdröckh sound the first note. In the chapter entitled "Getting Under Way," we read,

... does not the very Ditcher and Diver, with his spade, extinguish many a thistle and
puddle; and so leave a little Order, where he found the opposite? Nay your very Day-moth has capabilities in this kind; and ever organizes something (into its own body, if no otherwise), which was before inorganic; and of mute dead air makes living music, though only of the faintest, by humming.\(^1\)

Now from Wilhelm, in the chapter entitled "Confessions of a Fair Saint," we read an almost exact duplicate of that thought.

Life lies before us, as a huge quarry lies before the architect; he deserves not the name of architect, except when, out of this fortuitous mass, he can combine with the greatest economy and fitness and durability, some form, the pattern of which originated in his spirit. All things without us, nay, I may add, all things on us, are mere elements; but deep within us lies the creative force, which out of these can produce what they were meant to be.\(^2\)

The likenesses of these two passages becomes more significant when it is noted that motivation for man's creativity comes from deep within man. That is, the individual must have it within him to create before creation is possible. This takes us right back to the established necessity for experience and renunciation, without which\(^1\)

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order and chaos are indistinguishable. In turn, it is possible to see just what the authors deemed to be valuable creativity. In the preceding chapter it was said that while both Carlyle and Goethe believed in the necessity of renunciation, the degree of that renunciation differed. Carlyle strives for a complete annihilation of self. Even allowing for his violent style of writing, there is definitely implied here a casting out of mankind, society, and all it lives by, in order to achieve this annihilation.

Goethe, on the other hand, feels that the individual must renounce self to the benefit of the group, to society and its welfare. With this in mind, it may be said that the results of the two renunciations, fruitful creation, differ in that creativity for Carlyle has more to do with the value to the individual himself, while Goethe is more concerned with a creation of order for the sake of the group. Frederick Roe gives us added insight into Carlyle on this matter when he says,

Mr. Carlyle comprehends only the individual; the true sense of the unity of the human race escapes him. He sympathizes with all men, but it is with the separate life of each, and not with their collective life.  

The theme of man's duty to bring order out of chaos is made more clear through a basic agreement on the part

of both authors as to just how this is to be accomplished. First, and above all, action is vital. One must be a doer. Words and thought, of course, have their place in this scheme of things but their place lies in serving as a means to the act and never as an end in themselves. All the words and thought in the world will not turn the smallest stone. And while "wondrous indeed is the virtue of a true Book", books are also but means to an end. Their value is lost if the end—action—is not realized. Teufelsdröckh discovers this fact, but only after much suffering through many, many years. He laments,

The *Enchiridion of Epictetus* I had ever with me, often as my sole rational companion; and regret to mention that the nourishment it yielded was trifling. 4

After which his biographer immediately comments,

Thou foolish Teufelsdröckh! How could it be else? Hadst thou not Greek enough to understand thus much: *The end of Man is an Action, and not a Thought,* though it be the noblest? 5

In Wilhelm Meister there is seen a like outlook with the statement,

Words are good, but they are not the best. The best is not to be explained by words. The spirit in which we act is the highest matter. Action

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4 Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

5 Loc. cit.
can be understood and again represented by the spirit alone.  

On the surface, this "act in preference to thought" idea is rather difficult to explain. After all, how can one act intelligently without thoughtful background? Thought is the vehicle which brings us to wise action. In the case of two such men as Goethe and Carlyle, it is difficult to see just how they rationalized such an opinion in view of their own careers. Their lives were accentuated by thought, books and words. It is probable that they meant to emphasize action, while not meaning to exclude thought, which is quite understandable and commendable to us. But in their effort to forcefully point a moral, one cannot help feeling that they go too far in speaking of thought and action as two distinct entities, when they are actually inseparable. The separation is merely distortion of fact. It is an easy simplification of a complex problem, and is reminiscent of the eighteenth-century attempt to classify all existence.

Nevertheless, action is the only hope of the individual in Goethe's and Carlyle's ideas of the individual's place in society. As one writer says of Carlyle, and as Teufelsdröckh comes to realize so deeply,

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Self-realization, which is the aim of life, depends therefore upon action, upon work, and the call to duty becomes a gospel of labor, the cornerstone of Carlyle's social philosophy.  

