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
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
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# RAYMOND REVIEW

*Winter 1970*



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We encourage news from alumni and continue to include a special form at the end of each issue for news from Raymond graduates.





## IS PIAGET RIGHT?

(In which on the basis of a statistical sample of one child  
I put forward an alternative hypothesis of concept formation)

The latest (but by no means the newest) *primo donna* to capture the spotlight in educational circles is without doubt Jean Piaget. Trained as a biologist (with his first paper published when he was but ten years of age), this prolific Swiss thinker has been devoting his energies to educational theory since the early 1930's. Two factors contributed to an almost total ignorance of his ideas in America until the fifties.

- (a) He is an hypothesizer and is concerned with describing in holistic terms the behaviour patterns of children. Thus he eschews tests and experiments designed to elicit fragmented empirical data. It will be remembered that the 30's and 40's in America were a period of virtually unrelieved empiricism for child psychology (If it can't be counted, it's not worth thinking about!). For that reason those American psychologists who were familiar with Piaget's writings tended to be opposed to his teachings.
- (b) Even today many reputable psychologists in America tend to regard foreign language training as a waste of time on the grounds that anything worth knowing is fairly quickly translated into English. Piaget was not so fortunate. Never renowned for his literary merits, his writing style is tenuous and involved, albeit rich in ideational content. The task of translating his devious assaults on the French language into something even approaching readable English is a formidable one, not likely to recommend itself to a translator.

Despite this latter hindrance, by 1952 his works were becoming available in English (a twenty-year gap for the monolingual psychologists and educators!), and since that time he has been lionized in America. Flavell (1963) and others gave clear statements of Piaget's theories and in recent years he has become very fashionable indeed. Hardly a paper, having anything at all to do with educational psychology, appears in print today without some reference to Jean Piaget in it.

Allow me, then to give in capsule form an insultingly brief resume of Piaget's central thesis. His main idea is that intellectual growth takes place in a succession of "stages" for all children. The *sensory-motor stage* (0 - 2 years)



merges with and is followed by the *symbolic-representational stage* (up to 5 years) and then follows a two-year development, designated the *concrete operational stage*. After that follows a period of *growth within the concrete operational stage* (7 - 11 years) and then this leads into the *formal operational stage* (from 11 years onward).

Now the crucial emphasis in Piaget's theory is the *order of succession* of the stages, *not* the chronological ages at which they are attained. The latter factor is recognized as being controlled by social and environmental considerations. The ages given by Piaget represent those which he "*established*" with respect to Swiss middle-class children.

I have italicized "*established*" because one of the most obvious attributes of Piaget, clearly evident in all of his writings, is his lack of rigor in formulating his constructs and presenting his results. Instead he describes his experimental procedures in an anecdotal prose-style, which makes full use of his sense of the "*wholeness*" of the child in a way that would be impossible if his prime interest were the isolation of variables (an almost impossible task in his connection, anyway) and the statement of their parameters.

Piaget has examined his stage theory with respect to several facets of childhood development: morality, number sense, space-perception, awareness of reality, etc. His analyses of intellectual growth in these various areas have been widely used in designing subject syllabi in the primary grades, and this influence is especially evident in all of the new mathematics programs. It is of no small interest to note that Piaget arrived at his theories in a most (psychologically and educationally) unsophisticated manner. He kept a journal on the development of his own children! Talking to them, listening to them and observing them for several hours a day, he recorded attempts at concept formation. Even when he broadened the base of his observations by including other samples of children, his methodology was openly lacking in statistical finesse and could be assailed on a number of grounds. And yet what he says makes more immediate sense to anyone dealing with children than an empirical analysis of some isolated psychological phenomenon. His impact on the schooling of thousands of youngsters in several countries is too great to assess.

In this article, I would like to give a brief account of my own attempt at doing this sort of thing and to consider in more detail one particular construct of Piaget's - namely the concept of "*conservation of quantity*" by children - raising a question or two about its validity.



In his book *The Child's Conception of Number*, Piaget on the basis of questioning 25 children ranging in age from 4 years 6 months to 7 years 6 months, claims that basic to any real understanding of number is development of the concept of "conservation of quantity." That is, a child must have an inductive grasp (one borne out of his own experience) of the fact that a liter of liquid poured into two one-half liter containers has not increased in quantity! If the reader feels that something as basic as that should be obvious to a 4 or 5 year old, let him go and try it on one of his own. If nothing else, Piaget is full of surprises for us. Some children even appreciate that the volume has remained the same when poured out into two half-liter cans and then think that it has increased when poured into 4 quarter-liter cans!

