Dialectic as a philosophical method

Pierre Grimes

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DIALECTIC AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of The American Academy of Asian Studies
College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Pierre Grimes

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Approved for the American Academy of Asian Studies

[Signature]

Date: __________

Approved for the College of the Pacific

Willie N. Potter

Date: 11-2-58
PREFACE

I would like to acknowledge the generous intelligent assistance given to me by my advisor, Dr. Pillai, and for our numerous discussions over a long period of time which have helped immeasurably the development of this thesis. It would have been difficult without his kind assistance.

One further acknowledgement is necessary—to my wife—who has accepted an "absent husband" with understanding.
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FOREWORD

Philosophy is the quest for wisdom and hence it may share a common end with religion. Not all philosophies are, however, concerned with this end, nor, again, are all religions involved with a quest for wisdom. There may be different techniques and tools employed in the accomplishment of wisdom, but this dissertation is concerned only with the study of the nature and use of reason. In the philosophy of Plato reason is employed in diverse fields including mathematics, myths, and elaborate analogies, but when he turns to reason itself, then it becomes important to this analysis. Reason may be utilized in other systems of thought, say in Aristotelian, but when it is functioning as the sole or paramount vehicle to the Good--then it is the subject for this paper and its contents will be examined. In the works of Plato, the use of reason in this sense is termed dialectic.

The terms "philosophy" and "dialectic" are, of course, derived from the Greek. It is equally clear that a radical change has occurred in the meanings of these terms from the original formulation in the Hellenic Age to the present day. The primary and original meanings of these terms have been nearly eclipsed by modern usages and there is a confusion as to the basic meanings and content of these terms. This problem is further complicated by the tacit agreement that
whatever is modern, or of late origin, must be better than what preceded it. Hence there is today a general reluctance to examine basic origins and classic sources. Contrary to this belief is the concept that every real advance is a result of returning to the basic origins and sources and redefining problems from this perspective. This work will base itself on the latter concept. The final object will be to re-examine the grounds and the extent to which philosophy can be termed dialectical. It is a request to reconsider philosophy in the terms of dialectic.

A return to origins, in this case, is a return to the Greeks and the terms philosophy and dialectic will be defined with reference to the classic philosopher and dialectician—Plato. The Platonic concept of dialectic is to be utilized as a standard and basis of judging other systems that have been termed dialectical. Further, the work intends to reply to the criticism that philosophy, including philosophy as dialectic, has been superseded by religion since religion rather than philosophy can better insure the object of philosophy—wisdom. Such a rejection of philosophy and dialectic must of course presuppose a familiarity with the process of the Platonic dialectic as well as its scope. Thus, a rejection, to be considered, must demonstrate a knowledge of Plato and an understanding of the dialectic. A decline of philosophy and dialectic based upon a valid criticism would
be justified. On the other hand, it is important to discern the mechanism implicit in a denial of philosophy, as well as dialectic, in order to discern the consequences that follow from such a denial. Different systems of thought have been termed dialectic and those chosen for analysis will be examined to determine whether they advance the concept of dialectic as defined in the thesis, and if they do not, to see if it is possible to assign a cause. The deficiencies and inadequacies of the Platonic concept of philosophy as dialectic will also be shown and an attempt to correct this will be made by recourse to other traditions of thought.

In the succeeding chapters, the analysis will include Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, and Jung, as well as Gaudapada, Sankara, Nagarjuna, Confucius, and Lao Tzu. These authors have been chosen because of their use of dialectic and/or because they can contribute to the concept of dialectic as a philosophy as noted in this thesis. There is no intention to review or appraise any part of their work, except as regards their use of dialectic in selected instances. The philosophers are chosen to support and to illustrate the thesis of this dissertation.

Therefore the task will be to define dialectic within the philosophy of Plato, to account for its decline or rejection, analyze some private definitions of dialectic, and to correct any shortcomings or inadequacies of dialectic.
CHAPTER I

THE ANATOMY OF DIALECTIC

I. PLATO

To understand the works of Plato, it is first important to fix clearly the role of Socrates, the questioner, and to determine the scope of his activities. The dialogues are records of conversations, come actual, some ideal, and they present many excellent examples of the Socratic method. The Socratic method—the question and answer technique—is the dialectical method in the original and primary meaning of that word. In the dialogue the Theaetetus, there is a clear and definitive statement of Socrates as a dialectician functioning in his twin role as matchmaker and judge, or examiner, of the new-born. He is presented as a "midwife" because he attends the labors of men pregnant with ideas and examines the result to see if it is a genuine birth or if it must be aborted. It is in the function of examiner that he calls "the triumph of my art"1 for he must see if the "thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth."2 In this lies his paramount


2Ibid., 150c.
interest. If others come who are not "pregnant," if they are "empty," then he functions in the other capacity of midwifery--a matchmaker. He "matches" them to other teachers.

There are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; as I know they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying someone, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them some good. Many have I given to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages.3

As a midwife, he himself must be barren, past giving birth to concepts of his own design, "but God does not allow me to bring forth."4 Thus in the Socratic method, there is a questioner who is compelled not to add anything during the birth process. Within the dialectic the questioner, Socrates, must be active in the delivery but passive before the activity. This is the role of the midwife; barren, he remains silent, spinning no theories himself, "nor have I anything to show which is the invention of my soul."5 It might be argued that the "midwife" is only a literary symbol, a poetic metaphor, which is not therefore a valid object from which to draw logical deductions, yet the symbol embodies the precise laws and rules of operation for dialectic. Further, in the dialogue the Theaetetus, he clearly states again, without ambiguity or tie to the metaphor:

But you do not see that in the reality none of these theories come from me; they come from him who talks with

3Ibid., 151a-b. 4Ibid., 150d. 5Ibid., 150c.
me. I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another and to receive them in a spirit of fairness.  

The procedure is to elicit the birth of an idea from another and then to examine its character.

The acting out of the role of questioner has often been considered and criticized as being merely disguised rhetoric or empty disputes having little effect upon man, i.e., eristic; the assumption being that the difference between the dialectician and the disputer is one in which there is no real distinction. But Plato defines the difference by accepting the account of the dialectical procedure as presented in the speech of Protagoras and vindicated in the dialogue:

The disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and may make fun; but the dialectician may be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or the company which he has previously kept. If you do so your adversary will lay the blame and confusion and perplexity on himself, and will escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different than he was. But the other mode of arguing, which is practiced by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; as he grows older, instead of turning to philosophy, he will come to hate philosophy.  

The dialectician pursues one end—the Good—and he believes that the use of reason is an avenue to that ultimate end.

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6Ibid., 161b; cf. 157d.  7Ibid., 167e-168b.  
The immediate end is the elucidation of false beliefs and the provision of a fruitful condition for the further pursuit of philosophy.

This procedure of Plato is not often clear to many commentators since they often fail to recognize that Socrates weaves a philosophy without content, that in the Theaetetus there is no solution to the problem of the definition of knowledge (apart from the nature of knowledge), that all views are found contradictory, that none is adequate. The result of the midwifery is that no view is accepted. Socrates states that, "I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge."

At the conclusion of the dialogue all the concepts of knowledge are displayed fraught with contradictions and Theaetetus is brought to realize and agree "that the offspring of your brain is not worth bringing up." Yet, he does learn something in the process; he learns to be soberer, humbler, and "too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know."

Consequently, this implies the answer to a few questions. Primarily, does the failure of Theaetetus to uphold and defend his argument preclude that someone else might have

10 Ibid., 184a-b. 11 Ibid., 210a. 12 Ibid., 210c.
13 Ibid., 210c-d.
succeeded? Certainly Theaetetus was a youth, hence he pro-
vided only a weak argument, a straw-man for Socrates' rhetor-
ical play. What then can be the value of such activity?
Again, does the lack of any conclusion to the dialogue demon-
strate that either knowledge is not possible or that knowledge
is not definable? Still, it might be argued that Socrates is
merely correcting a false idea or notion, and that in some
other dialogue he states either his own theory or agrees with
that of another. Or can there be anything significant in the
silence that marks the end of the Platonic dialogues? What
is the cognitive quality in silence, in no-thesis? It might
even be argued that this dialogue, the Theaetetus, is a com-
plex dialogue, and that in his better known works, the dra-
matic dialogues, he does in fact turn from the so-called
silence and advance many theories. Hence, no valid deduction
can be drawn from this one example.

What these questions involve, then, is an analysis of
a dialogue and, seeing that most of the questions have arisen
from the Theaetetus, it is fitting that the defense should
come, for the most part, from that dialogue. To meet the
other objections, the other dialogues will be drawn on for
confirmation and validation. The choice of the Theaetetus at
this point is obvious, since it provides an excellent account
of the process of dialectic without being encumbered by other
considerations, i.e., its ultimate end or purpose.
The Straw-Man

Theodorus informs Socrates that his pupil, Theaetetetus, is moving "surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge" and this becomes an invitation for Socrates to begin the dialectic. These opening remarks set the stage for the drama of dialectic. Theaetetus begins by agreeing that knowledge and wisdom are one, hence extends the problem while at the same time it becomes quite obvious that he does not understand the consequences of this identity. Wisdom, for Plato, is the intuitive grasp of the Good, the Ultimate Good, while knowledge does not have this referent when it is understood as relational. Hence a typical alternative is open to Socrates and he treats it with his characteristic method of approach. He offers no alternative view of his own; neither does he correct by attempting to exchange his ideas for someone else's. He resists what would be an excellent pontificating opportunity. No lecture is offered, for a lecture is a poorly disguised attempt at dogmatism. Rather than make such a retreat from understanding, he starts at the level of the student's comprehension and permits him to see the consequences of what he thinks. He offers Theaetetus a mirror to see the contents of his own

14 Ibid., 144b. 15 Ibid., 145e.
16 Cornford, op. cit., VII. 534.
mind. He refrains from offering any alternative which he might understand even less than his own concepts. The student, Theaetetus, has one set of ideas that he believes he knows—his own—and that is his fixed center of interest and reference. Therefore, to offer an alternative at this time would only complicate the process by making a twin project necessary, i.e., to try to understand an alternative doctrine when actually one's own thoughts are arrested, or the other possibility of attempting some synthesis that would either exclude or include the new idea with one's private "truth."

For a teacher, this is always seen as the tragedy of the lecture method. The student's own ideas confuse the understanding, and thus it is always more basic to start at the particular level of the student's understanding.

Socrates is fully cognizant that this youth, Theaetetus, is no real match for the task that he too freely accepts for himself. Socrates encourages him to continue the examination even after he (Theaetetus) finds himself at the wrong end of several reductio ad absurdum arguments, and when the latter wants to give up the inquiry, Socrates says:

Well, but if someone were to praise you for running, and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grownup man, who was a greater runner—would the praise be any less true?17

The argument shifts after it is apparent that Socrates' distinction is beyond Theaetetus' understanding. He says, "How can a man understand the name of anything when he does not know the nature of it?" 16 This question assumes a different course of inquiry. He returns later to this same point, admonishing Theaetetus again and again, to no avail, "He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is contemplated under that name." 19

It is a request not to delineate definitions, the names of things, but to discuss how one can know the nature of a thing. Socrates makes clear the serious nature of the quest, "And is the discovery of knowledge so small a matter, as I have said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?" 20 Theaetetus recovers his courage and defines knowledge as perception. 21 Socrates is careful to demonstrate that this really assumes Protagoras' doctrine 22 and Socrates draws a set of admissions from Theaetetus which renders the thesis of Protagoras bankrupt and void of content. 23 He has extended the arguments showing the complexities of the doctrine. Theaetetus acclaims that he is so confused that at this point he is not sure if the statements and opinions are indeed Socrates' own or if he is only drawing

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18Ibid., 147a. 19Ibid., 177e. 20Ibid., 148c.
21Ibid., 151e. 22Ibid., 152a. 23Ibid., 156a.
them out from himself. To this Socrates replies, restating his favorite thesis:

You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day; when this has been accomplished then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your spirits and answer like a man what you think.

As a result of this drawing-out process, the thesis (Protagoras') is reduced to an absurdity. But the argument has been conducted by a boy, a youth unskilled in dialectic and incapable of defending Protagoras' thesis. Socrates, as the dialectician, aware of this, answers,

And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on his behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardian whom he left, and of whom our Friend Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore, I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done.

The argument is taken up again, but this time by Socrates, and meets the same unhappy fate; the argument is still found to be untenable. However, this does not end the dialogue. Socrates invokes Protagoras and restates an argument in the strongest and most forceful terms as if it came from Protagoras himself. Again, the thesis is rejected and they quote

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24 Ibid., 157c. 25 Ibid., 157d-e. 26 Ibid., 165a.
from his writings\textsuperscript{27} in an attempt to force the weak position into its more pristine form. Hence three things are done to remove the "straw-man" and the first is when Theaetetus is refuted. Then Theodorus, a friend of Protagoras,\textsuperscript{28} is called on to defend him, and Socrates tries "to do justice"\textsuperscript{29} to the argument by restating Protagoras' argument and constructing it as tight and as logically coherent as possible. But this too fails. It might appear that this would conclude the argument but Socrates repeats that, perhaps, the truth lies in the spirit as against the mere words; that one should see the extension of the idea and there in the spirit find the true proposition. Hence a logical analysis is deemed not sufficient. The seriousness with which Socrates works in this task of reassessing the faulty position and buttressing its weak points can be judged by his estimate of the dialectician's obligations: the dialectician must use the optimum of his powers in creating the most formidable position prior to any final rejection. Protagoras is not present to defend his position and Theodorus, his student, will not meet the challenge.

But as he [Protagoras] is not within call, we must make the best use of our own facilities, such as they are, and speak out what appears to be true. And no one will deny that there are great differences in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 170a.
  \item \textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 166d.
  \item \textsuperscript{29}Ibid., 165a.
\end{itemize}
Therefore, to meet the challenge of the straw-man thesis, the following can be noted. After Theaetetus' understanding of the thesis is demonstrated to be weak, the argument is rebuilt, first by reference to Protagoras' works, then by a logical examination of the idea. It is then extended to its limits to make explicit the contradictions. Again a restatement is made in terms of what Protagoras must have meant: a shift in emphasis from the words to the ideas or spirit behind them. Once again the process continues as Socrates turns to the thesis and attempts to revive it by adding to it so that it now goes beyond Protagoras' original thesis. This last stage takes the form of a new argument on three separate occasions. They are found to be without an adequate defense. One thing should be noted again: if Theaetetus had understood that Socrates was asking one question and that he was attempting to answer another, the dialogue would have taken an entirely different course. Socrates was asking about the nature of knowledge, and when that was determined then to attempt to define it. But since Theaetetus was intent

30 Ibid., 171e. 31 Ibid., 165e. 32 Ibid., 154d.
33 Ibid., 160e. 34 Ibid., 164b. 35 Ibid., 167a-b.
36 Ibid., 171d-e. 37 Ibid., 179b; 184b; 187b; 201c (cf 206c).
38 Ibid., 210a-b.
upon answering what he did not know, Socrates could resort to his twin alternatives. He could either force a point of view upon Theaetetus, or merely sit by and let Theaetetus see if he could define something he did not know. The dialogue's conclusion establishes the pretext for the inquiry to return to the original problem. Theaetetus is now open to the problem that he thought he had solved and understood. At this point he can return to the object of philosophy--to know the nature of knowledge.

Value of Dialectic

Turning now to the other question that was raised, "What is the value of this activity--of dialectic?" we find it rests upon the Platonic concept of the soul. The soul, analogous with the body, can be afflicted by the two evils of disease and deformity. The discord of the body is called disease. In the soul, it is termed vice, cowardice, intemperance, and injustice. Again, deformity of the body is likened to ignorance because, like the body, deformity is a lack of symmetry, as the soul becomes deformed by ignorance.

Two arts are required to cure the soul, for as the body needs medicine and therapy for the cure of disease and deformity,

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40 Ibid., 228 d.
41 Ibid., 228d-e.
so does the soul need chastisement and education.\textsuperscript{42} However, a difficulty emerges regarding education because two kinds of education are known—one being completely ineffectual, i.e., admonition techniques, lectures, and sermons. This kind is called "rough." In contrast, there is the "smooth"\textsuperscript{43} type of education and, as can be expected, it is dialectic. Plato provides a clear statement of this as well as a psychological matrix for its epistemology. He says that dialectic attempts to eradicate ignorance and conceit by use of the "smooth" education:

They \textsuperscript{[dialecticians]} cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself and grows gentle with others, and thus, is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.\textsuperscript{44}

Again he states the thesis of dialectic as a purifier and as non-respecter of a person's rank or position:

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., 229b. \textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 230a. \textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 230b-d.
For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest. Hence, in the philosophy of Plato, dialectic functions as a curative force—a purification of the soul in removing prejudice—and is thought to have a lasting effect upon man's psyche. Behavior has its roots in the understanding; its contents can either be contradictory, confused, and chaotic, or the converse. The irony is that if the basic ideas lie hidden, then it is never clear that they are themselves the source of the difficulties that reflect the underlying contradictions and obscurity of the mind itself. The goal determines behavior and consequently the ignorance of one's own goals has an adverse effect upon the behavioral patterns.

"Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it." The case is: One can make explicit the grounds of understanding or remain ignorant of them. One can be ignorant of the kind of mental activity one is enmeshed in and not realize that it is subject to blind determinism. Then, in ignorance, the world becomes a mirror of our confusion; it is even a major task of

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insight to even suggest that the cause of the trouble may lie within the mind. The contents of the mind are hidden unless transformed into speech, articulated and then examined. They can be the unconscious forces of motivation with undiscovered premises or the converse. In either case, our motivation of behavior can spring from this source. The choice is either to cooperate as a rational being with the pattern of true understanding or continue the folly of a disordered mind. There are twin possibilities, either to grow towards wisdom, or towards folly,

... the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; but they do not see them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation, they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like.47

Therefore the unexamined mind or life is fraught with contradictions which become the source of evil and ignorance in life. On the other hand, the alternative course in the conscious use of reason supplies a positive direction in society and in the quest of philosophy.

The Structure of Dialectic

The art of dialectic is the distinguishing mark of the true philosopher and his nature can be further defined by a

47 Ibid., 177a.
study of general features of dialectic itself. Dialectic has a structure and a formal character exhibiting the intellect's mode of operation; hence, at the same time it provides an opportunity to become aware of the philosopher's process of understanding. Analysis of Plato's more complex and dialectical dialogues (Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Parmenides, and Philebus) makes apparent a pattern of his dialectic merging with certain recurrent features capable of being woven into the dialectical structure. Plato in these dialogues recapitulates the process, thereby affording an excellent occasion to compare the methodology with his final summary.

Dialectic assumes the ability to perceive relationships, divisions, patterns, and unities within any field of discourse. The dual abilities of seeing unities and distinctions are the key factors presupposed in the successful operation of dialectic. Perception of unity can be further assisted by formal studies, that stress the perceiving and recording of distinctions. These distinctions disclosed by the dialectic are not arbitrary but reflect as much as possible natural models or orders. The employment of models provides the origin and ground of the analogical method so

48Cornford, op. cit., VII. 533; cf. VII. 518-519b.
49Ibid., VII. 528.
typical of Plato. It becomes the basis for making distinctions and the training for the art of discrimination. It is as if in each dialectical encounter the first obligation is to discover a set of natural models to base distinctions upon and then set these apart in isolation. The ability to find these connections in things, concepts, and then within discourse, is the pre-requisite for the dialectician.50 The movement between the model or analogy and discourse is an invitation to use insight, to sharpen intuition within the dialectical encounter. The best example is the analogy of State to individual in order to find Justice.51 This is not only an artistic device but a request for understanding to discover relations through discourse. Certainly, it also is a factor in furthering clarity and in translating concepts into a simpler matrix which can then provide the conditions for intuition. The reverse process (that of working backwards from the initial intuition) is also valuable because the presence of a simple matrix or model will provide not only the means to communicate it but also remove difficulties and obscurities and extend the connections between concepts (on the one side) and natural familiar events and distinctions (on the other). The use of models as analogies is one basic factor for the test of understanding since it is the medium

50 Ibid., VII. 537.  51 Ibid., II. 368.
to translate insights into common terms and thereby discover and even deepen the intuition.

This seems to suggest a natural order of structural similarity between analogies and reality.

Consider the previous analysis of the psychology of understanding in its relation to purification. It (the analysis) can be diagrammed to illustrate this process and provide a matrix to note the movements in the dialectic:

1. Collecting

   There are Arts of dividing home crafts, or arts of dividing, i.e., carding, spinning.

2. Underlying idea:

   implies division, separating the better from the worse, hence the art of discrimination, and purification.

   Objects

   inanimate animate

   fulling furbishing man other animals

   body soul/intellect
disease deformity vice ignorance

3. Analogy of doctory of body to "doctor" of soul, hence:

   medicine will cure disease as gymnastics will correct deformity or

   Medicine : Gymnastic as Disease : Deformity

4. Doctor of the soul, the purifier of the soul, hence:

   arguing from analogy with step 3 he likens disease to

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Yet, says Socrates, education seems to be a subject to further divide and so, as we found previously, the arts of admonishing and dialectic must have their place. Thus, starting with a simple idea of the arts of division, the dialectician found in a collection of examples, a single concept or idea from which he legitimately proceeded to show the natural character of his divisions or distinctions. Then he arrived at a point from which it was necessary to invoke a series of analogies to justify any further distinctions in order to clear the ground for a more basic or general intuition to be recognized; i.e., as the body suffers from disease and deformity, so, too, the soul or intellect suffers from vice and ignorance. This return to natural order, familiar objects and events and home-crafts is typical of the Platonic style of writing. By this device of purposeful analogy he sought to communicate and demonstrate the interrelatedness of things and events and reveal the fundamental unity underlying their various structures. The idea thus examined is concerned in a natural unity throughout many different divisions, or concepts, and precise enough to be capable of supporting differences and distinctions. This is the art of discrimination. The
necessity of passing from the one idea to the particular number (as specific case or cases) is decisive in the dialectic for without this they would be dogmatic assertions. Showing the grounds for belief, exhibiting the particular number of examples and attempting to exhaust them without ignoring the more obvious particulars, this is the role of reason. What it accomplishes is to demonstrate the evidence for and also to give support to the contention that it is meant to be inclusive. And attempting to be inclusive is to be vulnerable and open to criticism because it is an invitation for the protagonist to determine if there are any factors that have been ignored or treated lightly. Plato thus spells out his use of dialectic and demonstrates by both examples and a concise summary exactly what he means by the dialectical method. In the Sophist and the Philebus he provides a very condensed statement of his dialectic:

Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.53

Again, in the Philebus:

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A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and there with a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer to the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be composed of one and many, and have the finite or infinite implanted in them; seeing then that such is the order of the world, we ought in every enquiry to begin laying down one idea of that which is the subject of inquiry; this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two, or, if not, then for three or some number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity have been discovered—then, and not until then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.54

This adds to the concept of dialectic, but it might be argued that the above process has only a minimum function. The issue is still, what has this argumentative procedure to do with the Ultimate Good that Plato considers to be the highest object of knowledge? Or, stated another way, what has dialectic to do with the Platonic quest for wisdom? Stated simply, the objection could be raised that dialectic has nothing to do with wisdom, and the discourses of dialectic can only report

"views" and not disclose the object. However, dialectic includes more than the verbal. In the Symposium, Plato outlines a method of contemplation which joins contemplation to dialectic. Contemplation, in Plato, is the inner dialectic of the soul or intellect and, conversely, dialectic is the outward movement in speech of the inner movement of contemplation. In each system, the stress is on "seeing." In dialectic, it is the rational intuition tied to concepts; while in contemplation, it is intuition of "realities, since he [the contemplator] touches realities."55 The end is the vision of the Good, and the training ground is both dialectic and contemplation.56 Dialectic promotes the recovery of insight and intuition by the removal of ignorance and ego-identification. On the other hand, contemplation has the final task of seeing directly the Good. In the Symposium, the art of contemplation can be seen to have the following structure:57


57Rouse, op. cit., 209c-213d.
PRACTICE

Physical: Particular: "Love one body"
Many: "Notice that beauty of one body is akin to the beauty of another body."

Effect: relax the intense passion for one body.

Then, he "must believe beauty in souls to be more precious than in the body."

Ideational: Particular: "contemplate the beauty in laws, institutions, customs, and "in families state"
Many: "to see that all beauty is of one and the same kind"

KNOWLEDGE

Whole: "directing his gaze from now on towards beauty as a whole"

Intuition: One: Again this Beauty now will be "by itself with itself always in simplicity."

Recapitulation: "For let me tell you, the right way to approach the things of love, or to be led there by another is this: beginning from these beautiful things to mount for that beauty's sake ever upwards, as by a flight of steps, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful pursuits and practices, and from practices to beautiful learnings, so that from learnings he may come at last to that perfect learning which is the learning solely of that beauty itself and may know at last that which is the perfection of beauty. Therein life and there alone, my dear Socrates, is life worth living for man, while he contemplates beauty itself."58

58Ibid., 211c.
This last stage is neither the physical beauty, ideational, nor intuitional (in the sense of relational), for he says,

Do you not reflect that there only it will be possible for him, when he sees the beautiful with the mind, which alone can see it, to give to birth not to likenesses of virtue, since he touches no likeness, but to realities, since he touches realities; and when he has given birth to real virtue and brought it up will it not be granted him to be the friend of God, and immortal if any man ever is?59

In the Symposium, the movement of the art of contemplation follows the structure of dialectic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURE</th>
<th>THEAETETUS</th>
<th>SYMPOSIUM</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>object</td>
<td>purification</td>
<td>one beautiful body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collecting similar objects</td>
<td></td>
<td>many beautiful bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an underlying idea separating better from worse</td>
<td></td>
<td>beauty itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finding examples in natural models</td>
<td>deformity</td>
<td>laws, institutions, customs, families, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analogical &quot;leap&quot; to clear idea</td>
<td>&quot;as&quot; the soul has ignorance and vice</td>
<td>&quot;see&quot; all beauty as one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>examples as inclusive as possible stupidity, etc.</td>
<td>education, two kinds</td>
<td>directing &quot;gaze&quot; from the one to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final statement</td>
<td>education, two kinds</td>
<td>beauty as a whole</td>
</tr>
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59 Ibid., 211d-e.
Therefore, the movement of the dialectic can either follow the verbal or the contemplative. The training of the verbal is a technique to train the mind in the ability to handle the idea of unity and this is translated into the art of contemplation. This is the crowning art and the end of dialectic. Further, the object is neither an idea of beauty nor Beauty itself; it is the Good.

"Is not the Good also the Beautiful?"

"Yes." 60

The pursuit of the Good can be followed in many dialogues, but in the Symposium it takes the form, or natural model, of Beauty, while in the Phaedo it outlines another technique of contemplation and purification through the mysteries; whereas in the Republic it has the form of the quest of Justice.

Summary of Types in Dialectic

Plato introduced ideas that were new and strange to the Greeks as well as his innovating dialectic. 61 Certainly there were dialecticians prior to Plato, but they neither used his structure nor linked it with the Good. There is a large gap between the Greeks' love of conversation with its

60 Ibid., 201c.

free play of speculation, and the dialectic of Plato. Again, the dialogue form was not new. Actually, in the dialogues of Zenophone, Socrates is portrayed as a cracker-barrel, or homespun, philosopher concerned almost exclusively with domestic problems.

As for the dialogues of Plato themselves, it is quite apparent that the participants function differently according to their role; hence, there are four modes, or typical reactions.

1. The lecturers who may or may not be cognizant of the role of dialectic but who only state their thesis by long monologues.

2. The unskilled in dialectic.

3. The companions to Socrates who are familiar with the formal aspect of dialectic but are unable to present or attack an existing thesis.

4. The skilled dialecticians.

The men can be considered as represented by:

1. Timaeus
2. Cephalos
3. Glaucon
4. Parmenides

Dialectic, then, functions according to the ability and type of participator in the dialogues. The second class, the unskilled in dialectic, quickly leave after the discussion takes a serious turn; thus, Cephalos leaves.62 Again, his

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62Cornford, op. cit., I. 331.
type may be the dogmatist who only waits for an opening in a discussion and can hardly contain himself until his opinion is presented. If he does enter into the dialectic, it is quite clear that he thinks the questioning activity is superfluous. He comes quickly to his point, often using poor examples and poor analogies per se. To engage in dialectic after this truth is "given" is redundant since one should be spell-bound by the delivery and readily acquiesce in the "truth." Any insistence on remaining to examine or question is tantamount to doubting the validity of his thesis. The unskilled dialectician is usually insulted by any subjection to dialectic and, like his counterpart, Cephalos, would rather leave. Dialectic can only demolish his thesis by questioning and perhaps, as in the case of Thrasymachus, bring this type to humility by the destruction of his dogmatism—but only if he consents to stay after his presentation.

The fourth figure, Parmenides, is skilled in dialectic and hence is on equal footing with Socrates, the dialectician. Therefore his role is to examine not just the first category, but his peers and equals. In the example of The Parmenides, Socrates must be capable of seeing his own concept reduced to absurdities. But this is not the better part of dialectic,

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63 Ibid., I. 344: Speech of Thrasymachus.
64 Ibid., I. 331; cf. I. 336b-d; I. 343-344e.
for Parmenides must push on to the art of contemplation, the end of dialectic.

Glaucou, the third type, is very common in the dialogues and affords ample material for tracing the intellectual climate necessary for dialectic to flourish. Primarily, he takes the role of the "sounding board," or of the "mirror" for the ideas of the examiner. In order to function in this capacity, he is usually a youth, or a companion of Socrates who has become aware of this procedure. He does not suspend his critical faculties, but only assents if he sees the rationale for some thesis resting upon a sound or rigorous analysis, a valid distinction or a natural analogy. It is indifferent to him whether he really agrees with the thesis or not. What does matter, however, is whether he can pursue the discussion and assent to the logic of the dialogue. Dialectic in this case is not used to convince another disputer but to demonstrate that the thesis is sound, given these premises. It is interesting that the role of "Glaucou" is often misunderstood by readers of Plato unfamiliar with his dialectic. They often assert that some arguments need not have taken this direction but might just as well have had another course of travel. This is a misunderstanding of the use of reason within Plato and betrays a lack of confidence

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in the Socratic method. With this type or class only two clear alternatives are available. Either it elaborates or extends an idea to provide the general content of the thesis in question (this is what Moderns might call the working out of definitions), or it uses a participator as a judge to see that the idea has a logical coherence with the thesis in general. It is usually the case that "Glaucon" cannot make the final judgement as to the truth of the thesis in general, but only in the particular ordering of propositions. His tongue is often convinced by the display of dialectic, but his understanding cannot assimilate what his type of reasoning is blind to.

The first category is that of Timaeus. He is not pregnant with wisdom or knowledge but has a "likely story" to weave. Theories accounting for natural phenomena scientifically are not open to dialectic and, hence, are not subject to the dialectic. The cosmology of Timaeus, often attributed to Socrates in spite of his categorizing it as only a "likely story," is based more upon an aesthetic judgement than upon reason. It is not a set of metaphysical statements; it does not prescribe to or for reality, and may even be considered a convenient fiction to handle facts—the laws of science understood as only the shorthand expression of a complex of past

66Ibid., "Theaetetus," 154e.
observations. Making no claim to anything but a "likely story," it is in the realm of opinion.

In the Symposium, there is a suggestion of still another class of dialectic skill—a fifth. In the description of the stages of contemplation, it seems that he mentions the dialectical process by only a tangential reference when he says, "... then, to beget beautiful speech; then he should take notice that the beauty in one body is akin to the beauty in another body." He advances to another stage where Plato again refers to the same idea, but the speech becomes more and more like philosophy when:

Next he must believe beauty in souls to be more precious than beauty in the body; so that if anyone is decent in soul, even if it has little bloom, it should be enough for him to love and care for, and to beget and seek such talks as will make young people better; ... and as the process approaches that stage where the student "will behold a Beauty marvelous in its Nature," he says,

He should turn to the great ocean of beauty, and in contemplation of it give birth to many beautiful and magnificent speeches and thoughts in the abundance of philosophy.