There is another aspect to be included in this framework of the place of the individual in society. And the heart of all action is centered in this aspect. Putting the problem in question form, where is action to be found? Where does man first look for his work? The answer—why, at his feet. The architect does not have to search for his quarry; he is part of it, and it is all around him. Chaos is forever surrounding us, and we have but to attack—here and now. So famous are the answers of both Carlyle and Goethe on this matter that "Do the Duty which lies nearest thee" and "Here or nowhere is thy America" have become a part of our vocabulary, and need no documentation. If one is seeking the basis of Carlyle's and Goethe's philosophy of man and his work, surely here it is.

At this point, then, Wilhelm and Teufelsdröckh have struck a common note. The individual, through direct and unhesitating action, is to bring order out of the chaos which exists all around us. Yet there is a difference in outlook. Miss Howe attempts to make clear this diversity by noting that---

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Roe, op. cit., p. 93.
Both Carlyle and Goethe hated—the waste of human material... but Carlyle's answer to it was faith, action, renunciation of self and of all foolish claims to personal happiness. Goethe believed that his youth could grow to manhood by learning the value of practical, unselfish living through understanding that it was the only way to live harmoniously, and happily.8

This observation is quite true. There is an important element of personal happiness in Wilhelm's philosophy of life, an element looked upon with disdain by Teufelsdrockh. Yet if we look deeply into Carlyle's faith, there is also to be found a kind of happiness, but Carlyle would refer to it as satisfaction. If the point were pressed, and we tried to make a basic distinction between happiness and satisfaction, we would find ourselves debating the question of what true happiness is, which must be left for the individual to decide. Carlyle, in his aggressiveness, might answer for the individual by saying that even if this thing called happiness must be included in the pattern of man's self-realization, such happiness is completely impossible without the elimination of happiness as a goal to be sought. To Carlyle, happiness would be completely incidental, and it may or may not come with self-fulfillment. The satisfaction of the individual with himself, certainly a form of happiness, a kind of personalism, is

8 Howe, op. cit., p. 120.
more to Carlyle's view of self-fulfillment. To Goethe, as seen through Wilhelm, happiness is an end. It in itself is a good. Wilhelm not only finds his place in society, but is happy, indeed mildly exhilarated with his place. Teufelsdröckh never finds his place in the group; he runs off to the St. Simonians. It is suggested, however, that he does find his own form of happiness in his victory, not over his society, but over himself. Wilhelm does not run; he makes the adjustment. As Mr. Buck says,

... Meister learns at last not only to accept the hum drum of living, but to glow with health in its routine.9

In the light of the above discussion, then, the author of this thesis cannot accept happiness as a basis for distinction between the two ways of living exemplified in Wilhelm and Teufelsdröckh.

All of this, however, brings us to a more concrete diversity, a diversity made clear when we consider the reason for man's renunciation and his creativity. Carlyle's individual's main purpose is to achieve a harmony with himself; all else is secondary. Goethe's individual's main purpose is to achieve a harmony with society; and here again all else is secondary. This is clearly shown through

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the emphasis placed upon Teufelsdröckh's struggle with himself, as contrasted with the emphasis placed upon Wil- helm's struggle with the society in which he finds himself.
4. The Individual and Society

Both Carlyle and Goethe lived in an age of great social transition. It was a time of violent revolutions and of evolutions. It was a time in which the inroads of the middle and lower classes on the upper classes were leaving the radical document stage and assuming a reality. With this change in social forms, there was bound to be much confusion in social thought. Men were desperately attempting, with varying degrees of success, to ascertain the proper relationship of man to man, to discover proper social structures.

Carlyle and Goethe, like all thinkers of this era, were actively engaged in trying to find a solution to this problem. Their views on this subject, as seen through Sartor Resartus and Wilhelm Meister, will form the contents of the next discussion.

Up to this point we have been concerned with three separate and yet integrated aspects of life—education, barriers to that education, and the possible fulfillment of the individual as a result of that education. In some ways the following portion of this work is a continuation of the last of these, as the position of the individual in relation to society is still directly under discussion. However, there is to be a new emphasis, an added signifi-
cause, in that here we shall be dealing more directly with the social structure in which the individual projects himself. As in the last sub-chapter it was discovered how the individual places himself in society, so in this sub-chapter the attempt is to see how society might be arranged if proper placement is resolved.