The recognition of the conservation of fluid volume in this context is classified by Piaget as "continuous conservation." He did similar experiences with beads, placing 6 beads close together then far apart, to establish stages in the development of the concept of "discrete conservation." Piaget ascertained to his satisfaction (I will not pain the empirical purist with the statistical atrocities he committed in doing so) that both types of conservation develop simultaneously in children, and that three stages are involved.

Stage I characterizes children ranging in age from 4 years 6 months to 5 years 3 months and is marked by a total lack of appreciation of conservation of quantity. It is at this stage that we can deceive our child by breaking up one chocolate bar into several different pieces to satisfy his demand for "more than one." Stage II is marked by some ambivalence in the child's reactions. He might recognize conservation of quantity through one or even two transformations, but beyond that, cannot keep a mental grasp on it. The age range which Piaget suggests for this stage is from 6 years 2 months to 6 years 9 months. If one gives that a little thought, it is really quite horrifying that (in British schools at any rate) children of that age have already been forced through a rote memorization of all 12 times tables, inches-feet-yards, square measure and pounds-shillings-pence. What earthly relevance can it possibly have! Small wonder that so few people have any realization at all that mathematics is an intellectual, reasoning process. Some years ago, when I was teaching in a reform school in Canada, I was puzzled by one 12 year old's responses on an arithmetic diagnostic test. When asked (orally) which was larger, four or five, he answered correctly. But when the question was written, he answered incorrectly. When I asked him about this discrepancy, he answered rather slowly, "Mais le mot quatre se semble plus grand que le mot cinq!". It suddenly struck me then, and has been striking me ever since, that most children regard mathematics as a mysterious bag of black magic



anyway, so that an irrational response is perfectly reasonable. Stage III, according to Piaget, is not reached (by his Swiss middle-class group, anyway) until about the age of seven years. This level is marked by the child being able to *say* something to the effect that no matter how a fluid (or a set of beads) is separated, it remains the same when put back together again.

I think all of us in the academic community would say that we love children (at *least* our own children!), but how little we really know. Piaget, whether the details of his theoretical constructs are right or wrong, places children in quite a new light. They become more worthy of compassionate observation in their own right and less to be regarded as "tabulae rassae" on which we must scratch our adult world ideographs. The first impression that one sometimes gets on reading Piaget is that children couldn't possibly be so stupid (!), but gradually the immensely humbling thought dawns that the human mind, starting from so little can in a few years, coherently organize such a vast body of experience. Looked at in that light, many of our cherished educational procedures (both at home and in school) are nothing short of mental assault and de-humanizing in their effects.

Having said that, let me register some doubt about his constructs themselves. His system immediately strikes us as eminently logical. It fits in with our idea of linear progress (paging Marshall McLuhan!) and so forcible is our belief in this, that we may fail to recognize a different and less orderly pattern of concept formation, of which Piaget's "straight line" may only be a part.

This was brought home to me dramatically in keeping a written record of my own son's "progress" from babyhood. I kept a daily journal of my boy's movements, coos, first words, food likes and dislikes, use of words, frustration reactions, etc. Needless to say, I was amazed when at 2 years and 4 months of age my little Ross had reached Stage III of the concept of conservation of quantity! Then, within a few weeks, it seemed to founder and fade. By the time he was 3 years old, he was back to Stage I in his concept of conservation. At 3 years 5 months, he bounced back to Stage III again, staying there for but ten days, before sliding back to Stage I! Most perplexing. From the age of 4 years until he was 6 years and 8 months of age, (at which point his behaviour patterns became too complex to record) he followed through Piaget's stages beautifully.

Now what I would suggest to account for this sort of thing would be a rather more involved model than the one which Piaget offers. Consider the



following hypothesis. The child, impinged upon from infancy by a variety of stimuli, learns to associate certain stimuli with his own actions (e.g. Crying produces a face peering down at him, a pick-up or some other gratifying sensation). That is, the baby gradually "meshes in" to the active environment and develops the ability to manipulate certain aspects of it. In this way, he can create a set of mental responses to "events" in his environment. This stage might correspond with Piaget's Primary Circular Reactions, but maybe the child (and indeed, the adult) never advances in a linear fashion *away* from these reactions. Instead, his experience chart might well be represented as a spiral. He keeps recording the same stimuli, but gradually increases his bank of responses to them.

Thus, at a comparatively early stage, when the data-processing system of his mind has relatively little to deal with, he can arrive at a total mental picture of a concept like conservation of quantity. Gradually, each "experience" of conservation becomes associated with more and more stimuli not there the first time, eventually so many such extraneous stimuli accrue that his first mental construct of the phenomenon can no longer "account for" them all. At that point, his old construct of conservation dissolves and it, plus the new batch of stimuli that it couldn't accommodate, passes into the data-processing unit again, which designs a new mental construct of conservation that does everything that the old model did plus rendering coherent (as a single or "unit" experience) the new associated stimuli. This might continue to happen in a fairly rapid succession, until at about 5 or 6 years of age, a stable construct has evolved which only grows slowly in response to highly sophisticated intellectual experiences throughout the balance of the person's lifetime.

