Real Philosophy, Good Teaching, and Academic Freedom

Lou Matz
University of the Pacific, lmatz@pacific.edu

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS, TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF & EUGENE KELLY

ARTICLES

MARK NOWACKI AND WILFRIED VER EECKE
“Using the Economic Concept of a ‘Merit Good’ to Justify the Teaching of Ethics Across the University Curriculum”

LOU MATZ
“Real Philosophy, Good Teaching and Academic Freedom”

Teaching Philosophy Abroad

TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF
“Comments on the Differences and Similarities in Teaching Philosophy in Israel and in the United States”

EUGENE KELLY
“On Teaching Abroad: The Middle East and China”

DAVID B. MARTENS
“Sketches from a Lecturer’s Notebook, Johannesburg”

BOOK REVIEWS

Yuval Lurie: Tracking the Meaning of Life: A Philosophical Journey
REVIEWED BY EUGENE KELLY
e. Justice in other religions.


Schedule
Sept 2: Introduction and overview.
Sept 7: W. Ver Eecke, "Authority in economics"
Sept 9: Economic Justice for All.
Sept 14: W. Ver Eecke, "The Economic Order: A Human, Not a Natural Institution"
Sept 16: Bator, Francis M., "The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization"
Sept 21: Wildavsky, Aaron, "Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should Be Abandoned"
Sept 23: W. Ver Eecke, "Objecting to a Libertarian Attack"
Sept 28: Musgrave’s introduction of the concept merit good
Sept 30: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications
Oct 5: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications
Oct 7: McLure, “Merit Wants: A Normatively Empty Box”
Mackscheidt, Klaus. “Meritorische Güter: Musgraves Idee und Deren Konsequenzen.” (Translated)
Oct 21: Ver Eecke, “Concept of Merit Good”
Oct 26: Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness”
Nov 2: Sen, A.K., “More Than 100 Million Women are Missing”
Nov 9: Ver Eecke, W., “Ethical Function of the Economy” (on Hegel)
Nov 11: Buchanan, James, “Fairness, Hope and Justice”
Nov 16: Stiglitz, “Whither Reform?”
Nov 23: Summary of: Olson, M., “The Political Economy of Comparative Growth”
Discussion of: Ver Eecke. “Unjust redistribution in the American system”
Nov 30: John Paul II, Centesimus Annus
Dec 2: W. Ver Eecke, “Structural Deficiencies in the American System”
Dec 7: Wogaman, Economics and Ethics: A Christian Inquiry
Siegel, Seymour, “A Jewish View of Economic Justice”

Mechanics of the course:
1. The course will be conducted as a seminar. Sometimes I will summarize the content of the readings. Sometimes questions will be distributed to be discussed in groups and to be reported back to the class. Most of the time, a student will be assigned to present the reading material. At all times the whole class is expected to be prepared for discussing the material, unless an explicit exception is made. Questions dealing with problems of understanding the material will be dealt with first. Afterwards questions about the validity of the arguments will be addressed.

2. After each section, all students are expected to show their understanding of the material by writing a 4 page (double spaced) paper discussing one or more questions about that section. The paper is to be handed in one week after the end of the section. A rewrite is possible for the first paper. For all students, one paper may be replaced by a summary of a topic related to the chapter but not covered in class, e.g., ideas from the recommended reading. Such an option needs to be approved by the teacher.

Graduate or professional students need to present at the end of the course a final paper of 10-15 pages. You may relate some topics covered in the course to your own research area or you may summarize ideas of important authors and relate them to topics treated in the course (Brennan, Rawls, Buchanan, Sen, de Soto, Krugman, Stiglitz) or you may address important issues such as globalization, poverty, the role of international institutions, wealth distribution making use of the ideas discussed in the class. You need to have approval for the topic of your research paper.

For graduate and professional students, the research paper counts for half of the points determining the grade.

3. Class participation and class presentation may count towards the grade. Class absence for a valid reason needs to be explained to the professor.