First, let us examine Carlyle's idea of the proper social structure.

Carlyle's main dispute with the world concerned what he felt to be a distorted sense of values. Man is a non-recognizing being, without capacity to distinguish between fiction and reality. Carlyle's fight is ever against this failing of man, and rarely against the institutions of man. It rests with the individual to change; consequently, institutions must change. Government, schools, church, and all other social manifestations are only as good and only as wise as their makers—man. Now it has been said that in order for man to attain such a realization, and to act upon it, he must seek and discover his true place in the world.¹ "Know what thou canst work at." With this background, Carlyle's ideas on social structure may be made more clear, and his famous concept of heroes and hero-worshippers may assume a more natural and plausible setting.

To continue, then, the individual, with his knowledge of self and position and with his insight into reality, finds that all society is formed of the two classes mentioned above—heroes and hero-worshippers. He also finds to which group he belongs, and the duties consequent. Let us first see into the latter of these two categories. The worshippers, the lesser beings, are of course, in the great majority, as they are to be the followers. For their duties, and these are in addition to those demanded of all men, they must learn to recognize their leaders. This is held to be of great importance, as Teufelsdrockh feels that the failure to recognize superiority is one of the curses of his age. After finding the heroes, the worshipper must faithfully follow them in all things. This role, this ability to recognize superiority in others, along with the following of their dictates, assumes an almost super-human capacity, to which all ages will attest. Yet given the equally superhuman capacity to know one's self, to know what one can work at, the remainder may be accepted. In any case, inasmuch as society is made up of individuals possessing differing degrees of talent, this element of heed and obey must form a part of the structure. Why? Let Teufelsdrockh make the point. In the chapter entitled "Organic Filaments," he states,

True is it that, in these days, man can do
almost all things, only not obey. True likewise that whose cannot obey cannot be free, still less bear rule; he that is the inferior of nothing, can be superior of nothing, the equal of nothing.2

Hence Teufelstrick is asking us merely to face the facts. Society is filled with greater and lesser people, and it is necessary for the less gifted to recognize the greater person and to accept him as such. Men are seeking social freedom, but this freedom is impossible to attain without justice, which in turn is impossible, without a submission to rightful authority.

The heroes, even as the hero-worshippers, have certain obligations laid upon them. They must, through self-knowledge and through insight, again, learn of their capacities and of their future roles. They must realize themselves for what they were meant to be—leaders. But this is not enough. It was said in connection with the hero-worshippers that it was for them to recognize their leaders. On the other side, it also rests with the heroes to make themselves recognized as superior beings, a feat impossible in our society, but one much more easily achieved given a group of hero-worshippers who are cognizant of social placement. In the line of duty, these heroes must act,

——2 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus and Heroes and Hero-Worship. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1921), p. 188.
lead, and teach in strict accordance with their own consciences, never swerving in pursuit of all that is best for man, the best being an acceptance of and a love for the "higher realities" of life.

Essentially, then, Teufelsdrockh advocates a social structure built upon an acceptance of individual differences, placement in accordance with those differences, and a deep faith on the part of each man that such an approach to social living is the only road to social justice.

Goethe's work, unlike the story of Teufelsdrockh, rarely deals directly with problems of social structure, as the concern is primarily with the growth of an individual. Yet the growth of Wilhelm Meister is a steady inclination toward a social awareness, and it is through this growth that some insight into social thought is given. Early in the story it is made clear that the standards of the middle class in Wilhelm's country, a rising middle class at this time, leave much to be desired. Their fault, even as the fault of Carlyle's age, lay in possessing a distorted sense of values. Reality for them was to be seen only on the counting table and in columns of figures. It will be remembered that it was largely owing to this adoration of symbols on the part of this group of people, from which Wilhelm came, that he turned away from this world of accounts receivable.
The nobility of the land, too, comes in for its share of criticism. When Wilhelm with his theatrical troupe keeps an engagement on the estate of one of the nobles, this upper-class is seen to be cursed, not only with a false sense of values, but also with extreme idleness, a completely negative idleness which destroys all chance for progress in society.