It is interesting that he reverts to his favorite metaphor, "beget," and if this can be asserted it would seem that one sign of soul-pregnancy is the love of beauty. In the

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67 Rouse, op. cit., 209c. 68 Ibid., 210a.
69 Ibid., 210a-b. 70 Ibid.
Symposium, as different from the Republic, contemplation does not follow dialectic; rather, dialectic follows contemplation. In this class of "the lover of Beauty," the quest of philosophy has as its prerequisite the art of contemplation.

Plato has not written a dialogue presenting this fifth class. In the Symposium there are many beautifully composed speeches, but little or no dialectic is in evidence except for the supposed conversation between Socrates and Diotima and this can hardly be termed a dialectic. The lack of any dialogue demonstrating this higher dialectic is a weakness within his work. It is as if his works were written for the public at large and lacked this important element. There are numerous references to the existence of a dialogue "The Philosopher," but this apparently was never completed. In the Statesman he refers to three dialogues: The Sophist, Statesman, and The Philosopher. The first two were completed but The Philosopher is not now extant nor is it referred to by other contemporary authors of Plato.

The dialectic clearly functions differently in each dialogue: serious and playful, ironic and comic, analytical and synthetical. Hence, we could expect The Philosopher to differ again. Without this element it is difficult to adequately judge Platonic dialectic. The dialogues therefore

suggest this schema:

1. Timaeus - "likely stories," products of art and science.

2. Cephalos - afraid to enter into dialectic, either inner or outer, and remains ignorant.

3. Glaucon - capable of following another's thought but unable to pursue or comprehend the conclusion.

4. Parmenides - highly developed intellect, but there remains a question whether he can grasp the Good.

5. "Lover of Beauty" - Learning dialectic through beauty, he knows the Good.

In the Republic, the philosopher's training and the stages of his development are outlined, but it is unfortunate that there is no verbal or positive dialectic within the dialogue that sustains the high level of its other aspects. The dialectic is performed within only two classes, the second and the third, and hence there is no evidence of a dialectic functioning in the last stage, as in the Parmenides. Most of the dialogue is the systematic analysis of the training necessary to bring a sick or corrupt soul to health, from ignorance to wisdom; yet, the dialectical encounter that parallels this development is only with Glaucon. This lack of any clear evidence of dialectic functioning at the highest capacity is a definite shortcoming. In the Republic, Plato includes a course of contemplation of many years within the general discipline of the dialectic. It is clear that to Plato dialectic includes (a) contemplation, (b) a positive
dialectic in the Theaetetus with the "midwife" "matchmaker" and "examiner," and (c) a negative dialectic that is critical throughout and uses the major form of the reductio ad absurdum. Indeed, within the dialogues, dialectic is never summarized with all of its component parts, and Plato even mentions the difficulty of defining dialectic so it is no wonder there is some difficulty concerning this problem. Thus, the training in the Republic may have different stresses than the Symposium, but both dialogues need more definitive examples of the dialectical skill. Hence they shall both be treated as belonging to the last class, the fifth. But since there is not sufficient evidence to judge their differences, or whether their differences are significant, no new class will be invoked.

The Dialectic of the Republic

In the Republic, one of the central themes of philosophic merit is the role of reason as the intuitive faculty for the insight into the essential nature of the Good. Plato does not argue for a special or new intuitive faculty. He holds that man already has all the faculties. The only issue, therefore, is the proper employment of reason for the

72 Cornford, op. cit., VII. 533; cf. Rouse, op. cit., 210a.

73 Ibid., VII. 518-519.
vision of the Good. He (Plato) speaks of the necessity of a conversion—a turn-about—in order to insure that vision, and states that the soul, which already has the power of sight, could be turned so as to "bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendor which we have called the Good;" then its journey would be complete. The Platonic concept of conversion has little to do with a religious conversion, for:

Any study, as we have said, will have that tendency, if it forces the soul to turn towards the region of that beatific reality, which it must by all means behold. So geometry will be suitable or not, according as it makes us contemplate reality or the world of change.

The study of unity, be it in geometry or dialectic, sets in motion the Platonic conversion. The multitude of everyday interests seem to dissipate the power of seeing the Good, while the study of unity can "rekindle the sacred fire."

True, it is quite hard to realize that every soul possesses an organ better worth saving than a thousand eyes, because it is our only means of seeing the truth; and that when its light is dimmed or extinguished by other interests, these studies will purify the hearth and rekindle the sacred fire.

It is for this reason that Plato stresses the study of unity, since it converts the soul and "leads to the contemplation of reality." The course of studies in the Republic is based on that one simple measure—the effect it has on reason—

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74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., VII. 527.
77 Ibid., VII. 528. 78 Ibid., VII. 527.
since it can direct it either to the changing world or "towards the contemplation of the highest of all realities."\textsuperscript{79}

It is through the study of dialectic that one discerns the difference between a semblance of the Good and the Good itself. Plato says,

If he cannot do this, he will know neither Goodness itself nor any good thing; if he does lay hold upon some semblance of good, it will only be a matter of belief, not of knowledge, and he will dream away his life here in a sleep which has no awakening on this side of that world of death where he will sleep at last forever.\textsuperscript{80}

The Platonic Good is the ultimate—it is the basis, or ground, of the objects of knowledge, as well as their source and power, as in the case of Beauty, Justice, Virtue, and Truth. The Good is said to be beyond both being and becoming, and Plato expresses this very movingly when he writes,

This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them his power of knowing, is the form or essential nature of Goodness. It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while you may think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do well to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of still higher worth. . . . The Good must hold a yet higher place of honor.

. . . and so with the objects of knowledge; these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., VII. 533, cf. 527. \textsuperscript{80}Ibid., VII. 534.

Ibid., VI. 508-509.
The ability to pursue this end, as well as the course that has led to it, Plato says, is only possible to the dialectician. "And also that it can be revealed only to one who is trained in the studies we have discussed, and to him only by the power of dialectic."\(^{82}\)

Reason, as rational discourse, is stripped of all reference to the senses, reaching out alone by pure intelligence to the nature of the Good itself. Having reached that lofty realm, it continues until it has grasped "by pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what we call dialectic."\(^{83}\) All of the disciplines of the student are for the purpose of awakening the noblest faculty of the soul—reason—to the contemplation of the ultimate Good. It is important to note that it is not through thought that this profound insight is achieved. The elaborate models of both the divided line and allegory of the cave demonstrate the different levels of operation of the faculties of reason. Thought functions on the second level, not the highest, for thought is contrasted with knowledge and knowledge belongs to the highest (the first),\(^{84}\) which is related to intuition or nous. Dialectic trains the eye of the soul—intuition—for that ultimate vision of the Good,

\(^{82}\)Ibid., VII. 533. \(^{83}\)Ibid., VII. 532. \\
\(^{84}\)Ibid., VI. 511d.
and what reason refines by discrimination, contemplation secures; yet both are under dialectic.

II. PLOTINUS

The spirit of Hellenic philosophy that took its root in the Socratic and Platonic form reasserted itself in the temporary abode of Plotinus' soul before it was finally eclipsed from the Mediterranean area. Regretfully, after Plotinus, it soon perished and it has not found another fertile soul in the history of all European thought. The great difficulty of European thought lies here (and in this it is so vastly different from Asian thought), that something as noble as Platonic thought germinated but could not be kept alive through the ages; no tradition of Platonic or neo-Platonic thought was transmitted to future ages. It died. The European countries are fond of speaking of freedom, but the measure of freedom is reflected in the continuity of rich traditions and in this sense it can be seen to have not been free. It lost what the non-Christian nations retained—the additional insights of men returning to the source of lofty thoughts and ideals and purifying those very thoughts until the tradition became a fusion of many individuals. It therefore lost a real heritage for present and future ages.

With Plotinus, we find the last return to that particular vision known as Platonic thought. Last though he was,
The first European translation of his work was Ficine's of the sixteenth century, which was ignored by nearly all scholars, perhaps because a large part was hardly readable as well as through lack of interest. When MacKenna began his translation there were no critical texts to guide him; previous translations were incomplete, while Muller's was obscure in meaning and nearly illegible. The first trustworthy Greek text has only recently been made available, being the joint effort of Henry and Schwyzer. MacKenna, who was the first scholar to complete an English translation of Plotinus based on this accurate Greek text, finished his last volume in 1930. In E. R. Dodd's foreword to MacKenna's translation, he says,

The leading German authority on Plotinus was probably not far out in his estimate when he observed in 1930 that there are today perhaps only twenty or thirty men alive who can read this author after a fashion.  

The assumption of a continuity of tradition from the Greeks to the present time is just a myth; and this myth will be taken up at a later point in this paper.

The work of Plotinus is vast and profound, but this paper can only deal with but one aspect--dialectic.

Plotinus begins his section on dialectic with the

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85Stephen MacKenna (trans.), Plotinus: The Enneads (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1927-30), p. xii. The reference here is to Richard Harder, in the preface to the first volume of his German translation.
assertion that the method and discipline necessary for the vision of the Good is dialectic. There are two stages in the dialectic: "as they are making upwards," and those that "have already gained that upper sphere." The latter stage must complete the process and "advance within that realm," while the first must be led through a conversion from the lower life. Of this first category are the musician and "natural lover"; the technique outlined for this ascent is an exact statement of the contemplation of Plato's Symposium, which has been mentioned previously. The second stage belongs to the metaphysician and he, after perfecting virtue, is trained in mathematics and "put through a course in dialectics and made an adept in the science."

The three parts of the dialectic are set forth by Plotinus when he answers the question, "What, in sum, is it?" He says it is a method and discipline that has the power to pronounce the truth upon the nature and relation of things,

... what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings.

The second state of the dialectic occurs when it takes leave

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86Ibid., I. 3. 1. 87Rouse, op. cit., 210a-d.
88MacKenna, op. cit., I. 3. 3.
89Ibid., I. 3. 4.
of the previous activity that is characterized as "the realm of sense," and can now proceed into dialectic's own special act:

It employs the Platonic division to the discernment of the Ideal-Forms, of the Authentic-Existence, and of the First-Kind (or Categories of Being): it establishes, in the light of Intellection, the affiliations of all that issues from these Firsts, until it has traversed the entire Intellectual Realm: then, by means of analysis, it takes the opposite path and returns once more to the First Principle.\(^90\)

When the student has been instructed and "satisfied as to the being of that realm" he is no longer concerned with the multiplicity and has "arrived at Unity, and it contemplates."

From this stage, Plotinus adds:

It /Dialectic/ leaves to another science all that coil of premises and conclusions called the art of reasoning, much as it leaves the art of writing: some of the matter of logic, no doubt, it considers necessary—to clear the ground—but it makes itself the judge, here as in everything else; where it sees use, it uses; anything it finds superfluous, it leaves to whatever department of learning or practice may turn that matter to account.\(^91\)

Dialectic has often been considered as an arbitrary use of reason, critical with no standards and, often, inhuman in its rapier-like hunt for contradictions. This has nothing to do with dialectic, however, for in the Platonic dialectic, the standards are furnished, Plotinus states, by Intellectual-Principle and

\[...\] what else is necessary Dialectic puts together

\(^{90}\)Ibid. \(^{91}\)Ibid., I. 3. 4.
for itself, combining and dividing, until it has reached perfect intellection. "For," we read, "it is the purest perfection of Intellecction and Contemplative-Wisdom." 92

Plotinus considers dialectic to be the "precious part of philosophy" and it is neither the mere tool of the metaphysician nor does it "consist of bare theories or rules." It recognizes falsity and ignorance by virtue of its own truth; it does not know sophism or untruth except as something foreign to it as "it perceives a clash with its own canon of truth." 93 The knowledge of other schools of thought becomes unimportant because all that is required here is the vision of truth whereby the converse is recognized by its lack. On the other hand, what it really claims knowledge of,

... above all [is] the operation of the Soul, and by virtue of this knowing, it knows, too, what is affirmed and what is denied, whether the denial is of what was asserted or of something else, and whether propositions agree or differ; all that is submitted to it, it attacks with the directness of sense perception and it leaves petty precisions of process to what other science may care for such exercises. 94

The alliance between philosophy and dialectic is very close, as can be seen in its relation to morality. Philosophy, for Plotinus, uses dialectic, for by it philosophy comes to contemplation, "though it [dialectic] originates of itself the moral state or rather the discipline from which the moral

92 Ibid., I. 3. 5. Reference here is to Plato's "Phaedrus," 248d.
93 Ibid., I. 3. 5. 94 Ibid., I. 3. 5.
state develops.\textsuperscript{95} Virtue turns reason upon particular experience as well as acts, but the virtue peculiarly induced by the dialectic is, for Plotinus, "a certain super-reasoning much closer to the Universal."\textsuperscript{96} The reasoning in dialectic is centered upon morality by its concern with the moment, in its focus upon the propitious occasion for acts, and in its desire to fulfill the highest ideal in the moment. Plotinus continues:

\dots for it \textsuperscript{97} the reasoning in dialectic\deals with such abstract ideas as correspondence and sequence, the choice of time for action and inaction, the adoption of this course, the rejection of that other: Wisdom and Dialectic have the task of presenting all things as Universals and stripped of matter for treatment by the Understanding.\textsuperscript{97}

Yet the question could still be asked Plotinus, whether a Master of dialectic could achieve this proficiency without the lower virtues? He answers,

It would not happen: the lower will spring either before or together with the higher. And it is likely that everyone normally possesses the natural virtues from which, when Wisdom steps in, the perfected virtue develops. After the natural virtues, then, Wisdom, and so the perfecting of the moral nature. Once the natural virtues exist, both orders, the natural and the higher ripen side by side to their final excellence: or as the one advances it carries forward the other towards perfection.\textsuperscript{98}

He ends his third tractate with the very acute, and one could almost say, poignant observation of whether it is natural

\textsuperscript{95}\textit{Ibid.}, I. 3. 6. \textsuperscript{96}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{97}\textit{Ibid.} \textsuperscript{98}\textit{Ibid.}
virtue or the virtue through wisdom:

... to both orders of virtue the essential matter is from what principles we derive them.  

The absence of any actual example of Plotinus' dialectic is a serious lack, though on the other side he does give a detailed analysis of contemplation. However, since there are many features in common with Plato, it will not be examined in any detail. The lack of examples of the actual dialectical encounter precludes any definitive statement as to the question of the role of the midwife, or to catharsis and the movement of the dialectic. The reference he does give in his section on the dialectic suggests numerous inferences to the Platonic dialectic, but since there are no explicit references, any such eclectic speculation must be curtailed. The issue he does insist upon is the distinction between the disputer and the dialectician, the close tie of dialectic and contemplation, and the goal of dialectic being the ultimate good.

III. RECAPITULATION AND EXTENSION

The style of the dialogue used by Plato and his choice of this literary form as the vehicle to demonstrate the dialectic, is no chance choice. If the end of dialectic were

99Ibid.
merely to demonstrate the inconsistencies and contradictions in an opponent's thesis, then the form of the dialogue would have been ill-chosen since a concise and not an expository style would be indicated. It would have the brevity and economical model of the lawyer's brief. Digression and tangents would be censored and no point, however seemingly trivial, would be overlooked as a possible source of contradictions. The unfoldment of a personality behind the argument would also be superfluous and redundant to the merely logical pursuit of the disputer. The individual would necessarily be anonymous and the thesis would gain importance far beyond the originator or expositor. The desired result would be to quickly achieve the conclusion. Devices such as analogies, appeals to myth and examples would be sifted away as superfluous, prior to any critical examination. The object would be consistency and logical presentability; consequences from the conclusions would be secondary to the exhibition of economical analysis and rapid *reductio ad absurdum* techniques. Further, the disputer would prefer not to deal directly with an opponent, but rather deal with the thesis in isolation. Clearly, the object of the disputer is the argument, not the individual's goals or the reasons for maintaining the argument. It is sufficient for the disputer to be capable of destroying an argument and anything else would be deemed an unnecessary indulgence. The sole goal of the disputer is to
maintain his own status, whether it is a formal identification with a thesis or system, or a claim to disputation itself; his art is incapable of bringing to birth the concepts of another; incapable of rendering explicit the implicit assumptions of another, and incapable of directing the student's thought to philosophical ideals. This is not meant to minimize the achievements of the logical disputer nor is the term disputation meant to be derogatory—merely accurate—and it is important for any understanding of Platonic dialectics.

The dialectician, differing from the disputer, is not satisfied with mere verbal consistency, because his purpose is to give a rational account of his statements and to make others give an account of theirs. In the elaboration of views, inconsistencies and contradictions may become apparent and at that point dialectic enters. The systematic elaboration of such inaccuracies, placed alongside of each other, provides an opportunity for the asserter to see the contents of his reason. It is often asserted by Plato that this analysis of the contents of the understanding will have a good effect upon the participators,100 but this is no easy task. On the surface, it would appear to be merely a discussion, as

between friends, but, though it must be carried on in such an atmosphere, its discipline and directness challenges friendship itself. The Lacedaemonian rule, "strip or depart," is the spirit in which these discussions are carried out. To remain is the acceptance of an invitation to become a participant and, as such, to risk injury of the ego and its defenses.

The disputers are invariably defenders of a tradition or a system in which he has some vested interest; hence the rule that the dialectician and the disputers are often antagonists. The culture that can tolerate the dialectician is, unfortunately, rare, and even when it does, it is often for only a brief period of time. Once the thinker is let loose to speculate freely, he considers nothing sacred or profane and nothing a restraint to his inquiring mind. The State and its foundations are challenged; and frequently, rather than allow the discussion to continue, a bit of hemlock is offered.

In the Sophist and the Statesman of Plato's dialogues, the dialectic performs another valuable function. Socrates acknowledges this other goal in his reference to himself as a "Gadfly" who attempts to awaken the slumbering beast that is Athens. In the delineation of the personality and motivations of both the Sophist and Statesman, the recognizable

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features of the Tyrant and Dogmatist assert themselves. The Tyrant is always in need of a mask, as the Sophist needs his smile, in order to continue to manipulate either the society or the individual members. Hence the awareness of character and motivations enables one to recognize the difference between the Tyrant and the Statesman, the Sophist and the Philosopher. Yet the continued existence of both (the Tyrant and the Sophist) depends upon the ignorance of their respective subjects; once the awareness of their real natures is manifest, they change their roles to the Despot or Dogmatist, or they are forced to abdicate their illegitimate claim to authority. Therefore, the second function or role of dialectic is a social function. Hence dialectic has an effect upon society beyond the individual student of Philosophy in its demand to reflect upon customs, laws, institutions, and States. The object is to bring about a more rational order into society. Because of this, dialectic can seldom function except in a free society.

The dialogues are marked by the presence of leisure, which is necessary for the discovery of what reason can know (and it matters little if few or many words are used). This central notion, so difficult to modern ears, is that a concept is not an entity easily defined, nor is it a matter of some rapid consultation with a dictionary or encyclopedia. Rather than this, it is a private thing with many clusters of
meaning connecting it with insights, notions, and, sometimes, dimly felt beliefs. The object of leisure is to afford a free atmosphere to investigate and demonstrate the concept and to supply evidence in the form of reasons and analogies so that the concept arrived at through dialectic is not meant to be merely an arbitrary construction, but the fruit of intense thought, careful observations and reflections upon life. The concept that can be readily defined is in all probability a learned response with all the flatness of someone else's truth. Someone else's truth is a lie if not integrated within one's own understanding and seen to be defensible, not by some hypothetical person, but by the upholder of reason. Unless this is done, it is just another idea living in constant jeopardy of the first criticism. It is no more than a contradictory piece of potential difficulty. To act upon ideas that have not become one's own is to live another man's thoughts, another's ideals, and a betrayal of oneself. That is, if one can go so far as to assume a betrayed self when the self betrayed is another's thoughts misunderstood. Another's truth may in fact be the absolute truth, but it is not transferable. They are transformed and recreated by the understanding into a new thing. A new thought understood is a vast achievement. Certainly Plato would be the first to admit that truth is beyond
words, but it is because of this that he can say this and not in spite of it. The idea of truth being beyond reason does in no way mitigate the truth that it can also be grasped through reason. This is quite similar to the doctrine of "no-mind" in Chinese Buddhism. It assumes that there is a developed mind or, stated more ironically, it presupposes a mind to go through.

The catharsis brought about by the dialectic is nothing else than emptying the mind of incompatible notions and raising the mind to see the more embracing unity under one concept. As noted in the Symposium, the beauty that is seen in the final vision is beyond relations, eternal and absolute. This same beauty, the beauty that "has hold not of an image, but of a reality," is, nevertheless, previous to that vision seen in institutions, laws, sciences, and in the ordering of states and families, as well as that "which is called temperance and justice." The vision is the culmination of having realized the concept of beauty permeating all spheres of life that finally vindicates the entire ideational construction by an insight into something that is beyond all the particulars, being its source and life.

104 Rouse, op. cit., 209c.
105 Ibid., 211c.
Certainly one can "learn" this in the manner of cramming for an exam that will be forgotten in the following morning. But ideas cannot be learned by rote; if they are not transformed by the understanding, they will exist as misunderstood notions. The confusion of such a mind is the sickness of the soul. The doctor prescribes one remedy to regain a clear mind—to empty it of all ideas that cannot live harmoniously with itself. This cannot be done in solitary exile, but only with the aid of other critical minds sensitive to the difficulties of the task and capable of gently correcting notions and guiding the thinking through all of its consequences. The consequences of the thought, the implications and the extensions, are the raw materials out of which the notion becomes known. The rationale for the belief and the source of its birth must be brought to light carefully and then placed in a discussion with the care equalling the task. By bringing these to birth, by making them explicit in the answering of questions, one is forced to turn one's attention upon oneself, obliged to examine the nature of one's beliefs and the supposed evidence for their claims to legitimacy. This is rendering them objective and transforming them to the conscious and deliberative. The idea that can be defended without this process of extension is only a minor achievement and insignificant victory. To empty the mind in the attempt to render its content significant is a lengthy task demanding
leisure and tranquillity of surroundings. Thus dialectic is a task difficult to engage in and even more so to pursue to its end. Again, a midwife, a person who himself is not committed to any view, is as necessary as the very understanding presupposed before indulging in the activity. The ideas themselves are best if they are chosen from higher, more complex concepts (ideals, as they are called today), rich enough to justify the activity and sufficient in value to have meaning. They should be of the nature of one's basic commitments; one's fundamental premises of life, reflecting not merely ideas unconnected with the reasoner, but also those to which he feels an attachment; the things that politicians are fond of praising, but denying in practice—these are the materials, the ideas which start the dialectical process. The dialectical stage-setting of value concepts, sufficient leisure, a midwife, and a student in labour, are transformed into a drama within the drama of ideas. The concept is developed, analogies chosen for amplification, excursions into tangents and digressions are tolerated all in the expectation that reason may be capable of finally presenting its product. In this stage, the questions are intended to develop the general concept; contradictions and ambiguities, when discovered, are removed for the further purification of the idea. Once having achieved this stage, the critical aspect of the dialectic begins. This stage is what Plato calls the examination "to
determine if the birth of the idea is a true and noble birth.\textsuperscript{106} The asserter must now reply to criticisms and counter arguments. If he can still hold to the idea, answering all objections satisfactorily, then he can claim the idea, and his understanding is enriched.

The dramatic aspect of the encounter is reflected in the participators' reaction to this process, for they become the players in the dialectical drama. Some are eager to enter into it and find they cannot sustain after the "first fall" and are quick to depart. Then, too, such as Ademantas and Polymarchus, stay only to hear themselves deliver an oration, seldom desiring to remain long enough to listen to the critical examination of their theses. Or, from the other side, in the critical role (as with Simmias and Cebes), they carry their argument through to the end, all the while offering objections and rebuttals. Yet they are unable to accept the conclusion.\textsuperscript{107} Their inability to further challenge brings them to silence, but they still confess that they still cannot accept or believe the conclusions. This is the case of a participator who can follow the logic of the dialogue and agree to its cogency and yet feel he must refuse the conclusion without being able to offer any additional contradictory

\textsuperscript{106}Jowett, op. cit., "Theaetetus," 150c.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., "Phaedo," 107b.
evidence or criticism. He has, as it were, reached the limit of his own understanding. This is not to suggest that there are levels of truth, only levels of understanding of the participators in the dialectical encounter. To pursue this further would require a very careful analysis of the person's beliefs to find just what is so repugnant that its disclosure or admission would mean the cancellation of another more fundamental belief. It would be an attempt to locate the notion which precludes the admission of the tested concept, and, without the removal of the hidden notion, all else would prove fruitless since it is a bar to further understanding. The idea of removing a concept that has precluded further development simultaneously assumes the value of other concepts. The idea reduced to an absurdity does have a curative effect and so, too, does the newly acquired idea.

Part of the dialectic is an upward movement revealing the value of ideas and another segment is what might be called a downward movement—demonstrating the relative status of the idea. A new understanding of the concept of Justice may gather many diverse notions under one general concept, allowing the holder the freedom to see consequences in relations that he might never have envisioned with his previous understanding. The larger the area, the less distinct the concept; the broader the horizon of the thought, the less it can be distinct and differentiated; and when it is finally
seen to necessitate the Good, so, too, the less it has a
definite, precise referent. However, along this route the
student must first arrive at definite concepts in order to
proceed further in the dialectic. This stage should not be
minimized because the foundation of the dialectic presupposes
a developed mind before it can profitably enrol in the nega-
tive quest. The arrival of a new concept is the result of
seeing a new arrangement between a set of facts or ideas.
Its arrival is often accompanied by a sudden feeling of
elation. It is the exercise of the intuitive faculty. In a
recent publication of the Harvard Cognition Project, it is
stated,

The attainment of a concept has about it something of
a quantal character. It is as if the mystery of a con-
ceptual distinction were able to mask the preconceptual
memory of the things now distinguished. Moreover, the
transition experience between "not having it" seems to
be without experiential content. From the point of view
of the imagery and sensory stuff the act of grasping a
conceptual distinction is, if not unanschaulich or impal-
pable, to use the language of the Wurzburg investigators,
at least unverbalizable. It is, if you will, an enig-
matic process and often a sudden process. The psy-
chologist's "aha experience" singles out this suddenness
as does the literary man's "shock of recognition." Some-
thing happens quickly and one thinks one has found some-
thing. Concept attainment seems almost an intrinsically
unanalyzable process from an experiential point of view:
"Now I understand the distinction, before there was
nothing, and in between was only a moment of illumina-
tion."108

108Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George
A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Quite naturally this must be correlated with the insight experienced when on the wrong end of a reductio ad absurdum argument, for at the moment the concept is found to be unnecessary, it comes as a sudden shock—a shock of embarrassed recognition. The two parts of the dialectic—the midwifery and the examination—correspond to these two processes. The student proceeds in the entire process, hoping in the end to have bettered as a result.

Dialectic is a movement of the understanding towards the Good. It is first tested and tempered objectively by the disciplined discussion. The twin methods, the concept attainment and the reduction of concepts, are the initial stages of this dialectic. However, it soon outstrips this early stage in the search for unity, number, and infinity, and reaches out to the essential reality. There, after much perseverance, by the aid of pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself is grasped. This dialectic fuses into contemplation. The object of the contemplation has been purified of any image or outward appearance and carefully examined to justify the ownership. The object of contemplation, if one can legitimately term it as "object," is not another's concept, for the essential feature here in the dialectic is that the student himself must demonstrate his possession by fighting through all criticism, opinions, and appearance. "Hence the idea must not be left outside but must be made one
identical thing with the Soul of the novice so that he finds it really his own."\textsuperscript{109} If he fails in this task, "he will know neither Goodness itself nor any good thing."\textsuperscript{110} The object is actually beyond being and is considered as even beyond truth and knowledge. This object, the Good, is contemplated and culminates in Wisdom.

When it arrives at this stage of contemplation, it leaves the coil of premises, conclusions, and logic, finding these now superfluous. Plotinus considers dialectic to be the precious part of philosophy having nothing to do with theories and rules. These become superfluous because once having arrived at Unity the student contemplates. But contemplation is not a separate activity from the dialectic, since it is the outward movement of the quest for Unity. The inner and the outer dialectic are different. Plotinus expresses it well in his term "a certain super-reasoning"\textsuperscript{111} marks the inner dialectic. The particular virtue induced by dialectic is its affinity with the Universal. Its similarity has been stressed previously in its similar structure, but its affinity is much closer in that the vehicle is the intuitive activity in both cases.

\textsuperscript{109}MacKenna, op. cit., III. 8. 6.

\textsuperscript{110}Cornford, op. cit., VII. 534.

\textsuperscript{111}MacKenna, op. cit., I. 3. 6.
Dialectic is marked by its abhorrence of a merely speculative understanding, for it is in effect a method demanding the intuition of its object. In both the concept-attainment and reduction, the entire procedure is undertaken to awaken insight and bring about that illuminating experience known as intuition. Even in the formal discipline such as found in Plato's Republic, the object is in the perception of unity. The intuition is experienced when what appeared as separate and unrelated elements are seen in a new order or unity. Hence, Plato's remark that perceiving relations is the natural gift of dialectic.

The shift of emphasis from the outer to the inner dialectic is only distinguished by its vocal aspect. True, it soon outstrips even this distinction, but not the process of seeking Unity among the dualities. Again, the dialectic is a process in which immediate awareness as an intuitive experience is the feature of the recognition. In essence it is a demand for discrimination, a discrimination sharp and concentrated enough to transform the understanding—hence, consciousness itself.

A criticism of Plato would be that although he provides ample evidence of dialectic as distinct from mere disputation, as does Plotinus, the inner aspect—the contemplative—is not as clearly drawn. In fact, he only outlines it and leaves a tenuous tie to the outer movement. Plotinus, on the other
hand, makes this connection more rigorous, without, however, any improvement upon the dialectic as a contemplative act.
CHAPTER II

THE DECLINE OF PHILOSOPHY AND DIALECTIC

I. FOREWORD

At this point, it should be appropriate to return to Plato's rule for the operation of the dialectic and apply it to this thesis itself. He says,

I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better training for you.1

And later he adds,

In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself and to any other thing you choose,—to each of them singly, or more than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and anything else you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.2

Thus, to Plato, the argument in favor of the dialectic would only be one part of a real dialectic. The other aspect must be to develop the idea of what would be the conditions if dialectic were rejected. It would include drawing out the framework to see if the denial is justified or if it is itself fraught with errors, contradictions, and ambiguous assertions. Following its development, we would be meeting

1Jowett, op. cit., "Parmenides," 136a. 2Ibid., 136c.
the Socratic rule and would also throw a bit of light on the curious problem of why the flower of Athens withered without ever seeding.

However, to comply with the Platonic request in all its aspects (for tracing the consequences from the rejection) would be a too lengthy task to be adequately treated within this more limited study.

There are two possibilities—either the consequences from the denial could be stated dogmatically, or illustrated with the aid of an actual case of a repudiation of Philosophy and Dialectic. On the other hand, it should be investigated to determine if the alleged repudiation is in fact groundless either because of the typical "straw-man argument" or through lack of critical reflection. If the dialectic has actually been validly shown to be in error, then its present disappearance should be welcomed. Therefore, the requirement is to find those thinkers who have claimed a victory over Philosophy and examine their arguments.

As large as even this reduced task is, it has been somewhat lightened since there is material available as a result of Christianity's denial of Philosophy as an end in itself. Hence, with apologies to Plato, it will suffice for our purposes to restrict the denial to an examination of the reasons and arguments for Augustine's claim that Christian Philosophy has superseded pagan philosophy and therefore
eliminated the need of dialectic. Even if the arguments are found invalid, it will accomplish a measure of service by revealing the thought processes, rationalization, and commitments implicit in a denial of philosophy. To illustrate the consequences of a rejection of philosophy and the restrictions imposed upon reason is a study of dogmatism. The word dogmatism is often used as a derogatory term, but in this work it is understood as a result of belief exceeding the cognitive grounds for belief.\textsuperscript{2a} The selection of Augustine provides an example of a rejection of philosophy as an end in itself and also illustrates the mechanism of dogmatism.