4. No final exam.

Real Philosophy, Good Teaching and Academic Freedom

Lou Matz
University of the Pacific

In its “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy,” the APA exhorts philosophers, philosophy departments, and their institutions to be committed to providing “educational experiences of high quality.” To this end, the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy shares pedagogical best practices, giving faculty and departments new ideas and approaches to teaching philosophy more effectively and to improving philosophy curricula. In certain circumstances, it is not enough, however, to use effective teaching methods; one must persuade one’s colleagues and institution that one is, in fact, delivering a quality educational experience. Since teaching skill is determined by others—especially by one’s colleagues who are typically the final authorities—how well one teaches is ultimately dependent on the fairness and competence of one’s departmental colleagues. If one’s colleagues apply unfair or illegitimate standards to judge the quality of instruction, one’s teaching skill might not only be misrepresented but one’s academic freedom might also be violated. I contend that this is what happened to me when I applied for tenure at Xavier University, and I recommend that the APA add a section on academic freedom to its “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy” to guide departments more clearly and to support those faculty whose pedagogical views might be at odds with those of their department.
In 1992, I began a tenure-track position at Xavier University, a Jesuit-Catholic institution in Cincinnati, Ohio. I appeared to be a good fit for the department since its orientation was primarily historical. My graduate training at the University of California—San Diego was steeped in the history of philosophy and focused primarily on Hegel, Kant, and Plato. I wrote a dissertation on the relationship between freedom and character in Plato’s *Republic* and Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. For five years of my graduate study, I was a teaching assistant in a five-quarter “Great Books” writing program.

Xavier’s department of philosophy is an undergraduate program whose primary function is to serve general education since all students must take three philosophy courses in this order: Ethics as Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 100), Theory of Knowledge, and an upper-level elective of the student’s choice. My teaching load was three courses per semester, and in each semester for seven years, I taught two sections of PHIL 100, which is the first philosophy course that students take and which is taken during their first-year, usually in the first semester. In the university catalogs from 1992-1996, the description of PHIL 100 was the following:

“The goals of human life; the first principle of morality; virtue, duty, law, responsibility. Special emphasis on justice.”

In its 1994 program review, the department summarized its description of PHIL 100 as follows:

“In order to insure a common philosophical culture for advanced study at the elective level, each section of the Ethics as Introduction to Philosophy course requires the student to read the *Republic* of Plato and to engage the question of justice.”

Finally, there was an addition to the course description in the 1996 university catalog, a year before I applied for tenure.

“The goals of human life; the first principle of morality; virtue, duty, law, responsibility. Special emphasis on justice, along with a treatment of Deontological, Utilitarian and Natural Law/Right theories that are central to contemporary treatments of practical and professional ethics.”

PHIL 100 was also part of a sub-core curriculum—titled the “Ethics, Religion, and Society” program (E/RS)—whose purpose was to devote “special attention to ethical issues of social significance” (1996-98 Catalog). The premise of the E/RS program is to teach students how different disciplines—philosophy, theology, and literature—examine ethical issues that are relevant today.

Within the framework of the course description for PHIL 100, faculty were required only to teach Plato’s *Republic*; otherwise, it was their discretion to teach whatever primary source material that engaged the subject matter of the course. There was neither a requirement—stated or unstated—to teach any text other than the *Republic* nor a ranking of what course themes were the most important to teach, and faculty approached the course in a wide variety of ways.

In my fourteen semesters of teaching PHIL 100, I regularly varied the readings and issues in the course. Table I states by semester the works and the order in which I taught them. In my first semester of teaching PHIL 100, I approached the course in a traditional way by teaching standard ethical works chronologically: Plato’s *Republic*, Hume’s *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, and Mill’s *Utilitarianism* and *On Liberty*. I assumed that students would have to struggle with the readings, and I also worried that they might have difficulty appreciating the importance and contemporary relevance of these ethical works. To make the material of the course more accessible and engaging for first-year students—virtually all of whom would not major in philosophy and who would likely not take any other ethics courses in philosophy—I decided to take a different approach. I began the next semester’s course with Camus’ *The Plague*, a novel that depicts through its characters different philosophical and ethical responses to human suffering. I then followed *The Plague* with Mill’s *On Liberty* and *Subjection of Women*. I dropped Utilitarianism altogether (though I reinserted it into my course a few years later) and I made *On Liberty* (along with the *Republic*) a permanent feature of my course for the following reasons: In *On Liberty* Mill states his utilitarian standard and applies it to a variety of significant issues of justice; *On Liberty* is a more complete statement of Mill’s ethical thought since it includes the harm principle, which complicates his version of utilitarianism; *On Liberty* includes Mill’s most sustained discussion of the virtues; and Mill’s defense of liberalism in *On Liberty* makes for a philosophically richer comparison to Plato’s *Republic* than Utilitarianism, especially given Plato’s famous critique of liberty and equality in Book VIII, *The Subjection of Women* further illustrated the application of Mill’s utilitarian principles to issues of sexual equality and provided an opportunity to discuss the appeal to “nature” or “natural” as a standard of morality, which Mill addresses and rejects in the work. During this phase of my teaching of the course (spring 1993 to spring 1995), I included Dostoevsky’s “The Grand Inquisitor” as a challenge to Mill’s assumptions about the value of individual liberty.