Wilhelm, however, not yet seeing beyond his stage, accepts this situation, accepts it in the manner of a "social-climber", who looks upon advancement in terms of himself rather than in terms of society as a whole. In a passage concerning the lot of the common man and that of the nobleman, Wilhelm (early in his career, it must be remembered) leaves no doubt as to his solution to the status quo. He says,

Perhaps the reason of this difference is not the usurpation of the nobles, and the submission of the burghers, but the constitution of society itself. Whether it will ever alter, and how, is to me of small importance; my present business is to meet my own case, as matters actually stand; to consider by what means I may save myself, and reach the object which I cannot live in peace without.  

This attitude of isolation, however, was not to last, for as time goes on the social conscience of Wilhelm grows

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stronger. Certainly it is a slow progress, with only patches of it shown through Wilhelm's treatment of and attitudes toward those immediately surrounding him. The growth has yet to include society. But it is a certain growth, as is seen through the words of one of his "heroes", Lothario. In the last book, Book VIII, he states that the social order of things would improve for the betterment of all if--

... the state, for a regular and fair contribution, would relieve us from this feudal hocus-pocus; would allow us to proceed with our lands according to our pleasure; so that we were not compelled to retain such masses of them undivided, so that we might part them more equally among our children, whom we might thus introduce to vigorous and free activity, instead of leaving them the poor inheritance of these our limited and limiting privileges, to enjoy which we must ever be invoking the ghosts of our forefathers. 4

The passage, of course, is so vague as to be of little help in determining a specific political philosophy. The questions arising are, Who is the state? and How was it chosen? Nevertheless it is significant for our purpose in that here is a questioning of the status quo, a non-acceptance of the idea that whatever is, is right and proper. It shows a concern with general improvement rather than with mere self-improvement, the latter of these, it will be remembered, being the earlier objective of

4 Ibid., p. 13. (Book VII)
Wilhelm.

In contrast with Carlyle's work, here is a democratic tone, certainly minimized, but sufficient to have sounded a discord in the ears of the Scotsman. More impressive, however, is the parallel to be drawn. Even as Teufelströckh was distressed with authority abiding in improper persons, so in Wilhelm the same idea is seen in this dissatisfaction with semi-feudalism, a state which his country had reached at this time. In both works, interest is shown in finding true authority, a capable authority, rather than in submission to authority founded on set rules and through historical precedent. It is an authority founded on the worth of the individual.

On this matter of social forms, there is yet another comparison to be made between these two books, and this one is to be drawn on a much larger scale. In a general sense, the entire story of Meister reminds one of the hero and hero-worship scheme of Carlyle. Wilhelm is, for a period, a worshipper. He is not perhaps a worshipper in the connotation of the word as it is used by Carlyle, but some of the characteristics are present. Wilhelm's early years are spent in search of his self-fulfillment. He succeeds in his search largely because of his "heroes." Throughout the story, one by one, his heroes, the abbe, Jamo, Lothario, Nathalia, and Theresa, make themselves
and their influence felt, and later make themselves known, until at last they are his leaders completely. He learns, with much difficulty, to be sure, to accept them as his superiors.

There is, however, a distinction in ideas to be made here. Teufelsdröckh's pattern of society is a highly stable one. There is the theme of "once a hero--always a hero", the converse being true for the worshipper. These categories are ends, ends maintained by a supra-faith in their infallibility. In Wilhelm, Goethe gives us the idea that life is completely transitional. While Wilhelm is a worshipper, he shows definite signs of becoming a hero through his awakening. Moreover, this acceptance of superiority in others is learned by Wilhelm through trial and error, through reason. It is not accepted on faith, as the individual must in Teufelsdröckh's social plans.
Religion in England in the first quarter of the nineteenth century was passing through a high state of flux as a result of several developments. Science was bringing fundamental conflicts into view; revolutionary thought was drifting in from France; great movements of population were under way; and there were schisms within the churches themselves. Perhaps most important to our point of view, however, was the corrupt condition in which churches of different denominations were to be found. This, we can guess, Thomas Carlyle could not abide. Carlyle had a special dislike for hypocrisy, wherever it might be found; but in matters of faith and reverence, his dislike ever turned to fierce attack. One cannot help feeling that this corrupt condition of the churches led in part to his turning away from formal theologies.¹

