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Crimes

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Crimes

Crimes; public schools

Education Code §16676 (new).
SB 566 (Marler); STATS 1974, Ch 1187
Support: Oroville High School District

Chapter 1187 adds section 16676 to the Education Code in an apparent effort to give public school officials some control over the disruptive effects of certain outsiders who come onto school grounds. Specifically, section 16676 applies to all but the following persons: (1) a student of the public school; (2) a parent or guardian of such a student; (3) an officer or employee of the public school; and (4) one who is required by his employment to be on public school grounds. If a principal or his designee decides that the continued presence of an outside person on school grounds during school hours (defined in subsection (e)) would be disruptive of or would interfere with classes or school activities, he may order such a person to leave. If that person fails to promptly leave school grounds, or if he returns within 48 hours, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. Procedures are established for appeal from such an order of a school principal, first to the superintendent, then to the governing board of the local school district. Also, notice of school hours must be posted by the governing board of every school district at the entrance of each school within the district.

COMMENT

Two Penal Code provisions already provide misdemeanor penalties for certain conduct of unauthorized persons who come onto school grounds. Section 626.8 deals with those unauthorized persons who come onto school grounds without any "lawful business," when the presence of such a person interferes with or disrupts school activities, and when that person remains after an appropriate school official has ordered him to leave. Prosecution may not be had under this statute if such a person has "lawful business" for being on school grounds, that is, where no statute, ordinance, or regulation prohibits that person's presence. Section 653g.1 of the Penal Code proscribes unauthorized persons from "loitering" on or about school grounds (delay-
ing, lingering, or idling about school grounds without any specific reason or relationship involving student responsibility, school functions, or the exercise of a statutory or constitutional right) [See REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, this volume at 249 (Crimes; loitering about schools)]. In light of these two provisions, it appears that the void in the law, if any, filled by chapter 1187 is in those cases in which no local law regulates the presence of "outsiders" on public school grounds, and where the conduct of such persons does not constitute "loitering." Whether or not prosecution could be had under either of these Penal Code provisions, however, chapter 1187 still gives a principal wide personal discretion in determining if the presence of an outside person would disrupt or interfere with school activities, and gives to any subsequent order by the principal, the force of law. However, this wide discretion without any statutory standards which would put a person on notice of what is specifically required of him by the law may be subject to judicial scrutiny on constitutional due process "vagueness" grounds.

See Generally:
1) 2 WITKE, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §629H (Supp. 1973) (Penal Code §626.8).

Crimes; loitering about schools

Penal Code §653g.1 (new).
AB 1739 (B. Greene); STATS 1974, Ch 988
(Effective September 23, 1974)
Support: Attorney General

Pursuant to section 653g of the Penal Code, any person who loiters about any school or public place at or near which children attend or normally congregate is a vagrant and guilty of a misdemeanor. Loitering is defined in this section as delaying, lingering, or idling about any school or public place without a lawful purpose for being present. Chapter 988 adds section 653g.1 to the Penal Code to detail the provisions of section 653g. Specifically, section 653g.1 provides misdemeanor penalties for any person who loiters in or about a school building or grounds, or adjacent street, sidewalk, or public way, without written permission from a school official, or in violation of posted school rules or regulations. In this section loitering is defined to mean delaying, lingering, or idling about any school building or grounds without any specific reason or relationship involving (1) responsibility for a student, (2) exercise of a statutory or constitutional right, or (3)
purposes for which the school buildings or grounds are used. Exempted from the provisions of this section are (1) parents or guardians of pupils in regular attendance at the school, (2) those authorized by such parent or guardian, and (3) those authorized to be at or near the school by reason of employment.

COMMENT

In *In re Huddleson* [229 Cal. App. 2d 618, 40 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1964)], section 653g (then §647a) was constitutionally attacked on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad. The court affirmed the constitutionality of this section only by construing it to apply to "loitering . . . of such a nature that from the totality of the person's actions and in the light of the prevailing circumstances, it may be reasonably concluded that it is being engaged in for 'the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered' . . . " [229 Cal. App. 2d at 625, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 586]. *People v. Frazier* [11 Cal. App. 3d 174, 90 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1970)] reaffirmed this holding, emphasizing that specific intent to commit a crime as soon as the opportunity presented itself was a requisite element of the crime.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court in *Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville* [405 U.S. 156 (1972)] addressed itself to this issue by declaring void a Jacksonville, Florida, vagrancy statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide sufficient notice to an individual that his conduct is illegal. The opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, expressed the view that "living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that all persons are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids." [405 U.S. at 162]. The opinion rested on classic constitutional due process "vagueness" grounds, but also, in dicta, strongly raised the idea of a fundamental privilege of all citizens to loiter without undue interference from authorities.