Of course, we have all experienced this sort of thing (on the motor response level) at an age at which we can recall the rather unpleasant mental confusion attendant upon each dissolution of the old program and the establishment of a new one. If the reader cannot vividly recall any such experience, it might be efficacious for him to tackle something he has never done before, like learning to play the piano or balance on a tight-rope, anything at all that involves a new set of motor responses that have to be refined or added to before the task can be completed. Watch children learning to swim without formal instruction. Most children first learn to splash along with the head and neck erect, like a horse. Eventually, this set of motor responses becomes sufficiently smoothly programmed that the child can try to relieve the crick in his neck by alternately raising and lowering his head. However, this manoeuvre requires a rather novel set of responses for breathing, a process until then not associated with the "swimming construct." It is at this stage



that we often observe a child experience a sense of total confusion. All of the previously programmed motor responses melt away in a flurry of unco-ordinated arm and leg movements and massive gurgling gulps of water! However, out of this apparent retrogression emerges all of the old motor control plus a new sophisticated head movement (!) - provided that our struggling neophyte has not drowned himself first.

Let us return to my hypothesis for a moment and try to imagine what might be taking place physiologically. Mediating the first mental construct that the child has of a particular concept (say conservation) are a set of neurone patterns in his motor cortex. As a bank of a new stimuli become associated with this particular "patch of brain tissue," the signals which trigger it become too general so that it no longer can elicit a single response the same way each time. Eventually, the necessary "relay" adjustments are established through the emergence of a pattern of experiences. Then, this greater variety of stimuli also become uniquely defined by a network of neurones, and so forth.

For instance, can you complete the series beginning:

2, 5, . . . ?

Why, of course:

2, 5, 8, 11, . . . would do nicely

Now, let us add a new experience (another number). 2, 5, 11, . . .  
Bingo, no dice! So we reconstruct. What about:

2, 5, 11, 20, 32, . . . ?

But then again, it could just as easily be:

2, 5, 11, 23, 47, . . .

That is, the more experiences we have associated with a given concept (the more numbers we are given with respect to the particular sequence), the more subtle our model has to become.

If children do, in fact, develop their intellectual concepts by this spiral process (so that a child who has just learned to tie his shoe laces, stops associating the number symbolized by the numeral "2" with the set of feet



on a pigeon, until he can develop a model that can accommodate both experiences simultaneously), where does Piaget fit in? I would tentatively suggest that, were my hypothesis investigated to any rigorous degree, Piaget's "stages" would represent inflection points on my spiral model. Again, if that is true, we would have to develop a radically new method of formal instruction (for all ages of student). The possibilities for speculation are immense and illustrate a point which I find myself continually making in discussions with my colleagues across the academic spectrum. Piaget is provocative, and if read closely should cause any teacher at any level to face his students with a new sense of discovery, excitement, and humility. Teaching one's *subject* (e.g. mathematics) can sometimes become dull indeed, but teaching *people* is the liveliest experiment one can hope to embark upon.

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Alston, Patrick L., EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN TSARIST RUSSIA.  
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. ix, 322 pages, \$8.50.

Social scientists have recently been turning an increasing amount of attention to the impact of modernity on emerging societies. The concept and process of modernization has become the focal point of an increasing number of books on Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Accompanying this has been an interest in those nations which have "arrived" and thereby present models of modernization. One such model is Russia. Long a student and borrower of European Enlightenment, Russia wrestled with the impact of the West on her state and society for over two centuries. In perhaps no other continental country was the debate over the consequences of modernization so heated and so prolonged. At the center of the debate stood the question of the nature of the education most appropriate for a modernizing, multi-national, autocratic empire. In his first venture into print Professor Alston provides a penetrating analysis of Russian educational developments in the centuries of her struggle with modernization, the centuries stretching from Peter the Great to the Great War of 1914.

Beginning with Peter I Russia set out on the arduous journey of



creating a state system of general education. Two factors made this trek not only arduous but imperative: Russia's backwardness and external pressure. Russia had to modernize (or westernize as Peter viewed it) if she were to survive. Though the response to this challenge took a largely institutional-structural turn (a reformed army, a streamlined governmental apparatus), it pivoted around education. To make any of these structural changes workable there had to be a ready supply of trained intelligence and so, in its quest for modernity, the tsarist regime had to devise a sound educational system.