Carlyle’s forsaking any established religion, however, owes most to his ideas on society as a whole. This is the idea that has been seen as predominant throughout Sartor Resartus; namely, that social man has lost his sense of values. It was not the church itself, as an institution, that Carlyle detested; his dislike came from

¹ Carlyle spent some time in training for clerical duties. It was his mother’s wish that he be associated with the Church.
the fact that the men of the church were as blind and as
ineffective as the rest of society. They had succumbed to
the profit-and-loss theory, too, and therein lay the plot
for the old story of the blind leading the blind. They
were professing a leadership which for the most part just
did not exist, and insofar as it did exist, their paths
were constantly being distorted through a society holding
false values. Of the religion of his day, Carlyle says,

Meanwhile, in our era of the World, those same
Church-Clothes have gone sorrowfully out at
elbows; nay, far worse, many of them have become
mere hollow Shapes, or Masks, under which no
living Figure or Spirit any longer dwells; ... 2

Nevertheless, Carlyle was a man of devout reverence
and faith in the church, holding that this "vesture" of
society was the most important of all. For here, and only
here, is found that all important "why" of things. Yet
let Taufelsdröckh caution us:

Whose fancies that by Church is here meant
Chapter-houses and Cathedrals, or by preaching
and prophesying, mere speech and chaunting, let
him ... 3 read on, light of heart (gestroßen
Muthes). 3

2 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus and Heroes and
Hero-Worship. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1921),
p. 163.

3 Ibid., p. 162.
Each man first must find his own church, for with Teufelsdrossel, religion was a highly personal affair, with each man a church unto himself. Faith and reverence were to be found here in the individual, and not in any corporate religion. In each of us lies a divinity, and any founding, any reforming, any bolstering of this divinity must come through the individual. The church, even as any other institution, is only as good as the human integers involved.

Above all, man must attain and maintain a reverence. This is a prerequisite to any degree of self-fulfillment. Reverence is the heart of all being; for with nothing to revere, existence becomes meaningless, calling forth the soulless Everlasting May. But wherein should this reverence lie? The answer to this question reminds us of Teufelsdrossel's answer to the question of where one may find his work. That is, the source of faith and reverence is to be found all around us, in our very existence, in the many miracles evident. Miracles? Why, the miracle and mystery of man himself and all God's world that lies about him. All is miracle.

Art thou a grown baby, then, to fancy that the Miracle lies in miles of distance, or in pounds avoirdupois weight; and not to see that the true inexplicable God-revealing Miracle lies in this, that I can stretch forth my hand
at all; that I have free Force to clutch aught therewith? 4

When Teufelsdröckh speaks of immortality, claiming it is inevitable, we get a clear insight into the basis for his faith.

Know of a truth that only the Time-shadows have perished, or are perishable; that the real Being of whatever was, and whatever is, and whatever will be, is even now and forever. This, should it unhappily seem new, thou mayst ponder at thy leisure; for the next twenty centuries; believe it thou must; understand it thou canst not. 5

This is nothing more nor less than transcendentalism, an appealing to an acceptance of truth which is beyond man's understanding. With faith as a helpmate, one may and does reason a Deity and all its implications into existence; but one may not see into that Deity, nor reason with that Deity. An understanding of God is approached only through faith. Man-made contradictions are resolved only through faith.

Turning to Goethe's work, the tale of Wilhelm, in partial contrast to that of Teufelsdröckh, is not the story of a spiritual conversion, but rather the story of a cultural and social conversion. Hence religion, with the exception of one chapter, is not given wide treatment.