Section 653g.1 may be subject to judicial attack because of a failure to incorporate the specific intent requirement announced by *Huddleson* and confirmed by *Frazier*. However, from an analysis of these cases it seems doubtful that this omission standing alone would compel judicial rejection. Conversely, the section does seem to comply with the basic constitutional question posed by *Papachristou* in that it appears to provide adequate notice as to what type of behavior is and is not prohibited. That is, the statute spells out a reasonably definite set of
rules governing the who, where, and when with respect to loitering near schools. In addition, it disclaims any application to those exercising their statutory or constitutional rights, thereby offering additional restraint on arbitrary enforcement. In summary, the statute appears to strike a reasonable balance between constitutional guarantees to the individual and the reasonable exercise of police power by the state in the interest of management of the education process free from undue disruptive influences [See Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (discussion of time-place-manner regulation versus subject-matter regulation in a school picketing case)].

Crimes; unauthorized presence on school grounds

Penal Code §§626, 626.2, 626.4, 626.6, 626.8 (amended).
SB 96 (Carpenter); STATS 1974, Ch 1183
Support: Association of California School Administrators

Chapter 1 of the Penal Code (commencing with §626) regulates the presence of certain persons on state university, state college, or community college campuses. All offenses described in chapter 1 are misdemeanors with more severe punishment prescribed for those persons who have previously violated its prohibitions or those of section 415.5 (disturbing the peace on a college or university campus). Chapter 1183 has amended chapter 1 to extend its regulations to all school grounds.

Section 626.2 (willfully entering a campus after being suspended or dismissed for disrupting the orderly operation of the facility) also has been amended to reflect this change. In addition, section 626.4 (willfully re-entering or remaining on campus after consent has been withdrawn) and section 626.6 (entering a campus to commit a disruptive act) have been amended to declare that their respective sanctions shall not affect the rights of representatives of school employee organizations [CAL. EDUC. CODE §§13080 et seq.] when such representatives are on school grounds to engage in activities related to representation. Apparently this latter exception was made because even though such activities might be considered disruptive by local authorities, they have repeatedly been given constitutional protection by the courts.

See Generally:

Selected 1974 California Legislation
Crimes; vandalism

Penal Code §594 (amended).
AB 3490 (Maddy); STATS 1974, Ch 582
Support: California District Attorneys’ and Peace Officers’ Associations; Los Angeles County Grand Jury

Prior to amendment, section 594 of the Penal Code provided that one who maliciously injured or destroyed another’s real or personal property in cases other than those enumerated in the Penal Code was guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 594 now defines such an act as vandalism and provides more severe punishments for violation. For injury or damage of $1,000 or greater, vandalism is punishable by six months in the county jail or a fine of $500, or both, or by not more than five years in the state prison or by a fine of $5,000, or both. Vandalism which results in injury or damage not exceeding $1,000 is punishable by not more than six months in the county jail or a $1,000 fine, or both.

See Generally:
1) CAL. PEN. CODE §596 et seq. (enumerated malicious mischief offenses).
2) 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Property §470 et seq. (1963), (Supp. 1969) (malicious mischief).

Crimes; reports of child abuse

Penal Code §11161.5 (amended).
SB 1506 (Petris); STATS 1974, Ch 348
Support: Children’s Home Society of California; California Children’s Lobby
Opposition: California District Attorneys’ and Police Officers’ Associations

Penal Code Section 11161.5 requires doctors, dentists, religious practitioners, and certain other designated persons to report cases of suspected nonaccidental injuries inflicted upon a minor to the county health department or the county welfare department, and the local police. Chapter 348 amends section 11161.5 to specifically include in the reporting requirements of the section all cases of suspected sexual molestation of a minor and suspected injuries of a minor prohibited by section 273a of the Penal Code (willful cruelty toward a child). A minor is no longer defined as a person twelve years of age or under for purposes of section 11161.5. Apparently, any person under the age of eighteen will now be considered a minor. Thus, persons now making reports under this section are no longer exposed to possible civil and criminal liability when the report concerns suspected abuse of a
child between the ages of twelve and eighteen. The penalty for failure to make the required report under section 11161.5 is a jail term of up to six months, or a fine of up to $500, or both.