While recognizing the need for such an educational system, the autocracy was at the same time wary of the impact of education of Russian society. Would not education only feed society's insatiable appetite for public life? Would it not lead to a serious questioning of certain autocratic policies and hence pose a threat to the sponsoring regime? And yet was it not also clear that ignorance lost wars? How long could political independence be maintained when the country was so culturally dependent on better educated neighbors? Faced with these counter-vailing tendencies, the rulers of Russia decided to create a centralized educational system that would not only supply the needed trained personnel, but would also serve as an instrument for controlling social development. In short education was to be a device to guide social change; it was education against revolution.

In the long journey from Peter's ventures in vocational education to the creation of a "comprehensive political mechanism for guiding the social transformation of a multi-national, serf-ridden empire," Russian state education, points out Alston, developed in three discernable stages. In the first stage, which he calls "The State's Initiative, 1700-1875," the maker of educational policy was the state, personified by the tsar. Confronted with gentry opposition and popular apathy the Romanovs, in the tradition of enlightened despotism, sponsored new directions in schooling. One of the most serious consequences of aristocratic obduracy was that the state was forced to admit socially inferior elements into the schools so as to meet its need for trained intelligence. In the long run this probably undermined the autocracy (since the schools were the breeding ground of revolution), but it also may have "strengthened Russian society in a unique way for the unforeseen historical future."

Towards the end of this first stage Russia experienced most directly the challenge of modernization—she went down to defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Western powers in the Crimean peninsula. The Crimean debacle led to the inauguration of the Era of the Great Reforms,



but it also ushered in student riots and calls for revolution. This sudden appearance of student nihilism focused the spotlight on that which was supposed to prevent such occurrences--the educational system. In response to this challenge from below the state and its new Minister of Education, Dmitry Tolstoy, devised "its most ambitious attempt at institutionalized management of social change--the Tolstoy system."

The creation of this system, states the author, marked the transition from tsarist to bureaucratic initiative and from concern with the universities to concern with the secondary schools, the barometers of society. Increased domestic turmoil, however, led to attacks on Tolstoy's methods. In this "Crisis of Monolithic Control," Alston's second stage, the assassination of the tsar in 1881 quieted Tolstoy's critics and increased the bureaucratic hold on the educational ladder. In a further attempt to curb revolution the state moved to deflate educational opportunity by closing the doors of higher education to undesirable social elements. This famous "Cook's Circular" would haunt the old regime to its grave.

The Revolution of 1905 ended the second stage. Forced by war and revolution to take a closer look at itself, the autocracy loosened its hold on social change. In this period Russia made great strides not only economically (as scholars like Alexander Gerschenkron have pointed out), but also towards public enlightenment. Alston argues that "in general education tsardom was working hard, productively and intelligently at the moment when military disaster retired it from history."

In his conclusion Alston maintains that the history of Russian education is of more than antiquarian interest. Both the hated Tolstoy system and the Cook's Circular anticipate what later becomes somewhat universal policy. Today countries deflate educational opportunity more subtly (they raise standards and tuition) whereas the Romanovs were less subtle and thereby less successful. Likewise the use of a centralized educational system to control social change, the heart of the Tolstoy system, "has become routine global procedure behind the universal rhetoric of equal opportunity." Pushing further Alston argues that other universal themes are present:

The weight of an undigested past, the clamor for more educational opportunity amidst resistance to higher academic standards, the hazards of exposing the younger generation to ideas the adult world is not about to realize, the strains inherent in whetting the appetite



for spontaneity and self-expression in an environment demanding increasingly higher levels of social conformity and self-control . . . all these and related questions that occupied . . . servants of the tsar a century ago have become pressing contemporary concerns, as schooling becomes less and less a matter of primarily local and parental concern and more and more what it was for the tsarist state: a national issue with international imperatives.

In this masterfully written and researched book, Alston has made a major contribution not only to Russian institutional history (a much neglected field), but to the history of education as well.

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*Mr. MacIntyre's essay appears by invitation of the editors.*

da Cunha, Euclides. *Rebellion In The Backlands (Os Sertoes)*, trans. Samuel Putnam. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1944.

As our author warns, the relative obscurity of the events described intensifies their terrifying tragedy. Ostensibly an account of the Canudos Campaign, *Os Sertoes*, begins with the life of one Antonio Vicente Mendes Maciel, and the land of his death, the scrub-forests of Baia, in northeastern Brazil. Portrayed here is a dual martyrdom.

First and always there is the earth itself. Through da Cunha we envisage a land of extremes: the climate is polarized between intense heat, aridity, drought, and torrential rainfall. The ground is now barren, now inundated. But it is a land which supports life. And it is a life which is never quite forced to die, and is always sustained by an incredible strength and vitality. These *caatingas* are the home of the indomitable *sertanejo* and his herds of cattle, the foundation of his primitive and supernatural religious taboos, and the master of his resigned existence.