In the next phase of my teaching of the course (fall 1995 to fall 1996), I dropped *The Plague* and *The Subjection of Women* and began the course with Plato’s *Apology* and *Crito* and then had students read Locke’s *Second Treatise* and Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience” in order to offer students a later version of the treatment of some issues covered in the *Crito*. For example, I wanted students to see how the arguments presented by the Athenian Laws in the *Crito* reappear in Locke yet are developed further; how Locke’s notion of a natural moral law, though absent in the *Crito*, has its roots in Plato’s *ergon* argument in Book I of the *Republic*; and how morality is related to politics and law since in civil societies legal and political authorities are necessary to interpret and resolve disputes about moral issues that arise in many social contexts. The fourth phase of my teaching of this course (fall 1996-spring 1998) was similar to the third one except that I followed Mill’s *On Liberty* with chapters from Singer’s *Practical Ethics* on equality for animals, abortion, and euthanasia to extend our examination of issues of justice.

One of my regular pedagogical strategies in PHIL 100 during all of these phases was occasionally to connect the ideas and issues in the readings to contemporary events through newspaper articles in order to show the relevance of philosophy today and to illustrate the abstract principles of the readings with contemporary examples. For the students, the articles were useful supplements to the philosophical readings, and for me the search for articles led me to rethink the ideas in the readings in new ways.

My assignments in PHIL 100 varied but usually consisted of two papers and two exams; or two papers, an examination, and regular quizzes. The papers were always thesis-based and required demonstration of an understanding of the relevant ideas in the primary source readings and a critical assessment of these ideas to demonstrate a capacity for independent analysis. The exams consisted of short-answer essay questions, often comparative. Whenever I used quizzes, they constituted no more than 25 percent of the course grade and were primarily...
used to motivate students to read carefully in order to improve the quality of class discussion and to hold them accountable for the readings. In honors sections or in special first-year seminar sections of the course, I also assigned the students class presentations and would meet with each student out of class in preparation for them since the material was often difficult for students on their own.

My colleagues in the department had various other approaches to PHIL 100. For many years, the most senior member of the department taught only Plato’s *The Trial and Death of Socrates*, the *Republic*, and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*; later, he added Aquinas and Hobbes. Another colleague regularly taught the *Republic*, Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, and selections from Madison in *The Federalist Papers*. Another colleague—my first department chair for three years—often taught only the *Republic* and a few works by Freud. Another member of the department, whom was hired the same year as I, often taught only Plato and Aristotle. Finally, there was a colleague who taught Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Gilligan, and Dewey.

In 1994, the department chair conducted my mid-tenure review. His report was based on student course evaluations and one class visit by a senior faculty member. The report stated that I proved “to be an excellent classroom teacher” and that students were “virtually universal in their high praise.” The report emphasized my effectiveness with first-year students, i.e., with students in my PHIL 100 course. It also stated that there was “some concern over matters of pedagogy,” but it did not give any specifics, and there was never any follow up. In the summary section of my review, the only area that the chair mentioned as an area of development was to devote less time to committee work and more focus on scholarship. Three years later, in its 1997 tenure evaluation, the department found “serious” problems with the quality of my PHIL 100 course. It claimed that the fundamental problem was that my course was not really about ethics at all but about “political issues, such as the limits on the power of constitutional government.” As a result, the department claimed that my course was “not intellectually stimulating, because most of it deals with political theses from Locke and Mill that most Americans take for granted anyway. In effect he is confirming the students’ prejudices.” It also argued that the “superficial” level of my course was evident in the newspaper articles that I would hand out on contemporary social issues such as abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, the equality of animals, and freedom of speech.