4 Ibid., p. 197.

5 Loc. cit.
Furthermore, in this exceptional chapter, "The Confessions of a Fair Saint," Goethe seems to be but depicting a character, and not giving vent to any of his own beliefs. At least, one may conclude this, as the chapter is more of an inlay than an integral part of the book. However, this character is treated with an understanding and a sympathy by the author that seem to indicate a sympathy for her views. For while Goethe entertained ideas which by some would be called atheistic or pagan, there is ample room in him to appreciate sincerity of belief in others, provided that sincerity is not blind and provided it is of a pragmatic nature. In the chapter mentioned above, the "Fair Saint" states in answer to the question of how one may obtain a share in the fruits of religion,

"By faith," the Scripture says. And what is faith? To consider the account of an event as true, what help can this afford me? I must be enabled to appropriate its effects, its consequences. This appropriating faith must be a state of mind peculiar, and, to the natural man, unknown.6

While this is certainly not Goethe, one can well imagine his approbation of the Sant's attitude, for religion becomes strongly reasonable here. This is not blind acceptance of an unknown; it is a concrete "appropriation"

of the fruits of religion.

More of Goethe is seen through a conversation between Jarno and Wilhelm. Jarno, in answer to Wilhelm's question as to whether or not he believed in destiny, answers,

The fabric of our life is formed of necessity and chance: the reason of man takes its station between them, and may rule them both; it treats the necessary as the groundwork of its being; the accidental it can direct and guide, and employ for its own purposes: and only while this principle of reason stands firm and inexpugnable, does man deserve to be named the god of this lower world.⁷

Hence Wilhelm is lectured that reason holds the predominant station in life, while Teufelsdröckh finds that faith maintains that position.

In comparison, however, Goethe, like Carlyle, has little respect for formal theologies. For both men, an affiliation with a group or an institution has nothing to do with the spiritual fulfillment of the individual. Religion is an individual and an inner phenomenon, and all externals are merely manifestations of the inner fact. All outward forms, such as Teufelsdröckh's cathedrals and chapterhouses, and even great religious books, are meaningless without a "base of operations", without an inner core of religious existence. Teufelsdröckh says, in answer to the claim that religion is nothing but a world-

⁷ Ibid., p. 70.
Meanwhile what are antiquated Mythuses to me? Or is the God present, felt in my own heart,---? Feel it in the heart, and then say whether it is of God! This is Belief; . . . ONE BIBLE I know, of whose Plenary Inspiration doubt is not so much as possible; nay with my own eyes I saw the God's-hand writing it: thereof all other Bibles are but Leaves, -- say, in Picture-Writing to assist the weaker faculty.  

In comparison, Theresa says, in a discussion with Wilhelm,

I, for my share, cannot understand, . . . how men have made themselves believe that God speaks to us through books and histories. The man to whom the universe does not reveal directly what relation it has to him, whose heart does not tell him what he owes to himself and others, that man will scarcely learn it out of books, . . .  

Clearly, neither Carlyle nor Goethe sees the necessity of a medium between God and man, that is, no medium other than the divinity existing within the individual. This is not to say, it must be repeated, that these two men are anti-church, anti-Christ, anti-Bible, and against all the aspects of religion; it is to say that they admitted the value of religion only in proportion to the nature of the individual approaching that religion. Empirically, and this is empiricism, values are formed by that

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8 Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 146, 147.

9 Goethe, op. cit., p. 404.
which the individual gives of himself. To some, religion is nothing but an escape; to others, it is a "front", a badge for the benefit of social eyes; and still to others, it is a real and a powerful association with God, a destroyer of doubt and a link with eternity. It all depends on the man.

In sum, there seems to be only one difference between the ideas of these two men concerning religion, and this difference is one of degree rather than kind. For while both men believed that both faith and reason were necessary in acquiring reverence, Carlyle gives faith the upper hand and Goethe maintains the balance in favor of reason.
CHAPTER VI

THE TWO PATHS OF LIFE

To study Sartor Resartus and Wilhelm Meister, with their protagonists, Teufelsdrockh and Wilhelm, is to study the nature of Hebraism and Hellenism. It will be remembered that Hebraism connotes that attitude towards life which subordinates all other ideals to those of conduct, obedience, and ethical purpose. Hellenism, the counterpart, is that concept of life which subordinates all to the intellectual, to reason. Matthew Arnold, who gave us the most noted treatment of these two ways of life, sums up his discussion of them with the suggestion that Hebraism is a "strictness of conscience", while Hellenism stands for a "spontaneity of consciousness."1 With this, then, let us see to which camp Teufelsdrockh and Wilhelm belong.