And in the 1880's the *caatingas* welcomed Maciel. In the eyes of



da Cunha he was of questionable mental stability. What is known for certain, however, is the effect of the mysticism and simple life style natural to this ascetic. With a gaze that few could meet this man soon attracted many *sertanejos* as disciples. In 1893 Antonio Conselheiro (the Counselor), as he was now called, came to Canudos with his people. Year by year the community grew--from a church in disrepair and one lone ranch, to more than five thousand mud and reed shacks, housing a family of believers: young, aged, hearty, infirm, men of faith, and men of barbarous crime.

A setting well fortified by Nature and Art, Canudos is the stage of a vast natural amphitheatre. Bounded on three sides by the Rio Vasa Barris, the remainder of the perimeter is a nearly impassable ridge of granite monoliths. The collection of shacks, thrown up in haste and without planning, resembled a labyrinth huddled about the newly constructed cathedral. This latter edifice was more in the nature of a fortress, its walls of massive stone attending two towers that commanded a view of the adjacent countryside.

In spite of the unshakeable faith which united the people of Canudos (or, perhaps, because of it), they neither knew peace nor sought it. In fact, it was their search for adventure which first brought them to the attention of the authorities. Members of this tribe were accustomed to harrassing outlying settlements, and these latter called upon the governor of Baia to protect them from the Counselor's mob. Assistance was granted, and the first of three expeditionary forces was dispatched to quell a fictitious rebellion in October 1896.

The first two armies approached Canudos in ignorance of the terrain and the courage of the inhabitants. Without adequate lines of supply penetrating this desert, the soldiers were easily routed by the guerilla tactics of the *sertanejos* where they did not succumb to the wilderness itself. Catastrophe. The Brazilians on the coast had great difficulty comprehending this slaughter at the hands of a backland rabble who were not even considered fellow countrymen. Conselheiro was denounced as a monarchist traitor, and the authorities resolved to have an end of him.

This was accomplished by the third official expedition. After intense cannonading for three months the besieged city was reduced to a pile of rubble, burning homes, and broken bodies; but it was defeated only after a vicious and prolonged hand-to-hand combat, in which each hut was



transformed into a temporary location of defense. The defenders' will and strength, all but exhausted by thirst and the loss of brothers, nonetheless resisted the assault without surrendering. Then, on October 5, 1897, the last four defenders of Canudos were killed in the arbor beneath the crumbled towers of the cathedral, falling into a grave they had prepared for themselves.

The following day the "sole prize, the only spoils of war this conflict had to offer, was carefully retrieved. The exhumed body of Antonio Conselheiro (he had died a week before) was decapitated, and the prize. . . . taken to the seaboard, where it was greeted by delirious multitudes with carnival joy. Let science here have the last word. Standing out in bold relief from all the circumvolutions were the essential outlines of crime and madness."

In *Os Sertoes* the reader confronts a fierce language, where events and characters are imbued with a plasticity and realism so essential for a forceful rendering of historical subjects. And, if the truth be told, it was a difficult tale to tell. An uneven, insane story--one to be taken literally. And da Cunha's style--literary as well as scholarly--is anything but even or sane. His pen painlessly sketches the geologic and climatic panorama of the backlands. We have lucid characterizations of the heroic and unheroic alike; poignant vignettes of the *sertanejo's* habits and habitat. But these are interrupted by carelessly worded lists of battalion personnel, or the depressing repetition of irrelevant trivia. Moreover, one cannot overlook the frequent passages reflecting da Cunha's morbid preoccupation with the Brazilian racial-national problem, couched in the terms of an obsolete positivistic anthropology. Yet these all remain, their very inclusion amplifying the tragedy he so desperately sought to express: that rebellion is not greeted with brotherhood.

*Os Sertoes* is a grand epic created by accident. And this, one might say, is its genius, its genuine Brazilian character.

William Wachter  
(Class of 1968)

Berkhofer, Robert F. Jr., *A Behavioral Approach To Historical Analysis*, The Free Press, New York, 1969. 339 pages. \$7.95.

The historian has been variously defined as an imaginative artist, who will evoke an almost palpable reality out of the past with the aid of the muse



Clio, as the guardian and creator of a national spirit, or, in the least common view until recent times, as an objective social scientist. In America the field was given over to amateurs until the end of the nineteenth century when the study of the past led to a sense on the part of its practitioners of a discipline with definite and bounded research aims and a professional status. Within the last ten years or so the theory of history and the theoretical structures of the discipline have engaged the attention of philosophers, sociologists and particularly economists, to such an extent that historians themselves have felt compelled to look into these matters. Like Lister and Pasteur who had to cudgel the philistines into a recognition of the existence of invisible microbes, and not like Reich who fought similar prejudice on behalf of his spurious bions, we would hope that the "scientific" theorists of historiography now assail the chronicles and narratives of the moon spinners who tell all and explain nothing.