The department’s tenure evaluation of my teaching was written by the senior member of the department; he based this evaluation on his and his tenured colleagues’ written reports of their classroom visits to either my PHIL 100 course or to another one of my courses. However, this senior member’s own report of my teaching was predominant in the department’s evaluation for he stated in his report that most of my PHIL 100 course was “not about principles of ethics, but about what we would at best call politics, such as civil disobedience, liberty, women’s rights, animal rights, etc.,” and he objected to what he believed was my study of “easy issues discussed regularly in the media instead of addressing the fundamental questions, even though they are difficult. So the type of material chosen and the level of difficulty go hand in hand.”

As a matter of procedure, faculty in the philosophy department were not able to review the department’s (or chair’s) tenure evaluation, so I did not learn about its assessment of my PHIL 100 course until I appealed my negative tenure decision. In fact, the only way I obtained the department’s tenure evaluation was to get permission from every faculty member to release it to me since the process at Xavier did not require its release without explicit permission of the members of the department.²

Since the main reason for the department’s (and chair’s) negative tenure evaluation was its evaluation of my teaching, I decided to appeal the decision on the grounds that my academic freedom had been violated both in terms of what I taught and how I taught it. At Xavier, tenure appeals are only done in writing, and they are submitted to the same Tenure and Promotion Committee that judges the case in the first place. The defense of my appeal seemed very straightforward. Departments have a right to frame the subject matter of a course, e.g., its central issues, the time period, required readings, etc. Within this framework, however, faculty should have the right to use their professional judgment to teach material that is germane to the subject matter. Xavier presumably adhered to this principle of academic freedom since it included in its Faculty Handbook the classic 1940 AAUP Statement of Principles

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Table 1. Works taught by semester in my PHIL 100 course. The numbers indicate the order in which I taught them.

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on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which states, "teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter that has no relation to their subject." In PHIL 100, faculty were required to teach only Plato's Republic; otherwise, they had discretion to assign any primary source readings that dealt with the various issues of the course, especially justice. There were no other stated or unstated guidelines for faculty. The department never defined what "real" ethical issues were, never required the teaching of certain texts over others, and never required that a faculty member examine the most prominent ethical traditions (as was implied in the expanded 1996 course description but which was not, in practice, followed by the department).

My defense was that I adhered to the framework of the course and taught readings and issues that were germane to the course description. The department thus did not have a right to criticize what I taught since the material and issues that I taught had "relation to their subject." The department thus judged my course by reference to arbitrary and unstated standards and singled me out for teaching "political" works despite the fact that other colleagues who taught the same sort of material were not criticized for doing so. In introducing the distinction it did between its own conception of how the course issues were to be taught and my own (which it tendentiously dubbed "political"), the department subverted my right—and thus my academic freedom—to teach the material in my own way. Although the department claimed that I did not teach within the framework of the course, this was the very point at issue: they claimed my readings and issues were not relevant, and I claimed they were. Academic freedom protects the right of a faculty member to disagree with colleagues and a department so long as the former can make a reasonable case that the readings and themes of a course bear a direct relation to it.

As part of my written appeal, I included a letter from a member of the philosophy department who explained the ideological bias of the department. He pointed out that my sympathy for "applied" ethics—evident in the issues that I taught in my PHIL 100 course as well as in an article that I wrote, solicited by the editor of Xavier's Alumni magazine, defending doctor-assisted suicide—had diminished the philosophical respect of my colleagues since applied philosophy was considered by them to be a "regrettable devaluation of the nature" of its own conclusion, and stated that it believed my committee recognized "the seriousness and potentially divisive nature" of its own conclusion, and stated that it believed my case could have "a chilling effect on academic freedom at Xavier." Finally, there was another supportive letter from a highly respected senior member of the faculty who expressed concern that the previous two members of the philosophy department whom I succeeded and who presented "differing views were not granted tenure." He believed that a third denial would look to be more than mere coincidence.