It is often remarked that religion and philosophy, faith and reason, are bitter opposed concepts and if the side of religion were to lose ground there would be a corresponding development of reason and a decline of dogmatism. Granted that there is a certain measure of truth in this assertion, it is actually one-sided. The retreat from reason--dogmatism--can take a modern form that has no direct theological connection and yet may have just as much emotional commitment and exceed the cognitive grounds of belief as much as that of any religious appeal. The modern denial or rejection of philosophy will be examined and demonstrated to be a continuation of the process of seeking "certainties, indubitable truths, and clear and

distinct ideas." This modern rejection of philosophy is the pursuit of History. Therefore the second part of this Chapter will be review of the claims of History and will demonstrate that the same processes involved in the rejection of reason or philosophy by religion contain the same elements as those by the modern exponents of History.

Therefore the use of reason in a philosophy as a dialectic has been outlined in the First Chapter and in this Second Chapter the rejection is examined and the consequences traced in order to better understand and judge the merits of both claims.

The salient features of this analysis will be assumed for further sections of this paper, and therefore will greatly reduce the need of repeating certain key arguments. The conclusions are equally binding wherever similar arguments are maintained and therefore it is taken in a more archetypal referent and not meant to be exclusively an attack or criticism of Christianity as such.

Naturally, the truths of religion may not present philosophical problems for the believer and it would not be denied that insofar as devotion is the central element in religion, philosophy is unnecessary. It is only when religion enters into the field of philosophy that these statements are pertinent. It may be that J. H. Newman is correct in his view that "those higher Truths have been revealed to us for devotion and, for devotion, the mystery
II. AUGUSTINE

It has often been asserted that Philosophy was born on Grecian soil some twenty-five hundred years ago in the City of Athens, but whether this can be contested or not is of small importance. What does matter is that from her many progeny sprang Plato who was bold enough to introduce into philosophy the highest ideal and goal of Ultimate Wisdom. Whatever success he did achieve can be seen by the heritage he left future ages. They fell heir to a persistent problem that was to remain a continual source of difficulty for some time. It was in fact an Achilles' heel. The problem or question reasserted itself and took the form: "Was Christ necessary if Plato found a way to the Ultimate Good? If Christ came with an exclusive truth, what of philosophy?" This crystallized into the now familiar problem of the proper roles of reason and faith, but before it took this aspect it was known as the classical dichotomy between philosophy and religion.

It is argued that the Christian message relegates the pretensions of philosophy—and therefore dialectic—into

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obscurity by the utilization of the new organ--Faith. And in the very same way as it resolved the philosopher's thesis, it also swept away the tragedian--condemned by being in possession of an inadequate and partial view of truth. It is obvious that there can be little content or drama for a Christian in a Greek Tragedy, or any tragedy, if in the final moment of the hero's fate, his moira, he can claim salvation by an act of faith. Through the act of faith, one exchanges the two kingdoms and makes superfluous the one by contrast to the other. To the Christian, there is only one myth, hence only one drama, one hero--therefore one prototype. Thus, he can conclude that both Classical drama and philosophy have been superseded by a new dogma comprehensive enough to resolve problems of philosophy and fate. (But rather than resolving the problems of Classic philosophers, it absolved them.) They ask, what need now for philosophy at all? Tertullian retorts in a familiar passage:

So, then, where is there any likeness between the Christian and the Philosopher? between the discipline of Greece and of Heaven? the man whose object is fame, and whose object is life? between the talker and the doer? between the man who builds up and the man who pulls down? between the friend and foe of error? between one who corrupts the truth, and one who restores and teaches it? between its chief and its custodian?

This is the fundamental breach from which the Western world has not yet completely extricated itself. It is an admission of the gap between a commitment of faith and that of reason. It is an acknowledgement that the articles of faith are forever outside the realm of reason, inaccessible to reason, and, further, affirms an opposition between religion and philosophy. It is fundamental to the understanding that this is in fact the case because what developed later in Europe was an abortive philosophy having little in common with that of Plato's Athens. Tertullian states the doctrine of incarnation and at the same time defines an attitude that has become the prevalent mood, which is at bottom a rejection of the claims of reason:

The Son of God was crucified: I am not ashamed because men must needs be ashamed, and the Son of God died; It is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And he was buried; and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible.5

An appeal to an authority is the altar on which reason is sacrificed. Christ becomes the only avenue to Truth. Attention is shifted from the demands of reason to the meaning of Jesus' life. The new objective for reason is to represent the essence of the scripture and outline the need for salva-

tion and eternal life. It might be argued that these statements of Tertullian reflect only the early teachings of the Church and, as yet, do not contain the full truth, because later Augustine wrote, "Can paganism, I ask you, produce anything equal to ours, the one true philosophy?" Augustine believed that he had in his possession a true philosophy superior to the non-Christian. It is not a new religion in competition with philosophy, but a new religious philosophy that stands above all other philosophies. If this is so, one can expect the shortcomings of Plato and his dialectic to be resolved in Augustine. At the same time, however, Augustine accepts the role of faith. How then can it be an improvement?

Essentially what was accepted on faith? Both Athanasius and Ambrose elaborated the consequences of the Council of Nicaea into a creed which took its name. They became the orthodox interpretation of John XX 31-2 Peter 1; which in turn became the cornerstone of Christian apologetics and the

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6The Contra Julianum (Against Julian) is not listed in Farrar and Evans, *English Translations from Medieval Sources*, nor is it listed in the Union Catalogue of the Library of Congress. In the translated works of Augustine (both the Writings of St. Augustine and the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church), it is listed in the bibliography but not included among the translated works. Therefore, it has been necessary to cite this secondary source. Latin text reads, "obsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia gentium quam nostra Christiana, quae una est vera philosophia. IV.14.72" translated by Charles N. Cochrane, *Christianity in Classical Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 231-232.
article of faith. It is significant that Ambrose’s statement of this dogma also contains a succinct view of the function of reason. Augustine shares this view in his statement that arguments and differences of view or interpretations on this subject, or for that matter any subject of creed, are to be resolved by reference to the Scriptures and the writings of the Apostles. Reason, hence, was not a judge nor was she to be utilized without restraint, but became passive—accepting premises which she should neither discuss nor judge. The Nicaean creed, the concept of the Trinity, provides the basis for Augustine’s thought.

But the transition from Plato to Augustine is not just a movement from one system to another; there is a profound gap separating them which is only apparently joined by the common terms they shared. Yet, these very terms changed their content so radically that any attempt to see them within the same referent would miss their essential differences and obscure the vastly different goals they set for themselves. Augustine set a new note, a new key, which for centuries remained the basic motif of European philosophy. The confusion was compounded by using the same terms in totally differ-

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8Ibid., X. 23.
ent contexts with vastly different meanings. Primarily, Augustine's quest was for certainty; yet, so too was Plato's. The difference, however, lies in what they expected as their certitude. The object of Plato's philosophy was the Ultimate Good, the mystic vision of Reality, as he himself freely acknowledges. On the other hand, Augustine's quest was certainty, based on the acceptance of a principle, a conceptual framework, which would resolve his dilemmas and tensions. The highest ideal for Plato was the Socratic dictum, "I know that I do not know" and "know thyself," while to Augustine it was the acceptance of faith and the belief in the principles of the Christian Church. In Europe, the tradition of philosophy continued the quest for certainty and indubitable truths, and abandoned the quest of wisdom. It chose Augustine rather than Plato—the certain, not the dialectical.

To Augustine, knowledge is defined as "certissima ratione" but he is cognizant of the fact that not all elements are knowable in this sense because it is obvious that man accepts a vast field as knowledge based upon authority. He believes that the matrix of human relationships would collapse if this confidence in authority were undermined:

If this faith in human affairs is removed who will not mark how great will be their disorder and what dreadful

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confusion will follow?10

and he adds:

... therefore, when we do not believe what we cannot see, concord will perish and human society itself will not stand firm.11

Yet, on the other hand, it is manifest that the authority assumes, or demands faith in order to be operational. The restriction of belief only to what can be seen is ridiculed and, "many examples can be cited which show that absolutely nothing would remain intact in human society if we should determine to believe only what we can grasp by perception."12

In the acceptance of authority, knowledge is possible. Therefore, to Augustine, authority must precede reason and it must also be incumbent upon him to assume that faith is the very condition of understanding.

Not have knowledge and believe, but "believed and known." For we believe in order to know, for if we wanted to know first, and then believe, we should not be able either to know or to believe.13


Thus faith need not entail the blind acceptance of a Ter-
tullian, and the rejection of reason is not thought by
Augustine to be the prerequisite of faith. Hence, he thereby
attempted to return reason to the field; but he carefully
adds, "You ought not be taught by reason first and only then
by faith." Augustine inherited a tradition that asserts
two things difficult to reconcile, and he has attempted in a
masterly way to blend harmoniously these twin aspects.
First,

Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy
and vain deceit, according to the elements of the
world.15

and, again, the assertion,

Because that which is known of God is manifest among
them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invis-
ible things from the creation of the world are clearly
seen, being understood by the things which are made,
also his eternal power and Godhead.16

In Augustine's task of the reconciliation of reason and faith,
he sees his work as superior to the Philosopher's. That is
to say, he delineates the role of reason within a Christian
framework and concomitantly he sees philosophy as the possible

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14 Dods, op. cit., The Advantage of Believing, Chap. IX,
(21,22), pp. 418-419.

15 Dods, The City of God, op. cit., VIII. 10, quoted
from Col. ii.8.

16 Ibid., VIII.10, quoted from Rom. 1.19-20.
arena of deception which only reiterates the suspect status which philosophy has to those of strong beliefs. Yet, the other quotation, noted above, provides the basis of the concept of Natural Theology. To these two approaches, Augustine seeks a synthesis by arising to the notion that in Christian philosophy, one can even go beyond the natural philosophers by encompassing their works while at the same time demonstrating their limitations. He recognizes the three parts of natural theology. The natural is seeking "the cause of existence," the rational as "the ultimate reason for the understanding," and the moral--"the end in reference to which the whole life is regulated."\(^1^7\) In the analysis of the natural philosophers, he sees that "it is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists."\(^1^8\) In his statement of the Natural Theology, incorporating the three aspects, he discovers in Plato's works that the love of the Good equals God:

\[\ldots\text{ but the true and highest Good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.}\]

\(^{19}\) Hence, he adds again that "the philosophy which has come nearest to the Christian faith" is that of "Plato himself."\(^2^0\)

If this is true, then it is important to discern clearly

\(^{17}\text{Ibid., VIII. 4.}\)  \(^{18}\text{Ibid., VIII. 5.}\)

\(^{19}\text{Ibid., VIII. 8.}\)  \(^{20}\text{Ibid., VIII. 9.}\)
their differences with regard to reason since, if it has been assumed that in Plato reason can lead one to the Good, what need then of faith or Christianity? Augustine, although he gives this high estimate of Plato, assigns no epistemological role to reason as dialectic. He says:

And, as the study of Wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the other contemplation,—the active part having reference to the conduct of life, that is to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure truth,—Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all the force of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having perfected Philosophy by combining both parts into one.21

In this statement of the philosophy of Plato, it is hardly a fair or accurate summary. It lacks all of the essential features and, in fact, Augustine's general statement could just as well be attributed to other philosophers as well as Plato. The distinguishing feature of Platonic philosophy is the double role of dialectic; the outward and inner. In Augustine's analysis, it appears he did not utilize the Republic or the major dialogues. Further, many of his statements attributed to the Platonists are not only misleading, but often can be seen to have no relation to Plato. An interesting example is when Augustine states that the Platon-

21Ibid., VIII. 4.
ists knew of the "one true God" but "thought that sacred
rites were to be performed in honour of many Gods."22 There
are numerous statements such as these, but it is not the pur-
pose here to correct or to point out all the errors in August-
tine's thought, but only to examine the use of reason by this
so-called exponent of Neo-Platonism in Christianity. It is
clear that in his statement of the philosophy of Plato he did
not see the ethical side,23 but his analysis suggests that he
had few original works of Plato at his disposal with which to
draw an accurate conception of Platonic philosophy. He says
that the works he did read were translations from the Greek
into the Latin;24 hence it is now obvious why his concept of
Plato and of dialectic was so inaccurate, as only a small part
of Plato's works were translated into Latin.

Assuming then that the central doctrine of Platonic
thought is contained in the twin disciplines of contemplation
and dialectic, then the issue with Augustine is much simpler.
What works did he have access to? Were they basic and essen-
tial for the elaboration of these disciplines? Did he know
enough Greek to read them in the originals, if they were not
translated? It is asserted by Augustine that he did not have

22 Ibid., VIII. 12. 23 Ibid., VIII. 2, 3, 4.
24 Edward B. Pusey (trans.), The Confessions of Saint
Augustine (Collector's edition; New York: Pocket Books, Inc.,
1951), VII. 9.
this facility with the Greek language, hence, the question is, what texts then were available to him for his estimate of Platonic thought? Primarily there was a translation of the Timaeus by Chalcidius, which, if really translated by A.D. 350, was not quoted by authors of his time, nor did Augustine quote directly from this work. Then there were references in Cicero's works and passages in Seneca's letters, the fifty-eighth and sixty-fifth, and only casual references contained in Aulus Gellius. Some references were in Maximum's collection of Facts and Sayings, and, of course, the works of Appuleius. There were some other references in Macrobius' Saturnalia as well as a commentary by him comparing Plato's and Cicero's philosophy (which is of doubtful value), towards a delineation of the dialectic. Of the translated works of Plato into Latin were the Meno and Phaedo by Aristippus. Therefore, it is clear that the central doctrines of Plato referred to in this thesis were not translated into Latin and, accordingly, Augustine must have drawn his references from secondary materials without benefit of original sources or translations. He had no direct contact with the Symposium, Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and other major dialogues.

A more decisive judgement can be made without retreat-

25Ibid.
ing into "historical evidence," for this is at best a merely provisional proof. Augustine mentions his contact with Platonists and, hence, he might have gotten his knowledge through these contacts as a verbal tradition. Even if this is assumed, it would follow that either they did not teach a complete Plato, or he failed to comprehend its merits. Whatever the reason—it is manifestly clear that Augustine never mentions the Platonic doctrine of purification through dialectic, the dialectical catharsis, nor was he cognizant of the central concept that the Good is knowable. Further, it is evident that he does not distinguish between Plato, Platonists, and neo-Platonists. He assumes they all speak from the same tradition and that they can be the spokesmen for what he considers to be Platonic doctrine. This is the source of all the confusion and errors in his estimate of philosophy. His principal source appears to be a neo-Platonist of rather dubious merit who authored the "Golden Ass." He quotes him nearly exclusively and draws nearly all his references from "The God of Socrates"—or, as it is sometimes called, "The demon of Socrates." Had Augustine the works of Plato, he could have seen that this work bears no relation to the Socratic Demon which is mentioned in the Apology. Therefore,

27Ibid., VIII. 13-22.
it is an injustice to attribute these references to Platonists when all the evidence he had to conclude from was that the Christian doctrine opposes Apuleius' concepts and apparently can succeed the Apuleian doctrine. It is unfortunate that "The God of Socrates" is no longer extant but, nevertheless, Augustine's references and quotations demonstrate the classic example of a "straw-man argument" in philosophy. He thought he was arguing against Plato and Classic Greek philosophy, while all he was objecting to was a writer who was really outside the Platonic tradition.

Augustine's attack upon Apuleius affords him an opportunity to establish the heart of Christian doctrine: In support of Faith there is a basic claim that Christ is the mediator between man and God. The necessity of a "Christ" lies in the concept that since man is mortal he is also miserable,28 and therefore he is not capable of enjoying true blessedness29 without the intervention of one who, by the mortality of his body and immortal righteousness of his spirit, can give divine help in cleansing and liberating man.30 Hence a man who is also divine "remained heavenly even while on earth," providing the principle of the logos incarnated in man.31 The Platonic principle of the Logos assumed in Christianity a human form32 "cleanses

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28 Ibid., IX. 15. 29 Ibid., IX. 14. 30 Ibid., IX. 17. 31 Ibid., X. 24. 32 Ibid.
the soul and flesh of believers" from this is born a new act--faith--which by the act of belief cleanses and purifies. Augustine finds this the answer to his uncertainty, but he is seriously puzzled by the Platonists' reluctance to become converted to the Christian Faith when they so readily grant the concept of the Logos (or nous). Addressing his remark to Porphyry, he says:

You say, indeed, that ignorance, and the numberless vices resulting from it, cannot be removed by any mysteries, but only by the--patrikes nous--that is, the Father's mind or intellect conscious of the Father's will. But that Christ is this mind you do not believe.

He is firm in his conviction that this concept of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos is not just another way to the Good, or to God, but is the "only true principle which alone purifies and renews human nature." If so, what then of the Platonists who assert ultimate wisdom is knowable and who at the same time do not affirm this unique character to Christ? Augustine admits that the true philosopher is a lover of God and that wisdom is God, since it is attested by divine authority and truth, yet he still holds that Christ is the unique and sole avenue to God. The issue is, then, whether Augustine grants that the purification of the soul, as taught by the Platonists, can regulate the life of man towards that

33Ibid. 34Ibid., X. 28. 35Ibid., X. 24.
36Ibid., VIII. 1. 37Ibid., X. 24.
vision of the Good. He says that the Platonist Prophyry does not recognize Christ and "understand by this third person of the Trinity the soul of nature," adding, "he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient" and that philosophers "do not scruple to offend religious ears," which of course to Augustine is an act of impiety. He thinks it more credible and probable that so long as man is mortal, he is miserable and cannot attain wisdom and, therefore, blessedness. This is only to say that he can more readily accept that Christ was both mortal and divine than the assertion that some philosophers can attain to wisdom (which to anyone but a believer seems more improbable and incredible). Therefore, to recapitulate thus far, it can be said that Augustine did not know enough of Plato or the Platonists to judge them, and that the "one true philosophy" of Christianity is not only inferior to that of the philosophers, but also that there is a serious question as to its "truth." Further, Augustine's judgement of the natural philosophers is inaccurate and based on inconclusive evidence. His unfamiliarity with the actual works of Plato and, hence, the lack of knowledge of the

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., X. 29. 40 Ibid., IX. 14, 15.

41 Ibid., X. 29. "... in accordance with the opinion of Plato you make no doubt that in this life a man cannot by any means attain to perfect wisdom."--one can only wonder what he would have thought had he really read all of Plato and Plotinus. Cf. Cornford, op. cit., Republic IV. 476, "... that the perfectly real is perfectly knowable."
operation of dialectic leaves his conclusions about Platonists as weak as his knowledge of Plato's works. The only really important problem left is, how he understood "those facts of which we have said all minds have knowledge concerning themselves and which are indubitable."42a

Since a quest for certainty, for indubitable truth, has become the distinguishing mark of much that is called philosophy in Europe, a careful scrutiny of the father of this concept would be profitable. Primarily, the notion of certainty involves two concepts that are not normally separated: conviction and judgement. A proposition may be asserted with conviction but this does not affect the content, only the effect of the proposition. A proposition judged to be certain adds nothing to its cognitive content; it is solely a measure or indication of the emotive feeling attached to the utterance of the proposition. The proposition is still open and an available subject for an examination of its purely cognitive claim. The inquiry is completely independent of whatever belief or conviction may be generated about it. However, this always appears as a presumptuous act to the asserter since it invariably follows that the more examination of the claim apart from the conviction with which it is uttered, is itself an effrontery, as in the case of Ademantis and Polemarchus.42b The very conviction is meant to

42a See n. 43, p. 93 of this thesis.
42b Cf. Cornford, op. cit., Republic, Book II, III.
relegate it outside the domain of verification. The concept of certainty, therefore, involves the concept of the self-evident. Naturally, the certain and self-evident are meant to preclude analysis of their cognitive justification by any other measure than the criteria of certainty and the self-evident. This is the common breeding grounds of dogmatism. Therefore, whatever degree of belief may be attached to a proposition (some "X"), it must always await the impartial analysis of its cognitive justification before any credibility can be assigned to it. Needless to say, this is not asserting that at times, usually for practical or ethical action, one must act as if one had all the knowledge sufficient for practical judgements. Whatever subjective attitude of belief there may be attached to some "X," it is still of dubious merit until it can be determined just what evidence there is for the assertion. The main contention is that conviction is an attitude that does not actually seek justification among cognitive criteria. Doubtless Augustine is writing from the perspective of a Christian, a religious seeker, and it is common among religious thinkers and dogmatists that they often confuse appeals to belief with cognitive justification in its own right.

Aside from these considerations, there is a more basic flaw at work here. Belief provides the very conditions
necessary for devotion—it provides an object. The religious vocation can function to the degree that its object becomes ideal and absolute. In its absoluteness, it furnishes an appeal to an authority that affords the believer a feeling of protection, thereby taking the responsibility from the individual. The perfect figure becomes the object of its belief and devotion. But this is an unholy peace if the mind is at all active. If it once begins to doubt, it becomes strangely vulnerable. To guard against this eventuality, it seeks to hide the flaw by an appeal to certainty and indubitability. In finding this certainty, it rests, feels assured of its security, and allows the devotional side free play without the distressing element of doubt. Yet, the "x" in which the certainty is found does not gain anything on the cognitive side by its conviction. It does not remove by some gratuitous act the responsibility to find just what is certain. On the other side—even if it is in fact credible, it adds nothing to the content of legitimate belief by being asserted as "certain" since its claim must still rest upon its cognitive justification. Again, a further element of suspicious content is that the principle itself is never advanced as a criterion because it would follow that there is nothing to preclude conflicting claims to different and mutually contradicting certainties. Hence, it is usual that the asserter claims the unique nature of this particular "x." This is of course nothing else than
an appeal to faith.

In Augustine's quest for certainty, he sought for an indubitable truth which would be impossible to doubt and which would presuppose consciousness itself; the quest was for certainty itself. He sought for "something that is true" and not a vision of that truth. He demanded that reason present her own structure for examination; that consciousness display her fundamental elements, which, as such, would have to be accepted. It is a request for infallible knowledge and certain truths. To secure this, he begins a phenomenology of the human mind which, he believes, is indubitable simply because it is knowledge by the experiment of himself. Whether this can be actually claimed as "truth--indubitable truth"--is a point to be examined later, but it is important to note that the answer or solution to this phenomenology would be some assertion about the constituent elements of the mind, or an interior anatomy. "Reason" then looks for its own presuppositions and when they are found, it acclaims them as certain knowledge. These in turn become the building blocks of his philosophy. For Plato, the only object of knowledge is the Good. It is the only thing that is really knowable because it is perfectly real. It is not given in a class of statements which are pre-suppositions, or for that matter in any class of statements.

First, then, what is it that is indubitable in Augus-
tine's philosophy? He replies that:

The question being the nature of the mind, we must dismiss from consideration all notions acquired from outside through the bodily senses and pay the most careful attention to those facts of which we have said all minds have knowledge concerning themselves and which are indubitable. Men have expressed doubt as to whether the power of life, memory, intelligence, volition, thought, knowledge and judgment is a function of air, fire, brain, blood or atoms, or of some unknown body over and above the four elements, and as to whether it is within the power of some concretion or arrangement of our flesh itself to perform these operations; and some have ventured to assert one theory, some another. But who is there to doubt that he is alive, remembers, understands, wishes, thinks, knows and judges? Since even if he has such doubt, he lives; for if he doubts he thinks. Whatever doubts he has, therefore, regarding other things, he ought not to have doubts regarding all these; for if he did not exist, he could not have doubt regarding anything.43

Here then is the argument for clear and distinct ideas, be it from Descartes or Augustine, which asserts the criterion of obvious self-evidency. Two approaches are possible: first, one to examine the criteria and, second, by the content. But to examine the criteria of indubitability would mean contrasting this particular statement of certainty with others which may either disagree with it or may, indeed, offer an alternative. If so, the principle itself would be abandoned since all would be self-evident and, if not, where would their self-evident character lie?—unless Augustine would go so far

as to admit of contradictory self-evident truths. On the other hand, if it were asserted and then argued, it would not be self-evident since its certainty would depend upon the activity of the defense; therefore, its certainty would be credible if, and only if, its rational cogency were termed valid. But that again would be to abandon the principle by turning to common-sense appeals by depending on the logic of argumentation. The content of the certainty has this form:

1. All minds have knowledge concerning themselves which is indubitable.
2. If he doubts, he lives.
3. If he did not exist, he could not have a doubt regarding anything.

This is the origin of Descartes' dictum, "I think, therefore I am" and contains the same error. The activities mentioned, including the doubting, do not in themselves require evidence of any "doubter" or any "he" apart from the activity of cogitation. If this is an inference which asserts a "doubter" then it cannot be indubitable since it need not be assumed. Again, this appeal to indubitability cannot assert the necessary connection between cogitation and the cogitator any more than Descartes could join the extended and the unextended as his basic elements of consciousness and the world. Descartes had to insert the Pineal gland to tie this connection

\[44\text{Ibid.}\]
but this only leads to the further inquiry as to what ties each with the third, and so on to an infinite regress.

But Augustine believed it was not an inference and also not given through the senses:

... but it apprehends itself with direct and immediate awareness ... as it apprehends that it lives, remembers, knows and wishes.45

Clearly then, it is not understood by him as any inference from cogitation to the "thinker," but direct apprehension. The mere fact that an examination is offered to discredit this principle of certainty argues that either there is not common knowledge of indubitable truths, or the objector is perverting his own intelligence, or it must be made clear by some other technique that it is really certain. Nevertheless, the only real argument is that of "perversion," yet it is found that one need not admit that the existence of the doubter is anything but an inference; therefore it would have to be maintained that a retreat into logical analysis is itself a perversion of the inquiry. If so, it demonstrates that the position is outside of logic, its "certainty" resting somewhere other than within "all minds": the first assumption noted previously. Therefore, it is contradictory. The elements that are certain, Augustine says,

It is beyond question that I exist, and that I know and love that existence. In these truths there is

nothing to fear from the argument of the Academics: What if you are mistaken? Since if I am mistaken, I am. One who does not exist cannot possibly be mistaken. Thus if I am mistaken, this very fact proves that I am. Because, therefore, if I am mistaken, I am, how can I be mistaken as to my existence, for it is certain that I exist, if I am mistaken. Accordingly, since I must exist in order to be mistaken, even if I should be mistaken, it is beyond doubt that I am not mistaken in this, that I know myself as knowing. It follows, then, that I could not be mistaken as to the fact that I know myself as knowing. For, as I know myself to exist, so, also, I know this, that I know. And to these two, since I love them, I join that love as a third element of equal value to those things which I know.46

Here Augustine asserts the substantiality of the consciousness of the self. His elements are Being, Intelligence, and Love and they are self-evident and certain. This triad prescribes the character of indubitability by the experience common to all men. He further adds that these three are one, embracing one life, one mind, and one essence.47 Before passing on to other considerations, it is curious that Augustine should be engaged in a spurious problem. He says, "What is there to fear from the Academics: What if you are mistaken?" The possibility of being mistaken must take some concrete form; a possibility to be such must be explicit since even a hypothetical possibility is still explicit. A possibility of being mistaken, to be a consideration, must have some form; a possibility to be such must be explicit since

even a hypothetical possibility is still explicit. A possibility of being mistaken, to be a consideration, must have some form and not a mere possibility of nothing, void of content. If on the other hand, it is purely rhetorical, it can be answered by a similar play of rhetoric.

Asserting this triadic form of consciousness constitutes prima-facie claim to divinity but, along side of this, he is still cognizant of man's misery. This extends his concept of the need of man's assistance by the mediation of Christ for salvation. It also lays claim to the concept of a "natural Christian" because the Trinity is mirrored in consciousness. As a result of this formulation, he can criticize the claim of Pelagius that man must initiate the movement to the divine.\textsuperscript{48} Therefore, to Augustine, God intercedes for man in the world to give grace or assistance on the path to divinity. A God who operates in time and history is the working of his divine will for man's salvation.

Augustine's search for certainty, therefore, involves the acceptance of an infallible authority in the saving grace of the belief and faith in Christ, and the indubitability of propositions he believed self-evident. In his Confessions, it is quite apparent that he never discovers that the limitations of philosophy necessitated an acceptance of the Christ-

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 197 ("De Spiritu et Littera," V).
tian religion since he had utilized Platonic philosophy itself in a way that resolved philosophic problems that stood in the way of his becoming a Christian. He found he could not accept the Christian faith because he was torn by the dilemma of the Manichaeans—that Good and Evil are universal principles and that Evil has a substance no less real than the Good. He discovered in the Platonic writings a solution, and was able to overcome the obstacles to his commitment to Christianity. Other men might have pursued Platonic philosophy further, having discovered this much of value, but he was solely using it to become a Christian. Further, it is clear that he was searching for a Christian conversion, but not through a philosophic discipline—if one can assert he knew even this much about the Platonic, or philosophic, conversion. He utilized his rationalistic facilities to resolve his intellectual difficulties along pagan philosophic lines, yet retreated into certainty, self-evidence and indubitable truths in the construction of his own Christian philosophy. If he could have read the Theaetetus of Plato, one wonders how he might have answered:

... And when she [the mind or conceiving] has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion.50

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49 Pusey, op. cit., VII. 22.
Therefore, to Plato, all of this surety of thoughts, this self-evident doctrine, would be termed opinion. The test to Plato is the ability of the understanding to be able to demonstrate its certainty by recourse to the things that are certain—viz., the real or the Good. The certain in Plato is in the vision of the Good, but this does not have a content that can be structured into dogma. Augustine's purpose was to secure a place for reason so she could be fettered and kept from doubt. The furthest he could allow reason was in borrowing concepts from another philosophy and, at the same time, restricting its further movement to a closed system. The final test of reason is whether she is capable of cleansing the mind and purifying the intellect for a vision of the Good. The existence of a mediator (in Christ) is not to extend reason, but for devotional purposes. He admits that if one does not make that act of faith in the Christian creed, the teachings can be reduced to nothing:

... Those who hold it do so as a consequence of faith; for those who do not hold it by faith, it remains a matter either of doubt or of contemptuous disbelief. 51

Yet, the issue to the philosopher is, is there a need incumbent upon reason to recognize the unique truth of Christian dogma? But it is obvious that there is not, since philosophy, particularly the Platonic philosophy, contains what to the

51 Dods, The City of God, op. cit., IX. 17.
Christian is a basic flaw of impiety: that it can gain wisdom without faith in Christ. The security offered by indubitable silence silences doubt that might have had as its object the very figure of the infallible authority and, this would recreate the initial fear that the commitment of faith meant to resolve; it is a retreat from the rational. But far more important than these limitations of appeals to certainty and their cognitive criteria is the fact that any such acknowledgment of "certainty" results in the severe restriction of reason to pursue dialectic. Once the acceptance of any "certainty" is granted, reason can only function in a logical capacity from that point of certainty. It follows that reason would merely have only one object: the working out of the implications from such a point of certainty. The cathartic element of purifying the intellect from all opinions would necessarily be curtailed and arrested, at least on one point—the point of its certainty. To the Christian, the establishment of an infallible authority stops his quest for Truth, since by faith one can be saved. He is now free to speculate about other matters with the only restriction that he does not contradict any of the sacred teachings of the Church. His soul saved, he can think—secure in his belief that further philosophic inquiry along those lines is unnecessary. This is to say that he keeps his thinking within the confines of theological belief and dogma. He might think out new defenses
for his faith and belief, but not construct alternative systems that could remove the necessity of faith. He has saved his soul; the only other realm open to inquiry is nature. God is secure; only nature now awaits the mind of man. He only lacks a tool to handle nature and when that is discovered, he will attempt to capture her, as he did with God, within a set of certainties.