As his title implies, Professor Berkhofer is in the van of those who would have the historian become more scientific in some sense of that word. Indeed, Berkhofer can barely conceal his contempt for some of the fantasies, non sequiturs, and contradictory accounts which have been enshrined between the covers of a book under the name of history. Still, conceal it he must if his exhortations are to be received with constructive equanimity. With the judicious use of an editorial we, here and there, and periodic appeals to the comraderie and cooperative spirit of the "craft" or "guild," terms he favors in place of his more usual "researcher" or "analyst" whenever the pill is a particularly bitter one, Berkhofer seeks to neutralize the indignant opposition of those he so serenely reveals in all their fatuity. The battle, of course, is almost won, for many of the recent Ph.D.'s and current graduate students in the "big" schools are committed to an empiricism and logical positivism which have become *de rigueur* among those who evade the moral snares of the SDS, the YAF, the Newman Club, the Wesley Foundation, and the Fraternities.

For those who wish the study of history to evolve mathematical models and proofs of the sort current in the physical sciences, Berkhofer's message is not one of hope. The very nature of the subject matter precludes the possibility, he argues. The historian should strive to create holistic syntheses on the descriptive and interpretive levels, and engage in explanations of human behavior, on the analytic level, which are consistent with the latest social theory, that is, general theoretical propositions about human behavior developed by psychologists, sociologists and social scientists generally. The complete success of these endeavors, in Berkhofer's view, which he defines as the statistical and mathematical rigor exhibited by the physical sciences, is unattainable because



of our inability to perceive historical time holistically and because of the nature of social action, which studied dynamically can prove to be nonrepetitive and hence unamenable to theoretical generalization of the sort which yields covering laws.

It is in his analysis of historical time and the problem of holistic synthesis that Berkhofer is most subtle. Time for the historian can be either synchronic or diachronic. Synchronic time is the concept of time underlying the analysis of a linear series of events involving a single phenomenon, that bassoon part in an orchestral score, for example. Diachronic time is time as a "setting" for the analysis for a whole series of phenomenon at a given point in the time continuum, all the notes the orchestra plays on the third beat of measure 547 in an orchestral score, to pursue the analogy. "The historical analyst's aim should and must be the study of a topic in the past in both the overall simultaneity and the sequence of time if he would follow the traditional aims in regard to time held by his guild," Berkhofer enjoins, aiming at both the modern "analyst" and the traditional "guild" member. Yet he assures us, this is impossible, and constitutes an unresolved dilemma. At this point Berkhofer gives up too easily. The integration of diachronic and synchronic analysis does not seem so far out of reach as he would have us believe. A greater exploration of statistical and mathematic means for the study of the social system over time or the dynamic models of economists like Domar and Hicks suggest analogies in social sciences which may offer solutions to this "dilemma."

Less original, but of equal value, is Berkhofer's general discussion of the behavioral model of human activity and his advocacy of the "culture concept" in historical investigation. He is very persuasive in his demonstration of the manner in which the careful discrimination of points of view on a principle of cultural relativity can obviate certain fundamental misinterpretations. Berkhofer deserves close study as well on the subject of systems analysis as a means of depicting historical wholes. He gives succinct expositions of the various models which have emanated from the Harvard Department of Social Relations where Talcott Parsons, the late Clyde Kluckhohn, and the late Edward C. Tolman began their influential exploration of the theoretical foundations for social science. Although Berkhofer may be charged with oversimplification in his discussion of these matters, it is likely that his work will have the good effect of persuading at least the younger historians of the necessity for further study of the sources enumerated in his footnotes.

Finally, although everyone who has an interest in the historian's use of social science theory would ask for a different book, more directly addressed



to the problems of his own research, Berkhofer will have gained his point if he succeeds in making epicures of us all, who "use whatever logical forms of explanation apply to (our) purposes, whether causality, statistical generalization, functional, teleological, or genetic explanation, or any laws, theories, or concepts available." And yet, there will always be those with whom this sort of Epicureanism does not agree.

David N. Lyon  
American Civilization

Black, C. E. *The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History.* New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967. 206 pages. \$1.60.

The general reader will find this book stimulating; the historian, provocative. C. E. Black, a specialist in modern Slavic history, sets out to jar the complacency of his colleagues with a new theory of development which links the past and the present with the future. His engaging rationale for writing this short volume reads: "I have written this book to explain things to myself. I hope that others find it interesting." Whereas the traditional historian concerns himself primarily with the explanation of unique events of the past, Black attempts to blend the method of the historian and social scientist into a hybrid instrument which will help to elucidate human and institutional phenomena of the past and the present. He proceeds to offer both a modernization theory and a suggestive scheme of comparative history.