As part of my written appeal, I urged the Tenure and Promotion Committee to seek impartial testimony from philosophers outside of Xavier to judge whether the material that I taught had "relation to the subject" as well as whether my methods, in particular my attempts to apply the ideas in the readings to current events and to use newspaper articles, were pedagogically legitimate. I believed that if I could establish my interpretation of the course requirements as legitimate or reasonable, then the department's refusal to grant me tenure would constitute a violation of my academic freedom since I had taught within the framework of the course. In the end, however, the Tenure and Promotion Committee denied my request for external review, and it voted against my appeal without any comment.

My final recourse on campus was to appeal the violation of my academic freedom to a campus Grievance Committee. This time, I presented my case in writing and in person, and the philosophy department did likewise. The department defended its position by citing the Supreme Court case Keyishian v. Board of Regents, which affirmed that academic freedom implies the right to teach theories that are in conflict with conventional or "orthodox" views. The department claimed that since it had not required me to present and defend the teaching of Jesuit or other Catholic authors or teach and defend Aristotle or Aquinas, it did not violate my academic freedom. The department argued further that it ultimately had the right to decide what is appropriate in its PHIL 100 course:

Clearly, the department must be the judge of what is appropriate in a required core course, such as the ethics course, and if a teacher persists in teaching something else, e.g., political science or civics, he is quite properly blamed by the department. Matz taught and defended J.S. Mill's liberalism, as opposed to the views of other philosophers. The department never raised any objection to his opinions about what was true or correct. It stated, however, that if Matz wanted to teach Mill's thought in an ethics course, he should discuss Mill's basic ethical treatise, Utilitarianism, and not Mill's political works. The department was dealing, not with Matz's opinions, orthodox or unorthodox, but with the kinds of problems that ought to be addressed in an ethics course. Clearly this is a matter which the department may and should determine for its members.

Of course, the department did have the right to design PHIL 100 in whatever way it wanted and to have faculty conform to these expectations; however, the only explicit expectations stated for the course were to teach Plato's Republic and teach primary source material that dealt with the subject matter of the course. The department never identified preferred works to teach, never distinguished between ethical and "political" works, and never explicitly discouraged the teaching of applied ethical issues. So, although it is true that the department never required me to teach only Jesuit or Catholic writers or to teach only Aristotle or Aquinas, it violated my academic freedom in forbidding me from teaching applied ethical problems, such as the rightful limits of social and political power, the moral and legal treatment of women, and the moral status of animals. The department's interpretation of the appropriate issues or problems of the course was not the sole legitimate one, and since my interpretation was reasonable—indeed, I thought it was mainstream—the department violated my academic freedom in its negative tenure evaluation. I maintain that the department had no authority to settle principled differences of opinion regarding pedagogy since academic freedom is supposed to protect principled differences of opinion. Additionally, the department's claim that I persisted in defying the official guidelines of the course or departmental advice was simply mistaken. The only time anyone suggested to me that Utilitarianism should be taught instead of On Liberty was after the senior member of the department (the one who wrote the departmental evaluation) visited my course in spring 1997, the semester before I applied for tenure. The department had...
plenty of opportunity to register a complaint about my course before then, but it never did so. I turned in a syllabus to the chair every semester beginning in the fall of 1992. Moreover, a year or two before I applied for tenure, those who taught PHIL 100 reevaluated the focus of the course by exchanging syllabi and discussing our respective approaches.

The Grievance Committee upheld the department’s position. It concluded that regardless of my arguments about the philosophical legitimacy of the issues that I taught in my PHIL 100 course, the department ultimately had the authority to judge. Nonetheless, in the concluding section of its report, the Grievance Committee acknowledged the troublesome implications for academic freedom in the philosophy department. It raised two questions that appeared to support my grievance. It asked, “Does the Philosophy department hold a ‘rigid,’ and perhaps undesirable, adherence to a homogeneous approach to teaching?” and “Is there a need for more open and collegial intellectual debate regarding teaching and scholarship within this department?” It concluded by urging university officials “to engage the Philosophy Department in a dialogue to explore the possibility of fostering greater academic diversity in teaching.”

The Grievance Committee also learned that some philosophy faculty felt administrative pressure to hire me although I did not fit the “profile” of someone that it would normally hire since my philosophical and pedagogical approach was contrary to the “prevailing departmental culture,” as “applied techniques in the classroom were and remain contrary to the department’s ‘norm’ of teaching.” I was never aware of these circumstances of my hire until I read the Grievance Committee’s report.