When the Christian turns to nature, to the flow of time, he conceives it differently than those before him; he must see it as a Christian. The new element is the doctrine of the embodied Logos, Christ, who came once and for all time. The concept of this uniqueness is the basis of the belief that the creative principle discloses itself progressively in time; hence, time must be lineal and not cyclical. The arguments for the theory of lineal time are nowhere given; on the contrary, Augustine says reason cannot refute the cyclical view of time:

"... Even though reason could not refute, faith would smile at these argumentations, with which the godless endeavour to turn our simple piety from the right way, that we may walk with them "in a circle.""

The theory of lineal time is analogous to his knowledge of God, but what precludes his deity ordering a universe contained in itself? This alternative he does not engage directly

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52 Ibid., XII. 17.
since it could be handled by deduction from his embodied Logos. He traces the concept of cyclical time to:

... For what specially leads these men astray to prefer their own circles to the straight path of truth, is, that they measure by their own human, changeable, and narrow intellect the divine mind, which is absolutely unchangeable, infinitely capacious, and, without succession of thought, counting all things without number.53

Or, stated in other terms, the concept of lineal time can be smiled at when a Christian commitment is accepted on faith, but without this conviction there are no reasons to deny or refute it. It is indeed curious that another indication of his certainty--of which he cannot doubt--is given in this problem of cyclical time. As noted above, he admits no "reason can refute" this concept of time. He says:

... Of this, too, I have no doubt, that before the first man was created, there never had been a man at all, neither this same man himself recurring by I know not what cycles, and having made I know not how many revolutions, nor any other of similar nature.54

His appeal to certainty is no other than an act of faith in Christ having come once and for all time that establishes a principle which necessitates a new conception of time. He cannot doubt it because to do so would be to doubt the unique existence of Christ. This is also the foundation of the Christian concept of the personality. It shares the same uniqueness of Christ, since it shares the lineal concept of

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., XII. 19-20.
time, and we find he asserts this new concept with the same dogmatism as the lineal concept of time.

Time is conceived as having a beginning and an end; what of the end? He says:

The conversion of the Jews, the reign of the Anti-christ, the second coming of Christ, the last judgment, separation of the good from the evil, the conflagration and renewal of the world.

... All of which we are bound to believe will certainly come to pass.55

This is the reading into history Christian values he is "bound to believe" since it is the acting out of divine providence. "Everything," Augustine writes, "must be referred to divine providence."56

III. VICO

The Christian concept of history involves common features with its philosophy.57 Apart from the concept of lineal time, it added a new kind of assertion to history—universality. The early historians, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius, never made such claims. Theirs were moral, ethical, and pragmatic studies, and with Polybius, genealogic. The conception of universal application of the historian's skills was a foreign concept to any but the Christian

55Ibid., XX. 30. 56Ibid., V. 9. 10.

historian. It is with the rise of Christianity that historical methods are interpolated for dogmatic teleological and providential ordering of the entire course of time. To the Christian, God displays the timeless "pattern" of his being in the flow of temporality. The record of his actions and intent are the evidence of his will. The framework is the Biblical account imposed upon history. Augustine's *City of God* outlines the six ages in history developed in his Bible and the actual history of the providential in the world.\(^5\) However, as the opposition to the Church's metaphysics began to be felt, there was a return to history, interpreting it along non-theological values. Though it lost this tie to the Church, it still remained true to its "certainties"--lineal theory of time and the assumption that certain knowledge can actually be found in this activity. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Vico, Herder, and Hegel mark the reversion to pragmatic non-Christian historical writings. The element that persisted, however, was still Christian--the belief that man's existence can be viewed in a continuity, giving his life an added force which without this gift would leave man alone to face the infinity of time--from the vast beyond to the equally mysterious future. From such origins came the concept of progress.\(^5\)

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\(^5\)Dods, *The City of God*, op. cit., Book XV-XVI.

\(^5\)John Bagnell Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York:
By becoming historical, man acquired a dimension and, one should add, without breadth. It moved him from his remote past and swept him into the present as the heir of all that came before, and insured him a promise of the future. In this single concept, man found an armor of security in the certainty of history. It provided something far more important, or insidious, depending upon the perspective, and that was a "goal." History, along lineal conception, moves towards a goal, and therefore, if this end is known, one can consciously cooperate with it and find justification for his actions by such allegiance. But the particular event loses its meaning to the extent that it is measured by such a hypothetical goal; this is the archetypal form of the idea of sacrifice. "History justifies us," is the cry of every determinist. It is of little consequence whether it is being asserted by the Revolutionary Marxist or the Christian Inquisitor, for the same structure is being employed by both. Possessing their "truth" via the route of certainty, History functions as a vindication of their acts. It does not matter if the final appeal is made to a divine authority or to the

The Macmillan Co., 1932), "Progress is a natural and necessary effect of the constitution of the human mind." p. 67.

60 Ibid., p. 92, cf. pp. 105 and 126. "The sound views of intellectual men in different generations will continue to add up."
self-evident truths of the mind, since both appeals are
retreats from reason into dogmatism. The knowledge gained by
this procedure secures the quest of the troubled soul. It
possesses an infallible method capable of "truth beyond
question," as Giambattista Vico writes:

... But in the night darkness enveloping the
earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there
shines the eternal and never-failing light of a truth
beyond question that the world of civil society has
certainly been made by men, and that its principles
are therefore to be found within the modification of
our own mind.61

Vico's new science is, of course, history. He argues
that since civil society is made by man, the truths of soci-
ety can be known by recourse to the historical method along
the lines of his new science. He argues that it is by the
examination of the nature of man that certain knowledge can
be found, since governments must conform to the nature of
those governed.62 The error of the philosophers, he goes on
to state, lies in that they "consider man as he should be and
so can be of service to but very few who wish to live in the

61Giambattista Vico, The New Science, trans. from the
third edition (1744) by Thomas Goddard Serrin and Max Harold
Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1946), Book III,
Sec. 331; cf. Book I, Sec. 349. "For this is the first
indubitable principle above posited that this world of
nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must
therefore be found within the modifications of our own human
mind."

62Ibid., Book I, Sec. 246.
Republic of Plato and not fall back into the dregs of Romulus," while it is the legislators who "consider man as he is in order to turn him to good uses in human society."63 The historian turns from the philosophic pursuit to the certainty of history and finds his repose in such certainties for "their wills at least may rest on conscience."64 In contrast to philosophy, he poses philology which "observes the authority of human choice, whence comes the consciousness of the certain."65 He adds:

... This axiom by its second part defines as philologians all the grammarians, historians, critics, who have occupied themselves with the study of the languages and deeds of people; both their domestic affairs, such as customs and laws, and their external affairs, such as wars, peaces, alliances, travels and commerce.

This same axiom shows how the philosophers failed by half in not giving certainty to their reasoning by appeal to the authority of the philologists and likewise how the latter failed by half in not taking care to give their authority the sanction of truth by appeal to the reasonings of the philosophers. If they had both done this they would have anticipated us in conceiving this Science.66

In finding certainty, any additional inquiry would be redundant and unnecessary. If this is so, then the cathartic activity of reason in dialectical philosophy is foredoomed to failure. No cathartic or purifying function can be anything but an illusive and a mistaken task if reason must halt her

63Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 131. 64Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 132.
65Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 137. 66Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 139-40.
restless journey before such indubitable truths. Their existence are themselves paramount proof of the absurdity of the philosophic quest along dialectical lines. If there is a valid intellectual activity to history, if history can in fact justify her claims and at the same time illuminate those dark corners of ignorance instead of adding to its onacity, then it has succeeded to philosophy and can justly lay claim to her mantle. Vico's scope given to history has become the European standard of education. There is a historical method to all intellectual studies. Vico supplies a foundation and a lofty goal to all the culturists; the anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, and cultural analysts; it is within such studies they claim certainties and truth. This is the new Science--History.

The tacit assumption at work here is the same as that which is so prevalent today, which is that a thing is true if it can be reduced to something more certain than the object of inquiry, i.e., the reduction theory of truth. The assumption predicates a sharp cleavage between knowledge and reality and hence exhibits a scepticism as to the validity of the philosophic quest that posits direct knowledge. History, including the philosophy of history, is an example of this criterion at work. The object is to find apodictic certainty in a conceptual matrix. If knowledge is seen as an existential act, not about something, but something in itself, then
it precludes the reduction theory of truth as being anything but a convenient fiction. That "something" is Reality and that knowledge illumines the knower as reality. Hence from this perspective, philosophy has nothing to do with history. Philosophy does not use history--history is a secondary method of communicating ideas to readers who do not come into the main stream of works themselves. History, like automobiles, must be continually redesigned to fit the fashion of the day. Gibbon, Herder, Lessing, Vico, and Marx are dated and need restyling to meet the newer fashions.

A few cursory remarks, of course, cannot be deemed sufficient justification to relegate history into Limbo. Hence, an analysis of history is necessary because, ironically enough, a history of history yields a poor harvest.

The documentation of a work, philosophic or not, is a procedure which it is assumed gives continuity and background to correlate what, presumably, would otherwise be too difficult or impossible to comprehend. The result has been to return thinkers to the certain and sure domain of "facts, hard and rude." We have become accustomed to doubt the validity of metaphysical thinking, as well as any procedure for the use of concepts not grounded upon sense data. This is a result of a rationalism that has not been thought through to its logical conclusion. It is based on Vico's distinction between
the certain and the commune,67 and is a belief that philosophy is in the realm of the abstract and common, and therefore lacks appeal in the certain.

The abstract leads away from the security of the familiar and hence it lacks certainty. A return to history is a return to the concrete and comfort of the certain. In considering a work, it is as if one is under a strange kind of obligation to see it within a historical setting and it is this framework that lends it its authenticity.68 The historical setting is sought as if there were an historical a priori form of the understanding, and whatever truths that might sift down as a residual product must first, according to these rules, be vouched for by the historical method. The insights must, it is argued, fall back upon that realm of the certain, i.e., the culture into which the work has been born and from which its intelligibility has its source and strength. Indeed, a culture that has not developed her quota of historians is considered as "unhistorical" and this observation has become a criticism. To be unhistorical is to be naive and backward.

The distinction between the certain and the abstract,
as well as the validity of such a dichotomy, assumes a philosophical position, hence, to be judged as other assertions, i.e., its cognizance and consistency. The primary task then is still a philosophical analysis. Yet, the historian adds universality to his claims. His claim is not just pragmatic, but demands the same audience that her sister discipline claimed—the same universal application as universal mathematics. It is not an accident that this form of discipline arose at the same time as the growth and development of mathematics. The rise of symbolic techniques gave vast applications to mathematics, but left the particular, the content, bare and alone. History was cast in the role to fill this gap. The historical approach is the dominant pedagogical tool today. There is a historical method applied to all branches of knowledge—this is its additional claim to universality. It owes its existence to a sixteenth and seventeenth century distinction of rather dubious philosophical merit.

At any one time, there are an unending number of incidents, yet, not all things that happen are historical. No one could record all the events in any one day, much less cover a period of time that history seeks to embrace. A rule, measure, yardstick, or, if one prefer, a selection is assumed. This principle of selection is a value judgement. Indeed, it might be argued that the historian is not cognizant of consciously choosing value judgements, but nevertheless, it is
clear that there is one at work. Sir Keith Hancock, the historian's critic of history, states that the historian cannot succeed in refraining from judgement, "they simply succeed in concealing from themselves the principles on which their judgement is based."\(^{69}\) Whatever judgement is favored, the conclusion follows with mechanical rapidity. The selection of facts is determined by the value judgement and the idea seen in history is read into history by the selection of facts. A historical fact is a product of a fancy, or, if one prefer, a phantom. History justifies whatever thesis it first presupposed in its selection of facts, and conversely, the facts justify the scale of measurement. The utilization of the value judgement separates events into the historical and the unhistorical. The unhistorical are conveniently forgotten for they are the precise elements which do not lend themselves to the thesis nor the choice of judgement. The historical work then is a speculative pronouncement derived from a value judgement not defended on the basis of an explicit analysis, but seeking to assert its thesis by an immense accumulation of facts which, as if by mere force alone, shouts the thesis. It is an appeal, like all dogmatic appeals, to something outside of reason and logic, to the arena of the

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\(^{69}\) Sir Keith Hancock, "Machiavelli in Modern Dress"—(An Inquiry into the Historical Method), *Journal of History*, XX (1935), 100.
certain, the obvious, and the unquestioned assumptions of the readers. Dante's view no less than St. Augustine's is a matrix of symbolic interpretation in which man's fate is read both in his soul's course and in history. History is man's path written large. This history is lineal. There is no return, no cycle. The beginning was creation, the fall, the coming of Christ, that unique point that changes the succeeding course of history and is followed by the second coming that drops the curtain upon the drama of God's mastery into a cast of the saved and the damned. Christian history and metaphysics are intertwined.

The Bible writes metaphysics as though metaphysics were history. In other words, in the Bible God is not the most abstract and comprehensive universal but the Absolute Singular, known not by speculative deduction of the attributes from the pure idea of him, but by meditation upon his recorded deeds in history.\(^7\)

Marx utilized this same scheme to lay the foundations of his own system and in that sense he still remained true to his Judaic heritage. In understanding this time-continuity, he came into contact with the lost realm of certainty that was once the armor and protection of the laity of Christian

metaphysics. They returned to the arena of truthful certainty which precisely was what was lost when metaphysics lost its claim and yet improved upon it since it metamorphosed itself with the obvious, the certain, the factual, and the concrete.

Yet, even if the concept of continuity were to be abandoned, the historian could quite legitimately invoke the assumption of the discontinuous and pursue his work. Historical works would then be comparisons of different times directly. Teleology might conceivably lose its place of prominence, but that would not shake the hold of the historical method. The main and paramount assumption of history is that a work, or idea, must be confronted within the tradition and its institutions, and it is this that gives it meaning and is the test of truth. The work itself, at most, is only one further bit of collaborating evidence to support the main contention. Hence, one can see what any author "really" means by comprehending it within the historical setting. The value of this procedure is obvious, for it is an appeal to "facts"—the verifiable products of a false theory. Thus, history depends upon accepting a value judgement as true (and better yet, if it is an unexamined premise.) It assumes the thing to be proved; as for its conclusion, it is not embarrassed by the lack of critical reflection upon itself.

In looking back on past ages, the certainty of just what men of a distant age really thought remains illusive.
Dreams and ideals in a dead man's head are hardly the accessible property of investigators. But one thing is "certain" and that is the institutions that were left behind, for one can infer much from these tangible remains. They were certain that the thought of the past age must be embodied. The new thought can be seen mirrored in the institutions much like geological deposits read by the geologist. These are the facts that are unarguable. From these firm facts one can build a structure by virtue of which all else can be seen as radiating lines from a locus of points. If a problem is raised, the task is to revert the process and see it within the light of the age's institutions and traditions molded in the firm stuff of objective certainty. This is the field of the historian. Examining institutions and their effect upon man includes the work of the anthropologist, sociologist, and culturalist. The test of this, the historian's hypothesis, would be quite simple if there were in fact a positive correlation between the progress of man and his institutions. Assuming this correlation, social man or historical man is considered as a function of the tradition and institutions within his culture. He is not just influenced by them but is molded and conditioned by them. They become in fact the collective wisdom of the race and culture. Reflecting the ways in which man has resolved his problems, they, rather than man, become the objects of knowledge. Conditioned by society, his
thoughts are a function of this process and it follows that a lesser role must be relegated to him rather than to society or the state. Both Locke and Mill sought an alternative in their concepts of natural law and natural right when confronted with this obvious conclusion. They sought to protect the individual and preserve the right of a constant criticism of institutions without man suffering from the absolute state. Not being able to predicate where such criticism or insights might have their source, none, they thought, should be excluded by any arbitrary rule. This latter tradition advances the concept of natural man affecting institutions and not they. The origin of this concept owes itself to a reluctance to advance dogmatism in the face of their admitted thesis of only probable knowledge. On the other hand, if man as a historical being was to espouse other theories, he would seem to oppose the wisdom and history of the race. Hence, it is not an accident that the deduction from such theories necessitates the state to be untouchable and man a servant and an obedient one at that. The moral aspect of this thesis needs little exposition. Yet, the alternative in natural man places a value on thought and moral conduct precisely because it may affect society by changing and redirecting it. So again universal status was now given to natural law and natural right in order to insure the purifying nature of reason as criticism. This conflict between natural man and
social man, or man's obligation to himself as his ideals and those imposed upon him by society as duties, only point to a basic antinomy. Regardless, the issue is no longer obscure. Both concepts view man in relation to society and his effect upon it. The initial concept is therefore the same. They are twins each asserting the same thing, but utilizing different perspectives in applying the consequences. The society in both is the ideal whether the change is made by man or by the institutions. Philosophy, on the contrary, starts with a different approach. It starts with man and ends with him. If in the course of philosophy unfolding, the society is altered, so be it, but this is outside of its immediate concern.\textsuperscript{71} The philosopher acts and if others seek to mirror his actions, then undoubtedly society is changed, but it is not incumbent either upon society or the philosopher that it must do so. There is no collective categorical imperative in the offering. Society might indeed reject the philosopher, as it so often has, but it still matters not. The institutions of society may indeed change in the light of the impact of philosophy, but again it should be stressed that this does not reflect any priority for man as a social or natural man. It is in the strictest sense indifferent to fictions held by society. In the indifference lies the wisdom. Philosophy starts with the change

\textsuperscript{71}Cornford, \textit{op. cit.}, IX, 592a.
in the particular man which results from the discipline of philosophy not for the state, society, or institutions, but for himself. This does not preclude that it influences society, for if the members of society become philosophers then society as a whole changes. The outward change of man by virtue of a change in his institutions does not insure any philosophic change. It may leave man as he is, no different than before except for a change of plumbing. Likewise, changing institutions by criticism and redirection without the individual undergoing a basic non-conditioned change is a change of dress which might be attractive but leaves man naked underneath.

Perhaps it might be inquired, why this analysis, this effort to lay bare and repudiate the methodology of the historian? Granting that philosophy and history can be seen as antagonistic intellectual pursuits, what purpose would this advance if the thesis is at once accepted? Or, extending the argument further, even granting the assumption of its irreconcilable character, what follows that justifies the critique?

Primarily, what is accessible to reason must be treated by reason solely within the realm of reason. The author, his time, his influences, and his psychological character are of no importance. The work or the idea is the only concern and it matters little if he, the author, did or did not write or utter the tome. From evidence to existence is illegitimate.
If the concept is obscure, contradictory, and illogical, so the conclusion follows.

It might be argued that this philosophical analysis is one thing, but the historian's concepts are the tools, respectable tools, and hence must fashion his work. The other side answers that historians are also critics of themselves and were it not that criticism plays a lesser role in this culture than dreams, there would be little to say for it and it would have been dispelled long ago.

The concept of Western Civilization moving in an ordered straight line carrying with it all the wealth of the ages and depositing it along the shores of the present is the main and most basic concept of the historian. It takes the name of the "Western Continuity" and asserts the indigenous character of western society—nothing of value came from the outside, all that is of worth can be seen to have been derived from the Ancient Hellenics, the Romans, the Dark Ages, the Renaissance, to the Modern Ages. If there was, on the other hand, evidence to support the contention that the concept of Western Continuity is a myth and that there in fact was no such connection between Greece and Rome, 72 much less

72 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1945), pp. 138-9. Berdyaev's point is that Renaissance Platonism bears but a slight resemblance to that of the Ancient World and "such resemblances as exist are merely superficial and illusory."
between Greece, Rome and Europe, it would be recognized as a myth. It is interesting to see the conclusions of the scholars at this point, i.e., the masters of history examining the concept of Western Continuity. Charles Homer Haskins, looking back on time, attempts to fix the origins of the "Modern Age" and he advances the belief that the source can be traced to the Sicilian Court of Frederick II where the Byzantine and Islamic influences were strongly felt.73 Turning to Burckhart, he sees the rise of the discovery of man in the Renaissance and asserts this is "really" where the foundations of Western Civilization has its roots. But the historical techniques and scholarship of Burckhart have been carefully reviewed and subjected to careful scrutiny by Jan Huizinga and in this careful analysis, he demonstrates the very poor scholarship and biases of Burckhart.74 One can readily understand why he chose to argue that the modern age has its roots in the Renaissance since he is a Catholic historian who naturally feels it incumbent upon himself to mirror a theological belief in history. Again, one need not single out Huizinga, for Dr. Coulton does a similar analysis on Cardinal


Newman's "Gothic Man," the transmitter of the Greek-Roman and Christian heritage, and finds the same scholarship and biases in Newman as in Burckhart. The example of Oskar Halecki should be noted since he demonstrates the untenable distinction involved in fixing the limits of Western Civilization showing that this prejudiced judgement shows itself in the elasticity of their very boundaries as they shift from the Rhine, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, and the Pyrenees. Or, the course of reading may turn to Barraclough who finds himself in a quandary in his inability to define what he means by the familiar concept of Western Civilization. Hence what is asserted as without merit by a brief philosophical view is seen by historians themselves as questionable. Thus, among historians, there is little accord or agreement, even among the masters, since their conclusions dance as the premises shift.

Even if one were to retain and define adequately the distinctions necessary for history, the problem would remain,

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i.e., how to choose among conflicting authorities. Consider that if history could be predictive, a true history, a tragic flaw would persist, because by being predictive, it must presuppose no new factor. There would be a need for a history of the history's effect upon history, and so on to the infinite regress from which Aristotle fled.

Returning now, it can be seen that for philosophy, the assumptions of history must first be proved true prior to their employment: universal application. It might be better to suggest reading history for its dramatic import, for entertainment, or as a device to order salient facts for other purposes. This point of view is also expressed by Ferdinand Schevill when he says that History belongs to the world of Art:

... History still in the main, is what it has been since Herodotus invented the form. The major changes are (a) the recent advances of subject matter and (b) the recent severity of scholarly method. This has misled many to call it a science. You may, if you will, call its method scientific, but the finished product belongs to the world of art.78

78 Ferdinand Schevill, Six Historians (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1956), Notes on Historiography, p. 201.
CHAPTER III

MISAPPPELLATION AND CONFUSION OF DIALECTIC

I. FOREWORD

Kant, Hegel, and Jung use the term dialectic, but it seems that the only thing they share in common is their disagreement as to the scope and end of dialectic. The term "dialectic" now includes so many different meanings that the examination of these authors should be undertaken to determine what, if any, usage is consistent with the original Platonic.

This does not imply or suggest that the private vocabulary of philosophers should be abandoned; merely that the new terms to cover new processes or concepts should not be presented in terms otherwise well defined.

The conclusion to this section can readily be seen from what has preceded, but since these philosophers have employed a similar term--dialectic--the exercise shall be attempted. The examination will not advance the concept of dialectic, but it is justified as an example of how the concept of Dialectic has undergone a radical change since its original formulation.
II. KANT

The much discussed opposition between philosophy and religion in European thought actually never was much of a conflict nor could it be considered as a serious last-ditch battle between eternal foes. The philosophers in question were, with few exceptions, all Christians and at most they merely set in motion systems of thought in opposition to certain tenets of the Church's teachings. But at the same time, they were always careful not to appear to be evolving an alternative and competing metaphysics with a vindicating epistemological side. Rather, they remained Christians resting their salvation within Christian symbols. They adopted the very same epistemology and structure as their "opposition" for they retreated into certainty, indubitable truths, and appeals to faith. Their souls were saved and they sought the conquest of nature. The conquest of nature was not, however, conceived as such; for nature was the material through which certain knowledge could be attained, simply because salvation was thought as separate and distinct from the quest of knowledge. Salvation through faith assured the soul an escape from the inferno. Thus, knowledge was sought for along other lines. They had only one other world—the natural world—since entry into any other could only be as a competitor to Christianity. The methodology for this quest was the new
science and mathematics. There men sought the new knowledge under the model of self-evident and certain mathematics.

As with Descartes, their systems of thought were meant to indicate that the new science could be a source of knowledge and yet, at the same time, need not demand a mechanistic concept of nature, i.e., theirs was actually an apologetics for their intellectual life and, in its appeal to self-evident truths, a defense against disturbing theological beliefs. True, Hobbes failed to do this; yet, he didn't offer an alternative to Christian salvation. His work was primarily critical. Of course these thinkers were well enough aware of the "enlightening" force of the Christian Inquisition not to step too far. Descartes himself withheld the publishing of his work for three years because of the Galileo affair.¹ In order to secure a philosophical foundation for the new science, Descartes hypothesized two metaphysical entities—the extended and unextended—but this brought with it numerous problems. The rationalists and empiricists chose the unextended and extended respectively and accused each other of foolishness. Hume criticized both for not being aware that certainty cannot be had concerning either ideas, facts, or logic. He, like others of the empirical school, had drifted into scepticism and even denied the possibility of inductive inference. Hence some European philosophers, extending the issue, thought they could even get by without

the hypothesis of God. Concurrently with this, the growth of science was increasing in spite of these philosophical conversations and it appeared that a completely deterministic universe could soon be demonstrated. God, Free Will, and Immortality could be viewed as unnecessary concepts. Kant sought to reintroduce these concepts, define their scope, and also to re-establish the thesis that one could still be a Christian, a scientist, and a philosopher, simultaneously. He did not construct a system of thought towards a God; he offered no alternative to Christian metaphysics; rather, he intended to perform two services: One, to deny the claims of "speculative" reason to transcendent insight; and two, to restore the ethical force of practical reason. "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith." But speculative reason stood as an obstacle to the employment of practical reason; in fact, it extended a thesis discounting its value. Therefore, Kant attacks the claim of speculative reason and attempts to reintroduce the regulative side of reason--morality. However, the point at issue here is not to recapitulate the rise of Kantian philosophy, nor chart the general rise of European philosophy. The point is that Kant claims to employ dialectic and therefore

the question is simply: (1) define its nature and scope of activity, and (2) examine Kant's contribution to the role of dialectic. Primarily, his work is not a dialogue; it offers no dialectical technique, no personal envolvement, no "risk" in any Jungian sense: it is a monologue. Its subject is reason itself. The attempt is to deal with it in its universal character—the conclusions binding on all mankind. He says of dialectic:

In former times dialectic was studied with great diligence. This art presented false principles in the semblance of truth, and sought, in accordance with these, to maintain things in semblance. Amongst the Greeks the dialecticians were advocates and rhetoricians who could lead the populace wherever they chose, because the populace lets itself be deluded with semblance. Dialectic was therefore at that time the art of semblance. In logic, also, it was for a long time treated under the name of the art of disputation, and during that period all logic and philosophy was the cultivation by certain chatterboxes of the art of semblance. But nothing can be more unworthy of a philosopher than the cultivation of such an art. Dialectic in this form, therefore, must be altogether suppressed, and instead of it there must be introduced into logic a critical examination of this semblance.

We should then have two parts of logic: the analytic, which will treat of the formal criteria of truth, and the dialectic, which will contain the marks and rules by which we can know that something does not agree with the formal criteria of truth, although it seems to agree with them. Dialectic in this form would have its use as a cathartic of the understanding.2

Aside from Kant's ignorance of the theory and history of dialectic, it is clear that he has employed a special use for

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this term. Kant says that in regard to knowledge of form, as opposed to its content, the criterion of truth must be found in logic because there the universal and necessary rules of the understanding are found. Hence, "Whatever contradicts these rules is false. For the understanding would thereby be made to contradict its own general rules of thought, and so contradict itself."3 This is the General Logic—the principles of all logical criticism—and is therefore entitled the analytic. If the logical form is valid, the content can be examined to determine its validity:

We must first independently of logic, obtain reliable information; only then are we in a position to enquire, in accordance with logical laws, into the use of this information and its connection in a coherent whole, or rather to test it by these laws. There is however, something so tempting in the possession of an art so specious, through which we give to all our knowledge, however, uninstructed we may be in regard to its content, the form of understanding, that general logic which is merely a canon of judgment, has been employed as if it were an organon for the actual production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and has thus been misapplied. General logic, when thus treated as an organon, is called dialectic.4

In the employment of reason, certain concepts may be used which have their origin in and through the empirical or phenomenal world and no difficulties are encountered until they are utilized beyond this specific domain. If these concepts—what

3Smith (trans.), Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B84, A60, (p. 98).
he calls the categories of the understanding—are employed to characterize reality, then they have recourse to terms which are binding only in the phenomenal world and hence they are misapplied. If the categories of the understanding are nevertheless used to apply to reality itself, to what he calls the noumenal world, then it is invalid—not logically, however, since they may indeed accord with the formal rules of logic. This misapplication of the categories of the understanding to reality itself, the noumenal world, is simply an error of judgement, since the terms are valid only phenomenally. To demonstrate this spurious character, a criticism is applied, a technique of eliciting their error; hence, this is the function of the transcendental dialectic. The arguments in which these categories of the understanding are misused have all the formal aspects of a valid argument, but they are nevertheless illusions. The function of his dialectic is to make explicit this illusionary character. Therefore the important controversy between Platonic and Kantian dialectic at this point is whether the ultimate is capable of being reached, or, in Kantian terms, if the transcendental dialectic is able to resolve and dissipate the illusion so that the real, the noumenal, can be seen. In Plato, the dialectic is a discipline leading to the Good; while in Kant, the dialectic can merely demonstrate that the categories of the understanding are valid only phenomenally
and therefore must be confined to experience.\footnote{The term "experience" is used strictly in the Kantian reference.} It does not by that very insight, however, in any way remove its force—the illusion remains. The dialectic, in Kant's presentation, is restricted to detecting the illusion of transcendental judgements. It exposes them; it does not destroy it:

\ldots That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually disappear and cease to be an illusion, is something which transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve. For here we have to do with a natural and inevitable illusion, which rests on subjective principles, and foists them upon us as objective.\footnote{Smith (trans.), Immanuel Kant's \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, \textit{op. cit.}, A296, B355, (p. 300).}

It is one thing to say that reason, or the transcendental dialectic, is incapable of overcoming the transcendental illusion, and completely another thing to assert that it is therefore forever outside the grasp of man. It is obvious that man reasoning, thinking thoughts, will not by that very activity experience a state of not thinking thoughts. Or, again, the habitual modes of conceiving the world will not lose their function by thinking new thoughts. To know the world as it is, the noumenal, the thing in itself, presupposes that man knowing and experiencing must first remove the veils and projective devices that permit reality to become assimilated, finite, and thereby understandable to reason. The
real issue to philosophy is whether reason functioning as a cathartic tool can remove its own impediments to that vision of reality. To acknowledge that reality is beyond reason, supra-rational, is possible either by a dogmatic statement or by a discovery through reason realizing its own limitations by the intuition, or nous, going beyond reason itself. With Kant, it is a dogmatic assertion, hence it may still work towards skepticism and anti-rationalism. Kant, of course, escapes the skepticism because the lack of certain rational proof provides the grounds for the commitment of faith; but if one is not a Christian, it may conceivably advance the cause of skepticism.