What Black calls modernization has for quite some time been known to historians as "Westernization," "Europeanization," or "industrialization." However, he finds fault with all of these concepts; they are too narrow and too restricted to Western experience to encompass the dynamic forces of the "process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution." Such a definition of modernization sees the the process of historical change as an infinite continuum which extends from the past, through the present, and into the future. It speaks to the experience of all societies in the world, even though its origins and initial influence can be found in the societies of Western Europe. In giving the process of modernization multi-dimensional content, Black considers five aspects of human experience caught in the throes of social change--the intellectual, political, economic,



social and psychological. He is quite ready to admit that such divisions are arbitrary, and he would have indeed performed a major feat had he given nearly equal weight to these various aspects in his model of modernization. In general, Black singles out the intellectual dimension of human experience and activity--advance and dissemination of knowledge and its application in technology and social organization--as the major characteristic of his modernization paradigm, and combines this with the political order as the scope in which the application and transmission of advancing knowledge occurs.

Black finds the beginnings of Europe's transformation into modern societies in the Renaissance. The pace of social change was greatly quickened with the full impact of the scientific revolution and the coming of the Industrial Revolution. In analyzing the unfolding of the modernization process Black distinguishes four successive stages. The first consists of "the Challenge of Modernity," entailing the confrontation of a traditional society with modern ideas, institutions, and proponents of modernity. The second, "the Consolidation of Modernizing Leadership," brings modern leaders into positions of power and is a phase likely to last several generations but frequently accompanied by revolution and violence. The third, "Economic and Social Transformation," involves the change of a society that is largely agricultural in nature to one that is predominantly urban and industrial. Lastly, the fourth stage, "the Integration of Society," brings a major transformation of the basic social structure of society as a consequence of social and economic change. What is striking about this four-phase breakdown of the modernization process is that it does encompass other than intellectual and political criteria, which Black otherwise emphasizes as the major one, and moreover can be flexibly applied to the study of any society, whether Western in character or not. At the same time, there is of course the assumption that modernization does entail a certain degree of Westernization, i.e., through the adoption of science and technology traditional ideas and institutions undergo dramatic change and assume a Western imprint.

The second major theme of Black's book is a sophisticated outline of an approach to the comparative study of history. Everyone has heard of Spengler and Toynbee who in the guise of historians have presented us with interesting philosophical tomes which purport to give a comparative panorama of rising and falling civilizations. Black finds a great deal of merit in the use of comparison as a method of historical research. It, first of all, makes possible the organization and classification of complex materials and, secondly, serves as a way to come forth with explanations, which moreover can be concerned with change and the dynamics of the historical process, rather than



just a static quality. However, whereas philosophers of history have tended to select unmanageably large entities like civilizations as basic units of historical study, Black proposes a middle range level for which the "society" or "nation-state" becomes the unit of comparison.

In surveying the world in the past few hundred years Black establishes seven patterns of modernization, all of which are construed on the basis of political and constitutional criteria. Great Britain and France, forming the first pattern, were the first societies to modernize, undergoing a gradual social change spread over centuries within an organized state and administrative system with a defined territorial base. The second pattern was shaped by the overseas offshoots of Britain and France and included the U. S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which, leaving traditional social structures behind in the mother country, fostered a social structure that was unencumbered by fixed social stratification and amenable to change. The third pattern comprises those societies in which modernization came under the impact of the French Revolution and in which political fragmentation (Germany and Italy), colonial burdens (Spain and Portugal), and the aspirations and struggles of nationalities (Austro-Hungarian Empire and Eastern Europe) made social change painful and violent. The twenty-two independent countries of Latin America form a fourth pattern. In contrast to the overseas offshoots of Britain and France, these colonial offshoots of Latin European societies have experienced modernization not only, late but also under the impact of foreign influence, and thus show clear signs of retardation. The fifth pattern, including Russia, Japan, China, Iran, Turkey, Afganistan, Ethiopia, and Thailand, characterizes societies which experienced modernization without direct intervention from the outside, but after a territorial base had been established under traditional leadership, and where the adoption of Western technology was largely deemed to protect existing society against foreign pressure. The sixth and seventh patterns consist of the more than one hundred independent and dependent societies of Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania which lived through a period of colonial rule. But whereas the societies of Southern Asia and the Middle East were sufficiently developed to adapt to modern functions once contact with advanced societies was established, the societies of sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, constituting the seventh pattern, have had to borrow ideas and institutions relatively unchanged from more advanced cultures.