The defeat of my grievance exhausted all internal processes at Xavier. My final recourse was to bring my case to The American Philosophical Association’s Committee for the Defense of the Professional Rights of Philosophers. I believed that, at long last, I might get the independent, external review of my department’s judgments that had been wanting throughout the entire grievance process. The allegation that my department had violated my academic freedom in its evaluation of my PHIL 100 course was one of seven allegations that I brought, but I believed it was the strongest. After reviewing these allegations, the APA Committee decided to investigate three allegations that were “especially troubling”; however, to my dismay, the APA dropped my allegation about the PHIL 100 course. Since I do not know how the department responded to the APA, I can only speculate on the reasons the APA did not investigate.

In its “Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments,” the AAUP identifies a standard to judge whether there has been a violation of academic freedom: Did the department give the faculty member “adequate consideration”? It defines this standard in procedural and not substantive terms:

Was the decision conscientiously arrived at? Was all available evidence bearing on the relevant performance of the candidate sought out and considered? Was there adequate deliberation by the department over the import of the evidence in light of the relevant standards?...Was the decision a bona fide exercise of professional academic judgment? These are the kinds of questions suggested by the standard of “adequate consideration.”

Without making explicit reference to it, Xavier’s philosophy department and Xavier’s Grievance Committee appeared to rely on such a standard to judge my case. That is, the issue for them was the conscientiousness of the process and not the validity or wisdom of the conclusion. While I do not know the grounds of the APA’s assessment of my allegation about PHIL 100, I contend that a purely procedural standard is inadequate. For this allows that even after extensive deliberation, a department of narrow ideologues or a department with a few dominant and influential ideologues who can stifle the dissent of others can still violate a faculty member’s academic freedom. Whether a department had given “adequate consideration” to a faculty member thus cannot simply be a matter of rendering “conscientious judgment”; the competence or substance of that judgment, and not merely its process, should also be a condition to protect the academic freedom of faculty against colleagues.

I recommend that the APA add a section on “Academic Freedom,” perhaps after the section “Evaluation,” in its “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy.” The addition should call attention to the importance of academic freedom, identify what the APA takes to be the principles and standard of academic freedom, and describe the relationship between a department’s exercise of professional judgment and a faculty member’s right of academic freedom. Such a statement might be useful in motivating departments to be more specific in their course descriptions and expectations for faculty and in helping to minimize disputes within a department. I believe that unlike the AAUP’s purely procedural standard, the APA should support some substantive elements in its standard of academic freedom and judge on them. Among some of the questions relevant for this expanded standard of academic freedom could be: Are the readings and issues in fact relevant for the course given the course description? Are certain teaching methods in fact legitimate and reasonable? Were the APA to fashion an explicit statement in “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy,” it would strengthen its stance that departments should strive to develop “educational experiences of high quality.” After all, institutional judgments about the quality of teaching and educational experiences may sometimes be nothing but reflections of ideology.

Endnotes


2. The reader might wonder why the department claimed that issues such as the rightful limits of social and political control over individual liberty, the moral status of animals, the morality of civil disobedience, and moral and legal standing of women were not relevant for a course devoted to justice and ethical issues of social significance. The most influential members of the department held a “Great Books” view of philosophy: real philosophy takes place only in conversations about the great texts, not in an application of their ideas outside of them. Moreover, the power structure of the department held a rigid Straussian view that the ancient ethical thinkers (Plato, Aristotle) are superior to the modern ones (Mill, Rawls) since, in this view, virtue, not liberty, is the proper focus of ethics and hence anyone sympathetic to political liberalism and moral liberal views is not a serious or real philosopher and teacher. For an account that captures the sensibility of the power structure in Xavier’s department, see Richard Rorty, “That Old-Time Philosophy,” The New Republic, April 4, 1988.


4. Thanks to Michelle DiGuilio, Richard Arneson, Ed Lee, Bob Gillis, John Sims, Cynthia Dobbs, and the reviewers at the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy for their comments on earlier drafts. I’d also like to thank those at Xavier who supported me through my experience, especially John Fairfield, Paul Knitter, Stafford Johnson, and Bill Jones.