See Generally:

Crimes; firearms

Penal Code §§537e, 12090, 12094 (amended).
AB 2038 (Knox); STATS 1974, Ch 269
Support: California District Attorneys' and Peace Officers' Associations

Section 537e of the Penal Code provides misdemeanor penalties for one who knowingly purchases, sells, disposes of, conceals, or possesses specified consumer items which have had the manufacturer's label or serial number altered or destroyed outside the ordinary and regular course of business. This section has been amended to delete firearms from its provisions. However, chapter 269 adds firearms to Penal Code Section 12090, which makes unlawful the alteration, removal, or obliteration, without the permission of the Department of Justice, of the name of the maker, model, or manufacturer's number or other serial number of a revolver or pistol. Violation of this section is a felony, punishable by imprisonment in state prison for not less than one year nor more than five years. Section 12094 of the Penal Code has also been amended to provide that anyone who buys, sells, receives, offers for sale, disposes of, or possesses a pistol, revolver, or any other firearm with knowledge of any alteration of the manufacturer's identification or serial number is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Chapter 269 appears to have been enacted partly in response to People v. Hill [32 Cal. App. 3d 18, 107 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1973)] in which the Attorney General argued that possession by defendant of a rifle with the serial number defaced was a misdemeanor pursuant to section 12094 of the Penal Code. The court disagreed, finding that section 12094 specifically prohibited possession of pistols and revolvers only, and had no language evidencing an intent to include all firearms.

Crimes; concealed weapons

Penal Code §§12020, 12029 (amended).
AB 2571 (Papan); STATS 1974, Ch 141
(Effective April 4, 1974)

Support: California District Attorneys’ and Peace Officers’ Associations

Section 12020 of the Penal Code prohibits the possession, importation, offer or exposure for sale, and furnishing or manufacturing of certain specified weapons. A violation of section 12020 is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or in a state prison not less than one year nor more than five years. Chapter 141 has amended this section to include the “nunchaku” and any instrument without handles, fashioned from a metal plate in the shape of a polygon, trefoil, cross, star, diamond, or other geometric shape, to be used as a throwing weapon. These weapons are primarily used in conjunction with the martial arts, popularized by the “Kung-Fu” motion pictures and television series. Subsection (b)(1) allows the use of sawed-off shotguns (proscribed by §12020) as props for film production; however, this exception has not been extended to include the nunchaku or geometric throwing objects as such exposure in the past has presumably led to their use as weapons. Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) do, however, permit the possession of the nunchaku by licensed schools of the martial arts, and further allows the sale and manufacture for sale of the weapon to such institutions. Geometric throwing weapons and the nunchaku in particular are further regulated by amendment of section 12029, which defines them as nuisances subject to confiscation and summary destruction if found within the state.

See Generally:
1) CAL. PEN. CODE §§12020-12033 (unlawful possession and carrying of concealed weapons).
2) 56 OFF. ATT’Y GEN. 506 (1973) (application of §12020 to the nunchaku prior to ch. 141).

**Crimes; concealed weapons—aliens**

Penal Code §12021 (amended).
SB 1510 (Petris); STATS 1974, Ch 1197

Opposition: California District Attorneys’ and Peace Officers’ Associations

Prior to amendment, Penal Code Section 12021 prohibited any alien, ex-felon or addict from owning or having in his possession a concealable firearm. Violation of this provision is a felony. Chapter 1197 has been enacted to exclude all aliens from the provisions of this section. It appears that this exclusion is a direct response to People...
v. Rappard [28 Cal. App. 3d 302, 104 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1972)], which held that Penal Code Section 12021, as it applied to aliens, was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws. The court indicated that the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment to any person within a state's jurisdiction extends to aliens as well as citizens of the United States. Furthermore, “classifications based on alienage, like those predicated upon nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny . . . .” [28 Cal. App. 3d 302, 304, 104 Cal. Rptr. 535, 536 (1972)]. Additionally, the court concluded that there “are no rational grounds for believing that all [aliens] are ipso facto uncommitted to peaceful and lawful behavior.” [28 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 536]. Finally, the court found that “the classification of the statute—alienage—has no reasonable relationship to the threat to public safety which Penal Code Section 12021 was ostensibly designed to prevent.” [28 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 536]. Thus, as the court expressed its opinion solely in terms of discriminatory practices based on alienage, it seems doubtful that this case can be used to attack the remaining classifications (ex-felons and addicts) set out in the amended version of section 12021.