What then is the contribution of this short volume, written in unassuming English and mustering ideas and observations which often strike the informed reader as familiar? It presents us with a theoretical framework within which we can order the countries and societies which we have often heard about and



which we encounter in newspapers every day. It helps us understand the forces which underlie domestic and international unrest, revolution, and social transformation. The author moves away from the parochial ideological orientation which sees the modern world largely in terms of the struggle between liberal democracy and communism, and focuses on the factors that operate regardless of ideological value orientation. Without going to the extreme of a Toynbee whose comparative approach to the study of past and present civilizations has trapped him in a rigid deterministic scheme, Black alerts us to the merits of the comparative historical method by demonstrating that a study of similarities and differences, uniformities and divergencies, can indeed go beyond the preoccupation of the traditional historian with the uniqueness of historical events and suggest the *possibility* of predictable patterns of behavior. Lastly, by viewing modernization as a continuum Black also anticipates some of the pressing problems which beset our contemporary world and call for rational decision making. It is the problem of international integration on which international peace ultimately hinges that will continue to tax the human ingenuity and material resources of advanced nations. Their task will be made arduous, risky, if not problematic, by the less developed societies which are undergoing social and economic transformation and the many more which, as Adlai Stevenson once remarked, are being dragged kicking and screaming into the twentieth century.

George Blum  
History

Gilkey, Langdon. *Shantung Compound: The Story of Men and Women under Pressure*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 242 pages. \$4.95.

In March 1943 Langdon Gilkey, who had gone to Peking to teach English and philosophy fresh from college three years before, was rounded up with some two thousand other Western nationals living in north China and interned by the Japanese for the duration of the war. They were quartered in a former Presbyterian mission compound about the size of a small city block, given sufficient, though minimal, food supplies, and left largely to their own devices to organize camp life. Gilkey's book is not an account of Japanese maltreatment, nor of the horrors of concentration camp life depicted by Victor Frankl, Bruno Bettelheim, or Helmut Gollwitzer. "In our internment camp we were secure and comfortable enough to accomplish in large part the creation and maintenance of a small civilization; but our life was sufficiently close to the



margin of survival to reveal the vast difficulties of the task." Life was reduced to its bare essentials, providing a "laboratory" situation in which the anatomy of man's common social and moral problems could be probed.

The story is gripping, colorful, occasionally humorous. Dutch and Belgian monks and nuns, American Protestant missionaries of different denominations and sects, Colonial businessmen, British merchants, secretaries, ex-seamen, and assorted shady characters were crowded in together, often sharing the same rooms, struggling to maintain the few feet of space assigned to them. Business leaders of overseas firms whose life hitherto had been confined to the office, the mansion, and the club in China's treaty-ports had to learn how to become bakers, stokers, kitchen aides, masons. Gilkey records the human ingenuity of people to make life bearable for themselves under circumstances for which they were wholly unprepared, but also man's basic self-centeredness when the masks of ordinary conventions are torn away.

An incident particularly highlighted this. Toward the end of their stay, the American Red Cross delivered 1400 food parcel to the camp, without including any consignment. Previously the 200 Americans had received one food parcel apiece once before, which had been widely shared with the others. After deliberation, this time the Japanese commandant decreed that everyone in camp (then 1300) should receive one parcel each, with the Americans receiving one and a half. On the day of distribution, however, a notice was posted that seven Americans had protested this decision, arguing that the parcels were American property and belonged to the American internees exclusively, so the commandant withheld distribution until he could consult with Tokyo. Several Americans, deeply shocked by this selfishness, sought to hold a plebiscite among the Americans to show that this protest did not express the will of the community as a whole, but found they had to call it off when an informal canvass indicated that such a proposal would be roundly defeated. What is most interesting are the elaborate rationalizations by which the Americans were able to deceive themselves into thinking that their selfishness was morally justified. One man declared there would be no moral virtue in merely accepting a general distribution, for his generosity could only be genuine if he were given all seven packages to share with others.

The most important feature of Gilkey's account is its dialectical interplay between concrete incident and theoretical reflection. A good many themes are broached: the nature of technological progress, humanistic and Christian estimates of man, the contrasting roles of force and moral persuasion in government, the limitations upon reason in moral decisions, the strengths



and weaknesses of religious commitment, the conflict between justice and power, the necessity and weaknesses of a socialist economy. All these social, political, economic, moral and religious issues were being hammered out in this embryonic community within the confines of Shantung Compound. Gilkey's insights have been more elaborately presented by himself and others many times elsewhere, but here they receive a compactness and above all an authenticity growing out of clearly defined specific events that makes very rewarding reading.

Lewis S. Ford  
Philosophy and Religion

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

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