Teufelsdrockh (or Carlyle), according to the definition given above, may be classified as a Hebraist, for his conclusions clearly rest on foundations of "conduct, obedience, and ethical purpose," and certainly upon "strictness of conscience." Especially is he a Hebraist in the aspect

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of obedience, an element which was born into him, bred into him, and later advocated by him as one of the great essentials of a full life. The note has been heard throughout this thesis. In education, it is recalled, a great emphasis is placed upon the value of the apprenticeship, stressing the importance of the authoritarian approach to learning. Even the pain which tends to accompany such a procedure is considered to be of value in forging the chains of obedience. Above all, error and the waste of time are to be avoided, and this may be accomplished only through an exacting obedience to authority.

This obedience again makes itself felt in Teufelsdröckh's social ideas. His whole framework of heroes and hero-worship depends upon an adherence to authority; without it his society would disintegrate. And certainly these other aspects of Hebraism, conduct, ethical purpose, and strictness of conscience, are also necessary to Teufelsdröckh. The entire goal of life is to achieve a sense of the true, the right, the real, the ethical, and to cast out the unreal and unethical. In order that he may attain such an existence, man must conduct himself with a strictness of conscience, with a faith in the authority of his superiors, with a faith in himself and the rightness of his place, and with a faith in the system as a whole. Then, and only then, will come the complete satisfaction of self-
fulfillment.

Lastly, this obedience and strictness of conscience are seen as the basis for Teufelsdröckh's religion. Reverence is founded upon faith, a faith in a deity which must be believed in, but which never can be understood.

To turn to Wilhelm Meister (or Goethe) is to turn to Hellenism, for his path is of the intellectual and of a "spontaneity of consciousness." Indeed when one learns of his early years, it is difficult to think of a more apt word than "spontaneous", for these were years of an easy and a natural growth, years singularly devoid of any sense of obedience. The inclination towards the theater is completely spontaneous and intellectual in nature, being the product of his own lively imagination. Again this spontaneity of consciousness is seen in Wilhelm's conclusions on education. Here, results come from a freedom of mind rather than through an obedience of the mind. Error and time are deemed neither regrettable nor wasteful, but are considered as valuable mediums of attaining a rich, varied, and whole existence. Certainly there is not seen the strictness of conscience so evident in Teufelsdröckh.

Wilhelm shows an ability to absorb the new and unexpected, be the experience pleasant or unpleasant, without suffering the transitional pains felt by Teufelsdröckh. And this recalls another point of distinction. Arnold
states.

... there is a saying which I have heard attributed to Mr. Carlyle about Socrates—a very happy saying, whether it is really Mr. Carlyle's or not,... which excellently marks the essential point in which Hebraism differs from Hellenism. "Socrates," this saying goes, "is terrible at ease in Zion." Hebraism,... and here is the source of its wonderful strength.... has always been severely preoccupied with an awful sense of the impossibility of being at ease in Zion;... ²

The suggestion that Wilhelm "sits easily" with life, in contrast to Teufelsdröckh, will be recalled in this connection.³

Furthermore, life for Wilhelm is a life of change, inasmuch as he possesses this disposition to spontaneous activity. He never attains the complete stability of existence attained by Teufelsdröckh through his adherence to a philosophy of obedience. We leave Teufelsdröckh feeling that there is yet room for growth, and that that growth shall come.

In the discussion of religion, moreover, it was found that in Wilhelm fate and destiny are controlled through reason, and not through an obedience to some faith in a manifest destiny.

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² Ibid., p. 135.
³ See p. 32.
Now to go back to *Culture and Anarchy* again, Matthew Arnold says of Hebraism and Hellenism, "... between these two points of influence moves our world." The important thing to remember, then, is that the characteristics of each of these paths are defined in polar terms, and that no man is expected to conform completely and unswervingly to their distinguishing peculiarities. For while Tsufelsdröckh and Wilhelm are certainly strong embodiments of each category, they nevertheless do not move in exacting parallel lines. Opposition is never complete; it is always varied and in degree. The lines of thought are waving, now well apart, now almost touching, and again quite overlapping.