See Generally:

Crimes; controlled substances—narcotics

AB 2350 (Keene); STATS 1974, Ch 685

Section 11018 of the Health and Safety Code defines marijuana for purposes of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (commencing with §11000). Formerly encompassing all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., this section has been amended to now include all parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis. The purpose of this change would seem to be to provide a definition of marijuana broad enough to encompass a larger variety of substances which would support a prosecution. Section 11055 comprises Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act and primarily lists opiates and their derivatives. Chapter 685 has also amended this section to enumerate substances which are considered opium derivatives by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs [See 36 Fed. Reg. 7778, 7804 (1971) (regulations implementing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970)]. Apparently, the objective of this enumeration is to ease the district at-
torney's prosecutorial burden of having to produce expert witnesses to state that one of these substances is in fact a derivative of opium.

See Generally:

Crimes; reporting of controlled substance transactions

Health and Safety Code §§11103, 11104, 11106 (repealed); §11102 (new); §§11100, 11101, 11105 (amended).
AB 3567 (Ingalls); STATS 1974, Ch 1072

Prior to chapter 1072, article 1 (§§11100-11106) of the Health and Safety Code provided for the reporting to the State Board of Pharmacy of certain transactions in controlled substances. Former section 11100 mandated reporting of the sale, transfer, or furnishing of controlled substances in Schedule III (§11056) and Schedule IV (§11057) by a manufacturer, wholesaler, warehouseman, customs broker, or other person handling the drug. Chapter 1072 has made the following changes in this section: (1) warehousemen and customs brokers are no longer subject to the reporting requirements, and retailers have been added as being subject to such requirements; (2) the required reports must now be made to the State Department of Justice rather than to the State Board of Pharmacy; and (3) only eight drugs, including LSD and barbiturates, selected from Schedules III and IV, are now the subjects of the required reports, but provision is made for alteration of this list by the Department of Justice. Subsection (d) of former section 11105 required persons regulated under section 11100 to report to the Board of Pharmacy within five days of discovery of any theft or loss or any discrepancy between the quantity shipped and the quantity received of substances listed in section 11100. Chapter 1072 renumbers this section as section 11103 and amends it to require such reports to be made to the Department of Justice within three days from the time of discovery. Section 11101, as amended, now requires the Department of Justice rather than the Board of Pharmacy to provide a common form for such reports. New section 11102 authorizes the Department of Justice to adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of article 1.

Chapter 1072 also repeals provisions which required the Board of Pharmacy to regulate the storage of controlled substances used for display purposes (former §11104), and to maintain a data system on con-
trolled substances used for monitoring their movement within the state (former §11106).

The overall effect of chapter 1072 is to switch the reporting requirements for controlled substances from the State Board of Pharmacy to the State Department of Justice. The apparent intent of this changeover is to directly channel this reporting information to a department better equipped to monitor the information. This legislation also follows a trend toward centralization of crime-related information in the Department of Justice [See Cal. Pen. Code §11100 et seq.].

See Generally:

Crimes; disturbing the peace

Penal Code §415 (repealed); §415 (new); §415.5 (amended).
SB 2294 (Song); Stats 1974, Ch 1263
Support: California District Attorneys’ and Peace Officers’ Associations

Former section 415 of the Penal Code provided that the following acts constituted disturbing the peace: (1) maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace of any neighborhood or person by loud or unusual noise, tumultuous or offensive conduct, or threatening to fight or fighting; or (2) running a horse race, firing a gun, or using vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children while on the public streets of an unincorporated town. Section 415.5 similarly proscribed offensive conduct, threatening to fight or fighting, and vulgar, profane, or indecent language on the grounds of a community college, state college, or state university. Chapter 1263 alters and consolidates the substantive portions of these two sections. Section 415, as amended, now penalizes the following three acts: (1) unlawfully fighting or challenging another to fight in a public place; (2) disturbing another person by a loud and unreasonable noise; and (3) using offensive words in a public place which are inherently likely to produce a violent reaction. Section 415.5, as revised, penalizes the same three acts occurring on the grounds or within a building of a community college, state college, or state university. All of the offenses described are misdemeanors.
**COMMENT**

The United States Supreme Court in *Lewis v. City of New Orleans* [94 S. Ct. 970 (1974)] held that a New Orleans ordinance making it unlawful to “curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language” was susceptible of application to protected speech and therefore unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. A California case [*Rosen v. California, 94 S. Ct. 1922 (1974)*] involving a conviction based on Penal Code Section 415 has been remanded by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of *Lewis*. It appears that the legislature has redrafted both section 415 and related language in section 415.5 to bring them in line with *Lewis*. Specifically, the requirement which *Lewis* enunciates is that only “fighting words,” or words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, may be proscribed.