The illusion does have a vast popular appeal. Kant acknowledges that it furthers speculation and has practical, or ethical, ramifications. This human disposition to speculate beyond the legitimate employment of empirical categories is a natural tendency. On the other hand, this tendency cannot be rationally defended. The Christian accepts his thesis on faith and appeals to reason, but no matter how comforting it may be, it can carry no cognitive weight. Stated in familiar terms: one's conviction of the truth of a thesis

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7 Ibid., A466, B494-A476, B504, (pp. 424-426).

does not add any cognitive evidence to the assertion. Therefore, Kant's employment of dialectic is negative. It is a logic of illusion.\textsuperscript{8} This illusion is not, however, a merely logical illusion, for when attention is brought to bear upon it (the logical illusion) and the formal fallacy is demonstrated, the illusion completely disappears.\textsuperscript{9} The illusion to which dialectic addresses itself is, on the contrary, a transcendental illusion which

\textellipsis\textellipsis\textellipsis does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism (e.g. the illusion in the proposition: the world must have a beginning in time). The cause of this is that there are fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason, and that these have all the appearance of being objective principles.\textsuperscript{10}

Therefore, the dialectic in Kant has a negative or regulative employment. He says:

The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgements, and at the same time taking precautions that we be not deceived by it. That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually disappear and cease to be an illusion, is something which transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve. For here we have to do with a natural and inevitable illusion, which rests on subjective principles, and foists them upon us as objective; whereas logical dialectic in its exposure of deceptive inference has to do merely with an error in the following out of principles, or with an illusion artificially created in imitation of such inferences. There

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., A293, B350, (p. 297).
\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., A296, B353, (p. 299).
\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., A297, B354, (p. 299).
exists, then a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason—not one in which a bungler might entangle himself through lack of knowledge, or one which some sophist has artificially invented to confuse thinking people, but one inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into momentary aberrations over and again calling for correction.\textsuperscript{11}

The specific application of the dialectic reaches its culmination in the antinomies of pure reason, for it is there that Kant refers to them as "the dialectic play of cosmological ideas." That there are only four basic antinomies is obvious since there are only four series of synthetic presuppositions that a priori limit the empirical synthesis:

\begin{align*}
\textbf{T} & \quad \textbf{A} \\
\text{Thesis} & \quad \text{Antithesis} \\
\text{The world has a beginning} & \quad \text{The world has no beginning}, \\
\text{in time, and is also limited} & \quad \text{and no limits in space; it} \\
\text{as regards space}. & \quad \text{is infinite as regards both} \\
\text{time and space}. & \quad \text{time and space}.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Every composite substance in} & \quad \text{No composite thing in the} \\
\text{the world is made up of simple} & \quad \text{world is made up of simple} \\
\text{parts, and nothing anywhere} & \quad \text{parts, and nowhere} \\
\text{exists save the simple or what} & \quad \text{exists in the world any-} \\
\text{is composed of the simple}. & \quad \text{thing simple}.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Causality in accordance with} & \quad \text{There is no freedom;} \\
\text{laws of nature is not the only} & \quad \text{everything in the world} \\
\text{causality from which the appear-} & \quad \text{takes place solely in} \\
\text{ances of the world can one and} & \quad \text{accordance with laws of} \\
\text{all be derived. To explain} & \quad \text{nature}.\textsuperscript{14}
\text{these appearances it is neces-} & \quad \text{these appearances it is neces-} \\
\text{sary to assume that there is} & \quad \text{sary to assume that there is} \\
\text{also another causality, that} & \quad \text{also another causality, that} \\
\text{of freedom}. & \quad \text{of freedom}.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, A298, B355, (p.300). \quad \textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, A426, B454, (p.396).
\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, A434, B462, (p.402). \quad \textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, A444, B472, (p.409).
Thesis
There belongs to the world either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{15}

Antithesis
An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.\textsuperscript{15}

The four antinomies are the central issues in philosophy. They are central because they are the concern of a predominantly Christian era that has woven a fabric of thought from assumptions derived from theological beliefs. To admit they are the central issues of philosophy is but to acknowledge the importance of this set of theological beliefs, but, to the Platonist, these questions are part of the class of "likely stories," whereas the real philosophical questions and problems have a different emphasis—the dialectical treatment of concepts moving towards the removal of ignorance.

Kant presents these conflicting systems which are mutually exclusive theses, and attempts to demonstrate the antinomical character of reason. He does not engage in any midwifery; rather, he holds up to reason a statement of its own conflict. Kant has claimed that he has demonstrated the logical character of each of these four antinomies of reason, both the thesis and antithesis, and that he has taken full responsibility to thereby show the certainty of the inevitable

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., A452, B480, (p. 415).
antinomy of reason. 16 Be that as it may, there are certain reservations, since many of the arguments are poorly constructed. 16a Nevertheless, the issue is whether this accomplishes his end, and if this is dialectic. Let it be assumed that these two arguments, the rationalist's and the empiricist's cosmological theses, can be held by some hypothetical person; where then is the dialectic? The Kantian framework presents these positions formally in parallel columns; both are assumed to be formally logical; and Kant argues the incompatibility of these propositions rests entirely upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely as regards appearance to things in themselves, and confusing both in one concept. 17 The resolution of the antinomical character of these theses is quite simple. Kant proves they are false because they are founded upon a contradictory concept. It should first be remembered that he demonstrates that both space and time are applicable only to appearances since they have their origins in the forms of sensibility, i.e., objects experienced always are known or given within space and time and hence they can be considered as the very forms through which, or by which, one conceives the very experience of objects. Or stated in another way,

16Ibid., A421, B449, (pp. 393-94).
16aIbid., pp. 483-499.
17Ibid., A486, B514, (p. 437); A490, B518, (pp. 438-39); A525, B497, (p. 443); A506, B534, (p. 448).
these concepts (space and time) are presupposed in experience before it can be experienced, but experience does not presuppose only the form of the receptivity, hence they are always prior to the act of experience. Or, as Kant says, they are a priori. Space and time therefore are nothing in themselves, but only modes of representation. Yet, these arguments—both the thesis and antithesis—assume just such an independent character for space and time, and they assume that space and time are independent of their representations; but, if they are only given through them, why then defend the divorce? Assuming they are not self-subsisting apart from their representation, it is contradictory to assume they are so for cosmological considerations, i.e., the motive or intent of an argument hardly can be considered sufficient to change the character of the origin of concepts as well as regulate for their respective employment. At this point, it is not even important whether this is in fact true. The issue remains: How does this dialectically demonstrate their untenability? True, they are both mutually exclusive propositions and they both extend the categories of the understanding beyond their legitimate employment, but this is only true if the general criticism of reason as outlined by Kant is valid. The attempt here (in Kant) is to judge them both guilty and therefore invalid aside from their practical, speculative, and popular
appeal. The solution presupposes the individual accepting such a stalemate as conclusive evidence of their dubious character and of concurring that this is in fact an extension of categories beyond their legislated scope. Hence, his conclusion rests upon a higher criticism, not upon a dialectic. The arguments have not been shown to be invalid by any reductio, merely upon their mutual cancelling weight before reason. The object lesson that Kant wishes to draw is that suspicion should be aroused as to the proper use of reason, or concepts, in such arguments. However, the dialectical encounter need not employ such a form. It would question the asserter, either the rationalist or the empiricist, and draw from him the premises for asserting this cosmological argument, determine the reasons for its acceptance, and then judge that—not the thesis—for upon the one the other rests. The dialectician would approach Kant's dictum of destroying knowledge in order to make room for faith and would examine this in itself. Certainly Kant's main claim to fame is not in his anticipation of certain positivistic theories, but in the practical employment of

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18 Ibid., A502, B530, (p. 446). "It is impossible to decide between them," and cf. A475, B503 (p. 430), presumably a person can be in a "state of continuous vacillation" between the arguments.
reason in order to make room for ethics and faith. The issue for the dialectician would be to examine if morality has its roots in practical reason; why the concept of will is central to his thought, or why, if his inherited theological beliefs are shown to be invalid, should they be saved for practical considerations? Or, again, why consider morality in the light of law or imperatives? What would be abhorrent in assuming morality to be a function of man's inward growth? Before leaving Kant, there is a more general and important point to be examined. Granted that Kant's use of dialectic is a private usage and that he does not advance any additional factors to this study, still his doctrine as such does invite another issue of general importance. It raises the question of content. Is it to be assumed that dialectic can learn nothing therefore from Kant? However, since he might have employed another term than dialectic, the issue can be extended to the question: Of what value are the non-dialectical philosophies from the dialectician's viewpoint? This question is certainly a central issue and needs examination.

Primarily, dialectic as a philosophy begins with the individual who is "pregnant," hence it is an individual process. Whatever the formal grounds for asserting a position, the dialectician would profit from the general knowledge that he may have of some formal philosophical issue or problem, but that does not justify the use of any higher
critical employment of reason on universal grounds. That it has this added factor is certainly interesting, but this is only to say that it can be attacked from more than one point of view. Returning the question to Plato, we can immediately see a basis for a parallel. Theaetetus assumes knowledge is perception and is quite content to pursue the argument strictly along this line, but Socrates adds to this theory the implications of Theaetetus' position among ontological and ethical issues. Socrates shows that his (Theaetetus') notion of knowledge is in fact Protagoras' doctrine of Man as the measure of all things, and that this assumes that the nature of reality is in a state of flux: or Heraclitus' thesis. So, too, the Kantian should be able to demonstrate that the asserter of any position, of either the thesis or the antithesis, involves a conception of man, religion, philosophy and ethics or morality. Both asserters, the Kantian and Theaetetus, would suffer more from the ensuing catharsis. On the Platonic analogy, the issue was resolved quite early in the dialogue, but not the consequences of the assumption. Hence the dialectician could effect more far-reaching results by the knowledge of these formal positions. It could and does act as a matrix from which to draw the consequences. However, to demonstrate that the idea itself is at fault by use of a higher criticism without an examination of the reasons of the asserter or of his presuppositions,
indicates skepticism towards the role of philosophy as a whole. Therefore, from the considerations of dialectic, the issue is always the individual and his encounter during the midwifery. One can of course raise the question: What then would be the final philosophical solution of the major philosophical problems? Or, in other terms, what is the formal content of the dialectical philosophy? It is this question that still needs examination, but which must be put off until further examinations are made.

III. HEGEL

Hegel reintroduces Anaxagoras' Nous and gives a wide scope to philosophy. He says:

The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the object is truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the truth.\(^{19}\)

He also employs dialectic and the problem will be to determine the usage and to see if it can advance the concept of philosophy as dialectic.

Primarily, Hegel was the recipient of Kant's concept of dialectic and to it he added further elements that in no way made for a qualitative advantage. Hegel was not content

with the antinomical character of reason he inherited from 
Kant, he added a third term which was intended to blend 
their mutually exclusive natures into a new thing— the syn-
thesis. He took the name Kant originally gave to this and 
continued what was with Kant a misappellation. He claimed 
for this the name of dialectic. The essential thing in 
his dialectic is that the apparent opposition between the 
thesis and the antithesis are reconciled in this higher 
union; they are harmoniously joined by this broader concept 
of a synthesis.

Hegel's dialectic is subsumed under logic and is part 
of a triad of the Abstract, Dialectical, and Speculative. 
Each of these three corresponds to the understanding, negative 
reason, and positive reason. It is not as parts, however, that 
Hegel views these, but rather as the "moments" in every logi-
cal entity, that is, of every notion and truth whatever."20 
The abstract side, or thought as understanding, is character-
ized by the distinct, and limits the abstract and treats it 
"as having a subsistence and being of its own."21 It is this

20Ibid., par. 79, p. 143.
21Ibid., par. 80, a), p. 143.
capacity that is well known in the sciences as the spirit of classifying: it "is not satisfied with cloudy and indefinite impressions, but grasps the objects in their fixed character." In this activity, understanding must not, however, go too far, as Hegel says, because it is not an ultimate, "but on the contrary finite, and so constituted that when carried to extremes it veers round to its opposite." Hence out of the abuse of the understanding it sets up its own opposite; therefore, it becomes negative reason or dialectic. If this opposite negative factor is presented, then it is a "mere negation," and is dialectical skepticism when its application is applied to philosophical theories. Its true employment does not function in this restricted manner for Hegel; rather, it has far grander grounds since it "is the very nature and essence of everything predicated by more understanding--the law of things and of the finite as a whole." Dialectic then is a factor of nature herself, for here the

... indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sideness and limitation of the predicates of the understanding is seen in its true light, and shown to be the

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22 Ibid., par. 80, p. 145.
23 Ibid., par. 80, p. 146.
24 Ibid., par. 81, b) (I), p. 147.
25 Ibid., par. 81, b) (2), p. 147.
negation of them. 26

Hegel's dialectic is not just logic since there is no real difference in his writings between logic and metaphysics. Hence the dialectic is capable of portraying the movement of life:

Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge which is truly scientific. 27

The understanding may not concur with these findings and may be reluctant to admit the action of the dialectic, but Hegel insists the recognition does not rest within the understanding because the dialectic gives expression to a law which is "felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience." 28

Everything finite changes, is forced "to turn suddenly into its opposite" 29 and,

... in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself. 30

Hegel finds traces of the presence of dialectic in the natural world—in the motion of the heavenly bodies—in that motion itself allows for the possibility of being in another location. He finds it in law and morality, in politics, and in the ethi-

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., par. 81, b) (2), (I), p. 148.
28 Ibid., par. 81, b) (2) (I), p. 150. 29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
cal life and, of course, in history. Each realm in which it operates resolves itself by its movement into its own opposite, its own negative:

... For the negative, which emerges as the result of dialectic, is, because a result, at the same time the positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into itself, and made part of its own nature. Thus conceived, however, the dialectical stage has the features characterising the third grade of logical truth, the speculative form, or form of positive reason.

Understanding makes distinctions ruinous to themselves as it passes into their own opposites and becomes negative reason or dialectic. But this, too, emerges as a negative with a positive side because it absorbs into itself part of its own nature. Thus, it becomes positive or speculative. It apprehends the unity of propositions in their opposition—"the affirmative, which is involved in their dis-integration and in their transition." Speculation or the speculative stage of reason or logic means two things to Hegel. He says:

... first, that what is immediately at hand has to be passed and left behind; and secondly, that the subject-matter of such speculations, though in the first place only subjective, must not remain so, but be realised or translated into objectivity.

31 Ibid., par. 81, b) (2) (I), pp. 150-51.
32 Ibid., par. 81, b) (2) (I), p. 152.
33 Ibid., par. 82, g), p. 152.
34 Ibid., par. 82, f), p. 153.
It is not a subjective process but rises above the opposition of subject and object as a concrete, and for Hegel has an "all embracing nature." This is obviously the language of mysticism and a speculative Truth has just this reference for Hegel:

The mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions which understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition.35

However, this doctrine is mystical only in one sense. It does not advance a mysticism as such, for here the term has only a private meaning; it is mystical only because it goes beyond understanding.36 But by this rule, so too is Kant's dialectic when seen through Hegel's Logic. Understanding, the abstract activity which limits and isolates motions, becomes dialectical, or negative, and passes into positive reason, and it is this process that Hegel thinks is mystical: It goes beyond the understanding. He says:

... But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just consists in

35Ibid., par. 82, g), p. 154.

36Ibid., "... there is a mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions which understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition."
embracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements. Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical—not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding. 37

Thus it would appear that all thought that is not content with the Abstract is mystical. If so, that includes the thought of Karl Marx, which is certainly not without its irony. Hence, for Hegel, the laws of logic are in fact the law of being. The consequences of his logic are binding upon reality. The bare particular cannot be known by the understanding because of its abstract nature; so, too, the human being can only be comprehended when he gives up his uniqueness and is regarded as an aspect of the whole, or to the State, the larger whole to which he is a member. Reason, then, is the Sovereign of the World and "History presents us with a rational process." 38 Thus, the drama of History is but the other side of the coin of his structure of Logic. Nous is the concept of providence 39 but not as intelligence, which would be self-conscious reason, but as Wisdom "endowed with infinite power which realizes its aim: the absolute rational design of the world." 40 This design is the exhibit-

37 Ibid.


39 Ibid., pp. 11 and 16. 40 Ibid., p. 16.
The concept of Spirit involves freedom for "it is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence."\(^4\)

Hegel then turns to history, the history of the world which is "none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom."\(^4\)

Hegelian Philosophy, then, works with history, and in fact must comprehend history as its proper ground of activity. He says:

The insight then to which philosophy is to lead us, is, that the real world is as it ought to be—that the truly good—the universal divine reason—is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realizing itself. This Good, this Reason, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government—the carrying out of his plan—is the History of the world. This plan philosophy strives to comprehend; for only that which has been developed as the result of it, possesses bona fide reality.\(^4\)

He says further that:

Philosophy wishes to discover the substantial support, the real side of the divine idea, and to justify the so much despised Reality of things; for Reason is the comprehension of the Divine work.\(^4\)

The full force of Hegel’s work is just that—a justification of the ways of God\(^4\)—it is, as he himself terms it, A Theodicaea. Kant sought to "make room for Faith" and Hegel sought the same end by his critique—one chose the negative

\(^{41}\)Ibid., pp. 17-18.  \(^{42}\)Ibid., p. 18.

\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 19.  \(^{44}\)Ibid., p. 36.  \(^{45}\)Ibid., p. 36.  \(^{46}\)Ibid., p. 15.
and the other the positive, but both saw themselves as Christians first and philosophers second. The objections to this system, of course, are the same as those to Kant, hence it would be merely a reduplication to repeat; however, the concept of the synthesis is a new and additional factor. It matters little if the concept of synthesis is applied to history or logic. The same flaw is exhibited. It is an appeal to certainty, made certain by the construction of the system itself. It is a request to think in these terms and, presumably, to profit by the change. The assumption that the Speculative follows from the dialectical is merely an assertion justified by an appeal to experience—yet if one does not in fact experience it in this manner, then the system is rejected. On the other hand, if one does, it does not advance any additional cognitive merit or evidence, it is merely a statement or report of how a particular being conceives the world. It is merely another form of dogmatic appeal.

These objections to the concept of Hegel's synthesis might be thought to be too formal and therefore a doubt might be raised, since a synthesis can in some way be seen in a genuine dialectic. In Plato's Republic, the opinions of Justice are examined and are defined in numerous ways:

1. To speak truth and pay your debts.
2. The giving to each what is proper to him.
3. To be good to friends and harm enemies.
4. The interest of the stronger.
5. The greatest Good.
These first four alternatives are rejected, but not because they are incorrect, but because the asserter cannot properly defend his definition. The final statement of the nature of Justice does not contradict any of the previous four, since it can be seen in them (as the definition is always secondary to the test of the understanding). The first four alternatives are not synthesized into a new concept which embraces all the others, nor does it arrive at a new concept reconciling their contradictions: for if the individual knew his actual debts, knew what was proper, what was good to friends and what would harm enemies, and if he knew in what lies the "stronger interest," he would have resolved the problem. Hence in the Platonic dialectic, the synthesis, if one can ignore Hegel's reference, would not be a logical one, but spring from the recognition of the object. There is no problem of resolving contradictions into a higher synthesis--only an appeal for the mind to grant a deeper understanding of what is essentially the same definition but in a new way, a more profound way, and in a more personal manner. The elements in this new non-Hegelian synthesis would mean the resolution of many diverse parts into a higher unity or complex whole. The insight of this higher referent would provide an opportunity to see the same part in a richer whole and, therefore, the same definition could be maintained by a richer understanding. There is absolutely no petition to the reconciliation of mutually
exclusive thesis and antithesis in this synthesis. The criticism of an apagoric alternative need not be repeated here. It is far too common.

The historical side of the system has already been dealt with since this is merely another appeal to history and as such is fraught with the same weaknesses. It is quite possible to read into history any theory of history one assumes as the ordering agent.

The Greek term "dialectic" (which was understood as a discussion between equal partners, derived from "dialogue") now includes or is meant to signify the study of opposites and their unity in either logic or history. Such is the private use of language in philosophy. However, the Hegelian dialectic has no reference to individuals in a philosophical quest, has no reference to the catharsis or involvement psychologically; there is no midwifery, and he has no concept of the removal of ignorance as the condition for that perception of the Good. Similar to Kant, it does not extend the concept of dialectic, and has abrogated the term for private nomenclature. Therefore, from the point of view of its essential meaning, neither Kant nor Hegel concerns himself with a real dialectic. There is as little reason to allow the term dialectic to be legitimately applied to Kant as there is to Hegel, who adopted the concept from Kant, since their use of the term confuses or hides its original meaning. This view does not
assume that a dialectical philosophy cannot profit from the study of their respective systems, only that insofar as the study of dialectic per se is concerned, it does not advance that study one iota. It might be that Hegel's system could provide the basis for a religious or mystical group. His triad of the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis could, conceivably, support a structure of belief, yet all of this would be beside the point, for the only question here is not its availability for a discipline, a sadhana, but its contribution to the dialectic. The movement from the antithesis might be understood as a prelude to the synthesis and the struggle to move from the one to the other could be considered as a psychological preparation for the latter—as in the nature of a spiritual discipline—but, even if that were granted, the point is whether Hegel can advance the concept of dialectic, and not if he can or cannot become an element in a religious or spiritual system. By the same logic, it is not denied that Kant's system might also have a religious function in the attempt to save the concept of Christian faith, and again it would be foolish to deny that some Christians arrive at an insight into the nature of reality in their vision of God, but the only issue here is what extent they can advance dialectic as defined in this dissertation. Hence, as with Christianity and Kant, the Hegelian contribution is nil.
IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF JUNG

In the past fifty years, there has been a phenomenal growth of literature contributing to the solution of human ills and it is significant that psychology has been responsible for a large share. Yet, while this is true, it is equally true that there seems to be a reluctance on the part of psychologists to state the principles upon which their healing art depends.47 It may be that the formal statement of principles is always a late development of a science and, hence, one should bide one's time until a more formidable body of knowledge has been amassed, tested, and been made respectable by the procedures of science.

A craftsman, according to Plato,48 is one who is ignorant of the principles upon which his art depends, which, however, does not interfere with the execution of his art, and this seems true also of the therapist.49 Yet this paucity of reflection does make it difficult to comprehend it within the class of other intellectual pursuits. Certainly there is no scarcity of material for the psychologists; quite the contrary, for insofar as its application, scope, and techniques are concerned, there is a vast body of learning and it is only

49 Jung, op. cit., par. 86.
when one attempts to examine principles that there appears a shortage. Whatever the reason for this condition, undoubtedly it is quite valid, the result is that it presents a problem for the inquiring mind not formally identified with psychology to objectively determine its real contribution along lines other than pragmatic. The few occasions in which psychologists have allowed themselves the luxury of reflection resulted in a kind of provisional set of principles permitting only tentative conclusions. One of these men, Carl Jung, found it necessary to extend his psychological perspective beyond the narrow confines of his own "art" into other intellectual systems such as primitive psychology, comparative mythology, and religion. He found this was necessary in order to discover a matrix for the resolution of dream symbols and for their amplification. This wide grasp and acquaintance with other systems provides him with a basis on which to compare and sift the residual produce of his analysis and to report his results within the scope of not just his special art, but equally well within other intellectual systems. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, he is considered the spokesman for psychology. His acquaintance with other systems of thought gives him the basis for two interest-

50 Ibid., pars. 86 and 184.
51 Ibid., par. 44 and cf. par. 96.
ing comparisons. Primarily he acknowledges the role of philosophy in life and refers to his own role as that of a philosopher:

I can hardly draw a veil over the fact that we psychologists ought really to be philosophers or philosophic doctors—or rather that we are already so, though we are unwilling to admit it because of the glaring contrast between our work and what passes for philosophy in the universities.\textsuperscript{52}

and further, he concludes that Western man does not possess any monopoly of human wisdom.\textsuperscript{53} Jung does more than acknowledge the philosophical inquiry since he considers it

\ldots as the most complex of psychic structures, a man's philosophy of life forms the counterpole to the physiologically conditioned psyche, and, as the highest psychic dominant, it ultimately determines the latter's fate."\textsuperscript{54}

For him philosophy is not chosen objectively, "it is an essentially subjective system."\textsuperscript{55}

The intent here is not to present or restate his theory of psychology, only to examine the manner in which dialectic functions within his system. Jung characterizes the method of psychotherapy as dialectic, a dialogue or discussion between two persons\textsuperscript{56} and in his statement of the role of the therapist he draws the figure of a dialectician:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52}Ibid., par. 181.
  \item \textsuperscript{53}Ibid., par. 188.
  \item \textsuperscript{54}Ibid., pars. 180 and 218.
  \item \textsuperscript{55}Ibid., par. 189.
  \item \textsuperscript{56}Ibid., par. 1.
\end{itemize}
If I wish to treat another individual psychologically at all, I must for better or worse give up all pretensions to superior knowledge, all authority and desire to influence. I must perforce adopt a dialectical procedure consisting in a comparison of our mutual findings. But this becomes possible only if I give the other person a chance to play his hand to the full, unhampered by my assumptions. In this way his system is cleared to mine and acts upon it; my reaction is the only thing with which I as an individual can legitimately confront my patient.57

Jung is cognizant of the principle that this procedure of the dialectic necessitates that the "therapist must abandon all his preconceptions and techniques and confine himself to a purely dialectical procedure, adopting the attitude that shuns all methods."58 Naturally this involves the therapist in the process as much as the patient, thus they both become "fellow participants in a process of individual development."59 The mantle of the doctor is given up and he dons the philosophic garment, for it is the ancient dialectical rule that reason from whatever source must be heeded; it is the only "doctor"--dialectic is inconceivable if the therapist does not emerge from his usual cloak of anonymity.60 Psychotherapy for Jung consists of the use of dialectic and he is aware that the dialectic is not to be utilized with all patients indiscriminately. He admits that for some a dose of common

57Ibid., par. 2; cf. par. 8.
58Ibid., pars. 6, 239, and 289.
59Ibid., par. 7. 60Ibid., par. 23; cf. par. 8.
sense, a slap on the back and some good advice may be sufficient and, hence, that not all individuals need to engage in the bewildering process of the dialectic. 61 He also refrains from employing the dialectic if the ensuing change would involve too great a sacrifice on the part of the patient. 62 In these latter cases, the problem is "either refuse to treat the patient or risk the dialectical procedure." 63 Further, for others, the dialectic may be engaged on a limited scale until such time as the patient can accept some collective solution; i.e., referring patients to their respective religions for, he adds, "there is no point in promoting individual development beyond the needs of the patient." 64 If, however, the individual refuses this ushering into religion even under the guise of a cure, then Jung finds no other recourse than to risk what he calls a "major psychotherapy." 65 Jung seems somewhat reluctant to take on these cases, since the risk is shared equally and not just carried by the patient. He says:

The question then arises whether the therapist is prepared to risk having his convictions dashed and shattered against the truth of the patient. If he wants to go on treating the patient he must abandon all preconceived notions and, for better or worse, go with him in search of the religious and philosophical ideas that best correspond to the patient's emotional states. These ideas

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61 Ibid., par. 11. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., par. 21. 65 Ibid., par. 240.
present themselves in archetypal form, freshly sprung from the maternal soil whence all religious and philosophical systems originally came. But if the therapist is not prepared to have his convictions called in question for the sake of the patient, then there is some reason for doubting the stability of his basic attitude.

The search, he says, therefore, must be for religious and philosophical ideas which almost seems to be a return to a philosophy joined with the tool of dialectic. If so, it can be expected that a new kind of Platonic philosophy will emerge. Yet, Jung does not deal with the perplexities of the understanding, nor the contradictions within reason as does the Platonic dialectic for Jung's course is different. He seeks for the archetypal images that, presumably, represent these ideas. Jung has a dialectic, only the object is not Platonic since it is the "dialectical development of the mythological material which is alive in the sick man himself, regardless of history and tradition." Confronted with the mythological images of the patient, Jung has to risk treatment and attempt to understand these images in a joint effort with the patient. This methodology may be pragmatically successful in psychotherapy, but it doesn't really matter if it is or isn't, for what is of importance is: Why he had recourse to dream symbols? Jung says it is because, with these special cases, "all rational therapy leaves them stuck where they

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66 Ibid., par. 184. 67 Ibid., par. 22.
were."68 It would be interesting to discover just what rational techniques he employed that failed. However, they are not noted. Jung writes quite frankly of the origins and development of his system so it is possible to retrace the steps that brought him to choose dream analysis.69 He says that he is not tied to any mysterious dream theory that dictates the outcome of every dream70 but states, quite candidly, it derives "quite simply from perplexity. I do not know where else to go for help, and so I try to find it in dreams."71 Here in dreams is something definite whatever its nature or intelligibility "and that is better than nothing."72 In short, he "shares all your prejudices against dream-interpretation as the quintessence of uncertainty and arbitrariness."73 His choice of the dream rests on pragmatic consideration:

... on the other hand, I know that if we meditate on a dream sufficiently long and thoroughly, if we carry it around with us and turn it over and over, something almost always comes of it.74

The reply might be that if one were to meditate on anything, any object at all, the same thing would be said--the question would be to determine what is the therapeutic element? Is it the content of the dream or the process of the meditation? Jung does not pursue this line of inquiry. The reason he

68Ibid. 69Ibid., par. 86. 70Ibid. 71Ibid. 72Ibid. 73Ibid. 74Ibid.
holds to this method is that:

... I must content myself wholly with the fact that the result means something to the patient and sets his life in motion again. I may allow myself only one criterion for the result of my labours: Does it work? But just what is it that works? In what lies the curative factor? Having accepted dreams, he discovers difficulties in his choice, for some dreams are "sometimes incredibly strange and baffling." Therefore he turns to primitive psychology, mythology, archaeology, and comparative religion, "because these fields offer me invaluable analogies with which I can enrich the associations of my patients." At this point, one can only wonder if Jung considers the "merely" logical point that the dreams may be incidental to the rich material with which he analogizes and the curative element may simply be in forcing the patient to think more profoundly not about the dream symbol but with the material Jung brings to it. If so, then why not deal directly through the understanding and seek to resolve the opposition to these ideas as in a genuine dialectical encounter?

On the other hand, one might be led to the belief that Jung has a dream-theory, similar to a logic machine where information is cranked in and the results automatically produced. But he, himself, does not subscribe to this belief,

75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., par. 90. 77 Ibid., par. 96.
because "the therapist should give up all his theoretical assumptions and should in every case be ready to construct a totally new theory of dreams." He amplifies his view when he writes that the initial dreams are often lucid, an indication that analysis has not touched "some important layer of the personality" and the measure of the depth of the analysis is readily measured by the opaqueness which at this time, "if the truth be told, the doctor no longer understands the situation as a whole." He continues in a perfect ad hoc argument:

... that he does not understand is proved by the fact that the dreams become increasingly obscure, for we all know that their "obscurity" is a purely subjective opinion of the doctor. To the understanding nothing is obscure; ...

and, with an interesting time reference, dreams finally reveal their clarity:

... if, from a later stage of treatment or from a distance of some years, we look back at these unintelligible dreams, we are often astounded at our own blindness.

Jung's "confession" that he does not know where else to go—and so he went to the dream world—must be looked upon with an element of suspicion, for he is quite knowledgeable about Indian philosophy, "and in considering the psychology of the

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78 Ibid., par. 317. 79 Ibid., par. 313.
80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid.
self we would do well to have recourse to the treasures of Indian wisdom," and "we can learn a great deal from yoga philosophy and turn it to practical account."

With these considerations one might still legitimately wonder why he did not pursue a psychology along meditative lines. The only reason he gives is that the ideas of Alchemy are richer in their extraordinary symbolism and this affords Jung an opportunity to find a resolution of the content of the dream symbol in the matrix of Alchemy, i.e., assuming a value to dream symbols, he pursues the same motif in Alchemy. He is aware of all the burdens involved in reviving the study of Alchemy, is aware of the shortcomings of dream-analysis, of the dangers the therapist must risk in applying the analysis and of the merely "pragmatic" function of his system as a whole, but he chooses this rather than a formal system of meditation or a straightforward dialectical procedure which deals directly with the understanding.

Further, the meditative and philosophical discipline involves a relationship between a student and teacher while the Alchemist is a solitary figure with practically no communication even with other members of his craft. The essential element

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83Ibid., par. 219. 84Ibid. 85Ibid. 86Ibid. 87C. G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Vol. XII, Bollingen Series, XX. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), par. 301.
in the therapy process is the therapist, as is the teacher in philosophy, but this is altogether missing in Alchemy. Therefore, it seems Jung is tied to the medical sciences, to European institutions, and to the use of fictions whose sole value lies in their pragmatic usefulness—even though just what it is that is "pragmatic" is still open to question. His value here is that he has contributed to the revival of dialectic and posits an end for man similar to other mystics, while at the same time does much to offer an alternative to Christianity and thereby helps educate the European from his narcissistic bent.