For example, there is agreement between the two on the necessity of controlled experience in learning—and the lines of the two paths become one. There is disagreement on the extent of guidance and control and on the place of pain and error in that learning—and the lines move apart. There is agreement on the necessity of self-renunciation in the achievement of self-realization—again the lines swerve toward each other. There is disagreement on the nature and on the extent of this self-renunciation—and again the lines move apart. And so it goes throughout.

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4 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
their stories. Heroes and hero-worshippers are accepted by both men. But within this framework man assumes a static position for Teufelsdröckh, while he assumes a mobility with Wilhelm. Reverence is deemed vital by both, yet the basis for reverence differs. Teufelsdröckh finds it in faith; Wilhelm finds it in reason. Things become even more complicated, however, when one is reminded that Teufelsdröckh, to an extent, reasons his faith into existence, while Wilhelm has faith in his reason. If the point is pressed, definitions and distinguishing characteristics become confused and almost meaningless owing to semantic difficulties.

In any case, the point to remember is that these two men are at odds in many aspects, but always in degree and never in kind. Now this fact, inasmuch as both Teufelsdröckh and Wilhelm may be considered embodiments of Hebraism and Hellenism, would seem to destroy Arnold's two classifications. And indeed they are done away with—if one fails to remember the polar nature of the two terms. Hebraism and Hellenism are but terms of thought, as pure entities they do not exist. They possess the same value as numbers; they are valuable measuring devices. Life and thought are far too complex to treat the two philosophies as existing realities.

One of the great strengths of Hebraism and Hellenism,
according to Matthew Arnold, is the fact that both ideas are used as means to a common goal, regardless of their differences in methods of attaining that goal. This goal, in Arnold's words, is "man's perfection or salvation." He also states that the "final end and aim is 'that we might be partakers of the divine nature.'"\(^5\)

Now later in his discourse, Arnold observes that while many things point to this common goal, there are also plentiful indications that their means to the goal are identical. For example, he cites Solomon's words, "Understanding is a well-spring of life unto him that hath it."\(^6\) This is confusing in that Solomon is, of course, a Hebraist, yet he speaks of understanding, surely a virtue of Hellenism. Again, he cites Aristotle's contention that knowledge is not so important in the achievement of virtue as is "deliberate will and perseverance."\(^7\) Here is a Hellenist advocating concepts of Hebraism. But Arnold quite correctly points out that these crossed elements are superficial, for "the understanding of Solomon's is 'the walking in the way of the commandments,'"\(^8\) and Aristotle's

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 133.
\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 133, 134.
\(^7\) Loc. cit.
\(^8\) Loc. cit.
moral virtues are meant only as means to a life based on the intellectual. Hence, if we can surmount the text and derive the real meanings of words in connection with their speakers, we find that there is always existent a fundamental gulf between the two means.

But Matthew Arnold, it seems to the present writer, stops too soon with his examples of differences. He forgets the nature of the goals he set down. Without adequate reason he reconciles the dichotomy of the two concepts, in the name of a goal, and forgets his discussion of superficial differences between the two paths. He points out that such abstracts as truth, virtue, understanding, and light are relevant in meaning, but fails to carry out and apply the observation to "divine nature", and "man's perfection and salvation."9 Surely these abstractions do not mean the same to all utterers of them.

Teufelsdröckh's ideas concerning perfection and salvation are not those of Wilhelm. Yet both men long for perfection and salvation. They both wish to be partakers of the divine nature, but they are not as one when it comes to defining just what constitutes divine nature. Both wish to achieve a self-realization, but self-realization for one is not such for the other, for Teufelsdröckh has

9 Ibid., pp. 133, 134.
reference to a moral fulfillment, whereas Wilhelm has reference to an intellectual fulfillment. Therefore, so far as the author of this thesis is concerned, the dichotomy inherent in Hebraism and Hellenism is, in actual practice, present even in the goals.

In conclusion, then, the concept of Hebraism and Hellenism, as seen through Sartor Resartus and Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, possesses all the characteristics attributed to it by Matthew Arnold, with one exception. The goal of these two ways of life is not a common one; in fact, there is not one goal, but at least two, with as many tangential variations within each as there are adherents to either doctrine. The Hebraist seeks a life based upon understanding through faith; the Hellenist seeks a life based upon understanding through reason. The two cannot be reconciled.
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