See Generally:

**Crimes; willful diversion of construction funds**

Penal Code §484b (amended).
AB 2833 (Gonsalves); STATS 1974, Ch 910

Under section 484b of the Penal Code, one who receives money for the purpose of paying for services, labor, materials, or equipment and who willfully fails to use such funds by virtue of either willfully failing to pay for these services, or willfully failing to complete the improvement for which the funds have been obtained and who wrongfully diverts the money to another use is guilty of a public offense. If the amount diverted is greater than $5,000, the offense is punishable by incarceration in the state prison for not more than five years or in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both. Diversion of an amount less than $5,000 is a misdemeanor.

Prior to amendment, section 484b required that the owner's equity in his property be reduced or that the security for the construction loan be diminished as a result of the diversion (e.g., if a contractor begins work on a project and then quits, the subcontractors could file a mechanic's lien against the property). Chapter 910 eliminates this requirement from section 484b for the reason that many prosecutions were apparently impossible if the party diverting the funds (i.e., the
contractor) has done so prior to commencing work on the property and hence not exposing its equity to claims. Apparently the legislature believed that by eliminating the qualification of impairment of the owner's equity or loan security, contractors who fail to use money for the purpose intended can be more easily prosecuted. This legislation applies to any person who diverts funds entrusted to him and does not specify a contractor. Additionally, the crime is complete only upon a showing of a willful and wrongful intent at the time of the diversion. Furthermore, although one diverting funds under these circumstances could conceivably be charged with embezzlement under Penal Code Section 503, the Legislative Counsel has advised (Opinion No. 74-14269) that henceforth, any prosecutions for diversion of funds should be brought pursuant to section 484b.

See Generally:
1) 1 Witkin, California Crimes, Crimes Against Property §403 (Supp. 1969) (requisite intent in Penal Code §484b).

Crimes; criminal record dissemination

Penal Code Article 6 (commencing with §11140) (new).
AB 1687 (Crown); Stats 1974, Ch 963

Chapter 963 adds to the Penal Code several sections providing misdemeanor penalties for trafficking in criminal records. “Record” is defined in section 11140 as the master record sheet, commonly known as the “rap sheet” or “arrest record” which is maintained by the Department of Justice. A person authorized by law to receive a record is also defined in section 11140 as any person or public agency authorized by a court, statute, or decisional law to receive a record. The following acts relating to criminal records have been made misdemeanors: (1) knowingly furnishing a record or information obtained from a record to a person not authorized by law to receive such record or information, where the person passing the information is a Department of Justice employee (§11141), or is otherwise authorized by law to receive such information (§11142); and (2) buying, receiving, or possessing the record or information obtained from the record, with knowledge that receipt or possession of the record or information is not authorized by law, except when such action is taken by a publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with a newspaper and protected by the newsman's privilege of section 1070 of the Evidence Code (§11143).

Under section 11144, the following acts are expressly excluded from

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the misdemeanor prohibition: (1) dissemination of statistical or research information obtained from a record, provided that the identity of the subject of the record is not disclosed; (2) dissemination of information obtained from a record to aid in the apprehension of a suspected criminal; and (3) inclusion of such information in a transcript or other public record when the inclusion is authorized by a court, statute, or decisional law.

Currently, under section 11105 of the Penal Code, the only persons entitled to “rap sheets” are peace officers, probation officers, district attorneys, state courts, United States officers, officers of other states or territories of the United States, state agencies or officials, and under certain conditions, public defenders or private defense attorneys. Article 2.5 of the Penal Code (§§11705-11801) establishes some controls over the dissemination of criminal record information, placing the ultimate responsibility for the security of such information in the hands of the Attorney General. However, it has been common practice for law enforcement agencies to provide arrest record information to many types of private persons and agencies, including prospective employers [See Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAC. L.J. 20 (1972)]. Burgeoning computer technology and the consequent centralization of criminal records in the Department of Justice magnifies the potential harm from unauthorized dissemination of such information. Chapter 963 appears to be a legislative attempt to put a halt to such practices.

See Generally:

1) CAL. PEN. CODE §§11122-11127 (examination of criminal records).
2) 36 OPS. ATT’Y GEN. 1 (1960) (police and State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation records are not open to public inspection).
3) 4 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 418 (1973) (review of Penal Code Article 2.5 (commencing with §11075), relating to dissemination of criminal record information).