In concluding, then, it is manifestly clear that the Jungian therapist functions as a midwife in the capacity of "matchmaker"—sending patients to others—but not directly as the "examiner" since he does not bring to birth those who are pregnant in the soul. He also acknowledges a similar end for man as the Platonist and Christian mystic. And it also seems he, as does the Augustinian, misunderstands Plato and the scope available for dialectic—or the Socratic Method, as Jung calls it.88

Further, the Platonic catharsis is the effect of the effective removal of ignorance, the uncovering of half-truths,

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ambiguities, and falsehoods within the understanding by use
of the tool of dialectic. To the Jungian Analyst, and to the
Christian, the concept of catharsis is different—to them it
is the result of the confession of past deeds and thoughts
considered as violations of the moral code. These acts are
kept secret. Being concealed, they isolate the individual
from the community—he participates but is in exile. Afraid
that the secret will be known, he builds within himself a
sense of guilt and fear. Hence the dynamics of the confes-
sional: the fear, guilt, suspicion, and isolation become
intense and they live on as suppressed feelings so that if
the "sinner" could only share the secret with someone he would
thereby give up the very conditions of his own making, i.e.,
the suppressed feelings and secret, and re-enter the moral
community. The Church acted as the impersonal moral agent,
the confessor, and would, by its own inner laws, keep the
secret from the community. It is undoubtedly a fact that for
some individuals this confessional catharsis does have a cura-
tive aspect and the results are often astonishing. But such
a device breeds its own negative aspect: confessing ties the

89Jung writes in The Practice of Psychotherapy, op.
cit., however, that "had catharsis proved itself a panacea,"
psychology would have remained at the level of the confession.
par. 137. Which is to say that the Christian framework of
belief is inadequate to meet the challenge of resolving inner
tensions uncovered during psychotherapy, except for what Jung
terms merely a collective adaptation. Cf. pars. 2 and 21.
individual to his confessor which produces the phenomenon termed the "transference." Naturally this problem is mini-
mized when the Church is the confessor, but when the analyst takes on this role he cannot hide his identity and hence the serious nature of the burden of the transference takes place. Actually this rests upon two different concepts of man--the Platonist view that man is naturally good and the problem is to remove the impediments to that good, while to the Christian, man is in a "fallen state of original sin" and salvation is the result of an act of faith, a repentance of sins, and a belief in the mediator. Hence it can be seen that the therapist has assumed the role of the confessional pursuing a catharsis, which does not affect the understanding directly, for the liberation of the suppressed emotions. Returning to the fixation, or the transference, the removal of this is accomplished by bringing the individual to examine the attachment itself, i.e., educate the individual to see intelligently and emotionally directly the pattern of his own projections. This accomplished, the therapy may conclude itself, but Jung says that it may also continue. If so, this next stage he calls the transformation, "the step from education to self-
education is a logical advance that completes the earlier stages."90 The requirement for this stage is the counter-

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application to the doctor to which he says that "as soon as psychotherapy takes the doctor himself for its subject, it transcends its medical origins and ceases to be merely a method for treating the sick." 91 Recognizing this basic difference from the other stages, he nevertheless utilizes the same structure; therefore, it may be termed a philosophical quest employing psychological tools and methods. The criterion for selection of his technique, rather than strictly philosophic tools, has been noted previously. 92 What is left to be said is that he, or others, have yet to test classic philosophic tools, dialectic and reason, for this fourth stage of transformation, and only when this is done can psychology truly enter into philosophy and Jung can lay just claim to Athens.

91 Ibid., par. 174.
92 Cf. ante, pp. 147-154.
CHAPTER IV

DIALECTIC AND CONTEMPLATION

I. FOREWORD

To this point, the shortcomings of the Dialectic have not been complemented, or corrected, to produce a more cohesive philosophy. Hence, this section shall deal with the classic dialecticians of both Vedanta and Buddhism--Gaudapada, Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Candrakirti--to determine the extent of their contributions to this problem.

II. THE ADVAITA-VEDANTA: GAUDAPADA AND SANKARA

European philosophy is as different from the classic Greek as it is from the Indian. One of the basic differences between European and Indian thought lies in its relation to morality. In European thought--witness Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard--it sought to give morality a basis, a justification, and a defense, while in the Advaita Vedanta it is presupposed before the study of philosophy. The philosophical discipline in the Vedanta has a four-fold prerequisite: discrimination, non-attachment (renunciation), self-control, and a love of truth. These four are termed the Sadhana Chatushtaya.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Swami Nikhilananda (trans.), The Mandukyopanishad with Gaudapada's Karika and Sankara's Commentary, (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1949), Preface, p. xxxvii.
In Vedanta, morality needed no defense; rather, it was assumed to be the very ground of the philosophical quest. The end of Vedanta is not the justification of a morality or an ethic, but truth, in the sense in which Hegel remarked that God and Truth were one. It may be that a rational defense of morality from the philosophical side is in fact extremely deleterious in its social consequences since morality is taught and defended not by its defensibility, but by its presentment of an ideal to be imitated for some desired end.

On the moral side, the Sadhana Chatushtaya is the prerequisite for philosophy and it may reflect the social morality to which the student is a party. It is considered as a means, and its ultimate usefulness and validity are effective as guides to action only as long as the quest has not culminated in the realization of Brahman. Morality is essentially an external standard and, hence, the awareness of its binding force is indicative of the presence of a dualistic state of mind. But once having realized non-duality, it cannot function with this externally binding effect. After the non-dual is realized, Gaudapada writes, "behave in the world as an insensible object."\(^1\)

This non-dual state even precludes the concept of one as the knower. Essentially the state provides no evidence

\(^{1}\)Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 36.
for the belief that one is different, or separate from others. Hence Sankara adds, "He does not consciously assume the role of knower." He continues his commentary with the observations:

... In other words, concentrate your memory on the realization of non-duality alone. Having known this non-dual Brahman which is free from hunger, etc., unborn and directly perceptible as the Self and which transcends all codes of human conduct, i.e., by attaining to the consciousness that "I am the Supreme Brahman," behave with others as one not knowing the truth; that is to say, let not others know what you are and what you have become.²

Gaudapada presents the morality of a Sannyasin or, more technically, a Paramahamsa Sannyasin--the realized person. It is a morality only in that sense in which a spontaneous process can be so judged since it has nothing to do with fulfilling external obligations and commitments.

... He should have this body and the Atman as his support and depend upon chances; i.e., he should be satisfied with those things for his physical wants, that chance brings him.³

Sankara comments:

... He entirely depends upon circumstances, that is to say, he maintains his body with whatever food or strips of clothing, etc., are brought to him by mere chance.⁴

The law to which the realized person adheres can be

²Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 36.
³Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 37.
⁴Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 37.
considered as a "law unto himself," with the recognition, however, that the term "himself" is not a separate egoistic entity, since it is "free from all desire for external objects." Wisdom brings its own internal source of action or it would neither be Wisdom nor spring from the non-dual.

Therefore, the case with Advaita is not the saving of some ethical standard, but to further the quest of Philosophy as a pursuit for realization of the non-dual Brahman.

Again, to restate direction, it should be remarked that the issue here is the examination of Gaudapada and Sankara from the dialectical perspective. Hence there will be no remarks as to whether Gaudapada or Sankara was a Buddhist; or if Sankara's writings are consistent or if they contain a contradiction, e.g., in the comparisons of his commentary of the Brahma-Sutras and the Mandukyopanishad.

In European philosophy, the central question inherited from Kant was the concept of a Transcendental Illusion impossible to overcome and a bar to any direct knowledge of reality. Advaita Vedanta not only resolves this issue, but in so doing clears a field for the dialectical philosophy. On the other hand, it may be that the problem in understanding Plato's works lies in interpretative insights and an esthetic judgement of coherence, and therefore, is always open and plagued by interpretative questions concerning "his meaning." Indeed, an interpretative criterion is necessary
for understanding Plato, but not so with the Advaita because there the content is stated without the dramatic staging, the play of myths or analogies that have always been a source of pleasure and confusion to readers of Plato. In the Advaita, the pristine purity of the Mandukya has called for a commentary. It is a work of only twelve stanzas, to which Gaudapada added the Karika and on which Sankara commented. In comparing it with the Platonic works, it shows the brevity of the wise while the dialogues show the hand of the consummate artist conscious of his talents.

The Karika of Gaudapada added to the Mandukya has often been called the Mandukyakarika. The entire work is divided into four parts: Agama--because of its scriptural references; Vaitathya--due to its treatment of illusions; Advaita--from its concern for unity; and Atitasanti--the reduction of alternative views by a reductio. The last three parts have little to do with the Upanishad directly and represent Gaudapada's thinking. In Sankara's introduction to the Upanishad, he adds a commentary in which he summarizes these four parts:

The first chapter, then, seeks, by dealing specifically with Vedic texts, to indicate the traditional means to the realization of the essential nature of Atman and is devoted to the determination of the meaning of Aum. The second chapter seeks rationally to demonstrate the
unreality of duality; the illusion of duality being destroyed, the knowledge of non-duality becomes evident, as the cessation of the imagination of snake, etc., in the rope reveals the real nature of the rope. The third chapter is devoted to the rational demonstration of the truth of the non-duality, lest it should, in like manner, be contended to be unreal. The fourth chapter is devoted to the rational refutation of the other schools of thought which are antagonistic to the truth as pointed out in the Vedas and which are opposed to the knowledge of the Advaita Reality, by pointing out their falsity on account of their mutual contradiction.5

As might be expected, since the first chapter is an attempt to reconcile the non-dual concept with traditional scriptural sources, it will have little to advance this study of dialectic. However, there is much that is revealing within this first chapter and therefore it is worth noting its content. In this chapter, Sankara forcibly states the thesis of the Advaita in a most un-Kantian fashion:

The object is to realize the knowledge of the oneness of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwise, the explanation that the knowledge of the thing is dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness of the name and the thing is taken only in a figurative sense. The purpose of the knowledge of the unity of the name and the thing signified by it is to simultaneously remove, by a single effort, the illusion of both the name and the thing and establish the nature of Brahman which is other than both.6

The intent of this work carries the noblest intentions of philosophy in that it is both a statement of the Ultimate and includes an epistemological approach to its vindication.

5Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. I, Sec. 1.
6Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. I, Sec. 2.
The concept of Brahman is central to Vedanta and is understood as Nirguna, without attributes, which when known the knower recognizes, or rather he is cognizant that there is no difference between himself and the Ultimate Reality referred to as Brahman. In this knowing, the concept of the individual takes on a new and more profound meaning and is called the Atman. And it is said that this Atman is Brahman.7

The phenomenal world seen as dual is different from the observer and separate from him. This knower of the dual is the individual as an ego or Jiva. Therefore, an insight into the non-dual character of reality is dependent upon the entire structure of the dual ceasing to affect its particularization:

... That which has no parts [boundless], incomprehensible [with the aid of the senses], the cessation of all phenomena, all bliss and non-dual Aum is the fourth and verily the same as the Atman. He who knows this merges his self in the Self.8

To gain this insight into reality, the meditation upon the symbol "Aum" is used. Mind is unified with this syllable9 and results in the knowledge that Aum and Brahman are inseparable. The stages of psychological, spiritual, or meditative

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7Ibid., Chapter II, Section 34.
8Ibid., Chapter I, Section 12.
9Ibid., Chapter I, Section 12 (25), p. 86. "The mind should be unified with Aum..."
insight are four-fold. They correspond to the waking state, dream state, dreamless sleep, and Turiya:

Turiya is not that which is conscious of the internal \[subjective\] world, nor that which is conscious of the external \[objective\] world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. \[It is\] unseen \[by any sense organ\], not related to anything, incomprehensible \[by the mind\], uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, essentially of the nature of consciousness constituting the Self alone, negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful, all bliss, and the non-dual. This is what is known as the fourth \[Turiya\]. This is the Atman and it has to be realized.10

The insight into Atman being Brahman, the non-dual, is realized by meditation upon Aum, and the resulting stage of insight is the fourth or Turiya. The philosophical justification for this, the first chapter, is its consistency with the scriptures. There is no attempt to formulate it along strictly rational lines, for this is the problem reserved for the other three chapters. In Sankara's Commentary to the second chapter, he begins his critique with the statement that:

It is also equally possible to determine the unreality \[Illusoriness\] of duality through pure reasoning; and for this purpose is begun the second chapter which commences with the words Vaitathyam \[unreality\] etc.11

It is common among religious traditions to appeal to their own particular sacred scriptures for validation, but an appeal to authority contains no cognitive criteria; merely

10Ibid., Chap. I, Sec. 7.
11Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 1, Sankara's Commentary.
dogmatism. Hence to find validation of a religious work by reason is rare and an indication of the harmonious blending of both religion and philosophy. It is commonplace to find sacred scriptures equating their particular insight with the predicates of their creed and it is more often the case that the cognizer presents the insight within the terms of his own idea, i.e., within the accepted traditional religious concepts. To determine the content of the experience outside of these terms is as difficult as the attempt is rare. Thus, when Gaudapada says:

He [the inquirer] cognizes only that idea that is presented to him. It [Atman] assumes the form [of what is cognized] and thus protects [the inquirer]. Possessed by that [idea] he realizes it [as the sole essence].

It is an attempt to strip the insight from traditional ideas and provide a fruitful transition from the religious content of a particular creed to universal application by reason through philosophy. The introduction of reason frees the inquirer from the tempting possibility of religious dogmatism in the belief that, since the realization is apprehended under the form of his idea, it therefore validates the unique truth of that religion. This also precludes a possibility of intolerance of different opinions.

12Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 29.
13Ibid., Cf. Chap. II, Sec. 20, through Chap. II, Sec. 28.
14Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 29, Cf. Chap. IV, Sec. 1.
If the nature of Brahman or reality is non-dual, then the dual, the phenomenal, is unreal. Its unreality would constitute no more than dreams and illusions\(^{15}\) when seen from the aspect of Brahman. Again, if there are no valid relations then there is no dissolution, birth, and no one aspiring for wisdom; nor a seeker after liberation; nor could there be a teacher, student, or sacred scriptures.\(^{16}\) If so, and logic seems to justify such a conclusion, then does that not also necessitate that reality itself be non-real? Sankara answers that to conceive of such illusions presupposes a substratum as the illusion appearing in the rope as a snake, etc.\(^{17}\) The reasoning involved in this central argument also gives evidence of the Indian dialectic:

\[\text{\textit{Objection}}\text{--This analogy is not relevant as even the rope, which is the substratum of the imaginary snake, is also an imaginary entity.} \]

\[\text{\textit{Reply}}\text{--It is not so. For, upon the disappearance of the imagination, the unimagined substratum can be reasonably said to exist on account of its unimagined character.} \]

\[\text{\textit{Objection}}\text{--It may be contended that like the imagination of the snake in the rope, it the unimaginary substratum} \text{is also unreal.} \]

\[\text{\textit{Reply}}\text{--It cannot be so. For it }\text{Brahman} \text{is ever unimagined, because it is like the rope that is never the object of our imagination and is real even before the knowledge of the unreality of the snake. Further, the existence of the subject }\text{knower or witness} \text{of imagination} \]

\(^{15}\)\textit{Ibid.}, Chap. II, Sec. 31. \(^{16}\)\textit{Ibid.}, Chap. II, Sec. 32. \(^{17}\)\textit{Ibid.}, Sankara’s Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 32.
must be admitted to be antecedent to the imagination. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that such subject is non-existent.

[Objection]—How can the Scripture, if it cannot make us understand the true nature of the Self [which is non-duality], free our mind from the idea of duality?

[Reply]—There is no difficulty. Duality is superimposed upon Atman through ignorance, like the snake, etc., upon the rope. How is it so? I am happy, I am miserable, ignorant, born, dead, worn out, endowed with body, I see, I am manifested and unmanifested, the agent, the enjoyer, related and unrelated, decayed and old, this is mind—these and other such ideas are superimposed upon Atman. The notion of Atman [Self] persists in all these, because no such idea can ever be conceived of without the notion of Atman. It is like the notion of the rope which persists in all superimposed ideas, such as the snake, the water-line, etc. Such being the case, the Scripture has no function with regard to the Atman which, being of the nature of the substantive, is ever self-evident. The function of the Scripture is to accomplish that which is not accomplished yet. It does not serve the purpose of evidence if it is to establish what has been already established. The Atman does not realize its own natural condition on account of such obstacles as the notion of happiness, etc., superimposed by ignorance; and the true nature is realized only when one knows it as such. It is therefore the Scripture, whose purpose is to remove the idea of happiness, etc., associated with Atman, that produces the consciousness of the not-happy [i.e., attributeless] nature of Atman by such statements as "Not this, not this, not gross." etc. Like the persistence of Atman [in all states of consciousness] the not-happy [attributeless] characteristic of Atman does not inhere in all ideas such as of being happy and the like. If it were so, then one would not have such specific experience as that of being happy, etc., superimposed upon Atman, in the same manner as coldness cannot be associated with fire whose specific characteristic is that of heat. It is, therefore, that such specific characteristics as that of being happy, etc., are imagined in Atman which is, undoubtedly, without any attributes. The Scriptural teachings which speak of Atman as being not-happy, etc., are meant for the purpose of removing the notion that Atman is associated with such specific attributes as happiness, etc. There is the following aphoristic statement by the knowers of the Agama. "The validity of Scripture is established by its negating all positive charac-
teristics of Atman [which otherwise cannot be indicated by Scriptures].

It will be advisable to compare this example of dialectic with another case for a joint analysis. The second chapter on illusion establishes that duality does not really exist, by illustrations of "dreams, magic castle-in-the-air, etc.," and in the third chapter the object is to determine whether non-duality can be established by reason. The similar function of reason is employed and therefore the example previously noted is indicative of this third chapter as well. In the fourth and last chapter, Sankara employs reason along different lines. He says:

Now is undertaken the chapter styled Alatasanti in order to conclude the final examination for the establishment of the philosophy of the Advaita, by following the process known as the method of disagreement, which is done by showing here in detail that other systems cannot be said to be true philosophy. For there are mutual contradictions implied in them.

An example of this usage is quite clear when Gaudapada writes:

If the world is admitted to be beginningless [as some disputants assert] then it cannot be non-eternal. Moksha, or liberation, cannot have a beginning and be eternal.

and Sankara adds the commentary:

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18 Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 32.
19 Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. 1, Sankara's Commentary.
20 Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. 30.
Here is another defect in the arguments of those who maintain that the Atman is, in reality, subject to both bondage and liberation. If the world \( \text{i.e., the state of bondage of the Atman} \) be without beginning or a definite past, then its end cannot be established by any logical reasoning. In ordinary experience, there is no instance of an object which has no beginning but has an end.

\[ \text{Objection} \] -- We see a break in the beginningless continuity of the relation of the seed and the sprout.

\[ \text{Reply} \] -- This illustration has no validity; for, the seed and the sprout do not constitute a single entity. In like manner, liberation cannot be said to have no end if it be asserted that liberation which is attained by acquisition of knowledge has a \( \text{definite} \) beginning. For, the jar, etc., which have a beginning have also an end.

\[ \text{Objection} \] -- There is no defect in our argument as liberation, not being any substance, may be like the destruction of a jar, etc.

\[ \text{Reply} \] -- In that case it will contradict your proposition that liberation has a positive existence from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Further, liberation being a non-entity, like the horn of a hare cannot ever have a beginning.\( \text{21} \)

The dialectic displayed in the section on illusion, chapter two, indicates a higher framework of reference. In the reply to each objection, the following can readily be seen:

1. It demonstrates the reasonableness of the premise on the basis of a more critical analysis of the analogy.

2. It shows the acceptable nature of the premise by noting the presupposition implicit in the assertion.

3. This reply is an attempt to acquaint the objector

\[ \text{21 Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. 30, Sankara's Commentary.} \]
with the function of the scriptures in its role of instructor, i.e., it points to the moon and if one wishes to see, then one must follow the finger; or the scripture is not itself the knowledge in that it does not reveal the nature of Atman, only limits predicates.

There is no evidence here of dialectic; not all dialogues nor all discussions are dialectical. Rather, the evidence supports the conclusion of an informant in that sense in which a position is corrected from either prior accepted truths or from a vantage point of a higher learning. True, there is an appeal for reason to examine its statements with more care: i.e., to examine the analogy, to be cognizant of the nature of pre-suppositions as well as to distinguish between a sign and its referent. The acceptance of the replies to the argument, by the objector, is dependent upon his own faculties. It is incumbent upon him to validate the content. It is, as it were, the individual who has the obligation to accept the reply and reject his own objection. The objector either does or does not object depending purely upon the force of his own resources. This technique, of course, is not new or novel. It is the familiar pedagogical approach to knowledge—the teacher knows and the student need only come with cap in hand to receive the "correct" teachings. Whatever difficulties he might have, either with the answer or with his own puzzling objections, he must accept these "correct notions." Again, this is not to say that the answers are not correct, only that
there is no attempt to engage the individual on a personal basis of dialectic; no attempt to draw out his own statements as a preliminary to the knowing process; no attempt to draw the "correct" notion from him as in Plato's Theaetetus. The use of reason is that of a higher truth correcting the assertions of objectors in the same manner as a student's test paper is graded. The answer may indeed be corrected, but there is still the problem of why the objection was constellated in the manner in which the error was framed. If the cause of the error remains, then presumably it can again reappear in another form. There is no indication that these objections are basic in the mind of the objector: If that were the case, it would, of course, be more curative. Therefore, from these points it is clear that there is no dialectic in operation in this section.

The fourth chapter, that gives promise of a dialectic, needs analysis and can be rewritten as:

[Statement]--As the world has no beginning so too liberation has no beginning and therefore cannot be finite [non-eternal].

[Comment]--If something has no beginning then it cannot be reasonably shown to have an end.

[Objection]--On the contrary look at the example of the seed and the sprout which, though admitted to be in a beginningless relationship—one turning on the other—it can be seen to have definite marks or periods.

[Reply]--But if they both can be said to have definite periods or marks, then presumably they do not constitute a single entity and then they both have a beginning.
Objection—Sir, there is no real objection here for it is agreed that liberation is no object, that it is no substance and may be like the non-entity that results in the breaking of a jar made of clay.

Reply—Look now—if it is admitted that it is a non-entity "like the horn of a hare," then surely it cannot have a beginning. And, again, if it is true as you say that it has definite marks or periods, then how can something which is admitted to be as an non-entity have such delineations?

Aside from the specific content of the argument hinging upon the unmet premise that a substance, a jar (or ignorance or bondage, analogically), can be the causative factor in the production of a "non-entity," this nevertheless does provide an example of reason or dialectic in operation. It is obvious that the causative question permeates this argument and it is also clear that it is not treated directly. If it were, then the argument might have a more far-reaching effect than the simple reductio ad absurdum that is here presented.

However, the issue is not the shortcomings of the argument, but only its availability for testing the presence of dialectic. First, there is evidence of critical reason, as there is throughout the entire work, but the question remains whether this is in itself sufficient evidence of dialectic. The central and most basic distinction that Plato makes between the disputer and the dialectician should be recalled. He defines the disputer as one who is only able to
draw contradictions from another.\textsuperscript{22} The disputer's skill is an imitation of one phase of the art of the dialectician. The dialectician goes beyond just seeking contradictions. He must draw from the student the birth process in his capacity of a midwife. True, the logical examination for inconsistency is one phase of the dialectic. The dialectic, to be completed then, must move into the birth process. Further, it is to be remembered that the logical examination of the student's ideas is subsequent to the drawing out process, i.e., the birth process and the examination to determine whether the borne is a wind-egg or not. There is no birth process here in this work of Gaudapada or Sankara, no involvement of an intensive dialectic. Rather, there appears only one side of dialectic, i.e., recalling the passage in the Sophist where the value of refutation is discussed. In Plato we found that dialectic is coextensive with his epistemology and hence a parallel study is necessary of the epistemological side of Advaita Vedanta. There are usually two approaches to epistemological problems, but one has fallen into disrepute in Europe for some time. Epistemological questions have dominated European thought since Descartes, with the main question revolving around the problem of the method and source necessary

\textsuperscript{22}Jowett, \textit{op. cit.}, "Phaedo" 261; cf. "Sophist" 232, 225, "Gorgias" 458.
for men in general to acquire valid knowledge. The other question is the way that knowledge can be acquired not by men in general, but by philosophers--those that seek the Good, True, and Beautiful, or the Absolute in the form of being, bliss, and consciousness. Naturally these two approaches are different. Men in general do not acquire knowledge except in the most conventional sense, since their end is seldom, if ever, the quest for knowledge. Men in general, in the quest for knowledge, are concerned with questions of validity, perception, inference, postulation, theories of error, revealed truth, etc. Whereas, the philosopher may be aware of these problems, but his concern is rather for a way to achieve knowledge as a direct experience or a way in which direct realization of truths can be achieved. Primarily, the Mandukya makes the assertion that the mind itself is non-dual though it appears dual in both dreams and in the waking state. In both these states, consciousness is the highest reality and is common to them--common in the sense in which mind has superimposed upon a substratum (consciousness) the characteristics of determination and volition. The conception of Advaita directly attacks the condition of duality and

23Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 30. "There is no doubt that the mind, which is, in fact, non-dual appears as dual in dream; in like manner undoubtedly that which is non-dual, appears as dual in the waking state also." Cf. post n. 26.
invokes a discipline to restrain the ceaseless activity of the mind, for when the mind ceases to function duality itself cannot be experienced.\textsuperscript{24} It could be objected that when the mind ceases to act, it can no longer be properly termed the mind since when there is nothing cognized, there can be no idea of cognition, hence it is illegitimate to invoke the concept of mind as non-dual. This is certainly true, but only when the mind is understood as a faculty of a self and therefore different from it. This is made clear when Gaudapada states:

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\text{\ldots When the mind does not imagine on account of the knowledge of the Truth which is Atman, then it ceases to be mind, and becomes free from all idea of cognition, for want of objects to be cognised.}\textsuperscript{25}
\end{flushright}

Therefore, the concept that the mind is non-dual is not intended to assert when the mind is no longer functioning as a faculty, but as the ground of the mind itself.\textsuperscript{26} Duality is a function then of the mind's activity for "all modifications are mere names arising from efforts of speech."\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, Chap. III, Sec. 31.

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, Chapter III, Sec. 32.

\textsuperscript{26}The translator is not consistent in his usage, for the term mind is used as consciousness (III. 30; I, 12. (25); III. 34; III. 35; IV. 46) and then clearly not in this sense in other sections (IV. 36; IV. 45, etc.) but as a faculty.

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}, Sankara's Commentary, Chap. III, Sec. 32.
Therefore, the central task is to control the mind and free it from imaginations, since mind itself is the condition of duality. The concept of ignorance becomes embracive, including within it not only the illogical but the very structure of duality implicit in the activity of the mind. To achieve this goal of control, a technique of yoga is employed which is different from other meditative techniques in that it does not resort to any mechanical devices. The paramount tool is discrimination. It presupposes the Advaita-Vedanta teaching of Gaudapada and Sankara and in its application, it vindicates the teaching. Gaudapada makes this manifestly clear when he writes:

The mind should be turned back from the enjoyment of pleasures, remembering that all this is attended with misery. If it be remembered that everything is the unborn [Brahman], the born [duality] will not be seen. The teaching as a method becomes as it were the yoga. The simplicity of the teaching provides a control or guide in life, and life in turn becomes the condition for its emergence. The achievement of this state is indeed difficult and would require unrelenting effort. However, the teaching possibly may not be fully fathomed and it might not be

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28 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 33.
29 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 43.
30 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 41.
realized that the non-dual state in no way implies a state of oblivion. It is for this reason that proper means are stressed.\textsuperscript{31} Ironically, the proper means fall back on the proper understanding of the work itself.\textsuperscript{32}

If, however, the mind does fall into a state of oblivion, or distraction, it is urged to return it to the state of tranquillity.\textsuperscript{33} Once having gained this state, one is advised not to disturb it. To accomplish this end, the intermediate stage of knowing the desires even in their potential form is required.\textsuperscript{34} When these conditions are fulfilled,

\ldots When the mind does not merge in the inactivity of oblivion, or becomes distracted by desires, that is to say, when the mind becomes quiescent and does not rise to appearances, it verily becomes Brahman.\textsuperscript{35}

and

\ldots This highest bliss is based upon the realisation of Self, it is peace, identical with liberation, indescribable and unborn. It is further described as the omniscient Brahman, because it is one with the unborn Self which is the object by Knowledge.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 42.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 43.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 44.  \textsuperscript{34}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 46.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 47.
This should not, however, imply that the object is the control of the mind. Control of the mind for fearlessness, destruction of misery, knowledge of self, and eternal peace is different from the technique noted above. Such a methodology is dualistic and would acknowledge that the desired state can only be achieved when the control is effective. The technique may not be considered the same, for in the Advaita the condition would be permanent since the object is to cleanse the mind of the very propensity, or potentiality, for such modifications of the mind. If the control, on the other hand, were in any way relaxed, the modifications—vrittis—would reassert themselves. Hence the aim is not for some psychic state, because the world seen in its true character is itself Brahman. It is from this perspective that the student is urged that "the mind should not be allowed to enjoy the bliss that arises out of the condition of Samadhi." If Samadhi is desired as a separate object, then it would be contrasted—and thus dual—and if sought to be enjoyed, then still attached to the opposites of desire and aversion—whereas in the perfect state, it is not meant to be "enjoyed."

Sankara has added an excellent commentary to this last-mentioned Karika of Gaudapada (Chap. III, Sec. 40), drawing

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37 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 40.
38 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 45.
the distinction between these different approaches to Reality. Primarily, he makes the significant point that when the mind and sense organs are regarded as "seen apart from their identity with the very nature of Brahman, as mere imagination," then it is that these men,

... who look upon themselves as of the very nature of Brahman, spontaneously enjoy, as quite natural to them, fearlessness and eternal peace known as freedom for which they do not depend upon any mechanical effort.

For this discipline, however, "no duty [effort], whatsoever, exists for the Jnani." Sankara acknowledges, on the other hand, that those who look upon Atman as separate, "who possess inferior or middling understanding," can experience fearlessness and destruction of misery as a result of the discipline of the mind. But, however, "if the mind, [considered] related to Atman, becomes active," then they can never experience these states. Sankara concludes with the statement:

... Besides, their knowledge of self is dependent on their control of the mind. And similarly, eternal peace, known as Moksha [or liberation], in their case, depends upon mental discipline.40

Hence this section is consistent with Advaita-

39Jnani, a term used for the yogi who follows the discipline outlined in this Upanishad. This yoga is also termed Asparsayoga. "No salutation is made to the Yoga taught by the Advaita Philosophy, in order to extol it. The word Asparsayoga in the text means the Yoga which is always and in all respects free from sparsa or relationship with anything and which is of the same nature as Brahman. This Yoga is well known as the Asparsayoga to all Knowers of Brahman." Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. 2, Sankara's Commentary.

40Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. 5, Sankara's Commentary.
Vedanta, for the error of the dualistic yoga lies in the assumption of the mind as separate from Brahman. But the Jnani sees the identity of mind and Brahman, hence does not seek for control of the mind. This view is borne out in Gaudapada's statements:

... (This Atman is) beyond all expression by words, beyond all acts of mind; (it is) all peace, eternal effulgence free from activity and fear and attainable by concentrated understanding (of the Jiva). 41

and,

... In that Brahman which is free from all acts of mind there is neither any idea of acceptance nor any idea of giving up (of anything). Established in the Atman (Self), knowledge attains to the state of birthlessness and sameness, that is to say, changelessness. 42

Three elements are joined together in Advaita-Vedanta and each in turn complements the others. The test of the truth of the Advaita-Vedanta is corroborated by scriptural evidence, reasoning, and personal experience. If it were to rely on the scriptures alone, it would be no more than belief or faith and, as often happens, degenerate into dogmatism. Reason may arrive at the concept of Atman, but may not lift itself above the speculative. On the other hand, it may degenerate into a rationalization of a private set of beliefs. Personal experience, as such, with all the certainty of the

41 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 37.
42 Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 38.
personal experience can offer nothing more than dogmatic pronouncements and is incapable in itself of correcting the tendency towards self-deception. In the three-fold method, however, the very notion of dogmatic pronouncements being uttered would be contradictory to the thesis itself. Or, stated in other terms, the self to which the crime of deception is being fixed is nowhere in evidence: The factors that nourish deception have been detected and destroyed. (This is also vindicated in the morality of the Advaita mentioned in a previous section.) Christian metaphysics is an example of the twin efforts of reason and scripture with priority given to the scriptures. In the Vedanta, the student is first taught the scriptures, to reason upon them and attempt to experience the content within the discipline of his contemplation. The student is warned that "the Self cannot be known by study of the Vedas alone."43 The epistemological side of Advaita-Vedanta develops questions that were not even entertained by Plato. In the Symposium, Plato's meditative steps or stages involve the use of mechanical or external devices which from Sankara's view is a disadvantage in that it assumes obstacles which later must be resolved.44 It is not a ques-


44Sankara does not discredit a dualistic yoga as such
tion of which is more efficacious, but which can insure the permanent possession of the object—knowledge. Recognizing the advantage of the one over the other leads to a major issue. Is it possible to add to dialectic Sankara's epistemological approach and still have consistency? Can the asparsayoga be viewed dialectically and thereby add to it this immeasurable advantage? To this last question, the issue would be whether dialectic can remove the conceptual errors as well as the seeds of future acts that may either restore or add to man's state an additional increment of ignorance. But the linking of the Platonic art of contemplation with dialectic indicates that it should not be separated from it.

The asparsayoga of Vedanta requires a continual examination of dualistic thought patterns and silences them by understanding. The term "understanding" is the key in the asparsayoga, for understanding is a result of the prior process of discrimination. What we have called dialectic is the movement of discrimination in language, or rather in understanding, correcting it and removing ignorance, and at the same time it is also the belief in reason, that reason through discrimination can undercut its own processes. There

for he is fully aware of the need when it is a function of the understanding. Cf. his commentary, in Nikhilananda, The Mandukyopanishad, op. cit., Chap. III, Sec. 40.
is no attempt to control the mind, only to allow the understanding to discern the identity which lies at its base; this is the task of discrimination. Plato was undoubtedly correct in not separating dialectic and contemplation, but he did nevertheless separate it as a consistent activity with the dialectic: The retreat into models for the contemplative method leaves the discriminative role only to the outer dialectic, whereas the role of the understanding in this asparasayoga is the paramount employment of discrimination as an inner dialectic. True, the outward form of the dialectic (verbal) and the inner, as contemplation, bear a close structural similarity, but it has a different focus of attention. The addition of this technique of the Advaita emphasis on continuing discrimination (if one can be rash enough to call it a technique) to the dialectic would not only make it a consistent system, but would also have the advantages of a direct, uncluttered, and extremely profound carry-over of the very same activity into the contemplative. The condition for the direct experience is operative in both cases--discrimination--and by its continual movement and exercise the realization is dependent upon the total reduction of ignorance, i.e., duality. The inner movement of the dialectic would conclude in an activity beyond words and form, and even the silent monologue would reduce itself to "concentrated understanding," thereby giving birth to the intuitive. Hence this would be a higher contempl-
plation and "inner dialectic" because of the question and answer quest, though silent, is in fact critical reason confronting its own content. The process itself is a catharsis that Plato would have considered a blessing to have known. There is always a question of how complete the Platonic catharsis actually is, but there can be no such question with the Advaita-Vedanta. Gaudapada and Sanākara formulate a method and evolve a teaching that is more profound because of its deeper grasp of ignorance. Therefore, the Advaita does not further the explicit use of dialectic beyond further examples of seeking to uncover inconsistencies, i.e., logical analysis, but does provide another contemplative technique consistent with dialectic and bearing the same form as the "outward dialectic." Where the technique of Plato's contemplation bears an architectonic similarity with dialectic, Advaita-Vedanta asparsayoga has closer ties with the process as such and therefore an advantage and an improvement beyond Plato.

III. MAHAYANA BUDDHISM: NAGARJUNA AND CANDRAKIRTI

The Vedanta insight that reality is conceived under the concept utilized in its apprehension can also be used as a methodological key for an analysis of the paramount and formative ideas of a system. It is from this perspective that Mahayana Buddhism shall be examined. The central idea
there is Nirvana and it is understood as:

What neither is released, nor is it ever reached,
What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternality,
What never disappears, nor has it ever been created,
This is Nirvana, it escapes precision.45

Within Mahayana everything is considered as relative, hence no real origination or annihilation is possible.46 Yet, if this is so, then there can be no deliverance from ignorance; therefore, no possibility of Nirvana. On the other hand, if everything is real, substance, then neither creation nor destruction, nor even Nirvana is possible.47 Thus, from both sides it appears that Nirvana is impossible. Therefore both sides are denied and termed Nirvana: "It escapes precision."48 Nagarjuna proceeds further in his analysis of Nirvana and denies that Nirvana is a kind of ens, then not an ens, neither both and neither together simultaneously:


46Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. I-XIV.

47Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV.

48Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. III.
The Buddha has declared,  
That Ens and non-Ens should both be rejected.  
Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens  
Nirvana therefore is conceived.  

If Nirvana were both Ens and non-Ens,  
Final deliverance would be also both,  
Reality and unreality together,  
This never could be possible.  

and,  

If Nirvana is neither Ens nor non-Ens  
No one can really understand  
This doctrine which proclaims at once  
Negation of them both together.49  

This standpoint carried through to its limit would naturally assert no difference between Nirvana and Samsara, or Reality and the Phenomenal. If no distinctions, then no demarkation of ends or ideals can be contrasted. With this Nagarjuna concurs:  

There is no difference at all  
Between Nirvana and Samsara  
There is no difference at all  
Between Samsara and Nirvana.  

What makes the limit of Nirvana  
Is also then the limit of Samsara,  
Between the two we cannot find  
The slightest shade of difference.50  

The terms in this analysis are suspect themselves and, if a conviction can be had on a suspicion, not even this much can be said. To speak in any valid sense of "difference"  

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49Ibid., 25th Chap., Secs. X, XI, XII, pp. 75-76.  
50Ibid., 25th Chap., Secs. XIX, XX, p. 77.
assumes a distinction between identity and difference and assuming this, then even if the above comment of "no difference at all between Samsara and Nirvana" can be affirmed, the terms of comparison must therefore be said to be valid. But even these, the terms of identity and difference, are finally reduced to absurdity. Nagarjuna concludes his twenty-fifth chapter of the Madhyamika-Sastra with the lines:

What is identity, and what is difference?  
What is eternity, and what non-eternity,  
What means eternity and non-eternity together,  
What means negation of both issues?

The Bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,  
In the Quiescence of Plurality.  
No separate Reality was preached at all,  
Nowhere and none by Buddha. \(^{51}\)

In the Advaita-Vedanta as well as in the Madhyamika, concepts like origination, annihilation, deliverance, creation, destruction, eternity, non-eternity, death, decay, cause and effect, independency, phenomenality, and any predicate of reality that can be said to uniquely qualify or particularize Reality, is rejected. Hence, both systems have a share in the profundity of their grasp of the critical side of reason.

Gaudapada and Sankara are the basic thinkers of Advaita while Nagarjuna and Candrakirti are considered to be the foundation stones of the Mahayana with their works of the

\(^{51}\text{Ibid., 25th Chap., Secs. XXIII, XXIV, p. 78.}\)
Madhyamika-Sastra (Mula-Madhyamika-Karikas) and the Madhyamika-vrtti (Prasannapada).

Candrakirti provides a commentary on Nagarjuna's work. The Mahayanistic concept of Nirvana based on Nagarjuna furnishes an excellent occasion for a Candrakirti commentary. This can be seen in Candrakirti's answer to the question:

... Now if the Universe is really such a Unity, if it is no plurality, how is it then that our imagination has built up defilers, i.e., an illusion of personal identity and desires through a suppression of which Nirvana is supposed to be attained? Or how is it that our imagination has built up separate elements through the annihilation of which Nirvana reveals itself?52

Candrakirti states that "as long as these constructions of our imagination exist, Nirvana cannot be reached, since it is reached just through a suppression of all Plurality."53 An anonymous objector recognizes a good point and replies that "it may be as you say, but surely the defiling elements or elements in general do not exist when Nirvana is reached--but before Nirvana is reached they must exist and Nirvana is only possible through their annihilation."54 (The objector returns and there appears a form of dialogue capable of analysis for dialectical content.)

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An objection is raised. If this is so will it not be possible to maintain that Nirvana has been denied by the Buddha? Will not his doctrine be absolutely useless, this doctrine which establishes corresponding antidotes for every kind of worldly career in order to enable mankind to reach Nirvana. We answer. This criticism would be right, if there were any absolutely real doctrine, or if there were any absolutely real beings which would attend to this law, or if there were any absolutely real teacher, a divine Buddha. But since in a monistic Universe that does not exist, we are not hit by your accusation!

Our bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,
In the quiescence of Plurality.
To nobody and nowhere no doctrine about separate elements
By Buddha ever has been preached!

In this case how can the reproach made above affect us! Our view is that Nirvana represents Quiescence, i.e., the non-applicability of all the variety of names and non-existence of particular objects. This very quiescence, so far it is the natural genuine quiescence of the world, is called bliss. The quiescence of Plurality is also a bliss because, by putting an end to all defiling agencies, all individual existences are stopped. It is also a bliss because, by quenching all defiling forces, all instinct and habits of thought have been extirpated without residue. It is also a bliss because, since all the objects of knowledge have died away, knowledge itself has also died.

When the divine Buddhas have entered blissful Nirvana in which all Plurality has vanished, they are like regal swans soaring in the sky without any support, they are hovering in the wind produced by their two wings, the wing of accumulated virtue and the wing of accumulated wisdom, or they are hovering in the wind of Space, that Space which is the Void. Then from this elevation all separate objects having become indistinguishable, the Buddhas have not preached neither about the defiling elements of life, nor about its purifying elements, neither in the divine worlds, nor in the human world, neither to gods, nor to men. This should be realized.

55 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 538.3-539.2, pp. 208-209.
Here in this quoted passage, we find the same distinguishing marks that were apparent in the Advaita-Vedanta. It is essentially a higher criticism, from an analysis of the opponents' argument, tracing out misunderstandings of their doctrine and correcting interpretations. The feature of dialectic present in other sections is the rendering explicit the inconsistencies and contradictions. In this section, as it is in the entire Madhyamika-sastra and Madhyamika-vrtti, no original argument is advanced, only a basis for a systematic criticism of the understanding of an opponent. With Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, this is formulated into a systematic method. Candrakīrti, in a section titled, "The Madhyamika Method Explained," makes the following methodological points:

Ordinarily, when someone is asserting some position, it is his desire to convince the other party. He attempts to prove his argument in the manner in which he himself arrived at his conclusion, i.e., just as he convinced himself. Hence the respondent pursues a line of argument in order to prove his own thesis and thereby convince another. But the Madhyamika proposes a different technique:

... He does not vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. He has no reasons and examples of which he himself is convinced. He sets forth a thesis of his own and undertakes to prove it only so far as it runs parallel and destroys the argument of his opponent. He thus brings asserting which cannot be proved. He is in conflict even with himself. He certainly cannot convince his opponent of his imagined thesis. But can there be a more eloquent refutation of
an opponent than the proof that he is not capable of establishing his own thesis? Is there really any necessity to produce counter arguments? Therefore, we have in this dialogue a clear statement that the reductio ad absurdum argument is central to the Madhyamika and, by their own admission, is "The Method of the Madhyamika." The Madhyamika repudiates arguments from the principles admitted as valid by the opponent while claiming not to advance any original arguments of their own. However, if, in fact, some original thesis is advanced, then "all our arguments will also be wrong, because the reasons which will be adduced will either be non-entities themselves, or they will represent something appertaining to a non-entity." Candrakirti does note that some Madhyamikas, like Bhavaviveka, do assert independent theses and to them he says that, if so, then the same criticism should be applied:

But we, he says, do not resort to proof by syllogism. Our arguments can have only the result of repudiating the tenets of our opponents, for us they are not valid by themselves.

The Madhyamika asserts that separate entities are not caused, but such an assertion equally allows the converse—that every single thing is caused and exists. If the argument

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56 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XIV, 19.3-19.6, pp. 98-99.
57 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 34.1, p. 117.
58 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 34.4, p. 117.
of the denial of causation is founded upon an argument, then the following factors are pertinent: 59

1. How many are the sources of knowledge, their essence, scope, origin, and

2. Have they arisen out of themselves, out of something extraneous, both, or out of nothing.

On the other hand, if it is not founded upon argument,

1. It must be rejected.

2. "Cognition of an object depends upon the method cognized, if something is not known it cannot become known otherwise than by appropriate methods. If no methods then neither will there be cognition." 60

Thus, it appears the controversy rests upon the validity of logic and its employment. The point is acknowledged fully and Candrakirti's answer discloses a fine grasp of logical engagement. The issue is really the other side of the major contention which underlies the entire Madhyamika. Included in this would be the solution to the question of the content, if any, of the Mahayana dialectic as found in both Nagarjuna and Candrakirti. The objection is strongly put by the "anonymous logician" in the Madhyamika-vrtti when he raises the issue: 61

59 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXXIV, 55.11-55.12, p. 136.
60 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 55.12-56.0, p. 136.
61 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 57.4, p. 137.
... You thus insist that you make no assertion whatsoever. But we hear from you a proposition which looks like a definite assertion, viz., that entities arise neither out of themselves, nor out of something different, nor out of both, nor at random. How is it to be explained?

The point is answered by an illustration that common people ... impute to entities a reality which they do not possess, a reality which for the saint does not exist at all. It then happens that these ordinary men are tormented by some particular thing which they somehow imagine to exist. Then the saints try to rouse their skepticism by some argument that would appeal to them.

The general and more central issue still remains. It is continued in the reply:

If our answer did allow assertive judgments, implying the transcendental reality of a substratum, the question would then arise whether these judgments are founded on sound method or not. However, there is no place for them in a system of universal Relativity. The reason for that is just the following one. If problematic judgments regarding reality were admitted as possible, we would be obliged to admit the counterpart, the possibility of problematic judgments, regarding the transcendental reality of a substratum, how could we make the correlative assertions, since they would not be correlative with the other unexisting member of the relation. And as a conclusion, It is not our business to answer all these questions! 62

Therefore, questions are only entertained as part of a technique to educate and, on the other hand, they are repudiated apart from this pedagogical device. Candrakirti says:

We first assume the reality of something impossible

62 Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXXVIII, 62.4-63.8. Candrakirti's quotation is from the "Questions of Ratnacuda" of Nagarjuna.
and then condemn it.\textsuperscript{63}

However, the criticism is often raised that this method is itself impossible. The denial of a thesis implies the acceptance of another and therefore it is impossible to have a system that is critical and yet not advance a theory of its own. It may be that the Madhyamika assumes it has no position, but in order to deny a thesis, there must be some vantage point from which this itself can be asserted. Hence, a careful examination of this system will make explicit the implicit assumptions of the Madhyamika. It matters little if the Madhyamikas are not cognizant of this. The point is simply that it must assume such a position. In the repudiation of the theory of causation by a \textit{reductio ad absurdum}, does it involve the acceptance of the opposite theory, or does it necessitate the examination of the reductio for premises that can be seen to be a part of another theory and therefore presuppose it for the very criticism of the \textit{reductio}? But this is itself putting forth a theory that must be rationally defended by evidence and example. Without documentation, it is a theory without substance, another cry of the dogmatist. Madhyamika replies: \textsuperscript{64}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{63}\textit{Ibid.}, 1st Chap., Sec. XXXVIII, 56.4, p. 136.
\item \textsuperscript{64}\textit{Ibid.}, 1st Chap., Sec. XVIII, 23.3, p. 103.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
We have declared we have no theory of our own. We therefore cannot be accused of contradicting our own principles.

and,

The only result of our deduction is to repudiate the theory of our opponent. Our acceptance of the converse theory is not at all therewith implied.\textsuperscript{65}

There is a difference between asserting that the Madhyamika maintains no "position" and asserting that the Madhyamika contains no ontology. It would be more exact to advance the theory that though they do not admit any ontological theory (because they find none defensible before critical reason and which cannot be vindicated by an intuition of reality), nonetheless they still have an ontological referent in the sense that the intuition is not of anything but sunyata which is equal to "tathata," thusness, the unique reality of the universe. If it were of nothing, it would characterize reality as non-existent, but:

Now, if Nirvana is a non-Ens, How then can it be independent? For sure, an independent non-Ens Is nowhere to be found.\textsuperscript{66}

An intuition of nothing is hardly an intuition and undoubtedly much of the difficulty can be traced to the translation of "sunyata" as nothingness when the referent is understood

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 1st Chap, Sec. XVIII, 24.6, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., 25th Chap, Sec. VIII.
as a non-Ens rather than the referent of non-predicating or qualifying reality. It is interesting that Stcherbatsky translates the term as "relativity" thereby escaping the literal translation. There is quite obviously a logical jump from recognizing that Nirvana "escapes precision" to the assertion that it is "nothing." The task is lessened when the focus is on the perception rather than the universal aspect for then it takes the tathata rather than sunyata.

When experience is given precedence over speculation, when logic is silenced by logic and reason asked to reflect upon itself, there is always a value given to self-discipline and here in the Mahayana the same thing is true. It takes the form of introspection, the discipline of meditation. An outline of the Madhyamika discipline is stated as a practice, which presumably parallels the dialectic, and also includes its final intuition and realization:

Considering consciousness he [the Bodhisattva] investigates the stream of thought and asks wherefrom does it come. The following occurs to him. Consciousness arises, if there is an [Immanent] object does that mean that consciousness is one thing and the object another, or that they are identical? In the first case we have a double consciousness. But if they are not identical, how is then consciousness to be cognized through consciousness? Consciousness cannot apprehend its own self. The trenchant of a sword cannot cut its trenchant. The tip of a finger cannot touch that very tip. Similarly this, consciousness cannot be conscious of its own self.

Thus it is that when [a saint] is thoroughly attentive, then it appears to him as undefinable, it neither has an end nor a beginning. It is not changeless, it is not causeless, it does not conflict with the interdepend-
ence of the elements, but it is neither identical, nor non-identical neither with itself, nor with others. He then cognizes a stream of thought as thin as a creeper, the thought element, indefinite thought, non-manifested thought, imperceptible thought, thought as a thing in itself. He intuits this unspeakable thought as "this-ness" the unique Reality of the universe, he does not suppress it.

Such is the analysis of thought which he realizes and intuits. This, O noble son, is the Bodhisattva's exercise of application of mindfulness consisting in the consideration of what in our consciousness represents its essence.

This exercise of the "application of mindfulness" clearly shows the movement of an inner dialectic. The rejection of the duality of subject and object presented as consciousness and its object, however, does not of itself insure the intuition. There is a vast difference between acknowledging the distinction to be without foundation on the basis of a learned response, a teaching, or some revealed scripture; and another thing to actually realize it. Hence the "recognition" of the illusion does not of itself automatically dissolve its form, merely loosens its claim for attention and consideration. Attachment to the objects of imagination depend upon an unreflective, unquestioning acceptance of its externality, desirability (or repulsion), and reality. The doubt cast is more than a mere "as if," for the repeated

67 Tathata = Sunyata.
68 Ibid., 1st Chap, Sec. XXXVII, 61.10-64, pp. 145-6.
questioning insures a diminishing tie to the object relative to the success of the process. Therefore, this process strips the essential element of the object--its apparent integral reality. This could be termed a procedure of unattaching the object. Not being attached to the imagination, it is possible to sit attentively but not before. The increasing recognition of its unreality shifts the focus of consciousness from the seeming-objects to the process itself. Of course, the imaginative process has little hold on the individual when its claim is seen to have such a provisional basis.

The success of this exercise comes when the "thusness" is not suppressed but allowed. It is further interesting to note that the inner-dialectic functions not merely in a negative capacity as in a formal "Not this, not this," but in an analytical manner mirroring the outer movement of the dialectic. Through this exercise, the student intuits the unique reality of the Universe and the technique is a thorough-going dialectic.

Dialectic is the cleansing faculty, the preliminary discipline to the insight, and the grounds for its activity. The technique of "The Method of the Madhyamika," noted previously, is utilized here in the exercise. The student's own thought process is the material; the premises and methodology follow the same lines as the outer dialectic. The method is the use of the reductio ad absurdum technique in both the
outer and inner dialectic. The experience of Nirvana is dependent upon dialectic functioning as a catharsis, as a purifier of the defiling elements. In the Madhyamika, the catharsis is thorough and exhaustive. The catharsis as an activity is formulated by both Candrakirti and Nagarjuna and is central to their thought. Candrakirti states that neither suppression nor annihilation really takes place in the experience of Nirvana. Actually it consists "merely in the suppression of absolutely all the constructions of our imagination." The term "suppression" could more probably be coined "cessation" as in the statement of Nagarjuna from the Ratnavali:

Nor is Nirvana non-existence
How can such an idea come to you?
We call Nirvana the cessation
of every thought of non-existence and existence.69

The essential element is that the phenomenal world can be called Nirvana when the conceptual framework is silenced. Nagarjuna writes:70

Coordinated here or caused are \[\text{separate things}\]
We call this world Phenomenal
But just the same is called Nirvana
When viewed without causality, without coordination.

Therefore Nirvana is merely the seeing of the Phenomenal world when the imaginations cease their play. Candrakirti expresses

69 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. II, 524.5-524.9, p. 190.
70 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. IX, p. 195.
this negatively when he writes:71

... as long as constructions of our imagination exist Nirvana cannot be reached, since it is reached just through a suppression of all plurality.

The experience of Bliss is coincidental with the cessation of all thought, "Our Bliss consists in the cessation of all thought."72 The claim is not for a momentary abandon of thoughts and instincts but rather for a permanent state:73

... It is also a Bliss because, by quenching all defiling forces, all instinct and habits of thought have been extirpated without residue.

The assumption at work here in the exercise is the concept of the Prajna (intuition). This term, with its close affinities with Plotinus' parallel concept, is translated by the same term--Intellectual Intuition. The concept of the Prajna is that when the entire conceptual framework and activity loosens its tie or hold on the mind, only then does the Intellectual Intuition naturally function. It is not thought of as a separate faculty, but is understood as operative only when the obstructions are removed. The obscuring elements removed, intuition reveals itself. It would be a misunderstanding not to acknowledge that this intuition is thought of as a direct experience, not mediating between

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71 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. II, 521.14, p. 187; cf. 524.5, p. 190; 522.10, p. 188.
72 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 536.3, p. 209.
73 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 536.8, p. 209.
objects, and thoughts for it are termed "thusness," non-manifested thought, indefinite thought, and the unspeakable thought.

The method of the Madhyamika, the reductio ad absurdum technique, or as they call it, the Prasangapadananam, is carried to a limit that Plato would have been proud to have encountered. True, this same element is present in Platonic thought, but not carried to its limit as it is in the Madhyamika, nor was it ever considered as the exclusive tool of the dialectician. And balancing the scales, the Madhyamika has no parallel concept for the midwifery of Plato. The concept of ignorance in Platonic thought is thought to be the barrier to true knowledge, but on the other hand, it is certainly not developed into its more specific form of "the cessation of every thought" as the condition of Nirvana. To this insight, both the Advaita and Madhyamika are in agreement and both have direct techniques for the removal of this veil to intuition. The Platonic technique does not proceed as directly as does the Advaita and Madhyamika, nor is it as consistent within its system as they are within theirs, when taken as a whole.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND SYNTHESIS OF THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DIALECTIC

I. FOREWORD

In the Platonic works, the negative dialectic was neither extended to its limits nor was the method rendered into an explicit methodology as in the Madhyamika. The Platonic catharsis was a function of the negative dialectic but the latter never was the sole and paramount tool of both the catharsis and the insight into the Good, or Reality. Plato uses the negative dialectic to initiate the process of reflection and self-criticism. On the other hand, the Madhyamika accepts the negative dialectic and extends it to the limit of self-reflection as an epistemological tool to remove all the impediments to the vision of reality.

The recognition of the Asparsayoga as the inner dialectic extends it beyond the boundaries of Plato and offers more than merely the acquisition of another contemplative technique because it provides a more profound grasp of the concept of ignorance and, therefore, brings with it a more concise content. Thus, the addition of both the contemplative technique of the Advaita-Vedanta and the negative dialectic of the Madhyamika to the Dialectic is certainly a decided advantage for its development as a philosophy.
It is interesting that both the Advaita-Vedanta and the Madhyamika have developed those elements that were weak in the Platonic dialectic, and yet neither of these schools added to the positive dialectic—what Plato refers to as the "noble birth." The three aspects of the Dialectic—positive, negative, and inner dialectic are the elements of the Platonic concept of Dialectic. The positive dialectic is exemplified in the quest for unity as it feels new strength in fresh discoveries and intuitions of relationships, harmony, and order, all the while seeking its object among the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. The essential feature of this positive dialectic is that these notions are brought to birth by a special technique of question-and-answer by a trained dialectician who is, himself, restrained from either dictating solutions or offering positive answers.

The negative dialectic is not a separate and distinct part of the positive dialectic, for it assumes some conclusion from the positive dialectic. Its function is to expose contradictory assertions which claim some certainty, and is essentially a negative process in the reductive processes. Logic is employed and an examination of the asserter's thesis is made to determine if the birth process, the positive dialectic, has been a true birth or if it must be aborted. Since it prefers explicit non-contradictory propositions with clear and precise meaning, it is suspicious of metaphors and analogical thinking.
Inner dialectic, the contemplative, is an interior process of dialectic that has as its end the vision, or experience, of reality.

The dynamics of the positive dialectic is a function of its use of analogies and metaphors that assumes a different set of presuppositions than the negative dialectic. The analysis of these presuppositions would demonstrate the mechanism of both the positive and the negative dialectic and also reconcile a curious problem. The problem can be readily seen if these two activities are considered separate. Then the problem is obvious, for each seems to contradict the other. The positive sees the negative as unable to say anything since a thorough criticism must also cancel itself. The negative dialectic sees the positive as a system of analogical assertions and discoveries which, admittedly, cannot be the basis for any literal truth. Hence, what is needed is an analysis of the analogical and relational form of judgment within each of these tools of the Dialectic.

II. ANALOGY AND POSITIVE DIALECTIC

The positive dialectic does not examine language with any degree of severity; it accepts it and prefers to utilize the structure it assumes for its philosophical ends. The characteristic feature of the positive dialectic is its acceptance of the use of relational terms, or terms which
assume some relational matrix for their meaning. An example of this can be seen in Plato's quest for the nature of the Statesman and Sophist. It must first be granted that both terms are relational. It must be further assumed that there is a position of authority and a populace in whose interest, or against such interests, this authority can exercise some control or exert some influence. Whatever issue or question is pursued, if it assumes a relational character, then the positive dialectic seeks to uncover those relations that are necessary for the term to be meaningful by seeking the essential relations. The ability to discern relations would be the pre-requisite for this employment of the positive dialectic. On the other hand, the distinctions found, discerned, perceived or conceived depend in their turn upon either an arbitrary discovery or there actually being relations to cognize. Without order, there can only be an arbitrary concept of relation and, therefore, merely arbitrary definitions. Analogy and relation both depend upon the existence of some order, and to communicate by analogies involves

1Cf. Cornford, Plato's Republic, op. cit., II, 258. (A term can, of course, be both a relational term and a non-relational term, depending purely upon the extent to which the term is examined. An interesting example to note is the concept of Justice in Plato's Republic: this term has a relational referent in respect to its social function [cf. ibid., VI, 508/], and a non-relational character in respect to Justice itself [cf. ibid., VII, 259/].)
a perception of their connection and also presupposes an acceptance of some concept of order. It is essential in analogical thinking that the terms involved in the analogy are actually "seen" in the relation indicated. To actually perceive them in this way is in itself a discovery--an insight.

It might be argued that these orders and relations exist--but only in language and within a conceptual framework. The argument would proceed to assert that it is an analogical leap itself, and hardly legitimate, to move from relations in language to relations in reality. All the available evidence points, to continue the argument, to meaning in language and nothing else.

The reply would be to agree entirely with this contention and extend it a bit beyond those narrow confines. The assertion that the perceived order is in language and within concepts would certainly be admitted, but if the assertion were to add that it is "merely" and "only" in language and concepts, then the line would be drawn. On the other hand, the assumption that this order, asserted by some analogy, is "actually" the order of reality would also be going beyond the bonds of respectability. Both of these positions are excluded and yet both used. The analogical thinking assumes that the relation indicated is in some way in reality--perhaps totally mysterious, but it neither
qualifies it uniquely nor exhausts it. The assumption of the analogy is that two terms are related to two others—"as," or "as if"—and this is not meant to indicate that it "is" some other relation. Hence what is being asserted is really only a possibility and not a unique tie or identity. In strict usage it should be called a poetic tie or identity. Analogies invite the participator to determine if indeed it is "like" the other terms, and to see if it does seem to bear similar relations. To assert a strict identity is totally missing the point of analogical thinking.

The reason that the analogical function in language is not often acknowledged with the credit due it, is that analogies and metaphors are often looked down upon as indicative of an undeveloped reason that is incapable of expressing complex and profound thought patterns. This is, of course, merely an example of rank prejudice. The case is quite the contrary. Logic is actually one special case of analogy, a novel is an expansion of a metaphor, and mathematics is another example of a systematic use of analogy that is often disguised by the Latin term proportion, rather than the Greek

2Scott Buchanan, Rhetoric (manual used by St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland, n.d.), (mimeographed.)

equivalent—analogy. Again, the scientific method itself, in its statements of relations between things and their mathematical properties, can be seen as a system of analogies.4

The mathematical description of the Keplerian astronomy will illustrate this usage in mathematics. In the statement of the Earth and its path:

... the earth revolves around the heavens tracing the path of an ellipse while the sun is at one of the Foci.

The elements needed are:

1. The orbit of a Planet.
2. The Sun.
3. The circumference of a conic section, i.e., the ellipse.
4. The foci of the ellipse.

What the proposition can be really reduced to would be:

The orbit of a planet is to the sun as the circumference of the ellipse is to the foci.5

Which of course holds to the basic form of analogy with the classic type:

A is to B as C is to D


5This is itself a shorthand form of a mathematical process because the ellipse is derived from by a process of passing a plane through a conic section at a given angle. The later mathematicians may fail to recognize that the algebraic form of the ellipse is a special case of the analogical use of geometry and algebra when it is seen through the Cartesian coordinate system.
or simply,

Planet's Path : Sun :: Ellipse : the Foci

The only difficulty would be if this became an assertion that this is really the way the earth moves. Hence the conclusion should at this point be anticipated: that the dogmatist, in any of his many disguises, is simply a person who confuses a language problem with his convictions and feelings. He insists that a particular analogical expression uniquely characterizes some "x" and no other and, therefore, he believes his assertion is literal, self-evident, and indubitable fact.

In everyday usage, the metaphorical or analogical function of language is not obvious. Usually the literal statements have a very definite and non-analogical intent, or so it is believed. When a person shouts, "I hate John Smith!" is it hardly intended as a metaphor or as the statement, "Something like hate I experience for John Smith." Nevertheless, it can be seen as such in the analysis of its structure:

1. I hate John Smith.
   Objection: What does it mean for the "I" to hate? The grammatical first person singular, does it hate?

2. I have a hatred for John Smith.
   Objection: How does one have it? Like an arm, the moon, or a spoon?

3. I feel an emotion which I call hate, which I feel for John Smith.
   Objection: How can one feel for John Smith?
4. I feel an emotion which I call hate, which I project upon John Smith as the object of my feeling. Objection: Project? How? Carry it over? Place it upon him?

5. I feel an emotion which I call hatred which causes a feeling of tension within me; as a result I seek its resolution by reacting to an object that appears to threaten my previous placid state.

Naturally, this process could go on to further explore the content of the terms "call," "seek," object," and "appears," for these are all heavy terms that tend to obscure the metaphorical content that they possess within this context. The more complete the analysis, the more the investigation would tend to define the basis for the hate; hence, the easier its resolvement, but only if our activity were not entirely intended to disembowel poor John Smith.

The analogical structure for Mr. I and John Smith might be viewed in this form:

- tranquil state : turbulent state ::
  - a non-threatened matrix : a threatened matrix ::
    - the understanding of the matrix :
    - the blind and immediate acceptance of the matrix ::
    - understanding action : emotionally base action

The dialectic would explore just what it is that is threatened. The uncovering of this content would bring light upon "Mr. I's" behavioristic patterns and account for the ambiguous elements.

It is not often recognized that language can be seen within this scheme, but this is simply because of a predisposi-
tion to view them within a structure that language seems to provide. Language presents a model but it has its own implicit metaphysics as a linguistic structure which, if one is not careful, will be dictated to the unsuspecting. Our linguistic model stresses "static" things and their relationships, or relationships and the things related. Thus, the question arises: Could there be an alternative conception which would then offer entirely different consequences?

The basic factor in the model is the proposition, and it is agreed to have the elements of a subject-verb-object. The subject-noun is isolated, the verb imputes some aspect of motion, while its determination becomes the object. This is the customary manner of treating this division but it is not at all necessary to assume. Ernest Fenollosa presents an alternative in his request that if we get back to the basic etymology of words they would reveal rich metaphorical content. He argues from the case of the Chinese written character to draw conclusions for other languages, and claims for Chinese the "purest" meaning in that it has retained its ancient origins intact. He says of the subject-verb-object relation:

A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist in nature. Things are only the terminal points, or rather the meeting points, of actions, cross-sections cut through actions, snap-shots. Neither can a pure verb, an abstract motion, be possible in nature. The eye sees noun and verb as one: things in motion, motion in things, and so the Chinese conception tends to represent them.

It is often argued that it is only when words lose their archaic reference that exactitude can be had through language. Fenollosa counters that, on the contrary, the Chinese language in its written character retains the metaphor and, he points out, that the intellectual and philosophical works of the Chinese are evidence of the ability of metaphors to communicate complex thought patterns:

You will ask, how could the Chinese have built up a great intellectual fabric from the mere picture writing? To the ordinary Western mind, which believes that thought is concerned with logical categories and which rather condemns the faculty of direct imagination, this feat seems quite impossible. Yet, the Chinese language with its peculiar materials has passed over from the seen to the unseen by exactly the same process which all ancient races employed. This process is metaphor, the use of material images to suggest immaterial relations.

The conscious use of analogy can further understanding and create conditions for new insights. It can also limit understanding if its proper employment is not understood. Recently, an effort has been made to determine its proper function in mathematics and in reasoning, and G. Polya has

7 Ernest Fenollosa, The Chinese Written Character (New York: Kasper & Horton (Square 3 Series), n.d.), p. 60.

8 Ibid., p. 72.
authored a work covering this field.\(^9\) Polya's work argues
for the use of analogical thought in mathematics and reason-
ing rather than the deductive method because it is his claim
that the truly creative mathematician must be a good guesser
first and a good prover after. Both the guess and the idea
of the proof, he points out, rest heavily upon the utilization
of analogy:

... And the layman is not surprised to hear that the
naturalist is guessing like himself. It may appear a
little more surprising to the layman that the mathemati-
cian is also guessing. The result of the mathematician's
creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof, but
the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by
guessing.\(^10\)

The deductive method only can be employed after both the
guess and the idea of the proof are first grasped. Polya is
aware of the dangers in the use of analogies and begins by
stating that in "discussing analogy, we tread on less solid
ground."\(^11\) He lists several points of interest:

The essential difference between analogy and other
kinds of similarity lies, it seems to me, in the inten-
tions of the thinker. Similar objects agree with each
other in some respect. If you intend to reduce the
aspect in which they agree to definite concepts, you
regard those similar objects as analogous. If you suc-
cceed in getting down to clear concepts you have

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\(^9\)G. Polya, Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning

clarified the analogy.\textsuperscript{12}

He defines the concept, or condition, of analogy as follows:

\ldots two systems are analogous, if they agree in clearly definable relations of their respective parts.\textsuperscript{13}

The only difficulty in the analogical method is when it is not clarified:

\ldots And remember, do not neglect vague analogies. Yet, if you wish them respectable, try to clarify them.\textsuperscript{14}

The role that analogy plays, to Polya, is clear in his statement:

\ldots There is perhaps no discovery either in elementary or advanced mathematics, or, for that matter, in any other subject that could do without these operations \textsuperscript{[generalization and specialization]} especially without analogy.\textsuperscript{15}

Hence, here is further evidence that analogy has a large share in the intellectual processes. The positive dialectic finds in the analogical tool a way of analysis and also a way of discovery. The keen eye for analogical relations marks the dialectician and the almost playful use of them sometimes makes it hard to distinguish him from the dramatist in the concern for plot structure. Hence, a critique of analogy assumes the value of a relational matrix.

The development of a relational matrix in which a value is given presupposes that similar relations can be predicated of totally different things. Without this facility

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.  \textsuperscript{13}Ibid.  \textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 15.  \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 17.
there could be no assertion of this same or similar relations between the last terms. In the example,

King is to Subject as Father to Son

or,

Father to Mother as Heaven to Earth

or,

Heaven to Earth as the Generative Principle to the Creative Principle.

An examination of these analogies presupposes another concept which must be prior to the structural similarity concept. If the relation between a Father and Mother, a King and his Subject, or a Father to his Son is in name only, then no relationship can be asserted and the consequence—for the related terms—would be invalid. (The only relationship that could be asserted would be merely nomenal which would be the absence of any effective relationship.) That is to say that if the Father and Mother were not functioning within each realm in respect to their relational capacities, then nothing further could be deduced and the other terms—Heaven to Earth—would have no explicit relation and the analogy would further the cause of ambiguous and misleading relations. Clearly, the relation in the analogy must assume the ordered elements of the first part before any "is to" can be deduced. The principle of a structural similarity presupposes an ordered relational system, hence it should be termed a principle of
the Integrated Unit System. When the terms in the analogy are ordered sufficiently to function in related capacities, then similar structural similarities can be asserted in other equally related units. Once the units, or terms in the analogies, are sufficiently distinguished by their order, then a corresponding structural system appears in the relation of these similarities to other equally distinguished terms of any other order.

It would be profitable to return to the basic analogy for clarification,

A is to B as C is to D

or, as in our example:

Father : Mother :: Heaven : Earth

The conditions for this analogy therefore are:

1. A particular function must be assigned to father and mother, or such other terms in the analogy.

2. A corresponding structural relationship between both father and mother should emerge as a unit.

3. And sufficient evidence of this order, (1) and (2), must be given which is transferred "as" or "as if" to the latter terms, Heaven and Earth.

Even though these terms differ in respect to both quantity and quality, for as long as they are actually ordered, the relationship can be sought in the latter terms. When this is established, an integrated system is in evidence.16

16These two principles necessary for the analogy are also the major principles of the Chinese Classic--The Book of
The concept or principle of the repetition of the integrated unit system is hierarchical and also justifies the Changes, or the I Ching. In fact, the entire Book of Changes can be seen as an analogical system in which the relational patterns are given a basis and provided with a field. The principle of the integrated unit system and the principle of structural similarity are the key and paramount concepts underlying the Book of Changes, and also assumed for an analogy, or system of analogies. Professor Gi-Ming Shien writes:

The principle of structural similarity is the key principle of the Book of Changes. If we do not understand this principle, we shall never understand the essence of the Book of Changes. [Gi-Ming Shien, "Key Principles of the Book of Changes: The Principle of Structural Similarity and the Principle of the Integrated System" (paper read at the New School of Social Research, New York, October 29, 1954). (Kimeographed.)]

and, further, he adds:

The key principle of the Book of Changes is the principle of structural similarity and repetition of the integrated unit system. [Ibid.]

In order to see this process in a more detailed manner, the following is offered: Beginning with the first two terms,

Father : Mother

When these terms emerge with sufficiently ordered functional activities, then an integrated system results. This would also be true of terms as different as "father : mother" to "heaven : earth," hence a common structural condition is assumed to underlie this emergence. Naturally, there are certain structural relations which are assumed to be more profound or hierarchical than others, and the Book of Changes is based upon these deeper relations: both the eight trigrams and the sixty-four hexagrams are images of such functional differentiations. Professor Shien writes:

According to the Book of Changes, the eight trigrams, as well as the sixty-four hexagrams, are images of the
progressive concepts of the Good that characterizes the Plato-
tonic positive dialectic. The structural integral assumes
the integrated unit and the acceptance of units sufficiently
functionally developed to permit higher units of integrated
unities, as:

Father to Mother - The family, the clan, the small
community, the town, City, State, Nation, and World.

Certainly there is here a progressive unity and also an
increased complexity and magnitude, but since the same prin-
ciples are operative, one can see the same principle and
therefore the same relations can be predicated. The Sage
intuitively perceives these interrelations, his actions fol-
low from this knowledge, and he thereby attains tranquility.

5. Therefore it is the order of the changes that the
superior man devotes himself to and that he
attains tranquillity by.

and concluding this section:

... Thus our actions are set in order, and the mind
is also satisfied, for when we meditate upon the judgments
on the individual lines, we intuitively perceive the inter-
relations in the world.17

Professor Gi-Ming Shien notes:

functional differentiations which are shaped by all things;
moreover they are symbols of the structural relationships
which exist between great things such as heaven and earth,
but also the relationships which exist within microcosmic
systems. /Ibid./

17Richard Wilhelm (trans.), The I Ching or Book of
Changes, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes (Bollingen
Chap. II, pp. 311-312.
As implied in the philosophy of the Book of Changes, because the structural similarity among all structural systems, if we can understand one structural system within a certain area of phenomena / either the small one, such as the family, or great one, such as the world / then we can apply conclusions to all the structural systems in that area.\(^{18}\)

This concept provides a principle missing in the Platonic movement of the Republic justifying the movement of the analogy from the nature of the individual soul to the State; and in transferring qualities binding upon one upon the other. And in the Chinese Classic of the Book of Changes, the "trigrams of Ch'ien and K'un are applied to the unit of the nation. They are the symbol of the King and his vassals; if applied to the family--husband and wife."

On the other hand, the hexagrams, Ch'ien and K'un, are the fundamental principles of the I Ching and as principles they are not the elements of a basic dualism. In the same way as Yin Yang are complementary, so, too, are Ch'ien and K'un. In the Great Commentary (Ta Chuan, or, as it is sometimes called, Hsi Tz'u Chuan) it is noted:

> These two cardinal principles of all existence are then symbolized in the two fundamental hexagrams of the Book of Changes, the creative and the receptive. In the last analysis, this cannot be called a dualism. The two principles are united by a relation based on homogeneity; they do not combat but complement each other.\(^{19}\)

In his concluding remarks on the Key Principles of the Book

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\(^{18}\)Shien, op. cit., p. 2. \(^{19}\)Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 303.
of Changes, Professor Gi-Ming Shien writes:

So we can see that every integral structural system is structurally similar to every other integral structural system. The eight trigrams and the sixty-four hexagrams contain a principle embracing all things. In its fullness, they can be applied to the phenomena of nature as a whole; in its partialness, they can be applied to the phenomena of individual things. Likewise, the symbols, rules and relationships represented by the trigrams and hexagrams can be applied to the physical world, the social world, and the animal world. The application of the eight trigrams and the sixty-four hexagrams will lose any appearance of confusion or arbitrariness (e.g., the trigrams Ch'ien and K'un simultaneously symbolizing heaven and earth in nature, king and ministers in the nation, father and mother in the family) once the principle of structural similarity and repetition of the integrated unit system is firmly grasped. It is through this principle that the Book of Changes takes the changing rules, laws, and symbols of the changing phenomena and transforms them into an all-embracing principle which nothing escapes.20

The concern for the relations and their relatedness to other relations rather than to things and their properties or relations lies at the base of the system. The concept of order is not dependent upon perception but upon conception of similar relations between vastly dissimilar things.

It is said in the Book of Changes that "the Tao as expressed there can be applied to what is for (the inorganic or macrocosmic world), and at the same time it can be applied to what is near (the immediate social world or individual things). It is proper and fitting, when one speaks of space between heaven and earth, it embraces everything.21

The Book of Changes therefore adds to the positive dialectic a set of principles which can clarify much that

20Shien, op. cit., p. 4. 21Shien, loc. cit.
would be left to doubt, and also explicitly formulates much of the inner movement of the positive dialectic. Primarily, the following principles have been noted:

- Principle of Order
- Principle of Structural Similarity
- Principle of the Integrated Unit System

Hence these become the categories or postulates of an ontology from the aspect of the positive dialectic. It assumes a structural unity rather than a non-dual reality. However, the concept of order itself assumes a hierarchical class of principles but this is not explicitly formulated within the Book of Changes.

The concept of Nothingness in Lao-Tzu's philosophy can fill the gap in this problem. Lao-Tzu provides the missing element since his system assumes a hierarchical system from order to nothingness. The concept of Nothingness is one of the central concepts of Lao-Tzu and the Taoist philosophers, and it is, again, Professor Gi-Ming Shien who has advanced this concept, as well as demonstrating its interrelatedness to order.

On the side of the Madhyamikas, as, too, with the Buddhists in general, there is a great reluctance to discuss the concept of Sunyata, but not so with the concept of non-being in Chinese thought. The Taoists have thought it most important to lend it more substance than a mere negative
concept as in Buddhism.

Primarily, the concept of nothingness is based upon the concept of spontaneity, with both spontaneity and nothingness being known by direct intuition.

Investigating the structure, or content, of Nothingness, Professor Gi-Ming Shien says:

... Then again, we may find the same principle of spontaneity in our breathing. We are aware, if we stop to notice, that there are inhalation and exhalation in alternation. It is a reflex action in which no conscious effort is expended. The pushing out of air in exhalation brings about a condition of vacuum in the lungs; when this becomes great enough it starts the inward movement of the air to fill the lungs. This inhalation continues until the pressure of the inner expansion is great enough to start the cycle again in the outward movement of air. That is, there is a continuous cycle of pressure from positive to negative and back again. As long as it is in complete balance and all parts of the cycle have their equivalents, there are symmetry and harmony and complete return, in which the inhalation moves directly into the following exhalation over a smooth course, as it were. This is a condition of complete spontaneity and, of course, it is nothingness, being completely below the threshold of consciousness.\(^{22}\)

The example of breathing supplies an analogy to show the principles of proportion, symmetry, and harmony. These principles in their turn demonstrate the elements of spontaneity and presuppose (the concept of) Nothingness. Professor Shien clearly makes this connection between spontaneity and nothingness when he writes:

We may generalize to show the several parts of spontaneity. It is important to have proportion (analogy), symmetry, and harmony. Then, too, each force must be countered by an equivalent force, and the whole system must return upon itself in such a manner that it will continue in its cycle with self-sufficiency. In such a system there will be the spontaneity which is the result of obtaining a complete null point, or nothingness.23

A class of principles in an hierarchical order suggest this amended form:

The Principle of Nothingness
The Principle of Spontaneity
The Principle of Equivalence or Equilibrium
The Principle of Proportion—Analogy and Symmetry
The Principle of Order

A principle of order is assumed and this in turn rests upon the notion of the Principle of Proportion, or analogy, and Symmetry. This latter principle must accept the existence of a Principle of Equivalence, or Equilibrium, or else it will not be symmetrical or proportioned. Again, this principle of equivalence, being at equipose, or a point of equilibrium, must in its turn assume a principle of spontaneity for its existence. Spontaneity and equivalence assume no outside force or power acting upon it, directing it, or forcing an external pattern upon it. A system without this element of spontaneity continually needs adjusting in order to function, but with spontaneity, it must be cyclical because it returns upon itself. In a cycle, it is self-sufficient. "In such a

23Ibid., p. 3.
system, there will be the spontaneity which is the result of obtaining a complete null point or nothingness." Thus, all of these principles in turn rest upon the concept of nothingness: Each in their turn depend upon nothingness; it is the ultimate simplicity and the generating principle of all things:

If we ask where the order, proportion and symmetry come from, we shall notice a principle of equivalence. From this we can find the presence of spontaneity and nothingness. Thus, we see the prime importance of these two. When they are present, the others follow by necessary order of the universe or the Tao. They represent a principle of integration by which every part harmonizes with every other part. This principle is in every part and at the same time transcends every part because through its spontaneity and nothingness there is generation and completion of the universe. And this is the true meaning of the principle of nothingness in the philosophy of Lao-Tzu.

The concept of Nothingness has a twin aspect, for it can be seen as the final expression of a structural unity since it "represents a principle of integration by which every part harmonizes with every other part," and also as a non-dual reference since it "transcends" those very parts.

The transcendental reference from the metaphysical to the epistemological would be equivalent to the admission that the positive dialectic transforms itself by the denial of even an "as if" assertion when it reaches towards the

\[24\text{Ibid.}\]  \[25\text{Ibid., p. 4.}\]
Principle of Nothingness. It is not that it suddenly is transformed into a negative critique, but that it goes beyond its own boundary, its own analogical form, to a concept which is no longer analogical or metaphorical, but can be clearly seen to outstrip them both in the intuition of the non-dual insight which transcends the analogical, because it is beyond relations and things in relation. "The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao."26

This is of course a different understanding of nothingness than that of Fung Yu-lan, for in his History of Chinese Philosophy, he ignores the prohibition against the Tao being named when he says that the Tao has existence because it permeates everything and can be one thing and another. And, he further argues, it can, thus, be called an "all embracing principle" 27—but this cannot be the meaning of nothingness because it is named. It is clear that the true meaning of nothingness is beyond existence when Lao-Tzu says in the Tao Te Ching that "Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand things come from existence, but existence comes from non-existence."28

26Lao-Tzu, Tao Teh Ching, trans. P. Carus (Chicago: Open Court, 1945), Chap. I, p. 73.


28Lao-Tzu, op. cit., p. 102.
III. THE PROPOSITION AND NEGATIVE DIALECTIC

To the negative dialectic the entire course of the positive dialectic appears to be a system of ambiguities. The negative dialectic, being a severe critic of the propositional form of judgement, sees its own special task to be the exposure of metaphoric and relational content in what is apparently a literal assertion. Therefore, the transition from the positive to the negative dialectic is a shift from the acceptance of the relational to its denial.

The mechanism of this denial needs analysis, as does the assertion that a consistent critic can say nothing and from silence nothing can be deduced. The negative dialectic is a severe critic and therefore the mode and mechanism of this critical technique will be examined. This is of course equivalent to an analysis of the use of language, or more correctly, the analysis of the use of the relational proposition compared with the negative dialectic.

The proposition performs a twin object—it predicates difference and sameness of some given referent. But if the proposition is limited to the concept of sameness, it would be a tautology and, therefore, it is the other more major concept of difference that needs analysis. If all the philosophical problems were to pass by in single file, they could be seen as attempts to make an assertion of some difference
between things and concepts.

The solution to the philosophical questions, such as the relation between the phenomenal and noumenal, dvaita and advaita, appearance and reality, maya and Brahman, ignorance and wisdom, cause and effect, jiva and Brahman, etc., must first assume that an underlying concept is valid. It assumes the concept of difference can have more than an arbitrary or pragmatic employment in propositions. If, however, this concept cannot be rationally defended, then all of these so-called philosophical problems rest upon a spurious distinction. It is obvious that this is the fundamental notion and if it fails, then by the same analysis, so do all the derivative categories and concepts.

Nrsimhasramin, an Advaita-Vedantist following the course of Sankara, was an extremely capable logical disputer who authored a "Critique of Difference" known as "The Bhedadhikara." He examines the concept of difference and provides additional evidence of the methodological employment of reason as "disputation" rather than as dialectic.

The first part of the work indicates a clear, consistent employment of reason in handling the proposition that the Jiva and Isvara (the individual and the Lord) cannot be

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29S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and T. M. P. Mahadevan, A Critique of Difference (Bulletins of the Department of Indian Philosophy: No. 2. University of Madras, 1936).
predicated as different, since difference is not real nor can it rationally be defended. (This is not to say that they deny the seeming differences perceived, but only that apparent difference can have no ultimate validity.) The argument develops in the recognition that the terms, Jiva and Isvara, preclude difference, for the one is not perceived and the difference of the counter-correlate cannot be conceived. The Advaitan acknowledges the pragmatic, or empirical, "difference" due to nescience, stating that it would advance nothing to deny its inferential character since it was merely nominal in nature from its very beginning. \(^3^0\) Inference cannot establish any evidence of absolute difference simply because of the definitional character of logical inference. Inferential evidence is "just that," and is incapable of establishing anything but this tenuous tie by logic. It is derived from logic and postulates no more than what it assumes from the matrix of logic. It is at best a secondary means of cognitive evidence which must always await further analysis to substantiate it. \(^3^1\)

The Critique next turns to the question of conditioning as a source for the establishment of difference. But the adjuncts which are the conditioning agents cannot establish difference without the adjuncts. If it is only known through them, then the concept of difference cannot be assumed without

\(^{30}\)Ibid., pp. 13 and 14.  \(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 15, par. IV.
them. (The Critique examines the consequences of this conclusion by testing its coherence, harmony, and interpretation with scriptural writings. But this has value only to adherents of the tradition and therefore falls outside of this work. The next issue taken in the Bhedadhikara, namely, the problem of presumption, also assumes a scriptural interpretation and by the same token will be ignored.)

The more germane issue to this paper is Nrsimhasramin's treatment of individuals: If two apparently different individuals can be asserted to exist, then the concept of difference must have validity. The previous point (of difference being unintelligible if dependent upon sense-contact) is further pursued in this argument. Among different individuals there is no evidence for difference apart from adjuncts, such as egoity, body, and senses. Hence the Vedantist's conclusion follows that the individual is only an adjunct-conditioned part of the universal Self, Brahman. Differences and the concept of difference being thus not valid except in an apparent way, the propositional form which has a statement of difference as to major content suffers in its capacity to mirror reality. When Bradley writes:

The conclusion to which I am brought is that a relational way of thought--anyone that moves by the machinery of terms and relations--must give appearance, and not

32Ibid., p. 16. 33Ibid., p. 21. 34Ibid., p. 22.
truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible.\(^{35}\)

there are clear echoes back to Nrsimhasrmin.

In Bradley's philosophy, he continues this analysis along other lines in his criticism of things and their relations, qualities, space and time, causation, change, motion, and the Self, which shows remarkably similar features to that of the Madhyamika and Advaita-Vedanta schools. Bradley further develops the problem of difference and also provides an elaboration of the mechanism of dialectic by his analysis of the proposition as a form of judgement. The essential issue is the nature of the proposition itself: whether this has contained within it, as a linguistic structure, the very elements antithetic to reason which, ironically enough, reason employs as its matter. The basic problem is the valid use of the subject-verb-object combination. It can be stated as:

\[ X \text{ is in relation with some } Y \]

Bradley forcefully shows that:

\[ \ldots \text{our conclusion briefly will be this. Relation} \]

presupposes quality and quality relation. Each can be something neither together with, nor apart from, the other; and the vicious circle in which they turn is not the truth about reality.\(^{36}\)


\(^{36}\)Ibid., p. 21.
The point that he makes, and not without a shaded wit, is that qualities are supposed to be isolated and, hence, given, but if this be assumed than an operation of the mind is presupposed. What is "different must be distinct, and, in consequence, related," and this relation, having existence only to the observer, can hardly be predicated of reality. It is suggested by Bradley that this is the price for being able to render finite the world. The issue is whether relation is essential to difference, for upon one the other depends. His argument is as subtle as it is simple. It assumes two qualities different from one another; hence, where shall one relegate the difference?

... If it falls, in any degree or to any extent, outside A or B, we have relation at once. But, on the other hand, how can difference and otherness fall inside? If we have in A any such otherness, then inside A we must distinguish its own quality and its otherness. And if so, then the unresolved problem breaks out inside each quality, and separates each into two qualities in relation. In brief, diversity without relation seems a word without meaning.

Within the distinction of substantive and adjective, he employs the same analysis (as he does with all the concepts that he brings before his critical eye), and they meet the same conclusion. Realizing that adjectives are said to qualify a subject, a substantive, his argument can be dia-

37 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
38 Ibid., p. 24.
gramed for greater clarity as,

**A lump of sugar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjectives</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>1. Properties are distinct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard</td>
<td>2. A substantive is not any one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sweet, etc.</td>
<td>of its qualities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious that the thing is not the unity of its adjectives, since it cannot be, if it is taken severally. This is the issue— it is the ancient problem of the one and the many, or in Bradley's terms, unity and multiplicity. The properties are obviously in some relation with the subject, "when white, hard, sweet, and the rest coexist in a certain way, that is surely the secret of the thing." The irony is reintroduced when it is realized that the adjectives are now suddenly subjects. Clearly the problem has a simple solution: Whatever quality A, it is simply in a relation with B. Bradley counters: What does "is" mean here? Certainly not "in relation with B," for that would hardly leave room enough for B. Clearly this is an exhibition of sophistry when words not intended literally are employed as such. If so, then how is the relation to be saved? The argument usually proceeds along the line that the relation is not identical with the thing but is an attribute which adheres or belongs to the thing. This, of course, cannot escape detection, for if it adheres and

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39Tbid., pp. 16-18. 40Tbid., p. 16.
belongs, or if the thing has it, the question remains to be considered: In which way or sense can a thing have it—adhere to it or have possessions? As Bradley accurately reflects, "Apart from metaphors not taken seriously, there appears really to be no answer." The ancient dilemma reasserts itself, for in predicating what is different you say what it is not, and, if not, then nothing is said at all. In spite of this, Bradley admits that even though terms and their relations cannot exist together harmoniously, there must be "a whole embracing what is related, or there would be no differences and no relation." For everyday use, including a pragmatic, terms and relations are compatible only because they are not analyzed—nor is there any such need. But when these same dilemmas are transferred to the realm of metaphysics, there occurs a major difficulty.

Bradley employs his same methodology throughout his work and he concludes his third chapter with:

The reader who has followed and has grasped the principles of this chapter, will have little need to spend his time upon those which succeed it. He will have seen that our experience, where relational, is not true; and he will have condemned, almost without a hearing, the great mass of phenomena. Taking his suggestion, we can leave him for other considerations.

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41 Ibid., p. 17. 42 Ibid., p. 18. 43 Ibid., p. 29.
It should be noted that a very curious fact should become quite obvious: that literal statements only seem explicit when the metaphoric content is ignored. Critical analysis consists nearly entirely in exposing the metaphoric content that was ignored or which was not intended to be a subject for analysis because of its obviously non-literal reference. On the other hand, it has always been the assumption of the system builder and dogmatist that he can present his truths in the most precise and non-metaphoric language—the critic merely points to the metaphor and asks: What do you mean? or, Is it possible to express this element in other non-metaphoric terms? Looking back to Bradley's assertions, it is equally clear that his entire criticism is nothing more than this and, as a matter of fact, his conclusion should have been that he had found in the proposition an analogical form that can never be taken as literal because language is itself highly metaphorical and analogical in content and structure.

The basic assumption that this conception attacks is that language mirrors the structure of reality and therefore, by invoking meaningful statements, you are also characterizing reality. Bertrand Russell writes:

... Our confidence in language is due to the fact that it shares the structure of the physical world, and therefore it can express that structure. But if there is a world that is not in space-time, it may have a
structure which we can never hope to know.44

A more careful assertion would be--the extent to which reality can be understood within a space-time structure is a direct function of the space-time structure of our language, and it is to that extent that we feel a confidence for language. This is a far cry from predicating the linguistic structure to the physical world, or as Wittgenstein predicates to Reality:

... The proposition constructs a world with the help of logical scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true.45

Dogmatism, in any of its diverse forms, asserts much the same. It is a tacit agreement that the proposition is not meant metaphorically nor is it an extension by an analogical leap. It is the belief that it has an exact referent which uniquely characterizes some particular referent. It rests in the belief that literal statements are in themselves defensible. Certainly this theory has convenient uses in everyday life, but, as it happens, this opinion becomes the basis for the literal rendering of feelings, and moreover, the feelings often seem to add an interpretation within the literal scheme


45Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), Sec. 4.01.
of the linguistic structure. This has become the source of much of the wealth of the psychologist and psychoanalyst.

On the other hand, it should be admitted that the process in general is, on the surface, an apparently justified one. Bradley makes this clear when he justifies his contention that every proposition necessarily embodies a subject which is ultimate reality. A proposition asserts existence of a thing and isolates this ultimate reality by predicing to it certain attributes, yet by that process it cannot be valid when divorced or taken apart from the reality which lies at its basis. The proposition asserts a static matrix within a certain space-time configuration, which by the linguistic structure seems separate but cannot be so considered after the slightest scrutiny. The heart of the problem was seen by both Mahayana and Advaita thinkers when they asserted the same truth in the principle that nothing is intelligible when taken apart from the whole or from unity. Hence, the negative dialectic can be seen as a process in which the thing asserted is shown as relative and therefore not capable of providing a basis for dogmatic metaphysical assertions. An assertion taken literally needs a non-metaphoric or non-relational character; without this form, it

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loses precisely the elements it sought for its certainty, yet ironically enough it cannot separate itself from the relational.

In Vaihinger's classic work, his entire analysis of theoretical, practical, and religious fictions is based entirely upon finding the hidden metaphor within a system which would cause embarrassment should its presence become known. The demand for literal or non-metaphoric understanding involves the expansion of linguistic patterns to uncover their hidden content. This critical examination is very similar to the negative dialectic in its pursuit of fictions and ambiguities. The negative dialectic, not content with "as if" relations, attacks directly the metaphorical content and finds that it cannot be predicated of reality. But Vaihinger does not extend his concept of "as if" to the limit where he would have to admit Bradley's thesis of a concept of non-determination or non-predication.

Therefore the final assertion of the non-dual traditions, or schools of thought, takes the non-relational form. It might appear as a tautology except that its meaning reflects the entire teaching which precludes that identity. The Advaita-Vedanta "That thou art" or "Brahman and Atman are

one" is not intended either as a tautology or a relational proposition. It is an attempt to express an ontological fact in which the totality is itself non-relational and beyond reason. The assertion that it is beyond reason simply means that an intuition of the non-dual gives a non-relation content that cannot be expressed in any dual, or relational, proposition. Hence from the aspect of the negative dialectic, a metaphysical solution harmonizes the functions of reason by recourse to a synthesis that is actually its inclusion in a total picture. The extension of reason beyond itself leads to a non-relational form of the proposition. Again, this form is not meant to characterize either a specific thing nor is it intended to be a tautology, but a proposition of non-relations: "That thou art." The negation of difference and yet the statement of the real being both universal and identical lies at the basis of the Advaita ontology. The Madhyamika, on the other hand, does not offer any ontological assertion, yet does advance the identity between Sunyata and Tathagata. The denial of all doctrines, or the advancement of the "no-doctrine about reality" is not equivalent to the philosophical nihilist, since that is clearly rejected as well as all positive assertions. The intent of the Madhyamika is

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clearly the rejection of the conceptual tendency, but both traditions—the Madhyamika and the Vedanta—do acknowledge a reality which is non-dual and outside of all empirical determinations. Thus the non-relational form of the proposition provides a type of statement which precludes empirical determinations and relational attributes.
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